Aruta - Excusionary Rul Art. 3 Sec.3

10/1/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 288
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Aruta
*
G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA

ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; The plain import of the

language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a
valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.—
In People v. Ramos, this Court held that a search may be conducted by law
enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge
as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. x x x This
constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and
seizures as it operates only against “unreasonable” searches and seizures.
The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at
______________________
* THIRD DIVISION.
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People vs. Aruta
the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches
and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection
accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and police
must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to
issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016d86277fb5b1ef09b7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/26
Same; Same; Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement; A statute, rule or

situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest
or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their application
limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law.—Therewithal,
the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his
body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one.
A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and
their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by
law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set
back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet
often violated.
Same; Same; Same.—The following cases are specifically provided or
allowed by law: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; 2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the
elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search. 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly
regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless
search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and Emergency
Circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; “Probable Cause,” Explained; Words and
Phrases.—Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete defini-
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People vs. Aruta
tion, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction
by law is in the place to be searched.
Same;Same;Same;Same; In determining probable cause, the average

man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
the rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil.—It ought to
be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs
facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of
evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the
calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance.
The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause
relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown
by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of
being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in
the place to be searched. In searches and seizures effected without a warrant,
it is necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any probable cause,
the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the
person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or
is about to be committed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; There is no valid
warrantless arrest where the accused was apprehended while merely
crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that
she was committing a crime and it was only when the informant pointed to
the accused and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana
that she was singled out as the suspect.—Accused-appellant Aruta cannot
be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor
had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable
ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude
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People vs. Aruta
that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents
would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive
finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on
record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-
appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid
requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Same; Same; Same; Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine; Where the
arrest is incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search is
similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest.—Consequently,
there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless
search of accused-appellant’s bag, there being no probable cause and the
accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the
arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent
search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must
perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized
could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits
of a poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III,
Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a search is first undertaken, and an
arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search
and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.—Emphasis is to be
laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful
arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.
Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest
effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and
arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
Same; Same; Same; Where the implied acquiescence to the search
could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances, the same is considered
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People vs. Aruta
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.—While

in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search,
we believe that appellant—based on the transcript quoted above—did not
voluntarily consent to Bolonia’s search of his belongings. Appellant’s
silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was
conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent
based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.”
(Emphasis supplied) Thus, accused-appellant’s lack of objection to the
search is not tantamount to a waiver of her constitutional rights or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search.
Same; Same; The purpose of the rule that search warrants must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those,
particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.—Search warrants to
be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be
seized to those and only those, particularly described in the warrant so as to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they
shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be
made.
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; The plea
during arraignment and active participation by an accused in the trial do
not cure the illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence
into objects of proof.—While it may be argued that by entering a plea during
arraignment and by actively participating in the trial, accused-appellant may
be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless
search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same
may not apply in the instant case for the following reasons: 1. The waiver
would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her
plea of “not guilty” and participation in the trial are indications of her
voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
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People vs. Aruta
The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of
the search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof.
The waiver simply does not extend this far. 2. Granting that evidence
obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to
object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-
appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and opposed the
prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence.
Same; Same; While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.—The exclusion of such
evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary
rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. While conceding that the officer
making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly
liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that
the exclusionary rule is “the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction” against abuse. This approach is based on the
justification made by Judge Learned Hand that “only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will the wrong be repressed.” Unreasonable searches and seizures
are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary
to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of
no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo

City, Br. 73.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Norberto de la Cruz for accused-appellant.
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People vs. Aruta
ROMERO, J.:
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious

effects on our society, our law enforcers tend at times to overreach
themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing to
observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal
searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade
the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and
charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:
“That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City
of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting
approximately eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried
marijuana packed in plastic bag marked ‘Cash Katutak’ placed in a
travelling bag, which are prohibited drugs.”
Upon arraignment, she pleaded “not guilty.” After trial on the merits,
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted and sentenced
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment

1
and to pay a fine of
twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos.
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt.
Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on
their testimonies, the court a quo found the following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his
informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain “Aling Rosa” would
be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988,
with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said
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1 Decision penned by Judge Alicia L. Santos.
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People vs. Aruta
tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose

Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo
Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at
around 4:00 in the afternoon of December 14, 1988 and deployed
themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along
Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves
into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo
and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while
the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number
474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and back bumpers
stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening
of the same day from where two females and a male got off. It was
at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team “Aling Rosa”
who was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was “Aling Rosa,” the
team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM
agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked “Aling Rosa” about the contents of
her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana
leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “Cash Katutak.” The team
confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to
which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was
then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a
Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated
marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the

PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj.
Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report
stating that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a
prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers
and of the above technical report, the prosecution rested its case.
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People vs. Aruta
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a “Demurrer to

