PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL REVISION

LICENCES
Licences are not proprietary rights, they are personal. Therefore, they
are generally revocable. They are only irrevocable and binding if
coupled with a proprietary interest or via an equitable measure –
estoppel.

From strongest to weakest:

- Fee simple
- Legal lease
- Licence coupled with grant
- Equitable lease
- Licences
- Personal interests

A licence coupled with a grant exists somewhere between legal and

equitable lease.

Types of licences:

- Gratuitous licence – a licence to occupy or otherwise use land,

which is given without consideration, e.g. social invitations for
dinner/ party. Since they are given without consideration they are
revocable by the licensor at any time as such it is neither binding
on them nor successor in title/ future purchaser.

- License coupled with a grant – a right to enter land which is a

necessary corollary to the existence of a property right. Essentially
the licensee needs access to licensor’s land to exercise their profit
à prende (their right to take and carry away). So the license is
inextricably linked to the property right (p à p) in question and is
thus irrevocable and binding on licensor. They are not binding
on 3rd parties/ the purchaser/ successors.

- Contractual licences – a licence to use another person’s land given

with consideration. The relationship between the parties is
commercial in nature. A contractual licence may be revocable or
irrevocable in accordance with the terms of the contract
between the parties, and their intentions when signing it. If the
revocation of a licence is a breach of contract, the licensee may
recover damages for the breach. There was some debate as to
whether contractual licences are binding on successors (see
Ashburn Anstalt). It was concluded that generally, it is not
 binding on successors/ third parties/ purchaser (although I can
see it being binding if the new owner is also a party to the contract
but that’s probs v. rare).

- Estoppel licences – principal role of proprietary estoppel is to

enable rights to be acquired in another’s land. The underlying
ethos of doctrine is that A acts in the expectation that he either
already has rights in or will later obtain rights in B’s land.
Equity will grant said rights if A relied upon that expectation in
circumstances when it would be unconscionable for B to renege.
The court exercises discretion in determining what remedy would
most appropriately give effect to A’s expectation.

Cases that exist on fault line between licences and leases:

- Smith v Nottinghamshire CC [1981]

- Wettern Electric Ltd v. Welsh Development Agency [1983]
- Manchester Airport plc v Dutton and ors [2000]

PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL
P estoppel means you are trying to stop somebody from enforcing their
rights against you.

- An estoppel licence is not a different kind of licence. It is just

a remedy. But it is kind of coupled together and called an estoppel
licence cause its granted as part of the equity.

- It is not easy to revoke one. For example in Inwards v Baker,

there are no circumstances where it would be conscionable to
remove son from property.

- There are NO formalities in this area of law. The doctrine is

effectively answering a question of whether it is possible to bring a
claim to property without having something (a deed etc.) that
complies with the LPMPA 1989. The answer is yes.

There are 3 elements & 4 criteria that must be satisfied to raise an equity
(Inwards v Baker; Ashburn; Taylor Fashions):

1. Assurance
2. Reliance
3. Detriment
4. Unconscionability*
*The arisen equity may be satisfied in various ways and it’s up to the
court to decide how to grant relief to person who’s entitled to this
protection. The courts consider context, conscionability, expectation,
proportionality to determine what’s fair in the circumstances. It is at
this point satisfying the equity comes in – it’s intertwined almost with
establishing the equity, as the elements connect directly to the outcome.
It’s a holistic approach – Gillet v Holt.

[LEADING CASE: Thorner v Major [2009]The House of Lords held

that it is possible for a representation to be made by conduct alone, so
long as that conduct conveys the message to a reasonable person
sufficiently clearly that the claimant was to have a proprietary interest in
the land. This was to be determined by all relevant circumstances,
including the context of any representations or conduct, the relationship
between the parties and their understanding of the context. In most
cases where the message behind the conduct is somewhat ambiguous,
the House of Lords thought this would not normally act to defeat
proprietary estoppel.]

The effect of an estoppel licence on a transferee:

LRA 2002, s 116 ‘an equity by estoppel’ – recognizes that an equity that
arises under such a claim is protected by this section and that an equity
by estoppel is capable of binding third parties/ successors. It can
alternatively be protected by actual occupation – the same way as for an
equitable lease.

Estoppel doctrine applies to variety of cases:

- The imperfect gift cases – with families the contracts tend to get
forgotten
- Common expectation cases – like in Thorner, where there is
cultivated an expectation in relation to a piece of land.
- The unilateral mistake cases – rare. A neighboring landowner
mistakenly thinks they are entitled to do something but landowner
doesn’t correct them. So the landowner is standing back and
allowing someone to make a mistake to their benefit/ interest. This
is grounds for estoppel as you could have stopped them from acting
when you had the chance.

