Philconsa V Enriquez

9/14/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 235
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez
*
G.R. No. 113105. August 19, 1994.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION,

EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and RAMON A. GONZALES,
petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as
Secretary of Budget and Management; HON. VICENTE T.
TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 113174. August 19, 1994.
RAUL S. ROCO, as Member of the Philippine Senate,

NEPTALI A. GONZALES, as Chairman of the Committee
on Finance of the Philippine Senate, and EDGARDO J.
ANGARA, as President and Chief Executive of the
Philippine Senate, all of whom also sue as taxpayers, in
their own behalf and in representation of Senators
HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO A. AQUINO,
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, JOSE D. LINA, JR., ERNESTO F.
HERRERA, BLAS F. OPLE, JOHN H. OSMEÑA, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, VICENTE C. SOTTO III,
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD,
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and FREDDIE N. WEBB,
petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, and
THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, impleaded herein as an unwilling co-petitioner,
respondents.
*
G.R. No. 113766. August 19, 1994.
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as

Members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers, and
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, petitioners, vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR.,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, HON. CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016d2e613c76ae622c4b003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/54
capacity as National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION

ON AUDIT, respondents.
_______________
* EN BANC.
507
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 507

G.R. No. 113888. August 19, 1994.*
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as

Members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers,
petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review, requisites.—When

issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case (Luz Farms v. Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990]; Dumlao v.
Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 [1937]).
Same; Same; Veto Power; Parties; A member of Congress has
the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or
any other act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress.—We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the
House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing
to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. Where the veto is
claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority
vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an
impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the
Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge
Executive Action, 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
1366 [1974]). To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,

so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]). An act of the Executive which
injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]).
In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the
courts.
508
Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution provides a

mechanism for overriding a veto, said remedy is available only
when the presidential veto is based on policy or political
considerations, not when the same is claimed to be ultra vires.—It
is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding
a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available
only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political
considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires.
In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the
dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the
bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
Same; Separation of Powers; Power of Appropriation; Pork
Barrel; The power of appropriation carries with it the power to
specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation
law.—Under the Constitution, the spending power called by
James Madison as “the power of the purse,” belongs to Congress,
subject only to the veto power of the President. The President may
propose the budget, but still the final say on the matter of
appropriations is lodged in the Congress. The power of
appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or
activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive function under the
Countrywide Development Fund involves implementation of the
priority projects specified in the law while the authority given to
members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be
implemented.—Exe-cutive function under the Countrywide
Development Fund involves implementation of the priority
projects specified in the law. The authority given to the members
of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be
implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of

1994, the President must perforce examine whether the proposals
submitted by the members of Congress fall within the specific
items of expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if
qualified, he next determines whether they are in line with other
projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed
projects qualify for funding under the Fund, it is the President
who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are merely
recommendatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The procedure of proposing and
identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or
activities under the General Appropriations Act of 1994 is
imaginative as it is innovative.—The procedure of proposing and
identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or
activities under Article XLI of the
509
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 509
GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative. The Constitution is

a framework of a workable government and its interpretation
must take into account the complexities, realities and politics
attendant to the operation of the political branches of
government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven
allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the members of
Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership
or who hold cards for “horse-trading,” getting more than their less
favored colleagues. The members of Congress also had to reckon
with an unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto
power to cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a
Representative or Senator. The Countrywide Development Fund
attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and
their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable
about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to
be given each project.
Same; Appropriations; Fund Transfers; Under the Special
Provisions applicable to Congress, the members only determine the
necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for
their operating expenses but it is the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives who shall approve the
realignment.—Under the Special Provisions applicable to the
Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress only

determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the
allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best
position to do so because they are the ones who know whether
there are savings available in some items and whether there are
deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses that need
augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of
approval, these two officials will have to see to it that: (1) The
funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the
items of expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and
(2) The transfer of realignment is for the purpose of augmenting
the items of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is
to be made.
Same; Same; Debt Service; Education; The constitutional
provision which directs that the State shall assign the highest
budgetary priority to education is merely directory.—While
Congress appropriated——P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service
(Article XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it appropriated only—
P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt service
the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 because under the
Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the highest
510
funding. This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196

SCRA 22 (1991), where this Court held that Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory.
Same; Same; Statutes; The repeal of laws should be done in a
separate law, not in the appropriations law.—Likewise the vetoed
provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse
the debt payment policy. As held by the Court in Gonzales, the
repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law.
Same; Same; Veto Power; The veto power, while exercisable by
the President, is actually a part of the legislative process and the
Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto.—The Court will indulge every
intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto, the same as
it will presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas

Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz., 485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]). The
veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part
of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as
Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI on
the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the
Executive Department in the Constitution. There is, therefore,
sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto.
The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to
show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Line Item Veto; Generally, the President
has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts, except in regard to
general appropriations bills where he may veto any particular item
or items, in which case he has to veto the entire item.—Under his
general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not
merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The
exception to the general veto power is the power given to the
President to veto any particular item or items in a general
appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so
doing, the President must veto the entire item.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; General
Appropriations Bill, explained.—A general appropriations bill is a
special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified
sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal
unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31 Temple
Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of “Inappropriate
Provision”; Any provision which does not relate to any particular
item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of
appropriation, is considered
511
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 511
“an inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately from

an item.—As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which
Congress can include in an appropriations bill must “relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein” and “be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates,” it
follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular
item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of
appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision” which
can be vetoed separately from an item.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Provisions which are

intended to amend other laws are inappropriate provisions in a
general appropriations bill.—Also to be included in the category of
“inappropriate provisions” are unconstitutional provisions and
provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because
clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.
These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt
with in separate enactments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Provisos which are
appropriate provisions cannot be vetoed separately.—The
President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special
Provision of the item on debt service, including the provisos that
the appropriation authorized in said item “shall be used for
payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness” and that “in no case shall this fund be used to pay
for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators.” These
provisos are germane to and have a direct connection with the
item on debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the
power to specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards,
LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said provisos, being appropriate
provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of
said provisions is void.
Same; Same; Prohibition; The writ of prohibition will not
issue on the fear that official actions will be done in contravention
of the laws.—Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the
veto of the Special Provision on the ceiling for debt payment is
valid, the President cannot automatically appropriate funds for
debt payment without complying with the conditions for
automatic appropriation under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as
amended by P.D. No. 81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as
amended by the Administrative Code of 1987 and P.D. No. 1967
(Rollo, G.R. No. 113766, pp. 9-15). Petitioners cannot anticipate
that the President will not faithfully execute the laws. The writ of
prohibition will not issue on the fear that official actions will be
done in contravention of the laws.
512
Same; Same; Congress may add special provisions, conditions

to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately
from the items to which they relate so long as they are
“appropriate” in the budgetary sense.—The second paragraph of
Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the divergence in policy of
Congress and the President. While Congress expressly laid down

the condition that only 30% of the total appropriation for road
maintenance should be contracted out, the President, on the basis
of a comprehensive study, believed that contracting out road
maintenance projects at an option of 70% would be more efficient,
economical and practical. The Special Provision in question is not
an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the
other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended—70%
by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution
allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions
to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately
from the items to which they relate so long as they are
“appropriate” in the budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Words and Phrases;
Congressional Veto, defined; A congressional veto is subject to
serious questions involving the principle of separation of powers.—
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund”
for the AFP modernization program that the President must
submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its
approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto.”
By way of definition, a congressional veto is a means whereby the
legislature can block or modify administrative action taken under
a statute. It is a form of legislative control in the implementation
of particular executive actions. The form may be either negative,
that is requiring disapproval of the executive action, or
affirmative, requiring approval of the executive action. This
device represents a significant attempt by Congress to move from
oversight of the executive to shared administration (Dixon, The
Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a
Leash, 56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]). A
congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the
principle of separation of powers.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Any provision blocking an
administrative action in implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a
separate and substantive bill.—However the case at bench is not
the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the
legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3
because the issues at hand can be
513
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 513
disposed of on other grounds. Any provision blocking an

