Chomsky Focault PDF
Chomsky Focault PDF
Chomsky Focault PDF
An Essential Difference?
Foucault: "On the other hand, when we discussed the problem of human nature
and political problems, then differences arose between us. And contrary to what
you think you can't prevent me from believing that these notions of human nature,
of justice, of the realization of the essence of human beings, are all notions and
concepts which have been formed within our civilization, within our type of
knowledge and our form of philosophy, and that as a result form part of our class
system; and that one can't, however regrettable it may be, put forward these notions
to describe or justify a fight which should—and shall in principle—overthrow the
very fundaments of our society. This is an extrapolation for which I can't find the
historical justification. That's the point."
Chomsky: "It's clear."'
"Any serious social science or theory of social change must be founded on some
concept of human nature." — Noam Chomsky
1. Introduction
In 1971, Dutch television held a series of interviews and discussions
with noted intellectuals of the day to discuss a wide range of issues
regarding contemporary social and philosophical affairs. Perhaps the
most significant of these encounters was the meeting between Noam
Chomsky and Michel Foucault. It brought together arguably the two
most prominent Western intellectual-activists of the day in a debate
that illustrates clearly the lineage of thought within which each writer
is situated. Nominally the discussion was in two parts: the first an
examination of the origins or production of knowledge, with particular
concern for the natural sciences, the second explicitly focused on
the role and practice of oppositional politics within Western capitalist
democracies—in part a response to the unfolding Vietnam War.
As a glance at the transcript of the discussion between Chomsky
and Foucault reveals, the debate was a fascinating insight into many
features of their work, and there is far too much of interest in the
discussion to be conveyed within the limits of a single article. While
the discussion raises much of interest to contemporary debates in
social and political thought, I want to examine a limited number of
themes in this article. The title of the discussion, "Human Nature:
Power vs. Justice," conveys in itself a great deal about the respective
Copyright 1999 by Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer 1999)
177
178 Peter Wilkin
a. Reductionisni/Biologism
Foucault: "Yes, but isn't there a danger here? You say that a certain human
nature exists, that this human nature has not been given in actual society the rights
and possibilities which allow it to realize itself . . . that's really what you have
said, I believe."
Chomsky: "Yes."
Foucault: "And if one admits that, doesn't one risk defining this human nature
—which is at the same time ideal and real, and has been hidden and repressed
until now—^in terms borrowed from our society, from our civilization, from our
culture?"''
As a focus of study, the nation-state is no different from the atom or the single
cell organism. Its pattern of behavior, idiosyncratic traits, and internal structure are
as amenable to the process of formulating and testing hypotheses as are the
180 Peter WUkin
b. Homogenization/Determinism
A familiar criticism of ideas of essence in social and political thought
is voiced by Foucault when he notes that references to human nature
are in part an attempt to deny the importance of differences in human
identity and culture. This has become a familiar theme in postmodem
and poststmcturalist thought, but it is Foucault who voices its impor-
tance most clearly and who provides detailed historical (archaeologi-
cal and genealogical) narratives that focus on the way in which the
complexity of human identity has been suppressed in modemity.
This movement towards homogeneity is seen as being part of En-
lightenment themes about universality and the "brotherhood of man"
which place a priority on the essential unity of the human species,
a factor said to be inherent in our underlying human nature. The
practical impact of this, according to Foucault, can be gauged in the
rise of govemmentality and bio-power. "Govemmentality" is a term
he uses to describe the rise of modem political and social institutions
that, in tandem with the emergence of the sovereign nation-state,
have sought to categorize, compartmentalize, and control populations
by placing them into clearly defined groups. In related fashion,
Foucault uses the concept of bio-power to describe how these institu-
tions seek to shape the social body by placing people into these
distinct social categories. Once you are successfully categorized, then
you will be clearly marked in society and treated accordingly: deviant.
182 Peter WUkin
c. Social Constructivism
Foucault: " . . . the proletariat doesn't wage war against the ruling class because
it considers such a war to be just. The proletariat makes war with the ruling class
because, for the first time in history, it wants to take power. And because it will
overthrow the power of the ruling class it considers such a war to be just."
