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Pascual V CA

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G.R. No.

154064 February 28, 2005

SPS. ERNESTO GUTIERREZ and FELICISIMA B. GUTIERREZ, petitioners,


vs.
PASCUAL B. CABRERA (deceased), substituted by his Heirs namely: Reymundo F. Cabrera,
Enelia F. Cabrera, Nery Cabrera-Bacani, and Darlo F. Cabrera, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision,1dated September 28, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 46266 nullifying (a) the Decision,2 dated August 11, 1997, of the Municipal Trial
Court, of Calumpit, Bulacan in Special Civil Action No. 53, (b) the Decision,3dated November 17,
1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 20 in Civil Case No. 686-M-97, and (c) the Writ
of Execution4 issued on March 16, 1998. Included in this review is the Resolution,5 dated June 14,
2002, of the Court of Appeals, denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On September 29, 1970, petitioner Felicisima B. Gutierrez purchased from her mother, Primitiva
Lorenzo Vda. de Buenaventura, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
47965. After due registration with the Register of Deeds, petitioner Felicisima was issued TCT No. T-
252339.

On March 25, 1976, Primitiva entered into an agricultural lease agreement6 over the same parcel of
land with respondent Pascual B. Cabrera. By virtue of this agreement, Cabrera took possession and
cultivated the land. After sometime, the land was converted into a fishpond.

When petitioners sent their son, Apolinario, to check on the status of the property, respondent
confronted Apolinario and hacked him with a bolo. Respondent, for his part, filed a criminal case for
trespassing against Apolinario before the MTC. The complaint was, however, dismissed.

Subsequently, petitioners asked respondent to vacate the land but respondent refused. On May 14,
1997, petitioners then filed before the MTC7an ejectment case against respondent. On May 28,
1997, respondent, assisted by the Department of Agrarian Reform Legal Assistance Division, moved
for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent alleged that he was a
registered agricultural tenant.8

The MTC denied respondent’s motion to dismiss for two reasons, namely (1) that the jurisdiction
over the subject matter was determined by the allegations in the complaint and not on the
allegations in the answer or motion to dismiss; and (2) that the motion was defective for not being
addressed to the adverse party and set for hearing.9

Petitioners filed two motions to render judgment on the pleading for respondent’s failure to file an
answer. Accordingly, a decision10 on the case was rendered on August 11, 1997, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant
ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights over them:
a) to vacate the subject parcel of land and to surrender the peaceful possession thereof to
the plaintiff;

b) to pay plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 per month as reasonable monthly rentals to
commence on March 1976 until the possession of the subject parcel of land is turned over to
the plaintiffs;

c) to restore the subject parcel of land to its former condition before the same was converted
into a fishpond;

d) to pay the plaintiff the amount of P30,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.11

Respondent appealed the decision to the RTC raising as error the MTC’s lack of jurisdiction since
what was involved was an agrarian dispute.12 The RTC, however, affirmed in toto the MTC
Decision.13 Consequently, petitioners moved for the execution of the judgment. This was granted and
so, on March 16, 1998,14 and July 14, 1998,15 writs of execution and of demolition were respectively
issued.

Based on the sheriff’s partial report,16 dated August 11, 1998, respondent’s house on the subject land
was demolished. On February 2, 1999,17 the sheriff levied two parcels of agricultural land owned by
respondent and sold them, on July 5, 1999,18 in an auction. The petitioners were the highest bidders.
These fully satisfied the MTC judgment.

In the meantime, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.19 Petitioners opposed the petition on
ground that it impleaded the lower court judge contrary to Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It
prayed that the petition be dismissed.

On September 28, 2000, the Court of Appeals annulled the decisions of the MTC and of the RTC as
well as the writ of execution dated March 16, 1998. Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration,20 but it was denied.

