DP FMEA Test Procedure PDF

HN1899
ETESCO DRILLSHIP
TEST PROCEDURE
OF DP FMEA PROVING TRIAL
for
ETESCO DRILLSHIP
Report No : SHI-MRI-1899-061211-02 Rev 5.0
DOCUMENT HISToRY
Revision Date Reason for issue Origin Check Appr.
1.0 12/08/11 First issue for review K.J. Kim G.I. Park J.W. Choi
2.0 29/09/11 Issue reflected owner’s comments K.J. Kim G.I. Park J.W. Choi
3.0 24/10/11 Issue for additional tests of newly installed UPS K.J. Kim G.I. Park J.W. Choi
3.1 31/10/11 Issue for updating CAT numbering K.J. Kim G.I. Park J.W. Choi
4.0 14/11/11 Issue for the result of DP FMEA proving trial. K.J. Kim G.I. Park J.W. Choi
The status of punch list still open.

5.0 06/12/11 Issue for the revised test results with closed all K.J. Kim G.I. Park J.W. Choi
punch items
Marine Research Institute

Samsung Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.
Office Address : 10TH Floor, Production Support Buildings, Geoje Shipyard, Samsung Heavy Industries
Phone Number : + 82 (0) 55 630 5610 FAX : + 82 (0) 55 630 6270
Email Address : risingsun.kim@samsung.com
Test Procedure for DP FMEA ETESCO Drillship
INDEX
Section Description Page
1. Introduction ……………… 05
2. Check on the number of required equipments ……………… 07

to comply with DPS-3
3. Test items ……………… 09

1) - Power generation ……………… 10
2) - Power distribution ……………… 18
3) - Power management ……………… 38
4) - DP control system ……………… 47
5) - Thrusters ……………… 66
6) - Communication ……………… 75
7) - ESD and F/G system ……………… 76
4. The summary for results of FMEA proving ……………… 77

DP trials
5. The punch list from the tests ……………… 78
Samsung Heavy Industries 1/95 Page Marine Research Institute

ABBREVIATIONS
(A)
AVR : Auto Voltage Regulator
(C)
CBU : Capacitor Bank Unit COS : Console Operating System
COU : Control Unit CPU : Central Processing Unit
(D)
DCS : Drilling Control System DCU : Drive Control Unit
DG : Diesel Generator DO : Diesel Oil
DP : Dynamic Positioning DPC : Dynamic Positioning Controller
DPS : Dynamic Positioning System DPS : Differential Position Sensors
(E)
E/R : Engine Room ECR : Engine Control Room
(F)
FMEA : Failure Mode Effect Analysis FO : Fuel Oil
FW : Fresh Water FS : Field Station
(H)
HV : High Voltage (11kV) HiPAP : High Precision Acoustic Positioning
HPR : Hydroacoustic Position Reference
(I)
IALA : International Association of Lighthouse Authorities
IAS : Integrated Automation System INU : Inverter Unit
(K)
K-chief : Kongsberg Vessel Control System K-pos : Kongsberg Dynamic Positioning System
K-thrust : Kongsberg Thruster Control System KM : Kongsberg Maritime
(L)
LAN : Local Area Network LCL : Lever Communication Link
LO : Lubrication Oil LSU : Line Supply Unit
LT : Low Temperature LV : Low Voltage (440V)
(M)
MGE : Main Generator Engine MRU Motion Reference Unit
MSB : Main SwitchBoard

ABBREVIATIONS
(N)
NDU : Network Distribution Unit
(O)
OS : Operator Station
(P)
PLC : Programmable Logic Controller PMS : Power Management System
(Q)
QCV : Quick Closing Valve
(R)
RCS : Remote Control System RIO : Remote Input Output
RMS : Riser Management System RPM : Revolution Per Minute
(S)
SW : Sea Water
(T)
TEU : Terminal Unit
(U)
UPS : Uninterruptible Power Supply
(W)
WCU : Water Cooling Unit

PLAN HISTORY
No Page Why How
For ver. 1.0 – First issue for review
For ver. 2.0 – Issue for review

1. 7 Owner’s comment The term “VRS” was changed to “MRU”.
2. 15 Owner’s request Test method was added to verify the load of
generator is reduce to 50% at 8% discrepancy.
3. 19 Owner’s comment The sentence, “- Power source of No.4 UPS to be
auto-changed over from main supply to emcy
power supply” was deleted.
4. 23 Owner’s comment Some wrong UPS numbers were revised.
5. 25 Owner’s comment Some wrong FS numbers were revised.
6. 63 Owner’s comment Expected result 1) was revised.
For ver. 3.0 – Issue for additional tests of newly installed UPS
7. 17 Owner’s comment We added the following sentence in cell of ‘Pos.
ref. system’: “At least one should be the different
type.”
8. 17 Drawing update UPS test in stbd 220V feeder panel was added.
9. 19 Drawing update UPS test in cent 220V feeder panel was added.
10. 21 Drawing update UPS test in port 220V feeder panel was added.
11. 59 Drawing update UPS tests for DCU and RexCU in each thruster
room were added.
For ver. 3.1 – Issue for updating CAT numbering

12. 27~29 Drawing update We updated the number of CAT as reference
41~43 drawing in the DP control system FMEA test.
49, 51
53~57
For ver. 4.0 – Issue for the result of DP FMEA proving trial. The status of punch list still open.
13 All Performance of actual tests Actual result and comment were added
For ver. 5.0 – Issue for the revised results of DP FMEA proving trial with closed all punch items.
14 All Closed all punch We updated results with closed all punch.

1. Introduction
The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) study for DP system of the ETESCO drillship (HN1899) has
been performed with class notation DPS-3 as specified in the ABS rule (2010) for steel vessel, 4-3-5/15
section by Samsung Marine Research Institute.
These sheets were prepared to identify the results of FMEA study by testing single failure of main items
selected and simulating the loss of one compartment for some main compartments during DP sea trial.
After trial to prove DP FMEA the conclusion and the recommendations of the tests will be updated.
1.1 The conditions for the tests
The normal conditions for DP operation during trial for the tests should be the followings:
1) One generator will at least be working in each engine room and the others will be stand-by to be
started as required (Load dependent start mode).
2) MGEs in cent engine room will be supplied with fuel oil from service tanks in both port and stbd
engine rooms.
3) Control air for cent engine room is also fed from both port and stbd sides
4) For equipments with redundancy such as FO supply pumps one is duty mode and the other stand-by.
5) All 11kV and 440V/220V bus-tie breakers will be normally open. But 11kV bus-tie breakers can be
closed on some tests.
6) The DP system will be normally operated in auto control mode and the back-up DP ready for control
transfer.
7) All thrusters will be working or at least four thrusters working depending on the situation.
8) The number of DP sensors which have to work will at least follow the specification of ABS DPS-3.
9) DGPS and HiPAP system will be together used as position reference system.
10) Printers for checking of alarms and the event logger will be set.
1.2 The basic preparation for each test

The followings will be applied during each test:
1) Each test will be performed in condition that owner, class and shipyard are all attending.
2) FMEA practitioner will manage test and shipyard’s technicians perform test method.
3) All tests will be reset before starting the next test.
4) If there is any discrepancy with the FMEA study in test result, it should be analyzed and a counter
measure discussed.
5) If necessary, print sheets on which the alarm lists are recorded are kept after a test.

The test order can be changed as necessary or convenient.
The sequence of the tests presented here is a proposal and may be changed should that be convenient. In
order to avoid that a test could cause damages to equipment the proposed individual failure tests should
be cleared by the yard’s technical experts. Alternative means to simulate the failures may be discussed.

2. Check on the number of required equipments to comply with DPS-3

This vessel is complied with ‘ABS DPS-3’ on required equipments and their number as following Table
Subsystem or Component ABS DPS-3 ETESCO Drillship

Power Generator and prime Redundant, in separate 2+2+2 in separate compartments
System movers compartments (Port/Cent/Stbd E/R)
Main switchboard 2 with normally open bus ties 3 with normally open bus ties in
in separate compartments separate compartments
Bus tie breaker 2 6 (2 in each MSB)
Distribution system Redundant, through separate 1+1+1 in separate compartments

compartments (Port/Cent/Stbd E/R)
Power management Yes Yes (FS38, 40 and 42)
Thruster Arrangement of thruster Redundant in separate 6 in separate compartments

compartments
Control Auto control; no. of 2 + 1 in alternate control 3+1 in alternate control station
computer system station
Manual control; joystick Yes Yes (Bridge console, Port/Stbd

with auto heading wing joystick stations)
Single levers for each Yes Yes

thruster (K-THRUST 400-1 in W/H)
Sensors Pos. ref. systems 3 whereof 1 in alternate 6 whereof 3 in alternate control

(At least one should be control station station
the different type.)
External Wind 2 Whereof 1in 3 Whereof 1 in alternate

Sensor alternate control control station
station
MRU 2 As above 3 As above
Gyro 3 As above 3 As above

compass
UPS 1 + 1 separate compartment 2+1 separate compartments
Alternate control station for backup Yes Yes (DP backup room)
unit
Consequence analysis Yes Yes

