Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their
parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA;

ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA;

CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents
ENRICO and NIDA FLORES;

GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN;

GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and
MYRA MISA;

BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN;

JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO;

MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO;

JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO;

CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA;

MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors,
represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ;

KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by
their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING;

DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA;

JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA
ABAYA;

MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
LINA CARDAMA;

CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents
RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA;

PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents
JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT;
BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their
parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."

Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation
or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners ,
are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.

The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."

The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are
"so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirt y
million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species
of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable.

They are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time
immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area
should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as :
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks
and streams;

(b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which ma y
be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite;

(c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil erode d
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes;

(d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna;

(e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures;

(f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity;

(g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country;

(h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers;

(i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests;

(j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power; and

(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in th e course
of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely
2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour —
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources
after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued
trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are
already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands
will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors
— who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he
holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and
devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the
State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos; and

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being.
(P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient
use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
 21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative
of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him , and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.

In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakabl e
cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's
abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not
only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the
latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners
filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section
4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the
same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered
protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right viola ted
by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and
nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the
state in its capacity as parens patriae."

Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question
of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action
to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During
its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing,
to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the
TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, we must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a
class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, we hereby
rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest n ot
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court.

We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerne d.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature."

Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilizati on be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, we shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, we do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions , it (sic) fell short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).

Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions
based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to
the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
 agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assum ptions and conclusions
based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.

Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill heal th
consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions.

As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation
to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution —
air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it
the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided
for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country' s forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of
the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to
ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos ."

Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, of f-shore
areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the
use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well.
It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.

Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bas es for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid speci al
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued.

The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which
man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that
is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16
As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's
duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of
1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abus e of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself.
No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth
thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted.

The only issue to be resolved in such a case is – admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that
the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified.

If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After careful examination of the
petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific
averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation
of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.

It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as part y
defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination
by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation.

It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or
review.

The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member
of this Court, says:
 The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of
the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid
for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the
meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract acc ording
to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still
not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, we are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the
first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause.

If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly
respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public
interest and welfare.

He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or
a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court
held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither
is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).
 Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And
it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and
do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein.

They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry,
G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even
an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non -impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked.

Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such
as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.

In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, m oral,
safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract
is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference.
But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may
at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

31
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer
to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for,
save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal,
the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas
corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet,
after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular
government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a
government, were constituted.

The primary question is — shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up
in the Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for other
departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all
reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number
of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their
houses in the district by the police.

Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the
women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October
25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo
Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steam ers
that awaited their arrival.

The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were
being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao.
They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent
to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor
and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the
night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by
Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and
the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who
had been expelled from the city of Manila.

The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill -treatment are of public interest,
but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, oth ers
assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life
unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for
the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member
of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women
who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered
as including them.

The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained
of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by
certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents,
Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not
be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of
First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under
their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According
to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on
the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales.

In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of
Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao,
and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived
of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.

Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for
petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named
in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the
respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts,
were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court.

The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the
original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer
thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and
offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to
Manila.

Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women
had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or
signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control
and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate.

The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents
had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore
directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and
Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first
instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some oth er
legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in
contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.

Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen,
and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the
clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically
presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been
brought to Manila by the respondents.
 Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of
the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives
and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in
Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn
statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-
six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda.

The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo,
an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of
Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to
respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.

In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We
will now proceed to do so.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and
then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forc ibly
hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the
constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and
stealthy acts.

Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief
of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine
Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find — Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity
with an Act of congress.

The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the
Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and
punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen
of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes
providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes.

Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in
the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation,
which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but
Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality.

On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or
regulation, compels any person to change his residence.

In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rig hts
of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in
jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power
than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express.

Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and
the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen
so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same
privilege.

If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can exerci se
the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and
under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any
citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized
of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon
him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny
or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.)

No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty
and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the Unit ed
States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its
functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon
the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.)

"The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold
his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seem s to
be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],
118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the
very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of
laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action;
(2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest
with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such
situation as that now before us.

As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines
who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by
virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not
more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the
Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro
and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and
fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has
violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they
have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof
can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings.

To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law
if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement
was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow
process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal
purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this
instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a
assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was final ly
suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits an d
that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees.
The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas
corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec.
78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.)

The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas
corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,
though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have
been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and
inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this
is not a hard and fast rule.

The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine
Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable
before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the
particular circumstances.

In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means
by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys,
and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in
different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was
shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted
to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the
parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the
jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position.
On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas
corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve
a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in
a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned.

Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going
when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were
returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any muni cipality in the
Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and
then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was und er no
restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his pow er to
obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the
party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no
reason why the writ should not issue.

If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to
Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents,
within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her
domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it
may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts
are however very persuasive in nature.

A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas
corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor
child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the
Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and
Christiancy, justices.

On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ
should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred
Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on
his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view,
only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:

I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition w hich
was laid before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended
upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke
could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no
sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas
corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty,
which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here.

If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I
cannot doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the
state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case
in England that the court of King's Bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute.
Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .

The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and
served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The
officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him
by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and
if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is
the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which
are usual.
 The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so
that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not
increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The
important question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of
Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa,
193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the
respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her
husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce
the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him
to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ.

He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:

A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant
to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt
of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained.

That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be
shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted
with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the
child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he
does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse.

Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose
of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to
what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the
writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands.

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before
the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to
the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they
were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then
beyond his control and out of his custody.

The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the Negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ
of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes,
and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall
until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law.

The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the Negroes, for one of the Negroes had
run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two Negroes on the last day of the term. We find,
therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar
to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the
writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present
the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The
respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the
Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao.
According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao
women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The
half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the
bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits
to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.)

They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of
performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few
stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since
been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the
women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao,
and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents
guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non -production of
the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate
with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled.

For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought
that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences ; and we said that he
was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he
must advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in
the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse."

In other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That
the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the
spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another
chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a
better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined
in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided.

While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the
record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compli ance
with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally
closed.

If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is
still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connecti on
remains to be done.

The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the
city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto
Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of
justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does
not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must
order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas
corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court.

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of
the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its
authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under
the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance.

The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic
communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal
representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from
the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted.

When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful
deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the
constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government,
had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city
of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ
of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for
disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as
P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some
members of the court are inclined to this stern view.

It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court,
he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the
two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court
tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only
as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an
amount is P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in
contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred
pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los
Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents.

So ordered.

In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve
to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.

Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.

Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 147036-37 April 10, 2012

Petitioner-Organizations, namely: PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT

MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), COCONUT INDUSTRY REFORM MOVEMENT (COIR), BUKLOD NG
MALAYANG MAGBUBUKID, PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA (PAKISAMA), CENTER
FOR AGRARIAN REFORM, EMPOWERMENT AND TRANSFORMATION (CARET), PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG
MGA SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN (PKSK); Petitioner-Legislator: REPRESENTATIVE LORETA ANN ROSALES; and
Petitioner-Individuals, namely: VIRGILIO V. DAVID, JOSE MARIE FAUSTINO, JOSE CONCEPCION, ROMEO
ROYANDOYAN, JOSE V. ROMERO, JR., ATTY. CAMILO L. SABIO, and ATTY. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Petitioners,

vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS
FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), and UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB), Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 147811

TEODORO J. AMOR, representing the Peasant Alliance of Samar and Leyte (PASALEY), DOMINGO C. ENCALLADO,
representing Aniban ng Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan (AMMANI), and VIDAL M. PILIIN, representing the
Laguna Coalition, Petitioners,

vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS
FEDERATION, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain presidential decrees and executive orders of th e martial
law era relating to the raising and use of coco-levy funds.

The Facts and the Case

On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 6260 1 that established a Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for
the development of the coconut industry through capital financing. 2 Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer the
Fund through the Coconut Investment Company (CIC)3 whose objective was, among others, to advance the coconut
farmers’ interests. For this purpose, the law imposed a levy of ₱0.55 on the coconut farmer’s first domestic sale of every
100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock. 4

About a year following his proclamation of martial law in the country or on August 20, 1973 President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) 276, 5 which established a Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCS Fund), to address
the crisis at that time in the domestic market for coconut-based consumer goods. The CCS Fund was to be built up through
the imposition of a ₱15.00-levy for every first sale of 100 kilograms of copra resecada. 6 The levy was to cease after a year
or earlier provided the crisis was over. Any remaining balance of the Fund was to revert to the CI Fund established under
R.A. 6260.7

A year later or on November 14, 1974 President Marcos issued P.D. 582,8 creating a permanent fund called the Coconut
Industry Development Fund (CID Fund) to channel for the ultimate direct benefit of coconut farmers part of the levies that
they were already paying. The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was to provide ₱100 million as initial capital of the CID
Fund and, thereafter, give the Fund at least ₱0.20 per kilogram of copra resecada out of the PCA’s collection of cocon ut
consumers stabilization levy.

In case of the lifting of this levy, the PCA was then to impose a permanent levy of ₱0.20 on the first sale of every kilogram
of copra to form part of the CID Fund. 9 Also, under P.D. 582, the Philippine National Bank (PNB), then owned by the
Government, was to receive on deposit, administer, and use the CID Fund. 10 P.D. 582 authorized the PNB to invest the
unused portion of the CID Fund in easily convertible investments, the earnings of which were to form part of the Fund. 11

In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 12 which approved the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of the
coconut farmers to enable such bank to promptly and efficiently realize the industry’s credit policy. 13 Thus, the PCA bought
72.2% of the shares of stock of First United Bank, headed by Pedro Cojuangco.14 Due to changes in its corporate identity
and purpose, the bank’s articles of incorporation were amended in July 1975, resulting in a change in the bank’s name from
First United Bank to United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). 15

On July 14, 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961,16 the Coconut Industry Code, which consolidated and codified existing
laws relating to the coconut industry. The Code provided that surpluses from the CCS Fund and the CID Fund collections,
not used for replanting and other authorized purposes, were to be invested by acquiring shares of stock of corporations,
including the San Miguel Corporation (SMC), engaged in undertakings related to the coconut and palm oil industries.17

UCPB was to make such investments and equitably distribute these for free to coconut farmers. 18 These investments
constituted the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF). P.D. 961 also provided that the coconut levy funds (coco -levy
funds) shall be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities.19 This was reiterated in the PD 1468 20 amendment
of June 11, 1978.

In 1980, President Marcos issued P.D. 1699, 21 suspending the collections of the CCS Fund and the CID Fund. But in 1981
he issued P.D. 184122 which revived the collection of coconut levies. P.D. 1841 renamed the CCS Fund into the Coconut
Industry Stabilization Fund (CIS Fund). 23 This Fund was to be earmarked proportionately among several development
programs, such as coconut hybrid replanting program, insurance coverage for the coconut farmers, and scholarship
program for their children.24

In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312, 25 establishing a Sagip Niyugan
Program which sought to provide immediate income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a
sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products.26 The Executive Order sought to establish a
₱1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy funds or assets of entities supported by those funds.27 A
committee was created to manage the fund under this program. 28 A majority vote of its members could engage the services
of a reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits. 29

At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, 30 which created an irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut
Trust Fund (the Trust Fund). This aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut industry, and to
other agri-related programs.31 The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Fund’s initial capital.32

These shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC.
E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust Fund’s trustee bank. The Trust Fund Committee
would administer, manage, and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund. 33 The Committee would designate an external
auditor to do an annual audit or as often as needed but it may also request the Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene. 34
To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission on Good Government, the Office of the Solicitor
General, and other government agencies to exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033, entitled Republic of
the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al., which was then pending before the Sandiganbayan and to lift the
sequestration over those shares. 35

On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the suspension of E.O.s 312 and
313.36 This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R.
147036-37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional. On April 24, 2001
the other sets of petitioner organizations and individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article
III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional.

The Issues Presented

The parties submit the following issues for adjudication:

Procedurally –

1. Whether or not petitioners’ special civil actions of certiorari under Rule 65 constituted the proper remedy for their
actions; and
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to bring the same to court.

On the substance –

3. Whether or not the coco-levy funds are public funds; and

4. Whether or not (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b) Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d)
E.O. 313 are unconstitutional.

The Rulings of the Court

First. UCPB questions the propriety of the present petitions for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 on the ground that
there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal or board or before a government official exercising judicial, quasi -judicial,
or ministerial functions.37 UCPB insists that the Court exercises appellate jurisdiction with respect to issues of
constitutionality or validity of laws and presidential orders. 38

But, as the Court previously held, where there are serious allegations that a law has infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but the duty of the Court to look into such allegations and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy of the
Constitution.39 Moreover, where the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, as in this case, the Court has
the discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure. 40

Second. The Court has to uphold petitioners’ right to institute these petitions. The petitioner organizations in these cases
represent coconut farmers on whom the burden of the coco-levies attaches. It is also primarily for their benefit that the levies
were imposed.

The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as taxpayers. The Court recognizes their right to restrain
officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. 41 This so-called taxpayer’s suit is
based on the theory that expenditure of public funds for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act is a misapplication
of such funds.42 Besides, the 1987 Constitution accords to the citizens a greater participation in the affairs of government.

Indeed, it provides for people's initiative, the right to information on matters of public concern (including the right to kn ow
the state of health of their President), as well as the right to file cases questioning the factual bases for the suspension of
the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. These provisions enlarge the people’s right in the political
as well as the judicial field. It grants them the right to interfere in the affairs of government and challenge any act tending to
prejudice their interest.
Third. For some time, different and conflicting notions had been formed as to the nature and ownership of the coco -levy
funds. The Court, however, finally put an end to the dispute when it categorically ruled in Republic of the Philippines v.
COCOFED43 that these funds are not only affected with public interest; they are, in fact, prima facie public funds. Prima
facie means a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary. 44

The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmental purpose.
They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its
farmers in general. The COA reviewed the use of the funds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) treated them as public
funds and the very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character. 45

The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public
purpose.46 Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty for the support of the government and for all its public needs. 47

Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276. The funds were collected and
managed by the PCA, an independent government corporation directly under the President. 48 And, as the respondent public
officials pointed out, the pertinent laws used the term levy, 49 which means to tax,50 in describing the exaction.

Of course, unlike ordinary revenue laws, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the government’s general
funds but to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut industry, which is so
affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the State. 51 The funds sought to support the coconut industry,
one of the main economic backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits for the coconut farmers and farm
workers. The subject laws are akin to the sugar liens imposed by Sec. 7(b) of P.D. 388, 52 and the oil price stabilization funds
under P.D. 1956,53 as amended by E.O. 137.54

Respondent UCPB suggests that the coco-levy funds are closely similar to the Social Security System (SSS) funds, which
have been declared to be not public funds but properties of the SSS members and held merely in trust by the
government.55 But the SSS Law 56 collects premium contributions. It does not collect taxes from members for a specific public
purpose. They pay contributions in exchange for insurance protection and benefits like loans, medical or health services,
and retirement packages. The benefits accrue to every SSS member, not to the public, in general. 57

Furthermore, SSS members do not lose ownership of their contributions. The government merely holds these in trust,
together with his employer’s contribution, to answer for his future benefits. 58 The coco-levy funds, on the other hand, belong
to the government and are subject to its administration and disposition. Thus, these funds, including its incomes, interests,
proceeds, or profits, as well as all its assets, properties, and shares of stocks procured with such funds must be treated,
used, administered, and managed as public funds. 59

Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,60 the Court held that the State
collected stabilization fees from sugar millers, planters, and producers for a special purpose: to finance the growth and
development of the sugar industry and all its components. The fees were levied for a special purpose and, therefore,
constituted special fund when collected. Its character as such fund was made clear by the fact that they were deposited in
the PNB (then a wholly owned government bank) and not in the Philippine Treasury.

In Osmeña v. Orbos,61 the Court held that the oil price stabilization fund was a special fund mainly because this was
segregated from the general fund and placed in what the law referred to as a trust account. Yet it remained subject to COA
scrutiny and review. The Court finds no substantial distinction between these funds and the coco-levy funds, except as to
the industry they each support.

Fourth. Petitioners in G.R. 147811 assert that Section 2 of P.D. 755 above is void and unconstitutional for disregarding the
public character of coco-levy funds. The subject section provides:

Section 2. Financial Assistance. x x x and since the operations, and activities of the Philippine Coconut Authority are all in
accord with the present social economic plans and programs of the Government, all collections and levies which the
Philippine Coconut Authority is authorized to levy and collect such as but not limited to the Coconut Consumers’ Stabilizatio n
Levy, and the Coconut Industry Development Fund as prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 582 shall not be considered
or construed, under any law or regulation, special and/or fiduciary funds and do not form part of the general funds of the
national government within the contemplation of Presidential Decree No. 711.

The Court has, however, already passed upon this question in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED)
v. Republic of the Philippines.62 It held as unconstitutional Section 2 of P.D. 755 for "effectively authorizing the PCA to utilize
portions of the CCS Fund to pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the
CCS Fund levies with UCPB interest free.

And as there also provided, the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like levies that PCA is authorized to collect shall be considered
as non-special or fiduciary funds to be transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be deemed
private funds."

Identical provisions of subsequent presidential decrees likewise declared coco-levy funds private properties of coconut
farmers. Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961 reads:

Section 5. Exemptions. The Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund as well
as all disbursements of said funds for the benefit of the coconut farmers as herein authorized shall not be construed or
interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the national
government within the contemplation of P.D. No. 711; nor as a subsidy, donation, levy, government funded investment, or
government share within the contemplation of P.D. 898, the intention being that said Fund and the dis bursements thereof
as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by them in their own private capacities.

Section 5 of P.D. 1468 basically reproduces the above provision, thus–

Section 5. Exemption. — The Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund, as well
as all disbursements as herein authorized, shall not be construed or interpreted, under any law or regulation, as
special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation of
P.D. 711; nor as subsidy, donation, levy government funded investment, or government share within the
contemplation of P.D. 898, the intention being that said Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized
for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by them in their private capacities.

Provided, however, That the President may at any time authorize the Commission on Audit or any other officer of the
government to audit the business affairs, administration, and condition of persons and entities who receive subsidy for
coconut-based consumer products.

Notably, the raising of money by levy on coconut farm production, a form of taxation as already stated, began in 1971 for
the purpose of developing the coconut industry and promoting the interest of coconut farmers. The use of the fund was
expanded in 1973 to include the stabilization of the domestic market for coconut-based consumer goods and in 1974 to
divert part of the funds for obtaining direct benefit to coconut farmers.

After five years or in 1976, however, P.D. 961 declared the coco-levy funds private property of the farmers. P.D. 1468
reiterated this declaration in 1978. But neither presidential decree actually turned over possession or c ontrol of the funds to
the farmers in their private capacity. The government continued to wield undiminished authority over the management and
disposition of those funds.

In any event, such declaration is void. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to a person is completely subjected to
his will in everything that is not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. 63 An owner is free to exercise
all attributes of ownership: the right, among others, to possess, use and enjoy, abuse or consume, and dispose or alienate
the thing owned.64 The owner is of course free to waive all or some of these rights in favor of others. But in the case of the
coconut farmers, they could not, individually or collectively, waive what have not been and could not be legally imparted to
them.
Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact that
coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation. And since taxes could be exacted only for a public purpose, they
cannot be declared private properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct group of persons. 65
The Court of course grants that there is no hard-and-fast rule for determining what constitutes public purpose. It is an elastic
concept that could be made to fit into modern standards. Public purpose, for instance, is no longer restricted to traditional
government functions like building roads and school houses or safeguarding public health and safety. Public purpose has
been construed as including the promotion of social justice.

Thus, public funds may be used for relocating illegal settlers, building low -cost housing for them, and financing both urban
and agrarian reforms that benefit certain poor individuals. Still, these uses relieve volatile iniquities in society and, therefore,
impact on public order and welfare as a whole.

But the assailed provisions, which removed the coco-levy funds from the general funds of the government and declared
them private properties of coconut farmers, do not appear to have a color of social justice for their purpose. The levy on
copra that farmers produce appears, in the first place, to be a business tax judging by its tax base. The concept of farmers-
businessmen is incompatible with the idea that coconut farmers are victims of social injustice and so should be beneficiaries
of the taxes raised from their earnings.

It would altogether be different of course if the laws mentioned set apart a portion of the coco-levy fund for improving the
lives of destitute coconut farm owners or workers for their social amelioration to establish a proper government purpose.
The support for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty and has long been an accepted exercise of police power
in the promotion of the common good. 66

But the declarations do not distinguish between wealthy coconut farmers and the impoverished ones. And even if they did,
the Government cannot just embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or
otherwise.67 Consequently, such declarations are void since they appropriate public funds for private purpose and, therefore,
violate the citizens’ right to substantive due process. 68

On another point, in stating that the coco-levy fund "shall not be construed or interpreted, under any law or regulation, as
special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government," P.D.s 961 and 1468 seek to
remove such fund from COA scrutiny.

This is also the fault of President Estrada’s E.O. 312 which deals with ₱1 billion to be generated out of the sale of coco -fund
acquired assets. Thus–

Section 5. Audit of Fund and Submission of Report. – The Committee, by a majority vote, shall engage the services of a
reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits of the fund. It shall render a quarterly report on all pertinent transacti ons
and availments of the fund to the Office of the President within the first three (3) working days of the succeeding quarter.

E.O. 313 has a substantially identical provision governing the management and disposition of the Coconut Trust Fund
capitalized with the substantial SMC shares of stock that the coco-fund acquired. Thus–

Section 13. Accounting.

The Fund shall be audited annually or as often as necessary by an external auditor designated by the
Committee. The Committee may also request the Commission on Audit to conduct an audit of the Fund. (Emphasis ours)
But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of P.D.s 755, 961 and 1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312 and 313 that
remove such funds and the assets acquired through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate Article IX -D, Section
2(1)69 of the 1987 Constitution. Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power and authority to examine uses of government
money and property. The cited P.D.s and E.O.s also contravene Section 2 70 of P.D. 898 (Providing for the Restructuring of
the Commission on Audit), which has the force of a statute.

And there is no legitimate reason why such funds should be shielded from COA review and audit. The PCA, which
implements the coco-levy laws and collects the coco-levy funds, is a government-owned and controlled corporation subject
to COA review and audit.
E.O. 313 suffers from an additional infirmity. Its title, "Rationalizing the Use of the Coconut Levy Funds by constituting a
‘Fund for Assistance to Coconut Farmers’ as an Irrevocable Trust Fund and Creating a Coconut Trust Fund Committee for
the Management thereof" tends to mislead.

Apparently, it intends to create a trust fund out of the coco-levy funds to provide economic assistance to the coconut farmers
and, ultimately, benefit the coconut industry. 71 But on closer look, E.O. 313 strays from the special purpose for which the
law raises coco-levy funds in that it permits the use of coco-levy funds for improving productivity in other food areas. Thus:

Section 2. Purpose of the Fund. — The Fund shall be established for the purpose of financing programs of assistance for
the benefit of the coconut farmers, the coconut industry, and other agri-related programs intended to maximize food
productivity, develop business opportunities in the countryside, provide livelihood alternatives, and promote anti-
poverty programs.

Section 9. Use and Disposition of the Trust Income. — The Coconut Trust Fund Committee, on an annual basis, shall
determine and establish the amount comprising the Trust Income. After such determination, the Committee shall earmark,
allocate and disburse the Trust Income for the following purposes, namely:

Thirty percent (30%) of the Trust Income shall be used to assist and fund agriculturally-related programs for the
Government, as reasonably determined by the Trust Fund Committee, implemented for the purpose of:

(i) maximizing food productivity in the agriculture areas of the country;

(ii) enhancing the upliftment and well-being of the living conditions of farmers and agricultural workers;

(iii) developing viable industries and business opportunities in the countryside

(iv) providing alternative means of livelihood to the direct dependents of agriculture businesses and enterprises

(v) providing financial assistance and support to coconut farmers in times of economic hardship due to extremely
low prices of copra and other coconut products, natural calamities, world market dislocation and similar
occurrences, including financial support to the ERAP’s Sagip Niyugan Program established under Executive
Order No. 312 dated November 3, 2000.

Clearly, E.O. 313 above runs counter to the constitutional provision which directs that all money collected on any tax levied
for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. 72 Assisting other agriculturally-
related programs is way off the coco-fund’s objective of promoting the general interests of the coconut industry and its
farmers.

A final point, the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445, 73 Section 84(2),74 the first part by the previously mentioned sections of
E.O. 313 and the second part by Section 4 of E.O. 312 and Sections 6 and 7 of E.O. 313. E.O. 313 vests the power to
administer, manage, and supervise the operations and disbursements of the Trust Fund it established (capitalized with SMC
shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in a Coconut Trust Fund Committee. Thus–

Section 6. Creation of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee. — A Committee is hereby created to administer, manage
and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund, chaired by the President with ten (10) members, as follows:

(a) four (4) representatives from the government sector, two of whom shall be the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform who shall act as Vice Chairmen;

(b) four (4) representatives from coconut farmers’ organizations, one of whom shall come from a list of nominees
from the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation Inc. ("COCOFED");
 (c) a representative from the CIIF; and

(d) a representative from a non-government organization (NGO) involved in agricultural and rural development.

All decisions of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall be determined by a majority vote of all the members.

The Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall perform the functions and duties set forth in Section 7 hereof, with the skill, care,
prudence and diligence necessary under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in like capacity would
exercise.

The members of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall be appointed by the President and shall hold office at his pleasure.

The Coconut Trust Fund Committee is authorized to hire administrative, technical and/or support staff as may be required
to enable it to effectively perform its functions and responsibilities.

Section 7. Functions and Responsibilities of the Committee. — The Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall have the following
functions and responsibilities:

(a) set the investment policy of the Trust Fund;

(b) establish priorities for assistance giving preference to small coconut farmers and farmworkers which shall be
reviewed periodically and revised as necessary in accordance with changing conditions;
(c) receive, process and approve project proposals for financing by the Trust Fund;
(d) decide on the use of the Trust Fund’s income or net earnings including final action on applications for
assistance, grants and/or loans;
(e) avail of professional counsel and services by retaining an investment and financial manager, if desired;
(f) formulate the rules and regulations governing the allocation, utilization and disbursement of the Fund;
and
(g) perform such other acts and things as may be necessary proper or conducive to attain the purposes of the Fund.

Section 4 of E.O. 312 does essentially the same thing. It vests the management and disposition of the assistance fund
generated from the sale of coco-levy fund-acquired assets into a Committee of five members.