A. ASSURANCE

Forms of assurance:

1. Active assurance – words of encouragement for example. See

Pascoe v Turner; Thorner v Major; Gillet v Holt; Yeoman’s Row
2. Passive assurance – see Ramsden v Dyson
CERTAINTY OF ASSURANCE

The person bringing claim has to be certain what interest in land they
think they were promised cause scope of expectation has a causal
link to the remedy granted. See Thorner v Major.

UNCERTAIN ASSURANCES

- Lissimore v Downing (2003)

- Wayling v Jones (1995)

IRREVOCABILITY

Gillet v Holt – promise irrevocable if unconscionable unless alternative

arrangements have been made to satisfy the arisen equity.

B. RELIANCE

A change of position. This is difficult to show as “reliance and detriment

are often intertwined” (Gillet v Holt).
Reliance can be seen in Thorner where M forwent higher education and
other opportunities after the insurance policy made him change his mind.
The same thing happened in Gillet – assurances were given which
prevented him/ thwarted his plans to seek fortunes elsewhere. See
Coombes v Smith for failed attempt to establish reliance.

C. DETRIMENT

There is a connection between the detriment you suffer and whether that
notionally amounts to the asset you are asking for. Financial detriment
is usually what is looked for. In Gillet, court considered whether working
for 80% less wage than you deserve for 30 years warranted inheriting the
entire asset and concluded that it did. The losses and gains will be
weighed up. More on detriment in Gillet (below).

DETRIMENTAL CONDUCT:

1. Improving land – see Pascoe v Turner

2. Suffering financial disadvantage – more distinct than money

In Thorner, Major he was made to work for free and that is obviously
cash loss but what does that mean? If you work for free what is the
impact on your life, your family/ children – can you send them to private
school? Go on holidays? What does this mean to the quality of your life?
What is the consequence for 30 years? In Gillet, court weighed up power
relations between them. Holt was godfather of one of G’s children and
only sent that one to private school. He had an almost domineering
influence on Gillet’s life and it boiled down to money.

3. Non-financial personal disadvantage – foregoing further education

or other opportunities etc. See Greasley v Cooke [1980].

REMEMBER MAXIM: "He who comes into equity must come with
clean hands."
Due to misconduct of representee/applicant in Brynowen Estates Ltd v
Bourne (1981), the court refused to grant any award/ satisfaction
though an equity had arisen. She acted so badly before the court came
to trial – causing a nuisance at the asset and harassing people staying
there.

EXHAUSTION OF EQUITY: Sledmore v Dalby (1996) – Father gives

daughter and son in law (S) house. S does roof repairs on house.
Daughter dies but S lives there for the next 15 years. Father dies and
mother has nowhere to live; she is sick and wants to move in. Can she
take property back? The money he paid for the roof only bought him
a certain amount of time and the time has been spent. So the equity
arose but has since been satisfied. He lived there for free for 15 years so
he has had the benefit of the equity considering his detriment.

SATISFYING THE ESTOPPEL

General principle: “The court must look at the circumstances in each

case to decide in what way the equity can be satisfied.” – Plimmer v City
of Wellington Corp (1884).

Courts either favour:

1. Expectation-based approach –Thorner was expectation – he

expected farm and he got farm.

2. Compensation-based approach – court uses this where they don’t

feel applicant has relied on or suffered enough detriment to
warrant the full asset/ expectation. So they award you what they
think is proportional to your detriment.

PROPORTIONALITY

- Jennings v Rice 2002

- Davies v Davies 2016

Possible ways to satisfy equity:

 - Conveyance of a freehold – like in Thorner/ Gillet
- Grant of a lease – like Griffiths v Williams 1977
- Right to occupy – Inwards v Baker
- Compensation – Dodsworth v Dodsworth (1973)
- No remedy – Appleby v Cowley [1982] where the benefit of equity
was already satisfied i.e. you’ve had satisfaction for your
expenditure (like in Sledmore (above).

PRIORITY
The priority rule is under s 116(a) LRA 2002.

116 Proprietary estoppel and mere equities

It is hereby declared for the avoidance of doubt that, in relation to

registered land, each of the following—
(a)an equity by estoppel, and
(b)a mere equity,
has effect from the time the equity arises as an interest capable of
binding successors in title (subject to the rules about the effect of
dispositions on priority).

Equity arising by estoppel is proprietary and is capable of binding

successors in title subject to usual disposition rules – ss 28-30.

