Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Space2.0 Final 24feb PDF
Space2.0 Final 24feb PDF
0
Commerce, Policy, Security and
Governance Perspectives
© 2017 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from
ORF.
CONTENTS
Foreword vii
K Kasturirangan, former Chairman, ISRO
Introduction xi
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Narayan Prasad
I Space Commerce
II Space Policy
8. Privatisation of Space in India and the Need for A Law 103
Kumar Abhijeet
IV International Cooperation
16. Cooperation in Space between India and France 215
Jacques Blamont
origins, existence and destiny of the universe by dwelling deeper into human
consciousness. India’s current progress is also extending to the outer world,
addressing the quality of life of a billion-plus population. India stands at a
cusp to establish harmony of inner and outer lives; this may yet prove to
be its major contribution to global development.
A hallmark of India’s space programme has been international
cooperation. Some of the finest expressions of this paradigm can be seen
from the beginnings of the programme, such as the dedication of Thumba
Equatorial Rocket Launching Station to the United Nations and the
assistance to an international community of scientists in the study of upper-
atmospheric phenomena. Transcending ideological barriers, India’s
cooperation has also flowered into different hues, including joint space
missions, data sharing, capacity building in space applications, and policy
coordination. Of great relevance is how this can be evolved in the future
as a vibrant instrument of new advances in space activities, including human
space flight, space commerce, actions against climate change, and
international peace and security.
Over the decades, challenges of space activities have grown manifold.
This is a time when the world is seeing the emergence of NewSpace as a
revolution in space industry, with private industries leading the way in
applying the foundation elements established by space agencies as
commercial value propositions. Disruptive business models are being built
and there are distinct signs of growing potential for the overall size of the
space economy to grow multi-fold. Policy elements relevant to space
commerce and the private sector’s role in the future is extremely relevant
for the growth of India’s space endeavours.
Security applications of space, on one hand, and ensuring secure
environment using space, on the other, are no longer a matter of choice
for spacefaring states like India. Several initiatives at the international level
need to be coordinated and harmonised with India’s national interests, as
the country emerges as an economic power and seeks to strengthen its
relations with other states in an interdependent world. Examining the
various aspects of this dimension is extremely important, both to develop
holistic perspectives and to generate required capacities in India.
ix
INTRODUCTION
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Narayan Prasad
India’s space programme is more than five decades old and the country
today has come to be acknowledged as an established space power. India
began its space journey in 1963 with the launch of a sounding rocket
(Nike-Apache) supplied by NASA, a sodium vapour payload by France,
with a range clearance provided by a Russian helicopter. From these humble
beginnings, India in the 1980s would then develop its renowned Indian
Remote Sensing (IRS) and Indian National Satellite System (INSAT)
satellites series. The INSAT communication satellites have been operating
in the entire Asia Pacific region, offering services including television
broadcasting, weather forecasting, disaster warning, and search and rescue
missions. The IRS satellites comprise the largest State-operated civilian
constellation in the world and use state-of-the-art cameras for images of
the Earth in multiple resolutions, bands, and swaths. They provide services
nationally and to a large number of customers across the globe. Indeed,
even as interplanetary missions were not part of the original vision and
mandate of the ISRO, they have since matured to become an important
area of focus of the programme. Given that India was faced with multiple
social and developmental challenges, New Delhi, during the development
stages of both satellites and launch vehicle technologies, had maintained
focus on societal applications. However, with the changing dynamics of
regional security, the Indian political and scientific leadership set their mind
on the importance of space technology in the context of development
but also national security.
Even as India has journeyed for close to sixty years in this domain,
there are several requirements that need to be addressed for India to
maximise its gains and the potential of its strong capacity to build satellites
and launch vehicles. We believe there are several strategies, both short-
term and long-term, that may be employed by policymakers to expand
the utilisation of space assets and increasing the overall size of the country’s
space economy.
xii
This book addresses many of these prevalent policy issues and suggests
measures to address them from the varied perspectives of space commerce,
space policy, space security, global governance, and international
cooperation. It contains 26 chapters that deal with the different aspects of
India’s space programme, grouped in five sections, and seek to provide
insights to policymakers in the country.
The first section is on space commerce, and it opens with two chapters
authored by Narayan Prasad outlining first, the need for expansion of
India’s space industry to achieve a global footprint and second, an overview
of India’s space economy and the role of traditional and NewSpace
industry in India. A chapter by Prof. KR Sridhara Murthi follows, arguing
for the need to undertake policy regulations for greater commercialisation
of India’s space programme and tap into the burgeoning emerging space
markets. Neha Satak, Madhukara Putty and Prasad Bhat, in their chapter
explore the possibility of using satellites for digitally connecting more
than a billion people in bridging the digital divide that has both social and
economic implications. Arup Dasgupta then describes in his chapter the
potential benefits of using geospatial data for both government initiatives
and businesses, which have so far been fairly limited. He makes a strong
case for public-private partnerships in order to meet the growing demand,
which has been previously met by the government alone. Narayan Prasad,
in chapter six, argues for the holistic development of India’s space
ecosystem, with the establishment of a space start-up incubator as a
preliminary step which can be expanded to aid NewSpace companies in
contributing to India’s space economy growth story. Chapter seven by
Rohan Ganapathy, Arun Radhakrishnan and Yashas Karanam, on electric
propulsion and launch vehicles, explores the possibilities of adapting electric
propulsion for in-space navigation which would also create the spin-off
benefit of lowering the cost of launches.
Section two, in five chapters, details various aspects of India’s space
policy. Chapter eight by Kumar Abhijeet makes the case for legislative
requirements for elevating the private sector as a major actor in India’s
space story. Ashok GV and Riddhi D’Souza review India’s SATCOM
policy and norms with a view to both increasing private sector participation
and creating a public-private partnership that will enhance India’s space
xiii
Paikowsky and Daniel Barok in chapter nineteen examine India and Israel’s
collaboration, barely three decades old but strong. In chapter twenty,
Kazuto Suzuki details India-Japan space cooperation, which has so far
been rather limited in scope but carries significant potential to grow, given
the broader convergence in their political and strategic goals. Jason Held
looks at India-Australian space relationship which, like the India-Japan
one, is still at its exploratory stage. He examines the future potential in the
context of the growing India-Australia strategic partnership.
Section five contains five chapters detailing India’s approach to space
sustainability and collective governance of outer space. MYS Prasad
provides an overview of the major Indian efforts at tracking space debris,
including ISRO’s Space Debris Tracking Systems. Daniel Porras in his
chapter examines the relatively new area of space mining operations in
the context of both the US and global legal regimes. The chapter then
goes on to analyse the regulations that could be put in place to fulfil the
goals espoused by the Space Competitiveness Act. Charles Stotler studies
Article VI in the context of space security and sustainability. The chapter
deals with the complexities of new actors in outer space including non-
state players and the implications of these for the sustainability of outer
space. Yasushi Horikawa details the global governance mechanisms such
as the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)
in the context of both space sustainability and the larger strategic
cooperation between India and Japan. The last chapter on India and global
governance by Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan articulates the need for India
to take on a more pro-active approach both within the UN COPUOS as
well as in fora such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD), though the
CD has remained stagnant for more than two decades. Given India’s
strong sentiment that the CD is the key body for all multilateral negotiations
on international security issues, New Delhi should take the lead in injecting
political imagination to revive the CD as an effective platform in developing
an effective outer space regime.
We hope this volume adds to the slowly evolving debate on India’s
space policy and ambitions as it highlights some of the key challenges and
opportunities that are facing India in this realm.
I
SPACE
COMMERCE
Space 2.0 India – Leapfrogging Indian Space Commerce 1
Space 1.0
Space as a high-technology sector kicked off with government-backed
investments with official institutions in the military and civilian realm
developing core competence over decades of engineering. Space as an
industrial complex is one that has grown with this competence being
transferred to or encouraged to develop novel technologies in the industry,
which enables the private sector to then diversify its offerings as well as
expand its market reach. This process of initial capacity-building in the
industry can be deemed as Space 1.0, where the objective is to enable the
trickling down of technology, processes, patents, which have been
developed by taxpayer-funded research and development to an
entrepreneurial foundation which can commercialise and spin-off.
Space 1.0 is a process of handholding the industry to reach a tipping
point where there is a credible, reliable technology delivery capability
2 Space Commerce
Space 1.5
The encouragement that the industry is finding as a move further in the
steps of capacity building can be deemed as Space 1.5. This exercise in
technology/knowledge transfer provides the industry with the complete
know-how in end-to-end development of space and launch systems.
Although the entire technology will be that of ISRO, such a move will
provide a foundation to build core competence in the industry which, at
the same time, can be potentially used to diversify the offering from a user
base perspective or a technology perspective. From a user base perspective
for such systems, the immediate requirements from a medium-term
perspective (five to seven years) may well arrive from defence users who
have tremendously increased their utilisation of space-based capabilities
for security purposes. Moreover, this will provide the Indian industry with
the ability to design and develop advanced new-generation systems, which
in the longer term (10 to 15 years) may well match or feature themselves
as state-of-the-art systems in the world.
The emergence of Space 1.5 models in space transportation as well
as satellite manufacturing in the upstream hardware realisation plans of
Space 2.0 India – Leapfrogging Indian Space Commerce 3
This void, in some sense, may be also due to the fact that the country only
gained independence in an era where aerospace technology in the
international scene had already modernised against the backdrop of world
wars.
Post-independence, the sanctions against the country hindered growth
and maturity of the foundation technology and know-how while the
space sector enjoyed much more international collaboration and therefore
leapfrogging in the development of the foundation technology. From
an industry evolution perspective, the likes of Boeing and Lockheed Martin
in the US could take on the functions of Space 1.5 in a more rigorous
manner with larger functions due to the sheer size of their organisations
with a sound heritage and financials which was built up over decades of
expertise in the aerospace sector even before satellites or rockets were
around.
Therefore, on the space transportation front, India might see an
evolution of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model as a part of Space
1.5 that is quite unique in the international market and does not align with
the likes of other models such as Ariane Space. The important difference
in this PPP model against the ones already in the market is that the PPP
model India is evolving is one that may be completely dedicated to achieving
volumes for meeting local and international demand for reliable launch
vehicles such as Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and, eventually,
Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). The function of
development of new launch vehicles and making them operational will
still lie entirely in the government realm. This is one key difference in the
PPP model that is likely to evolve in India against that of Ariane Space or
United Launch Alliance, where the PPP models have also expanded to
develop new launch systems in addition to achieving volumes and serving
national and international markets under the PPP umbrella.
Similarly, on the spacecraft development front, ISRO is fostering a
capacity-building programme with the industry by engaging a vendor to
be involved in the realisation of two satellites which shall provide the
industry with an end-to-end spacecraft AIT know-how while operating
under the supervision of ISRO Satellite Centre. This again can be ticked
off as a Space 1.5 step for the industry to gain experience in AIT functions
Space 2.0 India – Leapfrogging Indian Space Commerce 5
which have been the function of the space agency for the past five decades.
This will enable ISRO to use the private sector to meet the burgeoning
demand which dictates about 10-12 satellites be flown every year for at
least the next five years instead of substantially increasing its manpower
base and infrastructure. Therefore, this step of capacity building on the
spacecraft side is an important step of transferring the technology, project
and quality management know-how to the industry for an end-to-end
spacecraft. It is likely that this step will lead to the industry developing the
spacecraft bus based on the type of mission while ISRO shall focus on
the development of new technologies for the spacecraft/mission payload
itself and integrate with the bus delivered by the industry. This is a model
that is quite different from developed spacefaring nations such as the US,
Canada, and EU, where end-to-end contracts are given to a single vendor,
which again has been possible via a more historically evolved government-
industry from the headstart in the 1900s.
Much of the liberalisation of the space activities in major spacefaring
countries has been based on providing encouragement to the private
industry for capturing the rising demand for services on the downstream.
The entry of the private sector has driven the year-on-year growth of the
space sector based on services where today almost two-thirds of the
$300 billion that runs in the space industry is captured by services.
Therefore, active promotion of involvement of the industry in
downstream activities is a crucial step in increasing the overall size of the
space economy. For example, tele-education via satellites for the first time
via the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) by ISRO is
one of the biggest successes in vetting a use case for satellite-based
communications services. With the technology maturing (on both the
consumer electronics segment as well as the satellite segment) from the
time of SITE, the applications of satellite-based television have not only
served in societal development but have also largely evolved as a
commercial television services platform for service providers to broadcast
news, advertisement, and entertainment. This demand, driven by the active
engagement of the private sector in the downstream, has therefore
provided the impetus for increased demand in terms of transponders.
While DTH is just one example, India has a large potential to evolve
such services via the private sector which can already be witnessed in the
6 Space Commerce
Space 2.0
The only way to break the conventional wisdom which says space is
expensive, space is inaccessible, and space is only for large companies, is
by closing the walls between engineering and business, which forms the
foundation of Space 2.0. It is important to note that this approach to
developing such a narrative is not exclusive to the conventional space agency
developed technologies or missions. Indeed, to a large extent it is based
on technology foundation developed by taxpayer-funded research. While
conventional space agency approach is more inward-looking towards
achieving targets based on national priorities, Space 2.0 is more outward-
looking with an intention to be globally disruptive in terms of offering a
space product or service.
The global NewSpace phenomenon is one that is fledging on this
trend where space entrepreneurs are funded by private capital to achieve
a product or a service that has the potential to disrupt the barrier to access
to space (in upstream) or offer a service at a price that potentially opens
doors to addition of a large base of new consumers (on the downstream).
To understand this phenomenon a bit more, Figure 1 provides an
illustration of what NewSpace companies are attempting to do. Traditional
space agencies have a budget that is driven by a political will which, in
turn, depends on geopolitical scenarios, where any steep rise in budgetary
allocation has to be driven by a national will which has mostly occurred
due to international competition. Therefore, typically space agencies may,
at best, have had linear growth post the Cold-War era. This also applies to
India (Figure 2) where the budget increase has also witnessed a similar
trend for investments in the space sector. Where NewSpace is trying to
Space 2.0 India – Leapfrogging Indian Space Commerce 7
at least 30 percent while still being able to launch over a dozen launches a
year. The approach taken by SpaceX is based on a business model that
intends to disrupt the cost of access to space while achieving it by
developing a disruptive technology that will create a barrier for its
competition to match in the short or medium term of five to seven years.
It is important to note that SpaceX’s efforts are not completely independent
or isolated from that of NASA. NASA provided much of the technology
for engines for the company under a technology transfer programme to
understand the foundation of building rockets. NASA also rescued SpaceX
from going bankrupt by awarding its first launch contract.Where SpaceX
has also possibly benefited in making its design for an RLV is in learning
from the mistakes of the shuttle programme.
The key question is how this approach—where the financial risk is
initially borne by private investments—which benefited from an active
public-private partnership in learning about the foundation technologies
to create a product that would otherwise take many folds more of
investments in both time and money to achieve in a traditional space
exploration approach? The answer lies in the approach to risk management
in decision-making as well as the management matrix itself which are
inherently different for a public institution that is held accountable for
spending tax money against that of a private actor. The approach is
therefore taken to management and realisation of such large-scale projects
seems to change dramatically by NewSpace players where the priority in
getting a product or service going is to get the most value for money,
while a conventional space agency approach would be to prioritise decision-
making on reducing risk.
The very reason that private capital backs NewSpace is that these
investors are ready to play with a risk vs reward quotient against a given
opportunity in a much vigorous fashion that may be impossible to
substantiate for a taxpayer-funded agency. In funding NewSpace
entrepreneurs, private capital is risking returns while a conventional space
agency will have no room for such risks. This is one reason why a
government-backed space agency would rather support a private actor
who is willing to risk. One should also underscore the realities of a possible
bubble in NewSpace in a sector that has already witnessed such a bubble
being burst.
Space 2.0 India – Leapfrogging Indian Space Commerce 9
The Indian space programme is one of the world’s fastest growing (Figure
1). Backed by investments for over five decades now, India is moving
towards increasing its capacity and capabilities of using space technology
products and services not only for societal applications but also to support
commercial space activities and pursue diplomatic and security objectives.
Thus there is an inherent potential to exploit the technological prowess
developed in the country for homegrown enterprises to expand products
and services for the domestic market as well as participate in the $300-
billion global space industry.
This step will elevate vendors in the space programme to the next
level, working alongside the space agency to be able to deliver back
complete end-to-end systems. However, this current form of capacity
building where a partnership is envisioned to perform AIT-related aspects
(in both launch vehicles and satellites) is an extremely elementary one since
the know-how transferred in this process is mostly at the system level of
integration and does not entail capacity building to design, develop and
complete end-to-end systems independently.
Although this is definitely a jump up for the industry in acquiring the
know-how on AIT aspects, the roadmap for the traditional vendors to
get to a level of being able to design, develop and manufacture end-to-
end launch vehicles or satellites is not on the horizon until the current
initiatives attain fruition and begin to show signs of sustainability. Therefore,
this track is more a top-down model that enables the industry over long
gestation periods to systematically develop capacity and primarily feeds
on taxpayer funding to execute projects.
This model of industry engagement is not exclusive to India. Most
traditional space business models work on this framework where the
industry is funded largely by the government to deliver end-to-end systems.
However, what is different between advanced spacefaring nations and
India in terms of current models is the level of capacity builtup in the
private industry. As a country, India is one of the most successful nations
to have developed the capacity to deliver payloads to space or to develop
satellites for services or to interplanetary missions. However, there is a
stark gap in the capacity builtup in the private industry where the industry
is mostly involved as tier-based vendors and presently there is no single
industry vendor who has the capacity to deliver end-to-end systems. This
creates bottleneck effects in the possible expansion of industry to the
global supply chain, especially from an export perspective.
However, traditional space approach has a strong edge of having
room for building upon proven and reliable technology and handholding
from the space agency. Policymakers should look to draw a long-term
roadmap in creating an environment of multiple industry players or industry
consortiums having the ability to deliver end-to-end systems so that there
is room for competition in the national ecosystem.
14 Space Commerce
2. NewSpace in India
NewSpace is a worldwide phenomenon of entrepreneurs developing
products, and service enterprises focusing on space and are using private
funding in their initial developments. While there is no internationally
accepted technical definition of ‘NewSpace’, principally, the ethos of the
movement has been to challenge the traditional ways of space exploration
that are widely considered as too expensive, time-consuming, and lacking
in room for inventive risk-taking. Companies that fit in the bracket of
NewSpace include the likes of SpaceX, OneWeb, and Planet Labs, which
are primarily funded by private capital to build products and services that
challenge the cost to either access to space itself or access to services
based out of assets in space.
NewSpace has gone on to attract successful global entrepreneurs to
either kick-off ventures of their own or to support start-ups. Examples
of such global entrepreneurs include the likes of Richard Branson kicking
off Virgin Galactic, Jeff Bezos starting up Blue Origin, and Larry Page
backing Planetary Resources.5 One can argue that NewSpace kicked off
where traditional space enterprises were stifling with the cost for creating
more assets in space in areas such as developing cheaper rockets with
greater launch cadence and developing satellite constellations that can enable
greater and faster coverage to now many of them diversifying into space
tourism and mining of space resources.
Traditional Space and NewSpace Industry in India 15
While this phenomenon has largely been orchestrated for the past
decade and a half with leadership from the US, with the revolution in
small satellites and the cost to access to space being reduced substantially,
there are 10,000 NewSpace enterprises expected to kick-off around the
world in the next 10 years.6 Even if this may be an estimate that is ten
times over what is realisable, having some 1,000 NewSpace companies in
the next 10 years can well change the very nature of space exploration and
exploitation. The key question here from a NewSpace perspective that
needs to be asked is this: Will India have, if not a dominant, at least a
relevant global NewSpace footprint or will it be a closed self-serving
ecosystem?
NewSpace has inspired several Indian entrepreneurs to form companies
that can inspire a whole new generation of fellow Indians to dream of
businesses based on space products and services. The ecosystem is very
recent with start-ups in a mix of both upstream and downstream offerings
such as Team Indus, Earth2Orbit, Astrome Technologies, Bellatrix
Aerospace, and SatSure. The spread of these companies include dreams
of landing a rover on the Moon,7 developing space-based internet service,8
developing a private launch vehicle,9 and using space data to change the
face of how space-based technology can be used to provide forecast and
insights to important basic sectors such as agriculture.10
Figure 3 provides an overview of a SWOT analysis for NewSpace in
India. The key question is how different these start-ups are from those
500-odd small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) that serve ISRO. The
answer lies in the rather simple fact that these companies are the ones that
plan to build either end-to-end systems or services for the first time in the
country. Their business model is more diversified, with the possibility of
either serving (private businesses or consumers themselves) customers
themselves directly. Another strong distinction from the traditional business
models that exist so far in the country is their vision to focus on the
possibility of exporting their offerings.
It is important to understand that enabling NewSpace in India will
have an effect not only on young start-ups with but it also gives an
opportunity for the already built-up SMEs to expand their business.
NewSpace in this sense is not a phenomenon but more of a framework
16 Space Commerce
that can act as an enabler to expand capacity and capability for the industry
to offer end-to-end products and services.
NewSpace India will look to feed on successes such as the most cost-
effective and the only first-time success mission to Mars as a brand-building
exercise and shall try to translate it into international business for homegrown
industries as a recognition of producing world-class products and services.
Therefore, NewSpace offers the potential for diversification of customer
base for Indian industry in the space sector at the global level.
The government of India has actively floated several key initiatives
such as ‘Make in India’ and ‘Digital India’, in which the space industry has
a key role to play in achieving the goals. With the backbone technology
know-how foundation in place, mainly by the efforts of ISRO and its
vendor base, there is immense scope for NewSpace enterprises to leverage
these cluster-based externalities such as technologies, infrastructure and
manpower to build space-based services.
The investments needed for NewSpace commercial enterprises are
extremely large since the target is to build end-to-end products and services
models. Therefore, one of the major challenges will remain to convince
private capital investors to buy into the business models. This exercise is
also challenging due to the fact that there is no long-term framework
within the national goals for NewSpace in India alongside concrete policy
frameworks.
Traditional Space and NewSpace Industry in India 17
REFERENCES
1. Narayan Prasad Nagendra and Prateep Basu, “Space 2.0: Shaping India’s
Leap into the Final Frontier,” Occasional Paper #68, Observer Research
Foundation, August 2015, http://dhqxnzzajv69c.cloudfront.net/wp-
content/uploads/2000/10/OccasionalPaper_68.pdf.
2. K.R. Sridhara Murthi and Mukund Kadursrinivas Rao, “India’s Space
Industry Ecosystem: Challenges of Innovations and Incentives,” New
Space 3, (2015): 165–71, doi:10.1089/space.2015.0013.
22 Space Commerce
A Review of India’s
Commercial Space Efforts
K. R. Sridhara Murthi
Technology Trends
Miniaturisation of space components and systems enabled by increased
use of solid-state power devices, new generation sensor devices, exponential
growth in processing and data storage capabilities, enhancement of weight
efficiency of energy storage and conversion, and process innovations such
as concurrent engineering have greatly influenced reduction of launch and
spacecraft costs. “New Space” era has also brought many disruptive
concepts, such as miniaturised high-performance spacecraft, inflatable
structures, large-scale clustering and constellations, greater autonomy in
spacecraft, smart concepts in power, bandwidth and payload management,
intelligent and robotic structures, and architectural integration in space and
ground networks. While future developments in technology in the longer
range will be directed towards increasing human presence in space, for
creation of habitations, in situ operations and resource exploration, there
will also be demands for technological developments for overcoming the
challenges being brought about by the new trends in space as well as
tackling global crises, such as climate change, terrorism, conflicts and uneven
development. Space systems can be an important component of new
generation systems needed for monitoring our planet’s health and natural
resources on a continuous and long-term basis using networks of sensors
far denser than the current ones. In this field, integration of space
technologies and space-based applications with new tools/technologies,
such as big data analytics and Internet of Things, can be expected.
Advances will also be demanded for making space operations safer and
more secure. This, in turn, will create an imperative of better Space
Situational Awareness through global cooperation and pursuit of new
steps for active debris removal or on-orbit repair missions. For India,
through the next few decades, practical applications of space for better
weather predictions and extreme-weather monitoring, applications in
democratising information and towards empowerment, education and
optimum use of natural resources and enhancing national security are
34 Space Commerce
Policy Implications
The preceding discussion clearly indicates that India’s commercial space
developments cannot be seen in isolation and must be viewed holistically,
keeping in mind the multidimensional objectives that the National Space
Policy will demand, besides imperatives of emerging international
environment both in terms of the commercial and strategic aspects of
the space domain. Major long-term policy implications for space
commerce, given the potentials of India’s economic developmental
aspirations, can be perceived as follows:
Target-Oriented Policies: Indian space-based service industry should be
targeted to reach a level of US $40–50 billion by 2050. This is not unrealistic
if economic development is sustained to predicted levels. In terms of market
values, this represents an eight-to ten-fold increase over the next three decades.
A robust infrastructure should be enabled by both government expenditure
and private investments or through public–private partnerships.
Industry Architecture: Recognising dimensions of space as a global
activity, policies should enable and incentivise a balance of competitiveness
and sustainability. There will be both hierarchy, e.g. a prime contractor and
associated supply chain, and segment-wise specialisations based on value
chain, e.g. infrastructure and services. A clear-cut policy is needed on
A Review of India’s Commercial Space Efforts 35
Concluding Remarks
In pursuit of the government-funded space programme over the past
five decades, ISRO has made some remarkable achievements, including
autonomous access to space and making and operating state-of-the-art
satellites that became the mainstay for television, telecommunication and
the image-applications industry, with a multibillion-dollar domestic market.
Opportunities are opening up to expand commercial space role of the
Indian industry, though the challenges that confront these opportunities
are daunting, and they demand a well-crafted strategy of engagement
between government and industry, with a long-term perspective. The
world has witnessed mainly policy driven forays in commercial space
activities and, more recently, a new breed of entrepreneurship in the western
world, challenging the traditional concepts and approaches. The potentials
for space commerce must be tapped by promoting an overall ecosystem
for space activities, which should serve to advance robust national space
36 Space Commerce
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the selfless, unflinching and dedicated support of my
erstwhile colleagues in ISRO and Antrix, too many to name here, who
made my journey in Antrix Corporation exciting and won the company a
global recognition. I am beholden to the outstanding leaders Prof. Satish
Dhawan, Dr. U. R. Rao and Dr. K. Kasturirangan for the high values that
they inspired in me, which reflected in my healthy relations with
collaborators and customers across the globe. I thank the dynamic
leadership of Dr. Madhavan Nair, who gave a great growth impetus to
commercial space activities; Dr. V. Siddhartha, who was the first chairman
of ISRO’s Technology Transfer Group and played a pioneering role in
seeding professional systems for technology transfers and industry interface;
his successor Mr. P. Sudarsan, who championed the concept for Antrix at
the very beginning; and late Mr. Sampath, who steered the challenging
initial years. Both Mr. P. Sudarsan and Mr. Sampath had been my senior
co-alumni at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. Finally, I
thank Mr. N. Rangachary and Mr. Sisir Das, public servants of high order
and rare qualities, who provided valuable guidance to Antrix.
REFERENCES
1. “PSLV-C 37 scheduled for launch on Jan 27,” The Hindu, Weekly Edition,
18 December 2016, ISSN 0971-751X.
2. Jeff Foust,”House committee seeks details on Indian launch policy,”
Space News, 6 July 2016,accessed on 29 December 2016, http://
spacenews.com/house-committee-seeks-details-on-indian-launch-policy/
#sthash.qFZ9SwKM.dpuf.
3. Indian Space Research Organisation, accessed on 16 December 2016,
http://www.isro.gov.in/indias-space-policy.
4. Department of Space, accessed on 22December 2016, http://dos.gov.in/
sites/default/files/SATCOM-norms.pdf.
5. Mukund Kadursrinivas Rao, K. R. Sridhara Murthi and Baldev Raj,
“Indian Space: Toward a ‘National Ecosystem’ for Future Space
Activities,” New Space, 1 December 2016, 4(4): 228–236.
Exploring the Potential of Satellite Connectivity for Digital India 37
Very many individuals with myopic vision questioned the relevance of space
activities in a newly independent nation which was finding it difficult to feed its
population. But the vision of the leaders was very clear: if Indians were to
play a meaningful role in the community of nations, they must be second to
none in the application of advanced technologies to their real-life problems.
- A P J Abdul Kalam in his autobiography, Wings of Fire
Introduction
India is a country at the cusp of a major transformation. Since early 2000,
the Indian internet user base has virtually exploded. It took 20 years to
have the first 100 million users online, but the next 100 million users will
come in less than three years.1 To cater to this meteoric rise in demand, it
is imperative to look beyond the traditional modes of internet delivery,
and as this chapter argues, space-based solutions are necessary.
India in Space
India has been an active player in space and has always utilised space for
improving the quality of life of its people. It is one of the few countries
in the world that have the capability to develop indigenous technologies
to carry out space missions.6 In 2014 the country joined an elite club by
successfully launching a Mars Orbiter in its very first attempt and at a
relatively lower cost. After its establishment in 1969, the Indian Space
Exploring the Potential of Satellite Connectivity for Digital India 39
that is unheard of in any other country in the world in the same period.
The high growth rate can largely be attributed to the fact that more than
half of India’s population is below 25 years of age. Further, the growth is
not limited to the number of users; the demand for data, especially over
mobile phones, is also growing at a much faster rate all over the world. By
2020, monthly global mobile data traffic is expected to reach 30.6 exabytes
from 3.7 exabytes in 2015.11
The internet user growth so far has been skewed towards urban areas
even though majority of the population resides in rural areas. The main
reason for this disparity is low population density in rural areas which
makes it difficult for traditional internet solutions to recover the cost.