Evidence” alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the
items thereby violating accused-appellant’s constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their
inadmissibility in evidence.
The said “Demurrer to Evidence” was, however, denied without
the trial court ruling on the alleged illegality of the search and
seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to
avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the
case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf.
As expected, her version of the incident differed from that of the
prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she
had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie
“Balweg.” While about to cross the road, an old woman asked her
help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello
and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the
NARCOM Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any
knowledge as to the identity of the woman and averred that the old
woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover,
she added that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting
officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the
defense filed a “Comment and/or Objection to Prosecution’s Formal
Offer of Evidence” contesting the admissibility of the items seized
as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and
seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted accusedappellant of
transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of
marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of
Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine
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People vs. Aruta
of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) 2

pesos without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents

could not apply for a warrant for the search of a bus or a
passenger who boarded a bus because one of the
requirements for applying a search warrant is that the place
to be searched must be specifically designated and
described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search
warrant was applied for by the NARCOM agents, still no
court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the
same would be considered a general search warrant which
may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless
search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated
the latter’s constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the
defense of denial is weak yet the evidence of the
prosecution is even weaker.
These submissions are impressed

3
with merit.
In People v. Ramos, this Court held that a search may be
conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant
validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution which provides:
“Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
_________________________
2 Decision, Rollo, p. 49.

3 222 SCRA 557 [1993].
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People vs. Aruta
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all

searches and seizures as it operates only against “unreasonable”
searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the
Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid
warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of
arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and
seizure clause is that between person and police must stand the
protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power
4
to issue or
refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches
and seizures are inadmissible as evidence
5
pursuant to the doctrine
pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno. This exclusionary rule was later
enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:
“Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding

section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.”
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply
intrude indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects, and most
importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional
provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable
searches and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of
the person 6
himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of
restraint.
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any
unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is
a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or
________________________
4 Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary,

1987, First ed., pp. 85-86.
5 20 SCRA 383 [1967].
6 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 147-148.
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People vs. Aruta
situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of

arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their
application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by
law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and
would set back a right so basic7
and deserving of full protection and
vindication yet often violated.
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized

8
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which
are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest

in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the

government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
9
5. Customs search;
_____________________
7 People v. Argawanon, 215 SCRA 652 [1992].

8 “Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant.”
9 Padilla v. CA and People, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997.
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People vs. Aruta
10
6. Stop and Frisk; and
11
11
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled

licenses for law enforcement officers to trample upon the
constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons
against unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of
probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it
generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said
offense or subject
12
to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to
be searched.
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense
which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of
evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to
search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by
substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by
virtue of being connected with criminal 13activity, and that the items
will be found in the place to be searched.
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is
necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any prob-
____________________________
10 People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 [1996].

11 People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 [1994].
12 People v. Encinada, G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997.
13 Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995].
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People vs. Aruta
able cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as
evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases,
must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that
a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has

become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and
seizure. 14
In People v. Tangliben, acting on information supplied by
informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory
Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against
persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may
be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the
evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling
bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and
requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on
when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers
only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior
knowledge from their informant regarding Aruta’s alleged activities.
In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an onthe-spot tip.
Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is
being used by drug traffickers as their “business address.” More
significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and
surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect
that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no
single indication that Aruta15was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt, the Narcom agents received reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They
likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs on his person.
____________________________
14 184 SCRA 220 [1990].

15 198 SCRA 401 [1991].
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People vs. Aruta
There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially

since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His
actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the
operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to
deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly,
including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment
of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant
case. In present case, the police officers had reasonable time within
which to secure a search warrant. Second, Aruta’s identity was

priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta, was not acting suspiciously.
Fourth, Malmstedt was search aboard a moving vehicle, a legally
accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other
hand, was searched while16
about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista, the NARCOM officers had probable cause
to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north to Acop,
Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they
received from their regular informant that a woman having the same
appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing
marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to
search accused-appellant’s belongings since she fitted the
description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a
valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence
obtained in the course of said search is admissible against accused-
appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a
search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers
erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the requirements of a
search warrant. 17
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People, the policemen
conducted a surveillance in an area of the Kalookan Cemetery based
on information that drug addicts were roaming therein.
____________________________
16 214 SCRA 63 [1992].

