LNG Risk Assessment and Management PDF
LNG Risk Assessment and Management PDF
LNG Risk Assessment and Management PDF
David Moore is the President and CEO of the AcuTech Consulting Group, a security and safety
consulting firm based in Alexandria, Virginia. Mr. Moore was the lead author of the AIChE CCPS®
“Guidelines for Managing and Analyzing the Security Vulnerabilities of Fixed Chemical Sites”, the
security guidelines for the American Petroleum Institute (API, the developer of the API )/National
Petrochemical and Refiners Association (NPRA) Security Vulnerability Assessment Methodology,
and the developer of the Tier 4 SVA guidelines for the Responsible Care® Security Code for the
American Chemistry Council (ACC).
He is a frequent speaker on security, process safety management, human factors, and inherent
safety for the petroleum and chemical industry. His firm is actively involved in chemical process
security and safety consulting and training. He has provided risk consulting services and training to
industrial facilities worldwide, including oil refineries, chemical plants, pipelines, and
manufacturing plants. Mr. Moore has taught process safety and security courses for over 15 years to
many of the world’s largest corporations. He is an instructor on process safety and security for
AIChE, API, OSHA, USEPA, and the NPRA.
Mr. Moore was formerly a Senior Engineer with Mobil Corporation; and a Fire Protection Engineer
with the National Fire Protection Association. He has been consulting in the industry since 1987.
Mr. Moore is a Registered Professional Engineer. He serves on the AIChE Center for Chemical
Process Safety Technical Steering Committee, the CCPS Plant Security Committee, the Canadian
Chemical Producer’s Association PSM Committee, and the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center
at Texas A&M University. He has an MBA, (NYU-1987), and a B.Sc., Fire Protection Engineering
(University of Md.-1979).
At Issue: The Challenge
of Making Risk Decisions
for Port Security
Topics
Acceptable risk?
Potential use as a
weapon?
Acceptable Risk - How Secure is
Secure Enough?
Today industry is facing issues of acceptable
risk without a clear threat or limit.
Facilities cannot prevent or protect against all
known or suspected threats,
There are reasonable measures and
approaches that can be taken for certain
threats, but...
Beyond that upper limit, facilities need to
seek out assistance and coordinate efforts
with law enforcement agencies for adversary
intervention.
Pool on Water
A major release of LNG most
likely ignite on site
Flame does
not spread
to the entire
cloud
LNG Terminal Flow Diagram
Vapor Return
Line
LNG Ship
BOG
Compressor
Recondenser
Unloading
lines NGL Extraction
2nd Stage
Sendout Vaporizer
LNG Pumps
Storage
Tanks
1st Stage To
Sendout Pipeline
Pumps C2 Fuel Hot Water
Refinery Damage
Israeli-Lebanese Conflict 2006
Purpose:
– Develop a common risk-based method for
comparing security risk across sectors of US
infrastructures and key resources
– Determine vulnerabilities
– Determine need for national security upgrades
and specific infrastructure upgrades
– Allocate resources based on risk
– To provide an efficient means to report
essential risk information to the U. S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
RAMCAP Modules Completed
Petroleum Refineries
Nuclear Spent Fuel
LNG storage
SVA Methodologies
Guidelines for
Analyzing and
Managing the
Security
Vulnerabilities
Of Fixed
Chemical
Sites
API SVA Methodology
Step 1: Assets
Characterization
Step 2: Threat
Assessment
Step 3:
Vulnerability
Analysis
Step 4: Risk
Assessment
Step 5:
Countermeasures
Analysis
Security Strategies to Manage Risk
Sandia Photo
Asset
Layers of Security
Inner
Layer
Middle
Layer
External
Layer
Value Chain Risks
Gas Liquefaction LNG Storage LNG Tanker LNG Storage Vaporizers To Pipeline
Field Facility Tank Tank System
Cooperating
Agency with FERC
for EIS process
Letter of Intent
Waterway
Suitability
Assessment
Letter of
Recommendation
Navigation and Inspection Circular
05-05
Cover Page
Enclosure 1: Timeline
Enclosure 2: Guidelines
Enclosure 3: Risk Matrix for LNG (SSI)
Enclosure 4: WSA Checklist
Enclosure 5-6: Public Meeting Notice
Enclosure 7-8: LOR and Record of Decision
Enclosure 9: Report to FERC (non-SSI)
Enclosure 10: Report to FERC (SSI)
Enclosure 11: Sandia Lab Zones of Concern
WSA -Segments
Inbound
Outbound
Illustration of
Zones of Concern
(Intentional Release)
(NVIC 05-05, Enclosure 11)
(Not to Scale)
3500
m
1600
m
500
m
Conclusions