Thus, Section 4 of E.O. 312 provides –

Section 4. Funding. – Assets acquired through the coconut levy funds or by entities financed by the coconut levy funds
identified by the President for appropriate disposal or sale, shall be sold or disposed to generate a maximum fund o f ONE
BILLION PESOS (₱1,000,000,000.00) which shall be managed by a Committee composed of a Chairman and four (4)
members to be appointed by the President whose term shall be co-terminus with the Program. x x x (Emphasis ours)

In effect, the above transfers the power to allocate, use, and disburse coco-levy funds that P.D. 232 vested in the PCA and
transferred the same, without legislative authorization and in violation of P.D. 232, to the Committees mentioned above. An
executive order cannot repeal a presidential decree which has the same standing as a statute enacted by Congress.

UCPB invokes the principle of separability to save the assailed laws from being struck down. The general rule is that where
part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if susceptible to being
separated from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. When the parts of a statute, however, are so mutually dependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In which case, if some parts are unconstitutional, a ll the
other provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected must consequently fall with them. 75

But, given that the provisions of E.O.s 312 and 313, which are already stated invalidly transferred powers over the funds to
two committees that President Estrada created, the rest of their provisions became non-operational. It is evident that
President Estrada would not have created the new funding programs if they were to be managed by some other entity.
Indeed, he made himself Chairman of the Coconut Trust Fund and left to his discretion the appointment of the members of
the other committee.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 147036-37, PARTLY GRANTS the petition in G.R. 147811, and
declares the following VOID:

a) E.O. 312, for being repugnant to Section 84(2) of P.D. 1445, and Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the Constitution;

b) E.O. 313, for being in contravention of Section 84(2) of P.D. 1445, and Article IX-D, Section 2(1) and Article VI,
Section 29(3) of the Constitution.

The Court has previously declared Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 144463 January 14, 2004

SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI, petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION and SPORTS AND GAMES ENTERTAINMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify the "Grant of Authority
and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming," executed by respondent Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in favor of respondent Sports and Games and Entertainment
Corporation (also referred to as SAGE).

The facts may be summarized as follows:

PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under Presidential Decree No. 1869 issued
on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos. Pertinent provisions of said enabling law read:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and
integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order
to attain the following objectives:

b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports,
gaming pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and
recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Philippines and which will: x x x (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices
and corruptions that are normally prevalent in the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and
casinos without direct government involvement.

TITLE IV – GRANT OF FRANCHISE

Sec.10. Nature and term of franchise. – Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation is
hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privileges and
authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools,
i.e. basketball, football, lotteries, etc. whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines.

On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument denominated as "Grant of Authority and
Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming", which granted SAGE the authority to operate and
maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and
international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established
to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games.

On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia Ll. Reyes, and SAGE, represented by its Chairman
of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document.
Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet
on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.

Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and
Sports, files the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains
that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to
operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to
operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet
gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were
confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being an international network of computers,
necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet
gambling contravenes the limitation in PAGCOR’s franchise, under Section 14 of P.D. No. 1869 which provides:

Place. – The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or games of chance on land or water
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x

Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of the authorized gambling
activities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the "right, privilege and authority to operate
and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines." 1 He contends that internet gambling could not have been included within the
commonly accepted definition of "gambling casinos", "clubs" or "other recreation or amusement places" as these terms refer
to a physical structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized by
law.

The issues raised by petitioner are as follows:

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PAGCOR IS AUTHORIZED UNDER P.D. NO. 1869 TO OPERATE
GAMBLING ACTIVITIES ON THE INTERNET;

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, OR

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT
AUTHORIZED RESPONDENT SAGE TO OPERATE INTERNET GAMBLING ON THE BASIS OF ITS
RIGHT "TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN GAMBLING CASINOS, CLUBS AND OTHER AMUSEMENT
PLACES" UNDER SECTION 10 OF P.D. 1869;

III. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT GRANTED AUTHORITY TO SAGE TO OPERATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERNET.

The above-mentioned issues may be summarized into a single pivotal question: Does PAGCOR’s legislative franchise
include the right to vest another entity, SAGE in this case, with the authority to operate Internet gambling? Ot herwise put,
does Presidential Decree No. 1869 authorize PAGCOR to contract any part of its franchise to SAGE by authorizing the
latter to operate Internet gambling?

Before proceeding with our main discussion, let us first try to hurdle a number of important procedural matters raised by the
respondents.

In their separate Comments, respondents PAGCOR and SAGE insist that petitioner has no legal standing to file the instant
petition as a concerned citizen or as a member of the Philippine Senate on the ground that he is not a real party-in-interest
entitled to the avails of the suit. In this light, they argue that petitioner does not have the requisite personal and substa ntial
interest to impugn the validity of PAGCOR’s grant of authority to SAGE.

Objections to the legal standing of a member of the Senate or House of Representative to maintain a suit and assail the
constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalitie s
are not without precedent. Ordinarily, before a member of Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of
any department of the government there must be an unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs
his rights and prerogatives as legislator.2
However in a number of cases, 3 we clarified that where a case involves an issue of utmost importance, or one of
overreaching significance to society, the Court, in its discretion, can brush aside procedural technicalities and take
cognizance of the petition. Considering that the instant petition involves legal questions that may have serious implications
on public interests, we rule that petitioner has the requisite legal standing to file this petition.

Respondents likewise urge the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition because under Section 1, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, these remedies should be directed to any tribunal, board, officer or person whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. They maintain that in exercising its legally-mandated franchise to
grant authority to certain entities to operate a gambling or gaming activity, PAGCOR is not performing a judicial or quasi -
judicial act. Neither should the act of granting licenses or authority to operate be construed as a purely ministerial act.
According to them, in the event that this Court takes cognizance of the instant petition, the same should be dismissed for
failure of petitioner to observe the hierarchy of courts.

Practically the same procedural infirmities were raised in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation where
an almost identical factual setting obtained. Petitioners therein filed a petition for injunction directly before the Court w hich
sought to enjoin respondent from operating the jai-alai games by itself or in joint venture with another corporate entity
allegedly in violation of law and the Constitution. Respondents contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to take original
cognizance of a petition for injunction because it was not one of the actions specifically mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 56
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respondents likewise took exception to the alleged failure of petitioners to observe the doctrine on hierarc hy of courts. In
brushing aside the apparent procedural lapse, we held that "x x x this Court has the discretionary power to take cognizance
of the petition at bar if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immedi ate exercise
of its jurisdiction."4

In the case at bar, we are not inclined to rule differently. The petition at bar seeks to nullify, via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed directly before this Court, the "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and
Internet Gaming" by virtue of which SAGE was vested by PAGCOR with the authority to operate on-line Internet gambling.
It is well settled that averments in the complaint, and not the nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of the
action.5

Although the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent PAGCOR, what it primarily seeks to
accomplish is to prevent the enforcement of the "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and
Internet Gaming." Thus, the action may properly be characterized as one for Prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65, which
incidentally, is another remedy resorted to by petitioner.

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well-being of this nation, especially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.

Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substant ial
justice, must always be eschewed. 6Having disposed of these procedural issues, we now come to the substance of the
action.

A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern whic h
cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the
government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in
the interest of the public.

It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting
the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to
be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and
unequivocal language.7 After a circumspect consideration of the foregoing discussion and the contending positions of the
parties, we hold that PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its franchise to
SAGE.

In the Del Mar case where a similar issue was raised when PAGCOR entered into a joint venture agreement with two other
entities in the operation and management of jai alai games, the Court, 8 in an En Banc Resolution dated 24 August 2001,
partially granted the motions for clarification filed by respondents therein insofar as it prayed that PAGCOR has a valid
franchise, but only by itself (i.e. not in association with any other person or entity), to operate, maintain and/or manage the
game of jai-alai.

In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants the latter the authority to operate
and maintain sports betting stations and Internet gaming operations. In essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the
privilege to actively participate, partake and share PAGCOR’s franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant of
franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must not
perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere t o its
terms and conditions.

A corporation as a creature of the State is presumed to exist for the common good. Hence, the special privileges and
franchises it receives are subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. There is therefore a reserved right
of the State to inquire how these privileges had been employed, and whether they have been abused. 9

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under
the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE.
PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as
there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.

In Lim v. Pacquing,10 the Court clarified that "since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not
so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila." By the same
token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not "ride on" PAGCOR’s franchise if it were to legally operate
on-line Internet gambling.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The "Grant of Authority and A greement to
Operate Sports Betting and Internet Gaming" executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007

ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC.
(ECN), Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.),
STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO), Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN)
(petitioners), come before this Court in this original action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9 136, otherwise
known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge, 1 and Rule 18 of the
Rules and Regulations (IRR)2 which seeks to implement the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional.

Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and
collecting the said charge.3

The assailed provision of law reads:

SECTION 34. Universal Charge. — Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be determined,
fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users for the following purposes:

(a) Payment for the stranded debts 4 in excess of the amount assumed by the National Government and stranded
contract costs of NPC5 and as well as qualified stranded contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the
restructuring of the industry;

(b) Missionary electrification;6

(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable sources of energy vis -à-vis
imported energy fuels;

(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-hour (₱0.0025/kWh), which shall
accrue to an environmental fund to be used solely for watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall
be managed by NPC under existing arrangements; and

(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding three (3) years.

The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which shall be passed on and collected from all end-users on a
monthly basis by the distribution utilities. Collections by the distribution utilities and the TRANSCO in any given month shall
be remitted to the PSALM Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of the succeeding month, net of any amount due to the
distribution utility.

Any end-user or self-generating entity not connected to a distribution utility shall remit its corresponding universal charge
directly to the TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be
disbursed only for the purposes specified herein in an open and transparent manner. All amount collected for the universal
charge shall be distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a reasonable period to be provided by the ERC.

The Facts

Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect. 7

On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group 8 (NPC-SPUG) filed with
respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for
Missionary Electrification, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-165.9

On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-194, praying that the proposed
share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge of ₱0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of
₱119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power Sector
Assets and Liabilities Management Group (PSALM)10 for the rehabilitation and management of watershed areas. 11

On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order12 in ERC Case No. 2002-165 provisionally approving the computed
amount of ₱0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and
authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-
users on a monthly basis.

On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision 13 (for ERC Case No. 2002-165) modifying its Order of December 20,
2002, thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the provisional authority granted to petitioner National Power
Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) in the Order dated December 20, 2002 is hereby modified to the
effect that an additional amount of ₱0.0205 per kilowatt-hour should be added to the ₱0.0168 per kilowatt-hour provisionally
authorized by the Commission in the said Order.

Accordingly, a total amount of ₱0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby APPROVED for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund
managed by PSALM as its share from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification (UC-ME) effective on the following
billing cycles:

(a) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO); and
(b) July 2003 for Distribution Utilities (Dus).

Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the UC-ME in the amount of ₱0.0373 per kilowatt-hour and
remit the same to PSALM on or before the 15th day of the succeeding month.

In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not later than April 30, 2004, a detailed report to include Audited Financial
Statements and physical status (percentage of completion) of the projects using the prescribed format.1avvphi1
Let copies of this Order be furnished petitioner NPC-SPUG and all distribution utilities (Dus).

SO ORDERED.

On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC, among others, 14 to set aside the
above-mentioned Decision, which the ERC granted in its Order dated October 7, 2003, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by petitioner National Power
Corporation-Small Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 26, 2003
is hereby modified accordingly.

Relative thereto, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit a quarterly report on the following:

 1. Projects for CY 2002 undertaken;
2. Location
3. Actual amount utilized to complete the project;
4. Period of completion;
5. Start of Operation; and
6. Explanation of the reallocation of UC-ME funds, if any.

SO ORDERED.15

Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing the NPC to draw up to ₱70,000,000.00
from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund
component of the Universal Charge. 16

On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P.
Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the
month of July 2003.17

Hence, this original action.

Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to implement the same are unconstitutional
on the following grounds:

1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2,
Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating
entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any
executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The
assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the
ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.

2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should be used.

3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation
without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented. 18

Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected to fund the operations of the
NPC. They argue that the cases 19 invoked by the respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges imposed
therein, which is not so in the case at bench.

In said cases, the respective funds 20 were created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act
as buffer to counteract the changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables which cannot be
adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to delegate powers to administrative
bodies.21 Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is imposed not for a similar purpose.

On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) contends that
unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public purposes, such as support of the government, administration of
the law, or payment of public expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is
to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry. Thus, it is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent
police power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the
latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the execution and implementation of the provisions of the
EPIRA.22

Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), share the
same view that the Universal Charge is not a tax because it is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure
the viability of the country's electric power industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power.
Respondents further contend that said Universal Charge does not possess the essential characteristics of a tax, that its
imposition would redound to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly
levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability to pay.

Moreover, respondents deny that there is undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth
sufficient determinable standards which would guide the ERC in the exercise of the powers granted to it. Lastly, respondents
argue that the imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police
power of the State and it complies with the requirements of due process. 23

On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount pertaining to the Missionary
Electrification and Environmental Fund components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the
Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165. Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under Sec. 4624 of the EPIRA,
which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its IRR. 25

The Issues

The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:

1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC. 26

Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall first deal with an obvious procedural lapse.

Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly denominated as a Complaint assailing the constitutionality of Sec.
34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. No doubt, petitioners have locus
standi. They impugn the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA because they sustained a direct injury as a result of the
imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in their electric bills.

However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they filed this "Complaint" directly with us.

Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of the
public respondents, in order for the Court to consider it as a petition for certiorari or prohibition.

Article VIII, Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution 27 categorically provides that:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the rules of court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while
concurrent with that of the regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals, does not gi ve litigants unrestrained freedom of
choice of forum from which to seek such relief. 28

It has long been established that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and call
for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. 29 This circumstance alone warrants the outright dismissal of the present action.
This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional issue raised herein. We are aware that if the
constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is not resolved now, the issue will certainly resurface in the near future, resulti ng
in a repeat of this litigation, and probably involving the same parties. In the public interest and to avoid unnecessary delay,
this Court renders its ruling now.

The instant complaint is bereft of merit.

The First Issue

To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the State’s power of taxation from the police power.
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so
that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency that is to pay it.30

It is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an
imperious need.31 Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.32

On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property.33 It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers
of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the
supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others).

As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. 34 We have held that
the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests ,
first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. 35

The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If
generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is
the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax. 36

In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police power, particularly its regulatory
dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge
is imposed37 and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character.

The EPIRA resonates such regulatory purposes, thus:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State:

(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the country;

(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power;
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a regime of free and fair competition and full public
accountability to achieve greater operational and economic efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of
Philippine products in the global market;
(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the ownership base of the power generation, transmission
and distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and private sector entities in the process of
restructuring the electric power industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services of electric utilities and other providers of
electric power;
(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy sources and infrastructure;
(h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and renewable energy resources in power generation in order
to reduce dependence on imported energy;
 (i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the assets and liabilities of the National P ower
Corporation (NPC);
(j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body and system to ensure consumer protection and
enhance the competitive operation of the electricity market; and
(k) To encourage the efficient use of energy and other modalities of demand side management.

From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the
exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.

Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. 38 In Valmonte
v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al. 39 and in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,40 this Court held that the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in the exercise of the police power.

The doctrine was reiterated in Osmeña v. Orbos 41 with respect to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree with petitioners that the
instant case is different from the aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also
created under the administration of PSALM. 42 The STF has some notable characteristics similar to the OPSF and the
SSF, viz.:

1) In the implementation of stranded cost recovery, the ERC shall conduct a review to determine whether there is
under-recovery or over recovery and adjust (true-up) the level of the stranded cost recovery charge. In case of an
over-recovery, the ERC shall ensure that any excess amount shall be remitted to the STF. A separate account shall
be created for these amounts which shall be held in trust for any future claims of distribution utilities for stranded
cost recovery. At the end of the stranded cost recovery period, any remaining amount in this account shall be used
to reduce the electricity rates to the end-users.43

2) With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if the total amount collected for the same is greater than the actual
availments against it, the PSALM shall retain the balance within the STF to pay for periods where a shortfall
occurs.44

3) Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the administration of the STF shall be transferred to the DOF or any of
the DOF attached agencies as designated by the DOF Secretary. 45

The OSG is in point when it asseverates:

Evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust Fund, under the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No.
9136, is well within the pervasive and non-waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical and
economic survival and well-being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police
power of the State.46

This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an exaction imposed primarily in pursuit of
the State's police objectives. The STF reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for
which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry.

The Second Issue

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of government has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of
separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non
delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment
and not through the intervening mind of another. 47

In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative
agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle.48 Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is
doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of
everyday life.

Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized
fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is
required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.

Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.49
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.

Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that "within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to
be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users," and therefore, does not state
the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative paramet ers
provided in the law itself.

For one, Sec. 43(b)(ii) of the EPIRA provides:

SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. — The ERC shall promote competition, encourage market development, ensure
customer choice and penalize abuse of market power in the restructured electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC
is authorized to issue cease and desist order after due notice and hearing. Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the
following key functions in the restructured industry:

(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate and enforce, in accordance with law, a National Grid
Code and a Distribution Code which shall include, but not limited to the following:

(ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers: Provided ,
That in the formulation of the financial capability standards, the nature and function of the entity shall be considered:
Provided, further, That such standards are set to ensure that the electric power industry participants meet the minimum
financial standards to protect the public interest. Determine, fix, and approve, after due notice and public hearings the
universal charge, to be imposed on all electricity end-users pursuant to Section 34 hereof;

Moreover, contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination
of the Universal Charge. Sec. 51(d) and (e) of the EPIRA 50 clearly provides:

SECTION 51. Powers. — The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its functions and for the attainment of its objective,
have the following powers:

(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of NPC which shall form
the basis for ERC in the determination of the universal charge;

(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds from sales and other property
contributed to it, including the proceeds from the universal charge.

Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power.

As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and
order;"51 "adequate and efficient instruction;"52 "public interest;"53 "justice and equity;"54 "public convenience and
welfare;"55 "simplicity, economy and efficiency;" 56 "standardization and regulation of medical education;" 57 and "fair and
equitable employment practices." 58
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, "to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability,
security and affordability of the supply of electric power" 59 and "watershed rehabilitation and management"60 meet the
requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are
sufficient standards.

It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC's conferred powers were challenged. In Freedom from Debt
Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission,61 the Court had occasion to say:

In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the provisions of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts.
Rather, the law must be read in its entirety, because a statute is passed as a whole, and is animated by one general purpose
and intent. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from any single part thereof but from a general consideration of the statute
as a whole.

Considering the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety, it is plain to see that the
law has expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable the latter to implement the reforms
sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the ERC, they did not
intend to abolish or reduce the powers already conferred upon ERC's predecessors. To sustain the view that the ERC
possesses only the powers and functions listed under Section 43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law.

In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 62 in the same case, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno
described the immensity of police power in relation to the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over
electric power as a vital public utility, to wit:

Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer limited to the preservation of public he alth, safety and
morals, which used to be the primary social interests in earlier times. Police power now requires the State to "assume an
affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial eco nomy."
Police power is now exerted "to further the public welfare — a concept as vast as the good of society itself." Hence, "police
power is but another name for the governmental authority to further the welfare of society that is the basic end of all
government."

When police power is delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise should be given a wide
latitude. Police power takes on an even broader dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State must take
a more active role in balancing the many conflicting interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC,
acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power. We should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its
exercise.

This approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric power generation and
distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important
factor in encouraging investment and promoting business. The engines of progress may come to a screeching halt if the
delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as a result of power outages or unreliable electric
power services. The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great flexibility, when the need
arises.

This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Commission 63 where
the Court held that the ERC, as regulator, should have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes wrought by
multifarious factors affecting public utilities.

From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.
Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge
on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such contention is
deemed waived or abandoned per Resolution 64 of August 3, 2004.65
Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially
involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same. 66 As a penultimate statement, it may
be well to recall what this Court said of EPIRA:

One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy,
legal structure and regulatory framework for the electric power industry. The new thrust is to tap private capital for the
expansion and improvement of the industry as the large government debt and the highly capital-intensive character of the
industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical constraints to the program. To attract private investment, largel y
foreign, the jaded structure of the industry had to be addressed.

While the generation and transmission sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the distribution side was fragmented with
over 130 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic. The pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of existing generation
capacity; extremely high and uncompetitive power rates; poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to forgettable
performance of the government power sector; high system losses; and an inability to develop a clear strategy for overcoming
these shortcomings.

Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including the privatization of the assets of the
National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of various
government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors,
namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its
transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter. 67

Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. 68 Indubitably, petitioners
failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant
a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG,
JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G.
FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN.
WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the
PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the first case has already settled
(1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended)
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating
an on-line lottery. Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be reopened.

Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves bound by the decision in the first case, petitioners suggest
that the two, in joining the dissenters in the first case in reexamining the questions in the present case, acted otherwise t han
according to law. They cite the following statement in the opinion of the Court:

The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members
sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority was thus
a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been
changes in the membership of the Court, with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment
of the writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the
maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.

Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too subtle suggestion, perhaps a Freudian slip, that the two
new appointees, regardless of the merit of the Decision in the first Kilosbayan case against the lotto (Kilosbayan,
et al. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who
were dissenters in the first case and constitute the new majority in the second lotto case." And petitioners ask, "why
should it be so?"

Petitioners ask a question to which they have made up an answer. Their attempt at psychoanalysis, detecting a Freudian
slip where none exists, may be more revealing of their own unexpressed wish to find motives where there are none which
they can impute to some members of the Court.

For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort to explain — rather than to justify — the majority's decision to
overrule the ruling in the previous case. It is simply meant to explain that because the five members of the Court who
dissented in the first case (Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.) and the two new members (Mendoza and
Francisco, JJ.) thought the previous ruling to be erroneous and its reexamination not to be barred by stare decisis, res
judicata or conclusiveness of judgment, or law of the case, it was hardly tenable for petitioners to insist on the first ruling.

Consequently to petitioners' question "What is the glue that holds them together," implying some ulterior motives on the part
of the new majority in reexamining the two questions, the answer is: None, except a conviction on the part of the five, who
had been members of the Court at the time they dissented in the first case, and the tw o new members that the previous
ruling was erroneous. The eighth Justice (Padilla, J.) on the other hand agrees with the seven Justices that the ELA is in a
real sense a lease agreement and therefore does not violate R.A. No. 1169.

The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one
of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the first case was later reversed.
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is barred because the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation made a " formal commitment not to ask for a reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case
and instead submit a new agreement that would be in conformity with the PCSO Charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) and
with the Decision of the Supreme Court in the first Kilosbayan case against on-line, hi-tech lotto."

To be sure, a new contract was entered into which the majority of the Court finds has been purged of the features which
made the first contract objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO said in its manifestation in the first case was the following:

1. They are no longer filing a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated
May 5, 1994, a copy of which was received on May 6, 1994.

2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently negotiating a new lease agreement consistent with the
authority of PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) and conformable with
the pronouncements of this Honorable Court in its Decision of May 5, 1995.

The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the PCSO.

There was thus no "formal commitment" — but only a manifestation — that the parties were not filing a motion for
reconsideration. Even if the parties made a "formal commitment," the six (6) dissenting Justices certainly could not be bound
thereby not to insist on their contrary view on the question of standing. Much less were the two new members bound by any
"formal commitment" made by the parties.

They believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous. Since in their view reexamination was not barred by the doctri ne
of stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment or law of the case, they voted the way they did with the remaining
five (5) dissenters in the first case to form a new majority of eight.

Petitioners ask, "Why should this be so?" Because, as explained in the decision, the first decision was erroneous and no
legal doctrine stood in the way of its reexamination. It can, therefore, be asked "with equal candor": "Why should this not be
so?"

Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not reversed, in a subsequent case because of change in the
membership of a court. In 1957, this Court, voting 6-5, held in Feliciano v. Aquinas, G.R. No. L-10201, Sept. 23, 1957 that
the phrase "at the time of the election" in §2174 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 meant that a candidate for
municipal elective position must be at least 23 years of age on the date of the election. On the other hand, the dissenters
argued that it was enough if he attained that age on the day he assumed office.

Less than three years later, the same question was before the Court again, as a candidate for municipal councilor stated
under oath in her certificate of candidacy that she was eligible for that position although she attained the requisite age (2 3
years) only when she assumed office.

The question was whether she could be prosecuted for falsification. In People v. Yang, 107 Phi. 888 (1960), the Court ruled
she could not. Justice, later Chief Justice, Benison, who dissented in the first case, Feliciano v. Aquinas, supra, wrote the
opinion of the Court, holding that while the statement that the accused was eligible was "inexact or erroneous, according to
the majority in the Feliciano case," the accused could not be held liable for falsification, because the question [whether the
law really required candidates to have the required age on the day of the election or whether it was sufficient that they
attained it at the beginning of the term of office] has not been discussed anew, despite the presence of new members; we
simply assume for the purpose of this decision that the doctrine stands.
Thus because in the meantime there had been a change in the membership of the Court with the retirement of two members
(Recess and Flex, JJ.) who had taken part in the decision in the first case and their replacement by new members (Barrera
and Gutierrez-David, JJ.) and the fact that the vote in the first case was a narrow one (6 to 5), the Court allowed that the
continuing validity of its ruling in the first case might well be doubted. For this reason it gave the accused the benefit of the
doubt that she had acted in the good faith belief that it was sufficient that she was 23 years of age when she assumed office.
In that case, the change in the membership of the Court and the possibility of change in the ruling were noted without
anyone — much less would-be psychoanalysts — finding in the statement of the Court any Freudian slip. The possibility of
change in the rule as a result of change in membership was accepted as a sufficient reason for finding good faith and lack
of criminal intent on the part of the accused.

Indeed, a change in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous decision. This was the
lesson of Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (1871). The Legal Tender Acts, which were passed during the Civil War, made U.S.
notes (greenbacks) legal tender for the payment of debts, public or private, with certain exceptions. The validity of the acts,
as applied to preexisting debts, was challenged in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1869).

The Court was then composed of only eight (8) Justices because of Congressional effort to limit the appointing power of
President Johnson. Voting 5-3, the Court declared the acts void. Chief Justice Chase wrote the opinion of the Court in which
four others, including Justice Grier, concurred. Justices Miller, Swayne and Davis dissented. A private memorandum left by
the dissenting Justices described how an effort was made "to convince an aged and infirm member of the court [Justice
Grier] that he had not understood the question on which he voted," with the result that what was originally a 4-4 vote was
converted into a majority (5-3) for holding the acts invalid.

On the day the decision was announced, President Grant nominated to the Court William Strong and Joseph P. Bradley to
fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Justice Grier and to restore the membership of the Court to nine. In
1871, Hepburn v. Griswold was overruled in the Legal Tender Cases, as Knox v. Lee came to be known, in an opinion by
Justice Strong, with a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Chase and the three other surviving members of the former
majority.