However, there has been a growing demand for internet in urban and
rural areas alike. By 2018, India is expected to have more than 500 million
internet users, and about half of them will come from rural areas.12
Recognising the socio-economic dividends of broadband internet, in
2011, the Indian government rolled out an ambitious project to connect
250,000 village panchayats with optical fibres. The project, initially called
National Optical Fiber Network, and later renamed Bharat-Net 2015, is
expected to facilitate transition to e-commerce, e-Banking, e-Governance,
e-Education, and Tele-medicine. At the time of writing this chapter, the
project had reached 15,624 village panchayats.13
All the major internet service providers in India are also making large
investments into expanding their existing infrastructure to get ready for
the expected growth. Bharti Airtel, for instance, is committed to expanding
its mobile broadband coverage to all Indian towns and 750,000 villages.14
Exploring the Potential of Satellite Connectivity for Digital India 41
Reliance Jio, a relatively new player into the country’s telecom market, has
made large investments to create fibre optic-based 4G infrastructure to
provide telecom internet service across India. However, their coverage
capacity is strongly linked to the population density of a region.
Aadhar number. This app uses fingerprints for authentication, and requires
a decent internet connection.26 With satellite internet, this revolutionary app
can be made usable in every nook and corner of the country. Apart from
these apps, the government has also introduced RuPay, a debit card which
comes with lesser transaction costs as compared to other cards in the
market.27
The Indian entrepreneurial ecosystem is also cashing in on the
opportunity by coming out with various fund transfer apps, each with its
own flavour.
2. Education: In absolute numbers, Indian higher education system is the
third largest in the world, next only to the US and China. However, only
a few educational institutions of higher learning are equipped with
infrastructure for delivering quality education. The IITs, which are known
globally for their quality training, cater only to less than ten thousand
students.
High-speed broadband internet can take learning materials even to
those who cannot attend these elite institutions. Scores of students and
professionals learn new skills through popular educational websites like
MIT Open Courseware, and online platforms like edX which connect
learners to the best universities in the world. The National Program on
Technology Enhanced Learning (NPTEL), a joint initiative of the IITs
and the IISc, is creating hundreds of Massive Open Online Courses
(MOOC) to which students can enrol and get certified in various subjects.28
Free and Open Software in Education (FOSSEE), part of the National
Mission on Education through Information and Communication
Technology (ICT), Ministry of Human Resources and Development, is
enabling students to improve their computational skills by learning new
free and open source tools online.29 The reach of such relevant and
ambitious programmes is hindered by the absence of internet in many of
the smaller towns and villages in the country. Satellite internet can go a
long way in taking these initiatives to the doorstep of every learner in the
country.
3. Healthcare: Like education and finance, healthcare is a basic service
that must be easily available to every citizen of the country. However, a
single statistic puts India’s healthcare system in perspective: only two percent
46 Space Commerce
of the country’s doctors cater to the rural areas, which are home to 68
percent of the total population. Public health centres are understaffed,
and often, are too distant to be visited by many villagers. With the availability
of satellite internet, specialist doctors can remotely monitor patients and
help in early diagnosis of various medical conditions. The availability
of such preventive healthcare facilities can also have a positive effect on
the finances of rural households.
4. Smart Cities: Cities around the globe are becoming hubs of economic
activity. They occupy two percent of the total land area, accommodate
more than half of the world’s population, account for 70 percent of
global GDP, consume 60 percent of global energy consumption, emit 70
percent of greenhouse gases, and produce 70 percent of total waste.30
Obviously, managing cities is becoming a challenge to all governments.
The Indian context gets more complicated because of the wide economic
disparity among the urban middle class and the urban poor. The
government’s Smart Cities Mission aims to leverage state-of-the-art
technology to improve the quality of life in the country’s crowded cities.
The smart cities, among other things, are thought to be brimming with
sensors that constantly monitor water and electricity supply, air pollution
levels at designated areas, and flag concerned officials automatically. These
sensors require internet connectivity to communicate among themselves
and to the central server that transforms raw sensor data into actionable
insights. Though urban areas are covered by optical fibres, satellite internet
can be used as a backup when the primary network breaks down in case
of an emergency.
5. Smart Agriculture: Agriculture, the sector which employs about half
of India’s workforce, provides plenty of opportunities for technological
intervention at various stages. Sensors that can measure moisture content
in the soil can ensure that the crops are grown at the right moisture level,
and can also help save water in large quantities. Video surveillance systems
can help farmers monitor their agricultural lands electronically.
India is second largest in the world in terms of farm output. Yet it
also loses a significant proportion of its produce to waste, due to poor
storage and transportation facilities. Technology solutions can be developed
to centrally monitor storage facilities scattered across the country. Tracking
Exploring the Potential of Satellite Connectivity for Digital India 47
Conclusion
Robust economic growth over the last few decades, increased investments
into R&D, and proactive policies have helped India to embark on a journey
of technological transformation. As the country prepares itself for the
road ahead, it should first address the wide disparity in the availability of
technology to its citizens. Making high-bandwidth, broadband internet
available to everyone is one of the best ways to make technology more
democratic. However, ground infrastructure may not be the best choice
for some of the rural and remote areas of the country.
This chapter argues that the time is ripe for leveraging satellite internet,
a technology that is unparalleled in its reach and reliability. Pervasive internet,
delivered from space, has the potential to transform the way basic services
like banking, education, and healthcare are delivered to citizens of the
country. Of course, for a country that has a tradition of utilising space
technology for social good and progress, beaming internet from space
could well be the next obvious step.
ENDNOTES
1. Alpesh Shah, Nimisha Jain, and Shweta Bajpai, “India@Digital.Bharat -
Creating a $200 Billion Internet Economy”, Boston Consulting Group,
January 2015, http://company.mig.me/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
bcg-report-on-Indian-internet.pdf.
2. "GDP (Current US$) - World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD
National Accounts Data Files,” The World Bank, http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=IN.
3. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Economic Diplomacy
Division,”India in Business - IT & ITeS,” http://indiainbusiness.nic.in/
newdesign/index.php?param=industryservices_landing/395/3.
4. Ministry of Finance, Government of India,”Economic Outlook,
Prospects, and Policy Challenges”, http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2015-16/
echapter-vol1.pdf.
5. "Vision and Vision Areas,” Digital India Programme, http://
digitalindia.gov.in/content/vision-and-vision-areas.
Exploring the Potential of Satellite Connectivity for Digital India 49
Introduction
For the planned development of a vast country like India, timely and
accurate information on various natural resources is vital. Such information
can be used for the optimum management of these scarce resources. The
spectacular advances in space science and technology in general, and
geospatial techniques like remote sensing, Geographical Information
Systems (GIS) and Global Positioning System (GPS), in particular, have
emerged as reliable and powerful means to this end.
India’s tryst with geospatial technology is not new. India boasts
institutions like the Survey of India, the Geological Survey of India (GSI),
the Forest Survey of India (FSI) and the Departments of Land Records
in different states, which have been around for at least a century. These
organisations have been updating their systems with new technologies,
though not perhaps as efficiently as is desirable.
Some of the points of inflection which mark the induction of new
and disruptive geospatial technologies can be outlined. The Pre-investment
Survey of Forest Resources conducted by the government in collaboration
with ITC in the 1960s was the first time an aircraft was used for remote
sensing. From this followed the establishment in 1966 of the Indian Photo-
interpretation Institute (IPI), now known as the Indian Institute of Remote
Sensing (IRS). The next milestone was in 1969 when the first United Nations
conference on the exploration and peaceful uses of Outer Space
52 Space Commerce
(UNISPACE) was held in Vienna. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai noted in his report
to the conference the importance of remote sensing for developing
countries like India. He said:
“When we came to Vienna, we thought that the areas of most
immediate practical application would be communications,
meteorology and navigation, in that order. But one of the most
striking things to emerge has been appreciation of the great
potentiality of remote sensing devices, capable of providing large-
scale practical benefits. One of the group discussions considered
the cost effectiveness of these techniques, and it was pointed out
that there is a high cost benefit ratio, which, for example, in
cartography, can be as much as 18:1. The time has come to interest
meteorologists, hydrologists, surveyors, agricultural specialists and
other groups in such programmes. The Chairman of the thematic
session summarised the consensus that aircraft could initially be
used because of their comparatively low cost. There is need, to
begin with, to understand problems of interpretation. Remote
sensing cannot replace man on ground, but can direct man’s efforts
on ground to be more efficient.”1
Programme Evolution
The two departments which played key roles in the evolution of geospatial
technologies in India are the Departments of Space (DOS) and the
Department of Science and Technology (DST). The two have always
worked in sync to introduce and promote new technologies. The IRS
programme was conceptualised and launched in 1981. Simultaneously,
the then Chairman of ISRO, Prof. Satish Dhawan coordinated with the
then Secretary of Science and Technology, Prof. M. G. K. Menon, to
launch a programme called the National Natural Resources Management
System (NNRMS) that would prepare Indian scientific departments to
use the data from IRS. NNRMS was established in 1983 by the Planning
Commission and had the participation of all government departments
and ministries. One of its activities was the assessment of the forest cover
of India in 1984. Using Landsat data, the DOS released a figure of 17
percent, a far cry from the 33 percent claimed by the FSI. There was a hue
and cry, and the number was ultimately revised upward after much
discussion, but the 33 percent claim was put to rest. The outcome was
that the FSI began to use remote sensing to periodically assess the forest
cover of India. The NNRMS programme resulted in many new initiatives,
such as the mapping of potential groundwater zones, wastelands,
grasslands, water bodies and coastal zones, to name a few.
All these efforts were in the nature of inventories and soon the question
began to be asked: What next? The question was sought to be answered
with a programme called the Integrated Mission for Sustainable
Development started in 1986, which sought to use remote sensing to plan
for better management of land and water. This programme and another
one on Scientific Source Finding for the Drinking Water Mission in 1985
brought out an important fact – that remote sensing by itself was not
enough. It needed information from many other sources, and planning
activity had to take into account the aspirations and expectations of the
people, who were to be the ultimate beneficiaries of the programmes.
There was, at this juncture, a standoff between the remote sensing purists
who refused to countenance any other data source or data management
54 Space Commerce
system, and the planners who needed tools to evolve decision support
alternatives. This laid the ground for the entry of GIS.
Experimentation with GIS began almost in conjunction with IRS,
and by 1989 GIS had found its way into the DOS, the DST, the Survey
of India, the FSI and other major departments. Two major projects under
the NNRMS, the Natural Resources Data Management System of the
DST and the National Resources Information System of the DOS
spearheaded these efforts. Survey of India set up its Digital Mapping
Centre and Modern Mapping Centre to cater to the upcoming requirement
of digital base maps for GIS. A major exercise to define a Digital Vector
Data Standard was undertaken, as well as a national Spatial Data Exchange
standard for vector and raster data.
Meanwhile, Global Navigation Satellite Systems began to revolutionise
position location and the use of GPS for precise location, survey and
mapping became common. The removal of selective availability gave a
great fillip to these activities. ISRO worked with Airports Authority of
India to establish the GPS Aided Geo-Augmented Navigation (GAGAN),
a space based augmentation system for aircraft navigation using GPS. A
regional navigation system, Navigation with Indian Constellation (NAVIC)
has also been established recently to provide an exclusive positioning and
navigation system for India under its own control.
Current Status
Today, investment in major government projects which use geospatial
technology is growing at a compound annual growth rate of 30 percent.
Programmes like the Restructured Accelerated Power Development and
Reforms Programme (RAPDRP); the National Land Records
Modernisation Programme (NLRMP) and the Jawaharlal Nehru National
Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) together have an investment of nearly
INR 5,000 million. Most of the work related to geospatial and IT is
outsourced to private industry. These numbers do require a leap of faith
because work has been slow, but it is picking up. The interesting fact about
these programmes is the way geospatial technology is being incorporated
into their systems.
If the initial phase consisted of managing geospatial data by way of
mapping and listing inventories, the current phase is one of managing
data geospatially by making geospatial systems an integral part of the IT
infrastructure of the programmes. Thus the GIS component of RAPDRP
is a part of its overall IT strategy to make power distribution efficient and
reduce losses. Similarly, the geospatial component of the NLRMP seeks
ways to use the technology to rapidly map land holdings and update all
the Records of Rights and make these available through an IT infrastructure.
The process of updating land records is well established and the geospatial
and IT components have been woven into this process. The JNNURM is,
however, a different story. While it does recognise the importance of
geospatial technology for mapping and updating maps at regular intervals,
it seems to have restricted the usage to determining taxes and building
permissions alone. Little wonder then, that of the 63 cities initially picked
up for the mission, not one has effectively integrated geospatial systems
56 Space Commerce
into its IT infrastructure. However, this too will change with geospatial
activities picking up.
Other major sectors of significant geospatial activity are Defence and
Homeland Security. The Directorate General of Information Systems of
the Ministry of Defence has a major programme for inducting geospatial
systems into its Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) activities. The National
Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) is similarly inducting the latest
technologies into its activities for Homeland Security. Both these sectors
provide huge opportunities for the Indian geospatial industry.
Future Directions
As a promoter of remote sensing and satellite communications, the DOS
has been in constant touch with ministries. At a recent interaction it zeroed
in on about 160 projects across 58 ministries/departments in the areas of
Natural Resources Management, Energy and Infrastructure, Disaster and
Early Warning, Communications and Navigation, e-Governance and Geo-
spatial Governance and Societal Services.
These 160 projects encompass applications across varied domains:
Earth Observation and Geospatial (97 projects), Communications and
Navigation (30), Technology Development (10), Meteorology (6), Asset
mapping and Mobile applications (8) and others (9). Some of these projects
will also render support to flagship programmes of the government such
as the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT),
the Smart Cities project, the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna (PMAY), the
Clean Ganga project, the Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana (PMSKY),
the Digital India project, among others.
Smart Cities
The large-scale GIS database prepared under AMRUT will also be
used for smart cities. Selected smart cites will be taken up on priority basis
to complete the GIS based Master Plan preparation.
Data Sharing
Indians tend to be very data secretive. As a result, the same data is collected
over and over again by different departments, and often by different
teams from the same department. As mentioned earlier, two major projects,
NRDMS and NRIS attempted to create structured geo-databases on the
basis of the Indian administrative structure. From this it was a short step
to creating a Spatial Data Infrastructure which could be shared by different
departments and provide data for academia and industry as well. This
effort, originally called the National Geospatial Data Infrastructure and
later renamed the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI), was
launched in 2001 by DOS and DST. After several meetings, the task group
on NSDI submitted its report in 2006. On 02 June 2006, the Cabinet
approved the creation of NSDI and constituted a National Spatial Data
Committee and an executive committee with a secretariat to assist the two
committees. An NSDI geo-portal was established on 22 December 2008.
However, the providing of information about the data held by different
departments to this geo-portal is still incomplete. Meanwhile individual
portals have been set up by different departments and states. NRSC has
its own platform on Bhuvan, while Survey of India and NIC have their
own portals. Portals of the Census of India and GSI are also available. As
a way out of this resistance to data sharing, NSDI promoted state portals,
so that the states could retain control over their data. Other useful efforts
of the NSDI such as the establishment of core metadata standards,
Geography Mark-up Language (GML) schemas and thematic standards
have gone unnoticed.
Notwithstanding the poor progress of NSDI, a new project, the
National GIS (NGIS), was promoted by the erstwhile Planning
Commission to replicate the work of the NSDI and in addition, provide
development support services for states (DSSS) for different departments
of the government. NGIS was to have been implemented by the DST.
Ultimately, the Digital India Programme took over these efforts, saying:
Unlocking the Potential of Geospatial Data 65
Data Policies
The key feature of geospatial data is geo-referencing. It encompasses maps,
imagery and point information generated by GPS as well as by other
means of data acquisition. The right to generate data is wholly with the
government. Space data is generated and distributed by the DOS alone
and topographic data is the responsibility of Survey of India. Aerial
surveys, including those using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), are
regulated by the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) the Ministries
of Defence and Home Affairs, and are subject to stringent controls.
Because of the spatially referenced context, such data is considered to be
strategic, and therefore its generation and access is controlled by the state.
This control is by way of established policies.
The Map Policy regulates access to maps created by the Survey of
India. The Open Series of Maps (OSM), available to general users, is
subject to several licences. Maps of coastal and international boundaries
are secret in the OSM series. No height data is included in the OSM series.
Third party value addition to OSM maps becomes the intellectual property
of the Survey of India. A new Map Policy is in the process of being
released which will reduce, but not remove, these restrictions.
Remote sensing is controlled by three policies. Aerial survey and UAV
policies have been mentioned earlier. The DOS has a Space Remote Sensing
Policy that regulates access to data having resolution better than one metre.
Data better than one metre resolution, such as Cartosat 2A and 2B data
and foreign panchromatic data is subject to screening. The group of
government users who are eligible to use such data without further clearance
are spelt out in detail. This was an area of ambiguity in the earlier policy
and created problems for many projects like R-APDRP, which were being
executed by PSUs.
Antrix, which handles access of foreign entities to IRS data, can also
enter into agreements with foreign data suppliers for marketing their data
in India, in addition to NRSC. But NRSC continues to be the sole data
distributor and in practice, is a single point choking off data supply. Private
Unlocking the Potential of Geospatial Data 67
users need a government certificate stating that the data is for development
purposes in India only before getting access to sub metre data from all
satellites. For those without such a certificate, the request is referred to a
High Resolution Data Committee for approval.
These policies effectively control and regulate the use of Indian data
by Indian users, but are ineffective in controlling their legal or illegal use by
foreign entities. Indian map data is available off the shelf abroad and even
on the Internet. High resolution data on India from foreign remote sensing
satellites is also available on the Internet on payment, and free on applications
like Google Maps. Stereo imaging data from foreign satellites can be used
in a standard digital photogrammetry workstation to obtain accurate height
information, which can be superimposed on the Open Series maps. GPS
is now available commercially on mobile phones and car navigation
systems, thus enabling 10m or even sharper accuracy in positioning.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Home Affairs has come out with a draft
Geospatial Information Regulation Bill 2016 which is so restrictive that it
could, if adopted, actually hinder the adoption of geospatial technologies
by the government, industry and academia. A new Geospatial Data Policy
2016 has also been announced by the DST which is much more enabling,
but the problem is that a Bill will always override a policy. There is need to
ensure that the proposed geospatial data policy is realistic and addresses
the needs of bonafide Indian users in the government, industry, education
and NGO sectors. It is necessary to revisit the several separate policies and
evolve a unified geodata policy which will satisfy development and civilian
applications, while at the same time taking care of national security concerns.
Capacity Building
There are various institutions in India that offer post-graduate courses in
Geomatics or more specifically, Remote Sensing and GIS. A shared
problem is that students who take these courses do not find suitable
placement. At the same time, industry bemoans that it is not able to get
trained people. To understand, consider the definition of Geographic
Information Science by the University Consortium of GIS:
“Geographic Information Science (G I Science) is the basic research
field that seeks to redefine geographic concepts and their use in the context
68 Space Commerce
People as Sensors
The relaxation of restrictions and the creation of a geospatially enabled
population will also help to promote Volunteered Geographic Information
(VGI). For a country of India’s size and diversity, the acquisition of data is
a major task. VGI can provide a cost-effective solution. The
operationalisation of NSDI should include processes to enable VGI and
Unlocking the Potential of Geospatial Data 69
its vetting and ingesting into the relevant databases. The government lays
stress on government-to-citizen interfaces through IT enabled services.
This should include geospatial information to enable citizens to understand
and perhaps even participate in the decisions that impact their lives and
living spaces.
Private-Public Partnership
The government is also keen on Private-Public Partnerships (PPPs).
However, their scope is rarely defined in concrete terms and is usually
reduced to contract services. If geospatial enablement is to take off, industry
involvement has to move beyond supply of hardware and software. For
example, in JNNURM, the problem is that of an urban planning mindset
which is tied to ‘building permissions’ and ‘tax collection’. Very few
metropolitan cities have planning departments and those that do are staffed
at best by eight to 10 planners under an engineer, all of whom are busy
with building permissions, rather than planning, because they are short of
personnel, under-budgeted and lack modern geospatial tools like GIS.
The need is for 80 to 100 planners for a large city and their domains
of expertise should cover the various sectors of planning as well as
economics and architecture. Needless to say, they also need to be able to
handle modern geospatial technology in their planning processes. This
technology goes much beyond a simple GIS and encompasses new data
acquisition systems, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and modelling.
This is an area where PPP in its truest sense can really take off.
While JNNURM provides the entry of geospatial technologies into
urban management through its stress on the use of GIS for efficient tax
collection and rational building permissions, geospatial professionals with
domain knowledge should use this opportunity as the thin edge of the
wedge to push into city and town planning technologies which recognise
and account for social, cultural and economic factors along with engineering
considerations. JNNURM is the start of the Smart City and a city becomes
smart when it provides a sustainable enabling environment to its population.
Today, geospatial technologies are adopting new technologies and
processes. Cloud, Big Data, Internet of Things, Deep Learning are the
latest tools which are already in use in the business environment. Early
70 Space Commerce
adopters have shown that these can be very useful in the geospatial domain
too. This is another area for PPP.
ENDNOTES
1. Vikram Sarabhai, “Summary of the conference and recommendation
for initiatives”, the First UN Conference on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space at Vienna in 1969
Developing a Space Start-up Incubator to Build a NewSpace Ecosystem in India 71
The development of India’s space industry started in the 1970s with the
Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) helping entrepreneurs kick-
off Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) by providing technology
and buy-back opportunities, while encouraging spin-offs.1 Today the
landscape of the Indian industry that serves ISRO includes about 500 of
these SMEs.2
With the increase in demand for space-based services in the country—
it is projected that 70 operational satellites will be needed in the country in
the next few years3 —the ISRO is increasing its engagement with the space
industry for the production of both satellites and launch vehicles. Industry
consortiums are being floated for the production of the Polar Satellite
Launch Vehicle (PSLV)4 and the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System
(INRSS) satellites.5 This brings a unique opportunity for the Indian industry
ecosystem to build up, for the first time, systemic capacity to deliver end-
to-end space systems in the country.
This development in the traditional space industry is based on a two-
pronged approach. One, to transition to a state where the industry can
achieve the required volumes of satellites and launch vehicles under ISRO
supervision while allowing ISRO to focus completely on novel technology
development over a longer period; and second, to serve as boon to the
72 Space Commerce
Incubation Structure
Given the nature of the space ecosystem in India, we believe that the
participation of the ISRO/DoS shall be extremely important to the success
of the incubator. ISRO/DoS can be critical in providing the basis for
spin-offs, request for technology while there is room for them to also act
as users/facilitators to other government departments.
Figure 2 gives an overview of the organisational structure of the
space start-up incubator. The Federal-State structure of the country and
the autonomy of organisations (user agencies) leave plenty of room for
the possible participation of States as catalysts in the incubator. While DoS/
ISRO can provide for technology licensing, access to facilities, consultancy
and act as pilot for the selected start-up product/service, States can offer
a broad range of services under the incubator such as the seed money,
volunteering as a first user via a pilot phase deployment of a particular
service, office space/utilities in exchange for incubating within the
jurisdiction of the State.
This will provide a two-pronged support to the start-ups in the
incubator, where the start-ups will get a secured kick-off. In exchange for
the support by ISRO/DoS, Antrix Corporation can hold upto five-percent
equity in the start-ups. Similarly, in exchange for support from States, the
State government via a relevant authority can hold five-percent equity.
This will ensure that the incubation services provided by these stakeholders
can be monetised as the start-up goes from ideation stage towards
deployment of the product/service.
The dynamic of the involvement of the State and DoS can also ensure
Developing a Space Start-up Incubator to Build a NewSpace Ecosystem in India 77
Incubation Tracks
The incubation tracks for NewSpace in India can be divided into Solicited
and Unsolicited tracks as shown in Figure 3. The Solicited track shall consist
of focussed efforts on acceleration of spin-off of ISRO technologies by
start-ups, push for ‘Make in India’ in space alongside possible request for
technologies from ISRO. The unsolicited tracks shall keep the door open
for entrepreneurs to build independent new products/services based on
local/international market requirements that they foresee.
78 Space Commerce
with further financing. The limited time should also ensure a commercial
approach to the development of the product or service. Following this
period, the start-up shall be liable to pay for any further use of facilities
and consulting, either by ISRO or the States.
The incubated start-ups will also receive legal support for registration
of the company, equity distribution, the patenting of its technology or
service, awareness on legal dispute resolution mechanisms, and other
requirements.
Post-Incubation
The incubation process would ensure start-ups that do not perform and
cannot sustain to fold the idea, while the start-ups that do create value
continue on to scale. The pilot deployment with ISRO/States shall give
the start-ups a credible footing to stage expansion of the product or
service into the national and international markets.
For example, if a start-up chooses to provide agriculture or crop
analytics and does a pilot at a district level of a State: Based on the success
of the Pilot, the State can scale the service to its entire jurisdiction, in the
process benefiting its local farm community. Based on this success, the
start-up shall be able to approach other States and scale nationwide. An
example from the product side would be to test a particular technology
such as an electric propellant-based thruster via the support of ISRO to
deploy it on its spacecraft. Based on its performance in space, the start-up
can claim heritage and market the product internationally to the larger
space industry. In case of spin-in and special technology request areas
under the solicited track, ISRO will also offer buyback guarantees to the
incubatees.
One of the extremely important phenomenon in the creation of an
ecosystem is the Merger and Acquisition (M&A) landscape. India so far
has not seen a strong M&A landscape in consolidation of industry in the
space sector. Creating a NewSpace ecosystem provides a great opportunity
to complement the development of the traditional space sector by creating
this M&A landscape as start-ups which create value can be acquired or
acquihired. It should be also noted that there is substantial scope for
successful space-based services to grow to a scale towards creating larger
public value via Initial Public Offerings (IPO).
Conclusion
India has created a strong foundation in space technology by investing
into creating a self-sustaining space exploration ecosystem for the last five
decades. There is a need to carry a comprehensive outlook towards the
globalisation of this foundation. While there are several positive
developments in the expansion of the traditional space industry—such as
the newly envisioned, ISRO-supported Joint Ventures with the domestic
82 Space Commerce
ENDNOTES
1. K. R. SridharaMurthi, U. Sankar, and H. N. Madhusudhan,
“Organizational Systems, Commercialization and Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Indian Space Programme,” Current Science 93, (2007), http://
www.currentscience.ac.in/Downloads/article_id_093_12_1812_
1822_0.pdf.
2. “ISRO To Double Missions To 12 Per Year,” NDTV, February 18,
2016, http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/isro-to-double-missions-to-12-
per-year-1278561.
3. “To Boost Satellite Launch, ISRO to Hold Industries Consortium by
2020,” The Indian Express, July 22, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/
technology/tech-news-technology/to-boost-satellite-launch-isro-to-hold-
industries-consortium-by-2020-2930364/.
4. Srikanth B R, “Indian Industry Gets Chance to Build, Fly Rocket,”
http://www.deccanchronicle.com/, April 12, 2016, http://
www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/120416/firms-get-
chance-to-build-pslv.html.
5. TE Narasimhan & Gireesh Babu, “Isro Will Outsource Satellite Making
to Private Consortium,” Business Standard India, December 8, 2016, http:/
/www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/isro-to-outsource-
navic-satellites-manufacturing-to-private-consortium-116120700850
_1.html.
Developing a Space Start-up Incubator to Build a NewSpace Ecosystem in India 83
6. “Alpha Design, ISRO Join Hands,” Deccan Herald, December 13, 2016,
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/586273/alpha-design-isro-join-
hands.html.
7. “Team Indus Secures Launch Contract with ISRO,” The New Indian
Express, December 3, 2016, http://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/
bengaluru/2016/dec/03/teamindus-secures-launch-contract-with-isro-
1545168.html.
8. Nilesh Christopher, “The Race to Provide Internet from Space to India
& Other Emerging Markets,” ETtech, accessed December 15, 2016,
http://tech.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/technology/bengaluru-
based-space-startup-astrome-aims-to-provide-superfast-internet-via-
satellites/55023828.
9. Arihant Pawariya, “National Optical Fibre Network: Modi’s Pet Project
Gains Momentum But Still Has A Long Way To Go,” Swarajya, December
12, 2016, http://swarajyamag.com/politics/national-optical-fibre-
network-modis-pet-project-gains-momentum-but-still-has-a-long-way-to-
go.
10. “Farming Facilitation With Imagery In India,” Satnews Publishers, August
19, 2016, http://www.satnews.com/story.php?number=1949325975.
11. Prateep Basu, Rachana Reddy, Umang Rathi, Narayan Prasad, “Business
Incubation for Fostering Innovation in Space Commerce: An Indian
Perspective”, International Astronautical Congress 2015.
12. European Space Agency, “ESA Business Incubation Centres,” http://
www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineering_Technolog y/
Business_Incubation/ESA_Business_Incubation_Centres12.
13. Pallava Bagla, “ISRO’s New Light-As-Air Gel Can Keep Indian Soldiers
Warm In Siachen Snow”, 21 April 2016, http://www.ndtv.com/india-
news/isros-new-light-as-air-gel-can-keep-indian-soldiers-warm-in-siachen-
snow-1397777.
