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Valenzuela vs. Caltex Phil

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 169965-66 : December 15, 2010]

CARLOS V. VALENZUELA, PETITIONER, VS. CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC.,


RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the


Decision[1] dated July 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 80494 and 80638. The appellate court had
reversed and set aside the Decision[2] of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated the Decision[3] of the
Labor Arbiter which dismissed petitioner's complaint for illegal
dismissal for lack of merit.

The facts follow.

Petitioner was hired by respondent Caltex Philippines, Inc.


sometime in March 1965 as Laborer and assigned in the Lube Oil
Section of its Pandacan Terminal in Manila. After three years,
he was designated as Machine Operator A.[4]

Sometime in 1970, petitioner requested that he be transferred


to respondent's main office. Since the position available then
was that of a messenger, he accepted the same. One year later,
petitioner was given a new assignment as Aviation Attendant of
respondent's Manila Aviation Service.[5]

After twenty-two (22) years at the Manila Aviation Service,


petitioner was moved to respondent's Lapu-Lapu Terminal in Lapu-
Lapu City. The transfer was part of the penalty for the charge
of not servicing an aircraft's fuel needs, which petitioner
denied. Reluctantly, petitioner acceded to the transfer.[6]

Petitioner was initially designated as Gauger but he also


handled Bulk Receiving, Tank Truck Loading and Bunkering. In
1996, the Warehouseman retired and the functions of the
warehouseman were given to petitioner.[7] As warehouseman,
petitioner's duties included, among others, the maintenance of
stock cards for storehouse materials and supplies, the conduct
of physical inventory of the company's merchandise stocks and
monitoring the movement of said stocks.[8]

On November 23, 1999, a spot operational audit was conducted on


the Lapu-Lapu City District Office, and several irregularities
in the handling of respondent's merchandise were discovered. A
net inventory shortage amounting to P823,100.49 was discovered.[9]

Petitioner was required to explain within forty-eight (48) hours


such shortage and the other irregularities discovered during the
spot audit. He was further informed[10] that an administrative
investigation will be conducted on the matter and because of the
nature of his offense and his position in the Company, he was
preventively suspended to prevent further losses and/or possible
tampering of the documents and other evidence.[11]

The administrative investigation was conducted with two hearings


held on December 15, 1999 and January 18, 2000. On both dates,
petitioner was present, together with his counsel and/or union
officer. Thereafter, based on the findings from the
administrative investigation, respondent found cause to
terminate petitioner's employment.[12] Specifically, respondent
found petitioner liable for (1) Gross and Habitual neglect of
duties and responsibilities as warehouse clerk, (2) Not
performing month-end inventory duties, (3) Not investigating the
shortages of stocks under his custody and (4) Commission of
Fraud.[13]

Aggrieved by the respondent's decision to terminate his


employment, petitioner filed a complaint[14] for illegal
dismissal with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII in
Cebu City. He also claimed salary differentials representing his
pay increases pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining
Agreement[15] (CBA) between the parties, which were not given to
him by respondent.[16]

On May 19, 2000, Labor Arbiter Ernesto F. Carreon rendered a


Decision[17] declaring the claim for illegal dismissal
unmeritorious. The Labor Arbiter held,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered


dismissing the claim for illegal dismissal for lack of merit and
the other monetary claims are referred to the grievance
machinery and/or voluntary arbitrator as provided under the CBA.

So Ordered.[18]

On appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC set aside the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and declared that petitioner was illegally
dimissed. The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated May 19, 2000 is


hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered declaring CALTEX
PHILIPPINES, INC. and LEODEGARIO W. JACINTO to have illegally
dismissed the complainant, CARLOS V. VALENZUELA. Instead of
reinstatement, the same respondents are ORDERED to pay, jointly
and severally, the same complainant a separation pay computed at
one (1) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at
least six (6) months being considered one (1) year, multiplied
by the number of years from his date of employment until full
separation pay shall have been paid, which is tentatively
computed below as of the date of this Decision:

Salary per month P 25,800.00


Number of years in service x 38
Separation Pay P 980,400.00

Other benefits covered by the CBA may be claimed by the


complainant in the Grievance Machinery in accordance with the
CBA.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[19]

