Third Division G.R. No. 229829, January 22, 2018 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNEL KALIPAYAN Y ANIANO, Accused-Appellant. Decision Gesmundo, J.
Third Division G.R. No. 229829, January 22, 2018 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNEL KALIPAYAN Y ANIANO, Accused-Appellant. Decision Gesmundo, J.
Third Division G.R. No. 229829, January 22, 2018 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNEL KALIPAYAN Y ANIANO, Accused-Appellant. Decision Gesmundo, J.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 29, 2016 of the Court
of Appeals-Visayas Station (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No.
01962. The CA affirmed with modification the Judgment2 dated
November 26, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City,
Branch 34, finding accused-appellant Arnel Kalipayan y
Aniano (accused-appellant) guilty of murder.
The Antecedents
Contrary to law.3
Celestina testified that she was in the kitchen with Glaiza while the
latter was trying to cook rice. Celestina was doing something to the
gas tank when accused-appellant suddenly entered the house and
stabbed Glaiza. The latter fell to the ground but accused-appellant
continued stabbing her. Celestina then went out of the house to seek
help and she was prevented by their neighbors to go back inside.
SPO2 Marion Lavadia testified that he was the policeman on duty and
he received the phone call about the stabbing incident. Celestina met
the police who responded to the incident and informed them that
Glaiza was stabbed several times. They later discovered that
accused-appellant could be somewhere in V&G Subdivision in
Tacloban City. When they saw accused-appellant, Josephine
confirmed that he was the one that stabbed Glaiza. The police
arrested accused-appellant and frisked him, which resulted in the
discovery of the knife used against Glaiza.
SO ORDERED.8
The CA Ruling
In its decision dated July 29, 2016, the CA denied the appeal. It held
that there was suddenness in the attack, as gathered from the
testimonies of the prosecution, when accused-appellant swiftly
appeared inside Glaiza's house and attacked her. The numerous stab
wounds found on Glaiza's body, delivered in a sudden manner,
negates the claim that Glaiza might have defended herself. The CA
likewise agreed with the RTC that there was the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength but the same is absorbed
in the circumstance of treachery.
SO ORDERED.9
Issue
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH ANY QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE.
Arguments of accused-appellant
Arguments of appellee
X X X
X X X
Celestina's account of the events also shows not only the suddenness
of the attack but that accused-appellant rendered Glaiza defenseless
as well, to wit:
Q: After she requested you to open the tank, what did you do?
A: I went near the LPG tank to open it.
Q: Were you able to open it?
A: I was not able to open it, because when I was about to open
it I saw Arnel Kalipayan already stabbing my granddaughter.
Q: Did you notice where Arnel Kalipayan came from?
A: I just saw him inside our house already stabbing Glaiza.
Q: What was the position of Glaiza when she [sic] first
stabbed by Arnel Kalipayan?
A: She was already lying down faced up and she was being
stabbed by Arnel.
Court: The first time you saw Arnel Kalipayan what she was
doing?
A: That's it, when I was about to open the gas, when I turned
my head to the left (witness demonstrated by turning her head
to the left) that was what I saw, Arnel Kalipayan was already
stabbing my granddaughter Glaiza.27
Though she was asked several times28 at various points during the
course of her testimony, Celestina did not waver in her story and
remained consistent throughout.
HEAD:
Punctured wound, right lower mandibular region, measuring 1 x
-
0.5 x 1 cms AML.
CHEST:
Stab wound, right anterior chest, at the level of the 3rd ICS,
measuring 3 x 2 x 9 cms AML, 4 cms in depth, directed
-
posteriorwards, penetrating the right thoracic cavity hitting the
middle lobe of the left lung.
Stab wound, anterior chest right, at the level of the 3rd ICS, at the
- level of the anterior mid mammary line, measuring 3 x 1 x 3 cms
AML, non-penetrating.
Stab wound, [indiscernible] posterior chest, right at the
- level of the 5th ICS, measuring 1 x 1 just along the posterior
median line measuring 1 x 1 cms.