administrative action in implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a
separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate”
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Same; Same; Contract Clause; The prohibition on the use of
the Modernization Fund for payment of the trainer planes and
armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the
AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage
of laws that impair the obligation of contracts.—Furthermore,
Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization
Fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel
carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative
of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that
impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so,
contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said
special provision is therefore valid.
Same; Same; Fund Transfers; The Special Provision, which
allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension
fund of the AFP violates Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution.—The Special Provision, which allows the Chief
of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP
being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of
the Constitution. Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and under Section
29(1), no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5)
allows as an exception the realignment of savings to augment
items in the general appropriations law for the executive branch,
such right must and can be exercised only by the President
pursuant to a specific law.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Words and Phrases;
Power of Impoundment, defined.—This is the first case before this
Court where the power of the President to impound is put in
issue. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for
whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is
the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type
(Notes: Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505
[1973]).
Same; Same; Same; CAFGU; The appropriations law is not
the proper vehicle to express Congressional intention to deny the
President the right to defer or reduce the spending for the
deactivation of the
514
CAFGU.—We do not find anything in the language used in the

challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress
intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the
spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at
once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation
law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention
must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that
it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are
existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
Again we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be
used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597
and R.A. No. 6758.
Same; Same; Same; Veto Power; Mere reminders in the veto
message that disbursements must be made in accordance with law
may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.—Petitioners claim that
the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court, the
Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. In the first place, the
conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by
Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely
highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or
indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the
second place, such statements are mere reminders that the
disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with
law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issuance of administrative
guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by Congress is
simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see
that laws are faithfully executed.—There is less basis to complain
when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot
be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. The
issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds
authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of
his constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed
(1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62
[1939]). Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has
the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into
execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147
[1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
Same; Judicial Power; The Court’s interpretation of the law is
part of that law as of the date of its enactment.—Article 8 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, provides: “Judicial decisions

applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form a
part of the legal
515
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 515
system of the Philippines.” The Court’s interpretation of the law is

part of that law as of the date of its enactment since the court’s
interpretation merely establishes the contemporary legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect (People
v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]). Decisions of the Supreme Court
assume the same authority as statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining
Corporation, 136 SCRA 141 [1985]).
Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; Reversal of previous
decisions cannot nullify prior acts done in reliance thereof.—Even
if Guingona and Gonzales are considered hard cases that make
bad laws and should be reversed, such reversal cannot nullify
prior acts done in reliance thereof.
PADILLA, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Veto Power; An

inappropriate provision is still a provision, not an item, and,
therefore outside the veto power of the Executive.—I therefore
disagree with the majority’s pronouncements which would
validate the veto by the President of specific provisions in the
appropriations act based on the contention that such are
“inappropriate provisions.” Even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that a provision in the appropriations act is
“inappropriate” from the Presidential standpoint, it is still a
provision, not an item, in an appropriations act and, therefore,
outside the veto power of the Executive.
VITUG, J., Concurring:
Constitutional Law; Appropriations; Pork Barrel; To give the

authority of Congress to appropriate funds for specific projects to
the individual members of Congress in whatever guise would be
constitutionally impermissible.—I cannot debate the fact that the
members of Congress, more than the President and his
colleagues, would have the best feel on the needs of their own
respective constituents. I see no legal obstacle, however, in their
making, just like anyone else, the proper recommendations to,
albeit not necessarily conclusive on, the President for the purpose.
Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to
appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded;
to give that authority, however, to the individual members of
Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally
impermissible.
PETITIONS for review of orders or resolutions of the

Executive Secretary, Secretary of Budget and
Management, National Treasurer and the Commission
on Audit.
516

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ramon R. Gonzales for petitioners in G.R. No.
113105.
Eddie Tamondong for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 113766
& 113888.
Roco, Buñag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for
petitioners Raul S. Roco, Neptali A. Gonzales and Edgardo
Angara.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for intervenor Lawyers
Against Monopoly and Poverty (Lamp).
QUIASON, J.:
Once again this Court is called upon to rule on the

conflicting claims of authority between the Legislative and
the Executive in the clash of the powers of the purse and
the sword. Providing the focus for the contest between the
President and the Congress over control of the national
budget are the four cases at bench. Judicial intervention is
being sought by a group of concerned taxpayers on the
claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly
exceeded their respective authorities, and by several
Senators on the claim that the President has committed
grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in
the exercise of his veto power.
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of

1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it
imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of

appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of
Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork
barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and
enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
Congress presented the said bill to the President for
consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into
law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act
No. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS
FOR THE
517
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 517

OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-
FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On
the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and
on which he imposed certain conditions.
No step was taken in either House of Congress to
override the vetoes.
In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution
Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales as
taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as
unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the
Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in
Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for
Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article
XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the
veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article
XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 88-90, 104-105).
In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of the Senate led
by Senate President Edgardo J. Angara, Senator Neptali A.
Gonzales, the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, and
Senator Raul S. Roco, sought the issuance of the writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, and the National Treasurer.
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers,

petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality of the
conditions imposed by the President in the items of the
GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on
Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human
Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s);
and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special
provision in the appropriation for debt service.
In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G. Romulo and
Wigberto Tañada (a co-petitioner in G.R. No. 113174),
together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-
stock domestic corporation, sought the issuance of the writs
of prohibition and mandamus against the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, the National Treasurer, and the
518

COA.
Petitioners Tañada and Romulo sued as members of the
Philippine Senate and taxpayers, while petitioner Freedom
from Debt Coalition sued as a taxpayer. They challenge the
constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the special
provision in the appropriations for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefor.
In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Tañada and Romulo
sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No.
113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions
added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by
the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the
National Housing Authority (NHA).
Petitioners also sought the issuance of temporary
restraining orders to enjoin respondents Secretary of
Budget and Management, National Treasurer and COA
from enforcing the questioned provisions of the GAA of
1994, but the Court declined to grant said provisional
reliefs on the time-honored principle of according the
presumption of validity to statutes and the presumption of
regularity to official acts.
In view of the importance and novelty of most of the

issues raised in the four petitions, the Court invited former
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate
Justice Irene Cortes to submit their respective memoranda
as Amicus Curiae, which they graciously did.
II
Locus Standi
When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual
and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3)
the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
519
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 519

question is the lis mota of the case (Luz Farms v. Secretary

of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51
[1990]; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392
[1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus
standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he claimed that
the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political
(i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not
have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was
recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452
(1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire
membership of the Upper House of Congress, filed a
petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the
GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was authorized by
Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989,
and which reads as follows:
“Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in

the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with
the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and
General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other
Purposes.”
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of

Congress to sue has been recognized (United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384, 391 [1976]; Notes:
Congressional Access To The Federal Courts, 90 Harvard
Law Review 1632 [1977]).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16
Senators, including the Senate President and the
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not
authorized by the Senate itself. Likewise, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an
enabling resolution for the purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of
petitioners in the three cases becomes a preliminary issue
before this Court can inquire into the validity of the
presidential veto and the conditions for the implementation
of some items in the GAA of 1994.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House
of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing
to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
520

Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in

excess of the authority vested on the President by the
Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the
Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises (Notes:
Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive Action, 122
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1366 [1974]).
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is
the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939];
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress
(Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a case,
any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus
Curiae, noted:
“This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or

individual Senators as such having a substantial interest in the
question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was the
requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile

to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the domain
appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the
situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that could
allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the
corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator
has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office” (Memorandum,
p. 14).
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for

overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy,
however, is available only when the presidential veto is
based on policy or political considerations but not when the
veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it
becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line
where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds
of legislative jurisdiction begin.
521
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 521

III
G.R. No. 113105
1. Countrywide Development Fund
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Countrywide

Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00 to “be used for
infra-structure, purchase of ambulances and computers
and other priority projects and activities and credit
facilities to qualified beneficiaries.” Said Article provides:
“COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND

For Fund ............................................ P2,977,000,000
requirements
of countrywide
development
projects
New Appropriations, by Purpose
Current Operating Expenditures
Current Operating Expenditures

A. PURPOSE
Personal Maintenance Capital Total
Services and Other Outlays
Operating
Expenses
1. For Countrywide P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000
Development
Projects
TOTAL NEW P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000
APPROPRIATIONS
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein appropriated
shall be used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and
computers and other priority projects and activities, and credit
facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by
officials concerned according to the following allocations:
Representatives, P12,500,000 each; Senators,
522

P18,000,000 each; Vice-President, P20,000,000; PROVIDED,

That, the said credit facilities shall be constituted as a revolving
fund to be administered by a government financial institution
(GFI) as a trust fund for lending operations. Prior years releases
to local government units and national government agencies for
this purpose shall be turned over to the government financial
institution which shall be the sole administrator of credit facilities
released from this fund.
The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of
Advice of Allotments and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the
assigned implementing agency not later than five (5) days after
the beginning of each quarter upon submission of the list of
projects and activities by the officials concerned.
2. Submission of Quarterly Reports. The Department of Budget
and Management shall submit within thirty (30) days after the
end of each quarter a report to the Senate Committee on Finance
and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases
made from this Fund. The report shall include the listing of the
projects, locations, implementing agencies and the endorsing
officials” (GAA of 1994, p. 1245).
Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of

Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities
to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since
said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of
a law. They argue that the proposal and identification of
the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal
and amendment thereof, the only function given to the
Congress by the Constitution (Rollo, pp. 78-86).
Under the Constitution, the spending power called by
James Madison as “the power of the purse,” belongs to
Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President.
The President may propose the budget, but still the final
say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the
Congress.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to
specify the project or activity to be funded under the
appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be.
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it
shall be used “for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances
and computers and other priority projects and activities
and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries x x x.” It was
Congress itself that determined the purposes for the
appropriation.
523
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 523

Executive function under the Countrywide Development

Fund involves implementation of the priority projects
specified in the law.
The authority given to the members of Congress is only
to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the
President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the
President must perforce examine whether the proposals
submitted by the members of Congress fall within the
specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was set
up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in
line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter,
if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the Fund,
it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the
proposals and identifications made by the members of
Congress are merely recommendatory.
The procedure of proposing and identifying by members
of Congress of particular projects or activities under Article
XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative.

The Constitution is a framework of a workable
government and its interpretation must take into account
the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the
operation of the political branches of government. Prior to
the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of
appropriations for the constituents of the members of
Congress, with the members close to the Congressional
leadership or who hold cards for “horse-trading,” getting
more than their less favored colleagues. The members of
Congress also had to reckon with an unsympathetic
President, who could exercise his veto power to cancel from
the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or
Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make
equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that individual
members of Congress, far more than the President and
their congressional colleagues are likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project.
2. Realignment of Operating Expenses
Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation for the Senate is

P472,000,000.00 of which P464,447,000.00 is appropriated
for current operating expenditures, while the appropriation
for the House of Representatives is P1,171,924,000.00 of
which
524

P1,165,297,000.00 is appropriated for current operating

expenditures (GAA of 1994, pp. 2, 4, 9, 12).
The 1994 operating expenditures for the Senate are as
follows:
“Personal Services
Salaries, Permanent 153,347
Salaries/Wages, Contractual/Emergency 6,870
Total Salaries and Wages 160,217
Other Compensation
Step Increments 1,073
Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 3,731
Compensation Insurance Premiums 1,579

Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 1,184
Medicare Premiums 888
Bonus and Cash Gift 14,791
Terminal Leave Benefits 2,000
Personnel Economic Relief Allowance 10,266
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53 11,130
Others 57,173
Total Other Compensation 103,815
01 Total Personal Services 264,032
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
02 Travelling Expenses 32,841
03 Communication Services 7,666
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government 1,220
Facilities
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government 318
Vehicles
06 Transportation Services 128
07 Supplies and Materials 20,189
08 Rents 24,584
14 Water/Illumination and Power 6,561
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 3,270
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 2,225
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous
525
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 525

Expenses 9,360
23 Advertising and Publication
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,325
29 Other Services 89,778
Total Maintenance and Other Operating 200,415
Expenditures
Total Current Operating Expenditures 464,447
(GAA of 1994, pp. 3-4)
The 1994 operating expenditures for the House of

Representatives are as follows:
Personal Services
Salaries, Permanent 261,557
Salaries/Wages, Contractual/Emergency 143,643
Total Salaries and Wages 405,200
Other Compensation
Step Increments 4,312
Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 4,764
Compensation Insurance Premiums 1,159
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 5,231
Medicare Premiums 2,281
Bonus and Cash Gift 35,669
Terminal Leave Benefits 29
Personnel Economic Relief Allowance 21,510
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53 21,768
Others 106,140
Total Other Compensation 202,863
01 Total Personal Services 608,063
526

Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses

02 Travelling Expenses 139,611
03 Communication Services 22,514
Facilities
Vehicles
06 Transportation Services 178
07 Supplies and Materials 55,248
10 Grants/Subsidies/Contributions 940
14 Water/Illumination and Power 14,458
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 325
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 7,236
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 14,474

20 Anti-Insurgency/Contingency Emergency 9,400
Expenses
23 Advertising and Publication Expenses 242
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,420
29 Other Services 284,209
Total Maintenance and Other Operating 557,234
Expenses
Total Current Operating Expenditures 1,165,297
(GAA of 1994, pp. 11-12)
The Special Provision Applicable to the Congress of the

Philippines provides:
“4. Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. A

member of Congress may realign his allocation for operational
expenses to any other expense category provided the total of said
allocation is not exceeded” (GAA of 1994, p. 14).
The appropriation for operating expenditures for each

House is further divided into expenditures for salaries,
personal services,
527
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 527

other compensation benefits, maintenance expenses and

other operating expenses. In turn, each member of
Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditure a
proportionate share of the appropriation for the House to
which he belongs. If he does not spend for one item of
expense, the provision in question allows him to transfer
his allocation in said item to another item of expense.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a
member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category (Rollo,
pp. 82-92), claiming that this practice is prohibited by
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. Said section
provides:
“No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations: however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in

the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants the

President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives the power to augment items in an
appropriation act for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their appropriations, whenever there is a
law authorizing such augmentation.
The special provision on realignment of the operating
expenses of members of Congress is authorized by Section
16 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1994, which
provides:
“Expenditure Components. Except by act of the Congress of the

Philippines, no change or modification shall be made in the
expenditure items authorized in this Act and other appropriation
laws unless in cases of augmentations from savings in
appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5) of Article VI of
the Constitution” (GAA of 1994, p. 1273).
Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the