17 G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997.
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People vs. Aruta
Upon reaching the place, they chanced upon a man in front of the
cemetery who appeared to be “high” on drugs. He was observed to
have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When
approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to
resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The
Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost
accused-appellant to determine if he was actually “high” on drugs
due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on
information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which
became the bases for conducting the warrantless search.
Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present
which, when taken together with the information, constituted
probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and

seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence
of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the facts. The
following have been established: (1) In the morning of December
13, 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an
informant named “Benjie” that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be
leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back
in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of
marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988,
accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a
travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law
enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers approached
her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked
by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the
same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found dried
marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the
NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police
received information two days before the arrival of Aminnudin that
the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board
642

People vs. Aruta
the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle was identified
and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had
received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead
of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin.
When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to
be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used
against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police
likewise received confidential information the day before at 4:00 in
the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing
in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in
the morning of the following day. This intelligence information
regarding the culprit’s identity, the particular crime he allegedly
committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of
probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held
that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular
No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant
even after court hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot
serve as an excuse for violating Encinada’s constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not

armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search
and seizure of accused-appellant’s bag, accused-appellant must have
been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides
inter alia:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
x x x x x x x x x.”
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime.

Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just
643
VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 643

People vs. Aruta
committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the

street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude
that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant
pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the
carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The
NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant
were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly
illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason
whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was
committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant.
This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance
with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents
to effect a warrantless search of accused-appellant’s bag, there being
no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently
illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly
illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce
operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized
could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are
“fruits of a poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant
to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the
search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself
may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings.
Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on
evidence produced by
644

People vs. Aruta
the search, both18such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being
contrary to law.
As previously
19
discussed, the case in point is People v.
Aminnudin where, this Court observed that:
“x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a

crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9
and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him
as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest.
The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.”
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal

warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of accusedappellant’s bag
would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in “plain view”
under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not
immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM
agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to
ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant’s bag
be justified as a search of a moving vehicle. There was no moving
vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accusedappellant was
apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner
bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street and not
while inside the vehicle.
20
People v. Solayao, applied the stop and frisk
21
principle which has
been adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals. In said case, Solayao
attempted to flee when he and his com-
____________________________
18 People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325 [1996].

19 163 SCRA 402 [1988].
20 262 SCRA 255 [1996].
21 188 SCRA 288 [1990].
645
VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 645

People vs. Aruta
panions were accosted by government agents. In the instant case,

there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused the
suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to “stop and
frisk” accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely
crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned
cases, accusedappellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM
agents when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is
another indication of the paucity of probable cause that would
sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was
committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be
categorized under exigent and22
emergency circumstances, as applied
in People vs. De Gracia. In said case, there were intelligence
reports that the building was being used as headquarters by the
RAM during a coup d’etat. A surveillance team was fired at by a
group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of
said building refused to open the door despite repeated requests.
There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside
the building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and
disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed
that a crime was being committed. In short, there was probable
cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could
not be said in the instant case.
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the
warrantless search and seizure would be consent given by the
accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver
of her constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that
accused-appellant voluntarily submitted
23
herself to search and
inspection citing People v. Malasugui where this Court ruled:
“When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on

his person or premises, he is precluded from complaining
________________________
22 233 SCRA 716 [1994].

23 63 Phil. 221 [1936].
646

People vs. Aruta
later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.)

The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be
waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.”
In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the

testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
“Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to

Aling Rosa, what happened after that?
A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents
and confronted her with our informant and asked her what she
was carrying and if we can see the bag she was carrying.
Q What was her reaction?
A She gave her bag to me.
Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?
24
A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.”
This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General’s contention for
the Malasugui case is inapplicable to the instant case. In said case,
there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making
the warrantless
25
search effected immediately thereafter equally
lawful. On the contrary, the most essential element of probable
cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case
making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly,
the search which accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise
unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-
appellant could not be used as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of
herein accused-appellant in handing over her bag to the NARCOM
agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied
acquiescence to the unreasonable search.
_________________________
24 TSN, June 14, 1989, p. 6.

25 Supra.
647
VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 647

People vs. Aruta
26
26
The instant case is similar to People v. Encinada, where this Court
held:
“[T]he Republic’s counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs
containing the package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus
effectively waived his right against the warrantless search. This he gleaned
from Bolonia’s testimony.
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what

happened next?
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.
Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to
examine the two chairs that he carried, what did you do next?
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in
between the two chairs.”
We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will

validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant—
based on the transcript quoted above—did not voluntarily consent to
Bolonia’s search of his belongings. Appellant’s silence should not be
lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering
that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we
cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of
regularity of the performance of duty.” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, accused-appellant’s lack of objection to the search is not
tantamount to a waiver of her constitutional rights or a
____________________________
26 G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997.
648

People vs. Aruta
voluntary submission
27
to the warrantless search. As this Court held in
People v. Barros:
“x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful

search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest “simply because
he failed to object”—
“x x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
(Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the accused failed to
object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the
case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
‘x x x xxx xxx
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of
the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they
hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the
law.’ (Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: ‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that28 we do not
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ ” (Emphasis
supplied)
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention29

to relinquish the right. As clearly illustrated in People v. Omaweng,
where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:
____________________________
27 231 SCRA 557 [1994].