14. "ISRO Future Missions: More Joint Ventures with NASA, JAXA on the
Cards”, 22 Oct 2015, http://www.microfinancemonitor.com/isro-future-
missions-more-joint-ventures-with-nasa-jaxa-on-the-cards/39559
15. "Contract signed for the Assembly, Integration and Testing (AIT) of
two standard satellites”, http://www.isac.gov.in/industry/industry-events/
alpha.jsp
Electric Propulsion & Launch Vehicles: An Indian Perspective 85
Introduction
November 21, 1963 marks the first milestone in India’s space odyssey as
the country launched its first rocket from Thumba. This launch represented
India’s future ambitions in outer space. Today India is a full-fledged
spacefaring country, with the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO)
conducting missions to the Moon and Mars.
India’s space programme has grown tremendously since its humble
beginnings during the 1960s. It is now on par with other space leaders
such as the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan and China. This growth
has been possible even with a minimum budget of $1.2 billion, while the
US spends almost 33 times more.
Today, outer space is no longer limited to just research and
development but has become an integral part of everyone’s life. The steady
advances by the space industry and new trends in manufacturing have
driven down the costs and enhanced innovation. The space industry is
now on the cusp of rapid expansion both in terms of capabilities and
services, even as experts deem that the industry is nearing saturation after
years of successive growth. The penetration of smartphones and Internet
of Things (IoT)—which leverage data derived from satellite-augmented
services—are two key drivers of this growth.
86 Space Commerce
Electric Propulsion
An electrically powered spacecraft uses electrical energy to change its
velocity. These systems work by electrically expelling propellant (reaction
mass) at high speed. Electric thrusters typically consume less propellant as
they have a higher exhaust speed (operates at a higher specific impulse)
than chemical rockets. The use of electric propulsion has been on the rise
in the last few decades.
In the early 1980s, satellite manufacturers began implementing arc jets
and resistojets, early forms of electric propulsion, for north-south station
keeping.
Using more efficient electric propulsion allowed satellite manufacturers
to either increase payload mass or extend satellite life while maintaining
the same launch mass. Gradually, newer electric propulsion technologies
such as gridded ion engines and hall thrusters were introduced and electric
propulsion began to carry more of the propulsion load for commercial
spacecraft.
In 2010, when an Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite
experienced an anomaly with its main propulsion system, it used onboard
high-power Hall thruster to complete its orbit raising manoeuvres. This
was the first in-flight demonstration of a high-powered (4.5 kW) hall
thruster. This event paved the way for more widespread adaptation of
electric propulsion for orbit raising of satellites.
Electric Propulsion & Launch Vehicles: An Indian Perspective 87
Works’ 2014 Projection, it was estimated that between 140 and 143 nano/
micro satellites across all sectors would be launched globally in 2014; 158
nano/microsatellites were actually launched. This represented an increase
of nearly 72 percent compared to 2013.
The major forces driving this market are price reduction, increasing
demand, investments from the Silicon Valley, better mission launches and
continual decrease in average satellite mass. The significance of Nano and
Microsatellites has increased due to increase in number of application
areas such as academic training, scientific research, earth observation, remote
sensing, among others. The increase in use of these satellites across a range
of commercial applications in all regions of the world has been noted as
one of the major factors behind the continuing increase in Nano and
Microsatellite market size.
In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has called for a complete
digitisation of the services within the country, starting from banking to
governance and medicine. Such an extent of digitisation requires an
infrastructure to build up from the grassroots level and fulfil the inclusive
promise of a digital India. The only way to cater to such massive task is to
meet the demand for bringing Internet connectivity to the masses, and this
is a difficult task considering the exorbitant prices for laying cables.
This is where the application of space comes into the picture, and
where the use of satellites shines. To begin with, the connectivity by using
satellites is around $3-6 compared to the $3000 for a given area by laying
cables and cellular towers. The task of digitisation is unenviable in a country
like India where there are only 375 million internet users in a population
of 1.2 billion. The dream of digitisation then will only become a reality
when the nation is completely connected. This calls for a huge demand in
setting up the satellite infrastructure that can cater to the billion-plus users.
This opens up a huge market potential for the use of Nano-size
thrusters in enabling Nano-satellites to reach full functionality in terms of
deployment. This is crucial in formation flying or constellations as Nano-
satellites require an on board propulsion system to maintain formation,
this is one of the reasons why current research in Electric Propulsion is
critical as it is the only technology which can be adopted for Nano-satellite
propulsion with the main reason being the incumbent small size of the
Electric Propulsion & Launch Vehicles: An Indian Perspective 91
orders from other countries. This is also augmented by the fact that the
recent missions of the PSLV also included a US-based satellite from a
company called SkyBox Imaging.
Indian Space would lay down the roadmap for the better governance of
Space and would ensure transparency in tailoring for the various vendors
within the space industry. Thus, a space policy would act as a catalyst in
providing functions that allow India to shoulder with other spacefaring
countries such as the US, UK and China. Such an initiative would not only
drive confidence within the industry but would bring it up to an entirely
new level. A similar debate on the necessity of a space driven policy by the
US space industry has prompted the US parliament to pass the SPACE
(Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship) Act
of 2015 to promote greater private participation in developing the
commercial space industry and spurring spin-offs that address the needs
and requirements of the industry by allowing for a better private investment
into such ventures.
A case in point is a company whose inception has captured the attention
of enthusiasts and aspiring geeks around the world—the Space Exploration
Technologies or SpaceX. SpaceX is one of the main launch vendors in the
global market and these days their ambitious plans to colonise Mars in the
coming few years is making headlines the world over. How SpaceX came
to be during a time when NASA was the only undisputed king of the US
launch segment shows just how much the times have changed. SpaceX
started in the summer of 2002 and after long years of development, three
consecutive failures of their Falcon launcher nearly left the company in
shambles, but the ecosystem of trust and support built around had managed
the company to rise out of this time and the success of the fourth and
final rocket turned the tides in their favour. This led to the acceptance by
NASA to award them with launch contracts for the progress ships towards
the ISS, and the rest is history.
SpaceX today is at the forefront of the competition by proving success
with their reusable launch vehicles. ‘Reusability’ is now the catchphrase of
the space industry as the major players try to perfect their own models in
this sphere. India has taken up Reusability seriously and the recent tests by
ISRO on its own Reusable Launch Vehicle reinforces this intent.
Just as how the success of SpaceX turned out to be the success model
that space programmes around the world seek to emulate, none of this
would not have been possible if the initial investors of the company did
not see the launch failures as setbacks but rather bitter medicine that was
98 Space Commerce
REFERENCES
1. Electric Propulsion: Commercial_Space_Transportation_Forecasts_2015
2. SpaceWorks_Nano_Microsatellite_Market_Assessment_January_2014
3. 2016 FAA Annual Compendium.
4. Electric Propulsion Robert G. Jahn, Edgar Y. Choueiri. Princeton
University
5. ESA EPIC - http://epic-src.eu/?page_id=63
6. ESA EPIC http://m.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineering_
Tech n o l o g y / E P I C _ E l e c t r i c _ P r o p u l s i o n _ I n n ova t i o n _ a n d _
Competitiveness
Electric Propulsion & Launch Vehicles: An Indian Perspective 99
SPACE POLICY
Privatisation of Space in India and the Need for A Law 103
Privatisation of Space in
India and the Need for A Law
Kumar Abhijeet
Introduction
In the era of commercial use of outer space, private enterprise participation
has been significantly increasing. This escalation is largely because of global
cuts in governmental space budgets and the possibility of
implementingrelatively cheaper space activities through private sector
involvement. Growing interest of private entities in space has generated
much discourse about the need for laws. Does participation of private
entities demand that laws be passed to cover their activities? Generally, any
law is needed to address the interest of stakeholders underlying the subject
of legislation. A space activity,although territorial in origin, actually operates
or is intended to operate in the global commons. Thus for any space
activity, the international community is the first and foremost stakeholder.
The second stakeholder is the State itself, which undertakes a particular
space activity because unlike in other branches of international law, for
space, States bear liability for private actors as well. And the third is the
private enterprise, if indeed a state intends to include them in its space
programme.
In India, the private sector has shown remarkable interest in space
activities. Media reports (Business Standard, 13 June, 2016) suggest that by
2020, India’s first private rocket will be set for launch. Yet another media
report (The Indian Express, 4 December, 2016) suggests Team Indus aspires
to tie up with the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) to plant the
Indian flag on the Moon in 2018. There is no doubt that India has had a
104 Space Policy
robust history in space, and its future holds plenty of promise, too. For
the last five decades space activities in India has been purely governmental
in nature and thus there has been no need for a unique law. Increasing
private sector participation today necessitates immediate attention on the
need for a law. This paper explains the need for a law in the light of
private sector participation, addressing the concerns of all the three
stakeholders in space.
Domestic Requirements
The combined effect of Article VI and Article VII of the OST is that
States are both internationally responsible and liable for damages towards
other State parties and their nationals for their national space activities.35
This obligation extends to assuming liability for private operations for
which a State is responsible under Article VI.36 The Liability Convention37
elaborates further the rules and procedures for damages caused by space
objects. It prescribes a two-fold liability regime: A launching State is
absolutely liable for damages caused by space object on earth or in air
space,38 whereas for damages caused in outer space, liability is on-fault
based.39 In view of the immense risk posed by the ultra-hazardous space
technology, a victim-oriented approach has been taken prescribing non-
fault based, absolute or objective liability.40 In case of two or more States
jointly launching a space object, their liability is joint and several.41
Thus, ‘public liability for private activities’42 is a strong incentive for
States to legislate. “If States are internationally responsible for private space
activities, they have a vital interest in regulating such activities and in making
sure that norms of international space law are respected by private space
actors – as far as possible”.43 It must not be misconstrued that by merely
enacting a legislation, States can escape liability for damage caused by private
entities.44 Rather, liability always vests with the launching State – “once a
launching State, forever a launching.”45 However, by way of legislation a
State can prescribe a mechanism for recourse.46 It can reserve its right to
seek indemnification should a State be required to pay on behalf of its
private entities. Should the State seek absolute indemnification or put a
cap, this will depend upon the space policy of a State towards private
entities. State practices suggest that many States47 put a limit on the liability
of private players beyond which the State itself bears the liability. It serves
as an incentive for private players,though to avail this benefit it is expected
that private entities exercise due diligence. Further, since damages are
oriented to the future, “unlimited in quantum and territory”,48 it is in the
interest of States as well as private enterprise that mandatory third-party
insurance is undertaken.49
spacefaring nations could show the path in this regard. Some legislations
prescribe limited liability of private enterprise towards third-party damages,
whereas others provide for reduced administrative fee/waiver of insurance
conditions for certain activities, which could serve as a model for drafters.
The United States and Australia are considered to have the most developed
legal systems for space activities. Until 1984, before the US Commercial
Launch Act put a cap on the liability, private enterprisesdid not get
motivation to engage in space activities because they had to bear unlimited
absolute liability for damages.64 They argued that unlimited absolute liability
would either cause them to perish or would dissuade them from starting
up their business unless an appropriate ceiling was put.65 On the lines of
US, subsequently the 1998 Australian Space Activities Act limited the liability
of Australian national private enterprise. The Explanatory Memorandum66
to the Australia’s Space Activities Bill stated, “imposition on launch operators
of unlimited liability is neither commercially tenable nor desirable from a
competitive standpoint.” Besides limited liability space regulations in
Australia may prescribe for different administrative fee for approved
scientific or educational organisations.67
A similar approach has been experienced with national space legislation
in Europe, including in France, one of the world’s most important spacefaring
nations. A special feature of the French Law on Space Operations is the
possibility of a state guarantee, often considered to be as public subsidy.68
The State owns the responsibility for damages exceeding the insurance
amounts.69 Where the operator provides some other form of financial
guarantee, insurance can be avoided.70 Further, while the French government
has reserved the right to make claims for indemnification by the operator in
cases where it has paid international liability, the “Government will not make
a claim for indemnification if the damage was caused by a space object
used as a part of an operation authorized according to the Act and resulting
from acts targeting governmental interest”.71A similar approach has been
witnessed in the Austrian national space legislation wherein if a space activity
serves science, education and research the insurance amount may be lowered
to the extent of complete waiver depending upon the risk involved and the
financial capacity of the operator.72 Even the South African Space Affairs
Act has a residual clause where the liability of licensee for damage may be
limited or excluded.73
Privatisation of Space in India and the Need for A Law 113
Conclusion
Articles VI, VII and VIII of the OST establish the primary basis for national
space legislation. At present, there exists a wide gap between the international
requirements and the domestic legal instruments to implement these
obligations. Having successfully demonstrated five decades of space
capabilities, India now needs to formalise and define the institutional legal
mechanism for its space activities. Being a party to existing international
space treaties, India has realised that for promoting private sector
participation it is essential to have space legislation. It is expected that
India’s national space legislation will take care of international obligations
as well domestic requirements, and at the same time, serve as an enabler
114 Space Policy
ENDNOTES
1. 1 Gerhard, Michael . 2009. “Article VI.”In Cologne Commentary on Space
Law, Volume 1, edited by Stephan Hobe, Bernard Schmidt-Tedd and
Kai-Uwe Schrogl , 105. Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag.
2. Id..
3. UN Doc. A/6352 (16 June 1966) and UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.13
(11 July 1966) with reference to UN Doc. A/6352.
4. Paragraph 1 Article 1 OST.
5. Paragraph 2 Article 1 OST.
6. Paragraph 3 Article 1 OST.
7. Hobe, Stephan. 2009. “Article I.”In Cologne Commentary on Space Law,
Volume 1, edited by Stephan Hobe, Bernard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe
Schrogl , 34. Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag.
8. Id at p.35.
9. Article VI OST – “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring
that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions
set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non governmental entities
in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require
authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party
to the Treaty.”
Privatisation of Space in India and the Need for A Law 115
Introduction
The world is breaking free of the shackles to its imagination and is looking
towards space, not just as means to satisfy its existential curiosity, but to
achieve resource security and bridge people and nations. With the United
States government announcing its support to private enterprises mining
space objects1 and the government of Luxembourg setting up a fund to
enable such activities,2 space is no longer the exclusive forte of governments
alone. These instances reveal an increasing synergy and cooperation between
governments and the private sector. Thus, space, which was once the forte
of governments, now represents an opportunity as well as a responsibility
for the private sector. A partnership between these stakeholders is inevitable
and perhaps even desirable to drive innovation and overcome challenges
associated with leveraging and exploring space.
India, being sixth3 in the list of the world’s spacefaring nations, is not
far behind. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has
demonstrated its capacity for deep-space activity through its Mars mission.
Moreover, the recent achievements of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle
(PSLV) and Geosynchronous Launch Vehicle (GSLV) have established
that the Indian space programme is not cheap, but in fact, cost competitive
and effective. ISRO is already thinking of models to engage with the
private sector for the operation of the PSLV.4 Seen in conjunction with
the initiative to engage the private sector for satellite integration activities,5
there is no doubt that ISRO is driven by a forward-thinking vision designed
120 Space Policy
world. Especially with upcoming space start-ups, what makes the Indian
private sector exceptional is also their commitment to national interests
and their respect and appreciation for the Indian space programme. If
this potent combination of talent and vision among the private space
enterprises in India is integrated with the government-authored space
programme, India can consolidate its position as one of the most powerful
spacefaring nations in the world and indigenise its SATCOM and
Broadcasting infrastructure. However, to give flight to the aspirations of
the private space sector in India, a critical area of need is to put in place an
enabling space policy.
The present Indian space policy is summarised by the following:
- Framework for Satellite Communication in India (‘SATCOM Policy’);
- The Norms, Guidelines and Procedures for implementation of the
Policy framework for satellite communications in India (‘SATCOM
Norms’);
- Remote Sensing Data Policy, 2011 (‘RSDP’);
- Technology Transfer Policy (‘TTP’)
To India’s credit, the sum total of the above policies not only
acknowledgesthe existence of a private space sector in India, but numerous
provisions are made to enable a private space economy by creating a
framework for authorising and launch of satellites, for leveraging the data
generated by remote sensing satellites and also for commercially exploiting
technologies developed by the Indian space programme. With a Foreign
Direct Investment Regime allowing for 100-percent FDI in the
establishment and operation of satellites,17 one would assume that India
would have attracted a significant portion of the global investments in the
space sector. Yet, with all its technical prowess and skilled labour, India’s
private sector has not matured beyond a vibrant vendor ecosystem for
the nation’s space programme.
This chapter examines the role of the SATCOM Policy and Norms
in addressing this predicament and offers a solution-based narrative that is
forward-thinking in vision and collaborative in approach. After all, if the
policy and the norms are suitably reviewed and addressed, it not only can
significantly encourage the private space sector in India but also become
122 Space Policy
INSAT Capacity
The Policy authorises capacity on the INSAT satellite systems to be leased
to non-government (Indian and foreign) parties as well as for Indian parties
to provide services including TV through Indian Satellites. At the outset,
quota allotted for the Department of Telecommunications, Doordarshan
and All India Radio for the use of INSAT Capacity is untouched. Clause
2.5.2, read with Clause 2.6.2 of the Norms specifies that a certain
percentage of INSAT capacity will be earmarked for lawfully authorised
non-governmental users to provide telecommunication services including
SATCOM Policy: Bridging the Present and the Future 123
Spanish Zone of Morocco claims, it was held that responsibility is the necessary
corollary of a right. All rights of an international character involve
international responsibility. Responsibility results in the duty to make
reparation if the obligation in question is not met.26 In view of this, it is
now necessary to see what is the international obligation India has assumed
so far as space activities are concerned and then assess the question of
India’s state responsibility under International Law.
So far as the activities of private space enterprises are concerned, the
Outer Space Treaty does mention that the state party can authorise space
activities by non-state actors.27 Such authorisation is provided either by
virtue of law enacted specifically for the said purpose or by virtue of a
contract between the Government of the State Party and the private
enterprise. India has leaned in favour of the latter category of authorization,
i.e., by virtue of contract. Though, it arguably provides a great degree of
discretion and flexibility to India to monitor and regulate space activities,
an ad-hoc contracted based authorisation leaves much to desire for, so far
as compliance with international obligations is concerned.
To begin with, the Convention on International Liability for Damage
caused by Space Objects imposes fault-based liability for damage arising
out of space objects, if the occurrence of such damage is outside of the
surface of the Earth.28 For damage caused to persons or property on
Earth, the liability imposed is absolute in nature.29 The liability for both
kinds of damages is imposed on the state party. Article 5 of the
International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘ILC Articles’), in reaction to the
proliferation of government agencies and parastatal entities, notes that the
conduct of a person or of an entity not an organ of the state but which is
empowered by the law of that state to exercise elements of governmental
authority shall be considered an act of the state under international law,
provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular
instance. This provision is intended inter alia to cover the situation of
privatised corporations which retain certain public or regulatory functions.30
Further, Article 8 of the ILC Articles provides that the conduct of a
person or group of persons shall be considered as an act of state under
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the
SATCOM Policy: Bridging the Present and the Future 127
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that state in carrying
out the conduct.31 Thus, whether or not the breach occurs in the hands of
the Indian government or a private agency authorised by the Indian
government, international law remains insistent on appropriate remedies.
Thus, depending upon the nature of breach of international obligation,
the consequences could be cessation, reparation or compensation. While
India can quantify the liability arising out of these headings, the loss of
reputation on account of such a breach would be immeasurable.
International treaty obligations do not automatically become part of
Indian law. Article 51 (c) of the Constitution of India stipulates that India
shall endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations
in the dealings of organised peoples with one another. However, this is
part of the Directive Principles of State Policy and thus not binding on
the state as perArticle 37.32 Therefore, India remains particularly vulnerable
in respect of its obligations under International law for space activities
because, on one hand, it is responsible for breach of such obligations but
it has no domestic law which it can use to enforce compliance of
international obligations on non-state actors. That the policy and the norms
do not specify specific consequences if a private space enterprise breaches
India’s international obligations, only aggravates the problem.
To ensure private space enterprises are legally bound to honour India’s
international obligations towards space activities, the solution remains a
legal regime that can either specify civil punitive consequences or criminal
punitive consequences. Civil Punitive consequences such as damages and
compensation can be achieved through contracts or by way of law. But as
far as penal consequences are concerned, such as penalties, fines or
imprisonment, Indian law in consonance with international human rights
jurisprudence, permits penal consequences only by way of explicitly defined
offences under statues. What is not explicitly defined as an offence or a
crime, cannot by implication or interpretation become a crime under Indian
law.33 India thus cannot meaningfully safeguard its obligations under
international law unless it undertakes legislative exercises to render them
enforceable under Indian law.Reviewing the SATCOM Policy and norms,
in view of this discussion, is thus critical for India’s own interest.
India must also remain mindful of obligations under its Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BIT). The provisions of such agreements are
128 Space Policy
DoT and TRAI have done an admirable job of ensuring India’s edge
in the telecommunication and broadcasting sector. Their sensitivity to India’s
needs on the ground and impeccable understanding of emerging trends
in telecommunication industry is unparalleled as was seen in the context
of the debate around net neutrality.43 Therefore, the DOT and TRAI not
only have the mandate under the Allocation of Business rules, but also the
expertise to manage spectrum, capacity and frequency and also to handle
all issues surrounding the same.
Thus, it would be useful for the SATCOM Policy and Norms to be
amended so as to ensure that spectrum, satellite capacity and frequency
licensing are handled by the DOT and TRAI, with ISRO remaining in an
advisory capacity in order to bridge India’s resources with needs on the
ground.This will ensure that India’s national interests are managed by the
government and address any fears ofnational interests being overwhelmed
by commercial interests. In addition, bridging the understanding of market
needs and realities with the planning for space missions will optimise the
returns on India’s investments into space activities.
It is also relevant to review the procedure specified for allocation of
INSAT Capacity where the demand exceeds availability. While the Norms
mandate that a transparent procedure must be evolved to address excess
demand and insufficient supply, in view of the judgement of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the famous 2G spectrum matter,44 the procedure to be
adopted for resolving such competition must also comply with the
requirements of reasonableness under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. Furthermore, one must be skeptical of resorting to the procedure
of “First Come First Serve”, as means to address competition for capacity
in view of the said judgement. Consequently, the existing Policy and Norms
132 Space Policy
must now suitably embrace these changes since 2000 to achieve legal
compliance and alignment with market realities.
Conclusion
India, despite its impressive history, is yet to truly reach the full potential
of its space programme. Here onEarth, better internet connectivity in
remote areas can be achieved through a forward-thinking approach to
high throughput satellites which can then aid the cause of successful and
widespread compliance of the proposed Goods and Services Tax and its
online compliance system, the Goods and Services Tax network. India
can support the aviation sector by adopting a liberal approach to in-flight
entertainment and connectivity. Away from Earth, as the world looks to
136 Space Policy
space objects to achieve resource security, India should not stay far behind
and quickly move to establish its position in deep-space activities, and go
beyond just research.
However, what is needed to complement the vision of ISRO and the
Department of Space, is a clear and explicit legislative exercise governing
space activities. This will have to either amend existing policies discussed
above or substitute them altogether with legislations. However, the emphasis
throughout this exercise must be to ensure a collaborative atmosphere
between the private sector and the government, as opposed to provoking
competition or confrontation. If all stakeholders can be sensitive to the
many competing interests India must address and balance, the country can
effectively assume its position as a world leader in space activities.
ENDNOTES
1. Loren Grush, “Moon Express becomes first private company to get US
approval for lunar mission,” The Verge, August 3, 2016, http://
www.theverge.com/2016/8/3/12361256/moon-express-private-
mission-spaceflight-us-government-approved
2. David Z Morris, “Luxembourg to Invest $227 Million in Asteroid
Mining,” Fortune, June 5, 2016, http://fortune.com/2016/06/05/
luxembourg-asteroid-mining/
3. “India Ranks Among top 10 Nations with Space Programmes: Dr
Radharkrishnan,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, IDSA Press
Release, November 11, 2014, http://www.idsa.in/pressrelease/
IndiaRanksAmongtop10Nations
4. “ISRO examining business model for industries in satellite, rocket
production,” Business Standard, April 4, 2014, http://www.business-
standard.com/article/news-ians/isro-examining-business-model-for-
industries-in-satellite-rocket-production-114040401169_1.html
5. “ISRO Throws Satellite Making Open To Private Sector,” NDTV, June
24, 2016, http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/isro-throws-satellite-making-
open-to-private-sector-1423043
6. Telephone Regulatory Authority of India, “Highlights of Telephone
Subscription Data as on 31st of May, 2016,” Press Release No. 74/
2016.
7. Saritha Rai, “India Just Crossed 1 Billion Mobile Subscribers Milestone
And The Excitement’s Just Beginning,” Forbes, January 6, 2016, http://
SATCOM Policy: Bridging the Present and the Future 137
www.forbes.com/sites/saritharai/2016/01/06/india-just-crossed-1-
billion-mobile-subscribers-milestone-and-the-excitements-just-beginning/
#2dae090c5ac2
8. Harveen Ahluwalia, “India’s pay-TV market to touch $18 billion by 2025:
report,” LiveMint, July 15, 2016, http://www.livemint.com/Consumer/
X9lwKpRLLf05gi4khHlFJN/Indias-payTV-market-to-touch-18-billion-
by-2025-report.html
9. Deepu Krishnan, “Commentary | Challenges and Opportunities in the
Indian Satcom Market,” Space News, February 17, 2014, http://
spacenews.com/39541challenges-and-opportunities-in-the-indian-satcom-
market/
10. Ibid
11. Ibid
12. Ibid
13. Blaine Curcio,”Putting The Brakes On India’s Satcom Growth,” Northern
Sky Research, January 22, 2015, http://www.nsr.com/news-resources/
the-bottom-line/putting-the-brakes-on-indias-satcom-growth/
14. Narayan Prasad, “Space 2.0 Shaping India’s Leap into the Final Frontier”,
ORF Occasional Paper 68, August 2015, http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-
content/uploads/2000/10/OccasionalPaper_68.pdf
15. See “Satellite Ser vices”, Ananth Technologies Ltd., https://
www.ananthtech.com/satellite-services/
16. Dipti Nair, “This space entrepreneur from a small town in Rajasthan is
taking on the Elon Musks of the world,” Your Story, August 11, 2016,
https://yourstory.com/2016/08/astrome-technologies-neha-satak/
17. Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce
and Industry, Government of India, “Consolidated FDI Policy, (Effective
from June 07, 2016), http://dipp.nic.in/English/policies/
FDI_Circular_2016.pdf
18. Department of Space, Section 3.6.2 of the SATCOM Norms, http://
www.vssc.gov.in/VSSC_V4/images/policy/SATCOM-norms.pdf
19. Department of Space, Section 3.6.4 of the SATCOM Norms, http://
www.vssc.gov.in/VSSC_V4/images/policy/SATCOM-norms.pdf
20. Department of Space, Section 3.6.5 of the SATCOM Norms, http://
www.vssc.gov.in/VSSC_V4/images/policy/SATCOM-norms.pdf
21. Department of Space, Section 3.7.2.1 SATCOM Norms, http://
www.vssc.gov.in/VSSC_V4/images/policy/SATCOM-norms.pdf
22. Department of Space, Sections 3.6.8 and 3.6.11 SATCOM Norms,
http://www.vssc.gov.in/VSSC_V4/images/policy/SATCOM-norms.pdf
138 Space Policy
39. "Luxembourg takes first steps to ‘asteroid mining’ law,” June 3, 2016,
Phys.org, http://phys.org/news/2016-06-luxembourg-asteroid-law.html
40. Srinivas Laxmani, “Plan to largely privatize PSLV operations by 2020:
Isro chief,” Times of India, February 15, 2016, http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Plan-to-largely-privatize-PSLV-
operations-by-2020-Isro-chief/articleshow/50990145.cms
41. M Matheswaran, “Hot on Mars, but short everywhere else,” The Hindu
Business Line, May 19, 2015, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/
opinion/hot-on-mars-but-short-everywhere-else/article7224259.ece
42. Department of Telecommunications, Ministry of Communications and
IT, Government of India, “Strategic Plan 2011-15,” http://
w w w. d o t . g ov. i n / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / F i n a l _ S t ra te g i c _ P l a n -
uploaded.pdf?download=1
43. "TRAI supports Net Neutrality, effectively bans Free Basics: All that
happened in this debate,” Indian Express, February 9, 2016, http://
indianexpress.com/article/technology/tech-news-technology/facebook-
free-basics-ban-net-neutrality-all-you-need-to-know/
44. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. 10/2011, http:/
/judis.nic.in/temp/42320103222012p.txt
45. Department of Space, Section 3.4.3 SATCOM Norms, http://
www.vssc.gov.in/VSSC_V4/images/policy/SATCOM-norms.pdf
46. Department of Space, Section 3.5 SATCOM Norms, http://
www.vssc.gov.in/VSSC_V4/images/policy/SATCOM-norms.pdf
47. Paragraph 1.12, “Recommendations on Provisioning of INMARSAT/
Satellite Phone Services”, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, 12th
of May, 201
48. Paragraph 1.24 and 1.25, “Recommendations on Provisioning of
INMARSAT/Satellite Phone Services” , Telecom Regulatory Authority
of India, 12th of May, 2014
A Review of India’s Geospatial Policy 141
10
A Review of India’s
Geospatial Policy
Ranjana Kaul
11
Introduction
India today is well-known for its self-reliant space technology. Of the
many ongoing advancements in India’s space exploration and use, satellite
launching is the most important one. The Indian Space Research
Organisation’s (ISRO) Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) has emerged
as its work-horse, which has earned repute both within the domestic and
international context. At the same time, the frequency of PSLV launchings
attracts many domestic private commercial actors – who have been
developing the sub-systemsfor PSLV – who are engaged with ISRO either
directly or indirectly. Space may thus be called a ‘sunrise industry’ in India.
