SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129875. September 30, 2005.]

JOVITO CABUSLAY , petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) , respondents.

DECISION

TINGA , J : p

Assailed in this petition for review 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is the Decision 2 dated 25 June 1997 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
19586 nding Jovito Cabuslay, petitioner herein, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, accused Celso G. Regencia, Rosello Canoy, Nilo Montebon and
Gerry Cane are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. Accused Jovito Cabuslay is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) years and
One (1) Day of prision mayor as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8)
Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal , as maximum, with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law, and to indemnify the heirs of Pacquito
Umas-as in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for actual
damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages, and to pay
the costs.

SO ORDERED. 3

In an Information 4 dated 10 August 1993, petitioner SPO2 Jovito Luna Cabuslay,

Senior Inspector Celso Gomera Regencia, SPO4 Rosello Rodriguez Canoy, C2C Nilo Rico
Montebon and C2C Gerry Orillaneda Cane were charged with murder, committed as
follows:
That on or about August 5, 1992, in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, SENIOR
INSPECTOR CELSO G. REGENCIA, SPO4 ROSELLO CANOY, SPO2 JOVITO
CABUSLAY, C2C NILO MONTEBON AND C2C GERRY CANE, all public o cers,
being then members of the Philippine National Police assigned at the PNP
Provincial Headquarters of Lanao del Norte, acting in the capacities aforesaid and
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, while manning a mobile
checkpoint at Libertad, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, thus committing the offense
in relation to o ce, and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treacherously shoot PAQUITO UMAS-AS, with their rearms,
thereby in icting mortal wounds upon the latter which caused his instantaneous
death. 5

On arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused all pleaded not guilty. Forthwith, trial
ensued with the prosecution presenting as witnesses Dr. Tammy Uy, Bernabe Puri cacion
Arenga, Leoncio Tagapulot Zaragosa and Generoso Caayao Umas-as.

