Governments and Citizens in a Globally Interconnected World of States INTRODUCTION As globalization became one of the most intensely debated concepts in the final years of the twentieth century, some analysts specu lated the state was being displaced as the primary vehicle through which political com- munities would organize themselves in the century t come, Cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1996: 19) argued that “the nation-state, as a complex modern political form, is on its last legs’, while management consultant Kenichi Ohmae (1995) claimed that economic interdependence and global communication had rendered the nation-state a ‘nostalgic fiction’, Those who advanced this argument never received a free pass in the fields of political science and intemational relations: from the beginning, competing per- spectives on globalization maintained that if anything, states were gaining new sources of power, Even scholars who hailed the onset of a ‘new world order’ (Slaughter, 2004) or the “global state” (Shaw, 2000) emphasized how ‘new sources of collaboration in world politics Hans Schattle revolved around states. The early years of the ‘twenty-first century have shown us that glo- balization, at Teast in the short run, has not displaced the state However, globalization has dispersed politi- cal and economic power well beyond the state, Governments now jockey for competitive advantage alongside international political and economic institutions, transnational civil soci ety organizations and multinational corpora tions, States now hold themselves accountable to a host of international norms and standards, often with the express purpose of gaining legitimacy at home and respectability abroad, States frequently find themselves in subordi- nate positions, particularly in the pecking onder of global capitalism, with diminished capaci- ties to protect the economic well-being of their populations, And states now face new kinds of pressures, with advances toward supranational integration on the one hand met with forces of local fragmentation on the other. The late inter- national relations theorist James Rosenau (2003: 11-16) framed these competing dynam- ies as “fragmegration’, and this hybrid concept106 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION has emerged with particular clarity in Europe: public discontent with the European Union and distrust of governing elites actoss the con- tinent has prompted a rising tide of far-right nationalist politics and animated secessionist movements in stateless nations from Scotland to Catalonia and beyond, If some of these movements are successful, they will result, of course, in still more states projecting their voices and promoting their interests globally. We need only review the ever-expanding ‘membership rolls of the United Nations to see quite simply how today’s era of globalization is indeed an era of states. The United Nations had 51 founding members shortly after the end Of the Second World War in 1945: by the end of 2012, the United Nations had 193 member ese states emerged as a result zation in the 1950s and 1960s and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 Controversies over which political communi: ties have the right to belong to the United Nations General Assembly illustrate the power and symbolism of states in the global age. Palestine, for example, gained recognition in November 2012 as a ‘nonmember observer state” of the United Nations (a status also held by the Vatican) amid much debate over whether a boost for Palestine was also a knock against Israel. The Republic of China (Taiwan), mean- while, completely lost its United Nations membership and its permanent seat on the Security Council in 1971, when the People’s Republic of China (which took over mainland China in 1949) replaced Taiwan as China's representative on the United Nations as the result of a period of rapprochement with the United States. Taiwan has been trying without success for years to be granted “non-member observer” standing within the United Nations. The most commonly cited definition of “state” comes from Max Weber, the German social theorist from the late nineteenth and carly twentieth centuries who tied both state hood and polities to coercive authority over specific territories. In Weber's words, trans- lated into English: “A compulsory political organization with eontinuous operations will be called a “state” if and in so far as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order’ (Weber, 1997: 154). What exactly constitutes the “legitimate” use of force is a matter debated to this day, not only in ma ters of war and peace but also domestic pol ties (consider issues related to civil liberties and civil disobedience). Another helpful de nition comes from Hedley Bull, the twentieth century international relations philosopher, who cast states (1995: 8) as “independent political communities each of whieh pos- sesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population’. Note that ‘state’ is this definition is prior t© government — governments and even constitutions come and go, but states more readily endure: note also that Bull’s definition does not assume that these partic lar territories and populations necessarily correspond evenly with each other. While the concept of “state” anchors itself upon jurisdictional claims over land and peo- ples and dates back to ancient models of political community ~ from tiny city-states 10 empires ~ the concept of ‘nation’ historically emphasized organic ties that hold groups of people together and inspire senses of loyalty and belonging, Whether the basis of national ism is ethnic, civie or psychological, and whether the potitical communities in question have a dominant culture or have evolved into multiethnic, eross-cultaral societies, today nations are viewed as socially constructed political communities that hold together cit zens across many kinds of cross-cutting iden- tities: ethnicity, language, religion, and so forth. (These days ‘nation’ is often taken figu- ratively, as well ~ consider ‘Red Sox Nation’ and "Colbert Nation’ from American sports and entertainment!) A tremendous amount of recent literature on nationalism builds upon Benedict Anderson's formulation (1991: 6) ofthe nation as ‘an imagined political community ~ and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’. The advent of national political communities and the fusion of ‘nation’ andGOVERNMENTS IN A GLOBALLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD 107 ‘state’ from the fifteenth century onward coincided with the rise of the printing press, the increasing public accessibility of books and newspapers, and theories of civil and political rights that eventually led to the American and French revolutions: The nation is imagined as sovereian because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of ‘the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dastc realm nations team of being fee, and if under God directly so. The gage ard emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state. (Anderson, 1991: 7), Although the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are often used interchangeably in everyday polit- ical specch and media commentary. it is important to avoid conflating these two di tinct concepts. As Christian Joppke (1998: 8) has disentangled this compound term: “Qua states, nation-states are territorial organiza- tions characterized by the monopolization of legitimate violence; qua nations, nation-states are membership associations with a collective identity and a democratic pretension to rule” Both concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ orient themselves toward legally-binding, rule- enforcing political communities: in the words of Emest Gellner (1983: 1): ‘nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruemt’. Globalization, international migration and diasporas, and the rise of mul- ticultural societies have disrupted national- ism, narrowly defined, and at least within many constitutional democracies, shifted its centre of gravity away from ethnicity in favour of eivie ties holding together diverse populations. Nearly one generation into glo- halization studies since the end of the Cold War, leading scholars in the field have con- cluded that nation-states are here to stay, for the time being, and that this is preferable to sweeping shifts in political organization either beyond or beneath states. Consider the