It is worthwhile to analyse whether there could be a possibility of joint
ventures in the near future with these private actors—which may mean
privatisation of PSLV, as the concept of ‘joint venture’ connotes the first
step towards privatisation.
The first point to consider is the legal infrastructure for this joint venture;
unless there is legal tie-up between ISRO and these private actors, the
feasibility of such commercial venture is meaningless. There are various
legal issues that could be solved at the primary stage before proceeding
further for its implementation. This chapter examines some of the legal
issues along with existing opportunities in the legal domain in India.
152 Space Policy
Their structure can be complicated.4 For example, the state becomes the
major shareholder—like in the case of French private launching company,
Ariane space, where the country’s national space agency, CNES, holds the
majority of shares (34.68 percent).5 Though there is a recent proposal to
sell all the shares of the French government to Airbus Safran Launchers, it
has not been implemented. In such companies, government control exists
by default. It is pertinent to note that the government does not even have
to retain equity in an enterprise to have control over it—especially in a
sector as strategic as space.6
The complexity is increased by interpreting the concept of
‘privatisation’, a phenomenon that began in the 1980s. Its simplest
interpretation is the transfer of ownership from public to private sectors.
But its critical interpretation adds the layer of liberalisation. Therefore, the
process of privatisation may or may not be involved with liberalisation.
One example is that private monopoly could exist in a country when the
ownership of a public entity was transferred to a private entity. In the case
of telecommunications, a part of the space industry, there are different
types of privatisation. One type is private sectors’ participation without
privatisation or liberalisation, as in the case of the People’s Republic of
China and of Saudi Arabia. There is also another type –liberalisation
without privatisation, such as in Finland with regard to Telecom Finland.7
In this context, space activities having commercial interest are not
distinctly separate from those having public interest. It is not easy to
differentiate clearly between the functions of the private and public (state)
sectors. Some enterprises perform dual roles like performing public service
but also having commercial operations. The private enterprises in
commercial space activities may depend on the public (state) sectors in
areas like hiring of launchers, or leasing of communication channels. In
the reverse, the public sector may depend on the private sector for the
supply of technology and equipment according to a commercial contract
between them.8
Therefore, private actors in space may co-exist with state actors, who
also serve as regulatory agencies. Of course, this inter-dependence varies
from one country to another, determined by state policy.
154 Space Policy
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty (1967) contains the legal provision
about this co-existence or inter-dependency. The relevant portion of the
Article says:
“states are internationally responsible for national activities in outer
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental agencies .... The activities of the non-governmental
entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the
appropriate State Party to the Treaty ....”
This is the only provision in the existing state-centric space law that
finds some place or justification for actors in space not to be from
governments.9
The text of Article VI is concerned not about a principle of ‘free
private enterprise’, but about the indirect recognition of a state’s right to
permit space activity as an exception by non-governmental legal entities.
There are two conditions attached with this exception: (i) the state bears
international responsibility for their activity; and (ii) the state authorises and
constantly supervises this activity which ensures that it conforms to the
provisions of the Space Treaty.10 But the forms of authorisation and
supervision are not specified. No condition is prescribed for this
authorisation, although the state indirectly supervises the activity.
Industries Ltd.19 Godrej & Boyce,20 among others that include small and
medium-size enterprises that may not be well-known domestically, much
less inthe international space market. However, proactive JVs like the above
examples from foreign countries are yet to start in India, as the country
still lacks the necessary legal infrastructure to work out such joint ventures.
(1) Liability:
Liability has always been an issue in this arena since the state-centric era of
space launches. An effort is made first to analyse how liability is reflected
within the texts of space law. Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty21
makes provisions for liability, imposing it only on states. A separate
international liability regime for space activities was eventually enacted
with the Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by
Space Objects (1972, or the Liability Convention). This Convention also
mentions liability for damages caused by space objects launched by a
state.22 It was unthinkable at the time these two instruments were established
that eventually, private actors would pursue the same space activities and
therefore liability was attached to states alone. The states were also made
responsible and liable for the activities pursued by any non-governmental
entities. The space treaties are silent about the direct liability of private
actors.
Formation of PSLV Joint Venture: Legal Issues 157
(3) Insurance:
The insurance for any launch is another legal issue that comes under financing.
The major economic hurdle arises from financing all private space activities
that require high-value investment with high risk. Space insurance is a difficult
task for any organisation, including the government. The principal difficulty
of a financer or an insurer is the security on its investment. In case of any
space disaster, how will the resources invested be returned?
To addressthis question, the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law (UNIDROIT) has adopted a Protocol known as the
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters
Specific to Space Asset. The matter was discussed during the final
proceeding of the Convention, according to Article XXXIV of the
Protocol. It shall not affect states’ rights and duties under the existing
space laws and the legal instruments of the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU). Whether the final Space Protocol fully respects this public
law supersession clause may be the subject of subsequent scrutiny. The
objective is to lower the cost of space asset financing by way of facilitation.
But major commercial satellite operators are unconvinced of the need for
the new legal instrument. Advocates, however, believe that the space
protocol will be a valuable tool for small satellite operators and start-up
companies. It will also make the industry more competitive.27
This Protocol, however, is not in force because it has not obtained the
required number of signatories.28
(4) Safety:
The safety related with space activities is going to be a more crucial area in this
era of space activity dominated by private actors. The safety question involves
the launch site processing, ground safety, launch safety, and many more.29
Disasters like those of Columbia and Challenger happened under the regime
of non-commercial space exploration. Today under the era of commer-
cialisation followed by privatisation, safety becomes a paramount criteria.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) took up the
issue in their symposium in March 2015, jointly organised with the UN
Office of Outer Space (UNOOSA).30
Formation of PSLV Joint Venture: Legal Issues 159
Conclusion
The consecutive and successive performances of PSLV launch activities
increase demand all over the world. The same demand is the force that
pushes for a PSLV joint venture. Whether or not the Indian government
is ready, the launch market is. India has certain policies from the ISRO but
when the share in terms of investment is more than that of ISRO in such
JV, the existing policy will not be effective. It implies that no suitable
policy exists for any type of PSLV JV. The legislations are general ones. If
the PSLV will be more demanding all over the world and there is a
possibility for ventures in India like Arianespace, the government may
then think of a ‘PSLV Act’.
It is time to chalk out a National Launching Policy prioritising PSLV.
The legal outlook of this Policy should be international, within legal
jurisdiction in India. Second, there is a dire need to institutionalise PSLV
JV, which should directly reach to the government of India instead of the
ISRO.
ENDNOTES
1. M. Ramesh (2014), “Godrej Aerospace to make semi-cryogenic engines”,
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/has-been-supplying-the-
vikas-engines-for-isros-rockets/article6705014.ece (Accessed on 26
November, 2016)
2. Reijnen, G.C.M. (1981). Utilization of Outer Space and International
Law. Amsterdam: Elsevier. p. 107.
3. Dula, Art (1985), “Private Sector Activities in Outer Space”, The
International Lawyer, 19(1), p. 187 .
4. Fawcett, J.E.S. (1984). Outer Space New Challenges to Law and Policy.
Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 37.
162 Space Policy
23. Lee, Ricky J. (2000). Reconciling International Space Law with the
Commercial Realities of the Twenty-first Century. Singapore Journal of
International and Comparative Law, 4 (1). p. 229.
24. Zhao, Yun (2009). Space Commercialization and the Development of
Space Law from a Chinese Legal Perspective, New York: Nova Science
Publishers. 46.
25. Larsen, Paul B. (2002). Future Protocol on Security Interests in Space
Assets. Journal of Air Law & Commerce, 67(2). pp. 1091-1092.
26. Issue paper prepared by International Bureau of WIPO, April 2004.
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/patent-law/en/developments/
pdf/ip_space.pdf (Accessed on 17 August, 2016).
27. Brief Report of the Final Space Protocol by Paul B. Larsen. http://
www.iislweb.org/docs/2012_unidroit.pdf (Accessed on 25 July, 2016).
28. http://www.unidroit.org/status-2012-space(Accessed on 25 July, 2016).
29. Jakhu, R.S. et al., (2011). The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime
for Aviation and Space ICAO for Space?, New York: Springer. pp. 71-
99.
30. http://www.icao.int/Meetings/SPACE2015/Pages/Programme.aspx
(Accessed on 30 July, 2016)
31. Pelton, Joseph N. (2010). The International Challenges of Regulation
of Commercial Space Flight, In Joseph N. Pelton and Ram S. Jakhu
(Eds.), Space Safety Regulations and Standards, Oxford: Elsevier. pp.
289-300.
32. See n. 31. p. xii.
33. International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety. http://
iaass.space-safety.org/ (Accessed on 3 August, 2016)
34. Goh, G.M. (2007). Dispute Settlement in International Space Law: A
Multi-Door Courthouse for Outer Space. Leiden: M.N. Publishers. p. 3.
35. Article III and IX of OST.
36. Bockstiegel, K.H. (1985). Proposed Draft Convention on the Settlement
of Space Law Disputes, Journal of Space Law, 12 (2). p. 136.
37. Article XIV of the Liability Convention.
38. Diederiks-Verschoor, I.E. H. (1998). The Settlements of Disputes in
Space: New Developments. Journal of Space Law, Vol. 26 (1). p. 42.
39. https://pca-cpa.org/.../Permanent-Court-of-Arbitration-Optional-Rules-
for-Arbitration-...(Accessed on 02 August, 2016)
40. http://www.isro.gov.in/isro-technology-transfer(Accessed on 02 August,
2016)
164 Space Policy
41. http://www.isro.gov.in/isro-technology-transfer/technologies-
transferred(Accessed on 02 August, 2016)
42. H.N. Madhusudan, Doing Business with ISRO Opportunities/
Procedures, http://www.bsxindia.com/hnmadhusudan.pdf(Accessed on
29 November 2016)
43. 12th Plan Working Group of the Department of SpaceWG-14:
Report.Para 5.3.10http://www.dst.gov.in/sites/default/files/14-
wg_dos2905-report.pdf (Accessed on 29 November 2016)
44. Society of Indian Aerospace Technologies & Industries. https://
www.siati.org/objective.html(Accessed on 29 November 2016). The
objectives of SIATI have mentioned so many opportunities to develop
industrial platform concerned with aerospace.
Exploring Space as an Instrument in India’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 165
12
Exploring Space as an
Instrument in India’s
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
Vidya Sagar Reddy
Introduction
A country’s foreign policy comprises decisions, strategies and procedures
guided by the directive principles of the Constitution and past experiences,
wielded to maximise national interests. The size, geographic location, history,
future aspirations, human and natural resources characterise these national
interests from within, while global dynamics casts its external influence.
Developments in science and technology both shape and help secure national
interests. Some of the niche areas that underpin the global political and
economic order include shipbuilding, communications, nuclear and rocket
sciences, nanotechnology, robotics and artificial intelligence.
The newly independent India laid emphasis on developing science
and technology for the country’s socio-economic development. This is
the vision that continues to drive development of space technology in
India. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) was created to
undertake projects including communications, weather forecasting, and
navigation, in the service of the country’s development needs. Self-reliance
in space technology empowered India to choose its own path of political
and economic organisationas well as elevate its standing in the international
community. This progress is not without fluctuations, as the country’s
changing foreign policy attitude since Independence influenced the advances
in the space programme, and vice-versa.
166 Space Policy
where the US, the Soviet Union and France made contributions. Later, India
dedicated this station to the United Nations in good faith of the organisation’s
contributions towards keeping outer space free from conflict.
Adopting Realism
The fast-changing geopolitical situation in southern Asia during the 1960s
questioned India’s adherence to idealism as the foundation of its foreign
policy. China’s attack across the Himalayan border in 1962 challenged India’s
tryst with peaceful principles in international relations. The US military
assistance to Pakistan during the 1971 war and its diplomatic recognition of
nuclear China permanently altered India’s foreign policy calculus.
This embrace of ‘realism’ also came to challenge India’s idealistic
perception of high-end technologies, leading to the test of a peaceful nuclear
device in 1974. Outer space also became a strategic tool in this scenario.
Therefore, India responded positively to the Soviet Union’s proposal to
launch an Indian to the Mir space station as part of the Intercosmos
programme. This programme was designed to launch astronauts from non-
Soviet countries to bolster the Soviet Union’s technological status as well as
strengthen its diplomatic connections. Thus, Rakesh Sharma became India’s
first astronaut in 1984.
The 1980s and 1990s saw India’s space research and launch activities
being subjected to international scrutiny and sanctions. The Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) was established on the suspicion that ISRO’s launch
vehicle technology was diverted for building India’s missile programme.
The MTCR became a tool to upset India’s deal with Russia for transferring
cryogenic engine technology that would have made India self-reliant in
launching geostationary satellites. Sanctions were imposed on India’s space
entities, ignoring the fact that cryogenic engines offer no strategic value,
especially in the development of ballistic missiles. These sanctions turned out
to be a blessing as India decided to invest in its scientific potential with
renewed emphasis and develop the required technologies indigenously.
balance in India’s favour. After all, space missions, especially space firsts,
represent a country’s technological innovation, economic strength and
financial planning, as well as future aspirations.
Once a recipient of space technology from developed countries, India
has now become a more advanced space power. India demonstrated the
robustness of its space programme by organising joint projects, launching
satellites and even providing disaster assistance for a number of countries.
ISRO’s Oceansat-2 satellite helped monitor Hurricane Sandy, the second-
costliest hurricane in US history, helping authorities to implement timely
disaster mitigation and rescue strategies and in the process, saving lives
and mitigating financial destruction.9 The joint mission, NASA-ISRO
Synthetic Aperture Radar—expected to be launched by India in 2021—is
in fact a highly recommended mission by the 2007 US Decadal Survey on
space missions. India’s involvement is helping NASA to finally realise this
mission which has thus far been delayed due to budget constraints.10
India and France have jointly built Megha-Tropiques and SARAL
satellites.11 These two satellites, along with the French SPOT-6 satellite,
were launched by the PSLV. The PSLV also launched Israel’s remote sensing
satellite TecSAR in 2008. This launch boosted the political and strategic
relations with Israel, which is now a major source of equipment
safeguarding India’s security.
The joint projects with established space powers signal India’s ascension
in the global space order where it can claim a status at par with the advanced
spacefaring nations. As with MOM, these space missions demonstrated
India’s technological leapfrogging and invariably advanced India’s position
in the global political order. By assuring India’s political administration
with independent ability to launch satellites, ISRO has strengthened the
country’s diplomatic position with major powers. Thus, space technology
has emerged a niche area in India’s foreign relations which can be further
leveraged for securing national interests.
this aspiration. The distribution of global public goods for the benefit of
developing and underdeveloped countries, especially in the immediate
neighbourhood, is one such responsibility. Space services have emerged
as the new global public goods highlighted by the US decision to allow
the world freely access its Global Positioning System. Civilians, businesses,
government and legal institutions, scientific establishments and even multiple
foreign militaries have become accustomed to using this system in their
daily activities.
A prosperous and peaceful neighbourhood is a prerequisite for India’s
economic growth, national security and its ascension in the global political
order. However, this neighbourhood consists of some of the least advanced
countries facing acute infrastructure deficit that cripples the ambitions of
millions. This situation could be altered by establishing both physical and
data connectivity in the region, which will in turn fuel India’s own economic
growth given the geography of the subcontinent. Therefore, the immediate
neighbourhood is now accorded a top priority in India’s foreign policy.
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
received major boost becoming a common communication node for
countries in the region. A wide range of projects for regional connectivity
have been proposed and India has initiated steps to augment these projects
using its space infrastructure. During his visit to ISRO’s spaceport, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi proposed that India build a communications
satellite, Satellite for SAARC, that can be used by all SAARC members.
Accordingly, the ISRO designed a satellite hosting 12transponders expected
to optimise direct-to-home broadcasting, tele-medicine, tele-education,
disaster management, and a host of communications services in the region.12
The costs associated with building and launching of the satellite will be
borne by India while respective countries contribute for their ground stations.
In addition, the indigenously developed Indian Regional Navigation
Satellite System (IRNSS) will now be shared with the SAARC nations,
augmenting regional terrestrial and marine navigation, disaster management,
vehicle tracking, and other activities.
True to the spirit of a leading power, as India continues to explore
the benefits of fusing space technology with various departmental works
like railways, shipping, management of natural resources, financial
172 Space Policy
Bold Decision-Making
Still, there are few areas in India’s space vision which could be leveraged
for strengthening the country’s foreign relations and fulfilling national
interests. The latest developments in India’s neighbourhood show that these
countries are drawn towards financial aid and infrastructure investments.
China had categorically emphasised geoeconomics as the central tool in its
foreign policy calculus, gaining political influence in Asia-Pacific in return
for financing projects. Realising this trend, India’s Foreign Secretary remarked
that realism applies more to economics than security.16
Therefore, if India were to successfully respond to major power
advances in its neighbourhood, it has to balance military buildup with building
basic infrastructure in the border countries. The Satellite for SAARC project
is offering such an opportunity for India. India should take a proactive
posture and assist those SAARC countries not possessing the requisite financial
or technological capacity to build their individual ground stations. Although
building and launching the satellite itself incurs huge expenditure, it should
nevertheless also finance, at least in part, the ground stations.
During the negotiations for this project, Afghanistan and Bangladesh
pondered whether they require using this satellite since their needs are
being fulfilled by other satellites. It is also interesting to note that ISRO has
no formal partnership or cooperative agreements with any of the SAARC
countries.17 These points highlight the dearth of attention being paid to the
neighbourhood, their development needs and India’s own national interests.
The Satellite for SAARC could also help fill this gap as ISRO could establish
agreements with the SAARC countries, starting with construction of the
ground stations and the deployment of training personnel.
174 Space Policy
The South Asian, South East Asian, African and Latin American
countries (collectively referred to as the Global South) are increasingly
looking towards space technology to augment their economic
development. Their communications and remote sensing requirements
are fast accruing and India needs to leverage its foreign relations to secure
opportunities from these emerging markets. The current ISRO
administration is pacing to expand India’s launch capabilities to cater to
both small satellite and heavier satellite industries. In addition to showcasing
the space capabilities to major powers, India should also communicate
the dependability of its space launch and services sectors to these emerging
markets. Empowering commercial and NewSpace actors who can better
market India’s space sector abroad is an absolute requirement in this regard.
Conclusion
Indeed, space technology now forms a central element of India’s foreign
policy. India’s space cooperation today spans major spacefaring countries
and other technologically advanced countries. Self-reliance in space
technology has helped India to maintain its strategic autonomy in foreign
policy decision-making. Space technology has also emerged as a diplomatic
asset for India as its economic and security interests span South Asia and
beyond. India’s willingness to distribute space services to the countries in
South Asia, Africa and South East Asia is a hallmark of its status as a
leading power. It should also strive to better market its space launch and
satellite manufacturing services to the Global South.
India has exercised strategic restraint despite provocations to showcase
destructive technologies because of its responsibility to safeguard the global
commons. Although India practices self-help owing to the anarchic nature
of the international system, it nonetheless supports institutions for ensuring
peaceful uses of outer space. It is clear that India’s economic development,
security and international image are critically dependent on the advances
being made in its space programme.
ENDNOTES
1. “Dr. Vikram Ambalal Sarabhai (1963-1971).” Indian Space Research
Organisation. Accessed September 2, 2016. http://www.isro.gov.in/about-
isro/dr-vikram-ambalal-sarabhai-1963-1971
Exploring Space as an Instrument in India’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 175
13. Miglani, Sanjeev, and Greg Torode. “India to build satellite tracking station
in Vietnam that offers eye on China.” Reuters. January 25, 2016. Accessed
September 8, 2016. http://in.reuters.com/article/india-vietnam-satellite-
china-idINKCN0V309W
14. Unnithan, Sandeep. “India has all the building blocks for an anti-satellite
capability.” India Today. April 27, 2012. Accessed September 10, 2016.
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/agni-v-drdo-chief-dr-vijay-kumar-
saraswat-interview/1/186248.html
15. “Joint Statement: Fourth U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue.” U.S. Department
of State. June 24, 2013. Accessed September 10, 2016. https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/211084.htm
16. Jaishankar S. “India, the United States and China.” International Institute
for Strategic Studies. July 20, 2015. Accessed September 10, 2016. https:/
/www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2015-f463/july-636f/fullerton-
lecture-jaishankar-f64e
17. "International Cooperation.” Indian Space Research Organisation.
Accessed September 10, 2016. http://www.isro.gov.in/hi/node/617
Exploring Space as an Instrument in India’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 177
III
SPACE
SECURITY
India’s Strategic Space Programme 179
13
More than 40 years have passed since India sent its first satellite into space.
In all the years since then, the focus of India’s space programme has
remained civilian. However, due to increasing threat perceptions, and given
the fact that modern space technologies offer a variety of strategic benefits
as well, India has also been making investments in defence technologies.
This paper examines the various facets of India’s space programme related
to defence.
The Indian advent into space began in the early 1960s. The first Indian
satellite, Aryabhata, was launched in 1975 using the erstwhile Soviet Union’s
space launch vehicle, Kosmos-3M. After five years, in 1980, India acquired
the status of a spacefaring nation when it successfully launched its Rohini
satellite using an Indian-made launch vehicle, SLV-3. Subsequently, India
made rapid progress in the space arena and launched various
meteorological, communications, earth observation and navigational
satellites in different orbits. India has developed reliable space launch vehicle
systems and its activities in space have expanded to the deep space region
with successful missions to the Moon and Mars. To support such prog-
rammes, India has put in place the necessary ground infrastructure as well.
The evolution of India’s space programme has been need-based. India
being a developing country was not able to make substantial financial
180 Space Security
investments to develop its space programme. This led the Indian scientific
community to innovate to develop vital space assets. Also, owing to India’s
nuclear policies, it faced international sanctions during the mid-1970s, and
again at the turn of the last century. It led to India’s technological apartheid,
which could be said to have lasted for more than three decades. Naturally,
indigenisation of technology was the only option for India. The key focus
of India’s space technology development from the beginning has been
technology development for socioeconomic benefits.
Over time, and with further developments in technology, India’s space
programme has also matured. Astonishing technological developments
are taking place in the space arena. This has led nation-states to search for
additional utilities for such technologies and design new need-specific
products or applications. The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the strategic
utility of space technologies to the entire world. Since then, various nation-
states have been making investments to use space technologies for military
purposes. Basically, militaries are using these technologies for the purposes
of intelligence gathering, communications and navigation. It is important
to note that use of space technologies for such purposes is not in violation
of any global legal regime or norms.
India is also making investments towards using its space capabilities
to assist its strategic requirements. There is no specific document like a
white paper, doctrine or policy paper providing the rationale behind India’s
defence-specific investments in space. However, the history of India’s space
programme does indicate that India’s investments are need-based and are
based on cost-benefit analyses. To appreciate India’s expectations and
investments from space technologies for strategic purposes, it is necessary
to recognise India’s overall threat perception. For defence agencies, space
technologies are mostly support technologies. They provide them with
real-time intelligence and secure communications and location identification
with pinpoint accuracy. Modern-day weaponry also gets assistance from
assets in space for target identification and weapon firing.
At present, all modern weaponry and weapon delivery platforms are
designed for compatibility with space-based systems. Thus, it is also worth
understanding the organisation of India’s overall security architecture.
The details of various existing military systems/hardware and manpower
India’s Strategic Space Programme 181
Currently India is the third largest military force in the world.The Indian
security establishment has proved its capability time and again over the course
of the last six decades through major military and peace-keeping operations.
The Indian armed forces’ dependence on technology has increased manifold
in the post-Cold War era. The Revolution in Military Affairs concept, accepted
by military strategists the world over, has led to the induction of modern
state-of-the-art weapons and weapons delivery platforms.
Indian Navy
India being a peninsular region and primarily a maritime nation, the Indian
Navy has the incredibly important task of defending the mainland as well
as safeguarding its shipping routes and sea lines of communication in a
India’s Strategic Space Programme 185
ISRO has made much progress in sensor technology over the years. An
important feature of Cartosat-2C was the use of adaptive optics and acousto
optical devices. This satellite has micro electro-mechanical systems and
adoptive optics that offer better visibility of objects on the ground. Here,
the optical system adapts to compensate for optical effects introduced by
the medium between the object and its image, while acousto optical devices
enable interaction between sound waves and light waves.
According to ISRO, the images sent by the Cartosat series of satellites
are useful in various cartographic applications, urban and rural applications,
coastal land use and regulation, utility management like road network
monitoring, water distribution, creation of land use maps, precision study,
change detection to bring out geographical and man-made features, and
various other land information system and geographical information system
applications4. The nature of these civilian applications indirectly reveals
that many useful and real-time inputs can be gathered on strategic areas of
interest, as and when required over a tactical battlefield area. These satellites
together offer the Indian security establishment 24 x 7 capability to monitor
various sensitive areas.
Various Indian observation satellites have optical and spectral sensors.
Such sensors do not perform correctly when the sky is overcast (cloud
cover). In order to overcome the limitations in surveillance owing to lack
of night-time and bad weather observational capabilities, ISRO has
developed a RISAT (Radar Imaging Satellite) series of reconnaissance
satellites. These are the first all-weather earth observation satellites which
use Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) technology. The first satellite in this
series was launched in response to the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack of2008,
and was imported from Israel. This was called RISAT-2 and was launched
in April 2009. Subsequently, a made-in-ISRO RISAT (called RISAT-1,
though it was launched well after RISAT-2) went into orbit in 2012. Both
these satellites have day and night viewing capacity and are not blinded by
cloud cover/bad weather. They have the capacity for continuous
surveillance. RISAT-1 with a resolution of one meter carries a C-band
SAR payload, operating in a multi-polarisation and multi-resolution mode
to provide images with coarse, fine and high spatial resolutions.
Apart from remote sensing satellites, India has also launched a few
meteorological satellites. These provide useful real-time information.
190 Space Security
Conclusion
Currently, defence-specific space requirements are handled by the Integrated
Space Cell. This is a small unit under the Integrated Defence Headquarters
(IDS), a tri-service organisation. There has been a demand for a separate
space command but the government is yet to take a decision on this.
There is a clear-cut mismatch between the expanse of India’s strategic
establishments and the space assets put in place to cater to their needs. It is
possible that the Indian armed forces themselves are also not fully aware
of how much assistance they can get from systems in space operated by
their own agencies. There is a need for education, training and joint planning.
India is carrying out joint military exercises with many friendly foreign
countries. There is a need to engage with the states which are successfully
using space assets for strategic reasons. There is a need to collaborate with
the space commands of these states.
192 Space Security
ENDNOTES
1. Speaking at the Officers Training Academy (OTA) at Chennai after
reviewing the passing out parade of the summer (2016)
2. India’s Security Concerns: National, Regional And Global, Author(s):
Baljit Singh Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 65, No.
3 (July-Sept., 2004), pp. 345-364
3. For construction of this section the main sources referred are Annual
Report 2015-16, Ministry of Defence, Government of India and
Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap, (TPCR), April 2013,
Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence and various
websites like http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-
detail.asp?country_id=india, accessed on September 18, 2016. The
number if military platforms mentioned is as per the sources. There
could be some differences amongst various sources. The purpose behind
giving the numbers is for getting a broad idea about the military inventory.
4. AjeyLele, “PSLV-C34 rockets India into an exclusive club”, http://
www.rediff.com/news/column/pslv-c34-rockets-india-into-an-exclusive-
club/20160623.htm, June 23, 2016
5. Ajey Lele, “GSAT-7: India’s Strategic Satellite”, September 9, 2013,http:/
/spacenews.com/37142gsat-7-indias-strategic-satellite/, accessed on
September 15, 2016
6. AjeyLele, “GSAT-6: India’s Second Military Satellite Launched”, August
31, 2015, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/GSAT6IndiasSecond
MilitarySatelliteLaunched_alele_310815, accessed on August 12, 2016
7. http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/icg/2008/expert/2-3.pdf, accessed on
August 28, 2016 and Ajey Lele, “Autonomy in Satellite Navigation Systems:
The Indian Programme”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 9, No. 3, July–
September 2014, 240-254.
Space Situational Awareness and Its Importance 193
14
The space domain can be defined as all conditions, areas, activities and
things terrestrially relating to space, adjacent to, within, or bordering outer
space, including all space-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo,
and space capable craft that can operate to, in, through and from space.
Space situational awareness (SSA), meanwhile, is defined as the effective
understanding of anything associated with the space domain that could
impact the security, safety, economy or environment of space systems or
activities. This definition acknowledges the supportive activities and threats
related to land, maritime, air and cyber regimes relevant to space operations.
It requires the combination of space situational awareness foundations of
detecting, tracking and environmental monitoring, along with space
intelligence foundations of characterising normal behaviour and sensitivity,
to detecting change to know when something has or is predicted to occur.
A purpose of SSA is to provide decisionmaking processes with a timely
and actionable body of evidence of behaviour(s) [predicted, imminent,
and/or forensic] attributable to specific space domain threats and hazards.
To date, SSA lacks credible scientific and technological rigour to
effectively quantify, assess, and predict space domain threats and hazards.
SSA’s current state-of-practice suffers from myriad privations: no standard
definition exists for elements in the space domain; no standard method
exists for calibrating sensors and information sources “tracking” those
elements; and there are only limited, inconsistent descriptions of what
space objects and events are. Moreover, the space community lacks a
194 Space Security
doubtfully look like the current US systems and capabilities because these
were designed primarily for missile defence and evolved over time to
deal with a growing space problem. There is no reason why SSA and
STM should be addressed in mutually exclusive sectors such as defence
and civil being separate. Each sector has needs but the problems are
foundational and common to all sectors. The proper solution should be
hybrid and consist of contributions by all sectors acting harmoniously
and strategically.