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 The prosecution presented evidence proving the following as facts:
Paquito Umas-as, 34, was one of the four children of Generoso Umas-as of Bulua,
Cagayan de Oro City. Still single, Paquito earned a living as a collector of payments for
assorted articles such as jackets, mats, thermos and plates that he sold on credit. Paquito
collected as much as P70,000.00 for a period of four months and the net pro t of such
collections was divided equally between him and his employer. 6
In collecting payments, Paquito used a motorcycle he bought on credit from his
employer. 7 His collection brought him to such places as Manticao, Iligan and Kolambogan.
8 He rented a house in Iligan City but every fteenth (15th) day of the month, Paquito would
go home to his family to give them a sack of rice. 9
At around 8:30 in the morning of 5 August 1992, Leoncio Tagapulot Zaragosa, a
refrigeration technician helper and resident of Roosevelt Street, Iligan City, was conversing
with Felix Lauriana 1 0 near the school building in Lapayan, Libertad, Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte when a Hammer (Hummer) truck parked in front of them. 1 1 Four policemen
alighted, followed by a driver. The police thereafter halted the collector who was riding a
motorcycle from Lapayan. The collector was wearing a blue denim jacket with folded
sleeves and blue denim pants. 1 2
The police asked the collector to show his identi cation card (ID). The collector
took the ID out of his left pocket and when it reached the "front man," one of the policemen,
who Zaragosa later veri ed as the petitioner, opened re at the collector whose right hand
was then raised. The four other policemen meanwhile had their rearms pointed at the
collector. 1 3
Petitioner, who was four meters away from the collector, consumed the entire
magazine of his M-16 armalite in ring at him. The collector fell to the ground and was still
moving when the police placed him on board a vehicle and brought him to Kolambugan. 1 4
One of the policemen rode on the collector's motorcycle and likewise headed for
Kolambugan. 1 5
Upon the request of Pedro P. Legaspi, barangay captain of Bulua, Cagayan de Oro
City, 1 6 NBI forensic chemist Bernabe P. Arenga examined the victim's body, later identi ed
as Paquito Umas-as, on 10 August 1992 to determine the presence of gunpowder nitrates
on his hands. Arenga's report revealed that the victim was negative for gunpowder
nitrates. 1 7 Arenga opined that on the average, nitrates would be lost within a seventy-two
(72)-hour period; that there had been instances when the substance would remain on a
living person up to nine days; that nitrates could not penetrate rubber gloves; that no
amount of washing can remove the nitrates; and that even the application of formalin does
not affect the presence of nitrates in the hands of a person. 1 8
On 11 August 1992, Dr. Tammy Uy, a medico-legal o cer of the NBI in Cagayan de
Oro City, conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of Paquito Umas-as. At the
time of examination, the victim's body had already been cleaned and embalmed. Dr. Uy's
examination disclosed that the cause of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to
multiple gunshot wounds. There were eight (8) gunshot wounds and each wound was
considered fatal. 1 9
To prove damages, Generoso Umas-as testi ed that he lost consciousness upon
learning of the death of his son Paquito. Paquito's family spent P8,000.00 for the wake and
P10,000.00 for his burial. Paquito had left his father P12,000.00 to pay for some
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 appliances the former had bought; but the latter, to underwrite funeral expenses, still had
to sell his land for P100,000.00 only P25,000.00 of which had been paid in advance by the
buyer. However, Generoso could not remember where he placed the receipts for the wake
and burial expenses. 2 0
The defense presented a different version of the commission of the crime.
Petitioner presented as witnesses Julmunier Akbar Jubail, Celso Gomera Regencia and
Jovito Luna Cabuslay.
Police Superintendent Julmunier A. Jubail, Provincial Director of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), Lanao del Norte Command stated that he had received a reliable
intelligence report of a plot to assassinate the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and Governor Abalos and his family. In response to the intelligence report,
he dispatched a team of PNP personnel to conduct mobile checkpoints along the national
highways in several municipalities and to check on people who would possibly carry out
the plot. Jubail claims that the intelligence report was proven accurate after a few months
because the Vice-Mayor of Kauswagan was killed in Samborong, Linamon and in
December of the same year, Governor Abalos was assassinated in Iligan City. 2 1
The team headed by Senior Inspector Celso G. Regencia included SPO4 Rosello
Canoy, SPO2 Jovito Cabuslay, C2C Nilo Montebon and C2C Gerry Cane. Their area of
responsibility consisted of the twenty-two (22) municipalities of Lanao del Norte. In full
military out t, save for Canoy as he was assigned to the Intelligence Operatives Command,
the men established a mobile checkpoint on 5 August 1992 at the national highway,
Barangay Libertad, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the purpose of intercepting armed
men who intend to carry out the assassination plot. 2 2
At about 8:30 in the morning, a man riding on a red Honda motorcycle 2 3 going to
the direction of Pagadian City approached the mobile checkpoint. The motorcycle rider
was allegedly wearing a black bonnet, sunglasses, sweatshirt and gloves that covered the
half portion of his fingers. 2 4
Regencia testi ed that he signaled the motorcycle rider to stop at the right side of
the road. He asked for the identi cation card of the motorcycle rider who pretended to
reach for his wallet, but instead pulled out a gun. He heard a shot and his thigh went numb.
As he rolled to the ground, he heard a volley of gunshots after which petitioner approached
him. Regencia then approached the motorcyclist and removed his bonnet to be able to
identify him. Regencia later found out that the motorcyle rider was shot by petitioner. 2 5
Regencia ordered his men to load the motorcycle rider to the truck. The victim later
identi ed as Paquito Umas-as was still alive when he was loaded on the hummer vehicle to
be brought to a hospital, but was pronounced dead on arrival by Dr. Caga, the attending
physician. Regencia then asked that he be given rst-aid treatment for the wounds he
sustained. He thereafter turned over the rider's motorcycle, sunglasses and revolver to the
police station at Kauswagan. And after bringing the victim's body to a funeral home in
Kolambugan, he proceeded to Baroy General Hospital where his wounds were treated by a
certain Dr. Fabin. 2 6
To prove that he was wounded during the incident, Regencia showed to the court a
quo the scars caused by the gunshot wounds. There were three scars, one of which was
the entry of the bullet and the other two were splinter wounds. He said that the bullet used
was the kind that splinters upon hitting an object. He presented a medical certi cate under
the signature of Dr. Demterio U. Opamen, Jr. 2 7
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 For his defense, petitioner con rmed Regencia's testimony that the latter had
directed an approaching motorcyclist to stop at the right side of the highway. He heard
Regencia ask the motorcycle rider in Visayan dialect to show his identi cation card.
Cabuslay then saw Paquito Umas-as shoot Celso Regencia. This and his belief that he was
the next target prompted him to shoot the motorcycle rider with his M-16. 2 8