words of sociologist Craig Calhoun (2007), no friend of old-fashioned nationalism: The idea of a nation-state is arguably pernicious Ithas been a recipe for conflets both internal and ‘external. Populations straddle borders or move long distances to new states while retaining alle iances to old nations. Dominant groups demand that governments enforce cultural conformity, challenging both the individual freedom and the vitality that comes from cultural creativity ‘And yet, the nation-state nether can be nor should be wished away. Source of so many evs, itis aso the framework in which the modern era produces history's most enduring and successful experiments in large scale democracy It continues to shape not Just the fact of democracy but diversity ints for. Itis basic to the rue of lav, not only because most law remains a demestc matter of nation-states but because most international law is literally that: structured by agreements among nation-states. Not least of all, while globalization has produces innuinerable paths acoss siate borders, it has ‘opened these very unevenly and dsproportionately 10 the benefit of those with access to high levels of fluid capital. Conversely it has made belonging to 2 nationstate and having dear rights within 2 nation-state more, not les, important It is essential, then, to understand the ways in which globalization has partially reconfig- ured and continues to reshape the roles and functions of states — and how and why this ‘matters for citizens, The sections of the ehap- ter that follow take a closer look at five major topics that illustrate ongoing changes in the roles of states and the relationships between states and citizens: economic interdepend- ence, economic and political integration, international law and universal norms, trans- national advocacy networks, and new com ‘munication platforms, We will also examine how new forms of political engagement are emerging through expressions and practices of “global citizenship’ and the pursuit of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’. Rather than evading or bypassing states, the economic, social, political and cultural dynamics. of lobalization are fixated on states. ‘THE STATE IN A WORLD OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE Globalization is commonly equated with the rising momentum of global free-market capitalism in the final decades of the twen- tieth century, the accompanying tise in108 ‘THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION transnational enterprises, and the resulting disparities between easy flows of money and commodities across intemational bor- ders and the legal barriers and logistical hhurdles that keep most workers tied to their home communities. Both champions and critics of the so-called Washington Consensus and its ‘neo-liberal’ emphasis on deregulation, privatization and free trade see globalization as imposing a forced choice upon states: either conform to free- market principles or run the risk of being left behind, One well-known advocate of neo-liberalism, journalist Thomas Friedman, translated this orthodoxy into plain English when he came up with the phrase “Golden Siraitjacket’ to describe how states are now forced into policies that suit the preferences of investment houses and corporate execu tives (the “Electronic Herd,” in Friedman's parlance) who swiftly move money and resources into countries favoured as adaptable to the demands of international business — and withdraw even more rapidly from countries are deemed uncompetitive: This herd has grown exponentially thanks to the democratizations of finance, technology and information ~ so much so that today itis begin ning to replace governments as the primary source of capital for both companies and coun: tries to grow. Indeed, as counties increasingly have to run balanced budgets to fit into the Golden Straitjacket, their economies become fever more dependent on the Electronic Herd for {growth capital. So to thrive in today's globaliza~ tion system a country not only has to put on the Golden Staitacket, it has to join this Electronic Herd. (Friedman, 2000: 107) Friedman's colourful language here essen- tially claims that states have lost an impor- tant element of economic sovereignty and that neo-liberalism is heyond contestation. ‘To make the point even clearer, in a chapter titled “Buy Taiwan, Hold Italy, Sell France’, Friedman indeed compares countries to indi- ‘vidual stocks ~ with the message that the new sovereigns of the “Blectronie Herd” reward and punish states and their governments in the same ways that they buy and sell shares of individual companies. Friedman’s outlook has been criticized as an overstated partisan apologia for ‘market globalism’ that ironically celebrates the Fad ing economic sovereignty of states while also giving generous latitude to American military dominance (Steger, 2005). Nevertheless, important changes within the world economy reinvigorated global talism during the final quarter of the twent eth century. State policies mattered greatly: national leaders such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher who pursued the laisse: faire economics of Priedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, in the years leading. up to the fall of Soviet communism, created the conditions for deregulation, privatization and free trade 10 spread around the world. This prompted the world’s poorer states, as noted by political economist Jeffry Frieden (2006: 415), to ‘orient their production to hundreds of millions of prosperous consum- fs and attract the capital of the world’s wealthiest banks, corporations, and inves- tors’ in hope of raising the living standards of their citizens: Under import substitution, Mexice had failed to create a viable car industry, but now it took by storm the global market far auto parts. Farmers in Argentina and New Zealand made fortunes selling winter fruits and vegetables to Northern Hemisphere consumers, an opportunity possible only with a global market for raspberries. Companies in Thailand and Turkey, previously constrained by the difficuty of borrowing at home, now had access to cheap and plentiful foreign finance. These countries and thelr iizens took advantage of global markets to specialize and speed their growth. (Frieden, 2008: 415-16) Competing narratives take issue with claims that globalization brings mainly opportunity to states and citizens, instead arguing that the main impact is exploitation, Take this account from Mexican journalist Rafael Barajas Durdn, the author of the mockingly titled How to Succeed at Globalization (2004), a cartoon book with a sardonie critique: Neolberal theory isa product packaged for export ‘0 underdeveloped nations. Rich countries tke theGOVERNMENTS IN A GLOBALLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD 109 USS, Germany, France or Holand don't practice itto the same degree at home because their citizens \Would be up in arms at the consequences. Yet neo- eral gurus insist tha if poor counties follow their advice about free and open markets, theyllsoon be ‘members of the first world club Al that talk, how lever, just a cover. The eal program isto make sure the rich countries maintain control of the third worlds wealth and raw materials and have access to thei (cheap labor. (Barajas Durén, 2004: 85-6) As states continuously fine-tune their com- petitive strategies in the world economy, national governments often. deliberately place the interests of external stakeholders and trading partners ahead of the interests of their own citizens, When former United States trade negotiator Clyde Prestowitz (2012) hailed South Korea’s strong position in the world economy, he noted that the gov emment systematically boosts exports. by keeping the national currency ‘somewhat under-valued and by often selling abroad at prices below their own domestic prices’ - meaning that South Korean conglomerates overcharge South Korean citizens for the same kinds of cars, computers and mobile phones that it exports to citizens of other countries. At the same time, South Korea has charted its own economic course and devi- ated from the marching orders of the Electronic Herd" Like the Japanese, they have rejected American ideas and advice about specializing only in what they do best and trading for the rest Rather, they have concentrated on developing world class capabilities where before they had none. They did this by protecting and subsidiz: ing in vatious ways