There were allegations that the new Justices were appointed for their known views on the validity of the Legal Tender Acts,
just as there were others who defended the character and independence of the new Justices. History has vindicated the
overruling of the Hepburn case by the new majority. The Legal Tender Cases proved to be the Court's means of salvation
from what Chief Justice Hughes later described as one of the Court's "self-inflicted wounds."1
We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning real
party in interest, applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule on standing, applies to
petitioners. Two objections are made against that ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies and principles
invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be
resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the
Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people's organizations "effective and reasonable participation at
all levels of social, political and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, §16), grants them standing to sue on
constitutional grounds.

The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:

Art. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the
courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity,
Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be
given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the
morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity
as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).

It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the
PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of
contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.

Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract
in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enabl e
the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations
through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political,
and economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§ 15-16)

These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case
may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is
limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial
function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the
government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.

Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner Garcia before the Constitutional Commission, explaining
the provisions on independent people's organizations. There is nothing in the speech, however, which supports their claim
of standing. On the contrary, the speech points the way to the legislative and executive branches of the government, rather
than to the courts, as the appropriate fora for the advocacy of petitioners' views. 2

Indeed, the provisions on independent people's organizations may most usefully be read in connection with the provision
on initiative and referendum as a means whereby the people may propose or enact laws or reject any of those passed by
Congress. For the fact is that petitioners' opposition to the contract in question is nothing more than an opposition to the
government policy on lotteries.

It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases
involving "paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators have inde ed been allowed to
sue but then only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and (2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these
requirements on standing.

Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds. (Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phi. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Bugnay Const. & Dev. v. Laron,
176 SCRA 240 (1989); City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 [1972]) or where a tax measure is assailed as
unconstitutional. (VAT Cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630 [1994]) Voters are allowed to question the
validity of election laws because of their obvious interest in the validity of such laws. (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774
[1967])

Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance" which must be
settled early. (Emergency Powers Cases [Araneta v. Dinglasan], 84 Phi. 368 (1949); Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n
v. Feliciano, 121 Phi. 358 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phi. 894 (1965); CLU v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317
[1991]) Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives qua legislators. (Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992); Gonzales
v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (1971); Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April
16, 1995 (Mendoza, J., concurring))
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers ,
but they do not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA
392, 403 (1980), to wit:

While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that
there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public
Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.

(Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution
Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no
assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking
through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained. (Emphasis added)

Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits.

Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their contention that taxpayers have standing to question government
contracts regardless of whether public funds are involved or not. In Gonzales v. National Housing, Corp., 94 SCRA 786
(1979), petitioner filed a taxpayer's suit seeking the annulment of a contract between the NHC and a foreign corporation.
The case was dismissed by the trial court. The dismissal was affirmed by this Court on the grounds of res judicata and
pendency of a prejudicial question, thus avoiding the question of petitioner's standing.

On the other hand, in Gonzales v. Raquiza, 180 SCRA 254 (1989), petitioner sought the annulment of a contract made by
the government with a foreign corporation for the purchase of road construction equipment. The question of standing was
not discussed, but even if it was, petitioner's standing could be sustained because he was a minority stockholder of the
Philippine National Bank, which was one of the defendants in the case.

In the other case cited by petitioners, City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 (1972), members of the city council
were allowed to sue to question the validity of a contract entered into by the city government for the purchase of road
construction equipment because their contention was that the contract had been made without their authority. In addition,
as taxpayers they had an interest in seeing to it that public funds were spent pursuant to an appropriation made by law.

But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are being misapplied or misappropria ted. The controlling
doctrine is that of Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975) where it was held that funds raised from contributions for the
benefit of the Cultural Center of the Philippines were not public funds and petitioner had no standing to bring a taxpayer's
suit to question their disbursement by the President of the Philippines.

Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because
no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as
legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.

Finally, in Valmonte v. PCSO, G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987, we threw out a petition questioning another form of
lottery conducted by the PCSO on the ground that petitioner, who claimed to be a "citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of
three minor children," had no direct and personal interest in the lottery. We said: "He must be able to show, not only that
the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.

It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of." In the case
at bar, petitioners have not shown why, unlike petitioner in the Valmonte case, they should be accorded standing to bring
this suit.

The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different. Citizens' standing to bring a suit seeking the
cancellation of timber licenses was sustained in that case because the Court considered Art. II, §16 a right-conferring
provision which can be enforced in the courts. That provision states:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Emphasis)

In contrast, the policies and principles invoked by petitioners in this case do not permit of such categorization.

Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard to
be immoral. This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress to decide and Congress has permitted
lotteries for charity.

Nevertheless, although we have concluded that petitioners do not have standing, we have not stopped there and dismissed
their case. For in the view we take, whether a party has a cause of action and, therefore, is a real party in interest or one
with standing to raise a constitutional question must turn on whether he has a right which has been violated. For this reason
the Court has not ducked the substantive issues raised by petitioners.

II. R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P No. 42, states:

§1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. — The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter
designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health
programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the
general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-Nine, as
amended, and shall have the authority:

A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, in such frequency
and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated
by the Board of Directors.

B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health and welfare-related
investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit-oriented, by itself or in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or
foreign, except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A), for the purpose of providing
for permanent and continuing sources of funds for health programs, including the expansion of existing
ones, medical assistance and services, and/or charitable grants: Provided, That such investments will
not compete with the private sector in areas where investments are adequate as may be determined
by the National Economic and Development Authority.

Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries
and other similar activities in collaboration, association or joint venture with any other party because of the clause "except
for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)" in paragraph (B) of §1. Petitioners contend that the ruling is t he
law of this case because the parties are the same and the case involves the same issue, i.e., the meaning of this statutory
provision.

The "law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable, because this case is not a continuation of the first one. Petitioners also sa y
that inquiry into the same question as to the meaning of the statutory provision is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The
general rule on the "conclusiveness of judgment," however, is subject to the exception that a question may be reopened if
it is a legal question and the two actions involve substantially different claims. This is generally accepted in American law
from which our Rules of Court was adopted.
(Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 59 L.Ed.2d 147, 210 (1979); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 2d, ON JUDGMENTS,
§28; P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN AND D. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1058, n.2 [3rd Ed., 1988]) There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that this exception is inapplicable in this
jurisdiction.

Indeed, the questions raised in this case are legal questions and the claims involved are substantially different from those
involved in the prior case between the parties. As already stated, the ELA is substantially different from the Contract of
Lease declared void in the first case.

Borrowing from the dissenting opinion of Justice Feliciano, petitioners argue that the phrase "by itself or in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any other party" qualifies not only §1 (B) but also §1 (A), because the exce ption clause
("except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph [A]") "operates, as it were, as a renvoi clause which refers
back to Section 1(A) and in this manner avoids the necessity of simultaneously amending the text of Section 1(A)."

This interpretation, however, fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should
be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority, but also the phrase "by itself." In other words,
under paragraph (B), the PCSO is prohibited from "engag[ing] in . . . investments, programs, projects and activities" if these
involve sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities not only "in collaboration, association or joint venture" w ith
any other party but also "by itself."

Obviously, this prohibition cannot apply when the PCSO conducts these activities itself. Otherwise, what paragraph (A)
authorizes the PCSO to do, paragraph (B) would prohibit. The fact is that the phrase in question does not qualify the authority
of the PCSO under paragraph (A), but rather the authority granted to it by paragraph (B). The amendment of paragraph (B)
by B.P. Blg. 42 was intended to enable the PCSO to engage in certain investments, programs, projects and activities for
the purpose of raising funds for health programs and charity.

That is why the law provides that such investments by the PCSO should "not compete with the private sector in areas where
investments are adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority." Justice Davide,
then an Assemblyman, made a proposal which was accepted, reflecting the understanding that the bill they were discussing
concerned the authority of the PCSO to invest in the business of others. The following excerpt from the Record of the
Batasan Pambansa shows this to be the subject of the discussion:

MR. DAVIDE. May I introduce an amendment after "adequate". The intention of the amendment is not to
leave the determination of whether it is adequate or not to anybody. And my amendment is to add after
"adequate" the words AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY.

As a mater of fact, it will strengthen the authority to invest in these areas, provided that the determination
of whether the private sector's activity is already adequate must be determined by the National Economic
and Development Authority.

Mr. ZAMORA. Mr. Speaker, the committee accepts the proposed amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
(2 RECORD OF THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, Sept. 6, 1979, p. 1007)

Thus what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and
other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so whether "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with others or "by
itself." This seems to be the only possible interpretation of §1 (A) and (B) in light of its text and its legislative history. That
there is today no other entity engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and the like does not detract from the validity of this
interpretation.

III. The Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract, which were considered to be features of
a joint venture agreement, had been removed in the new contract. For instance, §5 of the ELA provides that in
the operation of the on-line lottery, the PCSO must employ "its own competent and qualified personnel."
 Petitioners claim, however, that the "contemporaneous interpretation" of PGMC officials of this provision is
otherwise. They cite the testimony of Glen Barroga of the PGMC before a Senate committee to the effect that
under the ELA the PGMC would be operating the lottery system "side by side" with PCSO personnel as part of
the transfer of technology.

Whether the transfer of technology would result in a violation of PCSO's franchise should be determined by facts and not
by what some officials of the PGMC state by way of opinion. In the absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed
that §5 reflects the true intention of the parties. Thus, Art. 1370 of the Civil Code says that "If the terms of a contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control ."

The intention of the parties must be ascertained from their "contemporaneous and subsequent acts." (Art. 1371; Atlantic
Gulf Co. v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166 [1908]) It cannot simply be judged from what one of them says. On the other
hand, the claim of third parties, like petitioners, that the clause on upgrading of equipment would enable the parties after a
while to change the contract and enter into something else in violation of the law is mere speculation and cannot be a basis
for judging the validity of the contract.

IV. It is contended that §1 of E.O. No. 301 covers all types of "contract[s] for public services or for furnishing of
supplies, materials and equipment to the government or to any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities"
and not only contracts of purchase and sale. Consequently, a lease of equipment, like the ELA, must be
submitted to public bidding in order to be valid. This contention is based on two premises: (1) that §1 of E.O.
No. 301 applies to any contract whereby the government acquires title to or the use of the equipment and (2)
that the words "supplies," "materials," and "equipment" are distinct from each other so that when an exception
in §1 speaks of "supplies," it cannot be construed to mean "equipment."

Petitioners' contention will not bear analysis. For example, the term "supplies" is used in paragraph (a), which provides that
a contract for the furnishing of "supplies" in order to meet an emergency is exempt from public bidding. Unless "supplies" is
construed to include "equipment," however, the lease of heavy equipment needed for rescue operations in case of a calamity
will have to be submitted to public bidding before it can be entered into by the government.

In dissent Justice Feliciano says that in such a situation the government can simply resort to expropriation, paying
compensation afterward. This is just like purchasing the equipment through negotiation when the question is whether the
purchase should be by public bidding, not to mention the fact that the power to expropriate may not be exerci sed when the
government can very well negotiate with private owners.

Indeed, there are fundamental difficulties in simultaneously contending (1) that E.O. No. 301, §1 covers both contracts of
sale and lease agreements and (2) that the words "supplies," "materials" and "equipment" cannot be interchanged. Thus,
under paragraph (b) of §1, public bidding is not required "whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project
or activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service."

Following petitioners' theory, there should be a public bidding before the government can enter into a contract for the lease
of bulldozers and dredging equipment even if these are urgently needed in areas ravaged by lahar because, first, lease
contracts are covered by the general rule and, second, the exception to public bidding in paragraph (b) covers only "supplies "
but not equipment.

To take still another example. Paragraph (d), which does away with the requirement of public bidding "whenever the supplies
under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders
or the offers received in each instance were exorbitant or nonconforming to specifications."

Again, following the theory of the petitioners, a contract for the lease of equipment cannot be entered into even if there are
no bids because, first, lease contracts are governed by the general rule on public bidding and, second, the exception to
public bidding in paragraph (d) applies only to contracts for the furnishing of "supplies."
Other examples can be given to show the absurdity of interpreting §1 as applicable to any contract for the furnishing of
supplies, materials and equipment and of considering the words "supplies," "materials" and "equipment" to be not
interchangeable.

Our ruling that §1 of E.O. No. 301 does not cover the lease of equipment avoids these fundamental difficulties and is
supported by the text of §1, which is entitled "Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts" and by the fact that the only provisions
of E.O. No. 301 on leases, namely, §§6 and 7, concern the lease of buildings by or to the government.

Thus the text of §1 reads:

§1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. — Any provision of law, decree, executive order or other issuances
to the contrary notwithstanding, no contract for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials and
equipment to the government or any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities shall be renewed or
entered into without public bidding, except under any of the following situations:

a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may involve
the loss of, or danger to, life and/or property;

b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which
cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service;

c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer who does
not have subdealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be
obtained elsewhere at more advantageous terms to the government;

d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for
at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in
each instance were exhorbitant or non-conforming to specifications;

e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies through
negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the government to be determined by the
Department Head concerned; and

f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government.

Indeed, the purpose for promulgating E.O. No. 301 was merely to decentralize the system of reviewing negotiated
contracts of purchase for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment as well as lease contracts of buildings.

Theretofore, E.O. No. 298, promulgated on August 12, 1940, required consultation with the Secretary of Justice and the
Department Head concerned and the approval of the President of the Philippines before contracts for the furnishing of
supplies, materials and equipment could be made on a negotiated basis, without public bidding. E.O. No. 301 changed this
by providing as follows:

§2. Jurisdiction over Negotiated Contracts. — In line with the principles of decentralization and
accountability, negotiated contracts for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials or equipment
may be entered into by the department or agency head or the governing board of the government-owned
or controlled corporation concerned, without need of prior approval by higher authorities, subject to
availability of funds, compliance with the standards or guidelines prescribed in Section 1 hereof, and to the
audit jurisdiction of the commission on Audit in accordance with existing rules and regulations.
Negotiated contracts involving P2,000,000 up to P10,000,000 shall be signed by the Secretary and two
other Undersecretaries.

§7. Jurisdiction Over Lease Contracts. — The heads of agency intending to rent privately-owned buildings
or spaces for their use, or to lease out government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, shall have
 authority to determine the reasonableness of the terms of the lease and the rental rates thereof, and to
enter into such lease contracts without need of prior approval by higher authorities, subject to compliance
with the uniform standards or guidelines established pursuant to Section 6 hereof by the DPWH and to the
audit jurisdiction of COA or its duly authorized representative in accordance with existing rules and
regulations.

In sum, E.O. No. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment, and it was merely to
change the system of administrative review of emergency purchases, as theretofore prescribed by E.O. No. 298, that E.O.
No. 301 was issued on July 26, 1987. Part B of this Executive Order applies to leases of buildings, not of equipment, and
therefore does not govern the lease contract in this case. Even if it applies, it does not require public bidding for ente ring
into it.

Our holding that E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts of purchase and sale is conformable to P.D. No. 526, promulgated
on August 2, 1974, which is in pari materia. P.D. No. 526 requires local governments to hold public bidding in
the "procurement of supplies." By specifying "procurement of supplies" and excepting from the general
rule "purchases" when made under certain circumstances, P.D. No. 526, §12 indicates quite clearly that it applies only to
contracts of purchase and sale. This provision reads:

§12. Procurement without public bidding. — Procurement of supplies may be made without the benefit of
public bidding in the following modes:
(1) Personal canvass of responsible merchants;
(2) Emergency purchases;
(3) Direct purchases from manufacturers or exclusive distributors;
(4) Thru the Bureau of Supply Coordination; and
(5) Purchase from other government entities or foreign governments.

Sec. 3 broadly defines the term "supplies" as including —

everything except real estate, which may be needed in the transaction of public business,
or in the pursuit of any undertaking, project, or activity, whether of the nature of equipment,
furniture, stationery, materials for construction, or personal property of any sort, including
non-personal or contractual services such as the repair and maintenance of equipment
and furniture, as well as trucking, hauling, janitorial, security, and related or analogous
services.

Thus, the texts of both E.O. No. 301, §1 and of P.D. No. 526, §§1 and 12, make it clear that only contracts for the purchase
and sale of supplies, materials and equipment are contemplated by the rule concerning public biddings.
Finally, it is contended that equipment leases are attractive and commonly used in place of contracts of purc hase and sale
because of "multifarious credit and tax constraints" and therefore could not have been left out from the requirement of public
bidding.

Obviously these credit and tax constraints can have no attraction to the government when considering the advantages of
sale over lease of equipment. The fact that lease contracts are in common use is not a reason for implying that the rule on
public bidding applies not only to government purchases but also to lease contracts. For the fact also is that the government
leases equipment, such as copying machines, personal computers and the like, without going through public bidding .
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J. and Panganiban , JJ., took no part.
Padilla and Vitug, JJ., maintained their separate concurring opinion.
Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., maintained their dissenting opinion.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test
of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make dif ferent choices –
choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger
us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and de bate
about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on
genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of morality. In many
cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet
herein lies the paradox – philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time
powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological
stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse
viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 2 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 3 (the Second Assailed
Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s
refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-
List System Act.4

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans -
gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006.
The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On
August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual
orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. 6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. 7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition
on moral grounds, stating that:

This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
Community, thus:

A marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation, gender
identity and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

Refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations
with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious belief s.
In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into that which is
against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another;
men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81)
"And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!"
(7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F: ‘Consensual partnerships
or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves
for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is
the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions
of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes ‘Immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows’ as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of prision mayor or
a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
2. The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such
literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows,
it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or s hows, whether live or in film,
which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other
purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in
and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful
orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive
to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truth ful
when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to the elections."

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not
conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article
that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the State’s
avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation. 8

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution
(Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to
deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Yusoph).

The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed
Resolution, stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven
its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se would
benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers
of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of
persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests
are also the nation’s – only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under
representation.

Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transge nder identities is
beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians,
gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. Significantly, it has also been held that
homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitu tion discloses a
comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or
religion or belief.
Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad
constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights
that applies to all citizens alike.

III. Public Morals

There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to
any particular religious group’s moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts
are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its
more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have
sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

IV. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code
imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to
public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad"
apparently falls under these legal provisions.

This is clear from its Petition’s paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are
already of age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with
Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreover, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as
any act, omission or anything else which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality." These are all unlawful.10

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the
final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not
later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. 11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension,
requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in
support of petitioner’s application. 13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we
required it to file its own comment. 14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010. 15

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from
implementing the Assailed Resolutions. 16

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition on moral
grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR’s motion to
intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene 18 which motion was granted on February 2,
2010.19

The Parties’ Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s application for
registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own
special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However,
insofar as the purported violations of petitioner’s freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG
maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to
benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the L GBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements
in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941.

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated
in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system.

As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifi cally
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide
existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel,
it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the
country."21

This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence" is a new on e;
previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."

Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner’s accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions.
This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-existence were already available to
the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated
afterthought, a change in respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of petitioner’s right to procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that
it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the
Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the
country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. 22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT
umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found
that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed, petitioner does
not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the
records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under
any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the
COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise
stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor:26

The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds.
"Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be
resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious
programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a
religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom.

Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby
also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government
will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beli efs are disapproved
are second-class citizens.

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage,
must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religi on might have a
compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law.

After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling
influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform
manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utili tarian in its
deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the reli gion
clauses.

Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine
constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest
extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolen t
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling s tate
interests.27

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-
based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the d anger it
poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is
nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standar d
of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own
existence.28

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have
borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure – religious beliefs,
convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves
and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct .
Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of
law.29

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees
that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members have committed or are committing
immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:

A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but
mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action . Reduction ad
absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against
both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. 31

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the
youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is
wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the
government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society.

Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on o ne
end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the
notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our
scrutiny.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at
worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. 32

A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support
a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination
of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals
themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates
our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be denied equal
protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality,"
said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar persons." 33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person
or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in
the same place and in like circumstances. 34

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. 35 In Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis
of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution."37

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior.

Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here –
that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis
review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang
Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest
other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case
is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they d eserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list
system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under
different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in themselves
for the purposes of the equal protection clause.38

We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have
not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has
merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC
made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity
of its position through normal democratic means. 39 It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing
opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:40

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are
free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where
people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or
espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the
state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation.

Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this
democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will
largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very
act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not only
for a minority, however small – not only for a majority, however large – but for each of us" – the majority imposes upon itself
a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not
only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC
or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that
both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.

Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that homosexual
conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial
decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal
protection provisions in foreign and international texts. 42 To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions
that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while
not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court’s analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect
gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public
institutions must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 43

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights
tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a
change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes
are consistent with democratic principles.

The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by
peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even
if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 44 A political group
should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions
capable of satisfying everyone concerned. 45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are
incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.46

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant.
They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe
with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships .
They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes
using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members
of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision
will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex
moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong
consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality
through this Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and
its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom
of expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its
authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system.
This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

A denial of the petition for registration does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of
elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed
right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition has
the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate
in public life through engagement in the party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to l imitations imposed by law.
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and –
as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law.

To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing
its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law, in
particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and
groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly
significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather
than ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular, we
explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the
UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied
equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status
or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to
"sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual orientation." 48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have
declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements. 49

The UDHR provides:

Article 21

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the
Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs,
the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever for m of constitution or government
is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that
citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government
based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to
vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be
justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political
affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States
parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective
office.50

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’
international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer n ow to
the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), 51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. 52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these
alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment of society – wants or demands is automatically
a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate
that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as
rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of
diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "ri ghts" language, then they are no
longer controversial.

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.
Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is
full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to
no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. 53
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged, societal
attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court’s role is not to imp ose
its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public
opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11,
2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed
to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 139325 April 12, 2005

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and
JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United
States District Court of Hawaii, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives in
Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos,
Jr., Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have yet to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the
restoration of freedom and the fundamental structures and processes of democracy have been much lauded, according to
a significant number, the changes, however, have not sufficiently healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive
conditions of the martial law period.

The cries of justice for the tortured, the murdered, and the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in the hearts of the
fair-minded, yet the dispensation of the appropriate relief due them cannot be extended through the same caprice or whim
that characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage done was not merely personal but institutional, and the proper
rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve the award of reparations due within the confines of the restored rule of law.

The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights violations 1 who, deprived of the opportunity to directly
confront the man who once held absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do battle instead with the earthly
representative, his estate. The clash has been for now interrupted by a trial court ruling, seemingly comported to leg al logic,
that required the petitioners to pay a whopping filing fee of over Four Hundred Seventy-Two Million Pesos
(P472,000,000.00) in order that they be able to enforce a judgment awarded them by a foreign court.

There is an understandable temptation to cast the struggle within the simplistic confines of a morality tale, and to employ
short-cuts to arrive at what might seem the desirable solution. But easy, reflexive resort to the equity principle all too often
leads to a result that may be morally correct, but legally wrong.

Nonetheless, the application of the legal principles involved in this case will comfort those who maintain that our substanti ve
and procedural laws, for all their perceived ambiguity and susceptibility to myriad interpretations, are inherently fair and just.
The relief sought by the petitioners is expressly mandated by our laws and conforms to established legal principles. The
granting of this petition for certiorari is warranted in order to correct the legally infirm and unabashedly unjust ruling of the
respondent judge.

The essential facts bear little elaboration. On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US
District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate).
The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens 2 who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as
arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime. 3

The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by
aliens for tortious violations of international law. 4 These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their h eirs and
beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of
military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately ten thousand (10,000) members;
hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable.
The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the provisions of which were invoked by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District Court certified the case as
a class action and created three (3) sub-classes of torture, summary execution and disappearance victims. 5 Trial ensued,
and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff
class.

Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final
Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred
Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996. 6

On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the
enforcement of the Final Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the US District
Court awarded damages.7 They argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme
Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had
become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court then in force.8

On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct
filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and filing fees,
notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a
Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion).

The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees. In
response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary
estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141. 9

On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada10 of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing
the complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined that contrary to the petitioners' submission, the subject matter of
the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering
the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. On that score,
Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application, and the RTC estimated the proper amount
of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.

Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada denied in an Order dated 28 July 1999.
From this denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin orders of respondent judge.11 They
prayed for the annulment of the questioned orders, and an order directing the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 97 -1052 and
the conduct of appropriate proceedings thereon.

Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcemen t
of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They also point out
that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would
negate and render inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by Section 6, Rule 1 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action.

Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, which provides that "Free access to the
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty," a
mandate which is essentially defeated by the required exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as
arrived at by the RTC, was characterized as indisputably unfair, inequitable, and unjust.

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to intervene in this case. 12 It urged that the petition be granted and
a judgment rendered, ordering the enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment in accordance with Section 48,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution
of a foreign judgment as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a case has been decided between the same
parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be relitigated again in another country. 13 The CHR
likewise invokes the principle of comity, and of vested rights.
The Court's disposition on the issue of filing fees will prove a useful jurisprudential guidepost for courts co nfronted with
actions enforcing foreign judgments, particularly those lodged against an estate. There is no basis for the issuance a
limited pro hac vice ruling based on the special circumstances of the petitioners as victims of martial law, or on the
emotionally-charged allegation of human rights abuses.

An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily evinces that the respondent judge ignored the clear letter of the
law when he concluded that the filing fee be computed based on the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property
in litigation.

In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the computation of the filing
fee of over P472 Million. The provision states:

SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-

(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate not based on
judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in
intervention, and for all clerical services in the same time, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or
the starting value of the property in litigation, is:
1. Less than P 100,00.00 – P 500.00

2. P 100,000.00 or more but less than P 150,000.00 – P 800.00

3. P 150,000.00 or more but less than P 200,000.00 – P 1,000.00

4. P 200,000.00 or more but less than P 250,000.00 – P 1,500.00

5. P 250,000.00 or more but less than P 300,00.00 – P 1,750.00

6. P 300,000.00 or more but not more than P 400,000.00 – P 2,000.00

7. P 350,000.00 or more but not more than P400,000.00 – P 2,250.00

8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of P 400,000.00 – P 10.00

Obviously, the above-quoted provision covers, on one hand, ordinary actions, permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc.
complaints and complaints-in-interventions, and on the other, money claims against estates which are not based on
judgment. Thus, the relevant question for purposes of the present petition is whether the action filed with the lower court is
a "money claim against an estate not based on judgment."

Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of
the US District Court. The provision does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and
where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish.