ABDOMEN:
EXTREMITIES:
Incised wound, left hand, at the base portion of the left finger,
-
measuring 3 x 2 cms.
While many of the stab and puncture wounds were frontally made, it
is notable that Glaiza sustained posterior wounds, which strengthens
Josephine's claim that Glaiza was first struck in the back. Given this,
and uncontroverted by convincing evidence, the only reasonable
conclusion that can be made is that the attack was attended by
treachery.
Furthermore, the above details show that Glaiza was not expecting
the attack. She was also rendered helpless and unprotected not only
by the swiftness of the attack, but also because she was already
stabbed in the back before even becoming fully aware that a
reprehensible act was being committed against her. From this, the
first element of treachery is demonstrated without question.
With this finding that treachery is present, the conclusion that the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed therein
necessarily follows. Even without a definite finding as to whether it
exists in this case or not, it is beyond cavil that treachery, as a
qualifying circumstance, absorbs the aggravating circumstance abuse
of superior strength even though the latter was alleged in the
information.29 Thus, the circumstance of abuse of superior strength
should not be appreciated as a separate aggravating circumstance.
As pointed out earlier, Glaiza was only preparing dinner in the sanctity
of her home when the attack happened. There was no prior incident
that would give rise to accused-appellant's sudden actions. Clearly,
there was no provocation that would exempt this case from being
aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling. There is also no question
that Glaiza was living in the same house where the crime was
committed. Therefore, the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant
should be that for an aggravated crime, the higher of the two (2)
indivisible penalties, which is death in this case. However, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 934633 , the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed, with no eligibility for parole. Not only that, the amount of
the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages have to be
modified accordingly. The case of People v. Jugueta34 laid down the
amounts that should be awarded to the victims of some particular
crimes. For the crime of murder, punished by death but reduced
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole because of Republic
Act No. 9346, the heirs of Glaiza should be awarded the amount of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of funeral expenses
claimed by Josephine is sustained.
SO ORDERED.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs /Mesdames:
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 4-12. Penned by Associate Justice Germano
Francisco D. Legaspi, with Associate Justice Gabriel T.
Ingles and Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap,
concurring.
2
CA rollo, pp. 44-52. Penned by Judge Frisco T. Lilagan.
3
Records, p. 1.
4
Id. at 17.
5
CA rollo, p. 46.
6
Records, p. 7.
7
Rollo, p. 49.
8
CA rollo, p. 52.
9
Rollo, p. 11.
10
CA rollo, p. 109.
11
Rollo, pp. 20-21.
12
Id. at 25-26.
13
Candelaria v. People of the Philippines, 749 Phil. 517, 530
(2014) citing People v. Balacano 391 Phil. 509, 525-526
(2000).
14
People of the Philippines v. Bensig, 437 Phil. 748, 763
(2002).
15
People of the Philippines v. Pulgo, G.R. No. 218205, July
5, 2017.
16
People of the Philippines v. Sebastian, 428 Phil. 622,
626-627 (2002).
17
People of the Philippines v. Paragas, 434 Phil. 124, 143
(2002).
18
Id. at 144.
19
People of the Philippines v. Aquino, 396 Phil. 303, 307
(2000).
20
Supra note 16 at 626.
21
People of the Philippines v. Caboquin, 420 Phil. 744, 750
(2001).
22
Supra note 16 at 626.
23
People of the Philippines v. Perez, 404 Phil. 380, 388
(2001).
24
People of the Philippines v. Santillana, 367 Phil. 373, 389
(1999).
25
TSN dated October 6, 2009, p. 4.
26
Id. at 5.
27
TSN dated June 21, 2011, pp. 6-7.
28
Id. at 18, 20, 21, 24, 25.
29
People of the Philippines v. Castro, et. al., 346 Phil. 894,
912 (1997).
30
CA rollo, p. 51.
31
People of the Philippines v. Taboga, 426 Phil. 908, 928-929
(2002), among others.
32
People of the Philippines v. Belo, 360 Phil. 36, 50 (1998).
33
An Act prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the
Philippines.
34
G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.