new, infant industries like steel, consumer electronics, and semiconduc- to's .. The mast successful Korean companies are either those like steel maker POSCO that was founded with government investment or thse like Samsung that are giant family domi- nated conglomerates with extensive special relationships with the government and monop- ‘ly or quasi-manopoly positions in many inter lacking industries and technologies. Prestowitz 2012) Working-class citizens in countries losing ‘ground to global market pressures must either find their ways into the remaining industries in their hometowns, move (if they can) to places with more opportunities, o become part of the growing segment of dislocated and, “underemployed” workers. While cries point to the disposability of labour as an inherent flaw of economic globalization, others see no problem and believe that the costs imposed on dislocated workers in declining regions within the more affluent states are more than offset, in total, by rising living standards in the ‘emerging market’ zones, Rock-bottom wages, terrible working conditions, and neg. ligible environmental standards that attract ‘multinational corporations to set up Factories (typically through subcontractors) in many ‘developing’ countries only get noticed else where when startling incidents occur ~ such as a series of fires in Bangladesh in the fall of 20112 followed by a building collapse there, in April 2013. in which more than 1100 workers died at factories making clothing for retailers ranging from Benetton to Wal-Mart The more trenchant critiques of economic globalization call for states to take for them- selves, in the words of Canadian activist Tony Clarke, the power to ‘determine eco- nomic, social and environmental objectives for national development and the capacity to ensure that transnational corporations meet these priorities’ and to set the stage for ‘new forms of participatory democracy whereby citizens become effectively involved in intemational policymaking on trade, investment and finance’ (Clarke, quoted in Cavanagh and Mandet, 2004: 82). Short of higher national standards in ‘emerging mar ket’ states, fairtrade and consumer labelling campaigns targeting industries from coffee to carpets have prompted many citizens to acknowledge sources of economic interde- pendence and support voluntary codes of conduct and higher standards for the treatment of workers and the loc: ties in which global conglomerates do business. Still, the rising public recognition of global economic interdependence — and the moral weight this carries ~ have not altered mass consumer behaviour in the world’s wealthier countries to the point110 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION ‘where it has a significant impact. Nor have possible pathways to creating binding global standards gained much traction. One obvious step forward, for instance, that has long lan- guished on the back burner would be to attach the conventions of the International Labor Organization to the trade rules of the World Trade Organization, Instead, the standards that good states uphold to protect their citizens are likely to remain elusive ‘more widely in the global economy for some time to come. In this sense, the Bangladesh fires and building collapse unfortunately remind us how little has really changed since these issues first catapulted 10 the public spotlight nearly 20 years earlier. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Alongside the rising economic interdepend- ence of the past half century, states have formed regional partnerships with their neighbours, from loosely-knit organizations promoting trade and economic cooperation suchas the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to trad ing blocs such as the North American Free ‘Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Caribbean Community (Comunidad de! Caribe). Europe clearly stands out, as the continent's political elites made the leap into market integration shortly after the Second World War with the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community. Today the European Union (EU) hhas 27 member states (with Croatia becoming the 28th member state in July 2013), a single currency and monetary system (among 17 ‘member states), and a supranational European Parliament with growing legislative powers alongside the Council of Ministers, the BU legislative institution comprised of official representatives from national governments Im recent treaty revisions, the EU has expanded into foreign and security poliey and instituted, with the 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty, a common citizenship that affords citizens of the member states the rights to live, work, vote and even run for office in European parliamentary elections ‘outside one’s native member state Far more cohesive than the big interna- tional organizations but more diffuse than conventional nation-states, the EU has evolved into a supranational polity with its own kinds of power struggles among compet- ing national interests. The first decade of the first century closed with massive tainty about the EU's long-term pros- cially in light of a public debt crisis that highlighted stark divergence across the Eurozone and hesitancy among the wealthier member states of the Eurozone, particularly Germany as it pushed for austerity, to come up with collective mechanisms to resolve the crisis and assist the countries in greatest need. By the summer of 2012, it seemed Europe's financial erisis would yield more integration rather than less, with plans for “fiscal union” among the 17 member states of the Eurozone to accompany monetary union, This means the budgets of the Eurozone countries will likely be subject to approval and oversight by the European Commission, and long estab- lished rules that were supposed to limit budget deficits (to three per cent of yearly gross domestic product, or GDP) and public debt (to 60 per cent of GDP) are now actually supposed to be enforced. The European Parliament also passed legislation in September 2013 to implement closer integra- tion and supervision of the banking sector The financial crisis exacerbated the “dem- cratic deficit” — a term that now encom- passes the lack of popular representation in European policy making, the longstanding predominance of national elites in shaping the direction of the EU in relative detach- ‘ment from their respective publics, and the relatively low salience of a supranational European identity among the less mobile and less affluent citizens across Europe. Growing public disenchantment with the EU, fuelled by perceptions that the member states have irrevocably lost ground in their capacities to advanee the economic and social welfareGOVERNMENTS IN & GLOBALLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD. m interests of their citizens amid a rising tide of, immigration, has driven voters member states to support far-right political parties with nationalistic slogans such as ‘France for the French’, stiffer detention and deportation policies targeting undocumented migrants, and increasingly stringent “social integration’ requirements for legally docu- mented immigrants. Despite these setbacks for supranational community building, Europe has seen a dr matic rise in continental jurisprudence dur- ing the past half-century with two key institutions, The European Court of Justice (BCH), which has functioned since 1952 as the top dispute resolution body for the EU and its predecessors, has set forth provisions such as ‘direct effect” and ‘supremacy’ ‘meaning that BUI laws take precedence over national laws when the two sets of laws come into conflict, and member states are obli- gated to follow EU laws. Decisions from the ECI have often forced member states to adapt their own laws to fit supranational norms: the principle that women and men should receive equal pay for equal work became enshrined in law across Europe thanks in part to ECY rulings. Meanwhile, the European Court of Human Rights (ECUIR) part of a larger organization, the Council of Europe ~ upholds the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), now signed by all 47 of ity member states. Any individual, group of individuals, or civil society organi- zation can file ECHR cases against a member state, and states can also initiate cases against each other. The court has issued landmark decisions in areas such as freedom of expres- sion, freedom of religion, protection from