Police Superintendent Jubail was immediately informed of the incident and on the
basis of Regencia's account, he sent out a "Spot Report" 2 9 to inform Recon 9 and 13. The
report is couched as follows:
"SPOT REPORT . . . CMM SPO2 JOVITO CABUSLAY CMM INSP REGENCIA'S
BACK-UP OPEN FIRE (sic) HITTING AND FATTALY (sic) WOUNDING SAID
UNIDENT(IFIED) PERSON WWITH (sic) MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS IN HIS
BODY AND DIED ON THE SPOT PD RESPONDING PNP ELEMETS RECOVERED
FROM THE VICTIM'S BODY ALFA CAL. 38 REVOLVER SMITH AND WESSON (HM)
SN 236701 WITH ONE (1) EMPTY SHELL AND 5 UNSPENT AMMO . . . "

The incident found its way to the police blotter of the police station of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte. 3 0 It is embodied in a Certification 3 1 signed by Inspector Fulgencio dela
Pena Raguine, Chief of Police, issued at the request of Atty. Arthur Abundiente for trial
purposes and formulated in this wise:
Police Blotter Page Nr. 496-Entry Nr. 9187 & 9188=

050810H Aug 1992 — SPO3 Nestor S Ortiz, Intel NOR this station, left stn with
elements from Lanao del Norte PNPC under INSPECTOR CELSO G REGENCIA
PNP and proceeded to Libertad, Kauswagan, LN to follow-up suspects allegedly
hired for killing Mpl Mayor Myron B. Rico of Kaus, LN.
050835H Aug 1992 — SPO3 Nestor Ortiz PNP returned station informed that
suspects were intercepted at Libertad, Kaus, LN but when confronted by the PNP
team, red and shot INSPECTOR CELSO G REGENCIA PNP using cal. 38 revolber
(sic) (Homemade) hitting on his right thigh prompting SPO3 Cabustay (sic), red
back to the suspect hitting at the chest causing the instantaneous death of the
suspect. One cal. 38 revolber (sic) (Homemade) with 5 live ammos and one empty
shell at the chamber, one rayban (sunglass) and one motorcycle (Honda-Camel
backtype) color red with out plate Nr.
Police Blotter Page Nr. 497- Entry Nr. 9191=
081240H Aug 1992 — Romeo Umas-as, 42 years old . . . .

Police Blotter Page Nr. 501-Entry Nr. 9228=

251315H Aug 1992 — Impounded Honda Motorcycle . . . .

Police Blotter Page Nr. 508-Entry Nr. 9100=

021130H Oct 1992 — COP Bartolini RD got the one deposited rev. cal. 38 SW
S#236701 w/ (4) four live ammo and one empty shell past 30th day of Sep 92 for
NBI examination at Cagayan de Oro City. ITScAE