Hence, the instant petition for review raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGE WHO RENDERED A DECISION MAY BE


IMPLEADED AS A PARTY IN A PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE COURT OF
APPEALS UNDER RULE 42 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;

II. WHETHER OR NOT P.D. NO. 316 AND P.D. 1038 WERE EXPRESSLY
REPEALED BY R.A. 6657, SO AS TO RENDER THE ASSAILED DECISION AND
RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS;

III. WHETHER OR NOT A MOTION TO DISMISS BEING A LITIGATED MOTION


MUST BE SET FOR HEARING BY THE APPLICANT/MOVANT BY INDICATING
THE TIME AND DATE OF THE HEARING, DULY SERVED UPON THE ADVERSE
PARTY AT LEAST 3 DAYS BEFORE THE SCHEDULED HEARING OF THE
MOTION.21

Simply put, we are asked to resolve the following questions: (1) Should the appellate court dismiss
the petition because it impleaded the lower court judge as a party? (2) Should the trial court refer the
case to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for preliminary determination of agricultural
tenancy relationship? and (3) Was the denial of the motion to dismiss by the MTC proper?

First, petitioners assert that in accordance with Section 322 in relation to Section 223 of Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the petition. Second, petitioners insist
that proceedings in the trial court were proper and regular since Republic Act No. 665724repealed
Presidential Decree No. 31625 and Presidential Decree No. 1038,26 thus the condition precedent of
referring the case to the DAR for preliminary determination of agricultural tenancy relationship was
no longer necessary. Third, petitioners also claim that the MTC did not err when it denied the motion
to dismiss because the motion lacked the requirement set forth in Sections 427 and 5,28 Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.

Anent the first issue, the correct procedure, as mandated by the Rules of Court, is not to implead the
lower court or agency which rendered the assailed decision.29 However, impleading a lower court
judge as respondent in the petition for review does not automatically mean the dismissal of the
appeal but merely authorizes the dismissal of the petition.30

Formal defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has encountered previous petitions for
review that erroneously impleaded the Court of Appeals. In those cases, the Court merely called the
petitioners’ attention to the defects and proceeded to resolve the case on their merits.31 The Court
finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal treatment in this case. While the Court has
unquestionably the discretion to dismiss the appeal for being defective, sound policy dictates that it
is far better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on technicality as the latter approach may
result in injustice.32 This is in accordance with Rule 1, Section 633 which encourages a reading of the
procedural requirements in a manner that will help secure and not defeat justice.34

On the second issue, referral to the DAR is no longer necessary. P.D. No. 316 and P.D. No. 1038
which required the referral of a land dispute case to the DAR for the preliminary determination of the
existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship has indeed been repealed by Section 7635 of Rep.
Act No. 6657 in 1988.36Thus, the court may proceed to hear the case. However, it still has to
ascertain that the case does not involve an agrarian dispute before taking cognizance thereof.37

For a case to involve an agrarian dispute, the following essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy
relationship must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.38

Our examination of the records show that there is no landowner-tenant relationship between the
parties. Primitiva no longer owned the land on March 23, 1976, at the time she entered into the lease
agreement with Pascual Cabrera. On September 29, 1970, she already sold the land to her
daughter, petitioner Felicisima. Since the sale, Primitiva no longer had an owner’s right to alienate or
encumber it, much less, to lease it. Without a valid leasehold agreement, there was no tenancy
involved in this case, and the jurisdiction on the matter belonged to the regular courts.

Apropos the last issue, concerning the motion to dismiss filed by respondent before the MTC, we
have time and again warned that a notice of hearing which does not comply with the requirements of
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, is a worthless piece of paper and would not merit
any consideration from the courts.39 The clerk of court does not have the duty to accept it, much less,
to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.40 The defect cannot be cured by any subsequent
action of the court and it is grave abuse of discretion of the court to overlook the mandatory rule on
notice and act on the motion.41
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision, dated September 28, 2000, and the
Resolution, dated June 14, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46266 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decisions dated August 11, 1997 and November 17, 1997 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Special Civil Action No. 53 and of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No. 686-M-97, respectively, are reinstated. The Writ of Execution dated March 16, 1998, by the RTC
is also declared valid. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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