Proprietary estoppel is thus protected against purchasers by notice or

overriding interests (actual occupation at the right date).

OVERREACHING?

NO. An equity by estoppel is not capable of being overreached as it

does not fall within s.2 LPA 1925.

She left this essay Q. Hint that q for PE is exam question not problem?
Plus the in depth analysis in the seminar… hmmm:

Even after Thorner v Major (2009), the search for clarity and principle in
proprietary estoppel continues.’ Discuss.
To what extent does the current law on proprietary estoppel achieve a
satisfactory balance between certainty and fairness?
NAME FACTS ISSUE RATIO COMMENTS
Ashburn This case is now A contractual licence Some history:
Anstalt v authority on isn’t binding on
Arnold licences. Note: purchaser of land Orthodox position:
1989 the ratio on regardless of notice. Contractual licence
leases was CA setting record not enduring/
wrongly decided straight that licence is enforceable against
and has been just a personal right. new landlord/
overturned. incoming purchaser
“Down to this point we as licences are
do not think that there is personal interests
any serious doubt as to not proprietary.
the law. A mere Additionally, the
contractual licence to new landlord was
occupy land is not
not party to the
binding on a purchaser
contract – King v
of the land even though
David Allen & Sons
he has notice of the
licence.” 1916.

They said we don’t need Denning’s attempts

to look at reasoning in to alter orthodox
Errington anymore. They position: Errington
reclassify D’s v Errington &
judgements in those 2 Woods 1952 and
cases and say Binion v Evans
jurisprudence in regard 1972 – He
to trusts/ equity etc is essentially made
evolved so he would have contractual
said 1) either Errington licences equitable
would be an estate interests by
contract, 2) or there was twisting the law.
a resulting trust – paying
mortgage installments. Ashburn
A mortgage is a capital reclassified and
amount so as soon as she clarified the law of
started paying a trust licences.
arose. A trust is
equitable and protected More recent
against mother in law by reiteration:
virtue of her being in Lloyd v Dugdale
actual occupation, 3) or [2002]:
an equity by virtue of ‘“Notwithstanding
proprietary estoppel some previous
arose – daughter was authority
made a promise and suggesting the
relied on that assurance contrary, a
to her detriment contractual licence
(assurance/promise; is not to be treated
reliance and detriment a creating a
are the 3 basic proprietary interest
backbones of estoppel). in land so as to
The priority of this
 interest is protected by bind third parties
her being in actual who acquire the
occupation. land with notice of
Often estoppel and trust it, on this account
interests overlap. First alone.’
part of the test is
whether there has been
an assurance or
promise? yes; second has
she relied on it? Yes
cause for a long time she
lived there paying off the
house without looking
for another place to live;
lastly has she relied on it
to her detriment? Yes –
the easiest way to show
this is the outlay of
money and she has done
this.

Smith v Smith are They are granted it.

Nottingha students Quiet enjoyment is
mshire CC studying for enjoyed by leases.
[1981] exams. Outside
their
accommodation
are builders
doing loud work.
The students
bring a claim to
quiet enjoyment
under their
licence.

Wettern Wettern was Court said property

Electric about structural should be fit for
Ltd v. defects – purpose. These are the
Welsh property that usual conditions for a
Developm wasn’t fit for lease – they’re not
ent purpose. commonly found in
Agency licences.
[1983]

Manchest Peculiar case. Q was whether the

er Airport Manchester licensee had right to
plc v airport granted physically go on and
Dutton licence to enforce rights of
and ors someone to clear occupation and they did
[2000] land for despite not having
development. The occupational licence.
 land is then
invaded by
protesters who
want to protect
the land against
development.

Inwards v Kind father has Were It is quite plain from

Baker house with the these authorities that if
[1965] extensive garden. trustees the owner of land
His son is looking entitled requests another, or
to buy a house to indeed allows another, to
and he says build possessi expend money on the
house in my on? land under an
garden and you expectation created or
can stay here so encouraged by the
the son accepts landlord that he will be
that and relies on able to remain there,
it [good way to that raises an equity in
show reliance is the licensee such as to
by conduct. If they entitle him to stay. He
change course of has a licence coupled
action based on with an equity.
what you
promised then Court says equity has
that evinces it]. arisen as conditions are
Son spends £300 satisfied, because his
(detriment) to father has encouraged
build bungalow on him to come on and
father’s garden. watched him build, it
The father dies would be unconscionable
and the executors to take that away from
of his estate/will him. Court decides to
try to evict son. satisfy equity by
He has no title allowing son to stay
documents and for the rest of his life
there is nothing in based on licence
the will dealing agreement. Promise
with this. and outcome is
proportionate – as
father assured he
would be there forever
and as such equity
should be satisfied in this
way.

