Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 111416 September 26, 1994

FELICIDAD UY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati,
Metro Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Metro Manila;
SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIE JAVIER, respondents.

Albon & Serrano Law Office for petitioner.

Ramon M. Velez for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the order dated 2 July
1993 of public respondent Judge Maximo C. Contreras of Branch 61 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) of Makati, Metro Manila, denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos.
145233 and 145234 for slight physical injuries. The motion to dismiss is based on the failure of the
private respondents, as the offended parties therein, to comply with Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 and
Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure requiring prior referral of disputes to
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of the proper barangay.

At the outset, it must be stated that were it not for the importance of the issue to be resolved in the
light of the revised law on katarungang pambarangay provided for in the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which took effect on 1 January 1992, 1 this Court would have declined to
accept the invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ prayed for. We have
already ruled that while it is true that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus, such concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor may be directed. There is a hierarchy of courts determinative
of the venue of appeals which should also serve as a general determinant of the proper forum for the
application for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy by the petitioner
and her lawyers ought to have led them to file the petition with the proper Regional Trial Court. 2

The antecedent facts as disclosed by the pleadings of the parties are not complicated.

Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde (hereinafter Atayde) the other half of the
second floor of a building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati, Metro Manila. She
operated and maintained therein a beauty parlor. 3
The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993. However, the petitioner was not able to remove all
her movable properties.

On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde when the former sought to
withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves,
frames, a mirror, a shampoo bowl, and an airconditioning casing. 4 The argument degenerated into a
scuffle between the petitioner, on the one hand, and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees,
including private respondent Winnie Javier (hereinafter Javier), on the other.

On 21 April 1993, the private respondent had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries
inflicted on them by the petitioner. 5

On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela,
Makati, which was docketed as Barangay Cases Nos. 1023 6 and 1024. 7

The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain for 28 April 1993. On the
said date, only the petitioner appeared. The barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26 May
1993. 8

On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations for slight
physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati, which were docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 and assigned to Branch 61 thereof.

On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61 ordered the petitioner to submit
her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses.

On 14 June 1993, the petitioner submitted the required counter-

affidavits. 9 In her own counter-affidavit, the petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing
of the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings as she and the private
respondents are residents of Manila. 10 She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain
of Valenzuela, Makati, dated 18 May 1993, that there was an ongoing conciliation between Atayde
and the petitioner in Barangay Case No. 1023. 11

On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234
for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

On 2 July 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras handed down an order denying the motion to
dismiss, pertinent portions of which read:

The court finds the motion to be without sufficient merit. In the first place, the
offense subject of these cases accussed in Makati, Metro Manila on April 17,
1993; that Barangay Valenzuela of the Municipality of Makati had started the
conciliation proceedings between the parties but as of May 18, 1993 nothing
has been achieved by the barangay (Annex "2" of the Counter-Affidavit of the
accused); that the above-entitled cases were filed directly with this court by
the public prosecutor on May 11, 1993; and the accused and her witnesses
had already filed their counter-affidavits and documents. At this stage of the
proceedings, the court believes that the accused had already waived the right
to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati
considering that accused and complainant are residents of different
 barangays; that the offense charged occurred in the Municipality of Makati;
and finally, this offense is about to prescribe.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the court believes, and so holds, that the
complainants may go directly to the court where their complaint is about to
prescribe or barred by statute of limitations pursuant to Section 6 of PD
1508." 12

A motion to reconsider the above order was denied on 5 August 1993.

Hence this special civil action for certiorari. The petitioner contends that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to
dismiss considering that the private respondents failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of
P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and further
required under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

In their Comment, the private respondents contend that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper
because prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable in the case of private respondent
Javier since she and the petitioner are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality or
of adjoining barangays in different cities or municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not likewise
required if the case may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even assuming
arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the case of private respondent Atayde, the latter
had, nevertheless, substantially complied with the requirement.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that Criminal Cases
Nos. 145233 and 145234 should be dismissed for non-compliance with Sections 408, 409, 410, and
412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Section 7, Rule VI of the Rules
Implementing P.D. No. 1508.

The petitioner replied to the comments of the private respondents and of the Office of the Solicitor
General. The private respondents filed a rejoinder to the petitioner's reply to their comment and a
reply to the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.

