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Segovia vs. Climate Change Commission

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1. Victoria Segovia vs.

Climate Change Commission

FACTS:
This is a petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus to compel the implementation of
the following environmental laws and executive issuances - Republic Act No. (RA) 9729 (Climate Change Act), and RA
8749 (Clean Air Act); Executive Order No. 774 (BO 774); AO 254, s. 2009 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s.
2007 (AO 171).

Accordingly, the Petitioners seek to compel:

(a) the public respondents to:


(1) implement the Road Sharing Principle in all roads;
(2) divide all roads lengthwise, one-half (½) for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling, the other half for Filipino-made
transport vehicles;
(3) submit a time-bound action plan to implement the Road Sharing Principle
throughout the country;

(b) the Office of the President, Cabinet officials and public employees of Cabinet members to reduce their fuel
consumption by fifty percent (50%) and to take public transportation fifty percent (50%) of the time;

(c) Public respondent DPWH to demarcate and delineate the road right-of-way in all roads and sidewalks; and

(d) Public respondent DBM to instantly release funds for Road Users' Tax.

In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in
the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and
air" by the government without due process of law. They also decry the "unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing
scheme, claiming that ninety-eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when the car-owning
two percent (2%) is given almost all of the road space and while large budgets are allocated for construction and
maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized transportation systems.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;

2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; and

3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.

RULING:

1. Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), respondents argue that the
petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather
amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or injury. Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as
citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the decision in Oposa v.
Factoran; and that, in any event, legal standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion.
The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on standing, allowing the filing of
citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws. However, it bears noting that there is
a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing
represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a
writ of
continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.

2. Respondents also seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners failed to adhere to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, reasoning that since a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan must be filed with the Supreme
Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals,then the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is applicable. Petitioners,
on the other hand, cite the same provision and argue that direct recourse to this Court is available, and that the provision
shows that the remedy to environmental damage should not be limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the lower courts.
The respondents' argument does not persuade. Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy
covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental
rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's
constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address
the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats. At the very least,
the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule
on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed where it is dictated by public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows
direct resort to this Court, it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept
petitions brought directly before it.

3. We find that the petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for.

For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;

2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and

3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or
regulation was violated or would be violated.

In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology
and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any
unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful
ecology.

Moreover, the National Air Quality Status Report for 2005-2007 (NAQSR) submitted by the petitioners belies their claim
that the DENR failed to reduce air pollutant emissions - in fact, the NAQSR shows that the National Ambient Total
Suspended Particulates (TSP) value used to determine air quality has steadily declined from 2004 to 2007,37
and while the values still exceed the air quality guideline value, it has remained on this same downward trend until as
recently as 2011.38

On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not unlawfully refuse to implement or neglect the
laws, executive and administrative orders as claimed by the petitioners. Projects and programs that seek to improve air
quality were undertaken by the respondents, jointly and in coordination with stakeholders, such as:
priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is
aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service
Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs.

Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

RULES
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.-When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the
facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule
or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the
judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform
the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of
non-forum
shopping.

First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be entitled
to the writ. While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of real party-
in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.

Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It cannot be considered an absolute
imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied
or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that
are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary,and the official can only be directed by mandamus to act
but not to act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in
the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving
discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.

In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform any act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that
specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the
respondents were able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that seek to improve
air quality.

At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act -
the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of action (i.e.
the bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made transport vehicles) to
implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to be considered an act
enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the
implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of the executive as to
how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the environment is best implemented. Clearly, the
determination of the means to be taken by the executive in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or executive
policy relating to the environment requires the use of discretion.
Absent a showing that the executive is guilty of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority," the general rule applies that discretion cannot be checked via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence,
the continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Road Users' Tax


It bears clarifying that the Road Users' Tax mentioned in Section 9(e) of EO 774, apparently reiterated in Section 5 of AO
254 is the Special Vehicle Pollution Control Fund component of the Motor Vehicle Users' . Charge ("MVUC') imposed on
owners of motor vehicles in RA 8794, otherwise known as the Road Users' Tax Law. By the express provisions of the
aforementioned law, the amounts in the special trust accounts of the MVUC are earmarked solely and used exclusively
(1) for road maintenance and the improvement of the road drainage, (2) for the installation of adequate and efficient traffic
lights and road safety devices, and (3) for the air pollution control, and their utilization are subject to the management of
the Road Board.Verily, the petitioners' demand for the immediate and unilateral release of the Road Users' Tax by the
DBM to support the petitioners' operationalization of this Road Sharing Principle has no basis in law.

In fine, the allegations and supporting evidence in the petition fall short in showing an actual or threatened violation of the
petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology arising from an unlawful act or omission by, or any
unlawful neglect on the part of, the respondents that would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

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