Speaker of the House of Representatives, but not the
individual members of Congress are the ones authorized to
realign the savings as appropriated.
528

Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of

the Philippines, the members of Congress only determine
the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the
allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the
best position to do so because they are the ones who know
whether there are savings available in some items and
whether there are deficiencies in other items of their
operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is
the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve the
realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, these
two officials will have to see to it that:
(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are

actually savings in the items of expenditures from
which the same are to be taken; and
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of

augmenting the items of expenditure to which said
transfer or realignment is to be made.
3. Highest Priority for Debt Service
While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt

service (Article XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it appropriated
only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot
give debt service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994
(Rollo, pp. 93-94) because under the Constitution it should
be education that is entitled to the highest funding. They
invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, which provides:
“(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to

education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.”
This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196

SCRA 221 (1991), where this Court held that Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory, thus:
“While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the

Constitution, Congress is mandated to ‘assign the highest
budgetary
529
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 529

priority to education’ in order to ‘insure that teaching will attract

and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment,’ it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress
are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of
other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for
education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the
public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General
Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary
allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear
compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according
highest priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not

without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide
an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt,
the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous
administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival
of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress
appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.”
G.R. No. 113105

G.R. No. 113174
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling

The Congress added a Special Provision to Article XLVIII
(Appropriations for Debt Service) of the GAA of 1994 which
provides:
“Special Provisions
1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein

shall be used for payment of principal and interest of
foreign and domestic indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any
payment in excess of the amount herein appropriated
shall be subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the
Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case
shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the
Central Bank Board of Liquidators.
530

2. Reporting Requirement. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

and the Department of Finance shall submit a quarterly
report of actual foreign and domestic debt service
payments to the House Committee on Appropriations and
Senate Finance Committee within one (1) month after
each quarter” (GAA of 1994, pp. 1266).
The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without

vetoing the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation for debt
service in said Article. According to the President’s Veto
Message:
“IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT SERVICE
I would like to emphasize that I concur fully with the desire of

Congress to reduce the debt burden by decreasing the
appropriation for debt service as well as the inclusion of the
Special Provision quoted below. Nevertheless, I believe that this
debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994
GAA. This must be addressed by revising our debt policy by way
of innovative and comprehensive debt reduction programs
conceptualized within the ambit of the Medium-Term Philippine
Development Plan.
Appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or
domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign
Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated
under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the
Administrative Code of 1987. I wish to emphasize that the
constitutionality of such automatic provisions on debt servicing
has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of ‘Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Guillermo N.
Carague, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management,
et al.,’ G.R. No. 94571, dated April 22, 1991.
I am, therefore vetoing the following special provision for the
reason that the GAA is not the appropriate legislative measure to
amend the provisions of the Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D. No. 1177
and E.O. No. 292:
‘Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for
payment of principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness:
PROVIDED, That any payment in excess of the amount herein
appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be used to pay
for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators’ ” (GAA of
1994, p. 1290).
531
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 531

Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special

Provision on the appropriation for debt service without
vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said
purpose (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 93-98; Rollo, G.R. No.
113174, pp. 16-18). The Solicitor General counterposed that
the Special Provision did not relate to the item of
appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the
subject of an item veto (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 54-60;

Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 72-82).
This issue is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in
Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In that
case, the issue was stated by the Court, thus:
“The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the

President of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55
FY '89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the
1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY '90), is unconstitutional
and without effect.”
The Court re-stated the issue, just so there would not be

any misunderstanding about it, thus:
“The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President

exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto ‘provisions’ of
an Appropriations Bill?”
The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which are similar to

those invoked in the present case, are stated as follows:
“In essence, petitioners’ cause is anchored on the following

grounds: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards
appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed
Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions;
(2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation
bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the
entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be
legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers;
and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of
the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and,
therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power.
532

The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the

President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill
not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but
also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in
the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall

be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates
(1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in
the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is
limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which
it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.”
The Court went one step further and ruled that even
assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the
executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY '89) and
Section 16 (FY '90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary
sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that
should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the
President’s veto power.
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153
(1977), said that Congress cannot include in a general
appro-priations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as
“item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise
of his item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision
applicable to the appropriation for debt service insofar as it
refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the
bill, is an “inappropriate” provision referring to funds other
than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General
Appropriations Act of 1991.
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to
repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act)
and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy.
As held by the Court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws
should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations
law.
The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto, the same as it will presume the
constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State,
254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz., 485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is
actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of
Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is
why it is found in
533
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 533

Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in

Article VII on the Executive Department in the
Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in
the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on
those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use
is a violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto
the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution,
Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power
is the power given to the President to veto any particular
item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President
must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of
legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of
money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal
unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31
Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act of
the Philippines passed by the U.S. Congress on August 29,
1916. The concept was adopted from some State
Constitutions.
Cognizant of the legislative practice of inserting
provisions, including conditions, restrictions and
limitations, to items in appropriations bills, the
Constitutional Convention added the following sentence to
Section 20(2), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution:
“x x x When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or

more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision
without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to
which it relates x x x.”
In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the President was

empowered to veto separately not only items in an
appropriations bill but also “provisions.”
While the 1987 Constitution did not retain the
aforementioned sentence added to Section 11(2) of Article
VI of the 1935 Constitution, it included the following
provision:
“No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general

appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates”
(Art. VI, Sec.
534

25[2]).
In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that

sentence of Section 16(2) of the 1935 Constitution in the
1987 Constitution should not be interpreted to mean the
disallowance of the power of the President to veto a
“provision.”
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which
Congress can include in an appropriations bill must “relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein” and
“be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates,” it follows that any provision which does not relate
to any particular item, or which extends in its operation
beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an
inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately
from an item. Also to be included in the category of
“inappropriate provisions” are unconstitutional provisions
and provisions which are intended to amend other laws,
because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an
appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation
more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments.
Former Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented
that Congress cannot by law establish conditions for and
regulate the exercise of powers of the President given by
the Constitution for that would be an unconstitutional
intrusion into executive prerogative.
The doctrine of “inappropriate provision” was well
elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus:
“Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp

constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the
legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers
conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by
including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly
enacted in separate legislation. The Governor’s constitutional
power to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be abridged by
the careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation
bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between approving
unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing ‘items’ of
expenditures essential to the operation of government. The
legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from
executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor’s veto power
over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law
measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations
on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be
permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities and

functions of a co-equal branch of government
535
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 535

in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are

no more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation
power to infringe on the Governor’s constitutional right to veto
matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow the
Governor to encroach on the constitutional powers of the
legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the
legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general
appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as ‘items’ for
purposes of the Governor’s item veto power over general
appropriation bills.
x x x x x x x x x
“x x x Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner
as to encumber the general appropriation bill with veto-proof
‘logrolling measures,’ special interest provisions which could not
succeed if separately enacted, or ‘riders,’ substantive pieces of
legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto. x
x x” (Italics supplied).
Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of

the Special Provision on the ceiling for debt payment is
valid, the President cannot automatically appropriate
funds for debt payment without complying with the
conditions for automatic appropriation under the
provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as amended by P.D. No. 81 and
the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the
Administrative Code of 1987 and P.D. No. 1967 (Rollo, G.R.
No. 113766, pp. 9-15).
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will not
faithfully execute the laws. The writ of prohibition will not
issue on the fear that official actions will be done in
contravention of the laws.
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the
Special Provision of the item on debt service, including the
provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item
“shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of
foreign and domestic indebtedness” and that “in no case
shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the
Central Bank Board of Liquidators.” These provisos are
germane to and have a direct connection with the item on
debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the
power to specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v.

Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said provisos, being
appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence
the item veto of said provisions is void.
536

We reiterate, in order to obviate any misunderstanding,

that we are sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of
the item on debt service only with respect to the proviso
therein requiring that “any payment in excess of the
amount herein, appropriated shall be subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines with the
concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines x x x.”
G.R. No. 113174

G.R. No. 113766
G.R. No. 113888
1 . Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUC’s.
In the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges

(SUC’s), the President vetoed special provisions which
authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds. The Special Provisions
vetoed are the following:
“(H.7) West Visayas State University

‘Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned by the University
subject to Section 13 of the special provisions applicable to all
State Universities and Colleges shall be equally shared by the
University and the University hospital’ (GAA of 1994, p. 395).
xxx
(J.3) Leyte State College
‘Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC House and Human
Resources Development Center (HRDC). The income of Leyte
State College derived from the operation of its LSC House and
HRDC shall be constituted into a Revolving Fund to be deposited
in an authorized government depository bank for the operational
expenses of these projects/services. The net income of the
Revolving Fund at the end of the year shall be remitted to the
National Treasury and shall accrue to the General Fund. The
implementing guidelines shall be issued by the Department of
Budget and Management’ ” (GAA of 1994, p. 415).
The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to all SUC’s are

the following:
“12. Use of Income from Extension Services. State Universities

and Colleges are authorized to use their income from their
extension
537
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 537

services. Subject to the approval of the Board of Regents and the

approval of a special budget pursuant to Sec. 35, Chapter 5, Book
VI of E.O. No. 292, such income shall be utilized solely for faculty
development, instructional materials and work study program”
(GAA of 1994, p. 490).
“13. ‘Income of State Universities and Colleges. The income of
State Universities and Colleges derived from tuition fees and
other sources as may be imposed by governing boards other than
those accruing to revolving funds created under LOI Nos. 872 and
1026 and those authorized to be recorded as trust receipts
pursuant to Section 40, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 shall
be deposited with the National Treasury and recorded as a
Special Account in the General Fund pursuant to P.D. No. 1234
and P.D. No. 1437 for the use of the institution, subject to Section
35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292: PROVIDED, That
disbursements from the Special Account shall not exceed the
amount actually earned and deposited: PROVIDED, FURTHER,
That a cash advance on such income may be allowed State
Universities and Colleges representing up to one-half of income
actually realized during the preceding year and this cash advance
shall be charged against income actually earned during the
budget year: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That in no case shall
such funds be used to create positions, nor for payment of
salaries, wages or allowances, except as may be specifically
approved by the Department of Budget and Management for
income-producing activities, or to purchase equipment or books,
without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines
pursuant to Letter of Implementation No. 29.
All collections of the State Universities and Colleges for fees,
charges and receipts intended for private recipient units,
including private foundations affiliated with these institutions
shall be duly acknowledged with official receipts and deposited as
a trust receipt before said income shall be subject to Section 35,
Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292” (GAA of 1994, p. 490).
The President gave his reasons for the veto thus:
“Pursuant to Section 65 of the Government Auditing Code of the

Philippines, Section 44, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, s.
1987 and Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, all income
earned by all Government offices and agencies shall accrue to the
General Fund of the Government in line with the One Fund
Policy enunciated by Section 29 (1), Article VI and Section 22,
Article VII of the Constitution. Likewise, the creation and
establishment of revolving funds shall be authorized by
substantive law pursuant to Section 66 of the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines and Section 45, Chapter 5, Book
VI of
538

E.O. No. 292.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned provisions of the
Constitution and existing law, I have noted the proliferation of
special provisions authorizing the use of agency income as well as
the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds.
I would like to underscore the fact that such income were
already considered as integral part of the revenue and financing
sources of the National Expenditure Program which I previously
submitted to Congress. Hence, the grant of new special provisions
authorizing the use of agency income and the establishment of
revolving funds over and above the agency appropriations
authorized in this Act shall effectively reduce the financing
sources of the 1994 GAA and, at the same time, increase the level
of expenditures of some agencies beyond the well-coordinated,
rationalized levels for such agencies. This corresponding increases
the overall deficit of the National Government” (Veto Message, p.
3).
Petitioners claim that the President acted with grave abuse

of discretion when he disallowed by his veto the “use of
income” and the creation of “revolving fund” by the
Western Visayas State University and Leyte State Colleges
when he allowed other government offices, like the
National Stud Farm, to use their income for their operating
expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 15-16).
There was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar
provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and
maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because
these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by
virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as

exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for
the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities
and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the
Department of Budget and Management’s Procurement
Service).
2. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative) /30%

(contract) ratio for road maintenance.
In the appropriation for the Department of Public Works

and Highways, the President vetoed the second paragraph
of Special Provision No. 2, specifying the 30% maximum
ratio of works to be contracted for the maintenance of
national roads and bridges.
539
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 539

The said paragraph reads as follows:
“2. Release and Use of Road Maintenance Funds. Funds allotted

for the maintenance and repair of roads which are provided in
this Act for the Department of Public Works and Highways shall
be released to the respective Engineering District, subject to such
rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Department of
Budget and Management. Maintenance funds for roads and
bridges shall be exempt from budgetary reserve.
Of the amount herein appropriated for the maintenance of
national roads and bridges, a maximum of thirty percent (30%)
shall be contracted out in accordance with guidelines to be issued
by the Department of Public Works and Highways. The balance
shall be used for maintenance by force account.
Five percent (5%) of the total road maintenance fund
appropriated herein to be applied across the board to the
allocation of each region shall be set aside for the maintenance of
roads which may be converted to or taken over as national roads
during the current year and the same shall be released to the
central office of the said department for eventual sub-allotment to
the concerned region and district: PROVIDED, That any balance
of the said five percent (5%) shall be restored to the regions on a
pro-rata basis for the maintenance of existing national roads.
No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead expenses
shall be made, except as authorized by law or upon direction of
the President” (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786; Italics supplied).
The President gave the following reason for the veto:

“While I am cognizant of the well-intended desire of Congress to

impose certain restrictions contained in some special provisions, I
am equally aware that many programs, projects and activities of
agencies would require some degree of flexibility to ensure their
successful implementation and therefore risk their completion.
Furthermore, not only could these restrictions and limitations
derail and impede program implementation but they may also
result in a breach of contractual obligations.
D.1.a. A study conducted by the Infrastructure Agencies show
that for practical intent and purposes, maintenance by contract
could be undertaken to an optimum of seventy percent (70%) and
the remaining thirty percent (30%) by force account. Moreover,
the policy of maximizing implementation through contract
maintenance is a covenant of the Road and Road Transport
Program Loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB Loan No.
1047-PHI-1990) and Overseas Economic
540

Cooperation Fund (OECF Loan No. PH-C17-199). The same is a

covenant under the World Bank (IBRD) Loan for the Highway
Management Project (IBRD Loan No. PH-3430) obtained in 1992.
In the light of the foregoing and considering the policy of the
government to encourage and maximize private sector
participation in the regular repair and maintenance of
infrastructure facilities, I am directly vetoing the underlined
second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the Department of
Public Works and Highways” (Veto Message, p. 11).
The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to

fore the divergence in policy of Congress and the President.
While Congress expressly laid down the condition that only
30% of the total appropriation for road maintenance should
be contracted out, the President, on the basis of a
comprehensive study, believed that contracting out road
maintenance projects at an option of 70% would be more
efficient, economical and practical.
The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto.
It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance,
and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall
be expended—70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress
of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure
bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to
which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the

budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
The Solicitor General was hard put in justifying the veto
of this special provision. He merely argued that the
provision is a complete turnabout from an entrenched
practice of the govern-ment to maximize contract
maintenance (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 85-86). That is
not a ground to veto a provision separate from the item to
which it refers.
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision
No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is therefore
unconstitutional.
3. Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP.
In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the