28 Supra, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.
29 213 SCRA 462 [1992].
649
VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 649

People vs. Aruta
“PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q — When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what
did you do?
A — When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we
could see the contents.
Q — And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was
any?
A — He said ‘you can see the contents but those are only
clothings (sic).’
Q — When he said that, what did you do?
A — We asked him if we could open and see it.

Q — When you said that, what did he tell you?
A — He said ‘you can see it.’
Q — And when he said ‘you can see and open it,’ what did you
do?
A — When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not
clothings (sic) that was contained in the bag.
Q — And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did
you do?
A — When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some
of the contents and showed it to my companion Fomocod
and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was marijuana.”
(Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any

search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been
made, this Court would be the first to condemn it “as the protection
of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one
of the highest duties and privileges of the Court.” He willingly gave
prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it
conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the case
with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the
Solicitor General next argues that the police officers would have
encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be
secured only if accused-appellant’s name was known,
650

People vs. Aruta
the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in the
Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had fortyeight hours
within which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
“x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.” (Italics supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be

searched and the persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this
rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those,
particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize30to the
end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they
could have secured one without too much difficulty, contrary to the
assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be
searched has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified.
The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of
December 14, 1988. “Aling Rosa” turned out to be accused-
appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was
identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents
purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner
buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the
NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not
in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above
particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has
held that the police should particularly de-
_______________________
30 Herrera, Oscar, A Handbook on Arrest; Search and Seizure and Custodial

Investigation, 1994 ed., p. 60.
651
VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 651

People vs. Aruta
scribe the place to be searched and the

31
person or things to be seized,
wherever and whenever it is feasible. (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during
arraignment and by actively participating in the trial,
accusedappellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the
illegality of the warrantless search and to the inadmissibility of the
evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the instant
case for the following reasons:
1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the

illegality of the arrest as her plea of “not guilty” and
participation in the trial are indications
32
of her voluntary
submission to the court’s jurisdiction. The plea and active
participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the
search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects
of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far.
2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless

search becomes admissible upon failure to object thereto
during the trial of the case, records show that accused-
appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and
opposed the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence.
33
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros, which stated:
“It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured

through an invalid warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure
may be waived by an accused person. The a priori argument is that the
invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a
defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of
bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused from questioning the
legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a
preliminary
_________________________
31 People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 [1925].

32 People v. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993]; People v. De Guia, 227 SCRA 614 [1993];
People v. De Guzman, 231 SCRA 737 [1994]; People v. Correa, G.R. No. 119246, January 30,
1998.
33 Supra.
652

People vs. Aruta
investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter

necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former—an
argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver
of the non-admissibility of the “fruits” of an invalid warrantless arrest and
of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the
constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its
vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel
had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the
carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally
offered in evidence by the prosecution. We consider that appellant’s
objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and
seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights
under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or
during the trial.” (Emphasis supplied)
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to
procure a search warrant considering that they had more than
twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of
seizure of the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” hence illegal and

inadmissible subsequently in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and 34
spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and
seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case
observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary
rule is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction” against abuse. This approach is based on the justification
made by Judge Learned Hand that “only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows
35
that it cannot profit
by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.”
______________________
34 Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967].

35 Cruz, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., p. 148.
653
VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 653

People vs. Aruta
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which

the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power
to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare,
still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing
the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no
statute is of sufficient importance
36
to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order
is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes
declared: “I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that
the government should play an ignoble part.” It is simply not
allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce
37
another, especially
if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y
MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan and Purisima, JJ.,

concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside, accused acquitted and ordered

released.
Note.—Evidence secured on the occasion of an unreasonable

search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for
____________________________
36 Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Annotated, 1995 ed., p. 526
citing Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil. 230 and Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33.
37 People v. Aminnudin, supra.
654

Constantino vs. Desierto
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. (People vs. Montilla,

285 SCRA 703 [1998])
——o0o——
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10/1/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 288

626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA

Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; The plain import of the

VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 627

People vs. Aruta

Same; Same; Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement; A statute, rule or

628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Aruta

tion, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by

Same;Same;Same;Same; In determining probable cause, the average

VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 629

People vs. Aruta

630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Aruta

no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.—While

VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 631

People vs. Aruta

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious

her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment

1 Decision penned by Judge Alicia L. Santos.

VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 633

tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose

Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the

634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a “Demurrer to

VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 635

of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) 2

1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents

These submissions are impressed

“Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

2 Decision, Rollo, p. 49.

636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all

“Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding

4 Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary,

VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 637

situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the

7 People v. Argawanon, 215 SCRA 652 [1992].

638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled

10 People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 [1996].

VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 639

In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has

14 184 SCRA 220 [1990].

640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially

which to secure a search warrant. Second, Aruta’s identity was

16 214 SCRA 63 [1992].

VOL. 288, APRIL 3, 1998 641

probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and

642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not