Trump Mazars Opening Brief 06102019
Trump Mazars Opening Brief 06102019
Trump Mazars Opening Brief 06102019
Dated: June 10, 2019 Counsel for Appellant President Donald J. Trump
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• Donald J. Trump
• The Trump Organization, Inc.
• Trump Organization LLC
• The Trump Corporation
• DJT Holdings LLC
• Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust
• Trump Old Post Office LLC
• Elijah E. Cummings
• Peter Kenny
• Mazars USA LLP
• Committee on Oversight and Reform of the U.S. House of
Representatives
Per Circuit Rule 26.1, appellants The Trump Organization, Inc., Trump
Organization LLC, The Trump Corporation, DJT Holdings LLC, and Trump Old Post
Office LLC state that they have no parent companies or publicly-held companies with
Rulings Under Review. The ruling at issue is District Judge Amit P. Mehta’s
grant of summary judgment, Trump v. Comm. on Oversight & Reform of U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, No. 19-cv-01136 (APM), ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2019 WL 2171378 (D.D.C.
May 20, 2019), which can be found on pages 267-307 of the joint appendix (JA).
Related Cases. This case was not previously before this Court or any other.
There are no related cases currently pending in this Court or any other, though Trump
v. Deutsche Bank, No. 19-1540 (2d Cir.), does present similar issues.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities .............................................................................................................. iv
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1
Jurisdiction ............................................................................................................................... 5
Issue Presented ....................................................................................................................... 5
Statutes and Regulations ........................................................................................................ 5
Statement of Case ................................................................................................................... 5
Summary of Argument......................................................................................................... 12
Argument ............................................................................................................................... 15
I. The subpoena exceeds the Committee’s statutory jurisdiction. .......................... 15
II. The Committee’s subpoena exceeds Congress’s Article I authority. .................. 16
A. When Congress issues subpoenas in aid of valid legislation, it needs a
legitimate legislative purpose.............................................................................. 16
B. The district court misinterpreted the legitimate-legislative-purpose
requirement. ......................................................................................................... 20
1. The district court needed to decide whether the subpoena concerns a
matter on which Congress can legislate. ..................................................... 20
2. Congress does not have an independent “informing” power.................. 25
3. The district court mischaracterized reliance on contemporaneous
evidence of the Committee’s “purpose” as an attempt to inquire
into the Committee members’ hidden “motives.” .................................... 29
4. The “pertinency” requirement is not limited to criminal contempt........ 31
C. The Committee’s subpoena lacks a legitimate legislative purpose. ............... 32
1. Illegal Conduct ............................................................................................... 33
2. Conflicts of Interest ...................................................................................... 37
3. Foreign Emoluments .................................................................................... 41
4. Financial Disclosures..................................................................................... 43
III.The Committee’s subpoena does not further any non-legislative task
of Congress. ............................................................................................................... 45
IV. The district court’s conception of Congress’s subpoena power has no
limiting principle. ....................................................................................................... 48
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 51
Certificate of Compliance .................................................................................................... 53
Certificate of Service ............................................................................................................ 54
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999) .......................................................................................................... 41
Armstrong v. Bush,
924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991) .................................................................................. 16, 40
Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109 (1959) ................................................................................. 12, 20, 26, 30, 48
*Bergman v. Senate Special Committee on Aging,
389 F. Supp. 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)............................................................. 19, 31, 32, 43
Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) .............................................................................................................. 33
Cissell Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
101 F.3d 1132 (6th Cir. 1996) ......................................................................................... 42
CREW v. Trump,
__ F.3d __, 2019 WL 2261089 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2019) ........................................... 40
Duplantier v. United States,
606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979) ..................................................................................... 40, 44
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund,
421 U.S. 491 (1975) ............................................................................. 9, 19, 20, 31, 32, 48
Exxon Corp. v. FTC,
589 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ..................................................................... 16, 19, 20, 24
Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788 (1992) .......................................................................................................... 16
Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB,
561 U.S. 477 (2010) ................................................................................................4, 13, 39
Greenlaw v. United States,
554 U.S. 237 (2008) .......................................................................................................... 47
Hearst v. Black,
87 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ....................................................................................... 19, 31
Henry v. Henkel,
235 U.S. 219 (1914) .......................................................................................................... 45
*Authorities we chiefly rely on are marked with asterisks.