ABS DPS-3 : ■ Pass □ Fail

Witness Comments Signed Date
FMEA Practitioner SHI took complementary measures for KiJung Kim 04/11/2011
unfinished works, which had been checked

during DP trial, and then confirmed.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as follows :

- A) no. 1 ~ 6 at page 78 ~ 83.
- B) no. 1 at page 85..
- C) no. 1 ~ 7 at page 90 ~ 92.
Remarks

3. Test items

1) Power Generation
The systems for the power generation ars as followings :
Each Engine Room
1.1) MGE DO supply system

Fuel Oil System
Lub Oil System No test item
1.3) Sea water pump

Cooling Water System
1.4) LT fresh water cooling system
Compressed Air System 1.5) Control air system
Ventilation System No test item
Main Generator Engine 1.6) Electric governor

1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system – Fuel system)

1.1) MGE DO supply pump
Objective To check the auto-change over function of MGE DO supply pumps in each engine room.
Method 1. Stop No.1 supply pump

2. After recovery, stop No.2 supply pump
* Repeat for each engine room

Actual result
Expected result
Stbd Cent Port
1 - Alarm As expected As expected As expected
- Auto change over to No.2 supply pump
- No effect on running MGE

- Auto change over to No.1 supply pump
- No effect on running MGE

recommendation about alarm description,
and then confirmed.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, C) no.8 at
page 93.
Remarks

1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system – Fuel system)

Objective TO check the operation of DO service tank low level alarm and the redundancy of DO
supply to cent. E/R.
Method With one MGE running for each switchboard and bus ties open during this test.
1. Simulate low level alarm, and reinstate.
2. Close quick closing valves of DO service tank.
* Repeat for the other side engine room

Actual result
Expected result
Port Stbd
1 - Alarm As expected As expected

Alarm
- For corresponding MGEs, FO inlet pressure low FO inlet pressure low
MGE load will reduce as As expected
FO pressure drops. No.1 & 2 Load reduced, As expected
- The other side and cent MGE HV MSB frequency went No effect
side MGEs runs normally down
No.3 & 4 As expected As expected

MGE No effect No effect
As expected
No.5 & 6 As expected Load reduced,
MGE No effect HV MSB frequency went
down
FMEA Practitioner KiJung Kim 05/11/2011
Remarks

1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system – Cooling system)

1.3) Sea water pump
Objective To check the auto-change over function of cooling sea water (CSW) pumps in each engine
room.
Method 1. Stop No.1 CSW pump

2. After recovery, stop No.2 CSW pump
* Repeat for each engine room

Actual result
Expected result
Stbd Cent Port
1 - Alarm As expected. As expected. As expected.
- Auto change over to No.2 CSW
pump
- No effect on the cooling system

- Auto change over to No.1 CSW
pump
- No effect on the cooling system

Remarks

1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system – Cooling system)

1.4) LT fresh water cooling system
Objective To check the failure of LT fresh water cooling system (CFW pump, pneumatic 3-way
temp. control valve and FW expansion tank) in each engine room.
Method 1. Stop No.1 CFW pump and after recovery, stop No.2 CFW pump
2. Isolate and bleed off air from the valve
3. Push low level alarm button in FW expansion tank
* Repeat for other engine room
Actual result
Expected result
Stbd Cent Port
1 - Alarm and auto change over to stand-by As expected As expected As expected
pump
2 - Valve fails to fully open or keeps the As expected As expected As expected

failed position. Valve was fully Valve was fully Valve was fully
opened. opened. opened.

Remarks

1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system – Compressed air system)

1.5) Control air system
Objective To check the failure of control air system in port/stbd engine room.
Method 1. Isolate the control air system and drain the air.
* Reinstate and repeat for the other engine room

Actual result
Expected result
Stbd Port
- Corresponding temp. control valves remain in
open position.
- All dampers remain in open due to non-return
valves
- At stbd side test, no air for brake of No.4
thruster. At port side test, no air for brake of
No.5 thruster. (The brake is used for
maintenance purpose.)
- Loss of DO and LO purifiers in the ER
- Loss of emcy DO pump in the ER
- No direct effect on DP

unexpected results, which happened
during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no.2
at page 85.
Remarks

1) Power Generation (MGE Governor)

1.6) Electric Governor
Objective To check failure of speed sensor for MGE governor and simulate load sharing when fuel
rack position of one running MGE fails to maximum position.
Method With closed ring operation mode and each one DG running on each MSB
1. Disconnect one pick up sensor at running engine. Reinstate
2. Disconnect second pick up sensor at running engine. Reinstate
* Repeat for other engines
3. Fail the fuel rack on one engine to maximum position manually.
Actual result
Expected result Stbd Cent Port
(No.1 MGE) (No.3 MGE) (No.5 MGE)
- No effect on running engine

- No effect on running engine
3 If the difference between set actuator travel and As expected

actual actuator travel exceeds 8% of the total
actuator travel for over ten seconds the load of
the faulty engine will be reduced to maximum
50% of rated power, provided that there are
generators available for additional load on the
net. Simultaneously the standby engine
automatically started and when connected, the
faulty engine will be downloaded to 10% and
disconnected and stopped.
If 10%, the CB of the MGE will be tripped and
MGE will shut down.
Otherwise, if total load is less than one MGE
load, the faulty DG hogs load and may drive the
other DG(s) into reverse power trip. The faulty
DG may also trip on over-speed protection and
as the result the corresponding switchboard(s)
may be dead. But bus tie to open before DG
breakers to prevent two or more switchboard
blackout.


FMEA Practitioner SHI took complementary measures for KiJung 05/11/2011
unexpected results, which happened during DP Kim
trial, and then confirmed by retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no.3 at page 85.
Remarks

2) Power Distribution
In order to verify complying with ABS DPS-3 rule, carry out a battery capacity and failure test of UPS
during DP trial as follows :
a. Power distribution
b. UPS

2.1) Stbd MSB Room
Objective To check the effect on the failure of stbd 220V feeder panel, LV MSB, HV MSB and the
total loss of stbd MSB room
Method With closed ring operation mode

1. Disconnect input power cable of UPS in 220V feeder panel and check UPS capacity for
30 min.
2. Fail LV transformer feeding
3. Fail HV transformer feeding
4. Open breakers of each DC110V UPS feeding to stbd HV switchboard
5. Fail PDU-04, DC110V UPS, and FS-38,39 in stbd MSB room
Expected result Actual result

1 - Alarm As expected.
- Loss of power source of UPS for stbd MGEs
- Battery discharging time > 30 minutes
- Power sources of MGE local control panels and
governor control panels to be auto-changed over
after UPS battery time
- Loss of power source of No.1 DC 110V dist. board
- Power source of No.4 UPS to be auto-changed
over from main supply to emcy power supply
- No effect on DP
- Loss of stbd 220V feeder panel
- Loss of FO, CSW and CFW pumps
- Loss of LO and DO purifiers
- Loss of G/S and starting air compressors
- Loss of No.2 air supply fan
- Power source of MGE LO priming and cylinder
pumps to be auto-changed over
- Emcy air driven DO pump will start
- Loss of No.4 thruster due to power loss of No.4
thruster aux. panel. Remaining 5 thrusters will keep
the position.

4 - Alarm and partial black-out As expected.

- Bus-tie breakers to be open
- Breaker of running generator in stbd engine room
to be open
- Loss of stbd 440V and 220V sections
- Loss of fwd No.1 440V and 220V sections
- No.1 and 2 generators to be unusable. Remaining 4
generators will cover sufficient power to maintain
the position
- Loss of No.3 and 4 thrusters. Remaining 4 thrusters
will keep the position.
- K-chief OS 36 in ECR shut down
- Loss of FS 38 and 39
- Net B error
- No effect on remaining 4 thrusters and 4 generators

retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 4
and 5 at page 86.
Remarks

2.2) Cent MSB Room
Objective To check the effect on the failure of cent 220V feeder panel, LV MSB, HV MSB and the
total loss of cent MSB room

30 min.
4. Open breakers of each DC110V UPS feeding to cent HV switchboard
5. Fail aft 220V emcy dist. board, DC110V UPS, and FS-40,41 in cent MSB room

- Loss of power source of UPS for cent MGEs
- Power source of ECC to be auto-changed over
from main supply to emcy power supply
- No effect on DP
- Loss of cent 220V feeder panel
the position.


- Breaker of running generator in cent engine room
to be open
- Loss of cent 440V and 220V sections
the position
- Loss of alternative power source of No. 4,5 UPS
- Loss of alternative power source of FS 38~43

retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no.4
at page 86.
Remarks

2.3) Port MSB Room
Objective To check the effect on the failure of port 220V feeder panel, LV MSB, HV MSB and the
total loss of port MSB room

30 min.
4. Open breakers of each DC110V UPS feeding to port HV switchboard
5. Fail PDU-05, DC110V UPS, and FS-40,41 in port MSB room

- Loss of power source of UPS for stbd MGEs
- Loss of power source of No.3 DC 110V dist. board
- Power source of No.5 UPS to be auto-changed
over from main supply to emcy power supply
- No effect on DP
- Loss of port 220V feeder panel
- Loss of G/S and starting air compressors
the position.