Thorner v A lot of these Estoppel license was Any representation

Major cases is about granted. The CA isolated or assurance need
[2009] succession the instances and only be “clear
planning. assessed them enough” in the
Technical family individually rather circumstances. It
and business than cumulatively in a
must be identified
conflicts. Thorner cohesive contextual
property.
and Major are fashion – they failed to
cousins with a paint a picture to gain a Reliance must be
significant age true understanding of reasonable.
difference. the situation/
Thorner is looking relationship they had – The belief must
for successor to which was a life’s worth
relate to identified
take over farm. D of assurances and
starts working on promise. property that the
T’s farm at around landowner owns or
14. In total D One of the arguments possibly is about
works for over 30 put forward by the to own.
years on T’s and executors was that the
his father’s farm. assurance was not When looking for
Farmers work clear and unequivocal representation/ass
from sunrise to – based on Yeomans. urance they will
sunset 12-18 Lord Neuberger look at
hours a day. D accepted this but said it
statements/conduc
worked between was subject to three
14-18 hours a day conditions – ts of parties over a
for 30 years for (1) any words or actions period of time and
free. His dad must be considered in what might be
didn’t pay him the context in which sufficient is
either he just they were made; statements which
collected pocket (2) it would be wrong for might be unclear
money from time a court to search for but to the claimant
to time. During uncertainty and it is they were “clear
the first 15 years sufficient for the person enough”. (supports
T assured him in invoking estoppel to G v H holistic
his own way that establish a reasonable
approach)
he would inherit belief in the assurance
the farm and he he relied on
said this in (3) even if the assurance Estoppel looks
limited words. could be reasonable backwards.
Gestures are his understood as having
main multiple meanings, and Reiterated 4
communication. the facts would criteria
He is also otherwise satisfy all
illiterate and estoppel elements, this The equity of
isn’t interested in ambiguity should not estoppel may
putting things deprive a person who fluctuate over
down. But there is reasonably relied on time. Once the
encouragement that assurance of all
equity is formed
that he needs a relief, and it may be
successor. right to afford relief on after claim is
Teenage D is the basis of the successful – once
encouraged, interpretation least court order is
relying and favourable to him. given that he is
working. T is a owed the asset –
man of few words Assurance: everything the
but expressed CA asked whether a
explicitly promise a statement of
farm entailed in
through actions intention or binding at that moment is
and conducts. all? Does promisor have crystallized.
Puts him in will to intend to have them
as main rely on it?
beneficiary, HL said CA is coming at
gives him death this from the wrong
duties direction. There are no
(inheritance binding promises
taxes) when he made in a family
tries to seek context. Yes it is
other business but it is family
opportunities. In business. None of this
some ways this is contract law reasoning
stronger than just applies to estoppel.
an oral promise as Estoppel looks
he has laid down backwards (it works in
arrangements in hindsight) – it is not
order for D to supposed to have
takeover when he foresight like regular
dies. rules of contract. So q is
Will is revoked for whether in the reality of
other reasons but what has transpired, was
T dies before there anything that
being able to legitimately made C
reinstate it. think or built an
Executors say expectation that he was
there is no will or going to get this interest;
anything in has C acted reliantly on
writing so it’s not this to his detriment, to
his. D says there the effect that the
is a course of assurances become a
dealing or promise. Was there
agreement that anything that amounted
stops the to an assurance and has
executors from the person relied to their
enforcing the promise such that it
strict legal would be unconscionable
rights against for promisor to renege
him. on promise.

Certainty of
assurance:
M was promised the
farm – its huge and the
size fluctuated over
the 30 years.
Executors said it was
too uncertain/ not
consistent. But HL said
it’s like once the
equity arises the
asset crystallizes. So
whatever the farm is at
that moment is the
farm/ the transferred
asset. Neither M nor T
 would have been
uncertain about what
the farm entailed
cause they both
worked on the field
together. No confusion
on their part. So the
extent of the interest is
confirmed once the
equity is formed.

