Frank Ankersmit From Narrative To Exper PDF
Frank Ankersmit From Narrative To Exper PDF
Frank Ankersmit From Narrative To Exper PDF
Rethinking History
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To cite this Article Domanska, Ewa(2009)'Frank Ankersmit: From narrative to experience',Rethinking History,13:2,175 — 195
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Rethinking History
Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2009, 175–195
*Email: ewa@amu.edu.pl
The year 1960 saw the publication of the first issue of History and Theory.
Devoted mainly to the analytical philosophy of history, its articles on
historical laws, causality, and explanation tracked and monitored the
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Narrative logic was indebted to the early phase of narrativism in its focus
on the logical structure of narration. However, the theory of narrative
178 E. Domanska
substances he formulated in Narrative logic drew Ankersmit to devote more
attention to representation of the past, which in turn inspired his signature
aesthetic approach to historical writing. Narrative logic complemented
White’s already classic Metahistory, providing mature narrativism with a
metalogical apparatus.3
According to Ankersmit, historical theorists fall into two categories:
those who treat the historical text as a whole and those who believe that the
truth of the historical text resides in the truth of its individual propositions
taken distributively. The former, who follow Hayden White, rely on literary
theory for analytical instruments, while the latter turn to contemporary
linguistic philosophy and science. Ankersmit himself can be situated in-
between the two groups: on the one hand, he is interested in the text as a
whole; on the other, he uses the apparatus of linguistic philosophy and
science. This is perhaps the reason why his approach is not widely accepted
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by either of the two groups of theorists – some share his goals but criticize
his analytical instruments; others share the instruments but reject the goals.
Ankersmit’s in-betweenness was also one of the reasons why Narrative
logic failed to bring him wide reception or influence the development of
historical theory in any significant way.4 C. Behan McCullagh’s unfavour-
able review in History and Theory also had its share in this failure
(McCullagh 1984). Even Hayden White’s laudatory review in the American
Historical Review did not help, although White went so far as to compare
the importance of Ankersmit’s study with that of the English translation of
volume one of Paul Ricoeur’s Temps et re´cit, which was published in the
same year (White 1984). Historians ignored Narrative logic, discouraged by
Ankersmit’s abstract arguments about narration and a philosophical
language that was alien to most historians. However, Ankersmit was not
concerned with the historians’ opinion; it was philosophers whose attention
he wanted to attract. Because of his own philosophical education,
Ankersmit wishes philosophers were interested in historical theory and
historiography. In one of his texts he regretfully agrees with Danto’s opinion
that contemporary historians treat historical theory in the same way that
musicologists treat military music – as a noisy and unsophisticated genre
practiced by ungifted amateurs, whose company one should avoid if one
wants to be treated seriously by one’s colleagues. More than any other
contemporary theorist of history, Ankersmit draws upon the work of
philosophers and tries to draw their attention to historiography. He believes
R.G. Collingwood’s prophetic statement that historical writing will even-
tually become one of philosophy’s main interests.5 He also believes that
historical experience can provide a common ground on which historians,
historical theorists, and philosophers can debate issues and that historical
writing both demonstrates the turn from language to experience that has
occurred in history and historical theory and help to restore to philosophy
the category of experience.
Rethinking History 179
Historical representation
Historical discourse is a realistic discourse, Ankersmit argues. The historian
wants to represent a fragment of the past in a realistic fashion, but in order
to be realistic, a representation must not only contain a set of propositions
that have a truth value but also convey a certain notion about the nature of
past reality.6 Ankersmit often says that historical narratives are representa-
tions of the past which create meanings. They propose to look at the past
from a certain vantage point and to organize our knowledge about the past
in a certain way. Thus, the truth criterion proves insufficient in debates
between historians who represent different schools of thought. What is
important is which representation of the past is considered realistic and
which is not (Ankersmit 1992, 106). When we move from the level of an
individual true proposition to the level of sets of propositions –
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Historical experience
Ankersmit argues that the linguistic philosophy of history was successful in
its examination of the rhetorical dimension of historical writing and the
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and that philosophers have again begun to address the questions of how
experience is expressed in a work of art and how we as audience experience
art.