Giscrimination, and the right to a fair trial, which is the provision in the ECHR most often violated by member states (Council of Europe, 2012) ‘The EU is regarded by some leading schol- ars as having strengthened the state because it empowers the member states to project their interests into the international arena, enables national governments to build resources directed toward international negotiations and bolsters national regulatory mechanisms to fulfil the resulting international commit ments (Moravesik, 1994 and 2002), Member states also routinely engage in democratic debates over how t0 position themselves in the European Union, As Margaret Thatcher learned the hard way in 1990, when Britain’s Conservative Party forced het out of office as prime minister after an internal row over Europe, presidents and prime ministers now rise and fall based on whether or not their stances on European integration are in syne with their political parties as well as the pub- lies they represent, Historian Alan Milward has shown how the early stages of European integration also provided the member states with a crucial vehicle to rehabilitate them- selves following the devastation of the Second World Wat and the liquidation of their former empires abroad (Milward, 1994), Then again, the ongoing winter of public discontent in Europe and the prospect of still more eco- nomic integration on the way has strength- ened the ease for Europe to address its democratic deficit more decisively with bold steps, such a creating a high-profile, directly elected presidency (Maruand, 2011). The EU provides an excellent illustration of how international collaboration has been creating new roles and obligations for states, as well as how states now delegate specific elements of sovereignty to international organizations without giving up sovereignty in absolute terms. THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES ‘The end of the Second World War in 1945 led to a significant turn away from the model of state sovereignty dating back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that championed absolute state autonomy and foreclosed humanitarian intervention, The failure of the League of Nations before the war only strengthened the collective will among world leaders to start another international organization that would facilitate global dialogue and promote humanWw THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION rights and fundamental freedoms. Leaders of the Allies began framing themselves collec tively as the ‘United Nations’ while fighting the wat, and the San Francisco conference in the summer and autumn of 1945 set up the organization that continues to this day. The system has huge limitations: the United Nations (UN) has never transcended the states system and instead operates mainly as a forum for states to air their differences and try 10 resolve them; This is especially appar- ent within the Security Council and its out- dated composition that awards veto power to each of the five countries that won the Second World War, as well as the General Assombly’s relative lick of power and its state-based configuration. Aspirations in the founding period of the UN by many world federalists, including Albert Einstein, that the United Nations might one day progress into an institution representing the world’s peo- ples not on the basis of their national mem- bership but on the basis of their humanity remain a dream deferred, The UN has also been hobbled over the years by key state actors themselves: first with the Cold War stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union that made it difficult for the Security Council to reach collective decisions, and more recently by the US-led invasion of Iraq, in 2003 without the sane- tion of the Security Council. This sent a message that states invading other coun- tries unilaterally and in contravention of the UN Charter would face no meaningful consequences of their actions beyond criti ism and resentment, The UN has also been unable to prevent many atrocities and geno- cides around the world during its history. Concems about the limitations of the UN have been offset first by the formation of ad hoe tribunals that eventually convicted numer ous individuals from Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia of war crimes, and more signifi- cantly by the permanent establishment in 2002 of the Intemational Criminal Court ACC), with its role in prosecuting individuals accused of ‘genocide and other crimes against humanity. ‘The formation of the court represented an important expansion of public accountability beyond the state, though onee again with limi- tations; several key countries, most notably China, India, and the United States, are not among the 122 countries that as of January 2014 had ratified the courts founding treaty, the Rome Statute, This again illustrates. how states retain a commanding presence in today’s interdependent world not only by charting the terms of membership of emerging interna- tional institutions but also by deciding whether for not to avcept their jurisdiction in the first place, This underscores broader global limita- tions: while many states choose to hold them- selves accountable to international law as well as international conventions, adherence to Intemational law ultimately remains a matter of choice, and states ean often evade interna tional law without consequence, The same holds true for the landmark rights declarations of the United Nations and their accompanying, intemational covenants on civil and political rights and social, economic and cultural rights; once again, it is up to nation-states to sign these covenants and uphold them. These dis ide, the mere exist- ence of institutions such as the United ‘Nations and the International Criminal Court and the ever-widening public validation of key international human rights declarations relate in important ways with global govern ance in a world of states. As the number of states worldwide has risen steadily, national leaders of these fledgling states have turned to the UN and European rights declarations for inspiration when drafting constitutions and have often signed human rights conve tions quickly — sometimes more quickly than they can properly implement and uphold them — as a way of building up global respectability for their new political and legal systems, ‘The United Nations and its many interlocking institutions also. work with countries around the world to advance human rights and humanitarian values, and the Security Council itself found consensus to follow the doctrine of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) when it authorized in early 2011 a ‘no-fly zone’, an arms embargo, andGOVERNMENTS IN A GLOBALLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD 3 ultimately the use of force in Libya’s civil war as part of a controversial strategy to protect civilians from impending govern- ment attacks and also, by extension, give revolutionary forces a better chance at dis- lodging the regime of Moammar Gaddafi ‘The R2P doctrine signals a growing will- ingness on the part of states to intervene in the affairs of regimes east as illegitimate or unable to protect their own people, and R2P is also resolutely statist, Decisions about which states might lack legitimacy to justify intervention and the deployments of force that follow are made by group of states against other individual states ~ the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with Britain, France and the United States taking the lead, intervened in Libya — and so far, states have applied R2P selectively. While the Libyan revolution ousted Gaddafi thanks in part to NATO air strikes, in Syria Bashar Hafez al-Assad remained in power at the start of 2014 even though his government and military forces had committed far worse atrocities against thousands of fighters and protesters, including a chemical weapons attack in August 2013 that killed an esti- mated 1400 civilians After U.S. President Barack Ohama threatened to launch limited military strikes against Syria but received little backing at home or abroad, the Syrian government promised in an agreement worked out by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations Security Council to destroy its stockpiles of chemical weapons. Despite the statist orientation of R2P, it does signal an important shift: the protection of human beings, at least in some limited cases, now takes