A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is computed on the basis of the amoun t
of the relief sought, or on the value of the property in litigation. The filing fee for requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage is based on the amount of indebtedness or the mortgagee's claim. 14 In special proceedings involving properties
such as for the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the value of the property. 15

The aforecited rules evidently have no application to petitioners' complaint.

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value, thereof shall be alleged by t he
claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
It is worth noting that the provision also provides that in real actions, the assessed value or estimated value of the property
shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. Yet again, this provision does not apply in th e
case at bar. A real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or an action affecting title to or
recovery of possession of real property. 16 Neither the complaint nor the award of damages adjudicated by the US District
Court involves any real property of the Marcos Estate.

Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that the filing fees should be computed on the
basis of the schematic table of Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate based on judgment.
What provision, if any, then should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?

To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign judgment in this
jurisdiction.

The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries. 17

This principle was prominently affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot18 and expressly recognized in our
jurisprudence beginning with Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co.19 The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition
and enforcement of a foreign judgment were originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was
taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn, was derived from the California Act of March 11, 1872. 20

Remarkably, the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has remained
unchanged down to the last word in nearly a century. Section 48 states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in
rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign
judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.21

However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of
jurisdiction or notice to the party,22 collusion, fraud,23 or clear mistake of law or fact.24 Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign
judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should
be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this juris diction to properly determine its
efficacy.25

It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment 26 , even if such
judgement has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. 27 Consequently,
the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. 28

The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgmen t in the
Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose. A civi l
action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, 29 and clearly an action to enforce a
foreign judgment is in essence a vindication of a right prescinding either from a "conclusive judgment upon title" or the
"presumptive evidence of a right."30 Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for
enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.31

There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same
set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For example,
in a complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from the violation of the right of the
complainant through the act or omission of the respondent.

On the other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages from the same tortfe asor,
for the violation of the same right through the same manner of action, the cause of action derives not from the tortious act
but from the foreign judgment itself.

More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the complainant will have to establish before
the court the tortious act or omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual allegations
or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and
amount of damages are assessed.

On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not
the facts from which it prescinds.

As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court,
the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a
strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. 32

Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to
safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation
of the same disputes, and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be the
goal of all law: "rest and quietness." 33 If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would
be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation. 34

Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support the proposition that the subject matter of the complaintthe
enforcement of a foreign judgmentis incapable of pecuniary estimation. Admittedly the proposition, as it applies in this
case, is counter-intuitive, and thus deserves strict scrutiny. For in all practical intents and purposes, the matter at hand is
capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. In the assailed Order, the respondent judge pounced upon this point
without equivocation:

The Rules use the term "where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated." The subject matter of the
present case is the judgment rendered by the foreign court ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs definite sums of
money, as and for compensatory damages. The Court finds that the value of the foreign judgment can be estimated;
indeed, it can even be easily determined.

The Court is not minded to distinguish between the enforcement of a judgment and the amount of said judgment,
and separate the two, for purposes of determining the correct filing fees. Similarly, a plaintiff suing on promissory
note for P1 million cannot be allowed to pay only P400 filing fees (sic), on the reasoning that the subject matter of
his suit is not the P1 million, but the enforcement of the promissory note, and that the value of such "enforcement"
cannot be estimated.35
The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter of an action is c apable of pecuniary estimation is well-
entrenched. The Marcos Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, which ruled:

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
 primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.

However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

On the other hand, petitioners cite the ponencia of Justice JBL Reyes in Lapitan v. Scandia,36 from which the rule
in Singsong and Raymundo actually derives, but which incorporates this additional nuance omitted in the latter cases:

However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. 37

Petitioners go on to add that among the actions the Court has recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation include
legality of conveyances and money deposits, 38 validity of a mortgage,39 the right to support,40 validity of
documents,41 rescission of contracts,42 specific performance,43 and validity or annulment of judgments. 44 It is urged that an
action for enforcement of a foreign judgment belongs to the same class.

This is an intriguing argument, but ultimately it is self-evident that while the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the
enforcement of a foreign judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the adjudication of a sum of money. Perhaps
in theory, such an action is primarily for "the enforcement of the foreign judgment," but there is a certain obtuseness to that
sort of argument since there is no denying that the enforcement of the foreign judgment will necessarily result in the award
of a definite sum of money.

But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond the point of reckoning, we must examine its possible ramifications.
Petitioners raise the point that a declaration that an action for enforcement of foreign judgment may be capable of pecuniary
estimation might lead to an instance wherein a first level court such as the Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to
enforce a foreign judgment. But under the statute defining the jurisdiction of first level courts, B.P. 129, such courts are not
vested with jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments.

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil
cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the
grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of
the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thous and pesos
(P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs,
the amount of which must be specifically alleged:

Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes
of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such
cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession.

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
 pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs:

Provided, that value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. 45
Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights
and interests over property or a sum of money. But as earlier pointed out, the subject matter of an action to enforce a foreign
judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and the cause of action arising from the adjudication of such judgment.

An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if
capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, thus negating the fears of the
petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the provision indicates that it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respec t
to actions for enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no other court or office is vested jurisdiction over such
complaint:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District Court j udgment is one
capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing
it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing f ees over
the instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3),
involving as it does, "other actions not involving property."

Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation corresponds to the same amount required for "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the
correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly
inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.

There is another consideration of supreme relevance in this case, one which should disabuse the notion that the doctrine
affirmed in this decision is grounded solely on the letter of the procedural rule. We earlier adverted to the the internationally
recognized policy of preclusion,46 as well as the principles of comity, utility and convenience of nations 47 as the basis for the
evolution of the rule calling for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

The US Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot48 relied heavily on the concept of comity, as especially derived from the landmark
treatise of Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws of 1834. 49 Yet the notion of "comity" has since been
criticized as one "of dim contours" 50 or suffering from a number of fallacies. 51 Other conceptual bases for the recognition of
foreign judgments have evolved such as the vested rights theory or the modern doctrine of obligation. 52
There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral agreements the standards for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, but these have not borne fruition.

The members of the European Common Market accede to the Judgments Convention, signed in 1978, which eliminates as
to participating countries all of such obstacles to recognition such as reciprocity and révision au fond.53 The most ambitious
of these attempts is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, prepared in 1966 by the Hague Conference of International Law. 54 While it has not received the ratifications needed
to have it take effect,55 it is recognized as representing current scholarly thought on the topic. 56 Neither the Philippines nor
the United States are signatories to the Convention.

Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory behind the recognition and enforcement o f foreign judgments
or a universal treaty rendering it obligatory force, there is consensus that the viability of such recognition and enforcemen t
is essential. Steiner and Vagts note:
 . . . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on private international law, each following a quite separate
path, is not one conducive to the growth of a transnational community encouraging travel and commerce among its
members. There is a contemporary resurgence of writing stressing the identity or similarity of the values that
systems of public and private international law seek to further – a community interest in common, or at least
reasonable, rules on these matters in national legal systems. And such generic principles as reciprocity play an
important role in both fields.57

Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide renown, points out:

Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments, there can be little dispute that the end is
to protect the reasonable expectations and demands of the parties. Where the parties have submitted a matter for
adjudication in the court of one state, and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they may fairly be
expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the judgment issued by the court. 58

There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign judgment and the defenses against the enforcement
thereof. As earlier discussed, the exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have remain unchanged since the time
they were adapted in this jurisdiction from long standing American rules. The requisites and exceptions as delineated under
Section 48 are but a restatement of generally accepted principles of international law.

Section 98 of The Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, states that "a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a
fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States," and on its face, the term "valid" brings into play
requirements such notions as valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.59

Similarly, the notion that fraud or collusion may preclude the enforcement of a foreign judgment finds affirmation with forei gn
jurisprudence and commentators,60 as well as the doctrine that the foreign judgment must not constitute "a clear mistake of
law or fact."61 And finally, it has been recognized that "public policy" as a defense to the recognition of judgments serves as
an umbrella for a variety of concerns in international practice which may lead to a denial of recognition. 62

The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized in this
jurisdiction.63 This defense allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when
such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a person. 64 The defense
is also recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to a broad public policy exception which
may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing court,
applied the wrong law to the case. 65 The public policy defense can safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to
offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional values.

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments,
or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations.66

The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination
two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 67

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been
authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted
principles of international law. 68

As earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition
and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governi ng
the practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specif ic
rules governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement.

Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition and enforcement is embodied in the
rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is evidenced
primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed in its current form since the early 1900s.

Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an
action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from
internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state,69 but
they all prescind from the premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognit ion
and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in international
practice.

This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive
their efficacy not merely from the procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules of
procedure are promulgated by the Supreme Court, 70 and could very well be abrogated or revised by the high court itself.

Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State components, to obey the laws of the land, including generally accepted
principles of international law which form part thereof, such as those ensuring the qualified recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments.71

Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right recognized
within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well
as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country merely due to an exhorbitant assessment
of docket fees is alien to generally accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there are grave concerns
in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the value of the property subject of the foreign decis ion.

Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be in foreign denomination, computed in accordance with the applicable laws
and standards of the forum.72 The vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative low-income capacity of the Filipino, to date
may very well translate into an award virtually unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket fees
for the enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought to be enforced.

The theory adopted by respondent judge and the Marcos Estate may even lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an
award involving real property situated in places such as the United States or Scandinavia where re al property values are
inexorably high. We cannot very well require that the filing fee be computed based on the value of the foreign property as
determined by the standards of the country where it is located.

As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as it recognizes that the subject matter of
an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted
in the foreign judgment. In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is based
on the US District Court's Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of classification under the governing
procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of "all other actions not
involving property." Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.

Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the Constitution, which states that "[F]ree access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." Since the
provision is among the guarantees ensured by the Bill of Rights, it certainly gives rise to a demandable right.

However, now is not the occasion to elaborate on the parameters of this constitutional right. Given our preceding discussion,
it is not necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that th e
constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy can be settled on other grounds 73 or unless
the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case. 74

One more word. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but
presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded
to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and no other, does not render verdict on the enforceability of
the Final Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any other issue which may
legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines
of the matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the
trial court is encouraged, and contumacious delay of the decision on the merits will not be brooked by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a new order
REINSTATING Civil Case No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his
capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public
Highways, respondents.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for
respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition
proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its
implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power.

The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and
oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner
Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted
by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2

Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of
justification The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations
issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must
be dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974,
reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is
the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning
device to signal approaching motorists of their presence;

[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with
traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended
the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices;

[Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways ,
including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct:

1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of
early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the
base and 40 cms. at the sides.
2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway,
including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning devic e mentioned
herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked.

3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described,
to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece
not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to
effectively implement this order.

4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect
then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise.
"Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows:

3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the
registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid
motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate
to effectively implement this order.'" 4

There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They
were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the
installation of early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30,
1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of
Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8

It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of
Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, a s amended by
Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the following rules and
regulations are hereby issued:

1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may
come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in Section
2 of said administrative order;

2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered
stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be
indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle
concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect
immediately. 9 It was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works,
transportation, and Communications. 10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped
when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning
device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing
rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter
of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power.

" For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of
our compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called
early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14

Are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and
confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better
substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and
Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo
F. Edu, etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition
for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to fi le
an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to
[issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court. 16

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15, 1978, he
Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations
and stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle
Car.

Thus, they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the
effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land
transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional
provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are
likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said
allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this
Answer."18

Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the
sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Inst ruction was a
valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge
that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defe nses,
a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They
are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21

Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals,
of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in
detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed
Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its
highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the outset, it i s
far from meritorious and must be dismissed.

1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner
and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a
category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the
latter point was mentioned only in passing.

The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of th e American
Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision
after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that
sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power.

It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the
most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public
needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits.

In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with
the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency,
suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon
its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group
of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare." 24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police power
measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this
Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication
of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an
enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the
purpose of which was:

"To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As
a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense
Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations
becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the
presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor
of Manila. 28

The rationale was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme
Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police
power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law.

As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption
of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute. 29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted pres umption of validity. As was
pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical information and
data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitio ner's
naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents'
because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved
rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition).
Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court:
Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *.
 But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early warning
devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the
deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30

It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study
by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanctio n
to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for
exaggeration.

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the
Answer of the Solicitor General thus:

"Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose
cars are already equipped with1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered
blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,"
or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because:

Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under
adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world,
who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there
is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic.

On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum
lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all
about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty
in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor
General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order
No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby.

All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of
this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of
industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning
device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and
administrative order.

Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory,
much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners'
as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device requirement 'a more
subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation.

Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an
unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged
Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it. 32
7. It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the
justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to
its wisdom.

That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears
repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or
expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise
 legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern.'

There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate
any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise
or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and never inquire
into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis
for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be.

The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department
and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if
on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence
to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit
their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on
the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is
wisdom cannot be sustained. 33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any
support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative
pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the
aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter:

"To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.

It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.

The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose
of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is
sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition
given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into force and
effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments,
giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments.'

He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non -
legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this conside ration. The
petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed
by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);

[Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; It cannot be
 disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country
to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way
of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt
on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual observation
should be taken seriously.

In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule"
in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered
unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic
formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts.
The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, concur.
Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
Aquino J., took no part.
Concepcion J., is on leave.
Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.

MELO, J.:

The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-à-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His
only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in
times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's
ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the
fundamental writ.

The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:

On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure
for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine
of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was
committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and
the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide
the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.

On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way
of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an
extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State).

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note
Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida,
and other supporting documents for said extradition.

Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following
provisions of the United States Code (USC):

A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty
— 5 years on each count);

B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty — less than
one year).

On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began
with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel
found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there
are some other matters that needed to be addressed".

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July
1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as
all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall
have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be
held in abeyance in the meantime.

Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United
States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.

In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by
private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:

1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the
United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition
documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law.

Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary
requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and
admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069.

Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to
preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements
under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.

It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished
by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose
any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents.

2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained
through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to
secure orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury
information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr.
Jimenez.

Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this
particular extradition request the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of the subject information.

This Department's denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the
foreign governments in all extradition requests.

3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request.
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith".
 Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of
accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish
private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to
comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and
objectively);

certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from
considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private
respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction.

The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional
trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.

After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved
that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.

On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to
maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings
in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the
petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels
for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise,
ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said
date.

SO ORDERED.

Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:

I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E.,
TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST
AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT
ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO
CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
 II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE
EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;

III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND

IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND
WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.

On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary
restraining order (TRO) providing:

NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondent
Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead are
hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public
respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.

GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day
of August 1999.

The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective
memoranda.

From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these
issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings:
During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights
of notice and hearing?

An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which
are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the
TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of
the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court.

Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of
the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the
Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is
there any conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?

The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case,
brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the
propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.

To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only
on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the
Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the
penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted
as follows:
 The Extradition Request

The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and
shall be accompanied by:

1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the
Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal force;

2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity of
the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time
and place of the commission of these acts;

3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or description of
the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and

4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.

(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides:

. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of this
law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents to the
Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the
case.

The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the
request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?

In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain
whether or not the request is supported by:

1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location of the
person sought;

2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;

3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which extradition
is requested;

4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense;

5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of
punishment for the offense;

6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article,
as applicable.

(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his arrest
and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;
 8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and

9. A copy of the charging document.

The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents received in
support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in
the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of
Foreign Affairs).

In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e] xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of
the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation."

The Extradition Petition

Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are
sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The
lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a pra yer
that the court take the extradition request under consideration.

The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue
an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.

The Extradition Hearing

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special
proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the
provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings,
shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon
application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor
upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable
to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the
Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except
for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).

The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application of
the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also
determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US
Extradition Treaty).

With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself:

What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?

A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extraditio n
petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the
latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3],
Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense
which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5
of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.

However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisio ns
of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign
Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request,
apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same an d its
accompanying documents.

The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely
acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the
magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Departmen t
of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether
they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition
documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31,
1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right to be
furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of
time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings
be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.

The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other
enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a
manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evalua te
the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.

Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly
reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well -founded judgment that the request
and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law,
could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys.

How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a
criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the
executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition
papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are
not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a
military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and
Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).

Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted
in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based
upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative
Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also
known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body which better
enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under
its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of
witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.

In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory
body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to in vestigating the
facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions:

Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before
it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then
there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.

The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body
has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective
extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and,
therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition.

Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should
be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition
petition can be filed in court.

It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain
peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation
of liberty of the prospective extraditee.

This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request
the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP -US Extradition
Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree
No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]).

Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded
to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested
(Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically,
the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the
prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).

Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is no t
only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.

Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency
conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical
assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee.
As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make
available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily availa ble
only in criminal prosecutions.

Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the
trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against
self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335;
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).

In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to
administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed
physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty.

The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's
license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property. Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra)
involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379,
or the Anti-Graft Law.

Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are
deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda,
Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine whether
a proceeding is civil or criminal:

If the proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case,
such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that
the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve
the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.

The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this
true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for
while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.

By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country,
thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result — the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent
or the person charged.

Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an
information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.

Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the
extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well -taken. Wright is not
authority for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The
characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It
had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.

As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public
good, which regards and preserved these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado
vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty
commitments.

The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language
and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit
with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient
character which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time
to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future.

The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the
capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the
courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and
exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78).

Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association
vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very
idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).

Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).

True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right
to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law,
1996 ed., p. 64).

In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within
ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant.

These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:

1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative
charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters
showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and
the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;

2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from
enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the
summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary
appointee; and

3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the
subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.

American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause
in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, §2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the
governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state.
The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose,
which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with c rime
(31A Am Jur 2d 754-755).

In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all
the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation
that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person
demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before
some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407).

The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and
documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrument charging the person demanded with a
crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging
instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the government of
the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410).

A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or
sentence and other instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his
attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand.

In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the
Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer
having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).

In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the
Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes,
and judicial decisions, to wit:

1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the
provincial arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S.
Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is
transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.

2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of Justice.
Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been
made, that the treaty is in full force and effect;

That under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that
the offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been
authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition
hearing.

3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18
U.S.C. §3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offere d in
support of the extradition request (Ibid.)

4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The
court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing;
(b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there
is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged
(Ibid.)
 5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a
"complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of
the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.)

[In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition
proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather than
a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]

6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations in
factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this
certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate
decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. §3186).

7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the requesting
government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present whatever information
he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an
individual to the foreign government concerned.

From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity — the
Department of State — which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and,
in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability.

In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and
having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice
for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition.

Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the
Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted,
preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for extradition.

Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited
be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is
the possible delay in the evaluation process.

We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:

The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy
of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular,
that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for
efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less , and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones. (Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)

The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right — that of liberty — secured
not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of
expediency. (pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the
end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts.

There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person
invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the
 nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).

There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective,
requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless,
accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do
not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic pri nciples
inherent in "ordered liberty."

Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the
strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may
not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the
extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been
met (31 Am Jur 2d 819).

Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the power to deny the behest from
the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the
Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not
vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.

In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the
requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition
papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly
authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the
lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department.

With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated peri od of time due to its
intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice
and hearing can be dispensed with?

Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity a nd
deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure.

On one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative if adverse to the person
involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petitio n
in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after
the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arr est
allowed under the treaty and the implementing law.

The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.

Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which
reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to
information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general
right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of
access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provi ded
by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that ultimately
it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).

Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the
guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On
the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with publ ic interest and matters which
are of purely private interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters
requested, invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby, his
right to information becomes absolute.

The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the
conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen
(Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen
has "standing".

When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct bearing on his life,
and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section
1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public c oncern. As to an accused in a criminal
proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.

The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government (Bernas,
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official
records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.

In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the U.S.
Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of
foreign relations with the U.S. Government.

Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public
concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such particular
time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no
official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the righ t is premature.

Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our
government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition o f a fellow
Filipino would be forthcoming.

We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's
entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a
conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the
grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.

The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties
to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations."
Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action
is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situati ons in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the l ocal
state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal
law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed.,
p. 55).

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law
and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the
reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga &
Yap, op. cit., p. 13).

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most
countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments.

Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal
a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statute s
and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two
components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should
be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree
No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition
proceedings.

From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the
propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior
thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights.

Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the
extradition request and the supporting documents.

We disagree.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process
rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose
no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even
request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be suppli ed
the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).

Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this
stage would be obtainable during trial.
The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand j ury
information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition
proceedings. Not even during trial.

A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures
on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application
by analogy.

Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both
procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional
arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential
Decree No. 1069).

Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he
privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety
requires it"?

Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the
extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor,
notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ."

Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations,
the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs .
NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA
632 [1997]).

In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor
Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional
guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to
the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not
be given paramount consideration.

How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree
No. 1069?

Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661
[1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under
Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions
of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes);

And Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be
charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary
dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still
operate.

As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:

. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed
or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must
be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed
is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him.

This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the
constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some
misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say,
his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . .

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the
respondent.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but
of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's
favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," m ay
be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]).

The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due
process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not
be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That
would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and governme nt authority, he
must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant
him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99 -
94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 159618 February 1, 2011

BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L.
MAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This petition1 for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 assails and seeks to nullify the Non-Surrender
Agreement concluded by and between the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and the United States of America (USA).

The Facts
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period mate rial to this case.
Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. 2

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute 3 establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
with "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall
be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions."4 The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave
under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. 5

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms,
is "subject to ratification, acceptance or approval" by the signatory states. 6 As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out
of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines
is not among the 92.

RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and
the RP.

Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then
DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and
put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines
as "persons" of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against th em in international
tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries.
As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries. 9

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

 1. For purposes of this Agreement, "persons" are current or former Government officials, employees (including
contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such
tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third
country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal
has been established by the UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a third country, the
[US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country, the
[GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the
Government of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other of its
intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any
act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally
binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and
consent of the US Senate.10

In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying
the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
For their part, respondents question petitioner’s standing to maintain a suit and counter that the Agreement, being in the
nature of an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy. And for reasons detailed in their
comment, respondents assert the constitutionality of the Agreement.

The Issues

I. WHETHER THE [RP] PRESIDENT AND THE [DFA] SECRETARY x x x GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION FOR CONCLUDING THE RP-US
NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT BY MEANS OF [E/N] BFO-028-03 DATED 13 MAY 2003, WHEN THE
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY SIGNED THE ROME STATUTE OF THE [ICC] ALTHOUGH
THIS IS PENDING RATIFICATION BY THE PHILIPPINE SENATE.

A. Whether by entering into the Agreement Respondents gravely abused their discretion when they
capriciously abandoned, waived and relinquished our only legitimate recourse through the Rome
Statute of the [ICC] to prosecute and try "persons" as defined in the Agreement, or literally any conduit
of American interests, who have committed crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes
and the crime of aggression, thereby abdicating Philippine Sovereignty.
 B. Whether after the signing and pending ratification of the Rome Statute of the [ICC] the [RP] President
and the [DFA] Secretary are obliged by the principle of good faith to refrain from doing all acts which would
substantially impair the value of the undertaking as signed.

C. Whether the Agreement constitutes an act which defeats the object and purpose of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court and contravenes the obligation of good faith inherent in the signature of
the President affixed on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and if so whether the
Agreement is void and unenforceable on this ground.

D. Whether the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement is void and unenforceable for grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in connection with its execution.

II. WHETHER THE RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT IS VOID AB INITIO FOR CONTRACTING
OBLIGATIONS THAT ARE EITHER IMMORAL OR OTHERWISE AT VARIANCE WITH UNIVERSALLY
RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW .

III. WHETHER THE AGREEMENT IS VALID, BINDING AND EFFECTIVE WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE
BY AT LEAST TWO-THIRDS (2/3) OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE

The foregoing issues may be summarized into two: first, whether or not the Agreement was contracted validly, which
resolves itself into the question of whether or not respondents gravely abused their discretion in concluding it; and second,
whether or not the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the Senate for concurrence, contravenes and undermines
the Rome Statute and other treaties. But because respondents expectedly raised it, we shall first tackle the issue of
petitioner’s legal standing.

The Court’s Ruling

This petition is bereft of merit.

Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of Petitioner

Petitioner, through its three party-list representatives, contends that the issue of the validity or invalidity of
the Agreement carries with it constitutional significance and is of paramount importance that justifies its standing. Cited in
this regard is what is usually referred to as the emergency powers cases in which ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
accorded the personality to question the constitutionality of executive issuances.

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 13 Specifically, it is "a party’s personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result"14 of the act being challenged,
and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance." 15

The term "interest" refers to material interest, as distinguished from one that is merely incidental. 16 The rationale for requiring
a party who challenges the validity of a law or international agreement to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy is "to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 17

Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recognized that, in some cases, suits are not brought
by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in the public interest. 18 Consequently, in a catena of cases, 19 this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal stance on locus standi.

Going by the petition, petitioner’s representatives pursue the instant suit primarily as concerned citizens raising issues of
transcendental importance, both for the Republic and the citizenry as a whole.
When suing as a citizen to question the validity of a law or other government action, a petitioner needs to meet certain
specific requirements before he can be clothed with standing. Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. 20 expounded on this requirement, thus:

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met
have been given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal.
He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way.

It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In
fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirem ent
of personal interest.21

In the case at bar, petitioner’s representatives have complied with the qualifying conditions or specific requirements exacte d
under the locus standi rule. As citizens, their interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal. At the very
least, their assertions questioning the Agreement are made of a public right, i.e., to ascertain that the Agreement did not go
against established national policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the State’s obligation to the community of
nations.

At any event, the primordial importance to Filipino citizens in general of the issue at hand impels the Court to brush aside
the procedural barrier posed by the traditional requirement of locus standi, as we have done in a long line of earlier cases,
notably in the old but oft-cited emergency powers cases 22 and Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.23

In cases of transcendental importance, we wrote again in Bayan v. Zamora,24 "The Court may relax the standing
requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review."

Moreover, bearing in mind what the Court said in Tañada v. Angara, "that it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred
duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropri ate
cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government,"25 we cannot but resolve head
on the issues raised before us.

Indeed, where an action of any branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution or is done with
grave abuse of discretion, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle it. As in this petition,
issues are precisely raised putting to the fore the propriety of the Agreement pending the ratification of the Rome Statute.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot
be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargons–
–is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Arti cle II of the Constitution, wherein
the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. 26

An exchange of notes falls "into the category of inter-governmental agreements,"27 which is an internationally accepted form
of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by
the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to
record its assent.