Chomsky: "Yeah, I don't agree."
Foucault: "One makes war to win, not because it is just."
Having assumed the mantle of power, they are then open to recon-
struct society into a classless realm of social activity. Foucault, like
Hobbes, is an arch-nominalist who asserts that power is the ultimate
goal for any social and political movement and that the idea of tran-
scendent principles to guide political action is a residue of bourgeois
thought in Chomsky's politics that will ultimately serve only to
hinder the possibility of successful social transformation. Justice,
he says, is an idea that we have created in different times and places:
it refers to nothing more than that. This proves to be a fundamental
point of divergence from Chomsky and is a logical outcome, in my
view, of their respective essentialist and anti-essentialist perspectives.
I want now to turn to Chomsky's account of human nature before
examining the ways in which I think that he offers useful insights
into a form of essentialism that can be defended in the social sciences.
186 Peter WUkin
. . . if we were able to specify in terms of, let's say, neural networks the properties
of human cognitive structure that make it possible for the child to acquire these
complicated systems, then I at least would have no hesitation in describing these
properties as being a constituent element of human nature. That is, there is something
biologically given, unchangeable, a foundation for whatever it is that we do with
our mental capacities in this case.
We assume that the next person is like us in relevant respects, unless we have
evidence to the contrary, just as a chemist who analyzes two samples form the
same solution assumes, unless there is evidence to the contrary, that they are the
same in relevant respects; , , , When pressed, all would agree that even the fullest
evidence could not show definitively that these assumptions are correct, . . ., the
assumption that the other person is Uke us in relevant respects would be confirmed,
, . ., from evidence of a variety of sorts. We rely, in such cases, on concepts of
simplicity, insight and explanatory power that are not at all understood and that are
presumably rooted in our cognitive capacities.
If our ability to acquire language did not reflect some kind of natural
properties that were universally distributed across the species, it
would be hard to explain the ease with which we acquire a specific
language. Chomsky's point here is that given the uneven and partial
forms of language that we are exposed to as children, it is remarkable
190 Peter WUkin
b. A Realist Ontology?
a. Biologism/Reductionism
b. Homogemzation/Determinism
constraints, they are the basis from which diverse and creative actions
and practices can be generated. Beyond this, Chomsky draws out
the relationship between an understanding of human nature and
human needs, thus informing his conclusions that the general satis-
faction of human needs is a primary goal of the good society. As
Chomsky notes, human beings are clearly capable of a range of
social forms and moral codes but equally capable of becoming
conscious of them and the range of choices that they have as free
agents. This leads him to the conclusion that although cultural
practices may take a range of forms, it is unlikely that they are
simply limitless. The important point here is that the essential
properties of human nature are not simple constraints that cmdely
determine human behavior in any given way: they are potentials that
in conjunction with a range of contingent factors enable us to develop
complex and rich social forms.
The question that confronts us is an institutional and organizational
one: What aspects of human nature do we most want to encourage
and fiourish? What institutions and pattems of social organization
are most conducive to these choices? Chomsky's view is that we
should strive for a society in which the range of human needs is
satisfied in a fair and equitable manner, recognizing that the uneven
distribution of natural powers across the species will mean that we
do not all need identical things. For example, while we all need
food, you may be allergic to peanuts while I like them a great deal.
Thus, the way in which we satisfy general needs has to be sensitive
to the differences that affect the choices of individuals and groups.
By contrast, and pursuing Chomsky's concem with creativity, we all
possess natural creative powers to differing levels, but you are a
good painter while I prefer to write poetry. In order to satisfy our
creative needs, there would be no point in giving both of us a
typewriter. The point here is that although needs-based accounts of
social justice such as Chomsky's are grounded in a universalistic
claim, they do not lead (as strong anti-essentialists fear) to homo-
geneity and the suppression of difference. Logically, need satisfaction
should produce the opposite.