India should design a long-term roadmap which brings all of the
sectors together: defence, civil, commercial, and academic, and determine
the proper strategic investments required in order to significantly contribute
to orbital safety, long-term sustainability of space activities, and space
debris mitigation/remediation. Current guidelines and policies (e.g., UN,
IADC, and others.) are based upon incomplete science (physical, social,
cultural, geopolitical, and legal). India can lead the way in ushering an updated
and more rigorously informed set of guidelines and policies with
quantifiable mechanisms to measure their utility and progress toward
meeting their intent.
Everything in the current resident space object (RSO) population is
modeled as a sphere of uniform material. This is state-of-practice. The
world’s leading government space debris offices do not track RSOs and
rely upon other entities to provide them with orbital knowledge. NASA’s
models are based upon sensor detections but fail to properly account for
realistic astrodynamics. ESA’s models are based upon astrodynamics but
fail to do be rectified via applied estimation theory (i.e., the models are
not updated via an orbit determination process but rather by comparison
to the statistical distribution of sensor detections available). There is no
agreed upon taxonomy for manmade RSOs and no standard for
calibrating sensor data. In fact, sensor data are not openly exchanged within
the community, severely limiting the science regarding the RSO population’s
sources, sinks, and evolution. Many SSA studies in RSO catalog
development and maintenance make two foundational flawed
assumptions: (1) if an RSO is in a sensor field of view, it is detected 100
percent of the time; and (2) all sensor detections can be reconciled as
originating from unique objects. These are some of the hardest technical
challenges in SSA. Another flawed assumption is that the position and
198 Space Security
ENDNOTES
1. There are many more space objects that are detected than tracked and
this is a major source of the space traffic problem. We can only speak to
the behavior and knowledge of the trackable set of space objects.
Need for an Indian Military Space Policy 199
15
Over the last few decades, India has become an established space power.
Even though its space programme started largely with a focus on the use
of space technology for social and economic advancement of its people,
new compulsions in recent years are pushing India towards defence and
military uses of space. Nevertheless, it must be argued that India’s space
visionaries did recognise the utility of space technology for national security
and the importance of technology demonstration for India to earn its
rightful place in the global politics of space. The technological leapfrogging
and spinoffs that are achieved through advancing space technologies for
earth observation, weather forecasting and communications, also remain
significant. A case in point is the utility of remote sensing satellites for
military applications. But the importance of space in the national security
domain was not given prominence until the mid-2000s. In fact, India had
actively championed the cause of non-weaponisation and peaceful uses
of space in its rhetoric both within India and at global fora. For a variety
of reasons, however, this may be beginning to change, and not a moment
too soon. The regional and global landscape in the area of outer space is
changing rapidly and India’s indecisiveness could have far-reaching impact
in terms of both New Delhi’s critical technological and security capabilities
and its standing in international governance of outer space.
such as the United Nations (UN). For the first several decades since the
1960s, India maintained that outer space was a domain that must be
promoted as a realm of peace and cooperation. For instance, in one of
his earlier statements at the UN in 1964, India’s representative Krishna
Rao said that “outer space was a new field and there were no vested
interests to prevent the international community from embarking upon a
regime of co-operation than conflict. The problems of outer space were
fortunately not those of modifying an existing regime but of fashioning a
new pattern of international behaviour.”1 Then Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi too made a similar pitch at the UN in 1968.2 India’s vehement
criticism of the US and Soviet space competition, including their anti-
satellite tests, was a reflection of this policy sentiment. Another instance is
India’s strident opposition to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or
Star Wars programmes of the 1980s. In fact, India’s then foreign minister
PV Narasimha Rao made a scathing attack on such efforts when he said,
“Extension of [the] arms build-up to outer space would mean a permanent
goodbye to disarmament and peace and [would] plunge mankind into a
perpetual nightmare.”3
While India remained concerned about the use of outer space assets
for developing offensive capabilities, New Delhi was also beginning to
appreciate the use of space assets for passive military applications such as
reconnaissance, surveillance and military communications. This was a result
of an acknowledgement of the reality that technology plays a role in
active conflicts. Even as this recognition came around, there were questions
around the definition of concepts like ‘space militarisation’ and
‘weaponisation of space’. These concerns pushed India to seek a ban on
space weapons in all available multilateral platforms such as the UN and
the Conference on Disarmament (CD).4 India’s pro-activism at that time
also led then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to sponsor in January 1985 “a
declaration of six nonaligned countries opposing an arms race in outer
space and nuclear testing”.5 The Indian debate, seeking a total ban on all
global commons, was also being increasingly pursued from a morality
and sovereignty angle, which did not find too many takers except for the
non-aligned community. Policy perspectives along these lines continued
well into the 1990s even after the end of the Cold War. It is only by the
early 2000s that India began to reorient itself recognising a range of new
Need for an Indian Military Space Policy 201
problems – there have been such concerns for instance in the 1980s in the
context of US-Soviet space competition. An additional problem is that
there are no rules of the road or legal measures to regulate activities in this
regard.
to go down this path given its long-term approach of utilising space only
for peaceful purposes but if the country fails to respond to the changed
circumstances, it will stand to lose. Therefore, India must take steps to
declare a military space policy, or at least its key aspects. One good place
to start may be by issuing a white paper on space. India must then commit
and strengthen the resources available in the military space domain. For
instance, in order to meet growing demands, the number of dedicated
military satellites need to go up from the current one or two. After launching
the first dedicated military satellite for the Indian Navy in 2013, the Indian
Army and Air Force have been waiting for close to four years for their
own dedicated satellites. This scenario needs to change. The reason for
the delay is possibly because ISRO has had difficulty meeting these demands
– the number of launches that the ISRO is able to undertake has set
certain restrictions but also there are limitations on India’s launch
infrastructure that need to be addressed. A second related point that the
government must address relates to creating a more favourable ecosystem
for India’s talented private sector to play a more judicious role in meeting
India’s multiple requirements. This requires a change of mindset because
for long, private sector has been seen as the “other” that needs to be kept
at an arm’s length. Instead the government must introduce tough yet
reasonable regulations for both the public and private players and create a
more level-playing field, instead of favouring public-sector enterprises
just because they are state-funded. The US would not be a big player with
an edge in the high-technology domain if not for the private sector that
has had a critical role in keeping the US as the number one power in outer
space.
Further, of critical requirement is for India to have a longer-term
perspective of its goals. This has been problematic on India because
New Delhi is yet to issue a long-term strategy document. This would
bring about greater clarity and better resource allocation although the
scientific and technical community associated with the Indian space
programme could vouch that the space programme has never been short
on resources. However, in reality, ISRO’s tiny budget has been spread too
thin to meet all the growing requirements. There have been repeated
articulations that ISRO’s budget will be increased, but even the 2016
allocation did not see any improvement. A lot of work lies ahead.
210 Space Security
ENDNOTES
1. UN Doc. A.AC.105/C.2?SR.29-37, p. 78, cited in Nandasiri Jasentuliyana,
International Space Law and the United Nations (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague: 1999), p. 131, https://books.google.co.in/
books?id=CQDhfWYCVKMC&pg=PA131&lpg=PA131&dq=A.AC.+105/
C.2?SR.29-37&source=bl&ots=0leBhthdQU&sig=P7-
1pjAf7qsZTKFYcXX_Q_dCG_0&hl=en&sa=X&
ved=0ahUKEwiZ9azDv_jRAhWHtY8KHV8wCIEQ6 AEIJDAE#v=
onepage&q=A.AC.%20105%2FC.2%3FSR.29-37&f=false.
2. C Jayaraj, Secretary General, Indian Society of International Law, “India’s
Space Policy and Institutions,” Proceedings, United Nations/Republic of Korea
Workshop on Space Law, United Nations Treaties on Outer Space: Actions at the
National Level, United Nations, New York, 2004, available at http://
www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/st_space_22E.pdf
3. “Rao Warns of Arms Race in Outer Space,” Strategic Digest, Vol. 14,
No. 3 (March 1984), p. 232, cited in Ashley J Tellis, “The Evolution of
US-Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship,”
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2006, p. 114.
4. C Raja Mohan, “Rising India: Partner in Sharing the Global Commons?,”
The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2010, available at http://csis.org/
files/publication/twq10julymohan.pdf.
5. Cited in VojtechMastny, “The Soviet Union’s Partnership with India,”
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 2010, p.77.
6. Cited in Matthew Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of
Space, (Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 165-66 and Larry Greenemeier,
“GPS and the World’s First “Space War”,” Scientific American, February 8,
2016, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gps-and-the-world-s-
first-space-war/.
7. According to a study by the Secure World Foundation, China had
conducted ASAT tests in 2005 and 2006 testing the SC-19 missile. See
Brian Weeden, Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian
Anti-satellite Testing in Space, March 17, 2014, https://swfound.org/
media/167224/through_a_glass_darkly_march2014.pdf
8. "China fast builds ‘counter-space’ capabilities to counter US satellites,
Pentagon warns,” Russia Today, May 9, 2015, https://www.rt.com/news/
257197-china-space-military-report/
9. David Axe, “Is China’s Mysterious New Satellite Really a Junk
Collector—or a Weapon?,” The Daily Beast, July 05, 2016, http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/07/05/is-china-s-mysterious-new-
satellite-really-a-junk-collector-or-a-weapon.html
Need for an Indian Military Space Policy 211
10. David Axe, “Is China’s Mysterious New Satellite Really a Junk
Collector—or a Weapon?,” The Daily Beast, July 05, 2016, http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/07/05/is-china-s-mysterious-new-
satellite-really-a-junk-collector-or-a-weapon.html
11. “The Missile Defense Space Test Bed,” Union of Concerned Scientists,
May 2008, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons
_and_global_security/space_weapons/policy_issues/the-missile-defense-
space.html
12. Dwayne Day, “Blunt arrows: The Limited Utility of ASATs,” The Space
Review, June 06, 2005, available at http://www.thespacereview.com/
article/388/1
13. David Vaughan et al, “Capturing the Essential Factors in Reconnaissance
and Surveillance Force Sizing and Mix,” Documented Briefing,
(Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation, 1998); see also Michael V
Nowakowski, “Autonomous Precision Weapon Delivery using Synthetic
Array Radar,” United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent No.
5260709, November 09, 1993,https://www.google.com/patents/
US5260709
14. For details, see ISRO, “Satellite Navigation Programme,” http://
www.isro.gov.in/applications/satellite-navigation-programme
15. Manoj K Das, “India to Use Geo-Stationery Satellites for Missile
Defence”, The Times of India, May 19, 2013, available at http://
a r t i c l e s. t i m e s o f i n d i a . i n d i a t i m e s. c o m / 2 0 1 3 - 0 5 - 1 9 / i n d i a /
39369177_1_missile-defence-interceptor-missile-satellites
16. Madhumati DS, “Navy’s First Satellite GSAT-7 Now in Space,” The
Hindu, August 30, 2013, available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/
national/navys-first-satellite-gsat7-now-in-space/article5074800.ece
17. “Integrated Space Cell for Acquiring Space Capabilities”, Outlook India,
December 14, 2011.
18. Sudha Ramachandran, “India Goes to War in Space,” Asia Times Online,
June 18, 2008, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/
JF18Df01.html
19. Rajat Pandit, “Navy Creates New Post to Harness Space-Based
Capabilities,” Times of India, June 03, 2013, available at http://
a r t i c l e s. t i m e s o f i n d i a . i n d i a t i m e s. c o m / 2 0 1 2 - 0 6 - 0 3 / i n d i a /
32005182_1_network-centric-indian-navy-communications-technology
20. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India’s $2B Border Solution: Satellites, Gear and
Sensors”, Defense News, October 24, 2012, available at http://
www.defensenews.com/article/20121024/DEFREG03/310240014/
India-8217-s-2B-Border-Solution-SatellitesGear-Sensors
212 Space Security
21. “Aerospace command under way: IAF,” Times of India, October 7, 2003,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Aerospace-command-under-
way-IAF/articleshow/219096.cms
22. “India To Set Up Aerospace Defence Command,” Space News, January
28, 2007, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/India_To_Set_Up_
Aerospace_Defence_Command_999.html
Need for an Indian Military Space Policy 213
IV
INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION
Cooperation in Space Between India and France 215
16
Cooperation in Space
Between India and France
Jacques Blamont
For France, space was never going to be a solo effort. From the outset, in
1959, the Space Research Committee that was the forerunner of CNES
(Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales) focused its attention on two avenues
to be explored: the interdisciplinary nature of space research and the
possibility of finding international partners, materialised in 1961 by the
signature of a first agreement with the US National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). This agreement provided for a satellite project
and training of French personnel in the United States. In 1962, then President
Charles de Gaulle’s government created the CNES and gave it the task of
shaping the nation’s space policy. One ‘space giant’ followed the other,
and in 1966 CNES signed a cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union.
Also, France has extended its partnership to other major space players,
namely, India, Japan and China.
It was a miracle that this man with a vision had enough charisma and
clout to push for the embodiment of his dream into a real national
programme, considering thathe had nothing to start with. At the COSPAR
(Committee on Space Research) 1962 Assembly in Washington, this author,
as scientific and technical director of the then newborn CNES, had the
opportunity to meet Vikram. Highly impressed by Vikram’s ideas, this
author decided to help him in spite of the weakness of the French assets
at the time.
As France and India’s situations were similar, India had just to follow
the path taken by France five years earlier: to learn the trade by launching
sounding rockets. Under the Indian National Commission for Space
Research set up by Vikram, the launch site TERLS was built at Thumba
near Trivandrum, with the help of NASA, the Soviet Union, and CNES.
Since nobody in India could build a payload, the CNES suggested as a
first step in the learning process, to start by scientific studies of the high-
atmosphere dynamics with the creation of sodium clouds by rockets, an
experiment which needed no on-board electronics equipment. On 20
November 1963, an American provided Nike-Apache carried with success
a sodium ejector payload fabricated in CNES laboratory, and it was
immediately followed by three similar sodium clouds launched at Thumba
by French Centaures, a two-stage solid propellant rocket also provided
by CNES. That was the birth of the Indian space programme.
Solid propellants
The Indo-French collaboration was formalised through a memorandum
of understanding signed in May 1964 between CNES and India’s
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). CNES gave a variety of
equipmentto TERLS including a COTAL radar. Sarabhai decided to
manufacture Centaure rockets in India under license. CNES helped in
concluding agreements with the French aerospace industry and provided
specialised training to a number of Indian engineers and scientists every
year. The propellant plant was commissioned in Thumba by the end of
1968, and the first indigenous Centaure launched on February 1969, with
an Indian payload onboard. Concurrently, the propellants were indigenised
Cooperation in Space Between India and France 217
and used for the development of the all-Indian Rohini rockets: the two-
stage RH560, very similar to the French Dragon (a more powerful brother
of Centaure), reached a 350-km altitude with a 150-kg payload on 27
January 1973.
The indigenisation of imported Centaure technology was a major
milestone for India, establishing the future growth of rocketry in the country,
even though plastolite propellants, not suitable for a launch vehicle, were
replaced by other chemicals developed by ISRO scientists: PBAN was
used for the launch of SLV-2 on 18 July1980 which launched India to the
status of a spacefaring nation.
SLV-2 was powered by solid propulsion in all its four stages: liquid
propulsion was left by ISRO on the slow burner.
Liquid propellants
For India, the major breakthrough in liquid propulsion systems came in
1974 when ISRO signed an agreement with the SEP (SociétéEuropéenne
de Propulsion) located in Vernon (France). At that time, France was
developing the Viking liquid engine for its Ariane launch vehicle programme.
Without any exchange of funds, this agreement provided for technology
transfer from SEP to ISRO for theViking liquid engine. In return, ISRO
would extend the services of 100 man-years of ISRO engineers and
scientists to SEP for their Ariane launch vehicle development.
To acquire the Viking engine technology, ISRO engineers worked in all
areas of development activities of the Ariane programme. They participated
in design reviews, progress reviews and even had interaction with European
industries. They received all detailed design drawings and documents, and
participated in inspection and quality assurance of systems, subsystems and
components. They were also part of assembly and integration, checkout
and testing operations in SEP facilities. They had discussions with SEP
specialists and received clarifications to understand the technology fully. Some
40 engineers, working under a five-year contract, participated in the
technology acquisition program at Vernon and Brétigny in France.
The ISRO Chairman created in 1980 a Liquid Propulsion Project
(LPP) which organised three teams under the leadership of three SEP-
218 International Cooperation
trained experts—the first team developed the system, the second was
tasked to realise all hardware in India in association with Indian industries,
and the third team was to establish all development facilities at Mahendragiri.
Indian industries and academic institutions were associated in the
development effort. The Viking engine, renamed Vikas, today powers the
second stage of PSLV and GSLV launchers. The first Vikas engine was
realised with the active contributions from MTAR Technologies, Hyderabad,
Godrej and other industries. It was successfully tested in SEP facilities in
1985, demonstrating the triumph of the acquisition of the technology.
TheVikas agreement between ISRO and SEP is the seedling which
has grown today as a big tree called Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre
(LPSC) with branches in Bangalore (Karnataka), Mahendragiri (Tamil Nadu),
and Valiamala (Kerala). The ISRO-SEP agreement and the consequent
acquisition of technology for Vikas engine had a great impact on the very
configuration of the PSLV launches and therefore played a crucial role in
making PSLV the workhorse of ISRO.
dense observing system. The operational use of Saphir is in its infancy and
it results from Megha-Tropiques that this type of measurement will have
a positive impact on numerical weather forecasts.
SARAL-Altika, a joint ISRO-CNES mission is dedicatedto altimetry.
Previous altimetry missions such as Topex-Poseidon and Jason conducted
by CNES in cooperation with NASA,Eumetsatand NOAA, all operated
in Ku-band (13.6 GHz) coupled with S or C band. SARAL uses Ka-band
(35 GHz) for enhanced performances in terms of vertical resolution,
time decorrelation of echoes, spatial resolution (8 km footprint) and range
noise. The satellite has also enabled a better observation of ice, rain, coastal
zones, lakes, rivers and wave heights.
ISRO provided the platform and the PSLV launch on 25 Feb 2013
to a heliosynchronous circular (800 km) orbit. CNES provided an integrated
payload module including the instruments and an Argos-3 mission payload,
and a part of the ground system. The payload includes an AltikaKa band
altimeter and an embedded dual-frequency radiometer (23.8 GHz/37
GHz); the radio-positioning DORIS system for precise orbit determination
using dedicated ground station; a laser reflector array to calibrate the orbit
determination system; an Argos-3 instrument as part of the Argos system.
In orbit the behaviour of SARAL has been flawless. The quality of
data has been generally better than Jason-2’s products and demonstrated
new capacities (coastal, inland, ice). It has filled the gap between Envisat
and Sentinel-3 and played a key role in the ocean-surface topography
virtual constellation, which requires a minimal configuration of four
satellites simultaneously in orbit (Jason 3 and Sentinel 3A were not yet
launched, Cryosat not optimised for ocean observation and HY2 suffering
from data outage). A large scientific community of users has been
assembled, as was reported in a special issue of the journal, Marine Geology.
SARAL-Altika has been a pertinent precursor for the future NASA-
CNES altimeter mission SWAT.
The future
The recent success of the two joint ISRO-CNES missions, Megha-
Tropiques and SARAL, leads to the idea that the 50-year-old Indian-French
cooperation in space should now be expanded.
Cooperation in Space Between India and France 223
Scientific research
foresee that in 2018, the ISRO Oceansat 3-Argos mission will fly France’s
latest-generation Argos 4 environmental data collection and location
instrument. Sometime in the future, such ventures may lead to a world
space system of surveillance of the compliance of countries to agreements
on carbon emissions.
The 2016 ISRO-CNES agreements also contain the creation of a
joint space science group tasked with studying France’s participation in
future Indian interplanetary missions. This paper argues for this joint group
to focus on atmospheric, oceanic sciences and climatology. If (as has
been seen) the ISRO-CNES balloons and satellites have provided good
scientific results, these operations have happened on a sporadic, haphazard
road map, without any strategic view. Balloons studies of monsoon or
pollution were interrupted when LMD scientists obtained their D.Sc. The
Megha-Tropiques program was virtually abandoned after many years of
hopeless discussions between engineers of Toulouse and Bangalore, when
during the experts’ flight to Trivandrum for the 40th anniversary of the
first Indian rocket experiment, this author managed to convince the
Chairman of ISRO, Madhavan Naïr, to save the project and make it
happen; it has since succeeded. The programmatic management of the
cooperation has not been up to par with the excellence of the
instrumentation and to the potential of Saphir and Altika.
The method used in the Soviet-France Space cooperation programme
should be used in the ISRO-CNES joint ventures: a programme
committee should be established, tasked with the elaboration of research
projects in climatology -atmospheric science - oceanography to be
submitted on a regular basis to the two agencies. The projects would
involve whenever needed satellites, balloons, general equipment (lidars,
radars, sounders ships, aeroclippers, buoys, among others).
The purpose would be to support a wide scope use of many techniques
in a strategic approach providing extensity and continuity in the acquisition
of data. This policy could mean reflights of proven instruments such as
Saphir and Altika.
Planetary exploration
Beyond its space community, India is rightly proud of its successful missions
to the Moon and to Mars. On the other hand, CNES has participated in a
Cooperation in Space Between India and France 225
Defence
The following section involves unchartered waters, and the views expressed
are this author’s own.
Today all conflicts have become information wars. Space being the
essential global asset for collecting, transmitting and disseminating
information plays ipso facto a vital role not only in the formulation and
implementation of great power strategies, but also in the daily management
of theater operations. The acceptance of this reality and the consequent
need to restructure their entire national security complex figure obviously
among the most important tasks ahead of every state. Most important
226 International Cooperation
Small satellites
Small satellites are now understood to complement the operational
capabilities of larger space systems byproviding real-time coverage and
support. As an example, Cartosat-2 (700 kg) and Cartosat-2A form the
228 International Cooperation
Conclusion
There is no doubt that international cooperation is difficult. To move
beyond ministerial declarations of intent there must exist not only a deep
conviction shared by the top echelons of an agency supposed to engage
Cooperation in Space Between India and France 231
issued a call for proposals without informing CNES. During this period,
fruitless meetings have been held on Venus missions, and only industry has
shown interest in a follow-on to Altika.
A second tool would be the participation of ISRO in the ‘Federation
of the Crowd’ that CNES is considering to create. In this area, everything
has to be invented, and it is expected that a large part of the innovation
will surge in a bottom-up manner. Here is an example: Narayan Prasad
and colleagues have proposed to start, fund and run a space specialised
Business Incubation Centre (BIC) involving ISRO, startups, governmental
departments, industry and venture capital firms in a public-private mode.
The idea follows ESA’s BIC program which has created more than 50
viable firms. Aspace-BIC would build on ISRO’s success to create markets
and to render easier access to global activities. Such a BIC (and others)
seem an obvious partner for the Federation and a joint India-France BIC
would become a main enabler of change by cooperation.
Below is a summary of the domains where CNES-ISRO cooperative
space projects could be implemented:
- Climatology, oceanography and meteorology: good bases already
exist in this area but they should be upgraded into a structured
programme replacing the collection of successive unrelated items
that it has been. A programme committee should be appointed
with scientists from both nations involved in order to define a
long-term vision based on joint research projects, joint scientific
teams, and joint missions. The concerned community should be
comforted by symposia, student exchanges (both pre- and post-
doctorate) and a complementary research programme on Big
Data management. One of the objectives of the cooperation
may be to set up an international network of carbon use
monitoring.
- Joint missions to telluric planets. Complementary roles are here
offered with CNES providing instruments or equipment to
ISRO missions. Clearly, a long road has to be travelled before
anything concrete is decided in this matter, though a joint Venus
Balloon programme is not farfetched.
- Security. This is a domain where nothing has yet been done, even
Cooperation in Space Between India and France 233
Acknowledgments
This paper has greatly benefited from various papers by Narayan Prasad
and from the two books: U.R. Rao’s India’s Rise as a Space Power (Cambridge
University Press India, 2014), and P.V. Manoranjan Rao’s From Fishing Hamlet
to Red Planet, ISRO Editions (Harper Collins, 2015).
ENDNOTES
1. M.Y.S.Prasad, in From Fishing Hamlet to Red Planet, ed. P.V.Manorangan
Rao, ISRO Publications, Harpers Collins, 2015.
India-US: New Dynamism in Old Partnership 235
17
India and the United States have over 50 years of experience in cooperating
on space efforts, going as far back as when India launched a US-built
sounding rocket from a launch site in southern India in 1963. This
relationship has been beneficial, both in terms of enhancing scientific and
technical achievements and also in bolstering the relationship between the
two democracies. The cooperative efforts have largely focused on civil
space projects, however, so there is room for increasing the cross-cutting
alliances between the two countries by expanding joint efforts to include
those that affect security and stability. Furthermore, the two countries can
work together in multilateral fora to encourage the development of norms
of responsible behaviour that will help make the space environment stable
and predictable. To allow for cooperation on security space issues, issues
that could potentially warp the US-India relationship must be dealt with,
like using Indian launchers to put US satellites in orbit. While these are
complicated issues, they are not impossible to work through, given sufficient
leadership and support from both sides.
Much of the cooperation between India and the United States in
space has been, reasonably so, via the two countries’ respective space
agencies: India’s Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the United
States’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The first
meeting of the US-India Civil Space Joint Working Group was held in
June 2005, allowing for discussions that would identify future possibilities
for collaboration and sharing information about what each side is currently
236 International Cooperation
capability internationally and weather data is one of the less sensitive missions
when it comes to sharing.”8
Both countries have strong incentives to want to improve domain
awareness, so it should be a likely candidate for efforts to cooperate in
space. The first is space situational awareness (SSA). The US-India Joint
Statement of September 2014 highlighted SSA (and collision avoidance in
outer space) as an issue of potential interest. Frank Rose, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at the
US State Department, told a conference in New Delhi in January 2015
that “As we deepen our strategic relationship, we share an interest in
addressing the emerging security challenges of the 21st century. Ensuring
the long-term sustainability and security of the outer space environment is
one of those challenges, and one that the United States and India are
uniquely situated to address together.”9 He went on to highlight SSA sharing
as one of several “areas of concrete collaboration.”10 The United States
has signed SSA sharing agreements with 11 countries which are intended
to expedite sharing data about objects on orbit in order to reduce the
chances of catastrophic collisions on orbit; the most recent agreement
was signed with the United Arab Emirates in April 2016. India has not
signed an agreement with the United States yet on this issue, but its owner-
operator data could prove highly useful in increasing the reliability and
accuracy of the US space objects catalogue, which in turn could help
protect Indian assets on orbit.
Another area that could be ripe for cooperation is using space for
maritime domain awareness (MDA). Cooperating on MDA in general
has long been part of US policy: National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD)-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-13, released
in December 2004, calls for “Enhancing international relationships and
promoting the integration of U.S. allies and international and private sector
partners into an improved global maritime security framework to advance
common security interests in the Maritime Domain.”11Indian Minister of
Defense Manohar Parikkar and US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter
released a statement in April 2016 that discussed, among other things,
“new opportunities to deepen cooperation in maritime security and
Maritime Domain Awareness.”12Space for MDA is a natural outgrowth
of this mission, particularly given the explosion in number of Earth
India-US: New Dynamism in Old Partnership 239
given that India is a leader amongst developing countries and there are
some concerns about whether the guidelines will help or hurt them. There
were a dozen guidelines that were approved at the plenary session of
COPUOS in June 2016; more are still under discussion and will be brought
to the STSC in February 2017.15 Perhaps there, under the leadership of an
Indian chair, India will use the opportunity to demonstrate its support of
the long-term sustainability guidelines.
In looking for places where the two countries can cooperate on space
issues, it is important to also be aware of issue areas that could delay or
even prevent this from happening. One such topic is the use of Indian
launch vehicles for launching US commercial satellites, specifically using
India’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) for launching American
smallsats. India made news in June 2016 when it used its PSLV to launch
20 satellites at the same time in the same orbit; these satellites came from
five countries, and 13 of the satellites were American.16 With that launch,
the PSLV had put 113 satellites in orbit since its first launch in 1993, over
half of which (74) belonged to other countries.17 This was the second
time the PSLV had launched commercial US satellites; the first was in
September 2015, when the PSLV launched four satellites from Spire
Global.18 U.S.-based PlanetIQ has a launch booked with the PSLV program
later in 2016.19 What then is the problem? With the nascent commercial
smallsat Earth Observation market continually expanding, one would think
that having access to a relatively cheap ($33 million/launch) launch vehicle
that can place smaller satellites at their selected orbit at will, instead of
having to wait to be a secondary payload for a larger satellite that may end
up having its launch repeatedly delayed, would be good for US industry.20
It is – but that is only part of the story. To clarify: it is great for US
smallsats; but for companies working on developing US small launch
vehicles, the concern is that they will not be able to compete with India’s
PSLV and thus they will lose out on market shares and even fail to develop
as a successful and autonomous industry themselves.