- Breaker of running generator in port engine room
to be open
- Loss of port 440V and 220V sections
the position
- Loss of K-Chief 35
- Net A error

retest.
and 5 at page 86.
Remarks

2.4) Fwd Section
Objective To check the effect on failure of fwd 220V feeder panel, LV switchboard, and total loss of
fwd section
Method 1. Fail the LV transformer feeding to No.1 220V feeder panel

2. Fail the HV transformer feeding to No.1 LV switchboard. Reinstate
3. Fail the LV transformer feeding to No.2 220V feeder panel
4. Fail the HV transformer feeding to No.2 LV switchboard.
5. Fail the HV transformer feeding of both switchboards. (to check compartment loss)

1 - Alarm As expected
- No. 1,3 UPS and No.1 PA UPS power auto
change to emcy feeder panel
- No effect on DP
- Loss of fwd No.1 220V feeder panel
- Auto change over of SW and FW pumps to
No.2 section
- No effect on DP
- No. 2 UPS power and No.2 PA UPS auto
change to emcy feeder panel
- No effect on DP
- Loss of fwd No.2 220V feeder panel
- Auto change over of SW and FW pumps to
No.1 section
- No effect on DP

- Loss of fwd 220V feeder panels
- Loss of cooling system of No.1 thruster
- No. 1,2,3 UPS and No.1,2 PA UPS power
auto change to emcy feeder panel

retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, C) no. 9
at page 93.
Remarks

2.5) Emergency Switchboard
Objective To check the effect on failure of emergency switchboard (440V and 220V)
Method Check the emergency generator is set in manual-mode.

1. Open 220V incoming supply breaker after blocking auto-change over alternative supply
2. After blocking auto-change over alternative supply, open 440V incoming supply breaker
- Loss of alternative power source of No.
1,2,3,4,5 UPS and No.1,2 PA UPS
- Loss of alternative power source of FS 31, FS
38~43 and FS 47
- Loss of alternative power source of thruster
No.1~6 DCU UPS
- Loss of alternative power source of ECC
- Power fail of No.2 DC 110V DB
- Loss of alternative power of LO priming
pumps and cyl. Pumps in each engine
- Loss of one air supply fan in each engine
room
- Loss of stbd and port HPR hoist control unit
- Loss of emergency 220V feeder panel

unexpected results, which happened during
DP trial, and then confirmed by retest.
- B) no. 6 at page 86.
- C) no. 10 at page 93.
Remarks

2.6) DC 110V Distribution Board
Objective To check the effect on failure of AVR and one DC 110V dist. board.
Method 1. Fail incoming power supply for each DC 110V dist. board.
2. Check battery discharging time (over 30 minutes)
3. Disconnect DC110V power cable to AVR for each engine.
4. Open battery breaker and all output breakers.
* Restore and repeat for other dist. board
Actual result
Expected result
Port Cent Stbd
1 - Alarm ‘Battery charger abnormal’ As expected. As expected. As expected.
- No effect on DP
2 - Battery discharging time > 30 minutes As expected. As expected. As expected.

After 30min, After 30min, After 30min,
output voltage output voltage output voltage
= 115V = 112V = 113V
- Other DC 110V DB will supply power for the
AVR.
- Other DC 110V DB will compensate
- Protective relay (SEPAM) for the
corresponding LV switchboard will trip. But
CB will be still closed

retest.
and 12 at page 93.
Remarks

< CAT 4.5.2 / 4.8.3>

2) Power distribution
2.7) UPS 1 (NAV. INST. Room)
Objective Test a capacity of battery and failure of the UPS 1.
Method 1. Disconnect main power(online) from UPS 1.

2. And then fail all of power source for UPS 1.
Keep a battery supply for 30 minutes.
3. And then fail the UPS 1 during DP.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1, 2) A redundancy and battery capacity tests of the UPS are carried out during CAT 4.5.2
/ 4.8.3.
Please refer to the CAT item.
3) Item 4.5 ‘Power supplies of DPC-3’, 4.6 ‘NDU’ and 4.8 ‘Position reference system’ are
checked from results of this test.
1 - UPS error alarm. As expected
- UPS is supplied power from second source.
2 - UPS battery discharging time > 30 minutes As expected
- No effect on DP.
3 - Alarm and no effect on DP. As expected
- The NDU, reference systems and K-POS OS
for DP have redundancy.
< Lost DP equipments > < Lost DP equipments >

MRU 1 (from DPC-3 power A) F1 MRU 1
K-POS OS 1 F2 K-POS OS 1
K-CHIEF OS 31 F4 K-CHIEF OS 31
DPS 232-1 F5 DPS 232-1
GYRO 1 F6 GYRO 1
NETWORK PRINTER 4 F7 NETWORK PRINTER 4
ALARM PRINTER 6 F8 ALARM PRINTER 6
SVC-OS 41/HS F9 SVC-OS 41/HS
WIND 1 F10 WIND 1
K-POS OS 8 DATA LOGGER F11 K-POS OS 8 DATA LOGGER
HiPAP OS 6 F12 HiPAP OS 6
NDU A1 F13 NDU A1
K-THRUST OS 5 F21 K-THRUST OS 5
RMS 10 F22 RMS 10
OS 40 LOAD CALCULATOR F23 OS 40 LOAD CALCULATOR
CONNING COMPUTER F27 CONNING COMPUTER
INMARSAT TERMINAL F28 INMARSAT TERMINAL


FMEA Practitioner KyeongKi, 06/11/2011
Kim
The other equipments, which are not listed in above “Lost DP equipments”, have redundant
Remarks power. Therefore those equipments could be working normally in spite of loss of power from
UPS 1.

< CAT 4.5.2 / 4.8.3>

2.8) UPS 2 (DP Backup Room)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/ 4.8.3.


- No effect on DP.

- Loss of all of the back-up system but main DP
system is still working.
< Lost equipments > < Lost equipments >

DPC-1 F1 DPC-1
K-POS OS 4 F2 K-POS OS 4
HiPAP OS 7 F3 HiPAP OS 7
GYRO 3 F4 GYRO 3
WIND 3 F5 WIND 3
ALARM PRINTEWR 1 F6 ALARM PRINTEWR 1
AUTO S/W BOX(S) HPR STBD F7 AUTO S/W BOX(S) HPR STBD
ISOLATION BOX F8 ISOLATION BOX
MRU 3 (powered from isolation box) F8 MRU 3
DPS 132-2 F9 DPS 132-2
DPS 232-2 F10 DPS 232-2
NDU B1/C1 F18 NDU B1/C1
NDU B2 F20 NDU B2


FMEA Practitioner SHI took complementary measures for KyeongKi, 06/11/2011
unexpected results, which happened Kim
retest.
- C) no. 13 at page 93.
UPS 2.

< CAT 4.5.2 / 4.8.3>

2.9) UPS 3 (Gen. Elec. Room)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/ 4.8.3.


- No effect on DP.

- The NDU, reference systems and K-POS OS
for DP have redundancy.

NDU A2 F7 NDU A2
WIND 2 F16 WIND 2
NO.2 DISPLAY FOR X-BAND RADAR F17 NO.2 DISPLAY FOR X-BAND RADAR
GYRO 2 F18 GYRO 2
MRU 2 (from DPC-3 power B) F19 MRU 2
K-POS ALARM PRINTER 2 F21 K-POS ALARM PRINTER 2
K-POS O S 2 F22 K-POS O S 2
DPS 132-1 F23 DPS 132-1


retest.
at page 87.
UPS 3.

2.10) UPS 4 (Stbd MSB Room)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Item 4.7 ‘NDU’ is checked from results of this test.

- No effect on DP.

- Network B error
- The Field Stations are powered from
redundant power, aft em’cy AC220V dist.
board.

NDU B3/C3 F1 NDU B3/C3

retest.
at page 87.
UPS 4.

2.11) UPS 5 (Port MSB Room)
Objective Test a capacity of battery and failure of the UPS 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Item 4.7 ‘NDU’ is checked from results of this test.


- No effect on DP.

- Network A error
- The Field Stations are powered from
redundant power, aft em’cy AC220V dist.
board.

NDU A3 F5 NDU A3
NETWORK PRINTER 7 F6 NETWORK PRINTER 7
AUTO S/W BOX(P) HPR PORT F7 AUTO S/W BOX(P) HPR PORT
ALARM PRINTER 8 F13 ALARM PRINTER 8


retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as
follows :
- C) no. 13 at page 93.
UPS 5.