The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange
of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative
approval.28

In another perspective, the terms "exchange of notes" and "executive agreements" have been used interchangeably,
exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. 29 On
the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President "sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’" 30

As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of
Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other government’s ends and agreements – whether
denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment.

It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03––be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself,
or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a legally
binding international written contract among nations.

Senate Concurrence Not Required

Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between
states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation." 32

International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification ;
or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are
usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties. 33

Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects
on the contracting states concerned, 34 as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. 35 Neither,
on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution. 36

Authorities are, however, agreed that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the concurrence -
requirement aspect.37 As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater "dignity" than an executive
agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the
Senate, and the people;38 a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory
enactment.39

Petitioner parlays the notion that the Agreement is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence,
it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner takes a cue from Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading,
in which the Court reproduced the following observations made by US legal scholars:

"[I]nternational agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties [while] those embodying adjustments of detail
carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature take the form of executive agreements." 40

Pressing its point, petitioner submits that the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that
are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case, and that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as
commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and
navigation arrangements and settlement of claims.

In addition, petitioner foists the applicability to the instant case of Adolfo v. CFI of Zambales and Merchant,41 holding that
an executive agreement through an exchange of notes cannot be used to amend a treaty.

We are not persuaded.

The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is
not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an
executive agreement as an instrument of international relations.

The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an international
agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. Verily, the matter of form takes a back seat when i t
comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either
international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda42 principle.

As may be noted, almost half a century has elapsed since the Court rendered its decision in Eastern Sea Trading. Since
then, the conduct of foreign affairs has become more complex and the domain of international law wider, as to include such
subjects as human rights, the environment, and the sea. In fact, in the US alone, the executive agreements executed by its
President from 1980 to 2000 covered subjects such as defense, trade, scientific cooperation, aviation, atomic energy,
environmental cooperation, peace corps, arms limitation, and nuclear safety, among others. 43

Surely, the enumeration in Eastern Sea Trading cannot circumscribe the option of each state on the matter of which the
international agreement format would be convenient to serve its best interest. As Francis Sayre said in his work referred to
earlier:

It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such concluded from time to
time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreement act, have been
negotiated with foreign governments. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax
on shipping profits, the admission of civil air craft, custom matters and commercial relations generally, international claims,
postal matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights, etc.

And lest it be overlooked, one type of executive agreement is a treaty-authorized44 or a treaty-implementing executive
agreement,45 which necessarily would cover the same matters subject of the underlying treaty.

But over and above the foregoing considerations is the fact that––save for the situation and matters contemplated in Sec.
25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution 46––when a treaty is required, the Constitution does not classify any subject, like that
involving political issues, to be in the form of, and ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely prescribes is that treaties
need the concurrence of the Senate by a vote defined therein to complete the ratification process.

Petitioner’s reliance on Adolfo47 is misplaced, said case being inapplicable owing to different factual milieus. There, the
Court held that an executive agreement cannot be used to amend a duly ratified and existing treaty, i.e., the Bases Treaty.
Indeed, an executive agreement that does not require the concurrence of the Senate for its ratification may not be used to
amend a treaty that, under the Constitution, is the product of the ratifying acts of the Executive and the Senate. The presen ce
of a treaty, purportedly being subject to amendment by an executive agreement, does not obtain under the premises.

Considering the above discussion, the Court need not belabor at length the third main issue raised, referring to the validity
and effectivity of the Agreement without the concurrence by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. The Court
has, in Eastern Sea Trading,48 as reiterated in Bayan,49 given recognition to the obligatory effect of executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Senate:

[T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressio nal approval
has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering
such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously
questioned by our courts.

The Agreement Not in Contravention of the Rome Statute

It is the petitioner’s next contention that the Agreement undermines the establishment of the ICC and is null and void insofar
as it unduly restricts the ICC’s jurisdiction and infringes upon the effectivity of the Rome Statute. Petitioner posits that
the Agreement was constituted solely for the purpose of providing individuals or groups of individuals with immunity from
the jurisdiction of the ICC; and such grant of immunity through non-surrender agreements allegedly does not legitimately
fall within the scope of Art. 98 of the Rome Statute. It concludes that state parties with non-surrender agreements are
prevented from meeting their obligations under the Rome Statute, thereby constituting a breach of Arts.

Petitioner stresses that the overall object and purpose of the Rome Statute is to ensure that those responsible for the worst
possible crimes are brought to justice in all cases, primarily by states, but as a last resort, by the ICC; thus, any agreement—
like the non-surrender agreement—that precludes the ICC from exercising its complementary function of acting when a
state is unable to or unwilling to do so, defeats the object and purpose of the Rome Statute.

Petitioner would add that the President and the DFA Secretary, as representatives of a signatory of the Rome Statute, are
obliged by the imperatives of good faith to refrain from performing acts that substantially devalue the purpose and object of
the Statute, as signed. Adding a nullifying ingredient to the Agreement, according to petitioner, is the fact that it has an
immoral purpose or is otherwise at variance with a priorly executed treaty.

Contrary to petitioner’s pretense, the Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity
underpins the creation of the ICC. As aptly pointed out by respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction of the
ICC is to "be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states]." 54 Art. 1 of the Rome Statute
pertinently provides:

Article 1
The Court

An International Crimininal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall have the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the
provisions of this Statute.

Significantly, the sixth preambular paragraph of the Rome Statute declares that "it is the duty of every State to exercise it s
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes." This provision indicates that primary jurisdiction over
the so-called international crimes rests, at the first instance, with the state where the crime was committed; secondarily,
with the ICC in appropriate situations contemplated under Art. 17, par. 1 55 of the Rome Statute.

Of particular note is the application of the principle of ne bis in idem 56 under par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again
underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-a-vis that of the ICC. As far as relevant, the provision states that
"no person who has been tried by another court for conduct x x x [constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by
the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same conduct."

The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, argue against the idea of jurisdictional conflict between
the Philippines, as party to the non-surrender agreement, and the ICC; or the idea of the Agreement substantially impairing
the value of the RP’s undertaking under the Rome Statute. Ignoring for a while the fact that the RP signed the Rome Statute
ahead of the Agreement, it is abundantly clear to us that the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of
states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC
coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Given the above consideration, petitioner’s suggestion––that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, violated its duty
required by the imperatives of good faith and breached its commitment under the Vienna Convention57 to refrain from
performing any act tending to impair the value of a treaty, e.g., the Rome Statute––has to be rejected outright.

For nothing in the provisions of the Agreement, in relation to the Rome Statute, tends to diminish the efficacy of the Statute,
let alone defeats the purpose of the ICC. Lest it be overlooked, the Rome Statute contains a proviso that enjoins the ICC
from seeking the surrender of an erring person, should the process require the requested state to perform an act that would
violate some international agreement it has entered into. We refer to Art. 98(2) of the Rome Statute, which reads:

Article 98
Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity
and consent to surrender

The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending
State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.

Moreover, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty; 58 whereas a State-Party, on the other hand, is legally obliged to follow all the
provisions of a treaty in good faith.

In the instant case, it bears stressing that the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for
lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose o f
the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.

As a result, petitioner’s argument that State-Parties with non-surrender agreements are prevented from meeting their
obligations under the Rome Statute, specifically Arts. 27, 86, 89 and 90, must fail. These articles are only legally binding
upon State-Parties, not signatories.

Furthermore, a careful reading of said Art. 90 would show that the Agreement is not incompatible with the Rome Statute.
Specifically, Art. 90(4) provides that "[i]f the requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute the requested State, if it is
not under an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, shall give priority to the request for
surrender from the Court."

In applying the provision, certain undisputed facts should be pointed out: first, the US is neither a State-Party nor a signatory
to the Rome Statute; and second, there is an international agreement between the US and the Philippines regarding
extradition or surrender of persons, i.e., the Agreement. Clearly, even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the
Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the
States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.

Sovereignty Limited by International Agreements

Petitioner next argues that the RP has, through the Agreement, abdicated its sovereignty by bargaining away the jurisdiction
of the ICC to prosecute US nationals, government officials/employees or military personnel who c ommit serious crimes of
international concerns in the Philippines. Formulating petitioner’s argument a bit differently, the RP, by entering into
the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its ri ght to seek
recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country.
We are not persuaded. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines’ national
criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, as explained above, it is always the responsibility and within
the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the
jurisdiction of the ICC.
Thus, the Philippines may decide to try "persons" of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national
criminal justice system. Or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US " persons"
committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. As to "persons"
of the US whom the Philippines refuses to prosecute, the country would, in effect, accord discretion to the US to exercise
either its national criminal jurisdiction over the "person" concerned or to give its consent to the referral of the matter to the
ICC for trial. In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to "persons" of the
RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction.

In the context of the Constitution, there can be no serious objection to the Philippines agreeing to undertake the things set
forth in the Agreement. Surely, one State can agree to waive jurisdiction—to the extent agreed upon—to subjects of another
State due to the recognition of the principle of extraterritorial immunity. What the Court wrote in Nicolas v. Romulo59—a
case involving the implementation of the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement—is
apropos:

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction
(such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of
the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State’s territory. x x x

To be sure, the nullity of the subject non-surrender agreement cannot be predicated on the postulate that some of its
provisions constitute a virtual abdication of its sovereignty. Almost every time a state enters into an international agreement,
it voluntarily sheds off part of its sovereignty. The Constitution, as drafted, did not envision a reclusive Philippines isolated
from the rest of the world. It even adheres, as earlier stated, to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. 60

By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and
absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state
power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction.

The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal
undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. On the rationale that the
Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution. 61 Such waiver does not amount to an unconstitutional
diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of Philippine courts.62

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance

with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at
variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact
that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, "leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that
deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC]”.

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner’s earlier position, which, as already d iscussed, contends that the
RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations
under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles. 64

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, "is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national crimin al
laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously."

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons
who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in
the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary
to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met.

For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international
tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its exist ing
laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the
Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal
by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion

Petitioner’s final point revolves around the necessity of the Senate’s concurrence in the Agreement. And without specifically
saying so, petitioner would argue that the non-surrender agreement was executed by the President, thru the DFA Secretary,
in grave abuse of discretion.

The Court need not delve on and belabor the first portion of the above posture of petitioner, the same having been discussed
at length earlier on. As to the second portion, we wish to state that petitioner virtually faults the President for performing,
through respondents, a task conferred the President by the Constitution—the power to enter into international agreements.

By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head of state and government, is the sole organ
and authority in the external affairs of the country. 65 The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into
international agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes of the Senate. But as earlier
indicated, executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence.

As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put
it, "executive altogether." The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirme d
by long practice.66

In thus agreeing to conclude the Agreement thru E/N BFO-028-03, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, represented
by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acted within the scope of the authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution.
At the end of the day, the President––by ratifying, thru her deputies, the non-surrender agreement––did nothing more than
discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a prerogative that pertains to her office.

While the issue of ratification of the Rome Statute is not determinative of the other issues raised herein, it may perhaps be
pertinent to remind all and sundry that about the time this petition was interposed, such issue of ratification was laid to rest
in Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary. 67

As the Court emphasized in said case, the power to ratify a treaty, the Statute in that instance, rests with the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate, whose role relative to the ratification of a treaty is limited merely to concurring in
or withholding the ratification. And concomitant with this treaty-making power of the President is his or her prerogative to
refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate; or having secured the latter’s consent to the ratification of the treaty, refuse to ratify
it.68

This prerogative, the Court hastened to add, is the President’s alone and cannot be encroached upon via a writ of
mandamus. Barring intervening events, then, the Philippines remains to be just a signatory to the Rome Statute. Under Art.
12569 thereof, the final acts required to complete the treaty process and, thus, bring it into force, insofar as the Philippines
is concerned, have yet to be done.

Agreement Need Not Be in the Form of a Treaty

On December 11, 2009, then President Arroyo signed into law Republic Act No. (RA) 9851, otherwise known as the
"Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity." Sec.
17 of RA 9851, particularly the second paragraph thereof, provides:
Section 17. Jurisdiction. –

In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a crime
punishable under this Act if another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the
prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the
Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws a nd
treaties.

A view is advanced that the Agreement amends existing municipal laws on the State’s obligation in relation to grave crimes
against the law of nations, i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Relying on the above -quoted statutory
proviso, the view posits that the Philippine is required to surrender to the proper international tribunal those persons accu sed
of the grave crimes defined under RA 9851, if it does not exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute them.

The basic premise rests on the interpretation that if it does not decide to prosecute a foreign national for violations of RA
9851, the Philippines has only two options, to wit: (1) surrender the accused to the proper international tribunal; or (2)
surrender the accused to another State if such surrender is "pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties." But
the Philippines may exercise these options only in cases where "another court or international tribunal is already conducting
the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime;" otherwise, the Philippines must prosecute the crime before
its own courts pursuant to RA 9851.

Posing the situation of a US national under prosecution by an international tribunal for any crime under RA 9851, the
Philippines has the option to surrender such US national to the international tribunal if it decides not to prosecute such US
national here.

The view asserts that this option of the Philippines under Sec. 17 of RA 9851 is not subject to the consent of the US, and
any derogation of Sec. 17 of RA 9851, such as requiring the consent of the US before the Philippines can exercise such
option, requires an amendatory law. In line with this scenario, the view strongly argues that the Agreement prevents the
Philippines—without the consent of the US—from surrendering to any international tribunal US nationals accused of crimes
covered by RA 9851, and, thus, in effect amends Sec. 17 of RA 9851.

Consequently, the view is strongly impressed that the Agreement cannot be embodied in a simple executive agreement in
the form of an exchange of notes but must be implemented through an extradition law or a treaty with the corresponding
formalities.

Moreover, consonant with the foregoing view, citing Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution, where the Philippines adopts, as a
national policy, the "generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land," the Court is further
impressed to perceive the Rome Statute as declaratory of customary international law. In other words, the Statute embodies
principles of law which constitute customary international law or custom and for which reason it assumes the status of an
enforceable domestic law in the context of the aforecited constitutional provision.

As a corollary, it is argued that any derogation from the Rome Statute principles cannot be undertaken via a mere executive
agreement, which, as an exclusive act of the executive branch, can only implement, but cannot amend or repeal, an existing
law. The Agreement, so the argument goes, seeks to frustrate the objects of the principles of law or alters customary rules
embodied in the Rome Statute.

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, the view thus advanced considers the Agreement inefficacious, unless it is
embodied in a treaty duly ratified with the concurrence of the Senate, the theory being that a Senate- ratified treaty partakes
of the nature of a municipal law that can amend or supersede another law, in this instance Sec. 17 of RA 9851 and the
status of the Rome Statute as constitutive of enforceable domestic law under Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution.
We are unable to lend cogency to the view thus taken.

For one, we find that the Agreement does not amend or is repugnant to RA 9851. For another, the view does not clearly
state what precise principles of law, if any, the Agreement alters. And for a third, it does not demonstrate in the concrete
how the Agreement seeks to frustrate the objectives of the principles of law subsumed in the Rome Statute.
Far from it, as earlier explained, the Agreement does not undermine the Rome Statute as the former merely reinforces the
primacy of the national jurisdiction of the US and the Philippines in prosecuting criminal offenses committed by their
respective citizens and military personnel, among others. The jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to the Rome Statute over high
crimes indicated thereat is clearly and unmistakably complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction of the signatory
states.

Moreover, RA 9851 clearly: (1) defines and establishes the crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and
other crimes against humanity; 70 (2) provides penal sanctions and criminal liability for their commission; 71 and (3)
establishes special courts for the prosecution of these crimes and for the State to exercise primary criminal jurisdiction. 72

Nowhere in RA 9851 is there a proviso that goes against the tenor of the Agreement.

The view makes much of the above quoted second par. of Sec. 17, RA 9851 as requiring the Philippine State to surrender
to the proper international tribunal those persons accused of crimes sanctioned under said law if it does not exercise its
primary jurisdiction to prosecute such persons. This view is not entirely correct, for the above quoted proviso clearly
provides discretion to the Philippine State on whether to surrender or not a person accused of the crimes under RA 9851.

The statutory proviso uses the word "may." It is settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes
discretion, and cannot be construed as having mandatory effect. 73 Thus, the pertinent second pararagraph of Sec. 17, RA
9851 is simply permissive on the part of the Philippine State.

Besides, even granting that the surrender of a person is mandatorily required when the Philippines does not exercise its
primary jurisdiction in cases where "another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or
undertaking the prosecution of such crime," still, the tenor of the Agreement is not repugnant to Sec. 17 of RA 9851.

Said legal proviso aptly provides that the surrender may be made "to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition
laws and treaties." The Agreement can already be considered a treaty following this Court’s decision in N icolas v.
Romulo74 which cited Weinberger v. Rossi. 75 In Nicolas, We held that "an executive agreement is a ‘treaty’ within the
meaning of that word in international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the United States."76

Likewise, the Philippines and the US already have an existing extradition treaty, i.e., RP-US Extradition Treaty, which was
executed on November 13, 1994. The pertinent Philippine law, on the other hand, is Presidential Decree No. 1069, issued
on January 13, 1977. Thus, the Agreement, in conjunction with the RP-US Extradition Treaty, would neither violate nor run
counter to Sec. 17 of RA 9851.

The view’s reliance on Suplico v. Neda 77 is similarly improper. In that case, several petitions were filed questioning the
power of the President to enter into foreign loan agreements. However, before the petitions could be resolved by the Court,
the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion averring that the Philippine Government decided not to
continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project, thus rendering the petition moot. In resolving the case, the
Court took judicial notice of the act of the executive department of the Philippines (the President) and found the petition to
be indeed moot. Accordingly, it dismissed the petitions.

In his dissent in the abovementioned case, Justice Carpio discussed the legal implications of an execut ive agreement. He
stated that "an executive agreement has the force and effect of law x x x [it] cannot amend or repeal prior laws." 78 Hence,
this argument finds no application in this case seeing as RA 9851 is a subsequent law, not a prior one. Notably, this
argument cannot be found in the ratio decidendi of the case, but only in the dissenting opinion.

The view further contends that the RP-US Extradition Treaty is inapplicable to RA 9851 for the reason that under par. 1,
Art. 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, "[a]n offense shall be an extraditable offense if it is punishable under the laws in both
Contracting Parties x x x,"79 and thereby concluding that while the Philippines has criminalized under RA 9851 the acts
defined in the Rome Statute as war crimes, genocide and other crimes against humanity, there is no similar le gislation in
the US.
It is further argued that, citing U.S. v. Coolidge, in the US, a person cannot be tried in the federal courts for an internat ional
crime unless Congress adopts a law defining and punishing the offense.

This view must fail.

On the contrary, the US has already enacted legislation punishing the high crimes mentioned earlier. In fact, as early as
October 2006, the US enacted a law criminalizing war crimes. Section 2441, Chapter 118, Part I, Title 18 of the United
States Code Annotated (USCA) provides for the criminal offense of "war crimes" which is similar to the war crimes found in
both the Rome Statute and RA 9851, thus:

(a) Offense – Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a war crime, in any of the
circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of
years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.

(b) Circumstances – The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the person committing such war crime
or the victim of such war crime is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United
States (as defined in Section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).

(c) Definition – As used in this Section the term "war crime" means any conduct –

(1) Defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949,
or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party;

(2) Prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27 or 28 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907;

(3) Which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as defined in subsection [d]) when committed
in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an international character; or

(4) Of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of the Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended at
Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996), when the United States is a party to
such Protocol, willfully kills or causes serious injury to civilians. 80

Similarly, in December 2009, the US adopted a law that criminalized genocide, to wit:

Genocide

(a) Basic Offense – Whoever, whether in the time of peace or in time of war and with specific intent to destroy, in
whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such–

(1) kills members of that group;

(2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group;

(3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of the group through drugs,
torture, or similar techniques;

(4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group
in whole or in part;

(5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or

(6) transfers by force children of the group to another group; shall be punished as provided in subsection.
Arguing further, another view has been advanced that the current US laws do not cover every crime listed within the
jurisdiction of the ICC and that there is a gap between the definitions of the different crimes under the US laws versus the
Rome Statute. The view used a report written by Victoria K. Holt and Elisabeth W. Dallas, entitled "On Trial: The US Military
and the International Criminal Court," as its basis.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the report used may not have any weight or value under international law. Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) lists the sources of international law, as follows:

(1) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;

(2) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

(3) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and

(4) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

The report does not fall under any of the foregoing enumerated sources. It cannot even be considered as the "teachings of
highly qualified publicists." A highly qualified publicist is a scholar of public international law and the term usually refe rs to
legal scholars or "academic writers." 82 It has not been shown that the authors 83 of this report are highly qualified publicists.

Evidently, the gaps pointed out as to the definition of the crimes are not present. In fact, the report itself stated as much, to
wit:

Few believed there were wide differences between the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court and crimes within the
Uniform Code of Military Justice that would expose US personnel to the Court. Since US military lawyers were instrumental
in drafting the elements of crimes outlined in the Rome Statute, they ensured that most of the crimes were consistent with
those outlined in the UCMJ and gave strength to complementarity for the US. Small areas of potential gaps between the
UCMJ and the Rome Statute, military experts argued, could be addressed through existing military laws. 87

The report went on further to say that "[a]ccording to those involved, the elements of crimes laid out in the Rome Statute
have been part of US military doctrine for decades." 88 Thus, the argument proffered cannot stand.

Nonetheless, despite the lack of actual domestic legislation, the US notably follows the doctrine of incorporation. As early
as 1900, the esteemed Justice Gray in The Paquete Habana89 case already held international law as part of the law of the
US, to wit:

International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor,
research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted wi th the subjects of which they treat. Such
works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, b ut
for the trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. 90

Thus, a person can be tried in the US for an international crime despite the lack of domestic legislation. The cited ruling i n
U.S. v. Coolidge,91 which in turn is based on the holding in U.S. v. Hudson, 92 only applies to common law and not to the law
of nations or international law.93 Indeed, the Court in U.S. v. Hudson only considered the question, "whether the Circuit
Courts of the United States can exercise a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases." 94 Stated otherwise, there is no
common law crime in the US but this is considerably different from international law.

The US doubtless recognizes international law as part of the law of the land, necessarily including international crimes,
even without any local statute.95 In fact, years later, US courts would apply international law as a source of criminal liability
despite the lack of a local statute criminalizing it as such. So it was that in Ex Parte Quirin 96 the US Supreme Court noted
that "[f]rom the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of
the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of
enemy individuals."97 It went on further to explain that Congress had not undertaken the task of codifying the specific
offenses covered in the law of war, thus:

It is no objection that Congress in providing for the trial of such offenses has not itself undertaken to codify that branch of
international law or to mark its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law condemns.
An Act of Congress punishing ‘the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations is an appropriate exercise of its
constitutional authority, Art. I, s 8, cl. 10, ‘to define and punish’ the offense since it has adopted by reference the sufficiently
precise definition of international law.

Similarly by the reference in the 15th Article of War to ‘offenders or offenses that x x x by the law of war may be triable b y
such military commissions. Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all
offenses which are defined as such by the law of war, and which may constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction. 98

This rule finds an even stronger hold in the case of crimes against humanity. It has been held that genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity have attained the status of customary international law. Some even go so far as to state that
these crimes have attained the status of jus cogens. 99

Customary international law or international custom is a source of international law as stated in the Statute of the ICJ.100 It
is defined as the "general and consistent practice of states recognized and followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."101 In order to establish the customary status of a particular norm, two elements must concur: State practice, the
objective element; and opinio juris sive necessitates, the subjective element. 102

State practice refers to the continuous repetition of the same or similar kind of acts or norms by States. 103 It is demonstrated
upon the existence of the following elements: (1) generality; (2) uniformity and consistency; and (3) duration. 104

While, opinio juris, the psychological element, requires that the state practice or norm "be carried out in such a way, as to
be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it." 105
"The term ‘jus cogens’ means the ‘compelling law.’" 106

Corollary, "a jus cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical position among all other customary norms and principles." 107 As
a result, jus cogens norms are deemed "peremptory and non-derogable."108 When applied to international crimes, "jus
cogens crimes have been deemed so fundamental to the existence of a just international legal order that states cannot
derogate from them, even by agreement." 109

These jus cogens crimes relate to the principle of universal jurisdiction, i.e., "any state may exercise jurisdiction over an
individual who commits certain heinous and widely condemned offenses, even when no other recognized basis for
jurisdiction exists."110 "The rationale behind this principle is that the crime committed is so egregious that it is considered to
be committed against all members of the international community" 111 and thus granting every State jurisdiction over the
crime.112

Therefore, even with the current lack of domestic legislation on the part of the US, it still has both the doctrine of incorporation
and universal jurisdiction to try these crimes. Consequently, no matter how hard one insists, the ICC, as an international
tribunal, found in the Rome Statute is not declaratory of customary international law.

The first element of customary international law, i.e., "established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States,"113 does not, under the premises, appear to be obtaining as reflected in this simple reality: As of October 12, 2010,
only 114114

States have ratified the Rome Statute, subsequent to its coming into force eight (8) years earlier, or on July 1, 2002. The
fact that 114 States out of a total of 194 115 countries in the world, or roughly 58.76%, have ratified the Rome Statute casts
doubt on whether or not the perceived principles contained in the Statute have attained the status of customary law and
should be deemed as obligatory international law.

The numbers even tend to argue against the urgency of establishing international criminal courts envisioned in the Rome
Statute. Lest it be overlooked, the Philippines, judging by the action or inaction of its top officials, does not even feel b ound
by the Rome Statute. Res ipsa loquitur. More than eight (8) years have elapsed since the Philippine representative signed
the Statute, but the treaty has not been transmitted to the Senate for the ratification process.

And this brings us to what Fr. Bernas, S.J. aptly said respecting the application of the concurring elements, thus:
Custom or customary international law means "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense
of legal obligation." This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is how the states
behave, and the psychological factor or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do.

The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements:
duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states.

The required duration can be either short or long.

Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency and the generality of the practice.

Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to determine why states behave
the way they do. Do states behave the way they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only
as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an
international rule. Without it, practice is not law. 116

Evidently, there is, as yet, no overwhelming consensus, let alone prevalent practice, among the different countries in the
world that the prosecution of internationally recognized crimes of genocide, etc. should be handled by a particular
international criminal court.

Absent the widespread/consistent-practice-of-states factor, the second or the psychological element must be deemed non-
existent, for an inquiry on why states behave the way they do presupposes, in the first place, that they are actually behaving,
as a matter of settled and consistent practice, in a certain manner. This implicitly requires belief that the practice in que stion
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 117 Like the first element, the second element has likewise
not been shown to be present.