For Ankersmit, one of the key problems of contemporary historical
theory is the way we approach the past. In order to address this problem, we
need to study the history of historical experience. A major difficulty,
however, is the fact that experience is expressed in language; hence,
it will be the difficult but challenging future task of the historical theorist to
liberate the history of historical experience from the heavy and oppressive
weight of (the historian’s) language and to unearth experience from the thick
sedimentary strata of language covering it. (Ankersmit 2005, 14)
Historical experience expresses our attitude toward the past. The reality of
this experience is constituted in the space of a double movement of, first,
losing the past (the recognition that the present does not fully contain past
and present things) and, second, regaining it (the desire to cross the
boundary between the present and the past). The intersection of opposite
axes running from the present to the past and from the past to the present
creates intense feelings of pain and pleasure which become a source of the
sublime (Ankersmit 2005, 9).
Explaining his concept of historical experience, Ankersmit often refers to
the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder, Lodewijk Van Deijssel, and Johan
Huizinga. Those thinkers defined experience as a sort of ‘disclosure’ which
in a direct and authentic way reveals the past ‘as it really was’. Historical
experience is decontextualized and breaches the continuum of other
experiences. In addition, Van Deijssel and Huizinga stress the fact that
historical experience is related to the immediacy of touch rather than the
possessiveness of sight with the domesticating power of the eye, and that
historical experience can be produced by an ordinary object, such as an old
print. Although Ankersmit’s theory of historical experience incorporates
Rethinking History 183
many elements of this approach – such as the idea of a momentary, unique,
unpredictable experience which cannot be adequately expressed in language
and which is related to the sense of touch – Ankersmit points out that it is
not his intention to continue or further develop the Van Deijssel–Huizinga
approach.
Ankersmit realizes that on the level of traditional epistemology his
notion of historical experience as direct contact with reality must be
perceived as heretical. After all, he not only rejects earlier notions of
experience proposed by Dilthey, Collingwood, Oakeshott, or Gadamer, but
wholly abandons epistemology for the sake of aesthetics, following John
Dewey’s Art as experience. Historical experience becomes for Ankersmit a
sort of aesthetic experience – which does not mean, however, that it must be
produced by a work of art. Historical experience is possible when there is
harmony between the subject and the object of experience and with the
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with the most serious crises?’ This question is interesting in that every
catastrophe creates a new paradigm of historical writing; for example, the
trauma of the French Revolution and Napoleon’s wars led to the emergence
of historicism, which, according to Ankersmit, is still the predominant
model of historical writing.10
Ankersmit’s concept of historical experience may seem naive. However,
Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty, in whose footsteps he follows, claim that
sometimes such ‘infantilization’ of philosophy is necessary to change the
focus of the debate (Putnam 1994; Rorty 1999, 34, 221). It is this ‘naı¨vete´’ of
the question of experience that appeals to Ankersmit.11 His approach may
also seem mystical, not in the religious sense, but in a way reminiscent of
Bataille’s ‘inner experience’. In Sublime historical experience (2005)
Ankersmit explains that he associates the concept of sublime experience
with the concept of myth understood as suprahistorical and quasi-natural.
Ankersmit is more and more interested in seeing the world in terms of
natural law as understood by Spinoza rather than Rousseau. It is a romantic
notion, aimed against rational methods of argumentation. Ankersmit
openly claims this romantic legacy, as in the following passage:
Sublimity will, by its very nature, teach us no truths about the past, for from
the perspective of cognitive truth this kind of encounter with the past simply
does not and cannot exist. Sublime experience lives in a universe different from
that of truth – and of falsity, as I would like to insist . . . This may, again, be
interpreted as a plea in favour of a Romanticist conception of our relationship
to the past – a conception seeing in moods, feelings, and the experience of the
past the highest stage of historical consciousness. This is, finally, where and
why it surpasses the Enlightened rationalism of contemporary ‘Theory,’ whose
arid abstractions have so much dominated historical thought in the last
decades; this is where it can, at least, be seen as a correction of all the
hermeneuticist, (post-)structuralist, tropological or narrativist theories of
history and in terms of which we used to conceive of the past and of what it
must mean to us. It is open, again, to the profound and fascinating mysteries
Rethinking History 185
of the past and considers it to be historical theory’s main task to rekindle our
sensitivity to these mysteries, instead of surrendering to intellectualist fashions
from which the reality of the past, its hopes, its catastrophes, its joys and
miseries, have so completely been banned. (Ankersmit 2005, 231–2)
two centuries ago, one can only get to Romanticism after first having passed
through rationalism and ‘theory.’ In this way the book will remain tributary to
‘theory’ and the linguistic rationalism that it criticizes and rejects. I need only
point out, in this context, that it will be a literary category – this is, that of the
sublime – that dominates the argument in this book and in terms of which this
transition from rationalism to Romanticism will be performed. (Ankersmit
2005, 10–11)
I am convinced that we are entering a new world with this recent interest in
experience and consciousness . . . Experience, then, may very well prove to be
the notion that will enable us to overcome this ‘crisis of representation’ . . ..