3) Power management
The Field Stations for power management, which used to control and monitor, are classified as follows :
- IAS Field Station in ECR
- MGE Field Station
- Thruster Field Station
In order to verify complying with ABS DPS-3 rule, carry out redundant power and failure test during DP
trial as follow :
Overload Prevention by PMS
Port MSB Port MSB Port MSB
3.1) Overload Prevention for DG
IAS Field Station MGE Field Station
CENT SWBD Room PORT SWBD Room CENT SWBD Room STBD SWBD Room
FS 43 FS 44 FS 37 FS 38 FS 39 FS 40 FS 41 FS 42
3.2) Field Station for IAS (FS43, FS44) 3.3) Field Station for PORT MGE (FS37, FS38)
3.4) Field Station for CENT MGE (FS39, FS40)
3.5) Field Station for STBD MGE (FS41, FS42)
Thruster Field Station
FWD AFT
FS 31 FS 32 FS 33 FS 34 FS 35 FS 36
3.6) Field Station for FWD thruster (FS31, FS32, FS33)

3.7) Field Station for AFT thruster (FS34, FS35, FS36)

3) Power management
3.1) Overload Prevention for DG
Objective To prove DP/ PMS cut back on thruster load.
Method For each MSB, two DG’s running online.

Deselect two thrusters on DP mode, increase each thruster load to approx. 100% facing
each other.
The other thrusters on DP mode.
1. Trip one running DG by pushing MGE emcy stop or simulating MGE LO pressure low
* Reinstate and repeat for other MSB

Actual result
Expected result
Stbd Cent Port
- Cut back on running thrusters
to prevent partial blackout by
overloading the
remaining DG.

retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, A) no. 7
at page 84.
Remarks

3) Power management
3.2) Field Station for IAS (FS 36, FS 37)
Objective Simulate failure of the field station for IAS.
Method 1. Fail main supply for FS and after recovery, fail second supply for FS.
2. Fail both supply for FS.
Actual result
Expected result
FS 36 FS 37
1 - “24VDC supply power failure” alarm in the As expected. As expected.
K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS is still working normally by second
power.
2 - “Station is not communicational” alarm in the As expected. As expected.

K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS fails.
- Loss of data and machinery related to the FS.
- No effect on DP.

retest.
at page 94.
Remarks

3) Power management
3.3) Field Station for STBD MGE (FS 38, FS 39)
Objective Simulate failure of the field station for stbd MGE and MSB.
Method 1. Fail main supply for one FS. And after recovery, fail second supply for one FS
2. Disconnect the following signals from DG to FS
a. Generator kW signal, b. Generator Hz signal, c. Generator breaker status
d. Generator voltage, e. Bus voltage (only for FS 39), f. Generator raise/lower signal
3. Fail both power sources for the FS.
Actual result
Expected result
FS 38 FS 39
1 -‘ 24VDC supply power failure’ alarm in the K- As expected. As expected.
CHIEF OS.
- The FS is still working normally by second power.
2 a. Alarm, load share fail; no kW to DP/ a. As expected a. As expected

IAS. The corresponding DG to be changed to manual
mode.
b. Alarm, no Hz to DP/ IAS. No effect on DG b. As expected b. As expected
c. Alarm. No affect on DG c. As expected c. As expected
(But the breaker will trip at the load of DG < 10%)
d. Alarm, synchronising disabled. No affect d. As expected d. As expected
on DG
e. Alarm, No affect on DG e. - e. As expected
f. DG runs in DROOP. f. As expected f. As expected
3 - ‘Station is not communicational’ alarm in the K- As expected. As expected.
CHIEF OS.
- The FS shut down
- Loss of monitoring and control by the FS
- Available power will be kept
FMEA SHI took complementary measures for KiJung Kim 07/11/2011
Practitioner unexpected results, which happened during DP
- A) no. 8 at page 84.
- B) no. 10 at page 87
Remarks

3) Power management
3.4) Field Station for CENT MGE (FS 40, FS 41)
Objective Simulate failure of the field station for cent MGE and MSB.
Method 1. Fail main supply for one FS.

3. Fail second supply for the FS.
Actual result
Expected result
FS 40 FS 41
1 -‘ 24VDC supply power failure’ alarm in the K- As expected. As expected.
CHIEF OS.

mode.
on DG
e. Alarm, No affect on DG e. As expected e. -
3 - ‘Station is not communicational’ alarm in the K- As expected As expected.
CHIEF OS.
- The FS shut down

FMEA SHI took complementary measures for unexpected KiJung Kim 07/11/2011
Practitioner results, which happened during DP trial, and then
confirmed by retest.
- A) no. 8 at page 84.
Remarks

3) Power management
3.5) Field Station for PORT MGE (FS 42, FS 43)
Objective Simulate failure of the field station for port MGE and MSB.
Method 1. Fail main supply for one FS.

3. Fail second supply for the FS.
Actual result
Expected result
FS 42 FS 43
1 - ‘24VDC supply power failure’ alarm in the K- As expected. As expected.
CHIEF OS.

mode.
on DG
e. Alarm, No affect on DG e. As expected e. -
3 - ‘Station is not communicational’ alarm in the K- As expected. As expected.

CHIEF OS.
- The FS shut down


FMEA SHI took complementary measures for KiJung Kim 07/11/2011
Practitioner unexpected results, which happened during DP
- C) no. 14 at page 94
Remarks

3) Power management
3.6) Field Station for FWD thruster (FS 32, FS 33, FS 34)
Objective Test failure of the field station for FWD thrusters.
1. Power off main power of the FS.

2. After recovery, power off another power source.
Method
3. Fail both powers of the FS. (No power for the FS)

FS 32(CENT) FS 33 (STBD) FS 34(PORT)
1 - ‘24VDC failure’ alarm in the K-CHIEF OS. As expected.
power.

power.
3 - “Station is not communicational” alarm in the As expected.

K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS fails.
- Loss of data and machinery related to FS.
- The related thruster is out of DP.
- No effect on DP of vessel.

FMEA Practitioner Moonho Son 07/11/2011
Remarks

3) Power management
3.7) Field Station for AFT thruster (FS 44, FS 45, FS 46)
Objective Test failure of the field station for AFT thruster.
1. Power off main power of the FS.

2. After recovery, power off another power source.
Method
3. Fail both powers of the FS. (No power for the FS)
Actual result
Expected result
FS 44(STBD) FS 45(PORT) FS 46(CENT)
power.

power.
3 - “Station is not communicational” alarm in the As expected.

K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS fails.
- Loss of data and machinery related to FS.
- The related thruster is out of DP.
- No effect on DP of vessel.

FMEA Practitioner Moonho Son 07/11/2011
Remarks

4) DP control system
From the viewpoint of control system and equipments, essential tested systems during proving trial are
summarized as follows :
- DP controller & Operation Station
- Position reference system & Environmental sensors
- Network system
- Independent Joystick System
In order to verify complying with ABS DPS-3 rule, carry out as following tests during DP trial.
a. DP FMEA tests for DP control equipments
b. Function tests for DP control

4.9) DP control accuracy
4.15) Consequence Analysis

< CAT 4.3.2>

4.1) K-POS OS
Objective Test a redundancy of the K-POS OS.
Method 1. Power off the K-POS OS 1 which is main propulsion OS.

2. After recovery, power off the K-POS OS 2 which is main propulsion OS.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) A redundancy tests of control processors due to power loss are carried out in
‘Computer console’ test during CAT 4.3.2. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that automatic change over to other redundant OS correctly.

1 < K-POS OS 1 > As expected
- DP-OS fault alarm.
- If the K-POS OS 1 is main propulsion OS, “DP-OS 1 : Station is not communicational”
switch over to other OS. alarm
- No effect on DP.
2 < K-POS OS 2 > As expected

- DP-OS fault alarm.
- If the K-POS OS 2 is main propulsion OS, “DP-OS 2 : Station is not communicational”
switch over to other OS. alarm
- No effect on DP.

retest.
at page 88.
Remarks

< CAT 4.3.2>

4.2) K-THRUST OS
Objective Test a failure of the K-THRUST OS.
Method 1. Power off the K-THRUST OS 5 which is main propulsion OS.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
‘Computer console’ test during CAT 4.3.2. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that automatic change over to other redundant OS correctly.

1 - OS fault alarm. As expected
- If the K-THRUST OS 5 is main propulsion
OS, switch over to other K-POS OS (Hot “TC-OS 5 : Station is not communicational”
standby OS). alarm
- No effect on DP.

retest.
at page 88.
Remarks

< CAT 4.5.1>

4.3) Control processors(RCU) in DPC-3 (Main DP controller)
Objective Test a redundancy of the DP control processors.
Method 1. Power off a control processor, RCU A, of DPC-3 in online(Master).

2. After recovery, power off a control processor, RCU B.
3. After recovery, power off a control processor, RCU C.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
‘Computer redundancy test (Triple System)’ test during CAT 4.5.1.
Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that automatic change over to standby processor correctly.

1 < RCU A > As expected
- “DpPs ## Station is not communicational”
Alarm. “DpPs 01 : Station is not communicational”
- Automatic change over to standby processor. alarm
- No effect on DP.
2 < RCU B > As expected

- No effect on DP.
3 < RCU C > As expected

- No effect on DP.

Kim
Remarks

4.4) I/O modules in DPC-3 (Main DP controller)
Objective Test a failure of the I/O modules in DPC-3.
Method 1. Fail one I/O module in DPC-3.