higher priority than the protection of any particular government from external intervention. And as international relations theorist Michael Doyle has argued, the ambiguous status of R2P might be prefers ble, in some respects, to more clear-cut alternatives in either direction, if clarity ‘either abandons vulnerable populations or imposes unrealistic expectations of enforced human rights’ (Doyle, 2011: 72). Alongside the vertical linkages that bind states to international institutions, horizontal linkages across national bureaucracies have strengthened in recent decades, us compati- ble national agencies increasingly share information, agree to common standards and work side-by-side on host of areas: finance ministers fending off economic instability; regulators coordinating seizures of funds ‘raced to suspected criminal gangs or terror ist organizations; bankruptey judges in mul- tiple countries solving through negotiated agreements tricky cases that stretch across borders. ‘Transgovernmental networks’ among interconnected states are yet another hallmark of twenty-first century global poli- tics as national governments try to smooth out more productive and efficient working relationshipsamong themselves. International aw scholar Anne Marie Slaughter argues that the rise of transgovernmental networks among participating states helps resolve the ‘globalization paradox’ of needing more gov- emment to ‘solve collective problems that can only be addressed on a global scale’ (2004: 8) but “fearing” more centralized forms of authority, sueh as a prospective world government. “The state is not disap- pearing: it is disageregating. ts component institutions ~ regulators, judges, and even legislators — are all reaching out beyond national borders in various ways, finding that their once “domestic” jobs have an interna- tional dimension’ (Slaughter, 2004: 31). Slaughter (2004: 24) believes that transgov- cemmental networks improve the competence and regulatory effectiveness of governments and also bring governments around the world into greater harmony with intemational norms and treaties. She also argues that relying on national governments to handle global issues is preferable to creating a world government that would be ‘infeasible and undesirable. The size and scope of such a government presents an unavoidable and dangerous threat to individual liberty. Further, the diversity of the peoples to be governed makes it almost impossible to conceive of a global demos’ (Slaughter, 2004: 8), However, Slaughter sets14 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION up a false choice here: the leading contempo- rary scholarship on global governance does not call for a singular, monolithic world gov- cemment that would be remote from everyday citizens and their concerns and also possibly collapse all the peoples of the world into a single ‘demos Instead, scholars are trying 10 figure out how to create new global institu- tions that would complement national gov- emments and also open up new venues for democratic responsiveness and political engagement in the international arena, As Daniele Archibugi has argued (2008; 284): ‘Only by creating a global commonwealth of citizens who will express themselves in world politics can some changes be achieved. Empowering the citizen of the world means to build up, at the global level, those checks and balances that have nurtured the evolution of democracy. Another problem is that transgovernmental networks among states bear mixed results for citizens. While streamlined collaboration among states in some cases means better delivery of goverment services, in other cases it can mean intrusions by the “national security state” into civil liberties and privacy rights. This became especially apparent after the flood of disclosures in the summer of 2013 about the massive global surveillance opera tions engineered by the United States National Security Ageney and its government and busi ness partners around the world, One of the NNSA's former employees, Edward Snowden, ended up in temporary asylum in Russia after the U.S. govemment revoked his passport and sought to prosecute him for releasing the information to journalists. From interceptions of e-mail messages to the tracking of mobile phones, government intrusions into private spaces have become pervasive in many dimen- sions in the digital age. As international travel- lers are well aware, passport control officers in many countries now commonly take man- datory photographs and collect fingerprints of everyone passing through checkpoints, mak- ing it easier for national governments to share details on the biometries and travel patterns of millions of individuals; many countries have also recently been adding “biometric authenti- cation’ components into the issuing of pass ports and visas. Beyond transgovernmental networks, n it comes to the advancement of univer- sal principles, other important horizontal linkages and patterns of accountability have been building between states and non- governmental actors, States now compete not only for economic advantage but ‘moral credibility, and this is particularly evi- dent in the ways that many civil society organizations and think tanks now rank states, and release annual indexes. Transparency International's ‘corruption perceptions index’, Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” index of political rights and civil lib- erties, the democracy index published by The Economist Intelligence Unit, the press free- dom index compiled by Reporters Without Borders, the ‘Failed States Index’ from Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace, and the ‘Beiter Life Index’ launched in 2011 by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) all have an impact on a country’s competitive- ness and ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2005). National elites seeking greater global appeal for their countries ~ especially relatively new states ~ wateh these kinds of league tables closely. Iso for STATES AS TARGETS: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM ‘Transnational advoe: have y networks gained in prominence so extensively that itis, hard to believe, in hindsight, that just 20 years ago this was an understudied phenom- ‘enon in international relations and political sociology. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink blazed the trail for contemporary scholars with their book Activists Beyond Borders, which illustrated how transnational activism has deep roots that go back 10 nineteenth-century campaigns against slay- ery, against foot-binding practices in China, and for women’s voting rights. Keck andGOVERNMENTS IN A GLOBALLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD us Sikkink coined the phrase ‘boomerang pat tem of influence” (1998: 12) to describe what can happen when domestic civil society organizations on the losing ends of political struggles within their respective countries join forces with compatible advocacy groups overseas that can pressure the national gov- emments in question. As noted by Keck and Sikkink (1998: 37): ‘When a state recognizes the legitimacy of international interventions and changes its domestic behavior in response to international pressure, it reconstitutes the relationship between the state, its citizens and international actors’. This is *how net work practices instantiate new norms’ as states transform their policies and practices especially with regard to human rights and fundamental freedoms Coincidentally, at just about the same time as Keck and Sikkink published their book, the Norwegian Nobel Committee — itself an important actor within transnational civil society ~ called attention to the rising trend of Internet activism by awarding the Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and its coordinator, Jody Williams. ‘whose Vermont barn (where she had her hom office) became a local symbol for the larger dynamic of global activism, The 1997 Peace Prize also reminds us of the centrality of states: after all, the global advocacy campaign to ban landmines as a weapon of war specifi cally targeted states and urged them to sign the Ottawa Treaty that now has 160 countries on board. (Similar to the Intemational Criminal Court, however, some of the work's largest countries, such as China, Russia, and the United States have not signed.) ‘Then there is the sustained global citizens campaign — what many call the global justice movement ~ to call for