Petitioner justi ed the shooting of Paquito Umas-as because he believed that he

would be the next person to be shot at by the victim; and having acted in defense of his
person and that of his superior o cer, he asserted before the court a quo that he has no
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 criminal liability because of the attendance of the following circumstances: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the victim; (c) lack of su cient provocation on
his part, and in the case of defense of his superior o cer, he was not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motives. All of these requisites being present, petitioner claimed
there was legal justification for shooting Paquito Umas-as. 3 2
The Sandiganbayan however grave credence to the version of the prosecution and
rejected the version of petitioner. So, it found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide. It accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Zaragosa as it
was "categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and consistent." Moreover, it observed
that no proof was adduced to show that Zaragosa was moved by some evil motive to
falsely testify against the accused Cabuslay. 3 3
The Sandiganbayan likewise noted grave de ciencies in the evidence of the defense
as follows: (1) The physical existence of the handgun allegedly used by the victim Paquito
was not established as the same was not presented before the court during the trial; 3 4 (2)
The a davit executed by Gualberto Dayot Pasco-presented by the defense to impeach the
credibility of Zaragosa-was taken under intimidating and dubious circumstances, which
fact creates doubt as to the a davit's voluntariness and credibility; 3 5 (3) The medical
certi cate purportedly evidencing that Regencia had been shot has no probative value as
the doctor who executed the same did not testify during trial. Notably, the medical
certificate was executed by a doctor different from the one who treated Regencia's wound;
3 6 (4) The number of gunshot wounds inflicted upon the victim betrays petitioner's claim of
reasonable necessity of the means used to repel the unlawful aggression allegedly
displayed by the victim. 3 7
Hence, petitioner led the instant petition before the Court, insisting that the
Sandiganbayan erred in not crediting him the justifying circumstance of self-defense or
defense of a stranger or the lawful exercise of a right or office. 3 8
Pursuant to the Court's Resolution 3 9 dated 3 September 1997, the O ce of the
Solicitor General (OSG) submitted before the Court a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu Of
Comment 4 0 to aid the resolution of the instant petition. In said manifestation, the OSG
stated that it is the O ce of the Ombudsman which should represent the People in cases
elevated to the Court from the Sandiganbayan except in cases led under Executive Orders
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A issued in 1986. Nevertheless, it opined that the conviction of
petitioner should be reversed because the evidence of the prosecution when pitted against
that of the defense "may not stand close scrutiny." It also asserted that the ponente of the
appealed decision was not yet a member of the Third Division when the witnesses testified
and when the parties presented their evidence; hence, the applicability of the Court's ruling
in People v. Gutual , 4 1 that no respect can be accorded to the trial court's ndings of fact
where the judge who penned the questioned decision heard only one of the witnesses and
only at the sur-rebuttal stage. 4 2
In its Comment, 4 3 the O ce of the Ombudsman through the O ce of the Special
Prosecutor seeks the denial of the instant petition on the ground that the defense failed to
impeach the credibility of Zaragosa. It agrees with respondent court that petitioner's story
was contrary to human experience and hence, it correctly debunked self-defense and
defense of a stranger as grounds for petitioner's acquittal. 4 4
The petition is without merit.

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 While the rule that the factual ndings of the court a quo are generally not disturbed
on appeal because the trial judge had the best opportunity to observe them and the
manner by which they testify is concededly not applicable to the instant case considering
that the ponente of the assailed Decision was not the one who heard all the witnesses,
nevertheless, after a careful review of the records of the case, the Court nds no reason to
disturb the conclusions reached by respondent court. As held in Hugo v. Court of Appeals ,
4 5 "the e cacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only
took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. For it does not follow
that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision."
IcEACH

Moreover, it should be stressed that the Sandiganbayan, which functions in divisions

of three Justices each, is a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after
deliberation, the exchange of view and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority
vote. 4 6 Simply put, theponente of the assailed Decision is not the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan. He alone does not speak for and on behalf of his Division. Each Division of
the Sandiganbayan is a three-man body whose members each have one vote to cast in
every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is within its jurisdiction.
We have minutely scrutinized the assailed Decision and nd it amply supported by
the evidence on record.
Petitioner claims that he acted in self-defense and in defense of Regencia.
One who invokes self-defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the
burden of proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He
must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in
defense of a relative or a stranger. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following
elements of self-defense must be established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. 4 7
Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. It is well-settled
in this jurisdiction that once an accused has admitted that he in icted the fatal injuries on
the deceased, it is incumbent upon him in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the
justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.
He cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own
evidence, "for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved
after the accused himself had admitted the killing." 4 8 Thus, petitioner must establish with
clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justi ed, and that he incurred no criminal
liability therefor.
In order that defense of a stranger may be appreciated, the following requisites
must concur: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment
or other evil motive. 4 9
Unlawful aggression is the rst and primordial element of self-defense. Of the three
requisites, it is the most important. Without it, the justifying circumstance cannot be
invoked. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel. 5 0
Unlawful aggression refers to an attack or a threat to attack, positively showing the
intent of the aggressor to cause injury. It presupposes not merely a threatening or an
intimidating attitude, but an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger
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 thereof, which imperils one's life or limb. Thus, when there is no peril, there is no unlawful
aggression. 5 1