In the Resolution of 16 May 1994, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit their respective memoranda, which the petitioner and the private respondents complied
with. The Office of the Solicitor General, in view of its prior submission, moved that it be excused
from filing a memorandum.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by P.D. No. 1508 which was
enacted on 11 June 1978. However, the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically Chapter 7,
Title I, Book III thereof, 13 revised the law on the katarungang pambarangay. As a consequence of
this revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly repealed pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code.
Pertinent portions of Chapter 7, Title I, Book III thereof read as follows:

Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. — The
luppon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to
the performance of his official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine

exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different

cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other
and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by appropriate lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the
interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the
lupon under this Code are filed may, at anytime before trial, motu proprio
refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

Sec. 409. Venue. — (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the
same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of
said barangay.

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same
city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or
any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.

(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought
in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is
situated.

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are
employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall
be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located.

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the

punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal
question which may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to
venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his
duly designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding.

Sec. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. — . . .

 xxx xxx xxx

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. — While the dispute is

under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for
offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon
filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods
shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the
certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the
lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall
not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong
barangay.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 412. Conciliation. — (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. —

No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or
pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the
parties thereto.

(b) Where parties may go directly to court. — The parties may go directly to
court in the following instances:

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal

liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such

as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property, and support pendente lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute

of limitations.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. — In all katarungang

pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents
who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.

Pursuant to the authority vested in him under Section 421 of the Code, the Secretary of Justice
promulgated the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules to implement the revised law on katarungang
pambarangay. Sections 8 and 11 of Rule VI (Amicable Settlement of Disputes) thereof provide in
part as follows:
 SECTION 8. Failure to appear. —

a. Sanctions

The complaint may be dismissed when complainant, after due

notice, refuses or willfully fails to appear without justifiable
reason on the date set for mediation, conciliation or
arbitration. Such dismissal ordered by the Punong
Barangay/Pangkat Chairman after giving the complainant an
opportunity to explain his non-appearance shall be certified to
by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary as the case may be, and
shall bar the complainant from seeking judicial recourse for
the same cause of action as that dismissed.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 11. Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses and cause of action.

— The prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under existing
laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong
Barangay. The running of the prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipts
by the complainant of the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file
action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary: Provided, however, that
such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the
complaint with the Punong Barangay. After the expiration of the aforesaid
period of sixty days, the filing of the case in court or government office for
adjudication shall be subject to the provision of paragraph (b) (4) of Rule VIII
of these Rules.

It may thus be observed that the revised katarungang pambarangay law has at least three new
significant features, to wit:

1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those

punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding
P200.00 in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.

2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the

contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are
enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or
institution is located.

3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during

the pendency of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph
(c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from some ambiguity when it
provides that the prescriptive periods "shall resume upon receipt by the
complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the
certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary." What is
referred to as receipt by the complainant of the complaint is unclear;
obviously, it could have been a drafting oversight. Accordingly, in the above
quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations issued by the Secretary of
Justice, the phrase "the complaint or" is not found, such that the resumption
of the running of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be from receipt by the
 complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification to file action
issued by the lupon or the pangkat secretary. Such suspension, however,
shall not exceed sixty days.

The first feature has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of the lupon and if the mediation and
conciliation process at that level would be effectively pursued, few cases would reach the regular
courts, justice would be achieved at less expense to the litigants, cordial relationships among
protagonists in a small community would be restored, and peace and order therein enhanced.

The second feature, which is covered by paragraph (d), Section 409 of the Local Government code,
also broadens the authority of the lupon in the sense that appropriate civil and criminal cases arising
from incidents occurring in workplaces or institutions of learning shall be brought in the barangay
where such workplace or institution is located. That barangay may not be the appropriate venue in
either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the said section. This rule provides convenience to the
parties. Procedural rules including those relating to venue are designed to insure a fair and
convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between them as a result.14 Elsewise stated,
convenience is the raison d'etre of the rule on venue.

The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the mediation, conciliation, or
arbitration process. It discourages any intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the
expiration of the prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of such expiration as the reason
for immediate recourse to the courts. It also affords the parties sufficient time to cool off and face
each other with less emotionalism and more objectivity which are essential ingredients in the
resolution of their dispute. The sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could spell the
difference between peace and a full-blown, wearisome, and expensive litigation between the parties.