2. After recovery, repeat one by one.

< Unit No. 32 > < Unit No. 32 >
Gyro 1, DPS 132-1, Wind 1 fail. As expected.
No effect on DP. Gyro 1, Wind 1, DPS132-1(GPS 1) fail.
< Unit No. 33 > < Unit No. 33 >
Gyro 3, DPS132-2 fail. As expected.
No effect on DP. Gyro 3, DPS132-2 (GPS 3) fail.
< Unit No. 34 > < Unit No. 34 >
Gyro 1, MRU 1 fail. As expected.
No effect on DP. Gyro 1, MRU 1 fail.
< Unit No. 35 > < Unit No. 35 >
Gyro 3 fail. As expected.
No effect on DP. Gyro 3 fail.
< Unit No. 62 > < Unit No. 62 >
Gyro 2, Wind 2, DPS232-2 fail. As expected.
No effect on DP. Gyro 2, Wind 2, DPS232-2 (GPS 2) fail.
< Unit No. 63 > < Unit No. 63 >
Wind 3, DPS232-2 fail. As expected.
No effect on DP. Wind 3, DPS232-2 (GPS 4) fail.
< Unit No. 64 > < Unit No. 64 >
MRU 2 fail. As expected.
No effect on DP. MRU 2 fail.
< Unit No. 65 > < Unit No. 65 >
Gyro 2 , MRU 3 fails. As expected.
No effect on DP. Gyro 2, MRU 3 fail.

Kim
Remarks

4.5) Power supplies of DPC-3 (Main DP controller)
Objective Test a redundant power of DPC-3.
Method 1. Switch off main power of DPC-3 from UPS 1.

2. After recovery, switch off second power failure from UPS 3.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) This test can be confirmed from results of test item 2.7 UPS 1 and 2.9 UPS 3.

1 < Power A failure > < Power A failure >
- Power failure alarm. As expected
- MRU 1 fails.
- DPC-3 is still working by redundant power. “Critical low voltage 24V power supply A”
- No effect on DP. alarm
2 < Power B failure > < Power B failure >

- Power failure alarm. As expected
- MRU 2 fails.
- DPC-3 is still working by redundant power. “Critical low voltage 24V power supply B”
- No effect on DP. alarm

Kim
Remarks

4.6) NDU (Network Distribution Unit)
Objective Test a redundant network.
Method 1. Power off the UPS 1 for NDU A1 and check a network status.
2. After recovery, power off the UPS 2 for NDU B1/C1, B2.
3. After recovery, power off the UPS 3 for NDU A2.
4. After recovery, power off the UPS 4 for NDU B3/C3.
5. After recovery, power off the UPS 5 for NDU A3.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) The UPS loss causes NDU failure and so a redundant network can be confirmed during
UPS failure test.
Please refer to UPS failure test related to NDU as following in this procedure:
- UPS 1 failure : NDU A1 fail (item 2.7 UPS 1)
- UPS 2 failure : NDU B1/C1, B2 fail (item 2.8 UPS 2)
- UPS 4 failure : NDU B3/C3 fail (item 2.10 UPS 4)
2) Confirm that a network error alarm is coming and a redundant network is working
normally.
- Error Net alarm. < NDU A1 >
- A network with NDU failure has network As expected. “Error net A” alarm
error but other network is operating healthy as < NDU A2 >
redundancy. As expected. “Error net A” alarm
- No effect on DP.
< NDU A3 >
As expected. “Error net A” alarm
< NDU B1/C1 >
As expected. “Error net B” alarm
< NDU B2 >
< NDU B3/C3 >
Kim
Remarks

4.7) Voting of the position reference system
Objective Test voting performance due to degraded position reference system.
Method Select all of the position reference systems. (DPS systems and one HiPAP system)
1. Remove the differential correction signals or reduce the satellites of DPS 132-1.
2. After recovery, repeat of DPS 232-1.
3. After recovery, repeat DPS 132-2 in backup room.
4. After recovery, repeat DPS 232-2 in backup room.
5. After recovery, raise the transducer of HiPAP 1 stbd.
6. After recovery, restore and then repeat HiPAP 2 port.

1 < DPS 132-1 > As expected
- Degraded DPS 132-1 is rejected or weight
decreasing. And no effect on DP. “GPS 1 no diff data received” alarm.

3 < DPS 132-2 in backup room > As expected


5 < HiPAP 1 System > As expected.

- Degraded HiPAP 1 is rejected or weight
decreasing. And no effect on DP. “Reference high variance HPR” warning.
6 < HiPAP 2 System > As expected.

- Degraded HiPAP 2 is rejected or weight
decreasing. And no effect on DP. “Reference high variance HPR” warning.


FMEA Practitioner Kongsberg explained why keep on the standard KyeongKi, 06/11/2011
deviation of DGPS after disconnecting all of the Kim
differential correction signals when tested method 1
to 4 during DP trial.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, C) no.16 at page 94.
Remarks

4.8) Position reference system (DGPS, HiPAP systems)
Objective Test a redundancy of the position reference systems.
Method Select all of the position reference systems.
(DGPS systems and one HiPAP system)
1. Power off the DPS132-1 from UPS 3.
2/3/4. After recovery, repeat other DPS from UPS 1 or 2.
5/6. After recovery, repeat HiPAP systems from UPS 1 or 2.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) This test can be confirmed from results of test item 2.7 UPS 1, 2.8 UPS 2 and 2.9 UPS
3.
- DGPS telegram timeout alarm.
- Other systems are working.
- No effect on DP.
- No effect on DP.
- No effect on DP.
- No effect on DP.
5 < HiPAP 1 PORT > As expected
- HPR position status invalid alarm.
- No effect on DP.
6 < HiPAP 2 STBD in ECR > As expected
- HPR position status invalid alarm.
- No effect on DP.
Kim
Remarks

< CAT 4.4>

4.9) DP control accuracy
Objective Test a DP control accuracy using the HiPAP or DGPS system.
Method 1. Control a positioning alongship and athwartship using the HiPAP or DGPS system.
2. Make ±15˚heading change at low gain.
* Repeat with other reference system.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) DP control accuracy tests with the HiPAP or DGPS system are carried out in ‘DP
AUTO-CONTROL TEST’ during CAT 4.4. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Heading control test is carried out in ‘Heading Control’ during CAT 4.4.13.
Please refer to the CAT.
3) Confirm that maximum overshoot at each new position shall be less then 5m and range
of heading stability shall be within ±3˚.

1 - Position difference is recovered at new As expected
position.
- Maximum overshoot at new position shall be
less then 5m.
2 - Range of heading stability shall be within As expected

±3˚.

Kim
Remarks

4.10) MRU (Motion Reference Unit)
Objective Test a performance due to degraded MRU.
Method 1. Make a 4˚difference for roll and pitch of MRU 1 which selected as ‘in use’.
2. After recovery, repeat for MRU 2 which selected as ‘in use’.
3. After recovery, repeat for MRU 3 which selected as ‘in use’ in DP backup room.

1 < MRU 1 – HPR comp. stbd > As expected
- “VRS 1 rejected” warning and rejected in DP.
- Automatically change over to other MRU.
- No effect on DP.
2 < MRU 2 – HPR comp. port > As expected

- No effect on DP.
3 < MRU 3 – DP backup room > As expected

- No effect on DP.

Kim
Remarks

< CAT 4.5.4>

4.11) MRU redundancy
Objective Test a redundant MRU.
Method 1. Switch off the MRU 1 which selected as ‘in use’ by disconnecting terminals in DPC-2.
2. After recovery, switch off the MRU 2 which selected as ‘in use’.
3. After recovery, switch off the MRU 3 which selected as ‘in use’ in CENT MSB Room.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) MRU redundancy tests due to power loss are carried out in ‘Environmental Sensor
redundancy test’ during CAT 4.5.4. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that redundant sensor and no effect to DP control.

1 < MRU 1 > As expected
- “VRS 1 not ready” alarm.
- Automatic change over to other MRU.
- No effect on DP.

- No effect on DP.

- No effect on DP.

Kim
Remarks

4.12) Gyro compass
Objective Test a performance due to degraded Gyro compass.
Method 1. Give a difference for alarm on Gyro 1 which selected as ‘in use’.
2. After recovery, repeat for Gyro 2 which selected as ‘in use’.
3. After recovery, repeat for Gyro 3 which selected as ‘in use’ in backup room.

1 < Gyro 1 –NAV INST Room > As expected
- Gyro rejected alarm.
- Operator can change over to other gyro. The gyro 1 changed over automatically to other
- No effect on DP. preference gyro compass.
2 < Gyro 2 – NAV INST Room > As expected

3 < Gyro 3 – DP backup room > As expected


Kim
Remarks

< CAT 4.5.5>

4.13) Gyro compass redundancy
Objective Test a redundant gyro compass.
Method 1. Switch off the Gyro 1 which selected as ‘in use’ by disconnecting terminals in DPC-2.
2. After recovery, switch off the Gyro 2 which selected as ‘in use’.
3. After recovery, switch off the Gyro 3 which selected as ‘in use’.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Gyro compass redundancy tests due to power loss are carried out in ‘Gyro sensor
redundancy test’ during CAT 4.5.5. Please refer to the CAT.