It is crucial to ask whether the victim Paquito was an unlawful aggressor. We answer
this question in the negative. Aggression to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent,
such that there is a real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to
others whom that person is seeking to defend. SEACTH

Petitioner asserts that he was the victim's next target, thus the need to shoot the
victim in self-defense. His claim should be disbelieved. As he himself had explicitly
testi ed before respondent court, the hummer jeep was behind him and was parked about
three to four meters from the national highway. 5 2 He also stated that Paquito could not
have seen the hummer jeep because it was obscured by Muslim houses. 5 3 It only follows
that if from Paquito's perspective, he cannot see the hummer jeep which is a fairly large
vehicle, then he could not have seen petitioner as well. If Paquito cannot see petitioner
from where he was positioned, then Paquito could not have possibly aimed to shoot at
petitioner. Petitioner's contention therefore that there was an imminent threat of bodily
harm coming from Paquito upon his person is at best illusory. There was no peril, ergo,
there was no unlawful aggression.
It should also be recalled that at the time, Cane was on top of the hummer jeep
manning the machine gun. 5 4 If Regencia had indeed been shot as the defense insists, then
Cane was better situated to defend Regencia. It is implausible how an o cer like him, in
such a strategic position and trained in the operation of the said weapon could have
omitted ring a shot in Regencia's defense. More to the point, it is beyond credulity that
the outbursts of gun re hardly elicited any reaction from the other police o cers who
were only a few meters away from the crime scene and who continued conducting their
search on the bus which was then about to pass the checkpoint. 5 5
Likewise noteworthy is the fact that after the second burst of re on Paquito,
knowing that Paquito was still alive 5 6 and in all probability was still holding a handgun, 5 7
petitioner chose to assist Regencia instead of making sure that Paquito had been
immobilized and disarmed, basic to a policeman's training.
In addition, the claim of the defense that Paquito shot Regencia on his right thigh is
untenable. Petitioner would have the Court believe that Paquito dared challenge ve
policemen, four of them in full battlegear, at a checkpoint and armed with only a handgun.
This is contrary to ordinary human experience, as well as the human instinct which is to flee
for dear life and seek safety. If indeed Paquito was armed and had criminal designs in his
mind, the natural tendency upon seeing a checkpoint ahead would be to abort one's plans
and leave the premises immediately. Petitioner's story not only was contrary to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life, in all appearances it was also
contrived. 5 8 Respondent court was correct in rejecting it.
We also con rm that the medical certi cate presented by Regencia to prove that he
had been shot by the victim has no probative value. The physician who signed the same
was never presented as witness for the defense. We also note that the physician who
signed said medical certi cate, a certain Dr. Demterio U. Opamen, Jr., is different from the
doctor who according to Regencia had treated his wounds. 5 9
It is also worthy of note that the defense never presented in evidence the gun
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 Paquito allegedly use to shoot Regencia. The gun was also not clearly identi ed. Unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim must be positively proved and said gun would have
been a vital evidence to establish this requisite.
Petitioner, however, insists that he would have presented the gun had not
respondent court pressured him to rest his case and submit it for decision. Such
contention hardly inspires belief. Records reveal that petitioner never made it known to
respondent court that the defense would be presenting the gun allegedly used by Paquito.
What the defense did manifest was their intention to present one Major Bartolino to testify
that he had received the gun allegedly used by Paquito and that he had brought it to the
NBI on 30 September 1992 for examination. It should be underscored that the defense
was not even sure that there was an NBI report on said examination. The counsel for the
defense manifested before respondent court, as follows:
ATTY. ABUNDIENTE:
xxx xxx xxx