Gillett v 12 year old G The court found in Holistic approach –

Holt [2000] works on golf favour of the claimant. the elements
course and meets There was no need for cannot be
Holt who is an the defendant to do considered
older farmer anything additional to separately. They
looking for a make his promise intermingle and
successor. There irrevocable. In view of flow from one
are discussion of the promises made, another.
H formally reliance was
adopting G but it presumed. The court Promise irrevocable
never occurs. G pointed out that the if unconscionable
lived with them three elements of the but allowed to alter
and ran the farm doctrine are often will if other
for 30 odd years intertwined and are not arrangements
at a wage of 80% separate. Whether there made to satisfy
lower than what is a mutual equity.
he was entitled to. understanding depends
Holt persuaded on all the factors. Detriment must not
Gillett to abandon Detriment is not a be financial, but
plans for college narrow or technical substantial.
and to work for concept and need not
him instead. Holt be financial. Gillett had
made several been denied the
open opportunity of
declarations bettering himself by
that on his leaving school.
death the farm Therefore, he had
would be G’s. He suffered a detriment in
made a will reliance upon Holt’s
openly and promise.
actively
encouraging G ‘it is important to note at
to rely on fact the outset that the
that he will be his doctrine of proprietary
successor. The estoppel cannot be
relationship treated as subdivided
between them into three or four
subsequently watertight
soured and Holt compartments. Both
disinherited G and sides are agreed on that,
left everything to and in the course of the
his lover. After an oral argument in this
investigation into court it repeatedly
how they were became apparent that
running the farm, the quality of the
the claimant was relevant assurances may
dismissed and influence the issue of
subsequently reliance, that reliance
claimed a and detriment are often
proprietary intertwined, and that
estoppel. whether there is a
distinct need for a
Proprietary 'mutual understanding'
estoppel allows may depend on how the
the claimant to other elements are
claim an interest formulated and
in land if the understood. Moreover
landowner makes the fundamental
a promise that the principle that equity is
claimant will concerned to prevent
acquire an unconscionable conduct
interest and the permeates all the
claimant acts to elements of the doctrine.
his detriment in In the end the court
reliance upon this. must look at the
It was argued that matter in the round.’
there had been no
irrevocable Irrevocability
promise made by (assurance):
Holt who was free Position that Walker
to change his comes to is that the
mind if his promises that were made
circumstances to and relied on by G
changed. It was were irrevocable. It’s
also alleged there clear H consciously
was insufficient reneged but the critical
evidence of any point of law is here is
detriment to the that that is not possible
claimant. because it’s
unconscionable.
Additionally, he says you
can revoke/rescind your
will provided there is
another arrangement
giving effect to the
promise made – you have
to satisfy the equity.

Detriment:
“The detriment need
not consist of the
expenditure of money
or other quantifiable
financial detriment, so
long as it is something
substantial. The
 requirement must be
approached as part of a
broad inquiry as to
whether repudiation of
an assurance is or is not
unconscionable in all the
circumstances...There
must be sufficient
causal link between
the assurance relied
on and the detriment
asserted. The issue of
detriment must be
judged at the moment
when the person who
has given the assurance
seeks to go back on it.
Whether the detriment is
sufficiently substantial is
to be tested by whether
it would be unjust or
inequitable to allow the
assurance to be
disregarded—that is,
again, the essential test
of unconscionability. The
detriment alleged must
be pleaded and proved.”

Pascoe v Explicit words He was estopped. It was

Turner between 2 ex- unconscionable for him
[1979] lovers. Man buys to turn around and
a house and change his mind after all
woman moves in. her investments.
Relationship
breaks down and MIXED MOTIVES ARE
he moves out. He OK - Although Mrs
tells her she can Turner's actions could
have house and also have been based on
everything in it. her feelings for her
This is the active former partner Mr
assurance. The Pascoe, reliance on his
lady invests time promise that the house
and money (all her would be hers was ONE
capital savings) of the reasons she moved
refurbishing the in and renovated --> title
premises to property
indicating that she
had relied on that Detrimental conduct:
promise to her She put all her savings
detriment. He into the house – “...the
tries to evict her. claimant, having been
told that the house was
hers, set about
 improving it within and
without. Outside she did
not do much...Inside she
did a great deal more.
She installed gas in the
kitchen with a cooker,
improved the plumbing
in the kitchen and put in
a new sink. She got new
gas fires, putting a gas
fire in the lounge. She
redecorated four
rooms...We would
describe the work done
in and about the house
as substantial in the
sense that that adjective
is used in the context of
estoppel.”