alternatives to neo- liberal economic globalization, Many schol- ars and activists trace the contemporary origins of this movement to the transnational campaign launched in 1994 in Chiapas, Mexico, by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejéreito Zapatista de Liberacién Nacional) in response to the North American Free Trade Agreement, Another early victory for the movement came in 1998, when citizen activists stopped the Multilateral Agreement oon Investment dead in its tracks, with activ ists objecting that it would create a “bill of rights’ for global corporations but make it difficult for states to regulate investors from abroad (Barlow and Clarke, 1997), And then in November 1999 came what remains the “alter-globalization’ movement's single most celebrated event: the meeting of the World ‘Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle. Some of the problems that continue to confront the ‘movement became more obvious in the after- ‘math of Seattle: meciia attention ofien focused more on street disruptions and violent inci dents and deceptively framed the movement a ‘anti-globalization’ rather than for an alter- native model of globalization more attentive to human rights, participatory democracy, local control, sustainability and cultural diversity (Cavanagh and Mander, 2004: 77-108). In any case, the surge in public con- sciousness of globalization and all its impli- cations led growing numbers of everyday people during this period to begin thinking of themselves as “global citizens" and to link this, idea substantially with concepts of aware- ness, responsibility, participation and eross- cultural empathy (Schattle, 2008). Following the terrorist attacks that hit New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the public visibility of the movement challenging the ‘Washington consensus” version of economic globalization entered a doldrums phase. Tt didn’t help that the first WTO meeting held after 9/11 took place in Dohar, Qatar, a remote location difticult for activists to target, and national governments around the world have ratcheted up denials of entry to activists seeking 10 travel into countries in the days leading up to the big meetings of intemational organizations. The global justice movement as a vehicle for citizens 10 interact beyond the nation-state continued to expand and become more coherent, particularly with the entry of the World Social Forum as a counterpoint to the World Economic Forum (Steger and Wilson, 2012). And yet, power disparities have16 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION solidified during the past decade: while the World Economic Forum is lavishly funded, efficiently organized, and easy to observe online (at least superficially) with a compre: hensive website and abundantly archived documents and transcripts of proceedings (print, audio and video), the World Social Forum can be trickier for everyday people to follow, partly because its culture of avoiding hierarchy and centralized control leaves it without a single permanent web- site. While this does not keep the World Social Forum’s active members from com- municating with each other all year round, it renders this civil society clearinghouse less transparent, in some important respects, than its more powerful counterparts under- written by the world’s largest corporations and national governments. The disparities in power and public visibility hand an advan- tage in the globalization debates to market and state forces that ultimately back neo- liberalism rather than more socially and environmentally responsive alternative Scholarship in this field has advanced steadily, especially by examining the ways transnational activism fas opened up new points of interaction between domestic poli ties and intemational relations. From the perspective of contentious polities, Sidney ‘Tarrow (2005: 59-60) has shown how domes tic political and social activists ‘come to see their local grievances in terms that connect them to economic globalization’. AS a result, they tum to what Tarrow calls ‘global fram- ing” and link their particular local or national claims with more widely recognized claims, causes and symbols than their original issue might have seemed to warrant, (Tarrow describes, for example, how American activ~ ists fighting to save community gardens part- nered with farmers from developing countries outside the 1999 World Trade Organization summit in Seattle.) Tarrow also has explored. hhow transnational activists tend to be “rooted cosmopolitans’ who stay planted mainly within their respective home countries and local communities alongside occasional for- ays abroad that place them more directly in contact with fellow activists and the govern ing or corporate institutions of interest: The new transnational activism is as multifaceted a8 the Intemationalism within which it has femerged. Although globalization and global neo- liberalism are frames around which many activists mobilize, the protests and organizations we have seen in ths study ate not the product of a global imaginary but of domestically rooted activists (who) are the connective tissue ofthe global and the local, working as activators, brokers and advo- ‘ates for claims bath domestic and international {arow, 2005: 205-6) Global activists, then, direct a great deal of energy at states, and whether or not particu lar campaigns by global civil society activ- ists succeed or fail depends heavily on how they are received within the corridors of specific national governments. As Joshua Busby argues in Moral Movements and Foreign Policy, campaigns have a better shot at suecess when activists and their n work partners can convince key ‘gatekeep- ets’ that important shared values ate at stake. What works in one country some- times backfires in another: the Irish celeb- rity musician Bono, for instance, made a seemingly unlikely connection with the late US Senator Jesse Helms, on the issue of debt relief for developing countries by emphasizing how the Jubilee 2000 cam- paign had an important link with Biblical seriptures. The appeal to religion succeeded in Washington but then fell flat in Tokyo, where the argument needed to be ‘reframed as a test of Japan’s international contribu tion’ (Busby 2010: 12, 70-103) The social media revolution has lifted advocacy groups and social movements into aan exciting new phase and energized civil society organizations at all levels. The revolu- tions in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 showed how engaged citizens could topple dictatorships, even if these cases were excep tional and citizens elsewhere in the region continie to weather the storms of political repression and police brutality: even within Egypt, public frustration with the successor government and its authoritarian taetiesGOVERNMENTS IN A GLOBALLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD Ww remained high in early 2014, especi repeated crackdowns on prominent demo- cratic activists. But change is afoot around the world: protests in Myanmar (Burma) helped along by cyberactivism eventually pushed the government there to open up partially, while in China, citizens are more connected and vocal than before, even if the government is Stil working {0 manipulate public opinion nd crush dissent (Shirk, 2010). Social med platforms have also eased the way for citizens {groups across the ‘global south’ to build net- work partners. Facebook, Twitter and their localized counterparts around the world now figure heavily in much of the new scholarship in transnational advocacy movements; in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, for instance scholars and commentators were plumbing the depths of cyberspace to assess whether “the revolution would be retweeted” (Gladwell, 2010; Starbird and Palen, 2012). Politic: elites and everyday citizens everywhere are using new media to navigate and renegotiate their relationships in the global age ~ and this leads us to another important development in global studies: the growing interaction between the fields of international relations and political communication. ly after COMMUNICATION NETWORKS, NEW MEDIA AND THE STATE Globalization has accompanied new forms of igital media that bring to light the possibili- ties for new kinds of communities to coalesce Via networks and create new arenas for polit- cal interaction, identity and belonging. Sociologist and communication theorist Manuel Castells pioneered the concept of