Both parties went to the CA by way of petition for certiorari


under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
On July 20, 2005, the CA, 20th Division, Cebu City issued the
challenged Decision[20] reinstating the Labor Arbiter's decision,
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby


rendered by us GRANTING the petition in CA-G.R. SP NO. 80638 and
DENYING the petition in CA-G.R. SP NO. 80494. The assailed
decision of the NLRC, Fourth Division dated September 10, 2002
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated May 19,
2000 rendered by Labor Arbiter Ernesto F. Carreon in RAB Case
No. 7-01-0135-2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.[21]

On September 20, 2005, the CA denied the motion for


reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner argues that there were several procedural lapses in


the Petition for Certiorari[22] respondent filed with the CA. In
particular, petitioner points out that the petitioners therein
were respondent and Leodegario Jacinto, but only the latter
submitted a verification and certification against forum
shopping. There was no board resolution from respondent
authorizing Leodegario Jacinto to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping in its behalf, thereby
making the petition ineffectual.

Further, petitioner mentions the failure of herein respondent to


accompany said petition with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent to the petition as required by
Section 1 of Rule 65. This allegation is based on
the Resolution[23] dated February 26, 2004 of the CA directing
respondent and Jacinto to submit a copy of the May 19, 2000
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Motions for Reconsideration
dated November 7, 2002 and November 11, 2002 filed by the
parties and other pleadings and documents filed before the Labor
Arbiter. According to the petitioner, the CA would not have
ordered respondent to submit those documents if they were not
relevant and pertinent to the case. Hence, failure to submit
them together with the Petition for Certiorari was a violation
of the Rules which warranted dismissal of the petition.

On the merits, petitioner argues that there was no basis in law


to support petitioner's dismissal, contrary to the finding of
the CA. Petitioner relies on the fact that he had previously
brought to respondent's attention that he was overworked and
that his duties were too cumbersome for one person.

Respondent for its part counters by first denying petitioner's


claim that there was no certification and verification against
forum shopping. Respondent points out that there were two
certifications and verifications against forum shopping: one
from Alejandro Rey C. Pardo, Jr. in behalf of respondent and one
from Leodegario Jacinto in behalf of himself. Records would also
show that there was a board resolution authorizing Alejandro Rey
C. Pardo, Jr. to sign a certification and verification against
forum shopping in behalf of respondent.

As to the resolution of the CA requiring the submission of


additional documents, respondent argues that the issuance of the
resolution did not mean that the appellate court committed grave
abuse of discretion in eventually giving due course to the
petition for certiorari. The Resolution simply meant that the
appellate court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, wanted
to review the documents. Such order to submit particular
documents did not mean that the petition filed was procedurally
defective.

On the merits, respondent argues that the termination of


petitioner's employment was sufficiently supported by evidence
and the law. The CA categorically stated that petitioner was
guilty of habitual and gross neglect of his duties and performed
various acts that directly caused the loss of trust and
confidence reposed by the company in him.

Respondent also argues that the present petition raises


questions of fact which are beyond the ambit of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Respondent points out that
unless for compelling reasons, which are absent in this case, a
review of the factual milieu of a case is not in order
under Rule 45.

Essentially, the two issues for our resolution are: (1) Whether
the CA erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari
filed by herein respondent despite the alleged procedural
defects; and (2) Whether the CA correctly ruled that petitioner
was validly dismissed.

We deny the petition.

On the first issue, the claim of the petitioner that there was
only one certification and verification against forum shopping
filed by the respondents therein is utterly incorrect. Records
show that there were two certifications and verifications
against forum shopping submitted together with the questioned
petition for certiorari: one signed by Alejandro Rey C. Pardo,
Jr.[24] in behalf of therein petitioner Caltex Philippines, Inc.,
and another one signed by Leodegario W. Jacinto in behalf of
himself as petitioner, also in the same petition for certiorari.
Records show that a Secretary's Certificate[25] dated October 9,
2003 was issued by then Corporate Secretary Ariel F. Abonal
certifying that a Board Resolution was duly passed on January
28, 2002 approving a Revised Approvals Manual, on the basis of
which, Alejandro Rey C. Pardo, Jr. was authorized to sign,
verify and cause the filing of the petition for certiorari
before the CA in the case entitled "Caltex (Philippines), Inc.
v. Carlos Valenzuela, et al.," and to sign, verify and cause the
filing of other necessary pleadings. Thus, it is clear that the
respondent submitted a proper verification and certification
against forum shopping.