Yeoman’s Planning The House of Lords held The basis of

Row permission case. Mr Cobbe had no Thorner is that you
Manageme This one is in a proprietary estoppel have to establish an
nt Ltd v commercial claim, nor had he interest in land in
Cobbe context. Read this acquired an interest fact. You can’t just
[2006] case as well. Mr under a constructive give out estoppel
and Mrs Lisle trust. However he did licenses just
Manwearing own have a claim for unjust because of
property in enrichment, because unconscionable
Knightsbridge Yeoman's Row had behaviour.
London. Cobbe is received the benefit of
an experienced his services without Where a contract
property paying for him. He was for sale of land
developer. They awarded £150,000, fails s 2 formality
enter negotiations which reflected the then it is
– c says he wants application expenses,
precluded from a
to redevelop their and a reasonable fee for
claim based on
property. They professional services.
agree and say if estoppel cause
he gets planning Why he had no rights to proprietary
permission to do estoppel: estoppel is a sub
this then they will Parties were both species of
agree to enter into experienced promissory* and
a contract sell him practitioners. Cobbe if you don’t come
the property itself was taking on work within realm of
for 12 million aware of the risk that contract law then
pounds with a the £12 million you are high and
profit share on agreement may not be
any proceeds of
dry.
concluded. The
sale. So any agreement was
profits he made insufficiently certain *the whole sub
above 12 mil but to amount to a species thing was
up to 24 mil will contract as terms were debunked in
be split with u. C far from certain. There Thorner. Lord
is experienced – was also no interest in Walker basically
he spends time land per se – what he says this point is
and expertise in was contesting was the untrue.
gaining revocation of his right to
permission. Mrs L contract with Mr & Mrs
says no that she Lisle-Mainwaring. Lord
won’t sell – she Scott says first of all pro
wants 20 mil. C estoppel is a shield not
says he was a sword if your case
promised property don’t fall under areas of
for 12 and he has contract law proprietary
relied on that estoppel can’t help you
promise to cause pro estoppel is a
detriment by sub species of
spending money promissory estoppel.
getting permission
and thus it is The asset/interest has
unconscionable to be clear. The only
for u to renege. thing going on is that he
lost his right to contract:
“Proprietary estoppel
requires, in my opinion,
clarity as to what it is
that the object of the
estoppel is to be
estopped from denying,
or asserting, and clarity
as to the interest in the
property in question that
that denial, or assertion,
would otherwise defeat.”
Mrs L said her
negotiation is conditional
on him getting planning
permission first but this
is not binding.

Another key point is that

estoppel has no
formalities. It cannot be
used against Parliament
intention/ statute to
correct a lack of
formalities in your
situation: ‘There is one
further point regarding
proprietary estoppel to
which I should refer.
Section 2 of the 1989 Act
declares to be void any
agreement for the
acquisition of an interest
in land that does not
comply with the requisite
 formalities prescribed by
the section. Subsection
(5) expressly makes an
exception for resulting,
implied or constructive
trusts. These may validly
come into existence
without compliance with
the prescribed
formalities. Proprietary
estoppel does not have
the benefit of this
exception. The question
arises, therefore,
whether a complete
agreement for the
acquisition of an interest
in land that does not
comply with the section
2 prescribed formalities,
but would be specifically
enforceable if it did can
become enforceable via
the route of proprietary
estoppel.’
In T v M problem was
also lack of will/
formality to pass on
asset but the distinction
here is that they were
promised a farm/asset
not a contract and
estoppel will not give
you contract.

Lastly equity cannot

contradict statute:
“The proposition that an
owner of land can be
estopped from asserting
that an agreement is
void for want of
compliance with the
requirements of section
2 is, in my opinion,
unacceptable.…Equity
can surely not contradict
the statute.”

Ramsden v R granted T a The majority of the Where; (i) A

Dyson yearly tenancy. T House of Lords refused allows B to build
(1866) then spent a lot of relief: on A’s land, (ii) B
money to erect ‘[If a stranger] builds on does so because
buildings on the my land, supposing it to of a mistaken
 land. R then gave his own, and I , knowing belief that B has
notice to quit. T it to be mine, do not an interest in the
sought equitable interfere, but leave him land; and (iii) A
relief on the basis to go on, equity knows of B’s
that he relied on considers it to be mistaken belief
R’s agent’s dishonest in me to then A has a duty
assurances that remain passive and to correct the
he would be afterwards to interfere mistaken belief.
entitled to and take the profit.’
possession for as
long as he paid his
rent and that he
could call on R for
the grant of a
formal 60 year
tenancy (with a
right to renewal)
after that.