History might very well prove to be the discipline that best exemplifies what is
at stake in the transition from language to experience . . . [W]hat I am
dreaming of is a historical theory that will concentrate on the notion of
historical experience to write a new chapter not only in the book of the history
of historical theory, but also in that of the history of philosophy. (Domanska
1998, 94)
Ankersmit’s avant-poste
Ankersmit has written a book on historical experience that is at variance
with the current tendencies in historical theory. We cannot predict whether
it will succeed in drawing the attention of historical theorists to the notion of
experience or philosophers to the works of historians. It must be noted,
however, that Ankersmit’s new book, like his other writings, ignores the
186 E. Domanska
theory of experience as formulated by such trends as ‘history from below’,
women’s history, as well as the anthropology of experience or archaeological
theory.12 Ankersmit’s refusal to engage with those movements significantly
diminishes his readership and the potential impact of his theory.13 On the
other hand, as I pointed out above, Ankersmit is making a philosophical
rather than a historiographical argument and instead of being concerned
with historians’ opinions, he wishes to attract philosophers’ attention.14
In Ankersmit’s theory of history philosophy provides the methodology,
and historiography the empirical material. Notwithstanding his declarations
that historiography best illustrates the problem of historical experience and
despite his earlier work on historical narrative and representation,
Ankersmit’s approach is abstract and detached from the fabric of historical
writing. As McCullagh aptly remarked, Ankersmit’s studies, from Narrative
logic to his most recent publications, fail to provide specific analyses of
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creating objective knowledge and discovering the truth about the past (Jay
2005, 250). Thus, instead of studying experience itself – as did, e.g. Thompson
in his The making of the English working class – Scott advocates studying the
processes which situate the subject and produce its experiences through a
variety of discursive strategies. ‘It is not individuals who have experience,’
Scott argues, ‘but subjects who are constituted through experience’ (Scott
1991, 779; Scott 1992). Scott sees experience as a function of a number of
discourses. Of course, her approach is politically motivated, a fact she treats as
a manifestation of her professionalism rather than its opposite (Scott 1989,
690). In Scott’s view one aspect of the historian’s professionalism is her/his
specific, clearly defined political stance.
While Scott cautions against the notion of experience because it can
essentialize both the experiencing subject and experience itself, Frank
Ankersmit addresses experience within the aesthetic framework of the
sublime. His view of experience is radically opposed to that of Scott.17
Adopting the concept of the sublime based on the classic theories of Burke
and Kant, Ankersmit seems to invite the kind of criticism that is generally
aimed at the project of modernity.
I doubt whether Ankersmit’s understanding of the term ‘sublime’ –
which is his key concept – as conceived in the Burkean or Kantian sense, is
adequate to the situation and needs of the theory and history of
historiography in the new century. I might find useful a theory of the
sublime, the instruments for its analysis, and understanding of its aesthetics
insofar as it would not put historical reflection back within the framework of
the enlightenment ideology, which, after all, has long been subjected to
criticism by historians. I therefore believe that a discussion of the historical
sublime should take into account the critical views of it, which I would like
to recapitulate briefly below.