There is a clear relationship, then, between human nature and
culture in Chomsky's work that suggests that from our inherent
properties we are capable of producing a diverse, though not infinite,
array of practices, beliefs, and social forms through history. Human
nature is a foundation for Chomsky and largely represents a biological
constant that connects humanity across time and space. As he says
Chomsky and Foucault on Human Nature 199
The just society has something to do with what best meets the
requirements of human nature and needs. Thus, the good society
will not simply be any social order, but will be one tailored towards
satisfying these objectives. By contrast, Foucault's nominalist
account of justice leaves us in the situation where the just society
is an almost inevitable outcome of the seizure of power and the
reconstruction of social order. Chomsky cannot accept this, and he
is surely right not to. Foucault's position leaves no substantial ethical
grounds for rejecting one social order or another: they are all equally
just or unjust. Now I am not arguing that Foucault really accepts
this, and later in the interview he wants to quahfy his position in
the light of Chomsky's response. But it remains apparent that there
are no logical or ethical reasons on strong constructivist grounds for
choosing one form of justice over another if it is simply reducible,
as Foucault suggests, to questions of power. Indeed, this latter point
is reflected in Foucault's own ambivalence towards ideas of
emancipation in general. For Foucault it is not a question of
emancipation, but of the replacement of one regime of truth by
another, again echoing his Nietzschean heritage.
The second reason why Chomsky defends the idea that movements
for social change should set out an account of the just society has
also to do with his understanding of human nature and how it relates
to his political views. Unlike Foucault, Chomsky does not attempt
to "decenter the subject" from the stage of history but to reassert
the ethical and political primacy of the individual in social change.
If social chiinge is to be lasting and effective it has to be built on
the lasting support of a coalition of social forces who share a range
of values and beliefs about what would constitute a better society.
Chomsky's account of human nature and the autonomy and creativity
of individuals provides strong grounds for the kind of political values
that he espouses. People have to come to realize the need for social
change; if it is to be lasting, it cannot be forced on them in instru-
mentalist fashion. There is no hidden teleology to Chomsky's account
of social change, and using the satisfaction of human nature and
needs as a goal for a better society leads Chomsky only to the
following conclusions about social change:
[A]t every stage of history, our concern must be to dismantle those forms of
authority and oppression that survive from an era when they might have been
justified in terms of the need for security or survival or economic development,
but that now contribute to—rather than alleviate—^material and cultural deficit. If
so, there will be no doctrine of social change fixed for the present and the future,
nor even, necessarily, a specific and unchanging concept of the goals toward which
204 Peter WUkin
social change would tend. Surely our understanding of the nature of man or of the
range of viable social forms is so rudimentary that any far-reaching doctrine must
be treated with great scepticism, just as scepticism is in order when we hear that
"human nature" or "the demands of efficiency" or "the complexity of modem
life" requires this or that form of oppression or autocratic rule.
As Foucault asks, what grounds are there for accepting the essentialist
views of human nature, the good society, and justice that Chomsky
tries to articulate in their debate? This point lies at the heart of a
great deal of the postmodern and poststructuralist criticisms of the
Enlightenment and the Western tradition of social and political
thought, that it claims to speak in transcendent and universal terms
and fails to recognise its particular, historical articulation. So what
response can be made to this corrosive and important critique from
Foucault? It would seem to me that we can respond to this criticism
by reference to a number of ideas in Chomsky's work but there are
three that I would draw on here. First, with regard to the question
of human nature, Chomsky concedes that our insights into it are far
from being scientific and that we can gain as much understanding
about it from literature as we can from other forms of inquiry.
However, the insights and fragmented understandings of human nature
that we possess do not rule out the possibility of universal properties
underpinning our human potential. As I have tried to show, there is
no contradiction between the idea of universality and that of cultural
diversity. What Chomsky's model does rule out is the idea that
human nature is simply an open text, an unformed property that can
simply be whatever we make it. In defense of this view he has, on
numerous occasions, asked an insightful question: Why should we
assume that our human nature is unstructured? From what we know
of the natural world, it is highly structured, and this applies equally
to human physiology and to other things in the world. In this sense,
the onus of proof is on those who would challenge this view to
offer substantive grounds for rejecting the idea that human nature is
in some sense a series of fixed properties capable of generating rea-
sonably diverse social forms. As noted earlier, Chomsky's defense
of an essentialist account of human nature is not simply an act of
faith on his part; it is rooted in the insights gained from his study
of human language acquisition. This detailed empirical study of a
species-specific natural property provides Chomsky with what he
sees as an important insight into one characteristic of the human
essence.