Equally without merit is petitioner's contention that the


failure of respondent to submit certain documents together with
its petition for certiorari warrants the dismissal thereof. In
Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission,[26] we held,

x x x The Rules do not specify the precise documents, pleadings


or parts of the records that should be appended to the petition
other than the judgment, final order, or resolution being
assailed. The Rules only state that such documents, pleadings or
records should be relevant or pertinent to the assailed
resolution, judgment or orders; as such, the initial
determination of which pleading, document or parts of the
records are relevant to the assailed order, resolution, or
judgment, falls upon the petitioner. The CA will ultimately
determine if the supporting documents are sufficient to even
make out a prima facie case. If the CA was of the view that the
petitioner should have submitted other pleadings, documents or
portions of the records to enable it to determine whether the
petition was sufficient in substance, it should have accorded
the petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice, a chance
to submit the same instead of dismissing the petition outright.
Clearly, this is the better policy. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the failure to submit certain documents, assuming there


was such a failure on respondent's part, does not automatically
warrant outright dismissal of its petition.

On the merits, we likewise find that the petition fails. There


is no compelling reason in this case for us to reverse the
ruling of the CA sustaining the finding of the Labor Arbiter
that petitioner's dismissal was effected with just cause. The
findings of the Labor Arbiter are supported by more than
substantial evidence and even petitioner's admissions during the
administrative hearings.[27] As the CA correctly held,

Evidence overwhelmingly shows that petitioner Valenzuela was


indeed guilty of habitual and gross neglect of his duties. It
was not the first time that there occurred a shortage of the
merchandise stocks but apparently petitioner Valenzuela did
nothing about it and, instead, manipulated documents and
records, i.e., stock cards, to create the illusion that all
merchandise stocks were accounted for, when in fact a lot of
these merchandise were already missing from petitioner Company's
Lapu-Lapu terminal. x x x[28]

x x x x
Furthermore, petitioner Valenzuela likewise committed fraud and
willful breach of the trust reposed in him by petitioner Caltex.
He was in-charge of the custody and monitoring of the
merchandise stocks, and, as found by the Labor Arbiter, was
entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, i.e., the
handling and care and protection of the employer's property.
Considering that the merchandise stocks are the lifeblood of
petitioner Caltex, petitioner Valenzuela's act of allowing the
loss of merchandise stocks and concealing these from the
employer is reason enough for his termination from his
employment.[29]

Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, gross and


habitual neglect by the employee of his duties is a sufficient
and legal ground to terminate employment. Jurisprudence provides
that serious misconduct and habitual neglect of duties are among
the just causes for terminating an employee. Gross negligence
connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties.
Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's
duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.[30]

Further, Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, also


provides fraud or willful breach by employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer as a just cause for termination.
It is always a serious issue for the employer when an employee
performs acts which diminish or break the trust and confidence
reposed in him. The Labor Code, as amended, although
sympathetic to the working class, is aware of this scenario and
in pursuit of fairness, included fraud or willful breach of
trust as a just cause for termination of employment.

One last point on the preventive suspension imposed by the


respondents.

Sections 8 and 9 of Rule XXIII, Implementing Book V of the


Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:

SEC. 8. Preventive suspension. - The employer may place the


worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued
employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or
property of the employer or of his co-workers.

SEC. 9. Period of suspension. - No preventive suspension shall


last longer than thirty (30) days. The employer shall
thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in a
substantially equivalent position or the employer may extend the
period of suspension provided that during the period of
extension, he pays the wages and other benefits due to the
worker. In such case, the worker shall not be bound to
reimburse the amount paid to him during the extension if the
employer decides, after completion of the hearing, to dismiss
the worker. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, petitioner was preventively suspended from


November 26, 1999 to December 25, 1999. Respondents extended
his preventive suspension for thirty days, from December 26,
1999 to January 24, 2000.[31] After the conclusion of the
administrative investigation, he was finally terminated on
January 21, 2000.[32] There is no showing that petitioner was
paid his wages and benefits during the additional period of
suspension. Clearly, petitioner is entitled to his salary and
other benefits prior to his dismissal, from December 26, 1999 to
January 21, 2000.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated


July 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases
of CA-G.R. SP Nos. 80494 and 80638 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that respondents are hereby ORDERED to pay
petitioner Carlos V. Valenzuela his corresponding salary,
allowances and other benefits for the period December 26, 1999
to January 21, 2000.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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