I intended, Your Honor, Please, to present two more witnesses, Major Bartolini
who received the gun and he will testify on this particular testimony that he
was the Station Commander of the municipality of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte at the time of the incident and then he received this gun from the
team of Capt. Regencia on August 5, 19 (sic) and that he took the gun for
NBI Examination sometime in the month of October, 1992, no, on the 30th
day of September, 1992.
CHAIRMAN:
This was covered by police blotter?

ATTY. ABUNDIENTE:
Yes, Your Honor.
CHAIRMAN:
You don't need the testimony of Bartolini, but do you have the report of the
NBI?
ATTY. ABUNDIENTE:
That is why, Your Honor, because we have not received any communication
from Bartolini . . .
CHAIRMAN:

How did you come to know that Bartolini sent this firearm to the NBI for
examination? . . .

ATTY. ABUNDIENTE:
Because it is stated in the blotter, Your Honor, . . . dated September 1992 for
NBI examination in Cagayan de Oro City, Entry No. 91000, page 108 . . .

CHAIRMAN:
Does it matter — whether you can prove the examination report of the NBI or
not?
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 ATTY. ABUNDIENTE:
I don't know if there was a report of the NBI examination . . .
CHAIRMAN:

Precisely . . ." 6 0

The defense was well aware of the relevance of the NBI report to prove their
allegations that the victim was carrying a gun and used the same on Regencia, especially
since the victim was reported to be negative of nitrates on his hands. No cogent reason
could be thought of for the failure to secure a copy of the report or even know of its
existence. It should be noted that the examination was made as early as September 1992.
A party's failure to produce evidence, which if favorable would naturally have been
produced, is open to the inference that the facts were unfavorable to his case. 6 1 This
Court can only conclude that said gun never existed, and this explains the failure of the
defense to present it before respondent court. Thus, it is immaterial to delve on the issue
raised by the petitioner on the discrepancy of the make of the gun as noted by respondent
court in its Decision.
Parenthetically, petitioner stresses that the victim had tested negative for
gunpowder nitrates as the latter had been wearing gloves at the time of the incident. This
claim runs counter to his 6 2 and Regencia's 6 3 testimony that the only things recovered
from Paquito and which were turned over to the Provincial Police Command were the
victim's motorcycle, sunglasses and the alleged gun. The police blotter reporting the
incident con rms their testimonies. Interestingly, said police blotter also makes no
mention that gloves were recovered from the victim. 6 4
Anent the credibility of Zaragoza, the sole prosecution eyewitness on whose
testimony the version of the prosecution is anchored, we nd that petitioner failed to
impeach his credibility. No evidence was shown that Zaragoza was actuated by an
improper motive. As such, there is no cogent reason why the Court should deny Zaragoza's
testimony the full faith and credit it deserves.
On the alleged inconsistencies in Zaragoza's testimony, it is relevant to state that a
witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of the
minute details. Thus, even the most truthful of witnesses may err and often give confusing
statements. What is important is that Zaragosa unwaveringly, forthrightly and
unequivocally declared that petitioner shot at the victim. Neither did he falter in identifying
the gunman. 6 5
All in all, petitioner has failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Without this essential element, petitioner cannot successfully invoke self-defense. Even
assuming that he tried to defend a stranger, his defense would not prosper. In defense of a
stranger, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is also indispensable. In both self-
defense and defense of a stranger, unlawful aggression is a primordial element.
Granting arguendo that there was unlawful aggression, we nd that petitioner's
contention that he employed reasonable means to repel the aggression must fail. It is
settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is
rational equivalence. 6 6
Also, the nature and number of wounds suffered by Paquito negate any claim of self-
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 defense or defense of a stranger. The Court notes that the victim sustained eight gunshot
wounds which were all fatal as they affected vital organs. 6 7 Petitioner testi ed that he
pulled the trigger of his armalite twice. 6 8 He aimed at "the front of his body, at the chest,
up to the stomach." 6 9 Had petitioner merely defended himself from the victim's unlawful
aggression, one shot to immobilize him would have been enough. There was no reason for
petitioner to shoot him seven more times, even aiming at his vital organs. It bears
repeating that the nature and number of wounds in icted by the accused are constantly
and unremittingly considered as important indicia which disprove a plea for self-defense
or defense of stranger because they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and
not just defend oneself. 7 0 In the instant case, Paquito's wounds serve to tell us that
petitioner was induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive and that he was set on
killing the victim. AEIHCS