Philippines (AFP), the President vetoed the special
provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in
compliance with the Generics Drugs
541
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 541

Law (R.A. No. 6675). The vetoed provision reads:
“12. Purchase of Medicines. The purchase of medicines by all

Armed Forces of the Philippines units, hospitals and clinics shall
strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug
Policy of the Department of Health” (GAA of 1994, p. 748).
According to the President, while it is desirable to subject

the purchase of medicines to a standard formulary, “it is
believed more prudent to provide for a transition period for
its adoption and smooth implementation in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines” (Veto Message, p. 12).
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases
of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an “appropriate” provision. It is a
mere advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an
existing law, the Generics Act of 1988, that requires “the
extensive use of drugs with generic names through a
rational system of procurement and distribution.” The
President believes that it is more prudent to provide for a
transition period for the smooth implementation of the law
in the case of purchases by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, as implied by Section 11 (Education Drive) of
the law itself. This belief, however, cannot justify his veto
of the provision on the purchase of medicines by the AFP.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the
appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP,
the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President
without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics
Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
4. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for

purchase of military equipment.
In the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP, the

President vetoed the underlined proviso of Special
Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the
prior approval of Congress for the release of the
corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire
Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition”:
542

“2. Use of the Fund. Of the amount herein appropriated, priority

shall be given for the acquisition of AFP assets necessary for
protecting marine, mineral, forest and other resources within
Philippine territorial borders and its economic zone, detection,
prevention or deterrence of air or surface intrusions and to
support diplomatic moves aimed at preserving national dignity,
sovereignty and patrimony: PROVIDED, That the said
modernization fund shall not be released until a Table of
Organization and Equipment for FY 1994-2000 is submitted to
and approved by Congress.
3. Specific Prohibition. The said Modernization Fund shall not
be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18
SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers” (GAA
of 1994, p. 747).
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said
condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional
mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and
if allowed, “shall effectively alter the original intent of the
AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment
deemed necessary to modernize the Armed Forces of the
Philippines” (Veto Message, p. 12).
Petitioners claim that Special Provision No. 2 on the
“Use of Fund” and Special Provision No. 3 are conditions or
limitations related to the item on the AFP modernization

plan.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use
of Fund” for the AFP modernization program that the
President must submit all purchases of military equipment
to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the
“congressional or legislative veto.” By way of definition, a
congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can
block or modify administrative action taken under a
statute. It is a form of legislative control in the
implementation of particular executive actions. The form
may be either negative, that is requiring disapproval of the
executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval of the
executive action. This device represents a significant
attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the
executive to shared administration (Dixon, The
Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The
Executive on a Leash, 56 North Carolina Law Review, 423
[1978]).
A congressional veto is subject to serious questions
involving the principle of separation of powers.
543
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 543

However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to

resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as
provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the
issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Any
provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of
executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and
substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate”
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly
vetoed.
As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her
memorandum as Amicus Curiae: “What Congress cannot do
directly by law it cannot do indirectly by attaching
conditions to the exercise of that power (of the President as
Commander-in-Chief) through provisions in the
appropriation law.”
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the
use of the Modernization Fund for payment of the trainer
planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been
contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional
prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the
obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts

entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said
special provision is therefore valid.
5. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP

pension funds.
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity

Fund, the President vetoed the new provision authorizing
the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment
pension and gratuity funds. The vetoed provision reads:
“2. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized, subject

to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, to use
savings in the appropriations provided herein to augment the
pension fund being managed by the AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits System as provided under Sections 2(a) and 3
of P.D. No. 361” (GAA of 1994, p. 746).
According to the President, the grant of retirement and

separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose
pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
Moreover, he stated that the
544

authority to use savings is lodged in the officials

enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the
Constitution (Veto Message, pp. 7-8).
Petitioners claim that the Special Provision on AFP
Pension and Gratuity Fund is a condition or limitation
which is so intertwined with the item of appropriation that
it could not be separated therefrom.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to
use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article
VI of the Constitution.
Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations, and under Section 29(1), no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section
25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings to
augment items in the general appropriations law for the
executive branch, such right must and can be exercised

only by the President pursuant to a specific law.
6. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s,

including the payment of separation benefits but it added
the following Special Provision:
“1. CAFGU Compensation and Separation Benefit. The

appropriation authorized herein shall be used for the
compensation of CAFGU’s including the payment of their
separation benefit not exceeding one (1) year subsistence
allowance for the 11,000 members who will be deactivated in
1994. The Chief of Staff, AFP, shall, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of National Defense, promulgate policies and
procedures for the payment of separation benefit” (GAA of 1994,
p. 740).
The President declared in his Veto Message that the

implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the
CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval
pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. He gave the
following reasons for imposing the condition:
545
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 545

“I am well cognizant of the laudable intention of Congress in

proposing the amendment of Special Provision No. 1 of the
CAFGU. However, it is premature at this point in time of our
peace process to earmark and declare through special provision
the actual number of CAFGU members to be deactivated in CY
1994. I understand that the number to be deactivated would
largely depend on the result or degree of success of the on-going
peace initiatives which are not yet precisely determinable today. I
have desisted, therefore, to directly veto said provisions because
this would mean the loss of the entire special provision to the
prejudice of its beneficient provisions. I therefore declare that the
actual implementation of this special provision shall be subject to
prior Presidential approval pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No.
1597 and R.A. No. 6758” (Veto Message, p. 13).
Petitioners claim that the Congress has required the

deactivation of the CAFGU’s when it appropriated the
money for payment of the separation pay of the members
thereof. The President, however, directed that the
deactivation should be done in accordance to his timetable,

taking into consideration the peace and order situation in
the affected localities.
Petitioners complain that the directive of the President
was tantamount to an administrative embargo of the
congressional will to implement the Constitution’s
command to dissolve the CAFGU’s (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174,
p. 14; G.R. No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the
President cannot impair or withhold expenditures
authorized and appropriated by Congress when neither the
Appropriations Act nor other legislation authorize such
impounding (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 15-16).
The Solicitor General contends that it is the President,
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, who should determine when the services of the
CAFGU’s are no longer needed (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp.
92-95).
This is the first case before this Court where the power
of the President to impound is put in issue. Impoundment
refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to
spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to
spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes:
Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505
[1973]).
Those who deny to the President the power to impound
argue that once Congress has set aside the fund for a
specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes
mandatory on the part of the
546

President to implement the project and to spend the money

appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on
the matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to
faithfully execute the laws.
In refusing or deferring the implementation of an
appropriation item, the President in effect exercises a veto
power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution. As
a matter of fact, the Constitution does not say anything
about impounding. The source of the Executive authority
must be found elsewhere.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three
principal sources of the authority of the President.
Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either
expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive
power drawn from the President’s role as Commander-in-

Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which
ironically is the same provision invoked by petitioners
herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the
laws requires that the President desist from implementing
the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An
example given is when through efficient and prudent
management of a project, substantial savings are made. In
such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to
spend the entire amount budgeted in the law (Notes:
Presidential Impoundment: Constitutional Theories and
Political Realities, 61 Georgetown Law Journal 1295
[1973]; Notes: Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment
and Congressional Power, 82 Yale Law Journal 1686
[1973]).
We do not find anything in the language used in the
challenged Special Provision that would imply that
Congress intended to deny to the President the right to
defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate
11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if
such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the
proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be
embodied and manifested in another law considering that
it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there
are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be
amended. Again we state: a provision in an appropriations
act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this
case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
547
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 547

7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme

Court, etc.
(a) In the appropriations for the Supreme Court,

Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress added the
following provisions:
The Judiciary
x x x x x x x x x
Special Provisions
“1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court’s Appropriations. Any

savings in the appropriations for the Supreme Court and the
Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court to augment any item of the Court’s appropriations for (a)

printing of decisions and publication of ‘Philippine Reports’; (b)
commutable terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the
Supreme Court and payment of adjusted pension rates to retired
Justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No.
91-8-225-C.A.; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement and other
operating expenses of the courts’ libraries, including purchase of
books and periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and
improvement of printing equipment; (e) necessary expenses for
the employment of temporary employees, contractual and casual
employees, for judicial administration; (f) maintenance and
improvement of the Court’s Electronic Data Processing System;
(g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in
international conferences and conduct of training programs; (h)
commutable trans-portation and representation allowances and
fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator,
Chiefs of Offices and other Court personnel in accordance with the
rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorney-de-
officio: PROVIDED, That as mandated by LOI No. 489 any
increase in salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual
procedures and policies as provided for under P.D. No. 985 and
other pertinent laws” (GAA of 1994, p. 1128; Italics supplied).
x x x x x x x x x
Commission on Audit
x x x x x x x x x
“5. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Audit
is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, to use savings for the payment of
fringe benefits as may be authorized by law for officials and
personnel of the Commission” (GAA of 1994, p. 1161; Italics
supplied).
x x x x x x x x x
Office of the Ombudsman
548

x x x x x x x x x
“6. Augmentation of Items in the Appropriation of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is hereby authorized, subject
to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations to
augment items of appropriation in the Office of the Ombudsman
from savings in other items of appropriation actually released, for:
(a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, training
and information materials; (b) repair, maintenance and
improvement of OMB Central and Area/Sectoral facilities; (c)
purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d)

payment of commutable representation and transportation
allowances of officials and employees who by reason of their
positions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits as may be
authorized specifically by law for officials and personnel of OMB
pursuant to Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution; and (e)
for other official purposes subject to accounting and auditing rules
and regulations” (GAA of 1994, p. 1174; Italics supplied).
x x x x x x x x x
Commission on Human Rights
x x x x x x x x x
“1. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, to augment any
item of appropriation in the office of the CHR from savings in
other items of appropriations actually released, for: (a) printing
and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, training materials
and educational publications; (b) repair, maintenance and
improvement of Commission’s central and regional facilities; (c)
purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment, (d)
payment of commutable representation and transportation allow-
ances of officials and employees who by reason of their positions
are entitled thereto and fringe benefits, as may be authorized by
law for officials and personnel of CHR, subject to accounting and
auditing rules and regulations” (GAA of 1994, p. 1178; Italics
supplied).
In his Veto Message, the President expressed his approval

of the conditions included in the GAA of 1994. He noted
that:
“The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional

injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitution which states that ‘no elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am,
therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall
maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-
established principle on compensation standardization (Veto
Message, p. 10).
549
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 549

Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the

President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of
the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the

CHR.
In the first place, the conditions questioned by
petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not
by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the
Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect
compensation can only be given pursuant to law.
In the second place, such statements are mere
reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must
be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at
worse, be treated as superfluities.
(b) In the appropriation for the COA, the President
imposed the condition that the implementation of the
budget of the COA be subject to “the guidelines to be issued
by the President.” The provisions subject to said condition
reads:
x x x x x x x x x
“3. Revolving Fund. The income of the Commission on Audit
derived from sources authorized by the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445) not exceeding Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000) shall be constituted into a revolving fund
which shall be used for maintenance, operating and other
incidental expenses to enhance audit services and audit-related
activities. The fund shall be deposited in an authorized
government depository ban, and withdrawals therefrom shall be
made in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and
implementing rules and regulations: PROVIDED, That any
interests earned on such deposit shall be remitted at the end of
each quarter to the National Treasury and shall accrue to the
General Fund: PROVIDED FURTHER, That the Commission on
Audit shall submit to the Department of Budget and Management
a quarterly report of income and expenditures of said revolving
fund” (GAA of 1994, pp. 1160-1161).
The President cited the “imperative need to rationalize” the

implementation, applicability and operation of use of
income and revolving funds. The Veto Message stated:
“x x x I have observed that there are old and long existing special
provisions authorizing the use of income and the creation of
revolving funds. As a rule, such authorizations should be
discouraged. However, I take it that these authorizations have
legal/statutory basis aside from
550

being already a vested right to the agencies concerned which

should not be jeopardized through the Veto Message. There is,
however, imperative need to rationalize their implementation,
applicability and operation. Thus, in order to substantiate the
purpose and intention of said provisions, I hereby declare that the
operationalization of the following provisions during budget
implementation shall be subject to the guidelines to be issued by
the President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O.
No. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to
Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of this Act” (Veto
Message, p. 6; Italics supplied).
(c) In the appropriation for the DPWH, the President

imposed the condition that in the implementation of DPWH
projects, the administrative and engineering overhead of
5% and 3% “shall be subject to the necessary
administrative guidelines to be formulated by the
Executive pursuant to existing laws.” The condition was
imposed because the provision “needs further study”
according to the President.
The following provision was made subject to said
condition:
“9. Engineering and Administrative Overhead. Not more than five

percent (5%) of the amount for infrastructure project released by
the Department of Budget and Management shall be deducted by
DPWH for administrative overhead, detailed engineering and con-
struction supervision, testing and quality control, and the like,
thus insuring that at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the
released fund is available for direct implementation of the project.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That for school buildings, health
centers, day-care centers and barangay halls, the deductible
amount shall not exceed three percent (3%). Violation of, or non-
compliance with, this provision shall subject the government
official or employee concerned to administrative, civil and/or
criminal sanction under Sections 43 and 80, Book VI of E.O. No.
292" (GAA of 1994, p. 786).
(d) In the appropriation for the National Housing Authority

(NHA), the President imposed the condition that
allocations for specific projects shall be released and
disbursed “in accordance with the housing program of the
government, subject to prior Executive approval.”
The provision subject to the said condition reads:
551
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 551

“3. Allocations for Specified Projects. The following allocations for

the specified projects shall be set aside for corollary works and
used exclusively for the repair, rehabilitation and construction of
buildings, roads, pathwalks, drainage, waterworks systems,
facilities and amenities in the area: PROVIDED, That any road to
be constructed or rehabilitated shall conform with the
specifications and standards set by the Department of Public
Works and Highways for such kind of road: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That savings that may be available in the future shall
be used for road repair, rehabilitation and construction:
(1) Maharlika Village Road—Not less than P5,000,000

(2) Tenement Housing Project (Taguig)—Not less than
P3,000,000
(3) Bagong Lipunan Condominium Project (Taguig)—Not less
than P2,000,000
4. Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount appropriated for the

implementation of various projects in resettlement areas, Seven
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P7,500,000) shall be
allocated to the Dasmarinas Bagong Bayan resettlement area,
Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) to the Carmona Relocation
Center Area (Gen. Mariano Alvarez) and Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000) to the Bulihan Sites and Services, all of which will be
for the cementing of roads in accordance with DPWH standards.
5. Allocation for Sapang Palay. An allocation of Eight Million
Pesos (P8,000,000) shall be set aside for the asphalting of seven
(7) kilometer main road of Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan” (GAA of 1994, p. 1216).
The President imposed the conditions: (a) that the