1 < Gyro compass 1 > As expected
- “Gyro 1 not ready” alarm.
- Automatic change over to other Gyro sensor.
- No effect on DP.

- No effect on DP.

- No effect on DP.

Kim
Remarks

< CAT 4.5.4>

4.14) Wind sensor redundancy
Objective Test a redundant wind sensor.
Method 1. Switch off the wind sensor 1 unit by disconnecting terminals in DPC-2.
2. After recovery, switch off the wind sensor 2.
3. After recovery, switch off the wind sensor 3 of DP backup system.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Wind sensor redundancy tests due to power loss are carried out in ‘Environmental
Sensor redundancy test’ during CAT 4.5.4. Please refer to the CAT.

1 < Wind sensor 1 > As expected
- “Wind 1 not ready” alarm.
- Automatic change over to other wind sensor.
- No effect on DP.

- No effect on DP.

- No effect on DP.

incorrect wind data during DP trial, and Kim
then confirmed by retest.
at page 88.
Remarks

< CAT 4.5.6>

4.15) Consequence Analysis
Objective Test a consequence analysis performance with respect to reduced thrusters and generators.
Method 1) Consequence analysis test are carried out in ‘On-line Consequence Analysis’ test
during CAT 4.5.6. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm consequence analysis warnings.

1 - Warnings for consequence analysis on < Test Condition >
reduced thrusters and generators. DP Class 3
Type of failure : Bus pr. bus
< Result >

“Consequence analysis drift off warning” alarm

Kim
Remarks

< CAT 5.1 >

4.16) Change over between the DP systems
Objective Test a change over between main and backup system.
Method 1. Change over to DP backup system from DP main system by operating the selector
switch located at the backup OS, K-POS OS 4.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Change over between the DP systems test are carried out in ‘Backup Switch’ test
during CAT 5.1. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that normally change over from main to backup DP system.

1 - Change over correctly to backup system. As expected
- The DP backup system can control a vessel’s
positioning.

Kim
Remarks

< CAT cJoy >

4.17) Independent joystick
Objective Test a manual position control by the independent joystick.
Method 1) Tests of a manual position control by the joystick system are carried out during CAT
cJoy. Refer to CAT cJoy procedure.
2) Confirm that a positioning is controlled normally by the independent joystick system.

1 - The independent joystick system is operating As expected
normally.

Kim
Remarks

5) Thrusters
The thruster system is consisted of 5 sub-systems which are needed necessarily in order to operate
thruster. 5 sub-systems are as follows:
-Power system
-Hydraulic and Lubrication Oil system
-Cooling system
-Thruster drive system
-Control system.
THRUSTER
THRUSTER COOLING
COOLING
DRIVE
DRIVE SYSTEM
SYSTEM SYSTEM
SYSTEM 5.6) Sea water cooling system
5.2) Azimuth Signal
5.3) Speed Signal
2) Power distribution PART 5.7) Fresh water cooling system
CONTROL
CONTROL
SYSTEM
SYSTEM THRUSTER
THRUSTER Electric
Electric Line
Line
PROPULSION
PROPULSION
MOTOR
MOTOR Force
Force Line
Line
5.1) Thruster control panels Water
HYDRAULIC
HYDRAULIC and
and Water Line
Line
5.8) Emergency stops LUBRICATION
LUBRICATION
OIL
OIL SYSTEM
SYSTEM Oil
Oil Line
Line
THRUSTER
THRUSTER Signal
Signal Line
Line
5.4) Azimuth hydraulic system
5.5) Lubrication oil system
The Power system and Thruster drive system are related to supplying thruster power. The effect of these
systems can be confirmed in the power distribution part.
The Cooling system supplies cooling water to equipment related to thruster operating. It has to be
checked that the cooling water is supplied to thruster equipment. So the operation of cooling pumps is
confirmed.
The Oil system supplies oil in order to help thruster operation. The pumps and expansion tanks which are
related to oil supply are evaluated.
The Control system controls the thruster operation signals. Azimuth and speed signals for the thruster to
be operated and emergency stop signals have to be analysed.

5) Thrusters
5.1) Thruster Control Panels
To test a failure of the DCU (Drive Control Unit) power
Objective To test a failure of the RexCU (Rexpeller Control Unit) power
*Repeat for other thrusters.
1. Fail main supply power for DCU. (After recovery, test the other power)
2. Check battery capacity inside DCU after disconnecting two supply powers for DCU.
3. Fail main supply power for RexCU. (After recovery, test the other power)
Method
4. Check battery capacity supplied from THR. AUX. panel after disconnecting two supply
powers (UPS and THR. AUX. panel) for RexCU.
1 - DCU common alarm As expected.
- The DCU power is auto-changed to the
second power and the DCU will work normally
by second power.
2 - DCU UPS alarm As expected.
3 - Power failure alarm. As expected.

- The RexCU power is auto-changed to the
second power and the RexCU will work
normally by second power.
4 - Alarm. As expected.
SHI took complementary measures for incorrect

wind data during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
Moonho 07/11/
FMEA Practitioner Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as follows :
Son 2011
- B) no. 14 at page 88.
- C) no. 17 at page 95.
- C) no. 18 at page 95.
Remarks

5) Thrusters
5.2) Azimuth Signals
Objective To test a failure of azimuth control signals.
Method 1. Disconnect azimuth command signal from FS to RexCU.

2. Disconnect azimuth command signal from RexCU to Hyd. pump unit.
3. Disconnect azimuth feedback signal from transmitter box to RexCU.
4. Disconnect azimuth feedback signal from transmitter box to FS.
1 - Azimuth freezes. As expected.
- Propeller is operating.
- The thruster is in DP.
-‘FU major failure’ alarm.
2 - Azimuth is actually not operating. As expected.
- ‘FU major failure’ and ‘NFU failure’ alarms
- ‘Azimuth FB mismatch’ warning. (Time delay)
-‘Prediction error’ (at appx. 23deg command-
feedback differential at certain time intervals)
3 - Azimuth freezes. As expected.
- ‘FU major failure’ alarm.
- ‘Azimuth FB mismatch’ warning. (Time delay)
4 - Azimuth is operating. As expected.

- ‘FU major failure’ alarm.
- ‘Prediction error’ (at appx. 23deg command-
FMEA Practitioner Moonho 07/11/
Son 2011
Remarks

5) Thrusters
5.3) Speed Signals
Objective To test a failure of speed control signals.
Method 1. Disconnect speed command signal from FS to DCU.

2. Disconnect speed feedback signal from DCU to FS

1 - Thruster is in DP As expected.
- Propeller is idle running.
- DCU common alarm.
-‘Prediction error’ (at appx. 30% command-
2 - Thruster is in DP As expected.
- DCU common alarm.
- ‘Feedback’ input signal error

FMEA Practitioner
Moonho 07/11/
Son 2011
Remarks

5) Thrusters
5.4) Azimuth hydraulic System
Objective To test failure of hydraulic steering pumps.
Method 1. Power off running duty azimuth hydraulic pump.

2. After recovery, power off auto-changed azimuth hydraulic pump.
3. Power off two azimuth hydraulic pumps.

1 - ‘Steering pump power failure’ alarm As expected.
- The stand-by pump starts.


- Not ready for DP’ alarm.
- The thruster is out of DP.

FMEA Practitioner SHI took complementary measures for
incorrect wind data during DP trial, and then
Moonho
confirmed by retest. 07/11/ 2011
Son
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 15 at
page 89.
Remarks

5) Thrusters
5.5) Lubrication Oil System
Objective To check a failures of lubrication oil system.
Method 1. Power off running lubrication oil pump.

2. After recovery, power off auto-changed lubrication oil pump.
3. Power off two lubrication oil pumps.
4. Operate low level switch about the gravity tank.
(Put off the cable of the gravity tank connection box)
1 - ‘LO pump failure’ alarm As expected.


- ‘Low press’ alarm.
3 - ‘Gravity Tank Low Level’ alarm As expected.


FMEA Practitioner SHI took complementary measures for
07/11/
confirmed by retest. Moonho Son
2011
page 95.
Remarks

5) Thrusters
5.6) Sea Water Cooling System
Objective To test failure of the sea water cooling pump
1. Power off running duty SW cooling pump.

2. After recovery, power off auto-changed SW cooling pump.
Method

1 - ‘SWC PMP failure’ alarm. As expected.
2 - ‘SWC PMP failure’ alarm. As expected.


SHI took complementary measures for
07/11/
FMEA Practitioner confirmed by retest. Moonho Son
2011
page 95.
Remarks

5) Thrusters
5.7) Fresh Water Cooling System
Objective To test failure of the fresh water cooling pump.
1. Power off running duty FW cooling pump.

2. After recovery, power off auto-changed FW cooling pump.
Method

1 - ‘FWC PMP failure’ alarm. As expected.
2 -‘FWC PMP failure’ alarm. As expected.

-The stand-by pump starts.

Moonho 07/11/
FMEA Practitioner
Son 2011
Remarks

5) Thrusters
5.8) Emergency Stops
Objective To check of a failure of emergency stop circuit.
Method 1. Make a circuit open about the emergency stop.