While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence
built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court
remains applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the
Code.

In Peregrina vs. Panis,15 this Court stated:

Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de Borromeo vs.
Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes the
conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing
of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent could
affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative
remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between family
members, lacking which the case can be dismissed.

The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They are
actual residents in the same barangay and their disputes does not fall under
any of the excepted cases." (Emphasis omitted)

Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so in Garces vs. Court of
Appeals: 16

In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation
procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-
 compliance with which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Where, however, the fact
of non-compliance with and non-observance of such procedure has been
seasonably raised as an issue before the court first taking cognizance of the
complaint, dismissal of the action is proper.

xxx xxx xxx

The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of P.D.
1508 where applicable is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies; the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of
pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial
determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
(emphasis omitted)

There were, of course, cases where this Court ruled that the failure of the defendant to seasonably
invoke non-referral to the appropriate lupon operated as a waiver thereof. 17 Furthermore, when such
defect was initially present when the case was first filed in the trial court, the subsequent issuance of
the certification to file action by the barangay, which constituted substantial compliance with the said
requirement, cured the defect. 18

On 15 October 1991, this Court promulgated the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.19 Section 18
thereof provides:

Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for
conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there
is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed
without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have
been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where
the accused was arrested without a warrant.

In the proceeding before the court a quo, the petitioner and the respondent had in mind only P.D.
No. 1508. The petitioner further invoked the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the
decree by the Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her instant petition, the petitioner invokes
the decree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the private
respondents, realizing the weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer their
grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the decree, changed tack. In their Comment, they
assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a complaint against petitioner before the barangay council
of Barangay Valenzuela, Makati, in compliance with the requirement of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code." 20 Yet, in a deliberate effort to be cunning or
shrewd, which is condemnable for it disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the said law is
not applicable to their cases before the court a quo because (a) the petitioner and respondent
Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality; (b) the law does not apply
when the action, as in the said cases, may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c)
even assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has substantially complied
with it.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted enough diligence to inquire from
the private respondents if prior referral to the lupon was necessary before filing the informations.

Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the Local Government Code of
1991, more specifically on the provisions on the Katarungang pambarangay, is distressing. He
should have taken judicial notice thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of "the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines." We have ruled that a judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. 21 He should
have applied the revised katarungang pambarangay law under the Local Government Code of 1991.
Had he done so, this petition would not have reached us and taken valuable attention and time
which could have been devoted to more important cases.

In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993
for which the mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be
validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal Cases
Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to
paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should
have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge
under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code
of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe.
This is because, as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the
prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April
1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati.

Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private
respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had
sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the
scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot
be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.

Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical injuries, the offense for which
she may be liable would only be slight physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, considering that per the medical certificates 22 the injuries sustained by the
private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the absence of complication" and there is no
showing that the said injuries incapacitated them for labor or would require medical attendance for
such period. The penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos
and censure." These penalties are light under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and would
prescribe in two months pursuant to Article 90.

Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234
were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor would have expired two
months thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private respondents'
complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a
period of sixty days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the
said period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is issued, the private
respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to file their separate criminal complaints for
such offense. Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the
exception provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.

Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that the petitioner "had already
waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati,
considering that the accused and the complainant are residents of different barangays." The
petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she
submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-
condition of referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit. 23
Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondent that the parties could not agree
on a compromise and that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a certification to file
action. 24 The request is dated 23 June 1993, 25 or nearly one and a half months after Criminal Cases
Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the court a quo. Evidently, this was done to support their
contention in the said court that, in any event, there was substantial compliance with the requirement
of referral to the lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to appear at the
initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were filed, had no right to demand the issuance
of a certification to file action.

The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss Criminal
Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234.

Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the vital role which the revised
katarungang pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at the barangay level, in promoting
peace, stability, and progress therein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and
wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with sincerity, exhaust the
remedies provided by that law, government prosecutors should exercise due diligence in
ascertaining compliance with it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate
sanctions for non-compliance thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders of respondent Judge of 2 July 1993
and 5 August 1993 in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 1452334, both entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Felicidad Uy" are hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is hereby
DIRECTED to DISMISS said cases within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.

Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.