The second point to be made here is that contrary to common
postmodern and poststructuralist criticisms, it is not Chomsky's
intention to close down debate about human nature and politics by
claiming some connection to absolute certainty or truth about these
matters. On the contrary, the libertarian socialist tradition that
Chomsky situates himself within is one that wants to increase
206 Peter WUkin
human nature, the good society, and justice, and it is in this search
for such grounds that Chomsky's work offers us some useful insights.
Notes
1. A.I. Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors (London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1997), p. 140. All references to the television discussion between
Foucault and Chomsky in this paper are taken from this book.
2. Letter to the author, 21 May 1992,
3. M. Nanda, "Restoring the Real: Rethinking Social Constructivist Theories of
Science," Socialist Register, 1997; H. Lawson and L. Appignanesi (eds.).
Dismantling Truth: Reality in the Postmodern World (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1989).
4. Antimodemism is interchangeable, in this respect, with constructivism.
5. See E. Wood, Mind and Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
6. D. Layder, Understanding Social Theory (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 94-113.
7. Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors, p. 131-32.
8. J. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (London: Frances Pinter,
1980), p. 32.
9. See Foucault, Birth of the Clinic (London: Tavistock, 1976); Discipline and
Punish: Birth of the Prison (London: TaVistock; 1977); The History of Sexuality
(London: Allen Lane, 1979).
10. E. White (ed.), Sociobiology and Human Politics (Lexington: Lexington Books,
1981); E.O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1978).
11. Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors, pp. 123-24.
12. W. Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1987), p. 13.
13. W.W. Sharrock, R.J. Anderson, and J. Hughes, Philosophy and the Human
Sciences (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 116-19,
14. Foucault, Birth of the Clinic; Discipline and Punish: Birth of the Prison; The
History of Sexuality. See also R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
15. See also Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1972); A.W. McHoul and W. Grace, A Foucault Primer (London:
UCL Press, 1995); L. McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1994),
16. Foucault says, for example, "Truth is linked in circular fashion with systems
of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces
and which extend it. A 'regime' of truth." Power/Knowledge (Brighton: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1980), p. 133.
17. Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors, pp. 131-32. See also Foucault,
Discipline and Punish: Birth of the Prison; "Truth and Power," in Power/Knowl-
edge; J. Gray, Enlightenment's Wake (London: Routledge, 1995), chap. 1.
18. Gray, Enlightenment's Wake, chap. 1.
19. It should be stressed that social constructivist arguments are not simply
synonymous with poststructuralism or postmodernism, but it is reasonable to
208 Peter WUkin
suggest that they share important ideas in common such as the role that language
plays in constructing what we take to be real,
20, See also Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1970); The Archaeology of Knowledge; Layder, Understanding Social Theory,
chap. 6; Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors, pp, 115-19,
21, Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p, 133.
22, J,F, Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained (Minneapolis: The University of
Minnesota Press, 1992), p, 41,
23, Foucault's own political activism is illustrative of this point. See D,M, Halperin,
Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography (Oxford: Oxford Univ, Press, 1995),
24, Foucault, Power/Knowledge, chap. 3,
25, Z, Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989);
Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained, pp, 77-78,
26, See J, Squires (ed,). Principled Positions (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1993),
27, Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors, p. 136,
28, For an excellent account of Hobbes on language, see J,W, Danford, Wittgenstein
and Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978),
29, Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors, p, 138,
30, J, Leiber, Noam Chomsky: A Philosophical Overview (New York: Twayne
Publishers, 1982), chaps, 1 and 2,
31, Davidson, Foucault arid His Interlocutors, p, 110,
32, N, Chomsky, Language and Problems of Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass,: MIT
Press, 1988), p, 161,
33, N, Chomsky, Language and Thought (London: Moyer Bell, 1993),
34, See R. Keat and J, Urry, Social Theory as Science (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1975), pp, 128-29,
35, N, Blaikie,Ap/7roac/ies to 5ocifl///i^ttiry (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p, 165,
36, M,C, Haley and R,F, Lunsford, Noam Chomsky (New York: Twayne Publishers,
1994), p, 183,
37, N, Chomsky, Rules and Representations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), p, 136,
38, Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors, p. 125,
39, Chomsky, Language and Problems of Knowledge, pp, 164-65, See also P, Wilkin,
Noam Chomsky: On Power, Knowledge and Human Nature (London: Macmillan,
1997), chap, 3,
40, Chomsky, Language and Problems of Knowledge, pp, 156-59, where he says,
"this partial congruence between the truth about the world and what the human
science-forming capacity produces at a given moment yields science. Notice
that it is just blind luck if the human science-forming capacity, a particular
component of the human biological endowment, happens to yield a result that
conforms more or less to the truth about the world,"
41, Chomsky, Rules and Representations, p. 92,
42, Ibid,, pp, 21-22,
43, Chomsky, Language and Problems of Knowledge, pp, 160-63,
44, See T, Pateman, Language in Mind and Language in Society (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1987); and A, Collier, Critical Realism (London: Verso, 1994),
45, Chomsky, Rules and Representations, p. 219,
46, D, Sylvan and B, Glassner, A Rationalist Methodology for the Social Sciences
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp, 1-9; Pateman, Language in Mind and Language
in Society.
Chomsky and Foucault on Human Nature 209
what is its scope, what are its potentialities, are there kinds of social system
human beings could not possibly construct and so on. We have not really begun
this kind of investigation. Hence it is only a guess when I say that the range
of possible social systems may tum out to be very narrow. Of course, there is
an enormous human significance in living in one social system rather than
another, in capitalism rather than feudalism, for example."
63. N.Chomsky, 77ie C/iOffufcy/Jeatfer (London: Random House, 1987), pp. 183-202.
64. Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors, pp. 110, 126.
65. D.J, Levy, Political Order: Philosophical Anthropology, Modernity and the
Challenge of Ideology (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1987), p. 19.
66. H. Bracken, Mind and Language (The Hague: Foris Publications, 1983).
67. Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors, pp. 114-17.
68. Ibid., pp. 120-27. See Chomsky, Language and Problems of Knowledge, p. 157.
69. N. Chomsky, "An Interview," Radical Philosophy 53 (Autumn 1989): 31-32.
70. B. Barnes and D. Bloor, "Relativism, Materialism and the Sociology of
Knowledge," in S, Lukes and M. Hollis (eds.). Rationality and Relativism
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982). Also, Doyal and Harris, Empiricism,
Explanation and Rationality, pp. 100-70.
71. Layder, Understanding Social Theory, pp. 95-97.
72. For recent contributions on this point, see D.M. Halperin, Saint Foucault:
Towards A Gay Hagiography.
73. N. Chomsky, "Towards a Humanistic Conception of Education," in W. Feinberg
and H. Rosemont (eds.). Work Technology and Education (Champaign: University
of Illinois Press, 1975), p. 209; Language and Problems of Knowledge, p. 166.
74. Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors, pp. 136, 138.
75. A. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Brighton: The Harvester Press,
1983); R. Plant, Modem Political Thought (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); R,
Trigg, Ideas of Human Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
76. Lyotard also makes this point when he argues that there are no transcendent
grounds for evaluating ideas of justice. The Postmodern Explained, pp. 77-78,
77. E.F. Paul, F.D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (eds.). Foundations of Moral and Political
Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. vii.
78. C. Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Philosophy and the Human
Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), p. 160.
79. N. Chomsky, For Reasons of State (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 152,
80. Chomsky, Powers and Prospects, pp. 70-93; K, Nielsen, Equality and Liberty
(Totowa, NJ.: Rowman and Allenheld, 1985); Miller, "Social Justice and the
Principle of Need," in M. Freeman and D. Robertson (eds.). The Frontiers of
Political Theory (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980).
81. Davidson, Foucault and His Interlocutors, p. 140.
82. Ibid., p, 138.
83. P. Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History ofAnarchism (London: Fontana
Press, 1992).
Peter Wilkin
Department of Politics
Lancaster University
p.wilkin@lancaster.ac.uk