2. Make a circuit short about the emergency stop.
3. Control thrusters at a field station.
4. Push an emergency stop button.
1 - ‘EM STOP LOOP FAIL’ Alarm As expected.
- Thruster continues to run.
2 - ‘EM STOP LOOP FAIL’ Alarm As expected.

- Thruster continues to run.
3 - The thruster is deselected from DP. As expected.

- The thruster can be operated locally by lever.
4 - The thruster is shutdown. As expected.

- Thruster trips.
- Drive stops.
- Azimuth freezes.
- The thruster is out of DP.

FMEA Practitioner
Moonho 07/11/
Son 2011
Remarks

6) Communication
6.1) Communication
Objective Test normal operation of communication between DP and Drilling space.
(e.g. Wheelhouse, Driller cabin)
Method 1. Power off auto telephone system and then try to contact with other room.
2. Operate DP alert switch on K-POS OS 1. (green, yellow, red)

1 < Telecommunication > As expected.
- One of telecommunication is Always
available at least. Sound telephone could contact with the driller
cabinet.
2 < DP Alert system > As expected.

- The DP Alert status is confirmed correctly in
Driller cabin.

FMEA Practitioner
Moonho 07/11/
Son 2011
Remarks

7) ESD and F/G system

7.1) ESD and F/G control
Objective To check failure of ESD and F/G field stations
Method 1. Fail main supply for ESD FS 51. After recovery fail second supply. And fail both supply
2. Fail main supply for F/G FS 49. After recovery fail second supply. And fail both supply
3. Fail main supply for F/G FS 50. After recovery fail second supply. And fail both supply

- Dual power redundancy to be checked
- No effect on DP
- No effect on DP
- No effect on DP

FMEA
Moonho 07/11/
Practitioner
Son 2011
Remarks

4. The summary for results of FMEA proving DP trials
4.1 All the DP FMEA tests had been carried out between 5th and 7th November 2011.
4.2 Each test had been performed in condition that owner, class, and SHI were attending.
4.3 Final document for results of FMEA proving DP trials will be submitted after the punch lists
described in chapter 5 will be taken actions by SHI and closed.
4.4 The results of tests proved that this vessel complies with classification of the guidelines for dynamic
positioning system as defined in IMO MSC 645 and ABS DPS 3 requirements.

5. The punch list from the tests
A) “For Immediate Action”

Verification by
No. Item Test No. Description Action by SHI Status
SHI-MRI
SHI took Noted Closed
No fully insulation for bulkheads in Cent. E/R 2nd deck.
complementary
It has to be fully insulated.
measures by A-60
insulating the
2. Check on
undone parts
the number
1 Insulation
of required
equipments
< Portside in E/R 2nd deck > < Stbdside in E/R 2nd deck >

Verification by
SHI-MRI
No fully insulation for bulkheads in Cent. E/R 4th deck.
complementary
measures by A-60
insulating the
undone parts
2. Check on
the number
2 Insulation < Portside in E/R 4th deck >
of required
equipments
< Stbdside in E/R 4th deck >

Verification by
SHI-MRI
No fully insulation for bulkheads in Fwd. machinery room.
complementary
measures by A-60
insulating the
undone parts
< Portside in fwd. mach. room >

2. Check on
the number
3 Insulation
of required
equipments
< Stbdside in fwd. mach. room >

Verification by
SHI-MRI
The cable ducts, which for no.1 thruster HV power and net A cable, in the air
complementary
cond. unit room were not A60 insulated ducts.
measures for A-60
These ducts have to be with A60 insulation in accordance with drawing and
insulated ducts the
rules.
undone parts
2. Check on
the number
4 Insulation
of required
equipments
< Forward air cond. unit room >

Verification by
SHI-MRI
No fully insulation for bulkheads in Fwd. CO2 room.
complementary
measures by A-60
insulating the
undone parts
2. Check on
the number
5 Insulation
of required
equipments
< Forward CO2 room >

Verification by
SHI-MRI
The cable duct, which for net A cable, in the aux. store was not A60 SHI took Noted Closed
insulated duct. complementary
This duct has to be with A60 insulation in accordance with drawing and measures for A-60
rules. insulated duct the
undone parts
2. Check on
the number
6 Insulation
of required
equipments
< Forward aux. store >

Verification by
SHI-MRI
Load limitation frequency : Noted Closed
58 Hz, 2SEC -> 57.5 Hz, 5SEC
Overload During stbd side test, when No.1 DG stopped
Thruster lever shall be operated
7 Prevention 3.1) : No.2 MGE was unstable. The load was fluctuating.
slowly in manual mode.
for DG : The loads of No.3, 4 thrusters also were fluctuating.
It was fixed and confirmed
stable operating MGE.
When kw signal of a DG from as below FS was disconnected, It was fixed and confirmed Noted Closed
dummy value (minus value) came in and according to load changing to manual mode.
sharing the other DG was tripped by reverse power. To avoid
this, the corresponding DG should be changed to manual
FS for 3.3)
8 mode.
MGE 3.4)
 FS 38 in Stbd MSB room
 FS 39 in Stbd MSB room
 FS 40 in Cent. MSB room
 FS 41 in Cent. MSB room

B) “Important”
Verification
by SHI-MRI
2. Check It was fixed and confirmed an Noted Closed
No earthing for transceiver and switchbox in both HPR
on the earthing for the equipments.
compartments as follows :
1 Earthing number of
 HPR 1 at stbdside
required
 HPR 2 at portside
equipments
All dampers in the engine room where control air was failed It was fixed and confirmed a time of Noted Closed
kept the open position by non-return valve. As time goes by, keeping the open position of dampers
they started to close. As the result the corresponding air when control air fails.
Control
supply fans stopped. Finally they were completely shut in
2 Air 1.5)
13mins at stbd engine room and 4mins at port engine room.
System
All non-return valves have some leakage because of their
characteristics. But time that they keep the opening position
is short. So they should be examined.
When one pick-up sensor of a MGE was disconnected circuit The function for breaker trip when Noted Closed
breaker of the corresponding MGE was tripped. But it is one pick-up sensor failure has been
Electric
3 1.6) good that the alarm just comes out without opening the deleted.
Governor
circuit breaker of the corresponding MGE because each
governor has two pick-up sensors.

Verification
by SHI-MRI
220V UPS’s of as below MSB rooms had no alarm on IAS. It was fixed and confirmed alarm Noted Closed
UPS
Because UPS was newly installed the related name plates occurring.
Alarm 2.1)
should be changed.
4 in 2.2)
 Stbd MSB room
MSB 2.3)
 Cent. MSB room
Room
 Port MSB room
At 220V feeder panel fail test, there was no alarm for loss of It was fixed and confirmed alarm Noted Closed
DC 110V
2.1) one power source of as below DC 110V DB. occurring.
5 DB
2.3)  No.1 DC 110V DB in stbd MSB room
Alarm
 No.3 DC 110V DB in port MSB room
The alarm for loss of alternative Noted Closed
( During 220V fail test )
Em’cy power of DCU UPS’s and power fail
No alarm for loss of alternative power source of thruster
6 Swbd 2.5) alarm of No.2 DC 110V DB were
No.1~6 DCU UPS.
Alarm fixed correctly and confirmed.
No alarm for power failure of No.2 DC 110V DB.
When UPS 2 was one power loss, the earth failure alarm was It was fixed and confirmed correct Noted Closed
7 UPS 2 2.8) coming incorrectly on K-POS OS. Correct alarm is “auto alarm occurring
switch failure” alarm. It has to be fixed.

Verification
by SHI-MRI
When UPS 3 was one power loss, the “UPS 3 PDU earth It was fixed and confirmed correct Noted Closed
8 UPS 3 2.9) fail” alarm was coming incorrectly on K-CHIEF OS. Correct alarm occurring
alarm is “auto switch failure: alarm. It has to be fixed.
When as below UPS’s were both power loss, the UPS # It was fixed and confirmed alarm Noted Closed
abnormal alarm was not coming to K-CHIEF OS. coming up.
2.10)
9 UPS 4&5  UPS 4
2.11)
 UPS 5
It has to be coming up and fixed.
When breaker status signal of a DG from as below FS was According to KM logic, if the load of Noted Closed
lost, the load of the corresponding DG went to zero and CB the DG is below 10% the DG breaker
tripped. This should be checked. will actually trip and if over 10% the
FS for 3.3)
10  FS 38 in Stbd MSB room DG breaker will still be closed when
MGE 3.4)
 FS 39 in Stbd MSB room the signal of DG breaker status is
 FS 40 in Cent MSB room disconnected.
 FS 41 in Cent MSB room

Verification
by SHI-MRI
In case that as below FS38 which controls PMS fails, K- It was fixed and confirmed to keep Noted Closed
chief gives the dedicated two thrusters maximum available available power just before the FS
power values (4500kW) regardless of original values. But failure.
3.3) this may cause the MGE to overload or frequency low.
11 PMS FS 3.4) Therefore it is good to keep the values just before the FS
3.5) failure.
 FS38 in Stbd MSB room
 FS40 in Cent. MSB room
 FS43 in Port MSB room
The K-POS OS 1, 2 and K-THRUST OS 5 mimic have The OS mimic was modified correctly Noted Closed
DP OS 4.1)
12 incorrect description of switchboard. The switchboard name by Kongsberg.
Mimic 4.2)
of port and stbd should be exchanged correctly.
The wind sensors have too high difference each other The position and sensor’s value were Noted Closed
Wind
13 4.14) depending on weather condition. fixed properly and confirmed.
Sensor
It has to be checked relocation and fixed.
The battery of no.1 DCU UPS was Noted Closed
The battery capacity of No.1 DCU UPS must be confirmed.
14 DCU 5.1) changed and sufficient capacity was
The battery must last for 30 mins
confirmed.

