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Rana v. Wong

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SPS.

ROSARIO and WILSON UY, WILSON UY as attorney-in-fact of TERESITA LEE


WONG, and SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and RUBEN ANG ONG vs. SPS. REYNALDO
and LINDA RANA
G.R. No. 192861-62, 30 June 2014

Doctrine:

It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it


may not be summarily abated. Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which
should be taken under the parameters stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and
706 (for private nuisances) of the Civil Code, a private person whose property right was
invaded or unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission, establishment, business or
condition of the property of another may file a civil action to recover personal damages.
Abatement may be judicially sought through a civil action therefor if the pertinent
requirements under the Civil Code for summary abatement, or the requisite that the
nuisance is a nuisance per se, do not concur. To note, the remedies of abatement and
damages are cumulative; hence, both may be demanded.

Facts:

Teresita Lee Wong and Spouses Shirley and Ruben Ang Ong (Wong, et. al) are co-
owners pro-indiviso of a residential land situated in Peace Valley Subdivision, Lahug,
Cebu City, abutting a 10-meter wide subdivision road (subject road).

On the opposite side of the subject road, are the adjacent lots of Spouses Wilson and
Rosario Uy (Sps. Uy) and Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana (Sps. Rana). The said lots
follow a rolling terrain with the Rana property standing about 2 meters higher than and
overlooking the Uy property, while the Wong-Ong property is at the same level with the
subject road.

Sometime in 1997, Sps. Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the subject road that
runs between the Rana and Wong-Ong properties (subject portion) in order to level the
said portion with their gate. They likewise backfilled a portion of the perimeter fence
separating the Rana and Uy properties without erecting a retaining wall that would hold
the weight of the added filling materials.

The matter was referred to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Lahug as well as the
Office of the Building Official of Cebu City (OBO), but to no avail.

Wong, et al. then filed a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance with Damages against
Sps. Rana before the RTC, seeking to: (a) declare the subject portion as a nuisance which
affected the ingress and egress of Wong and Sps. Ong to their lot; (b) declare the subject
backfilling as a nuisance; (c) compel Sps. Rana to restore the subject portion to its original
condition; (d) compel Sps. Rana to remove the backfilling materials along Sps. Uy’s
perimeter fence and repair the damage to the fence; and (e) pay moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
In their Answer Sps. Rana countered that prior to the construction of their residence, there
was no existing road and they merely developed the subject portion which abuts their
gate in view of the rolling terrain. They claimed that Wong and Sps. Ong do not have any
need for the subject portion because their property is facing an existing road. They
likewise denied having undertaken any backfilling along the boundary of the Uy property
considering the natural elevation of their own property, which renders backfilling
unnecessary.

After the filing of Sps. Rana’s Answer, Wong, et al., in turn, filed a Motion for Leave to be
Allowed to Bring in Heavy Equipment for the intermediate development of the Wong-Ong
property with a view to the use of the subject road as access to their lot. Notwithstanding
Sps. Rana’s opposition, the RTC granted Wong, et al.’s motion in a November 27, 1997
Order (Order).

Despite the limited tenor of the Order, Wong, et al., proceeded to level the subject portion,
which, in the process, hampered Sps. Rana’s ingress and egress to their residence,
resulting too to the entrapment of their vehicle inside their garage.

Feeling aggrieved, Sps. Rana, filed a Supplemental Answer, praying for: (a) the
restoration of the soil, boulders, grade, contour, and level of the subject portion; and (b)
payment of moral damages, actual and consequential damages, and exemplary
damages.

Meanwhile, Sps. Rana filed with another branch of the same trial court a Complaint for
Recovery of Property and Damages against Sps. Uy. They alleged that Sps. Uy
encroached upon an 11-sq. m. portion along the common boundary of their properties.
Their demands for rectification as well as barangay conciliation efforts were, however,
ignored. Thus, they prayed that Sps. Uy be ordered to remove their fence along the
common boundary and return the encroached portion, as well as to pay moral damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. After the filing of Sps. Rana’s complaint, the
separate cases were consolidated.

In response thereto, Sps. Uy filed an Answer with Counterclaim, averring that while they
encroached around 3 sq. m. of the Rana property, Sps. Rana intruded into 7 sq. m. of
their property. Hence, they posited that they had "a bigger cause than that of Sps. Rana
in so far as encroachment is concerned." Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of
Sps. Rana’s complaint with counterclaim for damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation
expenses.