This problem goes back over a decade when India and the United
States came to an agreement in 2006 about the wording of the Technical
Safeguards Agreement (TSA), which was signed in 2009.21 This TSA was
intended to cover launches of US government- or academia-owned
India-US: New Dynamism in Old Partnership 241
ENDNOTES
1. “India, US to jointly develop resource mapping satellite for launch
in 2021: The satellite will be useful for variety of applications like natural
resources mapping and monitoring, assessing soil moisture, etc,” Indian
Express, July 22, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/technology/
science/india-us-to-jointly-develop-resource-mapping-satellite-for-launch-
in-2021-2928996/
2. Vishwa Mohani, “Cabinet approves MoU between ISRO and US agency
for exchange of critical data,” Times of India, Dec. 14, 2016, http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cabinet-approves-mou-between-isro-
and-us-agency-for-exchange-of-critical-data/articleshow/55988330.cms
3. “Joint Statement: The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners
in the 21st Century,” June 7, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2016/06/07/joint-statement-united-states-and-india-
enduring-global-partners-21st
4. Joint Statement, June 7, 2016, ibid
5. Joint Statement, June 7, 2016, ibid
6. Sandya Ramesh, “NAVIC, India’s Very Own GPS-lite,” The Wire, Jan.
22, 2016, with an update on April 28, 2016, http://thewire.in/19892/
irnss-indias-very-own-gps/
7. Mike Gruss, “U.S. Air Force’s long-term weather strategy relies heavily
on allies,” Space News, Aug. 29, 2016, http://spacenews.com/u-s-air-forces-
long-term-weather-strategy-relies-heavily-on-allies/
8. Mike Gruss, Aug. 29, 2016, ibid
9. Frank A. Rose, Remarks, “U.S.-India Space Security Cooperation: A
Partnership for the 21st Century,” March 5, 2015, http://www.state.gov/
t/avc/rls/2015/238609.htm
10. Frank A. Rose, March 5, 2015, ibid
India-US: New Dynamism in Old Partnership 243
in.rbth.com/economics/cooperation/2016/06/09/india-joins-mtcr-
space-missile-cooperation-with-russia-easier_601593
23. Mukunth, May 23, 2016, ibid
24. Mukunth, May 23, 2016, ibid
25. Peter de Selding, “U.S. launch companies lobby to maintain ban on use
of Indian rockets,” Space News, March 29, 2016, http://spacenews.com/
u-s-space-transport-companies-lobby-to-maintain-ban-on-use-of-indian-
rockets/
26. De Selding, March 29, 2016, ibid
27. De Selding, March 29, 2016, ibid
28. Srinivas Laxman, “Plan to largely privatize PSLV operations by 2020:
Isro chief,” Times of India, Feb. 15, 2016, http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Plan-to-largely-privatize-PSLV-
operations-by-2020-Isro-chief/articleshow/50990145.cms
Evolution of India-Russia Partnership 245
18
Evolution of India-Russia
Partnership
Vladimir Korovkin
In 1984 if you met a teenager in a Russian city who was singing the Hindi
song, Goronki nakalonki, duniya haidiwalonki – you were not necessarily
encountering a linguistics genius. Rather, that teenager would be one of
the millions of fans of the Disco Dancer Bollywood movie, the blockbuster
of that year in the USSR. In April of the same year another phrase in
Hindi made it to the big news in Moscow media: “Saare jahan se achcha.” In
these words the first Indian astronaut, Rakesh Sharma, replied to the
question of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who asked him how
India looked like from outer space. On 2 April 1984, he became the
138th person to fly to space, making India the 14th nation in the world to
have achieved such a feat. Interestingly, the country was also 14th to launch
a national space satellite, in 1975. In both cases, it was the launcher rocket
from the USSR that powered the mission.
At that time, over 30 years ago, space exploration was quite different
from what it is today. Manned orbital flights had their heyday with record-
breaking missions over hundreds of days (culminating in 1995 with 438
days spent by Valery Polyakov on board the Mir station). In 1986 the
SPOT satellites set new standards in high-resolution imaging of the Earth’s
surface. This set a new trend for themore active participation of private
corporations and academic institutions in the area of earth observation--.
The communication satellites were becoming a global alternative to
telephones, providing mobile services to maritime customers since the
establishment of INMARSAT by the United Nations in 1979. The scientific
246 International Cooperation
exploration for Far Space was advancing, with Soviet and American stations
frequenting Venus and Mars, and Voyagers already on their course to
Jupiter and Saturn. Space was mostly a governmental matter, yet the club
of space nations was becoming increasingly inclusive. Dozens of nations
already had their first satellite launched mostly by the Soviet or American
vehicles. The Soviet program Interkosmos put a total of 15 astronauts from
13 nations to the space orbit since 1978. The US followed the course in
1985, picking up the tempo, as the Space Shuttles allowed for a bigger
crew on a shorter mission.
In the 1980s India was making quick strides to turning into a fully self-
reliant space nation, putting the first satellite in orbit with its national launcher
in 1980, starting to build the Asia’s biggest domestic communications
system INSAT in 1983, and launching the original design of augmented
SLV in 1987. It was in those years that the country firmly demonstrated its
resolve to be among the leaders in space exploration. The development
of Russian space programmes, on the other hand, had quite more dramatic
twists due to the political and economic turbulence of the early 1990s.
Three spacefaring nations – Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine – emerged in
the place of the USSR, with certain unavoidable setbacks in the goals and
capabilities. Still Russia managed to hold a prime position among the space
exploring nations, with one of the most universal launcher fleets, new
launch sites and an effective pragmatic general strategy in space.
Today, some 30 years since the Rakesh Sharma flight, the world is on
the verge of completely new space era. Private space is the growing
phenomenon. The satellite DIY kits are available through Internet. Micro-
, nano- and even pico- satellites will soon work in constellations of hundreds.
Hi-resolution real-time imaging of most of the Earth’s surface will be
available for plenty of practical purposes. The private launches and private
launch pads are already here. Space tourism will soon turn into a real
industry. These developments may sometimes overshadow the “big space”
in media headlines, yet the progress here never stopped. Lunar and Martian
manned flights are plans, not dreams. Increasingly complex missions target
distant planets like Jupiter and beyond, with the new focus on exploring
their numerous moons. The number of space nations is constantly growing,
at the same time the international cooperative projects become ever more
Evolution of India-Russia Partnership 247
Early history
The Russian-Indian cooperation in space started at the early stages of the
development of India’s space project. Though the first rocket launched
from Indian territory on 21 November 1963 was designed by NASA
(Nike Apache),1 the Soviet Union soon joined the program of launches
from TERLS (Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station). The facility
allowed to launch only relatively light suborbital rockets like the Soviet M-
100. This was the most used sounding rocket model in the world, produced
since 1957 until the 1990s with the astounding number of almost 6,500
total launches.2 The rocket lifted the payload of 15 kg of meteorological
equipment some 90 km above the surface, then the nosecone part was
descending under a parachute for about 50 minutes collecting information
and transmitting it to the ground station. Tracking by radar the trajectory
of descend below the altitude of 50 km allowed to map the high-altitude
winds. Thus the M-100 (and the other sounding rockets) were filling an
important gap in meteorological observations going higher than aerostatic
devices, but lower than orbital space satellites.
A Soviet stamp celebrating the space cooperation with India picturing the M-100
rocket
248 International Cooperation
Political context
Understanding the development of international, particularly Soviet-Indian
space cooperation in 1970s and 1980s, requires reconstructing the political
context of this period. The Cold War between the ‘Western’ bloc led by
the US and the ‘East’ headed by the USSR was largely shaping events
across the globe. The 1970s saw marked decrease in the level of hostility
on both sides, the so called ‘détente’. With the end of Vietnam War, and
the signing of important international treaties including the Helsinki accord
and SALT, there emerged a trace of cooperation between the USSR and
the US. Its manifestation in space was the Apollo-Soyuz docking in 1975.
Evolution of India-Russia Partnership 249
At the same time, there was an important crank in the socialist bloc
with China-Soviet relations at their low. In 1969 there were border clashes
that claimed lives on both sides. Though the border violence was not
repeated, the two biggest socialist countries were in bitter controversy
over a number of international issues, including the reign of the Khmer
Rouge regime in Cambodia. The end of the decade was marked by Chinese
invasion into Vietnam, a close ally of the USSR, in response to Vietnamese
involvement in the overthrow of Pol Pot. Since mid-1970s the US made
efforts to improve relations with China, and these moves were seen by
the USSR as a source of strategic threat.
The global political situation was significantly disrupted by the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979, which initially had a limited goal
of stabilising the country against the dangerously growing sectarian split in
the ruling Party. The move triggered a chain of reactions that brought in
prolonged violence in the country itself, re-aligned politically the whole
region, and ended the period of detente. In particular, Pakistan became
the core source of support to anti-Soviet insurgents, the monarchies of
the Gulf led by Saudi Arabia were heavily involved in funding of these
operations and even the revolutionary Iran (which initially saw the USSR
as the lesser of the evils compared to the US) threw in active assistance to
mujahidin.
Against this background, India was seen by the USSR as the key
strategic partner in the region. While in the 1950s the blossoming Sino-
Soviet relations were, to the USSR leaders, overshadowing the role of
India in the continent, by the end of the 1960s there was clear understanding
in Moscow that partnership with Delhi is the key area of not just regional,
but of global policy. India’s leading role in the Non-Aligned movement
was appreciated and supported. The economic policies of the Indira
Gandhi government were also seen as increasingly socialist, which paved
the way for the level of Soviet cooperation usually maintained only with
the countries of the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance). The USSR was firmly supporting India on the international
issues with Pakistan and China, and in its internal policies as well. The
tragic death of Indira Gandhi in 1984 was mourned deeply across the
Soviet Union, and her funeral was broadcast on national TV, the only such
case for a foreign leader at the time.
250 International Cooperation
French Signe 3. The last Interkosmos mission went to orbit in 1994, while
Intersputnik managed to survive the political turbulence of the 1990s and
expand the membership to 28 nations.4
At the same time, the USSR began to promote the idea of fully national
satellites among its strategic political partners, offering support in design,
production, launch and operations, including the ground facilities for
reception of the information. India was the first country to participate in
the program, with a successful launch in 1975 (followed by COMECON
member, Czechoslovakia, three years later).
Two Soviet stamps dedicated to space cooperation with India, featuring the
drawings of the Aryabhata-series satellites (the specific version is not mentioned).
254 International Cooperation
Manned flight
The manned orbital flights were always at the core of the Soviet space
programmes and in many aspects the capabilities of the USSR in this field
were second to none in the world. By the 1980s the country had mastered
the launch of crews of three astronauts to permanently operational orbital
stations, which were built to support very lengthy stay in space. Importantly,
the USSR never had a launch accident with a manned flight, and this safety
record allowed the start of an ambitious program of bringing nationals
of strategic allies to space. Thus in the mid-1970s it was decided to give
new impetus to the Interkosmos programme with a series of joint missions
of Soviet and foreign astronauts (or ‘cosmonauts’ in Russian). On 2 March
1978 Vladimir Remek from Czechoslovakia became the first non-Russian
or non-American person in space. This was followed by nine missions
with COMECON member nationals, from Poland to Cuba to Vietnam.
Then, in 1982 a Frenchman, Jean-Loup Chretien became the first
Evolution of India-Russia Partnership 255
new space nation, the Russian Federation, largely inherited the space
capabilities and competences of the Soviet Union.
The book on Rakesh Sharma flight (‘USSR-India: The way to stars’) was widely
popular in the USSR.3
Evolution of India-Russia Partnership 257
could trigger the missile arms race with Pakistan. The claim was hardly
substantiated, as cryogenic engines require a long period of pre-launch
preparations (up to a month) and for this reason are ineffective for any
military purpose. American companies were bidding for the contract and
many observers regarded the US action as a move to clear the competitive
scene. Still, the Russian diplomacy of the times lacked the skills of
moderating this type of situation and was over-idealistic with regard to
the new level of partnership with the US.
As a result, the new contract was negotiated in 1994 with no
technology transfer yet a bigger lot of seven engines supplied ready-made
from Russia. They were used in Indian GSLV Mk. I launcher. The first of
the series was launched on 18 April 2001 (missing by just one day the 26th
anniversary of Aryabhata going to orbit) and was a partial success, as the
payload was delivered to the lower orbit than planned. ISRO declared
the launch a success and claimed that the failure was with the satellite
GSAT-1. Two fully successful missions followed in 2003 and 2004,
delivering GSAT-2 and GSAT-3 (each with the weight of almost two
tonnes) to designated orbits. Six of the seven engines supplied by Russia
were used, and India successfully tested its own cryogenic technology in
GSLV Mk. II launchers (in January 2014, the second attempt was made,
after a failure in 2010).
In the beginning of 2000s the Russian economy began to grow quickly,
due to successful internal restructuring and high international prices for
export commodities like oil and metals. This allowed the country to re-
approach its space exploration programmes, bringing some investment
into the industry which was on the verge of survival for almost a decade.
The new strategy in space was seeking to leverage the scientific and
technological advances inherited from the USSR and combine them with
a more pragmatic set of goals. Satellite navigation, telecommunications
and surface observation were among the priorities. However, the manned
orbital missions continued as part of international cooperative efforts
within the project of International Space Station. More so, since the
retirement of all Space Shuttles by the US in 2011, Russia became the only
country capable of delivering crews to the Station and bringing them
back to Earth.
Evolution of India-Russia Partnership 259
India was not participating in the ISS perhaps with the view of
developing an authentic manned mission. The country was seeking to
cooperate with Russia on two other important projects. One was
GLONASS, Russia’s effort to build its own version of global positioning
system, independent of GPS. The other one was India’s second lunar
mission, Chandrayaan-2. The cooperation agreements on the projects were
signed in 2004 (with revision in 20076) and 2007, respectively.
Under the GLONASS cooperation project, India was to launch several
satellites by GSLV vehicles and to get preferential access to data. The
Russian participation in Chandrayaan-2 was in providing the landing
module based on the latest technologies developed for the Fobos-Grunt
mission. Unfortunately, both projects did not come to life. Russia has
launched all the GLONASS satellites with its own launchers from the
Plesetsk pad. The reason for not cooperating with India as per agreement
of 2004 was never announced. However, there was an agreement in 2011
to grant the Indian military a preferential access to positioning data.7
As for the Chandrayaan-2 mission, the Russian party did not provide
the landing module in time, rescheduling the delivery first for 2013 and
later for 2016. Some experts cited the failure of Fobos-Grunt mission in
2011 to be part of the reason,8 though the mission failed due to an
unsuccessful launch and never managed to test the landing device. ISRO
announced in 2015 that it will develop the whole set of equipment for the
mission on its own, with rescheduling of launch to 2018.
Thus the space cooperation between the two countries for the past
20 years has been a mere shadow of their joint projects in the 1970s and
1980s.9 In fact, the countries even began to compete in the international
space market as India included commercial payloads on board its launcher
vehicles since 2000. Still, the development of global space market now
brings a completely new class of opportunities for the joint projects of
the two countries.
broad number of private actors to build and operate their own satellite.
The experts expect hundreds of launches of small satellites in the coming
years (up to 500 by 2020)10 with market size exceeding USD 7 billion a
year.
The effective operations of small satellites require re-shuffle of the
existing procedures and approaches in launches and ground infrastructure.
The very nature of the devices calls for high cost effectiveness in delivery
to orbit and in sessions of data exchanges with the ground. The total cost
of ownership of a small satellite should fall in the range of tens of
thousands or even thousands of dollars – lower by two to three orders
than most of the present-day cases. This needs new launch techniques
with clusters of dozens of devices on board one vehicle. A global network
of ground reception stations and marketplaces for data exchanges should
emerge, leading ultimately to real-time coverage of most of the Earth’s
surface.
The expansion of the space market through private satellites and space
tourism creates completely new opportunities for established players with
strong technology like Russia and India. While the ‘traditional’ segment of
heavy launches was growing rather slowly, at four-five percent a year,11
the new commercial segments of small satellites are expected to
demonstrate double-digit growth till 2020 and beyond. Both India and
Russia are advancing in the private space market. ISRO has formed a
commercial subsidiary called Antrix Corporation in 1992, it had a successful
launch of a cluster of five mini-satellites in 2014.12 Russia, for its part,
used effectively converted ICBMs for this type of launches.13 Russia also
has private ground network for signal reception operated by the Scanex
company.14 India and Russia have naturally complementing geographies,
commanding low and high latitudes, respectively. This gives an opportunity
to create a comprehensive offer on the space market which would include
both launch and operations services.
Deeper space scientific exploration remains a promising area, despite
the unsuccessful experience with Chandrayaan-2. Russia and India can
complement each other in designing and fulfilling joint missions to the
Moon, to Mars and beyond. Multi-lateral settings are also an interesting
option for this type of projects which require significant funding and take
262 International Cooperation
ENDNOTES
1. http://www.astronaut.ru/bookcase/books/afanasiev3/afanasiev3.htm
2. Encyclopedia Astronauticahttp://www.astronautix.com/m/m-100.html
3. Encyclopedia Astronauticahttp://www.astronautix.com/m/m-100b.html
4. "Monsoon experiment to be included in Garp” – In: EOS, Transacions
of American Geophysical Union, 1977 (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1029/EO058i010p00954/abstract); Murakami T.: Scientific
objectives of the Monsoon Experiment (MONEX) – In: Geo Journal,
March 1979, vol. 3, issue 2, p. p. 117 – 136 (http://link.springer.com/
article/10.1007/BF00257701 )
5. http://www.astronautix.com/e/ekran.html
6. http://www.intersputnik.ru/intersputnik/about/
7. http://kik-sssr.ru/Aryabhata_-_Bhaskara_KapYar.htm
8. On-line Russian version available at http://epizodsspace.airbase.ru/bibl/
gubarev/ariabata/01.html
9. The US reacted to the success of Interkosmos in 1985 starting its own
extensive program of international cooperation in manned flights. As
the Space Shuttles allowed for larger crews, bigger foreign teams were
theoretically possible, though the option was exercised only once, when
2 citizens of the West Germany and one Dutchman took all non-pilot
seats on board the Challenger, making it the most populous space launch
ever (8 people instead of regular 7). Incidentally, this was the last safe
Challenger mission, next flight resulted in tragedy when a booster exploded
during the launch destroying the shuttle and killing all aboard.
10. PankajaSrinvasan: The down to Earth Rakesh Sharma – Indian Times.
http://m.thehindu.com/features/metroplus/the-down-to-earth-rakesh-
sharma/article381946.ece/
Evolution of India-Russia Partnership 263
19
The question of why countries cooperate with each other has varied
answers. For the most part, cooperation between countries can be
explained by a combination of reasons and motivations. Nations
cooperate in technological projects like space programmes for several
reasons, among them the desire and need to maximise benefits while
minimising resource utilisation. Cooperation enables all the players to
improve coordination, reinforce their relationships and increase their
commitment to one other. Such commitments serve other goals as well,
like national security and/or the economy. Technological cooperation
often constitutes a tool used to build trust, thereby bridging differences
and difficulties in other areas, and founding strong relationships between
nations. In addition, international ooperation is meant to deal with
problems and challenges shared by all the involved parties, principally
regional or global problems that affect every nation, and which can only
be solved through widespread cooperation. This chapter will address
the potential motivations for cooperation between India and Israel in
the field of space.
War, India was among the leaders of the non-aligned nations, and the
relationship between the two nations developed quite slowly. Momentum
only developed after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Communist
bloc and in the 25 years since then, the relationship between the two countries
has only strengthened. Cooperation between India and Israel expanded
and deepened in a wide range of areas, and a tremendous potential exists
for continued development and expansion of this cooperation.
India and Israel have both been involved in space for several decades.
India’s first independent launch took place in July 1980; Israel’s, in 1988.
Both of the launches, which brought India and Israel into the “space
club”, took place in the ecosystem of space activities during the Cold
War. During that era, only the Great Powers proved their ability to
independently develop satellites and launch them into space. Commercial
space activities were almost non-existent, and the distribution of know-
how and space technology was strictly limited and monitored. In this
ecosystem, both India and Israel were very different in the ‘look’ of nations
active in space. Israel was and is a small nation with few resources; India,
although a large country, was also poor and was considered to be
underdeveloped in many fields. Nonetheless, they both played in the field
of the political and economic giants. Why did nations like India and Israel,
each independently, choose to act in the field of space? The answer, in
both cases, is that the decision to invest in a space programme was made
precisely because of the special conditions in which each nation found itself,
and not despite those conditions. Thus, to a great extent, it can be argued
that the State of Israel chose to create a space programme because of the
security challenges and strategic difficulties it faced in the region, especially
in light of its small size. India, as the leader of the non-aligned nations,
chose to invest in space because of demographic, economic, technological
and scientific challenges, all deriving from its poverty and lack of
development, due to its geographic size and the dimensions and distribution
of its population.
For each one of them, developing space capabilities provided solutions
and a bridge over disparities and problems that they had identified. In
Israel, the challenge was primarily in security. The peace treaty that Israel
signed with Egypt entailed Israel’s relinquishing the Sinai Peninsula, which
created a security challenge: how to monitor and enforce the peace treaty
Cooperating with Israel: Strategic Convergence 267
Recommendations
This chapter addresses the possible motivations for cooperation between
India and Israel in the field of space. Strengthening the ties between the
two nations in space endeavours requires deepening of each country’s
understanding and acquaintance of the other’s needs, goals, aspirations
and capabilities. Thus, as a first stage, the two countries can identify the
important areas and subjects within the overall rubric of space, in which
cooperation would be most effective and beneficial to both nations. As
set forth in this chapter, a broad spectrum of possibilities exists. Included
are scientific research in deeper space, scientific research about Earth and
its environment, technological development, components, sub-systems and
even joint space missions, development of civilian and security applications
based on their space capabilities such as communications, navigation,
meteorology, warnings and monitoring natural disasters, defence, long-
distance medical services, and others.
Beyond these and other practical ideas, cooperation in the field of
education is possible, starting with pre-school children and ranging through
advanced academic degrees, including exchange programmes for students
and academics. In light of the developing NewSpace economy, the
possibility exists of creating joint business ventures and establishing a joint
infrastructure in both countries. Alongside advancing economic, scientific
and technological endeavours, it is important to coordinate activities in
international forums and in the international organisations that have an
impact on the space agenda, e.g., UN institutions. Perhaps deeper
coordination in international forums should be examined concerning issues
on which the two countries’ interests are similar. Such coordinated positions
and efforts would not only provide tangible benefits to both countries,
but would contribute to the development of confidence building measures
at the international level.
An Asian Space Partnership with Japan? 275
20
For many years, there was a huge gap between the philosophy of space
development between India and Japan. Under the direction of Dr. Vikram
Sarabhai, Indian space programmes were conducted under the principle
of “space activities for developing nation”, focused on “the application
of advanced technologies to the real problems of man and society”. On
the other hand, Japan, from the beginning of its space programme, pursued
the strategy of “catching up” with advanced spacefaring nations. Although
India and Japan began their space programmes at nearly the same time –
the Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) was
established in 1962 and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in
1969, while the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) launched
the first sounding rocket in 1960 and the National Space Development
Agency (NASDA) was created in 1969 – the paths that India and Japan
took were quite different. Japan, as a relatively small island country with
densely populated cities, developed its social infrastructure even before
the second World War (though they were severely damaged during the
war), while India struggled to improve its social infrastructure for sub-
continental scale for economic development. These geographical and
historical differences provided different reasons for India and Japan to
engage with space programmes. Also, during these periods, India took
the strategy to develop its autonomous technical capability in the context
of the Non-Aligned Movement, whereas Japan received technical support
and assistance from its ally, the United States. While India struggled to
develop its economic capabilities after its independence and conflicts with
276 International Cooperation
programme. The industry did not challenge the government for such a
decision, and they did not find a way to improve their competitiveness.
Instead, they set their expectations too low and were satisfied to get contracts
for numerous technology-oriented engineering satellites.
The way in which Japan pursued its space objective was quite different
from India’s policy norm. The application programmes, on which India
has focused, were not the major concern for Japan. In fact, Japan was
not allowed to invest public funding into application programmes. Thus,
the cooperation with India was not on the radar screen for Japanese
international strategy. The situation, however, is changing.
Conclusion
India and Japan began their space activities for different purposes and
objectives. India aimed to develop its space capabilities for their socio-
economic benefits, while Japan pursued its strategy to catch up with the
advanced spacefaring nations. However, after the end of the Cold War
and changing strategic circumstances, India and Japan began to share
important strategic objectives in space. Changes in Japanese space
policymaking through the Basic Space Law brought Japanese space policy
thinking closer to that of India. India, which has achieved a certain level
of civilian space capabilities, is moving on to more ambitious space
programmes such as deep space exploration. In the new era of space
policy, India and Japan share a common ground for closer cooperation.
However, the emergence of space ventures such as SpaceX and the
promotion of commercialisation of space in the United States may add
new dynamics in the space activities of both countries. India is already
active in the launch market for small satellites with its successful PSLV
launcher, while Japan aims to develop a new industrial strategy for
encouraging private entities to invest and participate in space activities.
For both India and Japan, commercialisation is a new domain for space
activities where neither have yet to come up with a concrete strategy to
confront new challenges. Apart from potential areas of cooperation –
strategic, utilisation, Earth observation and science – cooperative approach
for commercialisation can provide further opportunities for India and
Japan to strengthen their ties.
India and Australia: Emerging Possibilities 283
21
and GPS company Prostar in the US. It is not clear who is likely to win
either case. However, two things can be gleaned from these examples:
1. Space domain is increasingly and substantially adding value to
traditional business.
2. The value of this domain is measurable and high enough to pursue in
court.
It is important to note that Precision Tracking and Prostar are data
distributors, not data producers, and the fact that entities are competing
relentlessly illustrates how valuable space data has become to companies
such as Domino’s. Navigation data is still produced for free by
governments, so this is an imperfect, albeit measurable, lesson on its
increasing effects to downstream industries.
As NewSpace companies start to build assets and new distribution
methods, there will likely be a similar emergence of experimentation-
adoption-value-competition.
REFERENCES
1. Neil Patel, “90% Of Startups Fail: Here’s What You Need To Know
About The 10%,” Forbes, 16 January 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
neilpatel/2015/01/16/90-of-startups-will-fail-heres-what-you-need-to-
know-about-the-10/# 4d75d2b455e1.
2. Doug Messeir, “U.S., India Find Way Around ITAR Export Laws With
Bilateral Space Launch Agreement,” Parabolic Arc, 13 July 2010, http://
www.parabolicarc.com/2010/07/13/india-find-itar-export-laws-bilateral-
space-launch-agreement/.
3. Stephen Di Franco, “What will it take to achieve IoT in India,” The Times
of India, 28 March 2016, http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech-
deck/what-it-will-take-to-achieve-iot-indian-style-a-unique-view-of-
industrial-iot/.
V
SPACE
SUSTAINABILITY
AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE
Space Debris Tracking: An Indian Perspective 295
22
Introduction
The number of catalogued space objects, as of the end of September
2016, is around 17,800, which includes both functional satellites and debris.
The total debris is roughly around 13,600.1 Around 1,500 of these objects
are in the Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO), and most of the remaining
are in the Low Earth Orbits (LEO). The term ‘catalogued’ implies that
these space objects are tracked, their orbits are determined, orbital elements
are continuously updated, and they are correlated to the original launch
and/or on-orbit break ups. These catalogues are maintained by the United
States and Russia, both of whom have all the technical capabilities for this
task. They provide the orbital elements data to the other countries free of
cost, in the general interest of reducing the space debris problem and to
implement the necessary mitigation measures.
The present global capability of tracking space debris is for objects
bigger than 1m in GEO, and bigger than 10 cm in LEO. This limitation
arises from the sizing and capability of ground tracking systems. The objects
in LEO are generally tracked by radars, and those in GEO are tracked by
optical telescopes. In the case of radars, a pulsed signal is transmitted
towards the object, and the reply pulse received is used to find the range,
and direction of the object. The amplitude, phase angle and the variations
of the reflected (reply) signal are used to infer the object’s size and other
characteristics. Both mechanically steered and the phased array radars are
used by different countries for space debris tracking. The received signal
296 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
Europe has a few high capability radars and optical telescopes, which
are used for tracking and monitoring space debris. A few simultaneous
tracking campaigns are carried out to track objects in LEO, and to compare
298 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
direction, and the small size debris flux passing through the beam are
counted and characterised. As the beam is in a fixed direction with respect
to Earth, the latter’s rotation scans 360 degrees in inertial space.
Radars with mechanically steered antennae, and phased array radars
are employed in tracking space debris. The phased array radars with beam
steering technology have additional advantage of tracking multiple objects
near simultaneously by time sharing. However, it is to be noted that so far
radars are used for tracking debris only in LEO.
Usually, the same radar is used for transmission and reception of the
pulses in time-shared mode. Sometimes, one radar is used as a transmission
system, and another radar, either co-located or far away, is used as the
receive system. Radars configured in this manner are called “Bi-static
Radar”. Bi-static radars have increased sensitivity, which can be used to
detect weaker signals.
In an excellent survey article on radars used for tracking space debris,
a few radars are verified technically for their potential to track small debris.5
Table 1 gives the details of those radars along with their important features.
These are by far the best radars deployed for tracking and monitoring
space debris in different frequency bands.
The AN/FPS-85, and Russian Don-2N are phased array radars. AN/
FPS-85 is the key sensor in the SSN and contributes significantly for tracking
and maintaining the space debris catalogue. It has 5,928 transmitting
300 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
If the combination range, radar’s frequency, and the size of the object
result in optical region, then the RCS is independent of the frequency, and
302 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
depends on the area offered by the target to the signal. Generally, such
simplified assumptions can be used in the sizing and design of the space
debris tracking radar.
The RCS data of the catalogued objects are available in the “Database
and Information System Characterising Objects in Space (DISCOS)”.
However, the DISCOS database has used the measurements in the UHF
frequency range, and the RCS over time can change due to the slow tumbling
of the debris in orbit. Such uncertainties are to be taken into account while
using the RCS data in interpreting the tracking data of other radars. The RCS
data obtained from Beam Parking Experiments (BPE) may contain incorrect
compensation of the angular offsets, and also due to short dwell times.