Petitioner's avowal that his rst shot was single but went automatic on the second
shot is likewise unbelievable. 7 1 Petitioner's armalite has a selector that switches it from
single shot to automatic. Since it was petitioner who was in possession of the rearm and
he admitted that he red the shots, we reasonably conclude that it was he who switched
the firearm to automatic firing.
All told, petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of self-defense and defense of a
stranger to justify the shooting of Paquito.
Next, petitioner contends that the killing of Paquito resulted from the lawful
performance of his duty as police o cer. However, such justifying circumstance may be
invoked only after the defense successfully proves that the accused acted in the
performance of a duty, and the injury or offense committed is the necessary consequence
of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. 7 2 These two requisites are
wanting in this case. The victim was not committing any offense at the time. Petitioner has
not su ciently proven that the victim had indeed red at Regencia. Killing the victim under
the circumstances of this case cannot in any wise be considered a valid performance of a
lawful duty by a man who had sworn to maintain peace and order and to protect the lives
of the people. As aptly held in People v. de la Cruz , 7 3 "Performance of duties does not
include murder. . . . Murder is never justified, regardless of the victim."
A nal word on the civil liability. An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole
case open for review and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the
appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not.
Therefore, we delete the award of P50,000.00 as actual damages. To seek recovery of
actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree
of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. Since
the prosecution did not present receipts to prove the actual losses suffered, such actual
damages cannot be awarded. 7 4
On the other hand, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we award P50,000.00 by
way of indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of Paquito. When death occurs as a result of a
crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to such amount as indemnity for death
without need of any evidence or proof of damages. 7 5
We also a rm the award of moral damages in view of the nding that Generoso
Umas-as lost consciousness and suffered anguish and sorrow because of the incident.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated 25 June 1997 of the Sandiganbayan in
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 Criminal Case No. 19586 nding petitioner GUILTY of homicide is partially AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
actual damages is deleted; and (b) petitioner is ordered to pay fty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnity ex delicto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 4-21; Dated 9 July 1997.
2. Rollo, pp. 22-36; Penned by Associate Justice Leonardo I. Cruz with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Cipriano A. del Rosario and Sabino R. de Leon, Jr.
3. Rollo p. 35.
4. Rollo, pp. 22, 211.
5. Rollo, pp. 22, 211; Sandiganbayan Records, p. 1.
6. TSN, 26 October 1994, pp. 8-9, 10-12; See also Exhibit G.
7. TSN, 26 October 1994, p. 27.
8. TSN, 26 October 1994, p. 23.

9. TSN, 26 October 1994, p. 16.

10. Lauriana had invited Zaragosa to his place for them to gather young coconuts.

11. TSN, 25 October 1994, pp. 21, 23-24, 46.

12. TSN, 25 October 1994, pp. 24-25, 38.

13. TSN, 25 October 1994, pp. 27-28, 32, 34-35.

14. TSN, 25 October 1994, pp. 27-28, 32, 34-35.

15. TSN, 25 October 1994, p. 34-25.

16. Exhibit E-1; Addressed to NBI Director Sancho K. Chan, Jr.

17. Exhibit E.

18. TSN, 25 October 1994, pp. 10-20.

19. Rollo, p. 23; Exhibit B.

20. Rollo, p. 24; TSN, 26 October 1994, pp. 14-15, 17-18.
21. Rollo, p. 25; TSN, 17 April 1995, pp. 5-8.
22. Rollo, p. 26; TSN, 17 April 1995, pp. 28-31.
23. Exhibit 6.