“operationalization” of the special provision on revolving
fund of the COA “shall be subject to guidelines to be issued
by the President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book
VI of E.O. No. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445
in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of
this Act” (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 5, 7-8); (b) that the
implementation of Special Provision No. 9 of the DPWH on
the mandatory retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts
released by said Department “be subject to the necessary
administrative guidelines to be formulated by the
Executive pursuant to existing law” (Rollo, G.R. No.
113888; pp. 10, 14-16); and (c) that the appropriations
authorized for the NHA can be released only “in accordance
with the housing program of the government subject to
prior Executive approval” (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 10-
11; 14-16).
552

The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere

reminders that the implementation of the items on which
the said conditions were imposed, should be done in
accordance with existing laws, regulations or policies. They
did not add anything to what was already in place at the
time of the approval of the GAA of 1994.
There is less basis to complain when the President said
that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will
issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. The
issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public
funds authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the
President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17;
Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1939]). Under the Faithful
Execution Clause, the President has the power to take
“necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the
law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]).
These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
IV
Petitioners chose to avail of the special civil actions but

those remedies can be used only when respondents have
acted “without or in excess” of jurisdiction, or “with grave
abuse of discretion,” (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 65,
Section 2). How can we begrudge the President for vetoing
the Special Provision on the appropria-tion for debt
payment when he merely followed our decision in
Gonzales? How can we say that Congress has abused its
discretion when it appropriated a bigger sum for debt
payment than the amount appropriated for education,
when it merely followed our dictum in Guingona?
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides:
“Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the

constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.”
The Court’s interpretation of the law is part of that law as

of the date of its enactment since the court’s interpretation
merely establishes the contemporary legislative intent that
the construed law purports to carry into effect (People v.
Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]). Decisions of the Supreme

Court assume the same
553
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 553

authority as statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining

Corporation, 136 SCRA 141 [1985]).
Even if Guingona and Gonzales are considered hard
cases that make bad laws and should be reversed, such
reversal cannot nullify prior acts done in reliance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except
with respect to (1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only
insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the
special provision on debt service specifying that the fund
therein appropriated “shall be used for payment of the
principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness” prohibiting the use of the said funds “to pay
for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators,” and (2) G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it
prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the second
paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of
appropriation for the Department of Public Works and
Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and (b) Special
Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748),
which is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,

Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., Narvasa, C.J., Certifies that Justice I. A.
Cruz concurs with Justice Quiason’s opinion.
Padilla, J., See concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, J., See concurring opinion.
CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D.

Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the Court’s
decision in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. (191 SCRA 452).
Sec. 27(2), Art. VI of the Constitution states:

554

“The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall
not affect the item or items to which he does not object.”
In my dissenting opinion in Gonzales, I stated that:
“The majority opinion positions the veto questioned in this case

within the scope of Section 27(2) [Article VI of the Constitution]. I
do not see how this can be done without doing violence to the
constitutional design. The distinction between an item-veto and a
provision-veto has been traditionally recognized in constitutional
litigation and budgetary practice. As stated by Mr. Justice
Sutherland, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court in Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410-416:
‘x x x. An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in

itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provisions of
law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. x x x’
When the Constitution in Section 27(2) empowers the

President to veto any particular item or items in the
appropriation act, it does not confer—in fact, it excludes—the
power to veto any particular provision or provisions in said act.
In an earlier case, Sarmiento III v. Mison, et al., 156 SCRA
549, this court referred to its duty to construe the Constitution,
not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative would
want it construed, but in accordance with what it says and
provides. When the Constitution states that the President has the
power to veto any particular item or items in the appropriation
act, this must be taken as a component of that delicate balance of
power between the executive and legislative, so that, for this
Court to construe Sec. 27(2) of the Constitution as also
empowering the President to veto any particular provision or
provisions in the appropriations act, is to load the scale in favor of
the executive, at the expense of that delicate balance of power.”
I therefore disagree with the majority’s pronouncements

which would validate the veto by the President of specific
provisions in the appropriations act based on the
contention that such are “inappropriate provisions.” Even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that a provision in the
appropriations act is “inappropriate” from the Presidential
standpoint, it is still a provision, not an item, in an

appropriations act and, therefore, outside the veto power of
the Executive.
555
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 555

CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.: Concurring
I concur on the points so well expounded by a most

respected colleague, Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason. I
should like to highlight a bit, however, that part of the
ponencia dealing on the Countrywide Development Fund
or, so commonly referred to as, the infamous “pork barrel.”
I agree that it lies with Congress to determine in an
appropriation act the activities and the projects that are
desirable and may thus be funded. Once, however, such
identification and the corresponding appropriation therefor
is done, the legislative act is completed and it ends there.
Thereafter, the Executive is behooved, with exclusive
responsibility and authority, to see to it that the legislative
will is properly carried out. I cannot subscribe to another
theory invoked by some quarters that, in so implementing
the law, the Executive does so only by way of delegation.
Congress neither may delegate what it does not have nor
may encroach on the powers of a co-equal, independent and
coordinate branch.
Within its own sphere, Congress acts as a body, not as
the individuals that comprise it, in any action or decision
that can bind it, or be said to have been done by it, under
its constitutional authority. Even assuming that overseeing
the laws it enacts continues to be a legislative process, one
that I find difficult to accept, it is Congress itself, not any of
its members, that must exercise that function.
I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress,
more than the President and his colleagues, would have the
best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. I
see no legal obstacle, however, in their making, just like
anyone else, the proper recommendations to, albeit not
necessarily conclusive on, the President for the purpose.
Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to
appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be
minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual

members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would
be constitutionally impermissible.
Petitions dismissed, except for some claims which are
granted.
556

Five J Taxi vs. National Labor Relation Commission
Note.—The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in

appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that
the courts are superior to the President and the
Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may
not shirk “the irksome task” of inquiring into the
constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive
action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the
courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by
such action. (Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 [1991])
———o0o———
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Philconsa V Enriquez

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Philconsa V Enriquez

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Philconsa V Enriquez

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

9/14/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 235

506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION,

RAUL S. ROCO, as Member of the Philippine Senate,

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as

capacity as National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION

VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 507

G.R. No. 113888. August 19, 1994.*

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as

Constitutional Law; Judicial Review, requisites.—When

1366 [1974]). To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,

508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution provides a

implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of

VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 509

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative. The Constitution is

Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress only

510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

funding. This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196

it will presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas

VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 511

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

“an inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately from

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Provisions which are

512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

Same; Same; Congress may add special provisions, conditions

Congress and the President. While Congress expressly laid down

VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 513

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

disposed of on other grounds. Any provision blocking an

514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

CAFGU.—We do not find anything in the language used in the

Civil Code of the Philippines, provides: “Judicial decisions

VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 515

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

system of the Philippines.” The Court’s interpretation of the law is

PADILLA, J., Concurring and Dissenting:

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Veto Power; An

VITUG, J., Concurring:

Constitutional Law; Appropriations; Pork Barrel; To give the

PETITIONS for review of orders or resolutions of the

516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Once again this Court is called upon to rule on the

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of

imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of

VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 517

OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers,

518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In view of the importance and novelty of most of the

VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 519

question is the lis mota of the case (Luz Farms v. Secretary

“Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in