Lim v. CA, 1992
Lim v. CA, 1992
Lim v. CA, 1992
D2021
Quick Facts
Case Petition for annulment of marriage
Evidence in Question Testimony of Psychiatrist as Expert Witness
Trial Court Decision The Trial Court allowed the Psychiatrist to testify
on the mental state of the wife (herein petitioner,
Nelly Lim)
Supreme Court Decision The testimony of Dr. Acampado is admissible,
because it isn’t covered by patient-physician
privilege.
RELEVANT FACTS
- The husband (private respondent) filed a petition for annulment of marriage with his wife
(herein petitioner) on the ground that petitioner was suffering from “a mental illness called
schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the present.”.
- One of the Chief Witnesses he sought to present was Dr. Lydia Acampado, Chief of the
Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, A doctor who specializes in psychiatry. So
his counsel filed for a subpoena ad testificandum to be issued to compel Dr. Acampado to
testify.
o The counsel of the wife opposed the issuance of the subpoena and applied for its
quashal on the ground that the “testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity
and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.”
- The RTC judge denied the motion to quash the subpoena and allowed Dr. Acampado to take
the stand and testify. Her testimony was subject to qualification and she didn’t directly
testify as to her sessions with Nelly Lim.
o “was qualified by counsel for private respondent as an expert witness and was asked
hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the
illness she examined and treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her
examination and the medicines she had prescribed.”
- The ruling of RTC judge as to why he allowed Dr. Acampado to testify is as follows:
o On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary questions to qualify her as
an expert in psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illness
are stelazine tablets applied to; she was asked to render an opinion on a
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D2021
RATIO DECIDENDI
Issue Ratio
Whether or not the NO. First, The testimony was not concerning information acquired
testimony of Dr. during Dr. Acampado acting in her professional capacity. Second, the
Acampado should’ve interviews by Dr. Acampado of Nelly Lim were done in the presence
been disallowed due to of a 3rd person, so this takes it out of the coverage of the patient-
patient-physician physician privilege. Third, no substantiation of the claim that the
privilege? [RELEVANT] reputation of Nelly Lim was blackened. Fourth, there was failure to
object during the testimony, so it must be deemed that there was
waiver.
The court says that the counsel for petitioner never raised an
objection during the actual testimony anyway:
The court explaining the This (quoting the provision in the rules) is a reproduction of
history and development paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
of the patient-physician Court with two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the
privilege and the phrase "advice or treatment given by him," and (b) substitution of
rationale behind it. the word reputation for the word character. Said Section 21 in turn
is a reproduction of paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940
Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the change of the
phrase "which would tend to blacken" in the latter to "would
blacken." Verily, these changes affected the meaning of the
provision. Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was sufficient if the
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DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Notes:
We are of the opinion that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged communication because the
information were (sic) not obtained from the patient while attending her in her professional capacity
and neither were (sic) the information necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or give treatment
to the patient Nelly Lim. And neither does the information obtained from the physician tend to blacken
the character of the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. Acampado is a Medical
Specialist II and in-charge (sic) of the Female Service of the National Center for Mental Health a fellow
of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She
was summoned to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.
After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado’s testimony, We find no declaration that
touched (sic) or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during
the period she attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that she
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D2021
examined and interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the course of her
examination, interview and treatment of her patient. Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical
question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history and behaviour of the fictitious
character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem
did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever information or findings the doctor obtained
from attending the (sic) patient. A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a
patient’s ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make
answer solely on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical question. (Butler v. Role, 242 Pac. 436; Supreme
Court of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926). Expert testimony of a physician based on hypothetical question (sic) as
to cause of illness of a person whom he has attended is not privileged, provided the physician does not
give testimony tending to disclose confidential information related to him in his professional capacity
while attending to the patient. (Crago v. City of Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354, see Jones on Evidence, Vol.
3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.).