the “network society’ (2000) with his cautious ‘optimism that citizens and civil society organ- izations can increasingly use networks to gain power relative to states by generating ‘alterna- tive discourses that have the potential 10 over- ‘whelm the disciplinary discursive capacity of the state as a necessary step to neutralizing its e of violence’ (2009: 16). Castells believes, states are making a ‘pragmatic transformation’ (2009: 39) by adapting to fit in among other “socially decisive global networks’ in arenas such as finance, education, science, technol- ogy, arts, culture, sports (think about the Olympics and World Cup), and so forth. However, Castells sees an inherent deficiency in how states have cast themselves into the global arena: for the most part, national gov= emments view themselves as representing merely their immediate and particular inter- ests rather than working to pursue any kind of ¢global common good: Global governance is seen asa field of opportu nity to maximize one's own interests, rather than a new context in which political institu tions share governance around common pro {ects n fact, the more the globalization process proceeds, the more the contradictions it gener ates (identity crises, economic crises, security crises) lead to 2 revival of nationalism, and to ‘attempts to restore the primacy of sovereignty ’As long as these geopolitical contradictions persist, the world cannot shift from a prag- matic, ad hoc networking form of negotiated decision-making to a system of constitutionally founded, networked, global governance (Castells, 2009: 41-2) The silver lining is that new media opens up potential for citizens to gain leverage: In the last resort, it is only the power of global civil society acting on the public mind via the media and communication networks that may eventually overcome the historical inertia of nation-states’ (Castells, 2009: 42). Citizen campaigns targeting global warming, social movements against corporate globalization and the online citi- zen mobilization that helped build momen- tum for Barack Obama’s successful 2008 election campaign all illustrate, for Castells, a new kind of ‘insurgent politics’ challeng- ing the old ways that states exert their dominance. The Occupy movement target- ing the forces behind social and economic inequality took this ‘insurgent polities’ to a new level with protests cresting in the fall of 2011 that swiftly spread to dozens of countries A new intellectual fault line, though, has, been emerging at the nexus of political18 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION communication and international relations regarding whether the new communica- tions technology is giving the upper hand to citizens or states. While growing num- bers of ‘network-oriented” scholars such as Castells are trying to pull together evi- dence tracing the extent that citizens in the ‘net generation’ are gaining ground, scep- ties argue that authoritarian states are working hard to consolidate their power advantages and preserve power imbalances that ultimately will strengthen their coer cive authority over citizens. In his book The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, Evgeny Morozov describes the many uphill battles facing democracy activists in dictatorships around the world and wars that constitutional democracies such as the United States, are not always careful enough to avoid unin- tended outcomes when advocating for dis- sidents in countries such as Iran and China, An official in the US State Department, for instance, sent an email message to Twitter in June 2009, in the midst of massive street demonstrations in Tehran following a dis- puted result in Iran’s presidential election, asking Twitter on behalf of the Obama administration to delay routine mainte~ nance to its network in order to ensure that protesters would be able to keep micro- blogging without interruption. — In Morozov's view, this move by the United States government was misguided: ‘The mate Western policymakers talk up the threat that bloggers pose to authortarian regimes, the ‘more likely those regimes are to limit the mane ver space where those bloggers operate... If, on closer examination, it tums out that the Internet has also empowered the secret police, the cen- 0%, and the propaganda offices of @ modern authoritarian regime, its quite Ikely that the pro- cess of democratization will become harder, not easier. (Morozov, 2011: 27) ‘echnological advances have also made it casier for authoritarian states from Russia to Saudi Arabia to Myanmar to silence pesky bloggers using software programs that filter Internet content and “denial-of-service™ attacks, making the targeted computers or web servers temporarily unavailable. More often, writes Morozov, it is not government officials who carry out eyberattacks and censorship these days but rather their inter~ mediaries and sympathizers ~ citizens will- ing to go out of their way to stifle public debate: The old model assumed that censorship was expensive and could only be carried out by one party ~ the government, Today, however, while many kinds of censorship are stil expensive (e.g, software like GreenDam), others are cheap and getting cheaper (e.g., DDoS attacks). This allows the governments to deflect the blame ~ they're nat doing the censorship, afterall - and thus significantly undercounts total censorship in the world. In many cases, governments don’t have to do anything at all: plenty of thei loyal supporters will be launching DDoS attacks on their own, The democratization of access to launching cyber-attacks has resulted in the democratization of censorship; this is poised to have chiling effects on freedom of expression. (Morozov 2011: 109-10), As much as Morozov worries about Internet communication and its ill effects upon civil rights and free expression, he also points out that “the only thing worse than an authoritar- ian state is @ failed one’ (2011: 264) and se the need for strong and effective states to protect their citizens from scam artists, trolls and criminals online. There are plenty of other ways states have been trying to be strong and effective in a world of (partial) media globalization, especially when it comes to strategic com- munication both at home and abroad. As we have already noted, states now compete in all sorts of ways for economic advantage and moral credibility, and states now expend vast resources. in communicating their respective points of view and trying to get a leg up on their counterparts in the court of global public opinion. Even the world’s most isolated and repressive states, ‘most notably North Korea, maintain web- sites trumpeting their national leaders and churning out colourful (and frequently hellicose) news releases. This has beenGOVERNMENTS IN A GLOBALLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD 19 compounded in the social media ag. ambassadors from many countries now take ‘public diplomacy’ literally and maintain Facebook groups, Twitter feeds, and dual blog postings written in both the language of the country they represent and the lan- guage of the country where they are serv- ing. And across all levels of government, from city halls to presidential offices, inter- active ‘e-government’ sites have spread worldwide in tandem with constitutional democracies; citizens can communicate ack and forth with government officials online not only to gain information about government policies and initiatives but to articulate their concerns (Coleman and Blumler, 2009). Even more visible to media mavens is the dramatic rise in state-funded television networks diversifying the landscapes of global electronic newsgathering. No longer is the American vanguard of CNN a hegem- onic presence: BBC World (United Kingdom), Al Jazeera English (Qatar), Al Arabiya (Saudi Arabia), France 24, Russia ‘Today, CCTV (China), NHK World (Japan) are among the most visible players in this, growing industry ~ and national leaders often get first wind of momentous events not through their intelligence agencies or diplomatic emissaries but through these broadcasters. Television news played a pivotal role during the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 — as live reports from West Germany fuelled public demands in East Berlin to open the checkpoints, d ing a final blow to the efforts of the fum- bling East German state to keep its citizens pened within its borders, Likewise, Al Jazeera played a similar role in the