Verification
by SHI-MRI
When the hyd. pump was changed the thruster was It was fixed correctly and confirmed. Noted Closed
Azimuth
deselected in the DP mode.
15 Hydraulic 5.4)
It must be modified. In this case the thruster must be in the
Pump
DP mode.
Sea water The auto-change logics for thruster Noted Closed
1.3) In the No.2, 3 and 5, when SWC pump was changed FWC
16 cooling pumps were modified and confirmed.
5.6) pump also was changed at the same time.
system

C) “Nice To Have”
Verification
by SHI-MRI
The cables of relevant DP equipments were exposed to sharp shape of the
complementary
hole on the wall in DP backup room.
measures for
Theses cables have to be protected against the sharp shape.
protection against
2. Check on
exposed sharp
the number
1 Insulation shape.
of required
equipments
< DP backup room on E-deck >

Verification
by SHI-MRI
Incorrect nametags were attached at the top of an entrance as follows : SHI took Noted Closed
 Port bow thruster room complementary
 Stbd bow thruster room measures to change
 Center bow thruster room correct nametags of
 Forward machinery room corresponding
These nametags have to be changed correctly. rooms.
2. Check
on the
2 Insulation number of
required
equipments
< Nametag of port bow THR, RM > < Nametag of stbd bow THR, RM >
< Nametag of cent. bow THR, RM > < Nametag of fwd. mach. RM >

Verification
by SHI-MRI
Labels It was fixed correctly and confirmed. Noted Closed
The labels for the number of thruster on K-POS OS and K-
for
3 THRUST OS panel were mismatched with mimic. It should
thrusters
be changed.
on OS
Labels The labels of control selector switch Noted Closed
of The labels of selector switch on backup K-POS OS 4 were on backup K-POS OS 4 had been
4
selector not attached. It should be indicated. attached after DP trial.
switch 2. Check
on the No nametag of switchboxes in both HPR compartments as It was fixed and confirmed. Noted Closed
S/W box number of follows :
5
Nametag required  HPR 1 at stbdside
equipments  HPR 2 at portside
The transceiver 2 cable tray in HPR 2 Noted Closed
Cable The transceiver 2 cable tray in HPR 2 compartment (P) was compt. was installed correctly after
6
Tray installed abnormally. It should be fixed correctly. DP trial and confirmed.
Arrangement drawing has been Noted Closed

UPS inserted into the panel instead of
7 The PDUs of the UPS have no nametags of breakers.
nametag nametags and it was confirmed.

Verification
by SHI-MRI
MGE DO It was updated properly and Noted Closed
There is no engine room name in alarm description of ‘standby
8 supply 1.1) confirmed.
started’.
pump
At fwd 220V fail test two alarm for No.1 and No.3 UPS came out. It was fixed and confirmed Noted Closed
Fwd correct alarm occurring
9 2.4) One is “Auto sw fail” and the other is “abnormal”. But only “Auto
Section
sw fail” alarm for No.2 UPS came out.
Indication for the bus has not Noted Closed

Em’cy
been applied for this project.
10 Swbd 2.5) The color of 220V emcy feeder panel was not changed to white.
This item was discussed with
Mimic
owner and closed.
DC110V It was fixed and confirmed Noted Closed
11 2.6) No alarm when one power source of AVR failed.
DB alarm correct alarm occurring
LV It was fixed and confirmed Noted Closed
12 protective 2.6) No alarm with regard to power failure of LV protective relay. correct alarm occurring
relay alarm
When the auto S/W box of as below UPS’s was power loss, the HPR It was fixed and confirmed Noted Closed
has redundant power but no alarm coming up to OS. correct alarm occurring
Auto S/W 2.8)
13  UPS 2 for auto S/W box at stbd side
box 2.11)
 UPS 5 for auto S/W box at port side
The alarm should be coming up to give indication for operator.

Verification
by SHI-MRI
Unlike stbd and cent, when kw signal of a DG was It was fixed and confirmed changing to Noted Closed
disconnected kW value was fixed and the other DG manual mode.
was not tripped by reverse power. But the
FS
corresponding DG should be not changed to manual
14 for 3.5)
mode either.
Port MGE
Unlike stbd and cent, in case of the loss of breaker
status signal nothing happened. In our opinion this
is normal.
It was fixed and confirmed. Noted Closed
FS power 3.2) ~ Description cell on alarm view was blank at alarm
15
fail alarm 3.7) test for FS power fail.
The standard deviation of DGPS was not increased < Kongsberg reply > Noted Closed
after all corresponding differential correction signals The standard deviation increasing slowly, there
fail and then suddenly the DGPS was rejected. are a few reasons to be aware of as follows:
Normally, in case of all correction signals loss, the 1) Vessel must move slightly since deviation is
Voting
standard deviation of DGPS is increasing due to calculated from present position.
16 of 4.7)
degraded accuracy and then the DGPS might be 2) The XP/HP must be disconnected firstly, and
PRS
rejected on DP by too high deviation. wait at least 2~3mins.
It should be explained why keep on the standard 3) The other correction signals can then be
deviation of DGPS without differential correction disconnected one by one, but give time between
signals. and make sure the vessel does not “stand still”

Verification
by SHI-MRI
It was fixed and confirmed Noted Closed
The alarm must be triggered when power of DCU is changed.
17 DCU 5.1) correct alarm occurring.
The alarm must be installed.
It was fixed and confirmed Noted Closed
18 RexCU 5.1) The alarm must be installed when power of RexCU is changed. correct alarm occurring.
Lubrication The description of stand-by start Noted Closed

When the pump is changed the description of stand-by start alarm was updated on mimic and
19 oil 5.5)
alarm must put in. confirmed.
system
Sea water It was modified correctly on Noted Closed

The description of cooling system mimic must be modified. mimic and confirmed.
20 cooling 5.6)
STBD and PORT are changed each other.
system

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HN1899

The status of punch list still open.

Marine Research Institute

2. Check on the number of required equipments ……………… 07

3. Test items ……………… 09

4. The summary for results of FMEA proving ……………… 77

5. The punch list from the tests ……………… 78

Samsung Heavy Industries 1/95 Page Marine Research Institute

Samsung Heavy Industries 2/95 Page Marine Research Institute

Samsung Heavy Industries 3/95 Page Marine Research Institute

For ver. 1.0 – First issue for review

For ver. 2.0 – Issue for review

For ver. 3.1 – Issue for updating CAT numbering

Samsung Heavy Industries 4/95 Page Marine Research Institute

1.1 The conditions for the tests

1.2 The basic preparation for each test

Samsung Heavy Industries 5/95 Page Marine Research Institute

The test order can be changed as necessary or convenient.

Samsung Heavy Industries 6/95 Page Marine Research Institute

2. Check on the number of required equipments to comply with DPS-3

Subsystem or Component ABS DPS-3 ETESCO Drillship

Bus tie breaker 2 6 (2 in each MSB)

Distribution system Redundant, through separate 1+1+1 in separate compartments

Power management Yes Yes (FS38, 40 and 42)

Thruster Arrangement of thruster Redundant in separate 6 in separate compartments

Manual control; joystick Yes Yes (Bridge console, Port/Stbd

Single levers for each Yes Yes

Sensors Pos. ref. systems 3 whereof 1 in alternate 6 whereof 3 in alternate control

External Wind 2 Whereof 1in 3 Whereof 1 in alternate

MRU 2 As above 3 As above

Gyro 3 As above 3 As above

UPS 1 + 1 separate compartment 2+1 separate compartments

Consequence analysis Yes Yes

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ABS DPS-3 : ■ Pass □ Fail

unfinished works, which had been checked

Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as follows :

Samsung Heavy Industries 8/95 Page Marine Research Institute

Samsung Heavy Industries 9/95 Page Marine Research Institute

The systems for the power generation ars as followings :

Each Engine Room

1.1) MGE DO supply system

Lub Oil System No test item

1.3) Sea water pump

Compressed Air System 1.5) Control air system

Ventilation System No test item

Main Generator Engine 1.6) Electric governor

Samsung Heavy Industries 10/95 Page Marine Research Institute

1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system – Fuel system)

Method 1. Stop No.1 supply pump

* Repeat for each engine room

2 - Alarm As expected As expected As expected

ABS DPS-3 : ■ Pass □ Fail

Samsung Heavy Industries 11/95 Page Marine Research Institute