PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

VICENTE TEMBLOR alias "RONALD,"

Facts:
The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was charged with the crime of murder in
Criminal Case No. 1890 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City for shooting to death Julius Cagampang. The information alleged:

The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about 7:30 in the evening of December 30. 1980,
while Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were conversing in the store adjacent to their
house in Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Province of Agusan del Norte, the accused Vicente
Temblor alias Ronald, arrived and asked to buy a half pack of Hope cigarettes. While
Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and
Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife Victorina,
upon seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name "Jul." Two persons, one
of whom she later identified as the accused, barged into the interior of the interior of the store
through the main door and demanded that she brings out her husband's firearm. Igawas mo ang
iyang armas" ("You let out his firearm!") they shouted. The accused fired two or more shots at
the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the maleta" (suitcase) where her husband's
firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took
her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.

The accused and his companion, admittedly members of the dreaded NPA (New People's Army)
were not apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong with other
members-followers of the New People's Army.
The accused capitalized the fact that the victim's widow, Victorina, did not know him by name.
That circumstance allegedly renders the identification of the accused, as the perpetrator of her
husband's killing, insufficient. However, during the trial, the accused was positively identified by
the widow who recognized him because she was less than a meter away from him inside the
store which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt flourescent lamp and by an incandescent lamp
outside. Her testimony was corroborated by another prosecution witness a tricycle driver,
Claudio Sabanal who was a long-time acquaintance of the accused and who knew him as
"Ronald." He saw the accused in the store of Cagampang at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of
December 30, 1980. He heard the gunshots coming from inside the store, and saw the people
scampering away.

Issue:
Whether or not proof of motives shall be given merits to implicate of the crime committed by
the accused.
Held:
The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively identified as the killer of Cagampang?
The settled rule is that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying
is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their
conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence as in
the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Dava. 149 SCRA. 582).
Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which
opined that the defendant's knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough
to kill him as killings perpetrated by members of the New People's Army for the sole purpose of
acquiring more arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte
but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA's "agaw armas" campaign. Moreover, proof
of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively Identified (People vs. Tan, Jr., 145
SCRA 615
The records further show that the accused and his companion fled after killing Cagampang and
taking his firearm. They hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an implied
admission of guilt (People vs. Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422).
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. USMAN HASSAN y AYUN

G.R. No. L-68969

January 22, 1988

Facts:

Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, single,
and a resident of Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his death on July 23,1981, the deceased was
employed as manager of the sand and gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan
was an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador. 4

The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old when he testified, married,
and a resident of Zamboanga City. On the day of the killing, he was employed at the sand and
gravel business of the father of the deceased but was jobless at the time of his examination-in-
chief on February 3, 1982.

He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 23,
1981; that he was a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at
Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting
mangoes, he saw a person stab Ramon who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was
parked about two or three meters from the fruit stand where he Samson) was selecting mangoes;
that he saw the assailant stab Ramon "only once" and that after the stabbing, the assailant ran
towards the PNB Building. When asked at the cross-examination if he knew the assailant,
Samson said, "I know him by face but I do not know his name." 5

The accused –appellant was later convicted of murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated.

Held:

Yes, the fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that
Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Police corporal Rogelio P.Carpio. There was no
such police line-up as the police investigator, to honestly correct erreoneous statements in his
examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and
unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Police Corporal Carpio.
There was no such police investigator claimed on second thought.

The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and unconvincing. And so with the
evidence sought to be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the
expert testimony of the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin
Bernalez, presented by the prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the testimony of the one
eyewitness, Jose Samson. While Samson averred on the witness stand that he saw the assailant
stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" 13 only once, the NBI medico-legal officer
Identified two stab wounds, one at the front portion of the chest at the level and third rib, (sic)
and another stab wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14 The same medical expert also
concluded from the nature and location of the chest wound, which was the cause of death, that
the same was inflicted on the victim while the alleged accused was in front of him." 15

Wherefore decision is REVERSED, and the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL
DELIM alias "BONG," et al.