The RTC found that: (a) Sps. Rana, without prior consultation with the subdivision owner
or their neighbors, developed to their sole advantage the subject portion consisting of
one-half of the width of the 10-meter subject road by introducing filling materials, and rip
rapping the side of the road; (b) the said act denied Wong and Sps. Ong the use of the
subject portion and affected the market value of their property; (c) Sps. Uy have no
intention of using the subject portion for ingress or egress considering that they built a
wall fronting the same; and (d) Wong, et al.’s manner of enforcing the November 27, 1997
Order caused damage and injury to Sps. Rana and amounted to bad faith.

In view of these findings, the RTC declared that the parties all acted in bad faith, and,
therefore, no relief can be granted to them against each other.

Separately, however, the RTC found that the backfilling done by Sps. Rana on their
property exerted pressure on the perimeter fence of the Uy property, thereby constituting
a nuisance. As such, the former were directed to construct a retaining wall at their own
expense. Meanwhile, the RTC, despite having adopted the findings of Atty. Reuel T.
Pintor – a court-appointed commissioner who determined that Sps. Uy encroached the
Rana property by 2 sq. m – dismissed both the complaint and counterclaim for damages
because of the failure of both parties to substantiate their respective claims of bad faith
against each other.

Dissatisfied, the parties filed separate appeals with the CA.

The CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC.

The parties filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied.

Hence, the recourse to the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC errs in (a) not finding Wong and Sps. Uy guilty of malice and bad
faith both in instituting the Civil Cases and in erroneously implementing the November 27,
1997 Order, and (b) failing or refusing to grant the reliefs prayed for. (Sps. Rana)

Whether or not the RTC errs in (a) applying the in pari delicto doctrine against the parties
and failing to abate the nuisance, and (b) not finding Sps. Rana guilty of bad faith in
instituting the Civil Cases and ordering them to pay damages. (Wong, et. al)

Ruling:

The petitions are partly meritorious.


For Abatement of Nuisance and Damages.

Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is defined as "any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or
endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3)
Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the
free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or
impairs the use of property." Based on case law, however, the term "nuisance" is deemed
to be "so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered
with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or
his comfort."

Article 695 of the Civil Code classifies nuisances with respect to the object or objects that
they affect. In this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance (or one which
"affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although
the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal"); or
(b) a private nuisance (or one "that is not included in the foregoing definition" [or, as case
law puts it, one which "violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a
few persons"]).

Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to


summary abatement (that is, corrective action without prior judicial permission). In this
regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a nuisance per se (or one which "affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity"); or (b) a nuisance per accidens (or that which "depends upon
certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot
be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing does in law constitute a nuisance.")

It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not
be summarily abated. Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should be
taken under the parameters stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for
private nuisances) of the Civil Code, a private person whose property right was invaded
or unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission, establishment, business or condition
of the property of another may file a civil action to recover personal damages. Abatement
may be judicially sought through a civil action therefor if the pertinent requirements under
the Civil Code for summary abatement, or the requisite that the nuisance is a nuisance
per se, do not concur. To note, the remedies of abatement and damages are cumulative;
hence, both may be demanded.

With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court finds that the same
is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
community. It was built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from
their house which was admittedly located on a higher elevation than the subject road and
the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong properties. Since the subject portion is not a nuisance
per se (but actually a nuisance per accidens) it cannot be summarily abated.

As such, Wong, et al.’s demolition of Sps. Rana’s subject portion, which was not
sanctioned under the RTC’s November 27, 1997 Order, remains unwarranted.

Resultantly, damages ought to be awarded in favor of Sps. Rana particularly that of (a)
nominal damages – for the vindication and recognition of Sps. Rana’s right to be heard
before the court prior to Wong, et al.’s abatement of the subject portion (erroneously
perceived as a nuisance per se) – and (b) temperate damages – for the pecuniary loss
owing to the demolition of the subject portion, which had been established albeit uncertain
as to the actual amount of loss.

Sps. Rana’s entitlement to the above-mentioned damages, however, is precluded by the


damage they themselves have caused Wong, et al. in view of their construction of the
subject portion.

As the records establish, Sps. Rana, without prior consultation with Wong, et al. and to
their sole advantage, elevated and cemented almost half of the 10-meter wide subject
road. As homeowners of Peace Valley Subdivision, Wong, et al. maintain the rights to the
unobstructed use of and free passage over the subject road. By constructing the subject
portion, Sps. Rana introduced a nuisance per accidens that particularly transgressed the
aforesaid rights. Thus, for the vindication and recognition of Wong, et al.’s rights, Sps.
Rana should be similarly held liable for nominal damages.

Under Article 2216 of the Civil Code, courts have the discretion to determine awards of
nominal and temperate damages without actual proof of pecuniary loss, as in this case.
Assessing the respective infractions of the parties herein, the Court finds it prudent to
sustain the CA’s verdict offsetting the damage caused by said parties against each other.

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