Optical Tracking
The visible light as reflected by the object is received by the optical telescopes
and the brightness of the reply depends on the size of the object, and the
Space Debris Tracking: An Indian Perspective 303
(iv) Refining the orbits (TLEs) of the catalogue using the freshly
determined orbit.
(v) Carrying out a close approach analysis for the operational satellites
of interest
(vi) Executing Collision Avoidance Manoeuvers for the satellites for which
the close approach of debris is critical.
The above process involves the development/use of many Models,
and refining them over time. The debris related work is a form of art,
which has to be acquired and refined with repeated work and experience.
satellites can easily be tracked, and their close approaches can be predicted.
The debris of size lower than 30cm x 30cm may be tracked and
characterised by tracking over a number of days and passes.
The primary mode of usage of MOTR is:
• Select the space objects passing very near to ISRO’s operational
satellites.
• Obtain the latest TLEs for those debris objects.
• Track the selected debris, and obtain tracking data over a few
passes.
• Use the tracking information to refine the debris’ orbit.
• Estimate close approach of the debris objects to the satellites.
Other modes of usage are:
• Search for any debris very near to the operational satellites - using
time dependent tracking vectors of the satellites and searching
around that position.
• Detect and track any debris unpredicted from the catalogues.
• Use the tracking information for close approach analysis.
Based on the requirements of multi object tracking, the final
specifications are detailed below.
Parameter Specifications
Frequency of operation: L Band (1.3 – 1.4 GHz)
RF bandwidth: 100 MHz approx
Maximum tracking range : 1000 km for 0.25 metre square
objects @ 10 dB S/N & 800 km
for 0.1 m2 objects
Size of Antenna: Rectangular planar array 6mx12m
Radiating elements: Micro strip patch (4608 elements)
Gain: 40 dB
Object tracking method: Mono pulse Scan and track:
Beam steering Beamwidth: Az: 1.1 deg& El: 2.1 deg
Scan angle: Az: ± 60 deg& El: ± 45 deg
Transmitter type: Solid state Peak power830 KW,
with 4608 T/R modules each with
200 W peak power
306 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
The following pictures show the installation process and other views.
Fig.6: The phased array antenna of MOTR on the positioner, with cooling pipes
interface.
Space Debris Tracking: An Indian Perspective 307
Acknowledgements
The author sincerely acknowledges all the authors of the original
research that has been cited in this paper, which are available in the public
domain. The material in the references is highly valuable and reflects the
efforts and experience of those authors in taking forward the field of
space debris. The support of Mr. C. Ravindranath, former chief of Library
and Documentation Services of SDSC – SHAR, in providing a lot of
technical articles to the author is sincerely acknowledged. The efforts of a
large number of engineers resulted in the realisation of MOTR in SDSC
– SHAR. The author acknowledges the support of all of them, and their
ready willingness to develop expertise in the tracking of space debris. The
author also acknowledges the information provided by Mr. J.A. Kamalakar,
former Director of LEOS Unit of ISRO on the status of optical tracking
systems. Finally, the author acknowledges the opportunity provided by
the editors of this book to translate years of work and experience into
this chapter.
REFERENCES:
1. Orbital Debris Quarterly News, NASA, Vol 20, Issue 4, October2016.
2. Space Surveillance Network, Lt Col Glen Shepherd, HQ AFSPC / A3CD
/Shared SSA Briefing.PPT. Accessed from Web.
3. Brian Weeden, “Space Surviellance and Stuational Awareness,”
Presentation, Secure World Foundation, www.secureworldfoundation.org.
Space Debris Tracking: An Indian Perspective 309
ENDNOTES
1. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Orbital Debris Quarterly
News 20 (4), (Washington, DC: NASA, 2016)
2. Space Surveillance Network, Lt Col Glen Shepherd, HQ AFSPC / A3CD
/Shared SSA Briefing.PPT
3. Brian Weeden, “Space Surviellance and Stuational Awareness,”
Presentation, Secure World Foundation, www.secureworldfoundation.org.
4. Ibid.
5. David W. Walsh, “A Survey of Radars Capable of Providing Small Debris
Measurements for Orbital Prediction,”Aerospace Engineering, Texas A&M
University, 2013http://aero.tamu.edu/sites/default/files/faculty/alfriend/
CTI2P/CT3%20S5.1%20Walsh.pdf
6. Radar Cross Section, www.microwaves101.com. Accessed from Web.
7. Apparent Magnitude, Article from Wikipedia, Accessed from Web.
8. Tim Flohrer and S. Frey, “Classification of Geosynchronous
Objects,”European Space Operations Centre, European Space Agency, Issue
18, June 3, 2016
9. T. Schildknecht et al.,”Optical observation of space debris in the
geostationary ring,” Proceedings of the Third European Conference on Space
Debris, ESA-SP 473 (1), 2001
10. M.Y.S. Prasad et. al., “Requirements of Indian Space Research
Organisation for a Multi Object Tracking Radar,” International Astronautical
Congress, 2010
310 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
23
Astro-propriation:
Investment Protections for
and from Space Mining
Operations
Daniel A Porras
Introduction
Imagine this scenario: In the cold vacuum of space, nearly 250,000,000
miles from Earth, a private-company probe sits on an asteroid. It has
deployed a high-tech drill into the asteroid, digging deep into the alien
surface. This giant rock has only ever been studied from a distance, and
no human has even come close to it. The probe is digging into the ground
and collecting valuable minerals, simultaneously sending priceless scientific
data back to researchers on Earth. Meanwhile, in a commercial control
centre in California, a technician is studying the readouts from the probe.
Everything looks the same as it has in the last few weeks of the mining
operation. Most importantly, the probe is functioning just as it was designed.
The billions of dollars and countless man-hours invested in this state-of-
the-art piece of equipment is paying off. The results are everything that
the engineers, technicians and, in particular, private investors could have
hoped for.
Suddenly, the technician notices something different in the readouts.
Something new. He looks and checks a different reading. This can’t be
right. He calls a colleague to take a look and confirm his suspicions. She is
also puzzled. “We should call the people upstairs,” she says, “This could
312 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
This paragraph authorises the US President to use the full force of his
office to facilitate space mining. As a matter of policy, enforcing the rights
of space miners will be a fundamental aspect for inviting investment.
Furthermore, the President is directed to submit a report to Congress
within 180 days that specifies what authorities will be needed to carry out
space mining in accordance with international US obligations (the deadline
for this report was 25 May 2016; no report was issued).12 This particular
provision will play a significant role in ensuring that the proposed US
regime is accepted by the international community.
Where does this leave our intrepid space mining investors? Going
back to our lonely asteroid probe and the team back on Earth, what are
their obligations and duties as envisaged by the Space Competitiveness
Act if they were to make a major scientific discovery like bacteria?
places like Mars where bacteria might exist. For guidance on how to prevent
such a catastrophe, the US will most likely look to existing regulations
under the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) and NASA’s Office
of Planetary Protection.
COSPAR
In 1958, there was an international meeting in London of COSPAR,
intended to promote scientific investigations in outer space as well as the
free exchange of data and information.16 This international organisation is
comprised of thousands of the world’s leading scientists as well as
representatives from 40 national institutions.17 Its reports and findings are
not legally binding, but they are often incorporated into domestic and
international legislation and policies, including the NASA Planetary Protection
Policy.18
COSPAR has worked significantly on the question of biological
contamination through space activities and, in accordance with Article IX
of the Outer Space Treaty, adopted its own policy on planetary
protection.19 This policy is intended to provide guidelines – which, as
mentioned, are not in and of themselves legally binding – that act as a
rubric for compliance with the Outer Space Treaty.20 It does so by offering
five distinct categories of missions for potential contact with extra-terrestrial
bacteria, each with increasingly stringent protections.21 These range from
missions to bodies with no interest “in the process of chemical evolution
or the origin of life” (which requires no protections) to missions that
involve landing on, and returning from celestial bodies that might contain
life.22 Protections for the higher categories include documentation and
implementing procedures, including:
• Having a microbial reduction plan
• Providing an organics inventory
• Sterilization or containment of contacting hardware
• Continual monitoring of project activities23
This presents an interesting range of obligations on space miners,
though not unexpected. Different missions to different classes of celestial
bodies will necessarily have their own requirements. For example, a mission
to an asteroid, which has no atmosphere and has a small chance of
318 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
Pre-existing rights
One of the benefits of the law is that it is a sword that cuts both ways:
where there are obligations, there are also rights. The Space Competitiveness
Act is no different. In seeking to give rise to a new stage in the space
economy, it must also provide certain legal assurances that will invite
investment. These rights will come from both national and international
sources. Interestingly, most of the rights and protections afforded to space
miners will come from domestic legislation. While other countries will
also be looking to be hubs for emerging space activities like mining, investors
may find that the US is still the most attractive “launching State” by virtue
of its domestic laws.
Returning to the hypothetical scenario, the question is what would
happen if a space mining company were to notify the US government
that they had positively identified biotic material on a celestial body. It
would not be beyond the imagination that the government would exercise
its powers to preserve and protect the specimens for further discovery. It
is also not beyond the imagination to think that the government would,
understandably, wish to exercise control over the mining operation. What
then are the space miners’ rights?
situation where a private citizen may have to bear a public burden that
should be borne by all.41 This right of the government extends not only to
real but also to private property.42
Eminent domain, or a taking, comes as either direct or indirect
condemnation.43 The former occurs when the government admits that it
has made a taking while the latter is when the government has made a
taking but denies that it is invoking eminent domain.44 Inverse
Condemnation can come in three forms: physical, regulatory or as an
exaction.45 As the first and last categories deal with real property, they are
not applicable to space miners. However, a “regulatory” taking occurs
when the value or usefulness of private property is essentially eliminated
because of a government regulation, even without physical occupation.46
In particular, this can occur when the regulation interferes with legitimate
investor expectations.47 For space miners, this means that should they
discover something of significant importance, and should the government
deem it necessary to suspend all activities in order to study the discovery,
they could argue that the US government has committed either a direct
condemnation or an indirect condemnation by way of taking and must,
by law, compensate the space miners.
But what would be the compensation? That will likely depend upon
the level of interference. For example, if a space mining probe were to
discover an artefact from the Apollo lander on the Moon, the US
government might require that the space mining probe retrieve the artefact,
but for “just compensation” for the retrieval and transport of the object
(which can be quantified). However, should a probe find bacteria on an
asteroid (and be capable of detecting it), it is not beyond the realm of
reason that the government might require the space mining activities to
cease altogether for fear of harming any specimens. What then would be
“just compensation”?
The Supreme Court has said that the purpose of the 5th Amendment
is to make the offended party whole, usually by paying fair-market value
or “what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller at the time”.48
Importantly, there are certain exceptions that the government does not
have to pay for, including incidentals (relocation costs, cost of
replacements), subjective losses (sentimental value) or future gains (or rather,
324 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
the Government does not owe the offended owner any future profits
once paid for).49 Importantly, there are some federal and state statutes in
the US that do offer, in some circumstances, compensation for incidentals,
but these are the exception, not the rule.50 Further, anticipated profits are
not included in the calculation of “just compensation”, only the value of
property or a contract at the time of the taking. 51
Where does this leave our space miners? Assuming the most protective
(and costly) measures are taken in our hypothetical, all space mining activities
are suspended by federal regulation in order to preserve any bacteria
discovered on the asteroid. The US Government would, therefore, have
to pay fair-market value for the equipment, though not for any anticipatory
profits that might have come from the mining operation. What about
incidentals? Will there be any compensation for the amount of time it will
take to rebuild and re-launch another probe?
It should be recalled at this point that, if nothing else, existing Outer
Space Law does support eminent domain in at least one case, and it applies
to our artefact hypothetical. If a space mining company were to alert the
US government that it had discovered, say, a Chinese probe, the US
government would be under an obligation to alert China. China could
then request that the space mining company either return or hold the object
until the launching authorities could retrieve the object. If the Chinese
were to request that the probe be returned, the costs would be borne by
the Chinese Government. The space mining company would, therefore,
be made whole.
Intellectual Property
While international intellectual property law has not yet developed, the US
has built some protections into its legislation to encourage commercial
activities in space: the Patents in Space Act of 1990. Typically, intellectual
property and patent law is subject to territorial rules; this does not change
just because the object is in space.52 The Patents in Space Act states that
any invention “made, used or sold” in space that was under US jurisdiction
remains under US jurisdiction unless specified by an international agreement
to which the US is a party.53 This means that anything that would be
governed by US patent law on Earth would still be subject thereto even if
Astro-propriation: Investment Protections for and from Space Mining Operations 325
it has physically left the territory. And any US citizens who invented anything
in space would be entitled to the full protections and remedies embodied
in the US Code on Patents, including injunctions and damages.54
It is here that one can see interesting applications of legal concepts.
Under 35 USC §101, both living and inanimate “things” can be patented,
provided that they are not the product of nature but of human-made
invention.55 Even without the application of the Space Competitiveness
Act, under US law, a party would not be able to put a patent on a newly
discovered strand of bacteria or a mineral compound “created wholly by
nature unassisted by man”.56 The exclusion of “biotic” material from the
Space Competitiveness Act is, in fact, superfluous. However, what is capable
of being patented is any invention or development that takes place in
space. For example, if a space mining company were to discover a new
mineral on an asteroid, they could not patent the mineral itself; however,
if they were able to significantly change the physical properties of that
mineral and create a wholly new material, both the process and the product
could be protected under US patent law. While the space mining company
might be obliged to share data with the rest of the world regarding the
discovery of any naturally occurring phenomenon in space, its obligations
would be limited by existing domestic patent protections.
Recommendations
Having surveyed both the Space Competitiveness Act and the major
applicable legal frameworks, we can now better describe the parameters
within which space mining activities will likely take place and what regulations
will apply in the event that there is a major scientific discovery. What kinds
of regulations could be put in place to ensure the goals espoused by the
Space Competitiveness Act are reached?
Discovery of bacteria
The level of responsibilities and obligations on space miners in relation to
the discovery of space bacteria will most likely depend entirely on the
destination of the mining mission. In order to make sure that space miners
are not over-burdened by technical requirements, it is highly probable that
the US Government will adopt policies similar to those contained in the
326 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
NASA Planetary Protection Policy, not least of all because they comply
with COSPAR recommendations and international law. This way, space
mining missions bound for Category I destinations - namely those that are
highly unlikely to have any type of biotic material on them, like asteroids -
will not be burdened with the costs of contamination prevention. In this
context, it is unlikely that space miners will be required to carry out any
type of detection sensitive to the presence of bacteria. Should our space
miners be on an asteroid, they would be under no obligation to even be
testing for bacteria. However, if the mission were bound for Mars or
another Category V body, it is highly likely that space miners would be
required to include equipment capable of detecting life. If the mining
regulations are in line with the current Planetary Protection Policies, these
missions would also have to be continually supervised.
In this context, given that the space miners represent unique
opportunities for the gathering of scientific data, it would be useful for a
partnership to be developed between commercial space miners and NASA.
For those missions bound for Category V bodies, the government could
require the presence of a planetary protection officer, a requirement not
inconsistent with current planetary exploration policies. This officer could
also be in charge of collecting data to be transmitted to federal authorities.
These authorities would then be responsible for determining what data
will be forwarded to the international community, in compliance with
international law. This information will, however, be limited by national
interests such as export controls or national security concerns. This is not
inconsistent with how exploration is carried out today.
If the space miners were to alert the government about the discovery
of bacteria, then it is likely that the government would seek to preserve
and observe the specimens to the best of their abilities. If this entails any
interference with space mining activities, the company would be able to
press the government for just compensation. However, it is unclear what
this compensation would entail. Would it cover the cost of the space asset
itself ? Would the government rent the asset to conduct its own studies?
Would it cover any incidentals such as the time it would take to launch a
replacement mission? For the time being, this will not be of too much
concern to companies like Planetary Resources and Moon Express, their
Astro-propriation: Investment Protections for and from Space Mining Operations 327
Discovery of an artefact
As mentioned above, ownership does not change just because an object
has been launched into space. Likewise, there is no concept of
abandonment, and so it does not matter how long an object has been in
space, it still belongs to the party that left it behind. If a space mining
operation were to discover an artefact, it would not be able to claim it,
but it also would not be under any obligation, under current laws, to
report their findings to any authority. Nor would they want to since, if
they alerted the launching authority of the object, they could be obliged to
328 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
return the object should they be asked. Even if the launching authority
bears these costs, it could still prove to be of significant inconvenience to
a space mining company, potentially even putting them at a competitive
disadvantage.
In order to pass on the protections that were intended to be found in
the Rescue Agreement to both US space mining companies and space
actors from other States, the US should include in its licensing requirements
regular reporting of space objects found in space. In this way, the US
Government can both inform the relevant launching authority that its object
has been found and it can ensure that any requests stemming from the
launching authority are “practicable” for the space mining company. This
policy would be in line with the aims of the Space Competitiveness Act
by removing the possibility of harmful interference by way of enforcement
of rights under the Rescue Agreement.
Conclusion
What happens then to the hypothetical asteroid probe, far away from
Earth? Under current legislation, the investors of the probe are under no
legal obligations to announce their discovery to anyone beyond the licensing
authorities, which have also not yet been established. Since the asteroid is a
Category I body, the US government will likely require very little data or
information beyond basic technical details of their operation, but nothing
currently requires that biological readings even be taken. However, once
they have established that bacteria has been found, the space miners will
likely be bound by domestic law to disclose this information to the US
government. If they do not, they could be found liable for contravening
far-reaching regulations such as NEPA. Once notified, should the
government go on to interfere with the space mining operation, the investors
will, at the very least, receive some type of compensation, though the
extent of this is still unclear. The same would be the case if they found a
new mineral compound or an artefact.
Looking over this result, one can see that mining activities will not, in
fact, be so different from activities here on Earth. The US laws that exist
are already largely capable of balancing the needs of investors with the
rights of humankind in celestial bodies. However, in order to ensure that
Astro-propriation: Investment Protections for and from Space Mining Operations 329
space miners know their limits and are able to plan accordingly, the US
government should quickly seek to establish the following. First, the US
government needs to authorise a regulatory body for the supervision of
space mining operations. Second, the US government needs to incorporate
contamination policies like those of COSPAR or the Planetary Protection
Policy into its licensing framework, making sure to include NEPA
requirements so that space mining companies can address all environmental
issues in a single request. Third, the US government should include a
notification requirement for findings of scientific value, including a provision
that ensures space miners will only have to return space objects when it is
“practicable”. And finally, within those policies, the US government should
provide some guidance on those situations that might call for government
interference in an operation, particularly where specimens of scientific
value might be discovered. By doing so, the government will afford space
mining companies a chance to prepare themselves for the risk of uncovering
monumental scientific evidence, whether it be through technical or financial
planning. Providing this legally certainty will play a critical role in meeting
the principal aims of the Space Competitiveness Act: namely to “facilitate
a pro-growth environment for the developing commercial space industry
by encouraging private sector investment and creating more stable and
predictable regulatory conditions.”
Yet perhaps the most important benefit that might result from adopting
these recommendations might not have anything to do with outer space
but, rather, with relations here on Earth. The Space Competitiveness Act
has caused a tremendous stir around the world, partly because it signals an
unsettling new era in human existence. Much like our ancestors, humans
are gradually leaving familiar shores and heading off towards the unknown.
This prospect makes many people uncomfortable, particularly those that
cannot yet make such a journey. The US should seek to make commercial
space mining activities as transparent as possible in order to further its case
at the international level.
ENDNOTES
1. Title IV of An Act to facilitate a pro-growth environment for the developing
commercial space industry by encouraging private sector investment and creating
more stable and predictable regulatory conditions, and for other purposes, H.R.2262,
330 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
45. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
46. Hotel and Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 965
(9th Cir. 2003).
47. Cinega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
48. Wyman, Katrina Miriam, “The Measure of Just Compensation”, UC
Davis Law Review, Vol.41, Npo.1, p. 252, citing: United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) and United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913).
49. Wyman, Katrina Miriam, “The Measure of Just Compensation”, UC
Davis Law Review, Vol.41, Npo.1, p. 255.
50. Wyman, Katrina Miriam, “The Measure of Just Compensation”, UC
Davis Law Review, Vol.41, Npo.1, p. 255
51. De Laval Steam Turbine Co. v. United States 284 U.S. 61, p.70 (1931).
52. Lyall, Francis and Paul Larsen, “Space Law: A Treatise”, Ashgate
Publishing, 2012, p 124.
53. 35 USC §105 – Inventions in Outer Space.
54. 35 USC Part III – Patents and Protection of Patent Rights
55. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 206 USPQ 193 (1980), noting
that, “Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not
between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature,
whether living or not, and human made inventions.”
56. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 206 USPQ 193 (1980).
Sustainability, Security and Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 335
24
Introduction
In the 20th century, the exploration and use of outer space were largely the
provenance of a few governments and government-funded agencies.
Today, these activities are carried out by an increasing number of emerging
spacefaring nations and non-governmental actors.
The increase in actors in outer space has accompanied advancements
in science and technology, such as the development of small satellites,
mega constellations, on-orbit servicing, and new commercial launch services
that are easing access to space and broadening the scope of space
applications. The diversification and growth of new actors and new activities
in outer space – particularly commercial actors – raises new concerns
over the sustainability of outer space activities.1
Companies in the US are pushing the envelope in space applications.
For instance, SpaceX announced plans to launch a constellation of more
than 4,000 satellites into orbit.2 Planetary Resources and Deep Space
Industries are actively pursuing new applications, specifically the exploitation
of outer space resources.3
Although the US currently is the epicenter of commercial space
activities, the forces of globalisation are changing this landscape.
Notwithstanding efforts of US launch companies to enforce a ban on the
use of Indian launch services,4 the Indian Space Research Organisation
(ISRO) has been regularly launching payloads of US commercial satellite
336 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
Revisiting Article VI
Because Article VI is a key provision of the Outer Space Treaty for ensuring
the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, and efforts at
sustainability are now overlapping with efforts to bring about international
security in outer space activities, it is an auspicious time to reexamine Article
VI vis-à-vis provisions affecting non-governmental actors carrying on
activities in outer space.
342 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
are primary obligations, the breach of which could give rise to international
responsibility under the secondary rules described above.67
Authorisation is fairly straightforward – the obligation has been
implemented through domestic legal regimes that typically require a licence
or permit prior to the conduct of space activities by a non-governmental
entity.68 Various interpretations have been put forth as to which State is the
‘appropriate State Party’ to authorise an activity.69 Nevertheless, the obligation
has been successfully implemented by many States.
The concept of ‘continuing supervision’ is less straightforward.70 It
raises questions of duration. For instance, how long must an activity be
supervised? It also raises questions of the extent of supervision – how
closely must activities be supervised? What would the obligation mean, for
instance, where a change in circumstances causes a national activity to deviate
significantly from the activity authorised?
A statement delivered on behalf of the US Department of State at the
11 Galloway Symposium described the US interpretation of the phrase
th
‘continuing supervision’.71 This was the first official statement on the Outer
Space Treaty by a US State Department Legal Advisor in more than 30
years.72
In the statement, the Legal Adviser mused, “What does it mean for a
State to supervise non-governmental activities in outer space? What space
activities must States supervise?” His response was somewhat circular:
“The meaning of the term “continuing supervision” in the second
sentence of Article VI can be found in the first sentence, which
creates the obligation to ensure conformity of all national activities,
whether governmental or non-governmental, with the Treaty. The
supervision required for any given activity will depend on the
provisions of the Treaty it implicates. “Continuing supervision”
means a legal link between government and operator sufficient
to ensure the activity is carried out in conformity with the Treaty.”73
It was further explained that under this interpretation, the US employs a
fact-specific, two-part enquiry that examines, first, which provisions of the
Outer Space Treaty are potentially implicated by the proposed activity, and
second, whether the applicable governmental oversight arrangements are
Sustainability, Security and Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 345
Conclusion
Article VI obligations of authorisation and continuing supervision require
the implementation of international laws on the exploration and use of
outer space. Authorisation and supervision entail the development of
domestic laws, regulations and policies on outer space activities carried on
by non-governmental entities.
Thus, Article VI serves as a lynchpin between international obligations
and domestic laws, regulations and policies for the use and exploration of
outer space. It tethers private, commercial actors to the international laws
that govern the exploration and use of outer space.78 As India continues to
privatise commercial launch services and as new commercial actors in India
continue to develop space applications, India must enact laws and regulations
to meet its Article VI obligations.
State responsibility for non-governmental activities incentivises the
progressive development of international law pertaining to outer space
activities. This includes the creation of non-binding instruments.
It should go without saying that non-binding international instruments
have profound effects on non-governmental, particularly commercial, space
actors. One need look only to export controls for an illustration of this
phenomenon.79
Non-binding instruments guide government agencies in the
interpretation of international obligations and the proper adherence to
international norms. Government agencies, in turn, affect the conduct of
private actors by promulgating regulations, by supervising private actors,
and by setting the terms of contracts for the purchase of goods and
services from private actors. ISRO, as an agent of the Indian government,
must consider non-binding legal norms as it privatises launch services and
as it contracts with commercial providers of space applications.
Sustainability, Security and Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 347
space become more clear, States should consider drafting a binding legal
instrument that further elaborates the Article VI obligations of authorisation
and continuing supervision. This proposition is in keeping with the theories
of McDougal and Lipson, who also favored “a series of agreements,
gradually arrived at, on particular subjects” and noted that some of these
agreements may arise from “consensus achieved by the gradual accretion
of custom from repeated instances of mutual toleration.”83
Should non-binding international instruments and state practice lead
to consensus that Article VI does not cover fully non-governmental activities
in outer space, the time will be ripe for a new treaty. Regardless of whether
or not States come to this conclusion, India should formulate laws and
policies implementing its Article VI obligations.
ENDNOTES
1. As of 2013, more than 1000 operational satellites in orbit around the
Earth were owned or operated by more than 60 States, government
consortiums, universities, and private corporations. (See, “Group of
Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building
Measures in Outer Space Activities,” Note by the UN Secretary General,
UNGA 68th Sess, UN Doc A/68/189* (29 July 2013)). As of mid-
2016, that number exceeded 1400 operational satellites. (See, “USC
Satellite Database” Union of Concerned Scientists (30 June 2016) online:
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-
database#.WFmdylcxXzI). These numbers do not include space debris,
of which there are approximately 17,729 objects being tracked. (See,
Orbital Debris Quarterly News, NASA (July 2016) at 8, online: https:/
/orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/quarterly-news/pdfs/odqnv20i3.pdf).
Estimates of objects in orbit that are too small to be tracked range
wildly but are on the order of 500,000 objects.
2. Avery Thompson, “SpaceX Wants to Launch Over 4,000 Satellites Into
Orbit” Popular Mechanics (17 November 2016) online: http://
www.popularmechanics.com/space/satellites/a23937/spacex-launch-
4425-satellites/
3. See, respectively: Planetary Resources, online: http://
www.planetaryresources.com/#home-intro; and Deep Space Industries,
online: http://deepspaceindustries.com
4. Peter B. de Selding, “U.S. launch companies lobby to maintain ban on
use of Indian rockets” Space News (29 March 2016) online: http://
Sustainability, Security and Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 349
spacenews.com/u-s-space-transport-companies-lobby-to-maintain-ban-on-
use-of-indian-rockets/
5. “Indian to launch 103 satellites in record single mission” Physics.org (4
January 2017) online: http://phys.org/news/2017-01-india-satellites-
mission.html
6. Jeff Foust, “India to hand over PSLV operations to private sector”
Space News (15 February 2016) online: http://spacenews.com/india-
to-hand-over-pslv-operations-to-private-sector/
7. Caleb Henry, “CNES supplying cameras to Indian X Prize team, talks
reusability with ISRO” Space News (10 January 2017) online: http://
spacenews.com/cnes-supplying-cameras-to-indian-x-prize-team-talks-
reusability-with-isro/
8. Paul Stephen Dempsey, “National Laws Governing Commercial Space
Activities: Legislation, Regulation, & Enforcement” (2016) 36(1) Nw J
Int’l L & Bus 1, 17 (fn. 74), 28, 42, 43.
9. Eilene Galloway, “Applicability of Space Treaties to the Uses of Outer
Space” (1976) 1 Annals of Air and Space Law 205, 207.
10. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched in
Outer Space (opened for signature on 22 April 1968) 672 UNTS 119
11. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
(opened for signature on 29 March 1972) 961 UNTS 187
12. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (opened for
signature on 14 January 1975) 1023 UNTS 15; See also, International co-
operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, UNGA Resolution 1721 (XVI)
(20 December 1961).
13. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (opened for signature on 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3
14. Some scholars identify the Liability and Registration Conventions as
developing Article VI. (See, e.g.: Ronald L. Spencer, Jr., “International
Space Law: A Basis for National Regulation” in Ram Jakhu (ed.), National
Regulation of Space Activities (London: Springer, 2010) 1, 12-21; Accord, I.
Marboe & F. Hafner, “Brief Overview over National Authorization
Mechanisms in Implementation of UN International Space Treaties” in
Frans G. von der Dunk (ed.) National Space Legislation in Europe (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 29, 31 at fn 9.) The preamble to the Registration
Convention expressly recalls that States shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space. The Liability
Convention does not. For reasons described in Part 3.1, infra, on the
meaning of international responsibility under Article VI, it is posited
that the Liability Convention does not serve to develop Article VI.