G.R. No. 175942

September 13, 2007

FACTS:

Marlon, Leon, Manuel @ "Bong," Norberto and Ronald @ "Bong," all surnamed Delim, were
jointly indicted in the RTC of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan for the crime of Murder under an
Information5 which reads as follows:

On January 23, 1999, at around six-thirty in the evening, the victim, Modesto Delim, his wife
Rita Manalo, son, Randy Manalo, and two young grandchildren, were about to take their supper
in their house at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, when suddenly, appellant Norbert Delim,
together with co-accused Marlon Delim and Ronald Delim, barged into their house carrying
short firearms. While Modesto was seated at the dinner table, Marlon poked a gun at him, and
then appellant and Ronald dragged him out of the house. Randy saw the group which abducted
his father who was then taken to Brgy. Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Shortly, appellant’s co-accused
Leon Delim and Manuel Delim, who were also armed with short firearms, appeared and guarded
the front door of the house to prevent Rita and Randy from following the victim. Leon and
Manuel left the house at around seven o’clock in the morning of the next day.

On January 27, 1999, four days after Modesto’s abduction, his lifeless and decomposing body
with several stab wounds and a gunshot wound in the head was discovered in a grassy area at the
housing project in Brgy. Paldit.8

Issue:

Whether or not the crime charged in the information is homicide?

Held:

Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. 32 It may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and after
the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. 33 Hence, common design
is the essence of conspiracy.

Here, as found by the trial and appellate courts, appellant acted in concert with his other co-
accused Marlon, Ronald, Manuel and Leon to achieve a common criminal design. Indeed,
conspiracy among said accused could easily be deduced from their presence and actual
participation in the commission of the crime. As aptly stated by the trial court:

Conspiracy having been established, the act of one, therefore, is the act of all and everyone of the
conspirators, appellant included, is guilty with the others in equal degree.

The sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence having been established and the existence of
conspiracy duly proved, appellant’s exact criminal responsibility must now be determined.

Pertinently, as defined by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of Murder is
committed by a person who kills another with treachery. Treachery exists when the offender
commits a crime against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specifically to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
any defense or retaliatory act which the victim might make.
 Although the victim may have been defenseless at the time he was seized but there is no
evidence as to the particulars of how he was assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be appreciated
against the accused. In this case, the victim was defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald.
However, the prosecution failed to present any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was
defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked and killed. It cannot be presumed that
although he was defenseless when he was seized, the victim was in the same situation when he
was attacked, shot and stabbed by the malefactors.

The qualifying circumstance of treachery not having been appreciated then against appellant’s
co-accused Marlon, Ronald and Leon Delim, said circumstance cannot now be appreciated
against appellant. Verily, absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant can be convicted only of
homicide defined and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

In sum, guilt for the crime of homicide to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
 THEUNITEDSTATES vs.AH CHONG

G.R. No. L-5272

March 19, 1910

Facts:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc
Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a
house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters
from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club.
No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the
rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was
covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a
small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat
insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one
small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there
were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the
night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in
bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at
the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due
to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If
you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the
edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the
defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open,
whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair
was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly
at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon
the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded,
he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to
secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was criminally liable based on the facts that there was mistake of
fact.

Held:

No.The rule that one is not criminally liable if there is no criminal intent as the court ruled under
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

In the present case, the accused acted in good faith without no malice or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self defense. he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be
he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can
not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into
his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent
danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his
charge.

The fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the
door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his
life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be
he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can
not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into
his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent
danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his
charge.

Wherefore, the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged.

G.R. No. L-47722

July 27, 1943

Facts:

Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and
Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary,
respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless
imprudence. Defendants appealedseparately from this judgment.

In the afternoon of December 24, 1938, Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial
Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following
tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina name Irene in
Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and
asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes
Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of
the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a
newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and
if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was
given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the
chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one
of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police
tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas'
whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he voluntered to go with the party. The
Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and
private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was
supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida
Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida
indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour, Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that
occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of
Irene, and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened
by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the
shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene, Irene
fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo
Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The
Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who
killed the deceased, Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The
corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de
Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on
Tecson's body which caused his death.

Issue:

Whether or not requisites on mistake of fact are present to justify or exonerate the accused from
the crime.

Held:

No.The court held that accused is declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in
the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.
According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfilment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in
order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instant case, only the first requisite is present appellants
have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them
committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was
to arrest Balagtas, or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are
overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they
have exceeded in the fulfilment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be
Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his
identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of
murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned.
GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA,v. ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR. AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 190912,

January 12, 2015

Facts:

On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, Elpidio Malicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the house of his
sister Isabelita Iguiron (Isabelita) in Pandacan, Manila when all of a sudden, he heard Isabelita's
son, Winston, throwing invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio confronted Isabelita but she also cursed
him, which prompted the former to slap the latter. On that occasion, Elpidio was under the
influence of alcohol.

The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the commotion was
taking place in order to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was eventually persuaded to go
home where he drank some coffee. Thereafter, Elpidio went back to the house of Isabelita to
offer reconciliation. On his way there, he passed by the house of Kagawad Andy Antonio and
requested the latter to accompany him, but was instead told to go back home, leaving Elpidio to
proceed alone.

Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus) and her son-
in-law Gary Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find their parents. Titus and Gary
responded, “putang ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas ka, punyeta ka.”

In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and saw Isabelita's
elder son, Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a rattan stick or arnis. Salvador
hit Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced the latter to bow his head but Salvador
delivered a second blow that hit Elpidio on the right eyebrow. Salvador attempted to hit Elpidio
for the third time but the latter got hold of the rattan stick and the two wrestled on the floor and
grappled for the possession of the same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the two and sprayed
something on Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the clutches of Salvador and to
extricate himself, Elpidio bit Salvador's head.

Thereafter, a certain “Mang Gil” tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted at him:
“Huwag makialam, away ng mag-anak ito” and the two continued to maul Elpidio. The people
who witnessed the incident shouted “maawa na kayo” but they only stopped battering him when
a bystander fainted because of the incident. Elpidio then pretended to be dead. It was then that
concerned neighbors approached him and rushed him to the emergency room of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).

Thus, a case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan Malicse Iguiron,
Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary Fantastico and
Rolando Villanueva. The Information reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage of superior strength,
commence the commission of the crime of murder directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and
there hitting the head of Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe and a
piece of wood and mauling him, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other
than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y
de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an abuse of superior strength in the commission of the crime to be
constituted as aggravating circumstances.
Held:
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a felony,
thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength
But it was a lopsided attack as the victim was unarmed, while his... attackers were all armed
(rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also drunk. This establishes the
element of abuse of superior strength. The suddenness of the blow inflicted by Salvador on
Elpidio when he entered the premises show that the former was ready to... hit the victim and was
waiting for him to enter. It afforded Elpidio no means to defend himself. And Salvador
consciously adopted the said actuation. He hit Elpidio twice on the head. Treachery is present in
this case and must be considered an aggravating circumstance against Salvador Iguiron.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of... the
crime."
"To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of...
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.The appreciation of this
aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.
 BONIFACIO NIEVA Y MONTERO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 188751

November 16, 2016

Facts:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Court finding petitioner Bonifacio Nieva
(Nieva) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide.

On October 28, 2005, at around six o'clock in the evening, Luna and Raymundo were doing
carpentry works for Judy at Kaunlaran, Hernandez, Catmon, Malabon City. Judy was supervising
the construction of her nipa hut when Nieva arrived and approached her. Judy was then the
President of the Catmon Homeowners Association. Nieva inquired on the electrification project
of the Homeowners Association, to which Judy replied that the matter was already taken care of
by the Manila Electric Company (MERALC0). However, Nieva suddenly shouted at Judy and
cursed her saying: "Mga putang ina nyo, lima kayo mga president kayo, kung gusto nyo
magkaroon ng mga problema, bibigyan ko kayo ng mga problema ngayon." He then drew a .357
caliber revolver (wrapped in a white piece of cloth) from his waist. Overwhelmed with fear, Judy
clung to Luna's back and used him as a shield against Nieva.

Nieva, who was about two arms' length away, pointed his gun at Judy and fired several times but
the gun jammed. At this point, Raymundo, who was at the roof of the nipa hut, jumped from the
hut to help her aunt, Judy. However, before Raymundo reached Judy, he heard a gunshot and saw
Judy fall to the ground. As she simultaneous fell, Judy was able to push Luna towards Nieva.
Luna and Nieva then grappled for the gun. With the help of Raymundo, Luna seized the gun
from Nieva.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the conviction of the petitioner.

Held:
No.To successfully claim the defense of accident, the accused must show that the following
circumstances are present: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he
causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) he had no fault in or intention of causing
the injury. None of these circumstances are present in this case.

To start, Nieva was not performing a lawful act when he drew a gun and pointed it at Judy. Thus,
in People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., we ruled that drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the
same not being in self defense, is unlawful, as it at least constitutes light threats. Subsequently,
Nieva fired the gun several times. In his initial attempts, the bullet of the gun jammed; yet, Nieva
did not stop until the gun finally fired and hit its target.

This clearly shows that Nieva intentionally and persistently performed the act complained of in
order to successfully maim Judy. He cannot now claim that he is without fault.

As his last defense, Nieva submits that he has no intent to kill Judy considering that the gun was
pointed to the ground when it was fired and Judy's wound was not fatal.

Nieva's contentions are untenable. In fine, the prosecution established beyond reasonable
doubt the elements of frustrated homicide, which are: first, the accused intended to kill his
victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; second, the victim sustained a
fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and third, none of the
qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
is present.
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES, vs.FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN
SAMSON y MAGDALENA,

G.R. No. L-74324

November 17, 1988

Facts:

For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and
BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER .

The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda
used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a
town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride
and one was a ferris wheel.

Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and
reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As
the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the
deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.

Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a
can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of
the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring
the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.

The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased.
Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with
rags to extinguish the flame. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the
incident gave their written statements.

Issue:

Whether or not conspiracy are present in this case to constitute a crime.

Held:

No. There is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay
or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the
accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective
criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the
deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed
by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the
body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed
the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be
conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire.
His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the
victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony
defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in
the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code
provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the
accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is
evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified
that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning.

THE UNITED STATES v. JAMES L. BROBST

G.R. No. 4935.

Facts:

The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American named Mann, were engaged in work on a
mine located in the municipality of Masbate, where they gave employment to a number of native
laborers. Mann discharged one of these laborers named Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to
come back on the premises, and told the defendant not to employ him again, because he was a
thief and a disturbing element with the other laborers. A few days afterwards, some time after 6
o’clock on the morning of the 10th of July, 1907, Saldivar, in company with three or four others,
went to the mine to look for work. The defendant, who at the time was dressing himself inside
his tent, which was erected on the mining property, when he caught sight of Saldivar, ordered
him off the place, ex-claiming in bad Spanish, "Sigue, Vamus!" (Begone). Saldivar made no
move to leave, and although the order was repeated, merely smiled or grinned at the defendant,
where-upon the latter became enraged, took three steps toward Saldivar, and struck him a
powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the point where the
handle of Saldivar’s bolo lay against the belt from which it was suspended. On being struck,
Saldivar threw up his hands, staggered (dio vueltas — spun around helplessly) and without
saying a word, went away in the direction of his sister’s house, which stood about 200 yards (100
brazas) away, and about 100 feet up the side of a hill. He died as he reached the door of the
house and was buried some two or three days later.

The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime of homicide (homicidio), marked with the
extenuating circumstances, denied in subsections 3 and 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, in that
the defendant "had no intention of committing so grave an injury as that which he inflicted," and
that he struck the blow "under such powerful excitement as would naturally produce entire loss
of reason and self-control." Sentence of sic years and one day of prision mayor was imposed, and
from this sentence defendant appealed to this court.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of homicide .

Held:

Yes.It was proven, and the court found that not only did the defendant no intend to kill the
deceased but also that he did not intend to do him any physical injury whatever; but in the case at
bar the evidence conclusively establishes the voluntary, intentional, and unlawful infliction by
the accused of a severe blow on the person of the deceased; and while it is true that the accused
does not appear to have intended to take the life of his victim, there can be no doubt that in thus
striking the deceased, he intended to do him some injury, at least to the extent of inflicting some
degree of physical pain upon him, and he is, therefore, criminally responsible for the natural,
even if unexpected results of his act, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, which
prescribes that "Any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit."

In such cases the law in these Islands does not excuse one from liability for the natural
consequences of his illegal acts merely because he did not intend to produce such consequence,
but it does take that fact into consideration as an extenuating circumstance, as did the trial judge
in this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.VALENTINA MANANQUIL Y LAREDO

G.R. No. L-35574

Facts:

VALENTINA MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of PARRICIDE allegedly committed as

On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA
Building at Pasay City where her husband was then working as a security guard. She had just
purchased ten (10) centavo-worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue
which... she placed in a coffee bottle. She was angry at her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because
the latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining a mistress and had been taking all the food
from their house. Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she... knocked at the door.
Immediately, after the door was opened, Elias Day shouted at the appellant and castigated her
saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON". The appellant tired of hearing the victim,
then got the bottle of gasoline and poured the contents... thereof on the face of the victim. Then,
she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim aflame.

Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and then to the
Trinity General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965. (Exh. "C", p.
208, rec.) due to 'Pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2°... secondary'.
In that... investigation, appellant categorically admitted having thrown gasoline at her husband
and thereafter set him aflame as evidenced by this pertinent portion of her statement.

Issues:
Whether or not extrajudicial confession may be regarded as conclusive proof of guilt when taken
without maltreatment or intimidation 7 and may serve as a basis of the declarant's conviction.
Ruling:

Indeed the trial court could not be faulted for relying heavily on accused-appellant's sworn
statement in assessing her guhit since it was given shortly after the incident took place. By then,
she had yet no time to concoct any fabrication favorable to her. Shock by the aftermath
consequences of her criminal design she must litem been motivated by no other purpose except
to admit the undeniable. On the other hand, when she took the witness stand, disclaiming any
responsibility for the burning of her husband, it was already January 13, 1969 . . . more than five
years after the incident and decidedly after she had the benefit of too many consultations.

The court ruled in citing the cases of PP vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1, 3 & 4; and PP vs. Quianzon, 62
Phil. 162, citing 13 RCL, 748, 751 is as follows -
"One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
immediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that other causes contribute to
the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. He would still be liable "even if the
deceased might have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical
operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the
death, or that death was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the
condition of the wound. The principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal
application. It lies at the foundation of criminal jurisprudence. It is that every person is held to
contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts
a wound with a deadly weapon in a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a
consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its
criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Neglect of the
wound or its unskilled and improper treatment which are themselves consequences of the
criminal act, must in law be deemed to have been among those which are in contemplation of the
guilty party and for which he must be responsible." The rule has its foundation on a wise and
practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away
from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amidst the conflicting theories of medical
men and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries it would
be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and
thereby open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction
and punishment."

The evidence shows that... pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While
accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death... this could not have resulted had not the
victim suffered from second degree burns. It concluded, and rightly... so, that with pneumonia
having developed, the burns became as to the cause of death, merely contributory
One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
immediately or immediately to the death of such other
It is that every person is held to contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of
his own... acts.
Principles:
Appellant's case falls squarely under Art. 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
"Art. 4. Criminal Liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended."... the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an
intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party
be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO, EDMUNDO ASIS

G.R. No. 75369

November 26, 1990

Facts:
In this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II 1 convicting them of
the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

At around 2:00 o’clock in the morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. and his
companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo,
Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a
certain Almadrones, they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo Asis, and Juan
Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed ("winahi") them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to box
him. 2 Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the accused that they had no desire to fight. 3
Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall, drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy Asis
but missed. Terrified, the trio ran pursued by the three accused. They ran for about half an hour,
passing by the house of Quiñones, Jr. They stopped running only upon seeing that they were no
longer being chased. After resting for a short while, Quiñones, Jr. invited the two to accompany
him to his house so that he could change to his working clothes and report for work as a bus
conductor. 4

While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiñones, Jr., the three accused suddenly
emerged on the roadside and without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiñones, Jr. with his bolo
hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall down. 5 Horrified, Felix Lukban and Zaldy
Asis fled to a distance of 200 meters, but returned walking after they heard shouts of people.
Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone shout "May nadale na." 6

On the spot where Quiñones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him already dead
with his head busted. 7 They helped the brother of Quiñones, Jr. in carrying him to their house.

That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiñones, Jr. was autopsied at the Funeraria
Belmonte in Labo, Camarines Norte by the municipal health officer, Dr. Marcelito E. Abas. The
postmortem examination report which is found at the back of the death certificate reveals that
Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., who was 21 years old when he died, sustained the following injuries

:jgc:
Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner can be exonerated of his criminal liability by a subsequent
vehicular accident of the victim.

Held:

No. The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in
this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to
their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between
the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.

Absent of any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again,
contrary to the lower court’s finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established to
hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan’s co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active part
in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which led to his running over by a
vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying a stone
at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and coming from an
undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have
known of the former’s criminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or approval of the act
without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose. Such being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the crime
did not make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by
Iligan. Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.
Since treachery and evident premeditation has not been established in this case the lower court’s
charge of Fernando Ilagan was modified from murder to homicide.