Lissimore v Proprietary Court said his

Downing estoppel claim statements are not a
(2003) brought by L on certain assurance in
the break-down of relation to the property
her relationship she was claiming
with D, a rock star (Astbury Hall). There
and the owner of was also no detriment –
Astbury hall, a she had no job
large English beforehand.
estate.
The relationship “Such statements do not
began in 1993 and on their face relate to
lasted for seven any specific property,
years. There was they plainly do not
an ‘engagement’ amount to a
but neither party representation which
expected to marry. binds the whole of Mr
He’s also had a Downing’s property, and
string of they are not expressed in
girlfriends and terms which enable any
tells all of them objective assessment to
the same thing – be made of what is being
he will “take promised. In this last
care of her” and respect they are to be
she will “never contrasted with
want for statements made to
anything”. unpaid or underpaid
workers or business
D was heavily partners, encouraged to
invested in work on because they
Astbury Hall. would be ‘treated
Even before the right’, and for whom a
relationship commensurate reward
with L could be objectively
deteriorated, D assessed.”
 consulted his
solicitors as to the
steps to be taken
to ensure that L
would have no
claim to an
interest in it.

Wayling v The plaintiff, The judge at first The relevant legal

Jones Wayling, met instance held that the principles:
(1995) Jones in 1967, claim in proprietary
when he was 16. estoppel failed because “(1) There must be
They began to the plaintiff was unable a sufficient link
cohabit as a gay to prove in cross- between the
couple in 1971 examination that the promises relied
when the W was promises that he would upon and the
21, and J, 56. With inherit property after the conduct which
the exception of a death of the deceased constitutes the
period of about a influenced him to remain detriment (Grant
year in 1975, W in Mr Jones' service. v Edwards) in
lived with J What they say to him is particular the
continuously why did you stay – he passage where he
until Daniel said love. They said what equates the
Jones' death if he hadn’t promised principles
(total 17 hotel? He said he would applicable in cases
YEARS). During have stayed anyway for of constructive
this period the love. Court said there is trust to those of
deceased owned a no assurance as there is proprietary
series of no idea that he is staying estoppel.
businesses. In there on the basis of
1982 he bought expectation that he will (2) The promises
the Glen-y-Mor inherit something, it’s relied upon do not
Hotel when W was just for love. have to be the
21. W acted as the sole inducement
deceased's He was cross examined for the conduct: it
companion and again by CA. His is sufficient if they
chauffeur and barrister said people can are an inducement.
gave substantial be in love but underlying
help in running it all is the fact that this (3) Once it has
the businesses man was promised a been established
(for free), and in property and has been that promises
return for his working free for 17 years were made, and
services he in expectation of this. All that there has been
received pocket the evidence points to conduct by the
money, living fact that it was intended plaintiff of such a
and clothing to be taken as serious nature that
expenses and and to be relied on by inducement may
the express him. Difficult to be inferred then
promise that he establish when there the burden of
would inherit are mixed motives. proof shifts to the
the business. defendants to
The deceased It held that once there establish that he
promised the was evidence of did not rely on the
plaintiff on conduct from which promises.”
 several reliance could be
occasions that inferred (working
he would leave without pay for many
him his years) then the
business, and defendant had to
made wills leaving prove that there had
first the cafe, and been no reliance.
by a later will, the “On the application of
Glen-y-Mor Hotel the principles set out
to the plaintiff. above to the facts of this
In 1985 the case I am satisfied: (a)
deceased sold the that the promises were
Glen-y-Mor made; (b) that the
Hotel and plaintiff's conduct was of
subsequently such a nature that
bought the inducement may be
Royal Hotel, inferred; (c) that the
Barmouth, defendants have not
telling the discharged the burden
plaintiff that it upon them of
was bought for establishing that the
the plaintiff to plaintiff did not rely on
run and to the promises.”
inherit after his
death. J intended Leggatt L.J: “In my
to alter his will judgment the effect of
to substitute the the evidence
Hotel Royal recapitulated by my Lord
Barmouth for is that:
the Glen-y-Mor (a) if the deceased had
Hotel, but he made no promise, the
had not done plaintiff would have
before his death. stayed with him;
Upon the death of (b) the deceased did
J, W claimed that make a promise; and
he was entitled to (c) if the deceased had
the proceeds of reneged on his
the sale of the promise, the plaintiff
Hotel Royal, would have left.
Barmouth on the From this it must be
principles of inferred that it was
proprietary because the plaintiff
estoppel. relied on the promise
that he would have left if
he had learned that it
was not going to be kept.
I therefore agree that
the appeal should be
allowed.”

Coombes v Assurance given by the

Smith defendant to his female
[1986] cohabitee that he would
always 'provide her with
 a roof over her head' was
held insufficient to
constitute a
representation that
she was legally
entitled to security of
tenure against his
wishes.