Further, the Rome Statute itself rejects the concept of universal jurisdiction over the crimes enumerated therei n as
evidenced by it requiring State consent. 118 Even further, the Rome Statute specifically and unequivocally requires that: "This
Statute is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States." 119 These clearly negate the argument that
such has already attained customary status.

More importantly, an act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great respect. The power to
enter into executive agreements has long been recognized to be lodged with the President. As We held in Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, "[t]he power to enter into an executive agreement is in
essence an executive power.

This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditional ly
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence." 120 The rationale behind this principle is the inviolable doctrine of separation
of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government. Thus, absent any clear contravention
of the law, courts should exercise utmost caution in declaring any executive agreement invalid.

In light of the above consideration, the position or view that the challenged RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement ought to be
in the form of a treaty, to be effective, has to be rejected.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999

PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fourth Division), CEBU CITY, CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNION
MISSION CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, ELDER HECTOR V. GAYARES, PASTORS
REUBEN MORALDE, OSCAR L. ALOLOR, WILLIAM U. DONATO, JOEL WALES, ELY SACAY, GIDEON BUHAT,
ISACHAR GARSULA, ELISEO DOBLE, PORFIRIO BALACY, DAVID RODRIGO, LORETO MAYPA, MR. RUFO
GASAPO, MR. EUFRONIO IBESATE, MRS. TESSIE BALACY, MR. ZOSIMO KARA-AN, and MR. ELEUTERIO
LOBITANA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Subject of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the Resolution 1 of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission (the "NLRC"), rendered on 23 January 1996, in NLRC Case No. V-0120-93, entitled
"Pastor Dionisio V. Austria vs. Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of Seventh Day Adventists, et al.," which
dismissed the case for illegal dismissal filed by the petitioner against private respondents for lack of jurisdiction.

Private Respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists (hereinafter referred to as
the "SDA") is a religious corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine law and is represented in this case by the
other private respondents, officers of the SDA. Petitioner, on the other hand, was a Pastor of the SDA until 31 October
1991, when his services were terminated.

The records show that petitioner Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the SDA for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to
1991.2 He began his work with the SDA on 15 July 1963 as a literature evangelist, selling literature of the SDA over the
island of Negros. From then on, petitioner worked his way up the ladder and got promoted several times. In January, 1968,
petitioner became the Assistant Publishing Director in the West Visayan Mission of the SDA.

In July, 1972, he was elevated to the position of Pastor in the West Visayan Mission covering the island of Panay, and the
provinces of Romblon and Guimaras. Petitioner held the same position up to 1988. Finally, in 1989, petitioner was promoted
as District Pastor of the Negros Mission of the SDA and was assigned at Sagay, Balintawak and Toboso, Negros Occidental,
with twelve (12) churches under his jurisdiction. In January, 1991, petitioner was transferred to Bacolod City. He held the
position of district pastor until his services were terminated on 31 October 1991.

On various occasions from August up to October, 1991, petitioner received several communications 3 from Mr. Eufronio
Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and
offerings collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to
the Negros Mission.

In his written explanation dated 11 October 1991, 4 petitioner reasoned out that he should not be made accountable for the
unremitted collections since it was private respondents Pastor Gideon Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his
wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time.

Thereafter, on 16 October 1991, at around 7:30 a.m., petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, the president of the
Negros Mission. During said call, petitioner tried to persuade Pastor Buhat to convene the Executive Committee for the
purpose of settling the dispute between him and the private respondent, Pastor David Rodrigo.
The dispute between Pastor Rodrigo and petitioner arose from an incident in which petitioner assisted his friend, Danny
Diamada, to collect from Pastor Rodrigo the unpaid balance for the repair of the latter's motor vehicle which he failed to pay
to Diamada.5 Due to the assistance of petitioner in collecting Pastor Rodrigo's debt, the latter harbored ill -feelings against
petitioner.

When news reached petitioner that Pastor Rodrigo was about to file a complaint against him with the Negros Mission, he
immediately proceeded to the office of Pastor Buhat on the date abovementioned and asked the latter to convene the
Executive Committee. Pastor Buhat denied the request of petitioner since some committee members w ere out of town and
there was no quorum.

Thereafter, the two exchanged heated arguments. Petitioner then left the office of Pastor Buhat. While on his way out,
petitioner overheard Pastor Buhat saying, "Pastor daw inisog na ina iya (Pador you are talking tough)."6 Irked by such
remark, petitioner returned to the office of Pastor Buhat, and tried to overturn the latter's table, though unsuccessfully, s ince
it was heavy. Thereafter, petitioner banged the attaché case of Pastor Buhat on the table, scattered the books in his office,
and threw the phone.7 Fortunately, private respondents Pastors Yonilo Leopoldo and Claudio Montaño were around and
they pacified both Pastor Buhat and petitioner.

On 17 October 1991, petitioner received a letter8 inviting him and his wife to attend the Executive Committee meeting at the
Negros Mission Conference Room on 21 October 1991, at nine in the morning. To be discussed in the meeting were the
non-remittance of church collection and the events that transpired on 16 October 1991. A fact-finding committee was created
to investigate petitioner.

For two (2) days, from October 21 and 22, the fact-finding committee conducted an investigation of petitioner. Sensing that
the result of the investigation might be one-sided, petitioner immediately wrote Pastor Rueben Moralde, president of the
SDA and chairman of the fact-finding committee, requesting that certain members of the fact-finding committee be excluded
in the investigation and resolution of the case. 9

Out of the six (6) members requested to inhibit themselves from the investigation and decision-making, only two (2) were
actually excluded, namely: Pastor Buhat and Pastor Rodrigo. Subsequently, on 29 October 1991, petitioner received a letter
of dismissal10 citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual
neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds
for the termination of his services.

Reacting against the adverse decision of the SDA, petitioner filed a complaint 11 on 14 November 1991, before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal against the SDA and its officers and prayed for reinstatement with backwages and benefits,
moral and exemplary damages and other labor law benefits.

On 15 February 1993, Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideño rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondents CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNION MISS ION

CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS (CPUMCSDA) and its officers, respondents herein, are
hereby ordered to immediately reinstate complainant Pastor Dionisio Austria to his former position as Pastor of
Brgy. Taculing, Progreso and Banago, Bacolod City, without loss of seniority and other rights and backwages in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P115,830.00) without
deductions and qualifications.

Respondent CPUMCSDA is further ordered to pay complainant the following:

A. 13th month pay — P 21,060.00
B. Allowance — P 4,770.83
C. Service Incentive
Leave Pay — P 3,461.85
D. Moral Damages — P 50,000.00
E. Exemplary
 Damages — P 25,000.00
F. Attorney's Fee — P 22,012.27

SO ORDERED.12

The SDA, through its officers, appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Labor Relations Commission,
Fourth Division, Cebu City. In a decision, dated 26 August 1994, the NLRC vacated the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The
decretal portion of the NLRC decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby VACATED and a new one ENTERED dismissing this case
for want of merit.

SO ORDERED.13

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-named decision. On 18 July 1995, the NLRC issued a Resolution
reversing its original decision. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Our decision dated August 26, 1994 is VACATED and the decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated February 15, 1993 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.14

In view of the reversal of the original decision of the NLRC, the SDA filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolut ion.
Notable in the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents is their invocation, for the first time on appeal that the
Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioner due to the constitutional provision on the separatio n
of church and state since the case allegedly involved an ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot interfere.

The NLRC, without ruling on the merits of the case, reversed itself once again, sustained the argument posed by private
respondents and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint of petitioner. The dispositive portion of the NLRC resolution dated
23 January 1996, subject of the present petition, is as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. Accordingly,
this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.15’

Hence, the recourse to this Court by petitioner.

After the filing of the petition, the Court ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (the "OSG") to file its comment on be half
of public respondent NLRC. Interestingly, the OSG filed a manifestation and motion in lieu of comment 16 setting forth its
stand that it cannot sustain the resolution of the NLRC. In its manifestation, the OSG submits that the termination of petiti oner
from his employment may be questioned before the NLRC as the same is secular in nature, not ecclesiastical. After the
submission of memoranda of all the parties, the case was submitted for decision.
The issues to be resolved in this petition are:

1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against
the SDA;

2) Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the
separation of church and state; and

3) Whether or not such termination is valid.

The first two issues shall be resolved jointly, since they are related.
Private respondents contend that by virtue of the doctrine of separation of church and state, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by petitioner. Since the matter at bar allegedly involves the discipline of
a religious minister, it is to be considered a purely ecclesiastical affair to which the State has no right to interfere.

The contention of private respondents deserves scant consideration. The principle of separation of church and state finds
no application in this case.

The rationale of the principle of the separation of church and state is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences make
good-neighbors."17 The idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus
avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive
jurisdictions.18

The demarcation line calls on the entities to "render therefore unto Ceasar the things that are Ceasar's and unto God the
things that are God's."19 While the state is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the Church is likewise
barred from meddling in purely secular matters. 20

The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of
the same. An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption
and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and
the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. 21

Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the c hurch and its members and relate to
matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so -called
ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance.

The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the above cited examples. While the matter at hand relates to the
church and its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved
here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no
relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church.

In this case, petitioner was not ex-communicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from
employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the
ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.

As pointed out by the OSG in its memorandum, the grounds invoked for petitioner's dismissal, namely: misappropriation of
denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and commission of
an offense against the person of his employer's duly authorized representative, are all based on Article 282 of the Labor
Code which enumerates the just causes for termination of employment. 22

By this alone, it is palpable that the reason for petitioner's dismissal from the service is not religious in nature. Coupled with
this is the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with a copy of petitioner's letter of termination. As aptly stated by the OSG,
this again is an eloquent admission by private respondents that NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.

Aside from these, SDA admitted in a certification 23 issued by its officer, Mr. Ibesate, that petitioner has been its employee
for twenty-eight (28) years. SDA even registered petitioner with the Social Security System (SSS) as its employee. As a
matter of fact, the worker's records of petitioner have been submitted by private respondents as part of their exhibits .

From all of these it is clear that when the SDA terminated the services of petitioner, it was merely exercising its managemen t
prerogative to fire an employee which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the case and to determine whether the SDA, as employer, rightfully exercised
its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. This is in consonance with the mandate of the Constitution to afford
full protection to labor.
Under the Labor Code, the provision which governs the dismissal of employees, is comprehensive enough to include
religious corporations, such as the SDA, in its coverage. Article 278 of the Labor Code on post-employment states that "the
provisions of this Title shall apply to all establishments or undertakings, whether for profit or not."

Obviously, the cited article does not make any exception in favor of a religious corporation. This is made more evident by
the fact that the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, particularly, Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI on the Termination of
Employment and Retirement, categorically includes religious institutions in the coverage of the law, to wit:

Sec. 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall apply to all establishments and undertakings, whether operated for profit or
not, including educational, medical, charitable and religious institutions and organizations, in cases of regular
employment with the exception of the Government and its political subdivisions including government-owned or
controlled corporations.24

With this clear mandate, the SDA cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of the doctrine of separation of church and
state to avoid its responsibilities as an employer under the Labor Code.

Finally, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction
for the first time on appeal. It is already too late in the day for private respondents to question the jurisdiction of the N LRC
and the Labor Arbiter since the SDA had fully participated in the trials and hearings of the case from start to finish.

The Court has already ruled that the active participation of a party against whom the action war brought, coupled with his
failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an
invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later o n
impugning the court or body's jurisdiction.25 Thus, the active participation of private respondents in the proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC mooted the question on jurisdiction.

The jurisdictional question now settled, we shall now proceed to determine whether the dismissal of petitioner was valid.
At the outset, we note that as a general rule, findings of fact of administrative bodies like the NLRC are binding upon this
Court. A review of such findings is justified, however, in instances when the findings of the NLRC differ from those of the
labor arbiter, as in this case.26 When the findings of NLRC do not agree with those of the Labor Arbiter, this Court must of
necessity review the records to determine which findings should be preferred as more comfortable to the evi dentiary facts.27

We turn now to the crux of the matter. In termination cases, the settled rule is that the burden of proving that the termination
was for a valid or authorized cause rests on the employer. 28 Thus, private respondents must not merely rely on the
weaknesses of petitioner's evidence but must stand on the merits of their own defense.

The issue being the legality of petitioner's dismissal, the same must be measured against the requisites for a valid dismissal,
namely: (a) the employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself, and; (b) the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code. 29 Without the
concurrence of this twin requirements, the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal. 30

Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code and Section 2, Rule XXIII,
Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code further require the employer to furnish the employee with two (2) written
notices, to wit: (a) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to
said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; and, (b) a written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.

The first notice, which may be considered as the proper charge, serves to apprise the empl oyee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought. The second notice on the other hand seeks to inform the employee of the
employer's decision to dismiss him. 32
This decision, however, must come only after the employee is given a reasonable period from receipt of the first notice
within which to answer the charge and ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of a
representative, if he so desires. 33 This is in consonance with the express provision of the law on the protection to labor and
the broader dictates of procedural due process. 34 Non-compliance therewith is fatal because these requirements are
conditions sine qua non before dismissal may be validly effected. 35

Private respondent failed to substantially comply with the above requirements. With regard to the first notice, the letter,
dated 17 October 1991, which notified petitioner and his wife to attend the meeting on 21 October 1991, cannot be construed
as the written charge required by law. A perusal of the said letter reveals that it never categorically stated the particular acts
or omissions on which petitioner's impending termination was grounded.

In fact, the letter never even mentioned that petitioner would be subject to investigation. The l etter merely mentioned that
petitioner and his wife were invited to a meeting wherein what would be discussed were the alleged unremitted church tithes
and the events that transpired on 16 October 1991. Thus, petitioner was surprised to find out that the alleged meeting turned
out to be an investigation. From the tenor of the letter, it cannot be presumed that petitioner was actually on the verge of
dismissal.

The alleged grounds for the dismissal of petitioner from the service were only revealed to him w hen the actual letter of
dismissal was finally issued. For this reason, it cannot be said that petitioner was given enough opportunity to properly
prepare for his defense. While admittedly, private respondents complied with the second requirement, the notice of
termination, this does not cure the initial defect of lack of the proper written charge required by law.

In the letter of termination, dated 29 October 1991, private respondents enumerated the following as grounds for the
dismissal of petitioner, namely: misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross
and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized
representative.

Breach of trust and misappropriation of denominational funds refer to the alleged failure of petitioner to remit to the treasurer
of the Negros Mission tithes, collections and offerings amounting to P15,078.10 which were collected by his wife, Mrs.
Thelma Austria, in the churches under his jurisdiction. On the other hand, serious misconduct and commission of an offense
against the person of the employer's duly authorized representative pertain to the 16 October 1991 incident wherein
petitioner allegedly committed an act of violence in the office of Pastor Gideon Buhat. The final ground invoked by private
respondents is gross and habitual neglect of duties allegedly committed by petitioner.

We cannot sustain the validity of dismissal based on the ground of breach of trust. Private respo ndents allege that they
have lost their confidence in petitioner for his failure, despite demands, to remit the tithes and offerings amounting to
P15,078.10, which were collected in his district.

A careful study of the voluminous records of the case reveals that there is simply no basis for the alleged loss of confidence
and breach of trust. Settled is the rule that under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, the breach of trust must be willful. A
breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act
done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. 38

It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise the
employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. 39 It should be genuine and not simulated. 40 This ground has
never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse, because of its subjective nature.

The records show that there were only six (6) instances when petitioner personally collected and received from the church
treasurers the tithes, collections, and donations for the church. 41 The stenographic notes on the testimony of Naomi
Geniebla, the Negros Mission Church Auditor and a witness for private respondents, show that Pastor Austria was able to
remit all his collections to the treasurer of the Negros Mission. 42

Though private respondents were able to establish that petitioner collected and received tithes and donations several times,
they were notable to establish that petitioner failed to remit the same to the Negros Mission, and that he pocketed the
amount and used it for his personal purpose. In fact, as admitted by their own witness, Naomi Geniebla, petitioner remitted
the amounts which he collected to the Negros Mission for which corresponding receipts were issued to him.

Thus, the allegations of private respondents that petitioner breached their trust have no leg to stand on.
In a vain attempt to support their claim of breach of trust, private respondents try to pin on petitioner the alleged non-
remittance of the tithes collected by his wife. This argument deserves little consideration.

First of all, as proven by convincing and substantial evidence consisting of the testimonies of th e witnesses for private
respondents who are church treasurers, it was Mrs. Thelma Austria who actually collected the tithes and donations from
them, and, who failed to remit the same to the treasurer of the Negros Mission.

The testimony of these church treasurers were corroborated and confirmed by Ms. Geniebla and Mr. Ibesate, officers of the
SDA. Hence, in the absence of conspiracy and collusion, which private respondents failed to demonstrate, between
petitioner and his wife, petitioner cannot be made accountable for the alleged infraction committed by his wife. After all, they
still have separate and distinct personalities.

For this reason, the Labor Arbiter found it difficult to see the basis for the alleged loss of confidence and breach of trust .
The Court does not find any cogent reason, therefore, to digress from the findings of the Labor Arbiter which is fully
supported by the evidence on record.

With respect to the grounds of serious misconduct and commission of an offense against the person of the employer's duly
authorized representative, we find the same unmeritorious and, as such, do not warrant petitioner's dismissal from the
service.

Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment.43 For misconduct to be considered serious it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely
trivial or unimportant.44

Based on this standard, we believe that the act of petitioner in banging the attaché case on the table, throwing the telephon e
and scattering the books in the office of Pastor Buhat, although improper, cannot be considered as grave enough to be
considered as serious misconduct. After all, as correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter, though petitioner committed damage
to property, he did not physically assault Pastor Buhat or any other pastor present during the incident of 16 October 1 991.

In fact, the alleged offense committed upon the person of the employer's representatives was never really established or
proven by private respondents. Hence, there is no basis for the allegation that petitioner's act constituted serious miscondu ct
or that the same was an offense against the person of the employer's duly authorized representative. As such, the cited
actuation of petitioner does not justify the ultimate penalty of dismissal from employment.

While the Constitution does condone wrongdoing by the employee, it nevertheless urges a moderation of the sanctions that
may be applied to him in light of the many disadvantages that weigh heavily on him like an albatross on his neck. 45 Where
a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by the worker ought not be visited with
a consequence so severe such as dismissal from employment. 46 For the foregoing reasons, we believe that the minor
infraction committed by petitioner does not merit the ultimate penalty of dismissal.

The final ground alleged by private respondents in terminating petitioner, gross and habitual neglect of duties, does not
require an exhaustive discussion. Suffice it to say that all private respondents had were allegations but not proof. Aside
from merely citing the said ground, private respondents failed to prove culpability on the part of petitioner. In fact, the
evidence on record shows otherwise.

Petitioner's rise from the ranks disclose that he was actually a hard-worker. Private respondents' evidence, which consisted
of petitioner's Worker's Reports, revealed how petitioner travelled to different churches to attend to the faithful under his
care. Indeed, he labored hard for the SDA, but, in return, he was rewarded with a dismissal from the service for a non-
existent cause.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was terminated from service without jus t
or lawful cause. Having been illegally dismissed, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of
seniority right48 and the payment of full backwages without any deduction corresponding to the period from his illegal
dismissal up to actual reinstatement. 46

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.

The challenged Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, rendered on 23 January 1996, is
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 15 February 1993, is REINSTATED and hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 171905 June 20, 2012

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC., PATRIZIO EZRA, GERONIMO V. NAZARETH, RUPERTO
MAYUGA, SR., ROBERT SCHAARE, HENRY CARIAT, REYNALDO FERRENAL AND JOHN DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83159 which affirmed the Securities and Exchange Commission 2 (SEC)
Decision3 in SEC Case No. C-00194.

Petitioner United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines. It is a national confederation of incorporated and unincorporated self -governing
Evangelical churches of different denominations, devised for fellowship, mutual counsel and cooperation. It is the
ecclesiastical successor of the Evangelical Church of the Philippines, the Philippine Methodist Church and the United
Evangelical Church of the Philippines. 4

Respondent Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), formerly known as Bradford Memorial Church, is likewise a
religious corporation with a personality separate and distinct from UCCP. It was organized at the turn of the 20th century
but it was incorporated only on 14 December 1979.

Respondents Patrizio Ezra, Geronimo Nazareth, Ruperto Mayuga, Sr., Robert Schaare, Henry Cariat, Reynaldo Ferrenal
and other John Does are members of BUCCI.

The following historical background briefly summarizes the relationship between UCCP and BUCCI, viz:

On May 25, 1948, The United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. was formally organized. The five ancestor churches
were the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church, the Church of Christ (Disciples) and the Congregational
Churches. These churches traced their lineage back to the early Christian Church.

Early on, at the turn of the century, the proponents of these churches came as missionaries, spreading the faith as ardent
off-springs of the Reformation. Aimed at converting Roman Catholics, Buddhists, Hindus and spirit worshippers to the
Protestant faith, these missionaries had organized the Evangelical Union by 1901, until it was superseded by a forerunner
of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines.

During th[o]se times, the precursor of Bradford Memorial Church, the Presbyterian mission came to the Philippines. It was
organized by the early missionaries of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. through its Board of Foreign Missions. In 1909,
it was alleged to have acquired real properties in the Philippines funded by one Matilda R. L. Bradford from whom the
congregation attributed its name, in recognition of her efforts for the church.

While not all churches in the Evangelical Union were equally strong in their desire for organic church union, such remained
as a goal of the organization. In 1921, it seemed that the plans for the union of the five churches were not to mate rialize, so
the movement widened its activities to include all the Presbyterian churches and the Congregational bodies in the
Philippines.
After considerable negotiations, four churches- the Presbyterian, the Congregational, the United Brethren and the United
Church of Manila were invited and an assembly was held in Manila. On March 15, 1929, the basis of Union was formally
adopted and the United Evangelical Church came into being.

The new church grew in strength from year to year until the Second World War when a division was created in the newly
formed Evangelical Church in the Philippines.

In 1946, immediately following the close of World War II, the Presbyterians and Congregationalist Churches in the Visayas
and Mindanao region under the Rev. Leonardo Dia reconstituted the United Evangelical Church in the Philippines in those
areas. In view of this development, the Bradford Memorial Church transferred its synodical connection to the newly
reorganized United Evangelical Church in the Philippines, and thereafter, carried the name BRADFORD Evangelical
Church.

A few years after the war, it was thought wise not to push through with the church union. However, on May 25, 1948, a total
of 167 delegates from three church bodies met at Ellinwood-Malate Church. They were the Evangelical Church, a federation
of evangelical churches operating in the Luzon area;

The Philippine Methodist Church (a split from the United Methodist-Episcopal Church) and the United Evangelical Church
in the Philippines, a federation of Presbyterian and Congregationalist churches operating in the Visayas and Mindanao area.
Each body reported that its constituted divisions had voted to accept the basis of Union and to join the new church. So on
May 23-25, 1945, these three major churches convened, organized and declared the new federation of evangelical
churches.

Thus, the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. or UCCP was born from the union of these three major churches.
Finally, on April 12, 1949, the UCCP was registered with the Commission. Thus, by circumstance, the Bradford Evangelical
Church transferred its synodical connection to and became a constituent Church of the UCCP.

Through the years the UCCP underwent major changes. Per its Constitution published in April of 1980, it was apportioned
into several Conferences, delineated according to geographical areas as determined by the General Assembly. Most of its
local congregations and conferences were also registered as separate entities for greater autonomy such as the Cebu
Conference Inc. and Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc.

On December 14, 1979, Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) was incorporated as a personality separate and
distinct from UCCP. Registered under SEC. Reg. No. 90225, its Articles of Incorporation declare Bradford United Church
of Christ as a Protestant Congregation. Among its original incorporators are herein Respondents Patricio Ezra, Robert
Schaare and Geronimo V. Nazareth. Furthermore, Article 3 of its original articles of incorporation provides:

That its incorporation is not forbidden by competent authorities or by the Constitution, rules, regulations or discipline of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines and that of the Bradford United Church of Christ. 5

UCCP has three (3) governing bodies namely: the General Assembly, the Conference and the Local Church, each having
distinct and separate duties and powers. As a UCCP local church located in Cebu, BUCCI belonged to the Cebu Conference
Inc. (CCI) with whom it enjoyed peaceful co-existence until late 1989 when BUCCI started construction of a fence that
encroached upon the right-of way allocated by UCCP for CCI and Visayas jurisdiction. 6

UCCP General Assembly attempted to settle the dispute. On 7 April 1990, the Cebu Conference Judicial Commission
rendered a decision in favor of CCI. 7 This unfavorable decision triggered a series of events 8 which further increased the
enmity between the parties and led to the formal break-up of BUCCI from UCCP.9

In a Church Council Resolution dated 21 June 1992, BUCCI disaffiliated from UCCP. The effectivity of the disaffiliation was
made to retroact to 16 September 1990 when BUCCI severed its ties from CCI. This disaffiliation was duly ratified by
BUCCI’s members in a referendum held on 19 July 1992. 10
Consequently, BUCCI filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws which provided for and effected its
disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved the same on 2 July 1993. 11

Thereafter, UCCP filed before SEC a complaint/protest for rejection/annulment of Amended Articles and Incorporation and
Injunction, docketed as SEC Case No. C-00194. UCCP also prayed for the disallowance of the continued use of BUCCI as
corporate name.12

UCCP later on filed an Amended Complaint/Protest dated 8 March 1994, abandoning the original
Complaint/Protest.1âwphi1 The Amended Complaint/Protest added BUCCI as one of the respondents; alleged that the
separate incorporation and registration of BUCCI is not allowed under the UCCP Constitution and By-laws; and sought to
enjoin BUCCI and the respondents from using the name BUCCI, both in its Amended Articles of Incorporation and its
dealings with the public, and from using its properties. 13

On 27 January 2004, the SEC en banc dismissed UCCP’s petition to declare as null and void the amendments made to the
Articles of Incorporation of BUCCI. SEC summarized UCCP’s arguments into three main issues, as follow:

1. Whether or not the separation of [BUCCI] from [UCCP] is valid;

2. Whether or not the amendments to the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of BUCCI made after it separated
from UCCP are valid; [and]

3. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to the use of the name "Bradford United Church of Christ,
Inc."(BUCCI).14

SEC defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition of its constitutional freedom to associate
and disassociate. SEC also pointed out that since UCCP had used the fact of BUCCI’s disaffiliation to consolidate its claim
over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case against BUCCI before the RTC, UCCP cannot now deny the validity
of said disaffiliation.

Moreover, SEC found that UCCP is not the real party in interest to question the amendments made by BUCCI to its Articles
of Incorporation and By-Laws. Finally, SEC upheld the right of BUCCI to continue using its corporate name.
UCCP filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 17 June 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
affirming the SEC.