350 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
15. See, e.g.: Application of the concept of the ‘Launching State’, UNGA Resolution
59/115, UN Doc A/Res/59/115 (10 December 2004); Recommendations
on enhancing the practice of States and international intergovernmental organizations
in registering space objects, UNGA Resolution 62/101, UN Doc A/Res/
62/101 (17 December 2007); Recommendations on national legislation relevant
to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, UNGA Resolution 68/74,
UN Doc A/Res/68/74 (11 December 2013).
16. See, e.g.: Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting, UNGA Resolution 37/92 (10
December 1982); Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from
Outer Space, UNGA Resolution 41/65 (3 December 1986); Principles
Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, UNGA Resolution
47/68 (14 December 1992); “UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space” UN Office of
Outer Space Affairs (2010) online: http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/
publications/st_space_49E.pdf (Adopted by the UN General Assembly
in 2007. See, International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, UN
General Assembly Resolution 62/217*, UN Doc A/Res/62/217* (22
December 2007)).
17. Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg Before the Committee
on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, on the Outer Space Treaty at 148 (U.
Mississippi, National Center for Remote Sensing, Air and Space Law,
online: http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/library/space/US/Legislative/
Congress/90/Senate/hearings/Outer%20Space%20Treaty%20
Hearings.pdf (Stating at page 22: “This would be – article IV is the key
provision of the treaty…. This is the arms control provision of the
treaty.”)
18. Moon Agreement, supra, note 13 at Article 3(2) (prohibiting “any threat
or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of hostile act on the
Moon”); See also, Peter Jankowitsch, “The background and history of
space law” in Frans von der Dunk and Fabio Tronchetti, eds. Handbook
of Space Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2015) 1,
15.
19. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, UNGA Resolution
1472 (XIV) (12 December 1959).
20. Resolution Adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
Tenth Special Session, General Assembly – Tenth Special Session, UNGA
Doc A/S-10/2 (30 June 1978) at para. 80
21. Id. at para. 118 (Stating, also, that the Disarmament Commission is the
successor to a committee of the same name established under the U.N.
Security Council by General Assembly Resolution A/Res/502(VI) of
Sustainability, Security and Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 351
1952.)
22. Jankowitsch, supra, note 18 at 18.
23. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN General
Assembly, Official Records of the 35th Sess., Supplement No. 20, UNGA
Doc A/35/20 (1980) at para. 57.
24. The United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (UNISPACE) are a series of conferences of the heads
of States, arranged by COPUOS pursuant to its mandate to continue
with the scientific cooperative program established as the International
Geophysical Year. (See, UNGA Resolution 1472 (XIV), supra, note 19).
All UNISPACE have been held in Vienna: the first in 1968 (Report of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN General Assembly
Resolution A/7285 (1968)); the second UNISPACE82 fourteen years
later (Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN General Assembly Doc. A.CONF.101/
10 (1982)); and UNISPACEIII in 1999 (Report of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN General
Assembly Doc. A/CONF.184/6 (1999)).
25. UNISPACE82 Report, supra, note 24 at para 14.
26. In 1981, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the
CD to take up the issue of PAROS (See, UNGA Doc. A/Res/A/36/
97C (1981)). The following year, PAROS was inserted as an item on the
agenda of the CD. (See: Fabio Tronchetti, “Developing a European-
Chinese/Russian Approach to the Issue of Non Weaponization of Outer
Space: A Feasible Goal?” 53 Proc. Int. Inst. Space L. 191, 195).
27. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGA, Official
Records of the 39th Sess., Supplement No. 20, UNGA Doc A/39/20
(1984).
28. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGA, Official
Records of the 40th Sess., Supplement No. 20, UNGA Doc A/40/20
(1985).
29. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNGA, Official
Records of the 71th Sess., Supplement No. 20, UNGA Doc A/71/20
(2016).
30. See, e.g.: Jankowitsch, supra, note 18 at 18-19 (Stating, “[The Committee],
while inhibited by its mandate from taking up matters of arms control
in outer space and putting them on the agenda, thus became one of the
main fora for the expression of international movements of concern
on developments threatening the uses of outer space for peaceful
purposes.”)
352 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
37. 2013 GGE Report, supra, note1 at para. 6 (Stating, “The result of the
increase in space actors and space users is that the space environment,
especially key Earth orbits, has become increasingly utilized over the
past few decades. As a consequence, the outer space environment is
becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive. In the
context of international peace and security, there is growing concern
that threats to vital space capabilities may increase during the next decade
as a result of both natural and man-made hazards and the possible
development of disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities.”)
38. Id. at para. 7.
39. Id. at para. 8 (Stating, “…States are ultimately responsible for the
authorization and continuing supervision of all space activities under
their jurisdiction.)
40. Id. at para. 9.
41. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, UNGA Resolution
70/82, UN Doc A/Res/70/82 (9 December 2015) at para. 13.
42. Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, UNGA
Resolution 70/82, UN Doc A/Res/70/53 (7 December 2015);
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, UNGA
Resolution 69/38, UN Doc A/Res/69/38 (2 December 2014);
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, UNGA
Resolution 68/50, UN Doc A/Res/68/50 (5 December 2013).
43. 2013 GGE Report, supra, note 1 at para. 66; OOSA and ODA serve as
the secretariats to COPUOS and CD, respectively.
44. “Contribution of space law and policy to space governance and space
security in the twenty-first century” Report on the United Nations Workshop
on Space Law UNGA Doc A/AC.105/1131.
45. Id. at para. 50(d).
46. Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its fifty-fourth session, UN Doc A/AC.105/
1090 (30 April 2015).
47. 2016 COPUOS Report, supra, note 29.
48. Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its fifty-fifth session, UN Doc A/AC.105/
1113 (27 April 2016).
49. 2016 COPUOS Report, supra, note 29 at Annex, 55.
50. For an overview of the formulation of the Long-tern Sustainability
Guidelines and the set up of the Working Group, see: Christopher
Johnson, “The UN COPUOS Guidelines on the Long-Term Sustainability
of Outer Space Activities” Secure World Foundation (December 2014)
online: https://swfound.org/media/189048/swf_un_copuos_lts_
354 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
guidelines_fact_sheet_december_2014.pdf
51. 2013 GGE Report, supra, note 1 at para. 13 (Stating, “These guidelines
will have characteristics similar to those of transparency and confidence-
building measures; some of them could be considered as potential
transparency and confidence-building measures, while others could
provide the technical basis for the implementation of certain transparency
and confidence-building measures proposed by this Group of
Governmental Experts.”)
52. 2016 COPUOS Report, supra, note 1 at Annex, 56.
53. Id. at 58.
54. “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts” UNGA
Resolution 65/63, UN Doc A/Res/56/83 (2001) (The UN International
Law Commission (ILC) finalized the text of the draft ARS in 2001. The
UN General Assembly took note of the draft ARS and commended
them to the attention of Governments during its Fifty-sixth session.)
55. The rules are described as ‘secondary’ in order to differentiate them
from primary rules. For instance, Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty
creates an obligation not to place in orbit around the Earth nuclear
weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. A breach of
Article IV would be an internationally wrongful act that gives rise to new
international legal relations that are additional to those which existed
before the breach. (See, Commentaries to the draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for internationally wrongful acts, UNGA ILC, 53rd Sess, A/56/10/
chp.IV.E.2/Sup.No.10 (2001) at 65).
56. Compensation owed under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and
the Liability Convention should be differentiated from the duty to pay
compensation that might arise arises out of Article VI and the secondary
rules of State responsibility. (See, generally, Frans von der Dunk, “Liability
Versus Responsibility in Space Law: Misconception or Misconstruction?”
(1991) 34 Proc Colloq L of Outer Space 363.) The former is a primary
obligation to provide compensation for the consequences of acts, which
are not unlawful. (See, James Crawford & Ian Brownlie, Brownlie’s Principles
of Public International Law, 8th Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), stating at 561: “[T]he sole example unanimously accepted as
creating a liability framework for an act that is completely lawful under
international law is contained in the 1972 Liability Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.”)) The
latter is a type of reparation sometimes owed as a consequence of an
unlawful act, such as the breach of an international obligation. (Crawford
& Brownlie at 567).
57. ARS, supra, note 54 at Article 2.
Sustainability, Security and Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 355
Imgard Marboe, “National Space Law” in Frans von der Dunk and
Fabio Tronchetti, eds. Handbook of Space Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2015) 127.
69. Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, “The Term ‘Appropriate State’ in International
Space Law” (1994) 37 Proc Colloq L Outer Space 77 (Illustrating several
interpretations of the term ‘appropriate state’, most of which support a
definition that includes more than one State as appropriate under the
terms of Article VI).
70. On state supervision generally, see, Ronald L. Spencer, Jr., “State
Supervision of Space Activity” (2009) 63 Air Force L R 75.
71. Brian J. Egan, “The Next Fifty Years of the Outer Space Treaty”
Statement of US Department of State delivered at the 11th Annual
Galloway Symposium on Critical Issues in Space Law (7 December
2016), online: http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264963.htm
[hereinafter, “Statement of the US State Department”]. Since the
inauguration of Donald J. Trump on 20 January 2017, this statement
has been removed from the US Department of State’s website. It can
still be found using the internet archive, Wayback Machine, online: https:/
/web.archive.org/web/20170101155011/https://www.state.gov/s/l/
releases/remarks/264963.htm
72. Marcia Smith, “State Department Legal Advisor: The Outer Space Treaty
– 50 Years On” Space Policy Online (14 December 2016) online: http:/
/www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/the-outer-space-treaty-50-years-on
73. Statement of the U.S. Department of State, supra, note 71.
74. A payload review is prerequisite for the issuance of a launch license by
the FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation. Payload reviews
are required by U.S. statute (51 USC § 50904). Under U.S. Federal
Regulations (14 CFR § 415.23), interagency consultations between the
FAA, Departments of Defense and State and other Federal agencies,
such as NASA, are required before a launch license will be issued. Under
14 CFR § 415.23, the Department of State must determine whether a
license application presents any issues affecting foreign policy or
international obligations.
75. On 20 July 2016, the FAA issued a favorable payload determination for
the Moon Express MX-1E mission. See: “Fact Sheet – Moon Express
Payload Review Determination” FAA Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (Press Release, 3 August 2016) online: https://
www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=20595
76. The Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), part of the International
Council of Science, has formulated a Planetary Protection Policy that is
implemented through national space agency policies and procedures,
Sustainability, Security and Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 357
25
Space Security,
Sustainability, and Global
Governance: India-Japan
Collaboration in Outer Space
Yasushi Horikawa
Introduction
Since the world’s first satellite was launched in 1957, many countries
have been involved in the development and utilisation of outer space.
Space science and technology and their applications, such as satellite
communications, Earth observation systems and satellite navigation
technologies, provide indispensable tools for achieving viable long-term
solutions for sustainable development. Active space development and
its application can contribute effectively to promoting global
development, improving people’s lives, conserving natural resources,
and enhancing preparedness for natural disasters and mitigating their
impacts. Further, efforts are being made to address threats to space
security, since the protection of the space environment is crucial to those
applications. This paper addresses these issues in the context of India
and Japan’s partnership.
Sustainable Development
The benefits of space activities are of a global nature. There is no doubt
that satellites provide significant and unique benefits to Earth’s inhabitants.
Space capabilities are utilised for the sake of the whole world, to develop
repeatable measurements, revisit capability, long-time series of data, and
360 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
Space Governance
Various satellites are operated to serve for science and technology
development and their applications, manned and unmanned space
exploration, and security and military use. The limited nature of space
resources will require some governance strategies to promote equitable
access for all, while ensuring the efficient and effective use of space.
The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS) is the highest international forum for political, scientific,
technical and legal debates connected with space. It is the exclusive platform
in the area of peaceful uses of outer space, for negotiations, elaboration
and promotion of important international treaties, agreements, UN
resolutions and guidelines for all member states. For more than half a
century now, UNCOPUOS has worked to resolve complex issues that
have influenced space activities of many states around the world while
simultaneously maintaining the principle of consensus in its decisionmaking
process. UNCOPUOS has also been at the center of humankind’s efforts
to peacefully explore and utilise the outer space environment with the
objective of bringing the benefits of space science and technology and
their applications to contribute to the social development of all countries.
In this connection, UNCOPUOS has been instrumental in the development
of five UN treaties on outer space, with the Outer Space Treaty establishing
362 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
the fundamental principles of international space law, and ten sets of legal
principles and declarations on outer space activities.
There have been active discussions for several years in addressing the
increasing involvement of private actors in the exploration and use of
outer space. Ongoing are discussions on national legislation relevant to the
peaceful exploration and use outer space. It will continue to be important
to reflect and review the implementation of international obligations and
the way in which States can best act and cooperate for the safe, peaceful
and sustainable use of outer space, particularly in view of the increased
private sector involvement.
During this author’s term as UNCOPUOS chair, three key main ideas
were proposed related to space research and utilisation in response to the
50th Anniversary of the UNCOPUOS in 2011: a) to promote the role of
UNCOPUOS and its Subcommittees as a unique platform at the global
level for international cooperation in space research and long-term space
utilisation; b) to promote greater dialogue between UNCOPUOS and
regional and inter-regional cooperation mechanisms in space activities for
the benefit of global development; and c) to strengthen the relevance of
space science and technology and their applications in meeting the outcomes
of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development.
These should be pursued for a governance of space activities for future
generations. In recent years, the number of space actors—including
developing countries, private sectors and even universities—has been rapidly
increasing. It is noteworthy that some space actors are not in compliance
with the provisions of UN treaties as well as their registration and liability
obligations. States should authorise and supervise their activities. Specifically,
looking at the recent trend in space activities, small satellites for educational
purposes that are rather cost-effective and easy to manufacture should not
be encouraged unless they comply with the guidelines on space debris
prevention. Further, a significant number of pico-satellites and chip-type
satellites in planning should be carefully examined in light of the question
related to the sustainability of outer space activities.
There is no doubt that dynamism of commercialisation and privatisation
of outer space is becoming more prevalent across the world. Space activities
are getting increasingly closer to people’s daily lives and vitalising national
Space Security, Sustainability, and Global Governance 363
UNISPACE+50 in 2018
The first UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space or UNISPACE-I was held in Vienna in August 1968. This Conference
served as an important platform for the exchange of information and
consultation in the field of practical application of space technology, and
as an impetus for considering the establishment of fellowship and technical
assistance in support of national efforts to develop space activities, taking
into account the needs of developing countries. The second such conference
(UNISPACE-II) was held in Vienna in August 1982. This conference
discussed the use of space science and technology and their applications
for economic and social benefits as well as the development of international
cooperative programs. Several other important issues were discussed, such
as the allocation of the geostationary orbit, direct broadcasting by satellites,
and remote sensing. The third conference (UNISPACE-III), held in Vienna
in July 1999, expanded the notion of ‘international cooperation’ by looking
into how space can help humankind in tackling global problems, from
protecting the Earth’s environment and managing its resources to using
space applications for human security, development and welfare.
The year 2018 will mark the 50th year since UNISPACE-I, providing
an excellent opportunity to review all the contributions of the three
UNISPACE conferences to global space governance. It is also a timely
opportunity to consider the current status and chart the future role of the
UNCOPUOS at this present time when space actors, both governmental
and non-governmental, are increasingly getting involved in ventures to
explore space and carry out space activities. The planned anniversary event
is being called UNISPACE+50.
The interrelationship between major spacefaring nations and emerging
space nations as well as the dialogue between them relating to increased
international cooperation and capacity-building efforts for the benefit of
364 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
developing countries, have laid the groundwork for success over the years.
The space agenda is evolving and becoming more complex, in particular,
due to the broader concept of space security and the expanding commercial
space sector. The development of international mechanisms such as
guidelines, codes and other confidence-building measures are reflective
of this new environment.
The SDGs have set targets for stronger space governance and
supporting structures at all levels, including improved spatial data
infrastructure. The outcomes or recommendations of the third UN World
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, held in Sendai, Japan, in March
2015 and the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change conducted in 2016 will be
incorporated in the discussion at UNISPACE +50 as well. The 2016
UNCOPUOS meeting decided that the following thematic priorities be
considered toward UNISPACE + 50.
1. Global partnership in space exploration and innovation
2. Legal regime of outer space and global space governance: current
and future perspectives
3. Enhanced information exchange on space objects and events
4. International framework for space weather services
5. Strengthened space cooperation for global health
6. International cooperation towards low-emission and resilient
societies
7. Capacity-building for the 21stcentury
These themes should be seriously examined for effective use of outer
space for future generations. Individual states, and non-governmental
organisations such as the academia and private sectors are also expected
to be involved in this activity.
International Cooperation
It is widely recognised that international cooperation, an indispensable
principle from the very beginning of the space age, has garnered tremendous
Space Security, Sustainability, and Global Governance 367
success in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. In
its early stage, international cooperation was unilateral, facilitating the transfer
of expertise and technology from advanced spacefaring nations to emerging
space actors. Over time, bilateral or multilateral cooperation has been
promoted for mutual benefits and roles/missions sharing between or among
the involved organisations or states, as successfully envisioned in the
construction and operation of the International Space Station (ISS) Program.
Space utilisation activities should be conducted focusing on resolving
the issues of humankind through international cooperation. International
cooperation which pursues compatibility and inter-operability can also
provide transparency to users. For example, in the field of application
satellite, the continued utilisation of satellites for the improvement of
people’s daily lives is essential, in addition to technological advancement.
These goals can be achieved through international cooperation.
Today, with an increasing number of space actors, the international
community is provided with a worthy occasion to consider each other’s
future activities and roles. What is becoming increasingly important is to
reassess the significance of international cooperation and its future perspectives
based on the past and present situations of space research and utilisation for
peaceful purposes. Further, recent cooperation calls for transparency and
confidence building measures and demands to share viable information to
achieve safe, stable, secured and sustainable space activities. Concrete steps
should be taken to open the door for a new era of international cooperation
and international harmonisation. Of course, conventional international
cooperation as well as capacity building for developing countries must be
continued to achieve significant benefits from space for the future. East-
West or North-South cooperation and bilateral or multilateral cooperation
must also be pursued. Ultimately, UN-level cooperation to secure space
traffic management is also necessary to sustain future peaceful use of outer
space, since outer space is a limited resource. In order to establish such a
mechanism, bilateral and regional cooperation through regional platforms
and forums like ASEAN and APRSAF should be exploited.
India-Japan Partnership
India and Japan have enjoyed a long history of cooperation in various
arenas, from cultural exchanges to economic and science endeavours.
368 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
Conclusion
Three aspects are key in the area of space for national prosperity and
sustainable development for all humankind. First, space technology
applications must be for users; second, space activities should vitalise
industries; and third, space activities must be undertaken in a manner
conducive for future generations’ use as well. In order to promote these
activities, it will be necessary to consider the following factors: making
370 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
26
Introduction
A domain that for a long time remained the monopoly of two or three
big powers, outer space is today a crowded, congested and contested
territory, with more than sixty players including non-state actors. The very
nature of space programmes is also undergoing important changes. After
decades of competition between the US and USSR, outer space has come
to be dominated by peaceful and civilian uses. This, though, is beginning
to change especially in Asia—and such shift is driven by a combination of
factors including the growing space-based applications for social,
developmental and security-driven utilities, as well as the changing global
balance of power dynamics.
The next section deals with certain contextualising factors that have a
bearing on the evolving global governance mechanisms.
Growth Trends
Outer space domain has undergone big shifts in the last decade. To begin
with, the number of stakeholders has increased; the nature of activities
has also changed drastically. Both these developments would indicate the
crowding of outer space, making the question of its long-term sustainability
even more challenging. Growing dependence on outer space, combined
372 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
The ICoC, meanwhile, has been another important step taken in the
recent years to address and regulate activities in outer space. Initiated by
the European Union, ICoC has run into trouble not so much for the
provisions it contained but for the lack of an inclusive process, with the
Code being prepared without prior consultation with all the spacefaring
powers. The EU had expected to have it endorsed globally by all the
major spacefaring powers before the end of 2012, but when it was
introduced outside the European community, it was received with
skepticism. To give the EU credit, it recognised the mistake and began to
take corrective measures, holding regional meetings to understand the
different perspectives and suggestions and how the Code could be taken
forward. These regional outreach meetings and the three Open Ended
Consultations – in Kiev in May 2013, Bangkok in November 2013, and in
Luxembourg in May 2014 – were productive to a degree but the Ukraine
crisis that erupted in 2013 damaged the consensus-building towards ICoC.
The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects
(PPWT) is a draft treaty first proposed by Russia and China in 2008 and
re-introduced with a new draft in June 2014, a couple of weeks after the
EU ended its third Open-Ended Consultations in June 2014. This treaty
seeks to bring about a ban on the weaponisation of outer space. The
draft though is yet to gather the support of a majority of states owing to
several factors including the fact that it was not verifiable.3
The 2014 text of the treaty was introduced with a new explanatory
note that said, “We consider a legally binding ban on the placement of
weapons in outer space as one of the most important instruments of
strengthening global stability and equal and indivisible security for all.”
The draft treaty and the explanation are important objectives that must be
pursued, but the treaty suffers from several loopholes that are not addressed
in an appropriate fashion even in the 2014 text. One of the biggest gaps
in the draft is the absence of any reference to ASAT weapons as well as
the soft-kill weapons such as lasers that can be used to disable a satellite
temporarily or on a permanent basis. These break-out weapons and
technologies are particularly potent in the event of hostilities. One can be
reasonably certain that no state is going to actually place weapons in outer
space but the bigger challenge is the ASAT-like weapons that will be shot
378 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
from the ground to damage and destroy another country’s assets in outer
space. Given the state of play in both the technological and geopolitical
realms within Asia, this is particularly significant. Also, the over-emphasis
on arms race in the PPWT is seen as problematic. Lastly, the PPWT
makes no mention of space debris, which is already a huge live problem.
Ecuador, for instance, lost its one and only satellite to space debris.
There have also been challenges with some of the existing institutions
such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU). The performance of the CD, the “single
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum for the international community”,
in the last two decades has been questionable. It has met for years without
making any progress, not even arriving at an agreement on a Programme
of Work. The last successfully negotiated instrument was the Chemical
Weapons Convention in 1992. Even though the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty was negotiated in 1996, and was adopted by the UN General Assembly,
it is yet to enter into force. Even as a Programme of Work was agreed
upon in 2009, the CD could not implement it.4 Problems within the CD
are only a reflection of the larger political difficulties that exist today among
major powers. Efforts are being made to reinject political will and revitalise
the CD. In one of its firsts, an Informal Civil Society Forum on the
Conference on Disarmament was held in March 2015, with an objective of
“generate[ing] ideas and inject[ing] different perspectives into the discussions
on the agenda items of the Conference through informal interaction among
States and civil society representatives.”5
The ITU, for its part, have met with its own problems. For one, ITU
failed to foresee the huge quantum of LEO activities (Low Earth Orbit)
which calls for the institution of a separate mechanism altogether, perhaps
via ITU that will manage the spectrum usage in an effective manner.
pursued right from the beginning with countries like the United States,
France and Russia.6 Pursuing this agenda of peaceful cooperation, UN
OOSA organised three global Conferences on the Exploration and
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space – the UNISPACE conferences of 1968,
1982 and 1999 – bringing together both states and multilateral organisations.
The conferences, held in Vienna, provided a unique opportunity to further
economic, social and scientific benefits of space research to all mankind.
India utilised these platforms both for gaining know-how and expertise
from other advanced space players and for sharing its own knowledge
and skill-sets to other countries especially in the developing world. For
example, in furthering the objectives of UNISPACE-2 conference, India
initiated a training programme to share space technology applications to
technical personnel from other developing countries.7
Marking the 50th anniversary of the first UNISPACE conference held
in 1968, OOSA is organising UNISPACE+50 in 2018.8 Despite the
growing requirements on India’s space programme, New Delhi has not
been particularly active in either UNISPACE or COPUOS. However,
UNISPACE+50 offers India a unique opportunity to share its expertise
to advance international cooperation and promote its foreign policy
objectives.
Though outer space was not immune to the Cold War competition
between the US and the USSR, there was a clear acknowledgement even
between them of the common challenges to space sustainability. This
gave way to cooperation in the development of certain regimes, one of
the first of which was the Outer Space Treaty (1967). The two countries
had an inherent interest in controlling the spread of space technology and
thus they managed to come together in writing certain rules of the road.
But such treaty-making efforts have become more difficult in the last
couple of decades.
From a security and arms control perspective, India has for long
articulated the need for legally binding, verifiable measures governing outer
space. Traditionally, at the CD, India had championed this cause while
partnering with the Group of 21 countries (the non-aligned group of
countries) articulating the need for a treaty-like mechanism banning the
placement of weapons in outer space. Also, India has not been comfortable
380 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
the moralistic drive, is far more sustainable both within the country as well
as in the global governance circles.
And after several decades of lack of substantial activity on the global
governance front, there is a sudden rush to institute new norms and
regulations governing outer space activities. India’s interests are also driven
by the fact that it is one of the earliest space powers. Taking on the role
of a norm-shaper has become an important character of this new
approach. India also understands and appreciates the geopolitical value
of its efforts in this normative exercise. Given the current state of play in
the outer space domain, India should make efforts to develop all measures
– treaties, TCBMs, norms of responsible behaviour, and code of conduct.
Efforts must also be made to strengthen the existing instruments such as
the OST, the UN-COPUOS, Conference on Disarmament and the GGE.
Nevertheless, the major global space powers, including India, will have to
recognise and address the political difficulties that have contributed to the
crisis in decision-making in the global governance of outer space.
ENDNOTES
1. "The International Academy of Astronautics (IAA)Cosmic Study onSpace
Traffic Management,” UNCOPUOS, Vienna, June 2006, http://
www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/copuos2006/06.pdf
2. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Role of TCBMs for A Sustainable Outer
Space,” UNIDIR African Regional Seminar, “The Role of Norms of
Behaviour for African Outer Space Activities”, Addis Ababa, March 7-
8, 2013,http://www.unidir.ch/files/conferences/pdfs/tcbms-for-outer-
space-activities-what-is-their-added-value-for-sustainable-activities-in-
outer-space-en-1-888.pdf
3. Michael Listner and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “The 2014 PPWT: A
New Draft but with the Same and Different Problems,” The Space Review,
August 11, 2014, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2575/1
4. “The Conference on Disarmament: Injecting Political Will,” UN Chronicle,
Vol. XLVII No. 4 2010 January 2011, https://unchronicle.un.org/article/
conference-disarmament-injecting-political-will
5. UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, “Informal Civil Society Forum on
the Conference on Disarmament,” https://www.un.org/disarmament/
geneva/cd/informal-civil-society-forum-on-the-conference-on-
disarmament/
382 Space Sustainability and Global Governance
Ajey Lele is a Senior Fellow with the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India. He started his professional career
with the Indian Air Force and opted for premature retirement to join the
field of academics. He holds a rank of Group Captain.
Arun Radhakrishnan is a Space Missions Engineer at Bellatrix Aerospace.
He is an amateur astronomer with deep ties with the astronomy
community in India. He hosts Sidewalk astronomy events for the public
and curates Science sessions for poor communities. He is a recipient of
the National Bal-shree award instituted by the Indian President for Creativity
in Scientific Innovation. A recipient of the NCERT scholarship, he writes
science content for astronomy magazines and forums during his spare
time.
Arup Dasgupta is the Managing Editor of Geospatial World. During his
35-year stint at the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Dasgupta
spearheaded several prestigious projects of national importance and
pioneered the introduction of geomatics in ISRO in 1985. He is also
Distinguished Professor, Academy of Geoinformatics, Bhaskaracharya
Institute of Space Applications and Geoinformatics (BISAG) and
Independent Director, Scanpoint Technologies Ltd.
Ashok G.V. is an advocate, specialising in commercial dispute resolution,
based in Bengaluru, India. He advises clients in the aerospace, technology,
electronics and e-commerce sectors on indirect tax, contract, privacy,
Intellectual Property and labour regulations.
Charles Stotler serves as the 2015-2017 Co-chair of the American Society
of International Law’s Space Law Interest Group, and as an Associate
with Aviation Advocacy, a boutique legal consultancy that provides
regulatory and market advice to aerospace industry stakeholders. He holds
an LL.M. in air and space law from McGill University.
Daniel Barok is Adviser for International Collaborations at Israel Space
Agency.
384 Space India 2.0
Jason Held is the founder and CEO of Saber Astronautics. Dr. Held
was a US Army Major and Army Space Support Team leader for
USSTRATCOM (formerly Space Command) and deployed internationally
in support of military space missions. He was a lead instructor at the
Interservice Space Fundamentals Course and a guest engineer at Army
Space and Missile Command Battle Lab. He conducted flight software
engineering for the Wide Field Camera 3 of the Hubble Space Telescope
and testing for the International Space Station. He also conducted verification
and validation testing for an invasive class II medical device currently in
market. He also co-founded the Delta-V Spacehub Startup Accelerator.
navigation, working for NASA Mars missions, and has led research
programmes in space object behavior assessment and prediction for the
Air Force Research Laboratory (US) since 2007. He directed the Air Force’s
Advanced Sciences and Technology Research Institute for Astronautics,
or ASTRIA, on Maui, Hawaii, for eight years, and for the last two years
has headed the space situational awareness programme at Kirtland Air
Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
New Delhi. Dr. Rajagopalan convenes the ORF Kalpana Chawla Annual
Space Policy Dialogue. She joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National
Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), where she was Assistant Director.
Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of
Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor
at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing
University, Taichung, Taiwan in 2012.
Vidya Sagar Reddy is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Nuclear and Space
Policy Initiative. He obtained his M.A. in Geopolitics and International
388 Space India 2.0