She claimed that she left

her husband, and thus
the chance of fixing their
marriage in addition to
the security of her home,
in reliance on Coombes
promise and her
detriment suffered was
that she became
pregnant for him. But
the court disagreed – she
didn’t get pregnant
because of some
mistaken belief of her
legal rights but cause
she wanted to be with
him and bear his child.
She would have left
her home and husband
anyway cause she loved
C and wanted to live
with him, not because he
promised her the house.

Greasley v 16 year old girl She is successful in

Cooke takes on work claiming estoppel to live
[1980] where she goes to there for the rest of her
take care of life. She never got her
someone’s own house.
severely disabled
child – child Reliance may be
requires round the assumed where a
clock attention claimant acts to their
and care. She detriment. The burden
lives with them. of proof then shifts to
After she starts to the defendants to
cohabit with establish that he did
eldest son she not rely on the
stops being paid. promises.
She lives with
them for 30 years
and continues to
look after her
partner’s siblings
 and after they
grow up, the
disabled child
still. (she was
promised to live
there for the rest
of her life?) The
father of the
family dies and
the children try to
evict her.

Jennings v Old lady lives HL used compensation This is that causal

Rice [2002] Lorne house. based approach. They link that runs
Jennings had been calculated around 15 through – amount
working for her as years free work and suffered must be
her gardener. Her calculated a carer’s equivalent to
health wage and paid him over amount you get
deteriorated and 200,000£. out.
she was
struggling to pay They say if the
him to garden. claimant’s expectation
One day when is uncertain or
they were extravagant or out of
standing in the proportion to
hall of the house detriment suffered,
he asked for his the court should
wages and she recognise that the
said “don’t equity should be
worry you’ll be satisfied in another
alright this will and more limited way.
all be yours one They decided that he was
day”. overstepping and his
He started doing desire was too ambitious.
more for her –
took her shopping, “all this” could mean
lived with her and literally anything may be
watching over and the property they were
caring for her at standing in or another
night. In addition asset.
to healthcare,
washing, toileting
and bathing until
she died.
Her
administrators
tried to sell the
property, he
sought estoppel.

Davies v This is referred to http://www.emmalees.co.

Davies as cowshed uk/on-going-research-
[2016] Cinderella in the blog/2016/6/14/davies-v-
 media. 3 davies-2016-ewca-civ-
daughters – one of 463-satisfying-the-equity-
which expected to appropriate-remedies-in-
inherit the farm cases-of-proprietary-
but had fallen out estoppel
with her parents
and made up so Again court took
many times and compensation approach.
didn’t have The appeal was allowed
enough periods of and the woman's award
time that she was reduced from £1.3m
worked there to to £500,000. It was clear
show estoppel. It’s that from 2001 to 2006
difficult to she had no expectation
establish her of inheriting the land. As
equity First she was shown a draft
instance judge will, at best an
awards her 1/3 of expectation to inherit
the farm – lasted only 3 years until
£350,000 the final breakdown in
[something about relations. In any event,
1.3 million] . Her her high level of
parents appeal expectation during that
this as she hasn’t time could not fairly be
worked for the 1.3 derived from the
mil. representations made to
her at the time.

In respect of non-
financial detrimental
reliance, the effect of the
rupture in relations
meant that the woman
was no longer
constrained by the
difficult working
relationship with her
parents and she was free
to work where she
wished. (I believe this is
referring to the on and
off nature of her and her
parents relationship)

Griffiths v The claimant The court declined to She was granted

Williams looked after the order the grant of a life lease for life.
1977 deceased (her interest because it would
mother) through have created a
periods of illness, settlement, under which
following the claimant would have
representations had the powers of a
that she would tenant for life. It
be able to life in suggested a long lease,
her mother’s determinable on her
 house for the death at a nominal rent.
rest of her life. Though the payment of a
The mother nominal rent was not
revoked her will, contemplated when the
and created a new representations were
one, leaving her made, ‘perfect equity is
house to another seldom possible.’ The
daughter court ordered the
grant of a long lease
at a rent of and pound;
30 per annum,
determinable on the
death of the tenant.
The lease was to be non-
assignable, and the other
terms of the lease were
to be agreed between
the parties or, in default
of agreement,
determined by the
county court.

Dodswort Woman has house Court thought his claim

h v and allows was ridiculous so he only
Dodswort brother and his got money he spent on
h (1973) wife to move in the house back.
and live there.
Brother
refurbishes house
and sister tries to
evict him. He says
she can’t cause
the house is his.