In 1981, shortly after the publication of Jean-François Lyotard’s well-
known essay ‘The sublime and the avant-garde’, Jean-Luc Nancy declared
188 E. Domanska
that ‘le sublime est la mode’. Lyotard’s reinterpretation of the sublime had
given rise to widespread criticism of this category. It was argued by some that
the aesthetics of the sublime is actually the aesthetics of power based upon
and supportive of binary oppositions between the mind and the body,
humans and non-humans, men and women, the self and the other, or the
colonizer and the colonized under imperialism. Critics of logocentrism
perceived the sublime as a manifestation of the ‘pride of reason’; ecologists
warned against the return to the romantic conception of the wilderness
rooted in the aesthetics of the sublime; Marxist critics considered the sublime
an element in the ideology of the bourgeois subject; anthropologists pointed
to the fact that it justified the power of the civilized ‘I’ over the ‘savage’ other;
finally, feminist critics viewed it as another expression of a masculinist will to
power. Thus, we actually have to do with an ‘ideology of the sublime’,
which – as the above-mentioned groups of critics claim – serves as an effective
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Acknowledgments
For consultation, criticism, and valuable insights which contributed to the final
shape of this text, I am grateful to Frank Ankersmit, Hayden White, Richard Vann,
Brian Fay, Keith Jenkins, and Alun Munslow.
Notes on contributor
Ewa Domanska is Associate Professor of theory and history of historiography in the
Department of History, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland. She is the
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author of Unconventional histories. Reflections on the past in the new humanities (2006,
in Polish); Microhistories: Encounters in-between worlds (1999, revd edn, 2005 in
Polish); and editor of History: A world too far? (1997, in Polish); Encounters:
Philosophy of history after postmodernism (1998); History, memory, ethics (2002, in
Polish); ed. and trans. with Marek Wilczynski of Hayden White, Poetics of historical
writing (2000, in Polish); ed. and trans. of Frank Ankersmit, Narrative, representa-
tion, experience (2004, in Polish).
Notes
1. Ankersmit’s interest in those issues is manifested in his subsequent books. The
first of those problems is addressed in Narrative logic (1983) and the opening
chapters of History and tropology (1994). This latter book documents
Ankersmit’s transition from questions of narration and narrative substances
(about which nonetheless he will continue to write) to the problem of historical
representation, which is discussed in depth in his next book (Historical
representation, 2001). Ankersmit’s theory of historical experience is expounded
in his Sublime historical experience (2005). Ankersmit holds academic degrees in
History and Philosophy. Beginning with his Master’s theses, his research
interests have centered upon two areas: (1) political philosophy – his Master’s
thesis in History, defended in 1973, dealt with the Kantian foundations of
contemporary liberalism, and (2) narrativist philosophy of history, which was
the subject of his Master’s thesis in Philosophy, defended in 1977. This latter
study was the germ of Ankersmit’s doctoral dissertation in philosophy,
Narrative logic (Ankersmit 1983). The dissertation was published in 1983 under
the same title.
2. See Ankersmit’s brief history of narrativism (Ankersmit and Kellner 1995, 278–
83) Cf. also Chris Lorenz’s critique of White’s and Ankersmit’s narrativism as
inverted positivism (Lorenz 1998) and Ankersmit’s polemic with this view
(Ankersmit 2001, 50ff).
3. For a comparison of Ankersmit’s ‘narrative idealism’ in Narrative logic and
David Carr’s ‘narrative realism’ in Time, narrative and history, see Crowell 1998.
4. It was Ankersmit’s publications in History and Theory in the late 1980s that
won him a reputation as a leading historical theorist: ‘The dilemma of
contemporary philosophy of history’ (1986); ‘Historical representation’ (1988);
192 E. Domanska
and ‘Historiography and postmodernism’ (1989), a debate with Perez Zagorin
about Ankersmit’s postmodern views on historical writing (Zagorin 1990;
Ankersmit 1990).
5. Collingwood says: ‘The chief business of seventeenth-century philosophy was to
reckon with seventeenth-century natural science . . . The chief business of
twentieth-century philosophy is to reckon with twentieth-century history’
(Collingwood 1939, 78–9).
6. Ankersmit claims, however, that ‘truth is, of course, a non-negotiable
requirement and a conditio sine qua non at the level of description’ (Ankersmit
2001, 294, fn46) and elsewhere writes: ‘I insist most empathically that this
should under no circumstance be interpreted as an attack on truth. Truth is our
only criterion when we have to decide about what to say about the past in terms
of singular statements. Nothing in my argument would compel us to question
this absolutely basic fact about the writing of history, and I have no ambition to
dispute most of what empiricists have said about this. Where truth has its role
to play, we should under all circumstances most dutifully respect its rights’
(Ankersmit 2005, 239).
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18. For various understanding of the term ‘new humanities’, see Ruthven 1992;
Fuery and Mansfield 1998; Spellmeyer and Miller 2006; Domanska 2006b.
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