Arab Spring revolutions, broadeasting videos filmed by protesters their mobile phones and forwarded via e-mail to their studios. (Imagine if online forwarding had been widely available in 1989!) A growing segment of global broadcasting is state controlled, and this brings mixed consequences. Quality journalism is a public good, 10 be sure, and some scholars have argued that publicly subsidized journalism is, needed to sustain an informed democratic citizenry given that “independent” newspa- pers and television networks dependent on corporate advertising have seen their sources, of revenue drying up as advertising is redi- recied to other sources, frequently online (McChesney and Pickard, 2011). But the new state-run television networks often stamp their national thumbprints on events in ways that reinforce the world views and stra- tegic interests of their rulers more than the Viewpoints and needs of their publies. They also often hold other countries to critical scrutiny while downplaying or even ignoring domestic controversies in their own back- yards. Al Jazeera tends to go easy on the Emir of Qatar, while Russia Today “features a subtle but distinctly Putinesque view of the world’ (Seib, 2008). In this new world of state-run broadcasting, the lines between journalism and propaganda are often blurred and concealed — and also defended, if not legitimized, by the government ministries shelling out the money. States do not have the final word, though, in the cacophony of global media: participa- tory news organizations (often reliant upon volunteer activists as correspondents) have become important players in global public space, indymedia.org launched one week before the 1999 World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle and has continued to attract readers ever since then (Kidd, 2003), and Wikipedia and WikiLeaks obviously fall into a similar category of information sharing by global citizens for global citizens. The Internet makes it possible now for citizens to click back and forth between ‘mainstream media’ and “alternative media’ and to gain myriad perspectives from around the world, in contrast to the days when collections of newspapers and magazines from other coun- Aries were tucked away in corners of the more well-endowed libraries. This illustrates how the channels of global political communica- tion have become diffused across a wide variety of state-run, market-backed and citi- zen-driven outlets. Although the ‘digital120 ‘THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION divide’ remains a_ problem (Norris, 2001; Mossberger et al., 2007), the world’s “digital citizens’ fortunate enough to have Internet access and the capability 1o make the most of eyberspace now face the enviable challenge Of seeking out these competing sources of information, separating the wheat from the chaff, evaluating for themselves which sources are credible and compelling enough to follow on a continuing basis, and explor- ing many perspectives rather than confining themselves to “echo chambers” that merely reinforce their personal points of view Gamieson and Cappella, 2010; Sunstein 2009). Good citizenship in the global me age takes effort, but the amenities are many! ‘CONCLUSION ‘Today we see more states than ever and more constitutional democracies that profess com ‘mitments to human rights and the rule of law. ‘These states claim for themselves an ever widening array of regulatory powers and bureaucratic funetions and hold themselves increasingly accountable to international norms and principles. We also see more citi- zens, civil society organizations and corpora- tions than ever seeking to wanscend the ‘boundaries of states and place their enterprises, endeavours and daily lives beyond any particu- lar territory or political community narrowly defined in spatial terms — even as states respond by tightening up the legal require- ‘ments for citizenship status and trying 10 eur unauthorized immigration. The state as we know it is neither being eclipsed nor gaining exclusive monopoly power over citizens. and their allegiances. As Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach have noted (2012: 280) Wher al is said and done, itis difficult to general ize about the impact of globalzation on states, Globalization has been faciitated by state benav- Tor even as it constrains state autonomy and reduces state capacity. For national leaders, the claim that globalization limits autonomy provides justification for policies they wish to undertake while denying responsibility for them, Several related concluding points, then, ‘emerge from our analysis: + Globalization coincides with states and indeed has spurred the creation of mary new states — with many nations and ethnic, linguistic and religious communities long submerged within existing states rising up and demanding state- hood for themselves. + States now operate in a world in which power is dispersed both horizontally (cil society and the: marketplace) and. verically (intemational organizations, subnational potical authorities and secession movements) + Globalization shapes states, and states in tum shape globalization, and this cular flow encom- passes many elements, such as transnational capi- tal investments, ideas, brands, art and music fm, broadcasting, sprting event, and so forth + Because the benefits and casts of globalization are unevenly distributed across states and popu lations, life chances for individual citizens are heavily determined by the particular states they ae from ~ and how these states measure up in Safeguarding basic rights and ensuring the provi- sion of basic needs. + States set the agendas and also drive the terms of cooperation that govern the word's leading international orgaizations, from the United Nations to the Word Trade Organization, States aso craft and uphold the cammon standards that emerge from thes institutions + Globalization places states into direct competi tion, States now compete on a varity of fronts: economic policies that offer the most favour able incentives for multinational corporations to locate within their jurisdictions, tourism cam- paigns that attract the worlds upwardly mobile populations and ther disposable incomes, and politcal systems that meet basic minimum standards of of democratic egjtimacy and moral credbbilty. Relative newcomer states on the global stage or states stil transitioning from authoritarian systems to free-market. capital- ism and constitutional democracy pay especially close attention to how their countries stack up in the league tables. + Globalization has sparked competing. dynam- ics of power difusion and power consolidation (Schattle, 2012) While citizen activists and cv society organizations, aided by Internet com- munication and social media platforms, have clearly gained leverage in world politics, eachGOVERNMENTS IN A GLOBALLY INTERCONNECTED WORLD m1 state around the world exerts itself to maintain, in Weberian terms, their ‘laim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the ‘enforcement of its order. We see this with biting Clarity inthe rise of the ‘national security state’ In the end, we are left with uncertainty about what it will take for states to uphold a more comprehensive set of rights: civil and politi~ cal rights as well as social and economic rights, which are essential for citizens 10 flourish but have taken a back seat in the cur rent political climate. As noted by Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir (2004: 209), the current progression of globalization and the existing makeup of governing institutions have left us with a ‘citizenship gap’ in which “the globalization of migration, production, regulation and conflict construct rights with= out suificient institutions to enforce them, identities without membership. and partici- pation for some at the expense of others ‘One major challenge ahead is for individuals and institutions of all kinds to work more assiduously to close this ‘citizenship gap” and create more equitable and sustainable conditions for the next generation, DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1 What kinds of states do we need to handle today’s mast pressing problems? 2. How is globalization changing the overall bal- ance of power between states and citizens? 3 How does the resilience of states both advance and inhibit democracy and how democratic is a world of globally interconnected states? 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