On 16 September 2005, UCCP filed a motion to drop BUCCI as respondent. 15

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied on 21 February 2006, 16 UCCP filed the present appeal.
UCCP maintains that the issue on whether the disaffiliation of respondents is valid is purely an ecclesiastical affair. It asserts
that it has the sole power and authority to declare and/or decide whether BUCCI or any of its local churches could disaffilia te
from it.17

UCCP likewise restates that individual respondents cannot validly effect amendments to BUCCI’s Articles and By-Laws nor
to continue the use of BUCCI’s name after they have disaffiliated from UCCP. Moreover, UCCP asseverates that the
stringent requirements of the Corporation Code to effect amendments have not been satisfied. 18 UCCP also refutes the
holding that BUCCI no longer forms part of UCCP because the latter had filed several cases against the former.

UCCP explains that the above-mentioned cases had been filed against individual respondents, and not against BUCCI; and
the inclusion of BUCCI’s name in said cases were merely circumstantial because at the time those cases were filed,
individual respondents were still acting and sabotaging the operation of BUCCI. 19 Lastly, UCCP criticizes SEC for its finding
that UCCP has no legal personality to prosecute the case before it. UCCP asserts that individual respondents were its
former members and BUCCI, the entity involved, is its member-local church.20

Respondents,21 on the other hand, counter that UCCP’s new theory—that the determination of membership to UCCP is a
purely ecclesiastical affair—is not and cannot be allowed at this late stage of the proceedings.22 They maintain that the Court
of Appeals and SEC are correct in ruling that BUCCI had validly disaffiliated from UCCP and is entitled to continue in the
use of its name.23

As their third point, respondents assert that the Court of Appeals and SEC’s finding that UCCP had no legal personality to
question the validity of the amendments to BUCCI’s Articles and By-laws, is in accord with law and settled
jurisprudence.24 Finally, they point out that the petition should be dismissed outright for failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 25

The Court denies the Petition.

The issue is not a purely ecclesiastical affair.

Notably, UCCP invoked the jurisdiction of SEC when it submitted for resolution the following issues:

1. Whether or not BUCCI is an organic component of UCCP subject to the latter’s Constitution and By-laws;
2. Whether or not the referendum conducted by respondents on July and November 1992 were valid;
3. Whether or not the supposed separation of BUCCI from UCCP is valid;
4. Whether or not the amendment of the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of BUCCI is valid;
5. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to the use of the name "BUCCI"; and
6. Whether or not the use of the name "BUCCI" is confusingly similar with UCCP. 26

Before the Court of Appeals, UCCP cited the following as grounds for review:

I. The SEC committed serious reversible error in upholding as valid the amendments to the constitution and
by-laws of BUCCI when there was absolutely no evidence proving that the strict requirements for
amendments provided (sic) for under the new Corporation Code were complied with;

II. The SEC committed serious reversible error in disregarding both testimonial and documentary evidence of
the petitioner proving that respondent did not comply with the proper notice, deliberation of the issues and
the 2/3 vote requirement for validity of the amendments of its articles of incorporation;

III. The SEC committed serious reversible error in holding that petitioner UCCP does not have the legal
standing to question the amendments made to BUCCI’s articles of incorporation and by-laws after the
latter’s separation from the petitioner.

IV. Petitioner’s legal standing to file the case had never been the issue of the case from the time of its filing,
during the pre-trial conference, during the trial on the merits, and in the respective memorandum filed by
the parties in this case; and

V. The SEC committed serious reversible error in upholding respondents’ continued use of the name BUCCI
when in fact individual respondents by their very own acts have expelled themselves from membership of
the UCCP and its local church the BUCCI. 27

Failing to obtain favorable judgment from the SEC and the Court of Appeals, UCCP now comes before the Court posing
ostensibly a question of law, that the determination of membership in UCCP is a purely ecclesiastical affair, which theory
strips SEC and the Court of Appeals of any authority to rule on the issues voluntarily submitted to them by UCCP itself for
resolution.

Basic is the rule that a party cannot be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief and later on
renounce or repudiate the same after it fails to obtain such relief. 28 After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. The Court frowns
upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. 29
The Court has likewise consistently rejected the pernicious practice of shifting to a new theory on appeal in the hope of a
favorable result. Fair play, justice and due process require that as a rule new matters cannot be raised for the first time
before an appellate tribunal.30 Failure to assert issues and arguments "within a reasonable time" warrants a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. 31

In any event, the Court believes that the matter at hand is not purely an ecclesiastical affair.

An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforceme nt
within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of
excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. 32

Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to
matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so -called
ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities attached with religious significance. 33

In the first place, relief from civil courts was sought when the incident of disaffiliation occurred, in the face of UCCP’s
assertions that it continues to recognize BUCCI as one of its local churches and that it has the sole authority to determine
the validity of the disaffiliation.

Secondly, intertwined with the issue of the validity of the disaffiliation is the question of whether BUCCI had the power und er
the law to effect disaffiliation such that it should be given legal consequence and granted recognition.
UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.

Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A provides that SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over
all corporations. Even with their religious nature, SEC may exercise jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and
corporate.34

BUCCI, as a juridical entity separate and distinct from UCCP, possesses the freedom to determine its steps.

UCCP’s statement in its memorandum- "[w]here else can petitioner seek protection and relief is particularly telling. That
UCCP sees the need to turn to a body for relief is an admission that its authority over BUCCI is not absolute and is actually
more tenuous than alleged.

Thus, UCCP cannot rely on the Court’s ruling as restated in Long v. Basa, 36 that "in matters purely ecclesiastical, the
decisions of the proper church tribunals are conclusive upon the civil tribunals." 37 If in the case at bar, even with its highest
executive official’s pronouncement that BUCCI is still recognized as its member-church,38 UCCP could not compel BUCCI
to go back to its fold, then the alleged absolute ecclesiastical authority must not be there to begin with.

In fact, Long may be viewed as supportive of respondents’ case. Said case involved a church’s sole prerogative and power
to expel its individual members. Similarly, the case at bar concerns BUCCI’s sole prerogative and power as a church to
disconnect ties with another entity. Such are decisions, that may have religious color and are therefore ecclesiastical affai rs,
the Court must respect and cannot review.

It is worth mentioning that in Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, 39 the Court held that the amendments of the constitution,
restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church
those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts.

Conversely, the Court owes but recognition to BUCCI’s decision as it concerns its legal right as a religious corporation to
disaffiliate from another religious corporation via legitimate means—a secular matter well within the civil courts’ purview.
Respondents Validly Effected the Amendments
UCCP contends that respondents have severed their UCCP membership and consequently, have lost their BUCCI
membership. As such, they have neither the power to bring about the amendments to BUCCI’s Articles of Incorporation nor
right to continue the usage of BUCCI’s name.

The Church Council Resolution dated 21 June 1992, duly ratified by BUCCI’s members in a referendum, carried out BUCCI’s
corporate act of disaffiliating from UCCP. By virtue of this disaffiliation, BUCCI members, including respondents, severed
their ties from UCCP but maintained their membership with BUCCI. UCCP’s contention that the severance of UCCP ties
amounts to severance of ties to the local church does not hold water.

Local church autonomy takes precedence in the UCCP polity. Section 4 of the 1974 UCCP Constitution provides:

SECTION 4. The autonomy of the local church or congregation in matters pertaining to its life in its own particular community
shall be respected, consistent with its relation to the Conference, Jurisdiction, and General Assembly.

According to respondent, UCCP adopted a "congregationalist" system where a local church has the right to govern itself by
its own laws, rules and regulations for the furtherance of its own general welfare and the freedom to practice its own faith
and polity of denominational origin. 40 This "congregationalist" system was shown in the Basis of Union, the

Declaration of Union and UCCP’s Constitution and By-laws.

Article IV of the Basis of Union reads:

ARTICLE IV -- Church Practices and Worship: Congregations may follow their customary practices and worship.41
Section 4, Article VI specifically outlines the duties and powers of the local church:

(a) Subject only to the general laws and regulations of the Church, every local church or congregation, shall, with its
pastor, be responsible for watching over its members, keeping its life pure, ordering its worship, providing Christian
education and proclaiming the Gospel;

(b) Call a Pastor;

(c) Recommended candidates for the ministry;

(d) Elect delegates to the Annual Conference. 42

Statement IV of Declaration of Union provides:

That by adoption of the name "UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES" for this Church Union, no right,
interest, or title in and to their respective names by which the uniting Churches have been identified and known, has been
nor is surrendered, but all such rights are specifically reserved against the claims of all persons, associations and
organizations whatsoever.43

As a matter of fact, the present UCCP Constitution 44 and By-laws continue to uphold this tradition of respecting local church
autonomy. The 2005 UCCP Amended Constitution provides in Article II, Section 14:

Consistent with the heritage and commitment of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, the autonomy of the Local
Church shall be respected. The scope of such autonomy shall be defined in the By-Laws.
Section 28, Article III of the UCCP By-laws provides:

Section 28. Scope of Local Autonomy: The primary locus of mission is the Local Church. Hence, the UCCP upholds the
autonomy of the Local Church particularly as to its right and power to conduct its ministry free from outside control, provid ed
the same is in line with the Constitution, By-Laws and statues of the Church, thereby enabling the Local Church to become
effective instrument in the ministry and mission of the Church and ensuring its positive contribution to the unity and
strengthening of the whole Church. Specifically, autonomy of the Local Church includes the authority to do the following:
 a. To call and support its Pastor and other Church workers, keeping in mind the basic policy of the Church to call
to its ministry pastors and Church workers belonging to the UCCP, subscribing to the UCCP Statement of Faith
and paying allegiance to the Constitution, By-Laws and statutes of the Church. Pastors, ministers and workers
of other churches affiliated with the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) may be requested
to serve in the Local Church with the prior written permission of the General Assembly or the National Council,
through the General Secretary;

b. To administer, maintain, encumber or dispose of its personal or real properties pursuant to a resolution of its
Board of Trustees and approved by its Church Council and, where real properties are involved, with the written
consent of the General Assembly or the National Council, through the General Secretary;

c. To invite pastors, ministers, workers and lay leaders of other churches to speak, preach or otherwise enter into
fellowship with the Local Church, from time to time, in consonance with Article II, Section 6, of the Constitution,
provided that the authority and integrity of the UCCP, as well as the unity of the Local Church, shall never be
impaired or compromised;

d. To nominate and elect its officers, in accordance with the Constitution and By-Laws, and hold annual and such
special meetings as it may deem necessary and proper;

e. To admit qualified persons into the membership of the Local Church, help ensure their nurture and spiritual
development, and promote and develop among them the idea of loving service, stewardship and missionary
outreach;

f. To celebrate its worship services that are orderly and solemn, yet joyful and meaningful, reflective of the faith
and life of the Church and responsive to the needs of the community in terms of witness, service and prophetic
ministry;

g. To support the ministerial and lay formation program of the Church and recruit, recommend and support
candidates for the ministry;

h. To adopt its own budget and financial program and fulfill its obligations to the wider bodies; and

i. To do all things as it may deem wise, necessary and proper, without encroaching on the prerogatives of, and
interfering with, the wider Church bodies, ensuring at all times that its action contribute to the unity and
strengthening of the whole UCCP.

From the foregoing it can be gleaned that: UCCP’s control and authority over its local churches is not full and supreme ;
membership of the local churches in the UCCP is voluntary and not perpetual; local churches enjoy independence and
autonomy and may maintain or continue church-life with or without UCCP.

Thus, under the law and UCCP polity, BUCCI may validly bring about its disaffiliation from UCCP through the amendment
of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.

Significantly, SEC approved the amendments on 2 July 1993, which approval has in its favor the presumption of
regularity.45 Government officials are presumed to have regularly performed their functions and strong evidence is
necessary to rebut this presumption. 46 In the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption must be upheld. 47

More importantly, well-settled is the judicial dictum that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as SEC, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but
even finality.
They are binding upon this Court which is not a trier of facts. Only upon clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, or that
such factual findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record will this Court step in and proce ed
to make its own independent evaluation of the facts. No cogent reason exists in the instant cases to deviate from this settled
rule.48

Anent the continued use by respondents of BUCCI, the Court likewise sustains the rulings of SEC and Court of Appeals.
Pertinently, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

As held in Philips Export B.V. vs. Court of Appeals [206 SCRA 457, 463], to fall within the prohibition of the law, two requisites
must be proven, to wit: (1) that the complainant corporation acquired a prior right over the use of such corporate name; and
(2) the proposed name is either: (a) identical, or (b) deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or
to any other name already protected by law; or (c) patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law.

The respondent BUCCI’s church history would show that it has a better right to use its corporate name on the ground of
priority of adoption. As thoroughly discussed by the SEC in its assailed decision, the evolution of respondent BUCCI to what
it is today undoubtedly establishes that it had acquired the right to make use of its corporate name.

As to whether or not BUCCI is confusingly or deceptively similar to UCCP, We find in the negative. In determining the
existence of confusing similarity in corporate names, the test is whether the similarity is such as to mislead a person using
ordinary care and discrimination. 49

Furthermore, Section 2, Article I of the UCCP Constitution 50 states that, "All local churches and church-owned entities shall
bear prominently the name: United Church of Christ in the Philippines." For this reason, BUCCI is evidently distinct from
UCCP and from all other UCCP local churches and church-owned entities.

SEC and Court of Appeals correctly ruled that UCCP has no locus standi to question the amendments to BUCCI’s Articles
of Incorporation and By-laws.

The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance in a court of justice has been adequately discussed by this Court in
a number of cases. The doctrine requires a litigant to have a material interest in the outcome of a case. In private suits,
locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in interest," which is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." 51

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy,
or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. 52

A suit may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest. 53

After a review of the evidence on record, the SEC, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, correctly ruled that UCCP, not being
a member of BUCCI, is not the proper party to question the validity of the amendments of the latter’s Articles of Incorporation
and By-laws. While UCCP stands to be affected by the disaffiliation, the same is admitted and accepted by UCCP’s polity
by the very establishment of its liberal structure.

Petition failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
We highlight the fact that when UCCP filed the original complaint before the SEC, only individual respondents were
impleaded. UCCP then amended the complaint to include BUCCI, only to drop it as respondent after the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision, purportedly to show that it was merely going after individual respondents.

We agree with respondents that failure to implead BUCCI as respondent in the instant case constitutes a blatant disregard
of Section 4(a), Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,54 but also renders the assailed decision final and executory and all subsequent
actions on the petition are void considering that BUCCI is an indispensable party. 55 We cannot countenance this
disingenuous practice of shifting to a new theory on appeal in the hope of obtaining a favorable result.56
Essentially, the three main issues raised by UCCP before the SEC and the Court of Appeals 57 are the very same issues
presented for our resolution.
Finding no serious errors to warrant a reversal of the assailed decision, we affirm.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 June 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A.
Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista
& Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C.
Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose
C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco,
Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon
Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and
on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael
C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho &
Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael
Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves
and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah
Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R.
Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE
OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his
personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of
the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP.
NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty.
Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio
Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana,
Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H.
LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G.
MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY
LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their
Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her
personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO
III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA
ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE
VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of
Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good." 1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people
beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the
revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning earth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the
poor, but every member of society.

The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of th e
Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative
government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed
set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz.

Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful
eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary
then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds
Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media.

From television debates 2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by
members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking
on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Awa re of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in
fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in
their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the
Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president,
Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche 7 and several others 8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of
the generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc., 11 Rosevale Foundation,
Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others, 13 in their capacities as citizens
(Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of X seminarians Inc.,18 and several
others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, 21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F.
Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also
proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10)Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc. 24 and several others,25 in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro -
Life);

(11)Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc., 27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-
Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members
of the Bar (MSF);
 (12)Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others, 29 in their capacities as
citizens (Juat) ;

(13)Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others, 31 in their
capacities as citizens (CFC);

(14)Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers (Tillah);

(15)Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer
(Alcantara); and

(16)Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy
against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners
posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes
cancer and other health problems. 36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their
beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. 38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled
health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical
officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives ,
who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. 40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed
as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to
satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free
exercise of religion and the right to free speech. 42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH
Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program,
they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively
be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of
the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioner’s services.44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against
the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The
petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the
penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to
be treated as "violation" of the RH Law. 46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the
people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services
they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in
accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods
is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that
although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer
their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure. 48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the
RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their
children in accordance with their beliefs. 49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law
forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining
to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a
miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives. 50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question
the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be
included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL). 51

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution. 52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at th e
local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local
Government Code and R.A . No. 9054. 54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in
behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza
I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, 57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health
(C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros, 59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia 60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave
to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions
for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO),
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or
until July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the
pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments.
On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the
SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court. 63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time
posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive
drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were
allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner." 65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or
anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or
device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be
delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population
problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that
promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth. 67

Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National
Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisio ned that "family
planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to
space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, 68 dated
December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family
planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except
abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under that
policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity
with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and Development. 70
Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others,
mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family planning and
sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From
a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in t he year
2000 and over 92 million in 2010. 72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate.

To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples'
right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to
provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide
reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception,
women's health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argue s
that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, vi olates the right to health of
women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo
ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921
and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription
duly licensed by a physician.

What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to
play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money.

The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program
by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and
supplies.74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the
following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

 1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and
political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a
majoritarian democratic process" 75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency." 76

The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since th e
Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments,
in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism
Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts
of the legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet
to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that
are abortive.

It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is
often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch
on the basis of the principle of separation of powers.

To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. 81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b)
the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the
courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in
striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of
courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave
abuse of discretion.88

Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment
to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes
no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or
otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point.

The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to
review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities
and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any
sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. 90

This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controvers ies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

As far back as Tanada v. Angara, 91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless
others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no dou bt
raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.

"The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld. "Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised
before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide.

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments
of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him,
judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that
balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and
every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH
Law has yet to be implemented. 97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law
is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.

The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the constitutionality of
an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that
the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly
violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights.

Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger
of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard
on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 107

After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights
of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintain ed, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it has expanded
its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.109

The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 110 Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court
has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny.

To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court
as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the
Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as ap plied
challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against
them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112 The petitioners, for their
part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing
the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of th e
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as -applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to
sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue o f
transcendental importance is invoked.

The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held
in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well-being of this nation, especially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.

This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constituti onal provisions
on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights.

Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division
among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication.

More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court
need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are bein g
imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court
would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case
has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65.121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of th e
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent - to act as a population control measure. 123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124 and that the
concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable. 125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure.

The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and
keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law
emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full
range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law,
however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to
prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It
is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. 126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it
and the RH Law loses its very foundation. 127

As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre -and post-
natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in
the Magna Carta for Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission
on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so
as not to cripple or impede legislation."

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the
first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right
to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading ,
either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act." 129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment
of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion. 130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thu s,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Fram ers
of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has
life.131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that
the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients
are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these
products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be us ed
for abortifacient purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that
only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made
accessible to the public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting
the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health
Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such
a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive. 135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that
various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that
the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation
of the fertilized ovum are allowed. 136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creat ion of,
or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provi des:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage.
From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, 139 and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in
order to achieve long-term economic development.

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component
of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of
the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A.
No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the
Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and
the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative
policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee
religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it
was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural a nd
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception,
there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently
disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at
implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by
the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of
the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well -settled principle
of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.

As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter
it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily
a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described a nd defined by
all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization. Webster's Third New International Dictionary
describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new enti ty capable
of developing into a being like its parents. 145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the fema le ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146 Even in jurisprudence,
an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that
the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior
to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for
human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting f etal life."
Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child. 149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception"
used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilizati on." The
records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human
life.

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the
fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive.

First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by its elf. It begins doing this upon fertilization.
Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the cont inuous
process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized
ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of
the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosom es from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the
sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells.
Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and
human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. 151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not
because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: The phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase
"fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment
of conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without speci fying
"from the moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would
leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and
that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception.

There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was
going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now
states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. When it
speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we kn ow
today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in
the uterus.

If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root.
What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus.
Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives
are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient .154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall
provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon ferti lization
or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum.

It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that
would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the
right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact
which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus
prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those
that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to
protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I
would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of
Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually
saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the
sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet
unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives , such as the intra-uterine
device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the
moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. 156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157

Atty. Noche: Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin: There is no life.

Atty. Noche: So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin: To be protected.

Atty. Noche: Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin: So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche: Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin: Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche: Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section
12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin: Alright.

Atty. Noche: And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an
ovum and forms a viable zygote." 159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops." 160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that
ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and
female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that
begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their
pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell.

This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being." 162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous
process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human
organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes
in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic
unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from
the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome
would be.

In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no
point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any
philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual
evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the
intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the
life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous." 166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm
that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that
pregnancy can be medically detected." 167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human
being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those
who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infideli ty not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent th e
implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception
was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot
interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception,
explained:

The intention is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision
passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has
opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with
provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the
uterus for implantation.170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes
the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute t o
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the
purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the
following:

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

SEC. 4. Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether
or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction,
free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard
of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and
access to abortifacients.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance,
executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended
accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH
Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms –

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or
the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word
"or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those
that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that e ither:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion
becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed
exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits
any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as
Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners
likewise suggest.

Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized
ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb.
After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to
prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law d oes not
sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a ferti lized
ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning
of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or
destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an
abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to
be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fu lly
attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance
when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. 171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the
Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under
the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills,
postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined
the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb o r
the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 for purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health
product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a
fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion
of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH -IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid.

There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constituti on.
With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient"
if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive .
With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against
abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those
contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the
secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with
each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared
void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the
primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may h arm
or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution." 175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must
be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the
inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176

Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk
is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued.

Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of
venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p) 178 and (w)179 of the RH
Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying
sex lives.180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement
of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the
claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women. 181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill healt h consciousness among
them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be prio rity
for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavo r to provide free
medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate
health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self -development, and
self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the
contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to
implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumpti on
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.

That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective.

These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners,
particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. 184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under
R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed
by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There
is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus , the
Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still
require the prescription of a licensed physician.

With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe
are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:

C. Contraceptives cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without
prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions
of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by
RA No. 4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distri bute whether
for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of
preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive
system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not mo re
than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of
the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever
nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming
public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the
petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely
unwarranted and baseless.186

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and
monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local
government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments
shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall
provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729,
which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will do ne following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a
heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may
be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law.
It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency
tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.

Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various
kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as
the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine
devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested,
evaluated, and approved by the FDA.
The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device
is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal
of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra -uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non -
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies.

There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non -abortifacient and
effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription,
there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether
abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only
the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use.
Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God
in the transmission of Human life." 188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189

2. On Religious Accommodation and The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for
a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the
conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who
would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to
cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited,
because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive
health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a
patient seeking reproductive health procedures.

They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities
referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c)
teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize. 191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to
another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They
add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1
7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with
abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon
the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required.192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health
care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling
participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be
regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the
public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom
because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the
people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice
and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible
parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and
responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals
to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the assailed law dangles
the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the
RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be
struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out
that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health
services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of
their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an
assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively
going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the
RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that
the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire
citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand,
who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has
the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession
given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion
without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, locat ion
and impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15, the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation
providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are complete ly free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention
of the State.204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable
to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand
of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of
contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.
The Church and State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic,
cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has
allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed
fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance
and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness
as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State
recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain
benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious
officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the
church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in
the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-
cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an Iglesia, or any other
house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit o f
its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29
(2), of the 1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preach er,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against
other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment
of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 207 Under
this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of
one's belief and faith.208

Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of
any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits
of utmost amplitude.

It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to
impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though
the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.

But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advan ce
the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144;
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor, the establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes.
They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In
other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to
influence individual religious beliefs and practices. 210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained
in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of
belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre
and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctri nal
standards.

But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper
regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect th e public
welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution."215
In the same case, it was further explained that the benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove
a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion." 216 "What is sought under the theory of
accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or
its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts." 217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218 Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise
Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless,
this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law.

The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law .
The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the
Gerona rule.

Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of
Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the "clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not
surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved,
in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On t he other hand,
the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and
law.

Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave
and immediate danger" test. Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained
previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and
present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate
effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality
approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising
from religious belief.

The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different
effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A
test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore
necessary.

However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental
right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the
words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty.
The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus
the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government."

As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere
balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, onl y a
compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry
a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful
ones until they are destroyed.

In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on
Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect
the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestio nably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." 220

The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the
case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands
without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, i t does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete
with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against
his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2. The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the
foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning,
including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non -abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered
and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization:

Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning,
especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions.
[Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they
desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to
them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions.
 5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with
their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human
rights instruments.

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs), women's and people's organizations, civil society,
faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and
population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and
the marginalized.

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and asp irations of the
family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired
number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into
account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their
religious convictions.

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its populatio n control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed,
the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one
religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between
Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are
God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in
line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24
thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person
seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling
state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application . In
this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from o bligations under the
RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserve s
no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. A s
in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet
under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs
are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written,
"at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot,
in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets
the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guaran tee
of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as
well as the protection for simply being silent.

The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in
his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees
the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the
practice of one's religion.224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the
State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods
to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the st rong
view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.

Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion"
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v.
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the
provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor
ward who were involved in abortions. 226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the
person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty." 227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to
assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they
fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck
down for being violative of the freedom of religion.

The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health
care service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to al low
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good." 10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when
what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to
stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to anothe r,
or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause.

The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is n o
perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded
to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to
the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that
guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind
must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral di scourse
or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation.
Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom
of association.229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is
violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the
RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza: I'll go to another point. The RH law in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law
is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this
with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH
Bill?

Congressman Lagman: Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected
the nuances of the provisions.

Justice Mendoza: I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says:
" .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman: I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza: In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious
objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not
against the constitutional right to the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman: Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were
able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to
render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve
the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not
to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence
and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro: Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer.

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay: Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro: Which you are discussing a while ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing
this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay: Ahh, Your Honor..

Justice De Castro: What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay: In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest,
this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise ma tter.
This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients. 231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious
objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy
of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. 232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according
to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from
acting according to one's belief. 233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of
the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a
future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or
supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious
freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could
limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.234
Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a
conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to
demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the
conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform
reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation.

Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the l ast
vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population
Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of
women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health
services and programs for women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's
life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses
to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right
of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary
right and duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and
AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided
with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention
of diseases.
 (b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate,
timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in
government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of mo ral
character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment
and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal
deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed. He, however, failed to substantiate this
point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the
proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they
could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious belie fs in exchange for blind
conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare
service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious
beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures.

In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.
Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting
on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency." 237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save
both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of
the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring
about a "good" effect.

In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to
save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save
both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or
the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder.
The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to
even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a
medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the l ife he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds
the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares
that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated.

All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be
natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find
unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather
than promote its solidarity and total development. 240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one
article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the S tate.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck
the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process
regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply
because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

 (a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall refuse to perform legal and medically-safe
reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the
following persons in the following instances:

Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, that in case of disagreement, the decision of the one
undergoing the procedures shall prevail.

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature,
should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues in timately related to
the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spous es
to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section
3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them" is equally
recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse
who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake
of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable
social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of
them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of
their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared
by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unl ess
it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny
together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19(c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the
joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law
states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide
whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention
would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was
first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc, 243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to
privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection." 244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 245 where Justice
William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground
of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the
zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various
guarantees create zones of privacy." 246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, that
minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage,
the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not
yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her ow n parents.
The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their
consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parent s
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of
parents is superior to that of the State. 248

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of
the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of
conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive o f the
unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the St ate
affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and
society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor c hild,
whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with
respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation
between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health
procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned,
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in
the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child.

After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the
unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and
maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health m ust be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to
exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that
of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be
denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental auth ority
in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the
case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their
constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age -and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of
academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach
reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their studen ts.250

Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that
the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity
among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable
role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of
parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed,
the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also
for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy;

Physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior;
gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of
the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional
changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements,
rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed
in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be
said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV,
Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit. 254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive h ealth
education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs,
the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a) (l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results
since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from
rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are
also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a) (l), or from rendering reproductive health
procedures under Section 23(a) (2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the
same time fails to define "incorrect information." The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of th e
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle. 255

Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with
their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute mu st be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be
made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and
devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or
other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3)
public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in
the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines
promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care servi ce
provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health
service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures.

Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to rende r
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to
give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are
broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For
ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and
access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules;
inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257

On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in
relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the
nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service
providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice.

While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and
services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public
deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates
against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use.
They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor,
especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition of terms 260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program
imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, 261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection.

Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process,
as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.

Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes
of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to tre at
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."
"The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's
duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it sim ply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, t he equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of t he law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong
to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in
the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.

Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number
included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances
and conditions. It must not leave out or "under include" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health
development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be prio rity
for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free
medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are sufferin g from fertility
issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction
abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon
couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the
duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provi sions shows that what
the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic
reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program
under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public
educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the ass ailed provision. On the other
hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularl y
because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non -government health
care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor
analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving
pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the
accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession,
the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the
people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions
or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or co ntrol
such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidati on
or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than
non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of heal th
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsi on,
force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden,
but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are
exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health
service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply
or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of
terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and
shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the
same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to
recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers,
exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as
determined by the FDA;

"(f) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations
to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(g) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and
non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product
has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(h) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not
registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty
(30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(i) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous,
or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement
for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry
out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective.

Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety
by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared po licy of the RH
Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.

The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculi ar
and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in
legislation has become necessary.

To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone
the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioner’s claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to
local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs
the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code.
Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to:
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have
already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and
facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception
of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. 268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other
facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations
Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources,
are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services.

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within
the jurisdiction of the LGU.269

A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be
implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals, 272 or the training of barangay health workers, 273 it will be the national
government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government
still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the
RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the
LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The
RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic
act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous
region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government.

These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that
would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national
and the regional governments.274

Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise
its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize
it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by
man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or
ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body.

Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and
theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law
of the past or present.277

Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic
v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine
every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law.

Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where
no law is applicable.279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any
shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and
making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies.
As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what
the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As suc h,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside
each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the
problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the
large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long
as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries,
which embarked on such a program generations ago, are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young
workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital
which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their
programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because
we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an
ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when
our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal
provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference
in the wisdom of a law.

But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the
lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what the correct rule is in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted
by the legislative branch.

Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law.
It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial
caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constituti on
and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence.

The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body. 281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the
reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method
should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not
in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility
which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access
to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual,
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures;

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs ;
 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders
the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients
and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH
Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby
LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 170165 August 15, 2006

B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN Petitioners,
vs.
LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA CORONA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CARPIO-MORALES, ARMED FORCES
OF THE CALLEJO, SR., PHILIPPINES, COL. GILBERTO AZCUNA, JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRE-TRIAL TINGA,
INVESTIGATING OFFICER, THE CHICO-NAZARIO, PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL GARCIA, and OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

A most dangerous general proposition is foisted on the Court — that soldiers who defy orders of their superior officers are
exempt from the strictures of military law and discipline if such defiance is predicated on an act otherwise valid under civilian
law. Obedience and deference to the military chain of command and the President as commander-in-chief are the
cornerstones of a professional military in the firm cusp of civilian control. These values of obedience and deference expected
of military officers are content-neutral, beyond the sway of the officer’s own sense of what is prudent or rash, or more
elementally, of right or wrong. A self-righteous military invites itself as the scoundrel’s activist solution to the "ills" of
participatory democracy.

Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo1 enjoining them and other military
officers from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a
pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the
military justice system in connection with petitioners’ violation of the aforementioned directive.

The Court is cognizant that petitioners, in their defense, invoke weighty constitutional principles that center on fundam ental
freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Although these concerns will not be addressed to the satisfaction of petitioners,
the Court recognizes these values as of paramount importance to our civil society, even if not determinative of the resolutio n
of this petition. Had the relevant issue before us been the right of the Senate to compel the testimony of petitioners, the
constitutional questions raised by them would have come to fore. Such a scenario could have very well been presented to
the Court in such manner, without the petitioners having had to violate a direct order from their commanding officer. Instead,
the Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct
order of the AFP Chief of Staff.

The solicited writs of certiorari and prohibition do not avail; the petition must be denied.

I.

The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both petitioners, Brigadier General
Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan), belonged to the Philippine
Marines. At the time of the subject incidents, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were assigned to the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) in Baguio City, the former as the PMA Assistant Superintendent, and the latter as the Assistant
Commandant of Cadets.2

On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a
public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28
September 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 e lections emerged in the
public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a
phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen.
Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of "Joint Task Force Ranao" by the AFP Southern
Command. "Joint Task Force Ranao" was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in the
provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. 3 `
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga (Gen. Senga) were among the
several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 September 2005 hearing. On 23
September 2005, Gen. Senga replied through a letter to Sen. Biazon that he would be unable to attend the hearing due to
a previous commitment in Brunei, but he nonetheless "directed other officers from the AFP who were invited to attend the
hearing."4

On 26 September 2005, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to the Superintendent
of the PMA Gen. Cristolito P. Baloing (Gen. Baloing). It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen.
Senga.5 Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing on 28
September 2005, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. 6 Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent.

On 27 September 2005, Gen. Senga wrote a letter to Sen. Biazon, requesting the postponement of the hearing scheduled
for the following day, since the AFP Chief of Staff was himself unable to attend said hearing, and that some of the invited
officers also could not attend as they were "attending to other urgent operational matters." By this time, both Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan had already departed Baguio for Manila to attend the hearing.

Then on the evening of 27 September 2005, at around 10:10 p.m., a message was transmitted to the PMA Superintendent
from the office of Gen. Senga, stating as follows:

PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY
CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F
GUDANI AFP AND LTC ALEXANDER BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY. 7

The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the senator that "no approval has
been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear" before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004
elections.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the respondents before this Court, has offered additional information
surrounding the testimony of Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan. The OSG manifests that the couriers of the AFP Command
Center had attempted to deliver the radio message to Gen. Gudani’s residence in a subdivision in Parañaque City late in
the night of 27 September 2005, but they were not permitted entry by the subdivision guards.

The next day, 28 September 2005, shortly before the start of the hearing, a copy of Gen. Senga’s letter to Sen. Biazon sent
earlier that day was handed at the Senate by Commodore Amable B. Tolentino of the AFP Office for Legislative Affairs to
Gen. Gudani, who replied that he already had a copy. Further, Gen. Senga called Commodore Tolentino on the latter’s cell
phone and asked to talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen. Gudani refused. In response, Gen. Senga instructed Commodore
Tolentino to inform Gen. Gudani that "it was an order," yet Gen. Gudani still refused to take Gen. Senga’s call. 8

A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga iss ued a statement
which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee "in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given
that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance;" that such directive was "in keeping with the
time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command;" and that the two officers "disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles
of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x
x" Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then. 9

On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464
(E.O. 464). The OSG notes that the E.O. "enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment
from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval." 10 This Court subsequently ruled on the constitutionality of
the said executive order in Senate v. Ermita.11 The relevance of E.O. 464 and Senate to the present petition shall be
discussed forthwith.
In the meantime, on 30 September 2005, petitioners were directed by General Senga, through Col. Henry A. Galarpe of the
AFP Provost Marshal General, to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for
investigation. During their appearance before Col. Galarpe, both petitioners invoked their right to remain silent. 12 The
following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service, having reached the age of 56. 13

In an Investigation Report dated 6 October 2005, the OPMG recommended that petitioners be charged with violation of
Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to th e good
order and military discipline.14 As recommended, the case was referred to a Pre-Trial Investigation Officer (PTIO)
preparatory to trial by the General Court Martial (GCM). 15

Consequently, on 24 October 2005, petitioners were separately served with Orders respectively addressed to them and
signed by respondent Col. Gilbert Jose C. Roa, the Pre-Trial Investigating Officer of the PTIO. The Orders directed
petitioners to appear in person before Col. Roa at the Pre-Trial Investigation of the Charges for violation of Articles 65 16 and
9717 of Commonwealth Act No. 408,18 and to submit their counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses at the Office of the
Judge Advocate General.19 The Orders were accompanied by respective charge sheets against petitioners, accusing them
of violating Articles of War 65 and 97.

It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed, particularly seeking that (1) the
order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners from testifying before Congress without her
prior approval be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges stated in the charge sheets against petitioners be quashed; and
(3) Gen. Senga, Col. Galarpe, Col. Roa, and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders,
be permanently enjoined from proceeding against petitioners, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate
on 28 September 2005.20

Petitioners characterize the directive from President Arroyo requiring her prior approval before any AFP personnel appear
before Congress as a "gag order," which violates the principle of separation of powers i n government as it interferes with
the investigation of the Senate Committee conducted in aid of legislation. They also equate the "gag order" with culpable
violation of the Constitution, particularly in relation to the public’s constitutional right to information and transparency in
matters of public concern.

Plaintively, petitioners claim that "the Filipino people have every right to hear the [petitioners’] testimonies," and even i f the
"gag order" were unconstitutional, it still was tantamount to "the crime of obstruction of justice." Petitioners further argue
that there was no law prohibiting them from testifying before the Senate, and in fact, they were appearing in obeisance to
the authority of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Finally, it is stressed in the petition that Gen. Gudani was no longer subject to military jurisdiction on account of his
compulsory retirement on 4 October 2005. It is pointed out that Article 2, Title I of the Articles of War defines persons subject
to military law as "all officers and soldiers in the active service" of the AFP.

II.

We first proceed to define the proper litigable issues. Notably, the guilt or innocence of petitioners in violating Articles 65
and 97 of the Articles of War is not an issue before this Court, especially considering that per records, petitioners have not
yet been subjected to court martial proceedings.

Owing to the absence of such proceedings, the correct inquiry should be limited to whether respondents could properly
initiate such proceedings preparatory to a formal court-martial, such as the aforementioned preliminary investigation, on the
basis of petitioners’ acts surrounding their testimony before the Senate on 28 September 2005. Yet this Court, consistent
with the principle that it is not a trier of facts at first instance, 21 is averse to making any authoritative findings of fact, for that
function is first for the court-martial court to fulfill.

Thus, we limit ourselves to those facts that are not controverted before the Court, having been commonly alleged by
petitioners and the OSG (for respondents). Petitioners were called by the Senate Committee to testify in its 28 September
2005 hearing. Petitioners attended such hearing and testified before the Committee, despite the fact that the day before,
there was an order from Gen. Senga (which in turn was sourced "per instruction" from President Arroyo) prohibiting them
from testifying without the prior approval of the President.
Petitioners do not precisely admit before this Court that they had learned of such order prior to their testimony, although t he
OSG asserts that at the very least, Gen. Gudani already knew of such order before he testified.22 Yet while this fact may be
ultimately material in the court-martial proceedings, it is not determinative of this petition, which as stated earlier, does not
proffer as an issue whether petitioners are guilty of violating the Articles of War.

What the Court has to consider though is whether the violation of the aforementioned order of Gen. Senga, which emanated
from the President, could lead to any investigation for court-martial of petitioners. It has to be acknowledged as a general
principle23 that AFP personnel of whatever rank are liable under military law for violating a direct order of an officer superior
in rank. Whether petitioners did violate such an order is not for the Court to decide, but it will be necessary to assume, fo r
the purposes of this petition, that petitioners did so.

III.

Preliminarily, we must discuss the effect of E.O. 464 and the Court’s ruling in Senate on the present petition. Notably, it is
not alleged that petitioners were in any way called to task for violating E.O. 464, but instead, they were charged for
violating the direct order of Gen. Senga not to appear before the Senate Committee, an order that stands
independent of the executive order.

Distinctions are called for, since Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 listed "generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege," as
among those public officials required in Section 3 of E.O. 464 "to secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress."

The Court in Senate declared both Section 2(b) and Section 3 void, 24 and the impression may have been left
following Senate that it settled as doctrine, that the President is prohibited from requiring military personnel from attending
congressional hearings without having first secured prior presidential consent. That impression is wrong.

Senate turned on the nature of executive privilege, a presidential prerogative which is encumbered by significant limitations.
Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before
Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration.25

However, the ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress
pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority—the commander-in-chief powers of the
President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same
degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.

During the deliberations in Senate, the Court was very well aware of the pendency of this petition as well as the issues
raised herein. The decision in Senate was rendered with the comfort that the nullification of portions of E.O. 464 would bear
no impact on the present petition since petitioners herein were not called to task for violating the executive order.

Moreover, the Court was then cognizant that Senate and this case would ultimately hinge on disparate legal issues.
Relevantly, Senate purposely did not touch upon or rule on the faculty of the President, under the aegis of the commander-
in-chief powers 26 to require military officials from securing prior consent before appearing before Congress. The pertinent
factors in considering that question are markedly outside of those which did become relevant in adjudicating the issues
raised in Senate. It is in this petition that those factors come into play.

At this point, we wish to dispose of another peripheral issue before we strike at the heart of the matter. General Gudani
argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court-martial, considering his retirement last 4 October 2005.
He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, "all
officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP]," and points out that he is no longer in the active service.
This point was settled against Gen. Gudani’s position in Abadilla v. Ramos,27 where the Court declared that an officer whose
name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when
military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been
acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, the Court held:

The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses. This
jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings against Colonel
Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until
the case is terminated.28

Citing Colonel Winthrop’s treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated:

We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and we find the following passage which goes against the contention
of the petitioners, viz —

3. Offenders in general — Attaching of jurisdiction.

It has further been held, and is now settled law, in regard to military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdicti on has
once duly attached to them previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to
trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld.

This principle has mostly been applied to cases where the offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such
cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished. It is held therefore that if before
the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is complete, proceedings with a view
to trial are commenced against him — as by arrest or the service of charges, — the military jurisdiction will fully
attach and once attached may be continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of
the enlistment of the accused.

Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of
the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. We see no reason to un settle
the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also points out that under Section 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, as amended, "[a]n
officer or enlisted man carried in the retired list [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines] shall be subject to the Articles of
War x x x"30 To this citation, petitioners do not offer any response, and in fact have excluded the matter of Gen. Gudani’s
retirement as an issue in their subsequent memorandum.

IV.

We now turn to the central issues.

Petitioners wish to see annulled the "gag order" that required them to secure presidential consent prior to their appearance
before the Senate, claiming that it violates the constitutional right to information and transparency in matters of public
concern; or if not, is tantamount at least to the criminal acts of obstruction of justice and grave coercion.

However, the proper perspective from which to consider this issue entails the examination of the basis and authority of the
President to issue such an order in the first place to members of the AFP and the determination of whether such an order
is subject to any limitations.

The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic
way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government .

The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member
of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the
office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature. 31 Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the notion
that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searc hes
and seizures.32
Pursuant to the maintenance of civilian supremacy over the military, the Constitution has allocated specific roles to the
legislative and executive branches of government in relation to military affairs. Military appropriations, as with all other
appropriations, are determined by Congress, as is the power to declare the existence of a state of war. 33

Congress is also empowered to revoke a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.34 The
approval of the Commission on Appointments is also required before the President can promote military officers from the
rank of colonel or naval captain. 35 Otherwise, on the particulars of civilian dominance and administration over the military,
the Constitution is silent, except for the commander-in-chief clause which is fertile in meaning and implication as to whatever
inherent martial authority the President may possess.36

The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple
declaration that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x" 37 Outside
explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the
President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces.
Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities
which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.

Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa38 is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under "house arrest"
by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest,
that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court
unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:

[T]he Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain
liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by rules of
military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the
military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its
ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with,
irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on
petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered. 39

Any good soldier, or indeed any ROTC cadet, can attest to the fact that the military way of life circumscribes several of the
cherished freedoms of civilian life. It is part and parcel of the military package. Those who cannot abide by these limitatio ns
normally do not pursue a military career and instead find satisfaction in other fields; and in fact many of those discharged
from the service are inspired in their later careers precisely by their rebellion against the regimentation of military life.

Inability or unwillingness to cope with military discipline is not a stain on character, for the military mode is a highly
idiosyncratic path which persons are not generally conscripted into, but volunteer themselves to be part of. But for those
who do make the choice to be a soldier, significant concessions to personal freedoms are expected. After all, if need be,
the men and women of the armed forces may be commanded upon to die for country, even against their personal
inclinations.

It may be so that military culture is a remnant of a less democratic era, yet it has been fully integrated into the democratic
system of governance. The constitutional role of the armed forces is as protector of the people and of the State. 40 Towards
this end, the military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life. 41

The laws and traditions governing that discipline have a long history; but they are founded on unique military exigencies as
powerful now as in the past. 42 In the end, it must be borne in mind that the armed forces has a distinct subculture with
unique needs, a specialized society separate from civilian society.

In the elegant prose of the eminent British military historian, John Keegan:

[Warriors who fight wars have] values and skills [which] are not those of politicians and diplomats. They are those of a worl d
apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it. Both worlds change
over time, and the warrior world adopts in step to the civilian. It follows it, however, at a distance. The distance can neve r
be closed, for the culture of the warrior can never be that of civilization itself.

Critical to military discipline is obeisance to the military chain of command. Willful disobedience of a superior officer is
punishable by court-martial under Article 65 of the Articles of War.45 "An individual soldier is not free to ignore the lawful
orders or duties assigned by his immediate superiors.

For there would be an end of all discipline if the seaman and marines on board a ship of war [or soldiers deployed in the
field], on a distant service, were permitted to act upon their own opinion of their rights [or their opinion of the President’s
intent], and to throw off the authority of the commander whenever they supposed it to be unlawfully exercised." 46

Further traditional restrictions on members of the armed forces are those imposed on free speech and
mobility.1âwphi1 Kapunan is ample precedent in justifying that a soldier may be restrained by a superior officer from
speaking out on certain matters. As a general rule, the discretion of a military officer to restrain the speech of a soldier under
his/her command will be accorded deference, with minimal regard if at all to the reason for such restraint.

It is integral to military discipline that the soldier’s speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander.
The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely
on political matters. The Constitution requires that "[t]he armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics," and that
‘[n]o member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote." 47

Certainly, no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldier’s ability to form a personal political
opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of discord
among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the
people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active
dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged
to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. This fundamental principle averts the country from going the way of banana
republics.

Parenthetically, it must be said that the Court is well aware that our country’s recent past is marked by regime changes
wherein active military dissent from the chain of command formed a key, though not exclusive, element. The Court is not
blind to history, yet it is a judge not of history but of the Constitution. The Constitution, and indeed our modern democratic
order, frown in no uncertain terms on a politicized military, informed as they are on the trauma of absolute martial rule.

Our history might imply that a political military is part of the natural order, but this view cannot be affirmed by the legal order.
The evolutionary path of our young democracy necessitates a reorientation from this view, reliant as our socio -political
culture has become on it. At the same time, evolution mandates a similar demand that our system of governance be more
responsive to the needs and aspirations of the citizenry, so as to avoid an environment vulnerable to a military apparatus
able at will to exert an undue influence in our polity.

Of possibly less gravitas, but of equal importance, is the principle that mobility of travel is another necessary restriction on
members of the military. A soldier cannot leave his/her post without the consent of the commanding officer. The reasons
are self-evident. The commanding officer has to be aware at all times of the location of the troops under command, so as
to be able to appropriately respond to any exigencies.

For the same reason, commanding officers have to be able to restrict the movement or travel of their soldiers, if in their
judgment, their presence at place of call of duty is necessary. At times, this may lead to unsentimental, painful
consequences, such as a soldier being denied permission to witness the birth of his first-born, or to attend the funeral of a
parent. Yet again, military life calls for considerable personal sacrifices during the period of conscription, wherein the higher
duty is not to self but to country.
Indeed, the military practice is to require a soldier to obtain permission from the commanding officer before he/she ma y
leave his destination. A soldier who goes from the properly appointed place of duty or absents from his/her command,
guard, quarters, station, or camp without proper leave is subject to punishment by court-martial.48 It is even clear from the
record that petitioners had actually requested for travel authority from the PMA in Baguio City to Manila, to attend the Sena te
Hearing.49 Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from their superiors before
they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing.

It is clear that the basic position of petitioners impinges on these fundamental principles we have discussed. They seek to
be exempted from military justice for having traveled to the Senate to testify before the Senate Committee against the
express orders of Gen. Senga, the AFP Chief of Staff. If petitioners’ position is affirmed, a considerable exception would be
carved from the unimpeachable right of military officers to restrict the speech and movement of their juniors. The ruinous
consequences to the chain of command and military discipline simply cannot warrant the Court’s imprimatur on petitioner’s
position.
V.

Still, it would be highly myopic on our part to resolve the issue solely on generalities surrounding military discipline. Aft er all,
petitioners seek to impress on us that their acts are justified as they were responding to an invitation from the Philippine
Senate, a component of the legislative branch of government. At the same time, the order for them not to testify ultimately
came from the President, the head of the executive branch of government and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-
in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same
time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance.

Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the P resident
is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final
judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. 50
Explication of these principles is in order.

As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive
officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds.

However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech
of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in executive privilege.

Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing
before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President
as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations
and the approval of higher-rank promotions,51 yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-
in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.

Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the
individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying
the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President.
After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.52
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to
judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation.53 Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries.
The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet
the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members
of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be
compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief
Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any
basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the
legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions.
Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other
to a particular mode of behavior.

The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or
executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to origi nate national policies and
legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its
rulings by the other branches of government.

As evidenced by Arnault v. Nazareno54 and Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,55 among others, the Court has not
shirked from reviewing the exercise by Congress of its power of legislative inquiry. 56 Arnault recognized that the legislative
power of inquiry and the process to enforce it, "is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function." 57

On the other hand, Bengzon acknowledged that the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not "absolute or unlimited", and its exercise is circumscribed by Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. 58 From
these premises, the Court enjoined the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring the petitioners in Bengzon from
testifying and producing evidence before the committee, holding that the inquiry in question did not involve any intended
legislation.

Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and limitations on the
constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus:

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the
legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for w ise
legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era", however, the right of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be
subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation,
and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one
possible way for Congress to avoid such result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry.
Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions rel ative to
and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry
is in aid of legislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision
requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily
implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also
mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates
Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they
belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances… wherein a clear pattern of abuse
of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members
of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts
by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction59 .

In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive officials from testifying
before Congress without the President’s consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify such
prohibition. The Court did not rule that the power to conduct legislative inquiry ipso facto superseded the claim of executive
privilege, acknowledging instead that the viability of executive privilege stood on a case to case basis.

Should neither branch yield to the other branch’s assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if
the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries.

Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to
appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance.
Such judicial action should be directed at the heads of the executive branch or the armed forces, the persons who wield
authority and control over the actions of the officers concerned. The legislative purpose of such testimony, as well as any
defenses against the same — whether grounded on executive privilege, national security or similar concerns — would be
accorded due judicial evaluation.

All the constitutional considerations pertinent to either branch of government may be raised, assessed, and ultimately
weighed against each other. And once the courts speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to
comply with the decision of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or disfavor.

Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and
executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. 60 This is the fair and workable solution
implicit in the constitutional allocation of powers among the three branches of government. The judicial filter helps assure
that the particularities of each case would ultimately govern, rather than any overarching principle unduly inclined towa rds
one branch of government at the expense of the other.

The procedure may not move as expeditiously as some may desire, yet it ensures thorough deliberation of all relevant and
cognizable issues before one branch is compelled to yield to the other. Moreover, judicial review does not preclude the
legislative and executive branches from negotiating a mutually acceptable solution to the impasse. After all, the two
branches, exercising as they do functions and responsibilities that are political in nature, are free to smooth over the thorns
in their relationship with a salve of their own choosing.

And if emphasis be needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-
in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier
disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless
obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

Petitioners have presented several issues relating to the tenability or wisdom of the President’s order on them and other
military officers not to testify before Congress without the President’s consent. Yet these issues ultimately detract from th e
main point — that they testified before the Senate despite an order from their commanding officer and their commander-in-
chief for them not to do so,61 in contravention of the traditions of military discipline which we affirm today.

The issues raised by petitioners could have very well been raised and properly adjudicated if the proper procedure was
observed. Petitioners could have been appropriately allowed to testify before the Senate without having to countermand
their Commander-in-chief and superior officer under the setup we have prescribed.

We consider the other issues raised by petitioners unnecessary to the resolution of this petition.
Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of their Commander-in-Chief and
Commanding General in obeisance to a paramount idea formed within their consciences, which could not be lightly ignored.

Still, the Court, in turn, is guided by the superlative principle that is the Constitution, the embodiment of the national
conscience. The Constitution simply does not permit the infraction which petitioners have allegedly committed, and
moreover, provides for an orderly manner by which the same result could have bee n achieved without offending
constitutional principles.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice