Supreme Court: Gasing/Truck Operator, Finding Sereno To Have Been Illegally
Supreme Court: Gasing/Truck Operator, Finding Sereno To Have Been Illegally
Supreme Court: Gasing/Truck Operator, Finding Sereno To Have Been Illegally
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175910 July 30, 2009
ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA, Petitioner,
vs.
FE VDA. DE TE, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
FAUSTINO CASTAÑEDA, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 with prayer for
preliminary injunction assailing the Order 2 dated March 22, 2006
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City, Davao del
Sur, in Civil Case No. 3488.
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
On February 14, 1995, a Decision was rendered in NLRC Case No.
RAB-11-07-00608-93 entitled, Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro
Gasing/Truck Operator, finding Sereno to have been illegally
dismissed and ordering Gasing to pay him his monetary claims in
the amount of ₱43,606.47. After the Writ of Execution was
returned unsatisfied, Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho issued an
Alias Writ of Execution3 on June 10, 1996, directing Fulgencio R.
Lavarez, Sheriff II of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), to satisfy the judgment award. On July 23, 1996, Lavarez,
accompanied by Sereno and his counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio
E. Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck bearing License Plate No. LBR-514,
which at that time was in the possession of Gasing. On July 30,
1996, the truck was sold at public auction, with Sereno appearing
as the highest bidder.4
Meanwhile, respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her
attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, filed with the RTC, Branch
18, Digos, Davao del Sur, a Complaint 5 for recovery of motor
vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck
pendente lite against petitioner, Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC of
Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 3488.
Respondent alleged that: (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te,
the registered owner of the truck, as evidenced by the Official
Receipt6 and Certificate of Registration;7 (2) Gasing merely rented
the truck from her; (3) Lavarez erroneously assumed that Gasing
owned the truck because he was, at the time of the "taking," 8 in
possession of the same; and (4) since neither she nor her
husband were parties to the labor case between Sereno and
Gasing, she should not be made to answer for the judgment
award, much less be deprived of the truck as a consequence of
the levy in execution.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 9 on the following grounds: (1)
respondent has no legal personality to sue, having no real
interests over the property subject of the instant complaint; (2)
the allegations in the complaint do not sufficiently state that the
respondent has cause of action; (3) the allegations in the
complaint do not contain sufficient cause of action as against him;
and (4) the complaint is not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit
and Bond that would entitle the respondent to the delivery of the
tuck pendente lite.
The NLRC also filed a Motion to Dismiss 10 on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
Meanwhile, Lavarez filed an Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. 11 By way of special and
affirmative defenses, he asserted that the RTC does not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint does
not state a cause of action.
On January 21, 2000, the RTC issued an Order 12 denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
In his Answer,13 petitioner denied the material allegations in the
complaint. Specifically, he cited as affirmative defenses that:
respondent had no legal personality to sue, as she had no interest
over the motor vehicle; that there was no showing that the heirs
have filed an intestate estate proceedings of the estate of Pedro
Te, or that respondent was duly authorized by her co-heirs to file
the case; and that the truck was already sold to Gasing on March
11, 1986 by one Jesus Matias, who bought the same from the
Spouses Te. Corollarily, Gasing was already the lawful owner of
the truck when it was levied on execution and, later on, sold at
public auction.
Incidentally, Lavarez filed a Motion for Inhibition, 14 which was
opposed15 by respondent.
On October 13, 2000, RTC Branch 18 issued an Order 16 of
inhibition and directed the transfer of the records to Branch 19.
RTC Branch 19, however, returned the records back to Branch 18
in view of the appointment of a new judge in place of Judge-
designate Rodolfo A. Escovilla. Yet, Branch 19 issued another
Order17 dated November 22, 2000 retaining the case in said
branch.
Eventually, the RTC issued an Order 18 dated May 19, 2003 denying
the separate motions to dismiss filed by the NLRC and Lavarez,
and setting the Pre-Trial Conference on July 25, 2003.
On October 17, 2005, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss the Case on the following grounds: 19 (1) lack of
jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants; and (2) to
discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact for lack of legal
personality to sue.
It appeared that the respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died on April 12,
2005.20
Respondent, through her lawyer, Atty. William G. Carpentero, filed
an Opposition,21 contending that the failure to serve summons
upon Sereno is not a ground for dismissing the complaint,
because the other defendants have already submitted their
respective responsive pleadings. He also contended that the
defendants, including herein petitioner, had previously filed
separate motions to dismiss the complaint, which the RTC denied
for lack of merit. Moreover, respondent's death did not render
functus officio her right to sue since her attorney-in-fact, Faustino
Castañeda, had long testified on the complaint on March 13, 1998
for and on her behalf and, accordingly, submitted documentary
exhibits in support of the complaint.
On March 22, 2006, the RTC issued the assailed Order 22 denying
petitioner's aforesaid motion.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
Inhibition,23 in which he claimed that the judge who issued the
Order was biased and partial. He went on to state that the judge's
husband was the defendant in a petition for judicial recognition of
which he was the counsel, docketed as Civil Case No. C-XXI-100,
before the RTC, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao del Sur. Thus,
propriety dictates that the judge should inhibit herself from the
case.
Acting on the motion for inhibition, Judge Carmelita Sarno-Davin
granted the same24 and ordered that the case be re-raffled to
Branch 18. Eventually, the said RTC issued an Order 25 on October
16, 2006 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.
Hence, petitioner directly sought recourse from the Court via the
present petition involving pure questions of law, which he claimed
were resolved by the RTC contrary to law, rules and existing
jurisprudence.26
There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises
as to what the law is on certain state of facts, and which does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a
"question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is
no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the
conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law. 27
Verily, the issues raised by herein petitioner are "questions of
law," as their resolution rest solely on what the law provides given
the set of circumstances availing. The first issue involves the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of one of the defendants,
who was not served with summons on account of his death. The
second issue, on the other hand, pertains to the legal effect of
death of the plaintiff during the pendency of the case.
At first brush, it may appear that since pure questions of law were
raised, petitioner's resort to this Court was justified and the
resolution of the aforementioned issues will necessarily follow.
However, a perusal of the petition requires that certain procedural
issues must initially be resolved before We delve into the merits
of the case.
Notably, the petition was filed directly from the RTC which issued
the Order in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The question
before Us then is: whether or not petitioner correctly availed of
the mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Significantly, the rule on appeals is outlined below, to wit: 28
(1) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to the Court of
Appeals by mere notice of appeal where the appellant raises
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law;
(2) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction where the appellant raises only
questions of law, the appeal must be taken to the Supreme
Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(3) All appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether the
appellant raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law, shall be brought to the Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.
Accordingly, an appeal may be taken from the RTC which
exercised its original jurisdiction, before the Court of Appeals or
directly before this Court, provided that the subject of the same is
a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case,
or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Rules to be
appealable.29 The first mode of appeal, to be filed before the Court
of Appeals, pertains to a writ of error under Section 2(a), Rule 41
of the Rules of Court, if questions of fact or questions of fact and
law are raised or involved. On the other hand, the second mode is
by way of an appeal by certiorari before the Supreme Court under
Section 2(c), Rule 41, in relation to Rule 45, where only questions
of law are raised or involved.30
An order or judgment of the RTC is deemed final when it finally
disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done
with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment
ends the litigation in the lower court. 31 On the other hand, an
order which does not dispose of the case completely and
indicates that other things remain to be done by the court as
regards the merits, is interlocutory. Interlocutory refers to
something between the commencement and the end of the suit
which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision on
the whole controversy.32
The subject of the present petition is an Order of the RTC, which
denied petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, for lack of merit.
We have said time and again that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is interlocutory.33 Under Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable. As a remedy for
the denial, a party has to file an answer and interpose as a
defense the objections raised in the motion, and then to proceed
to trial; or, a party may immediately avail of the remedy available
to the aggrieved party by filing an appropriate special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Let it be
stressed though that a petition for certiorari is appropriate only
when an order has been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Based on the foregoing, the Order of the RTC denying petitioner's
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss is not appealable even on pure
questions of law. It is worth mentioning that the proper procedure
in this case, as enunciated by this Court, is to cite such
interlocutory order as an error in the appeal of the case -- in the
event that the RTC rules in favor of respondent -- and not to
appeal such interlocutory order. On the other hand, if the petition
is to be treated as a petition for review under Rule 45, it would
likewise fail because the proper subject would only be judgments
or final orders that completely dispose of the case. 34
Not being a proper subject of an appeal, the Order of the RTC is
considered interlocutory. Petitioner should have proceeded with
the trial of the case and, should the RTC eventually render an
unfavorable verdict, petitioner should assail the said Order as part
of an appeal that may be taken from the final judgment to be
rendered in this case. Such rule is founded on considerations of
orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid
undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail
orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders
may be contested in a single appeal.
In one case,35 the Court adverted to the hazards of interlocutory
appeals:
It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by
an appeal. Thus, it has been held that "the proper remedy in such
cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the
merits, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders
would result in the `sorry spectacle’ of a case being subject of a
counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as
often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of
its interlocutory rulings. x x x.
Another recognized reason of the law in permitting appeal only
from a final order or judgment, and not from an interlocutory or
incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action, which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision
on the merits of the case during the pendency of the appeal. If
such appeal were allowed, trial on the merits of the case would
necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time and
compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one
of the parties may interpose as many appeals as incidental
questions may be raised by him, and interlocutory orders
rendered or issued by the lower court.36
And, even if We treat the petition to have been filed under Rule
65, the same is still dismissible for violating the principle on
hierarchy of courts. Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for
certiorari is highly improper, for it violates the established policy
of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. 37 This
principle, as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to
the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a
higher court. However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an
iron-clad rule. A strict application of the rule is not necessary
when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve
factual but legal questions.38
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law
involving the effect of non-service of summons following the
death of the person to whom it should be served, and the effect of
the death of the complainant during the pendency of the case. We
deem it best to rule on these issues, not only for the benefit of the
bench and bar, but in order to prevent further delay in the trial of
the case. Resultantly, our relaxation of the policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts is warranted.
Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that, since Sereno died
before summons was served on him, the RTC should have
dismissed the complaint against all the defendants and that the
same should be filed against his estate.
The Sheriff's Return of Service39 dated May 19, 1997 states that
Sereno could not be served with copy of the summons, together
with a copy of the complaint, because he was already dead.
In view of Sereno's death, petitioner asks that the complaint
should be dismissed, not only against Sereno, but as to all the
defendants, considering that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of Sereno. 1avvph!1
FACTS:
RULING: YES.
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not
extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the
deceased.Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
actions that survived and may be filed against the decedent's
representatives as follows: (1) actions to recover real or personal
property or an interest thereon, (2) actions to enforce liens
thereon, and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a
person or a property. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform
the court of the death of his client and give the name and address
of the latter's legal representative.