24. Rollo, p. 26; TSN, 17 April 1995, p. 37.

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 25. Rollo, p. 150.
26. Rollo, p. 26; TSN, 17 April 1995, pp. 37-39, 41, 46-50, 51-55; TSN, 18 April 1995, p. 33.
27. Rollo, p. 26; TSN, 17 April 1995, pp. 39-40, 53, 55-56; Exhibit 5.
28. Rollo, p. 26; TSN, 18 April 1995, pp. 29-30.
29. Exhibit 1.
30. Rollo, p. 27.
31. Exhibit 6.
32. Rollo, p. 28.
33. Rollo, pp. 29-30.
34. Id. at 30.
35. Id. at 32.
36. Id. at 33.
37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id. at 38.
40. Id. at 86-115; Dated 24 April 1998.
41. 324 Phil. 244 (1996).

42. Rollo, p. 87.

43. Id. at 143-169; Dated 26 August 1998.
44. Id. at 162.
45. 437 Phil. 260, 269-270 (2002).

46. Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, Nos. L-51065-72, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 399, 408;
Consing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78272, 29 August 1989, 177 SCRA 14, 21-22.
47. People v. Cawaling, 355 Phil. 1, 37 (1998); People v. Tan, 373 Phil. 990, 1009 (1999);
People v. Aglipa, 391 Phil. 879, 888 (2000); Salcedo v. People, G.R. No. 137143, 8
December 2000, 347 SCRA 499, 507; People v. Asuela, 426 Phil. 428, 443-444 (2002);
People v. Magnabe, Jr., 435 Phil. 374, 390 (2002).
48. People v. Belbes, 389 Phil. 500, 507 (2000).
49. People v. Diego, 424 Phil. 743, 751. (2002).
50. KAPUNAN, R. AND FAYLONA, D. CRIMINAL LAW (1993 ed.) 58; People v. Cawaling,
supra note 47 at 36.
51. People v. Sabdani, 389 Phil. 840, 847 (2000); People v. Janairo, 370 Phil. 59, 32 (1999).
52. TSN, 19 April 1995, pp. 7-8.
53. Id. at 16.
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 54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 15.
56. Id. at 14-15.
57. TSN, 18 April 1995, pp. 13, 32.

58. People v. Cabaya, 411 Phil. 616, 630 (2001).

59. TSN, 17 April 1995, p. 55.
60. TSN, 19 April 1995, pp. 17-18.

61. People v. Salangga, G.R. No. 100910, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 407, 421-422.
62. TSN, 18 April 1995, p. 33.

63. TSN, 17 April 1995, p. 54.

64. Certification dated 25 October 1994, Exhibit 6, Exhibit 6-A.

65. See supra note at 45, p. 271.

66. People v. Gutual, 324 Phil. 244, 259 (1996).

67. TSN, 24 October 1994, p. 21.

68. TSN, 19 April 1995, p. 12.

69. Id. at 15.

70. People v. Diego, supra note 49 at 755.
71. TSN, 19 April 1995, p. 12.

72. Section 5, Article 11, Revised Penal Code; People v. Belbes, 389 Phil. 500, 508-509
(2000); People v. Cawaling, supra note 47 at 37-38.

73. G.R. Nos. 101000-01, 18 October 1993, 227 SCRA 278, 284.

74. People v. Pansensoy, 437 Phil. 499, 522-523 (2002); People v. Cawaling, supra note 47
at 43.

75. People v. Calabroso, 394 Phil. 658, 676 (2000); People v. Pansensoy, 437 Phil. 499, 522
(2002) citing People v. Adoc, 330 SCRA 626 (2000) and People v. Solis, 291 SCRA 529
(1998); see also supra note at 49, p. 273.

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