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Hentoff v. Ichord,
318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970) ................................................................................... 29
Hewitt v. Helms,
482 U.S. 755 (1987) .......................................................................................................... 23
Ill. ex rel. Barra v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,
704 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1983) ........................................................................................... 23
In re Lindsey,
158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ................................................................... 36, 38, 39, 40
Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes,
37 U.S. 524 (1838) ............................................................................................................ 38
*Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168 (1880) ........................................................17, 18, 19, 28, 34, 35, 45, 47, 51
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
445 U.S. 136 (1980) .......................................................................................................... 16
La. Public Service Comm’n v. FCC,
476 U.S. 355 (1986) .......................................................................................................... 26
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137 (1803) ........................................................................................................ 15, 48
Marshall v. Gordon,
243 U.S. 521 (1917) .......................................................................................................... 47
McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135 (1927) ...................................................................... 3, 17, 18, 27, 30, 42, 49
McPhaul v. United States,
364 U.S. 372 (1960) ............................................................................................. 13, 19, 32
McSurely v. McClellan,
521 F.2d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ................................................................................ 20, 34
Meyer v. Bush,
981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ...................................................................................... 16
Michigan v. EPA,
268 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................... 26
Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Semonite,
916 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ...................................................................................... 15
NFIB v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2012) ................................................................................................4, 41, 45
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Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731 (1982) ......................................................................................... 4, 16, 37, 44
Nixon v. United States,
506 U.S. 224 (1993) .......................................................................................................... 46
NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 929 (2017) ........................................................................................................ 37
Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193 (2009) .................................................................................................... 22, 23
Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969) .................................................................................................... 13, 38
*Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155 (1955) .......................................................... 3, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 33, 37, 49
Ritter v. United States,
84 Ct. Cl. 293 (1936) ........................................................................................................ 46
Rumely v. United States,
345 U.S. 41 (1953) ................................................................................... 15, 16, 25, 27, 28
Russell v. United States,
369 U.S. 749 (1962) .......................................................................................................... 28
Schneider v. Kissinger,
412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ........................................................................................ 46
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ........................................................................................ 36
Shelby Cty. v. Holder,
570 U.S. 529 (2013) .......................................................................................................... 50
Shelton v. United States,
404 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ......................................................................... 12, 29, 34
Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (1951) .................................................................................................... 19, 50
*Tobin v. United States,
306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1962) .........................................................16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779 (1995) .................................................................................................... 13, 38
United States v. Bullock,
632 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 2011) ......................................................................................... 42
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Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 2 .................................................................................................. 45
U.S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 5 .................................................................................................. 45
U.S. Const., Art. I, §3, cl. 6 .................................................................................................. 45
U.S. Const., Art. I, §5, cl. 2 .................................................................................................. 17
U.S. Const., Art. I, §9 ........................................................................................................... 41
U.S. Const., Art. II, §1, cl. 1 ................................................................................................ 37
U.S. Const., Art. II, §1, cl. 5 ................................................................................................ 37
U.S. Const., Art. II, §3.......................................................................................................... 37
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Statutes
18 U.S.C. §208(a) .................................................................................................................. 39
28 U.S.C. §1291 ....................................................................................................................... 5
28 U.S.C. §1331 ....................................................................................................................... 5
5 U.S.C. §7342(a) .................................................................................................................. 41
5 U.S.C. App. 4 §101 ............................................................................................................ 44
5 U.S.C. App. 4 §102 ............................................................................................................ 44
5 U.S.C. App. 4 §103 ............................................................................................................ 44
Pub. Law No. 112-105, §9 ................................................................................................... 40
Rules of the House of Representatives,
116th Congress (Jan. 11, 2019) ................................................................................... 5, 15
Supreme Court Ethics Act, H.R. 1057,
116th Cong. (2019) ............................................................................................................. 1
Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862,
112th Cong. (2011) ............................................................................................................. 1
Other Authorities
2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary .......................................................... 2, 44
Application of the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution and the Foreign Gifts
and Decorations Act, 6 O.L.C. Op. 156, 156-59 (1982) .................................................. 41
Hearing with Michael Cohen, Former Attorney to President Donald Trump:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong. (2019) .................... 7, 8
Ltr. from Acting Att’y Gen. Silberman to Chairman Cannon
(Sept. 20, 1974) ................................................................................................ 4, 13, 38, 39
Ltr. from House Judiciary Democrats to Chairman Goodlatte
(Jan. 24, 2017) ................................................................................................................... 42
Michael W. McConnell, Trump Resists Congressional Subpoenas –
That’s What Presidents Do, Austin Am.-Statesman (May 2, 2019) .................................. 6
Nancy Pelosi Doesn’t Want Trump Impeached: “I Want to See Him in Prison”,
Vanity Fair (June 6, 2019), bit.ly/2Xt9Ixo .................................................................... 50
Nancy Pelosi on Impeaching Trump: “He’s Just Not Worth It”,
Wash. Post (Mar. 11, 2019) ............................................................................................. 47
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INTRODUCTION
The separation-of-powers implications of this appeal are profound. The House
entities dating back to 2011—years before he declared his candidacy for office.” JA268.
The Committee claims “the requested records will aid its consideration of strengthening
ethics and disclosure laws” and “in monitoring the President’s compliance with the
that belong to the executive branch; (2) any proposed or contemplated legislation on
these subjects would be unconstitutional; and (3) few of these records are pertinent to
the Committee’s stated purpose. The district court sided with the Committee. Indeed,
it concluded that this subpoena does not even raise “serious constitutional questions.”
JA305 n.31.
That would surprise the Supreme Court. Congress has expressed an interest in
too. See, e.g., Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th
Cong. (2011); Supreme Court Ethics Act, H.R. 1057, 116th Cong. (2019). These
proposals raise serious constitutional concerns. As the Chief Justice has explained, there
is “a fundamental difference between the Supreme Court and the other federal courts.
Article III of the Constitution creates only one court, the Supreme Court of the United
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States, but it empowers Congress to establish additional lower federal courts.” 2011
“Congress has directed Justices and judges to comply with both financial reporting
requirements and limitations on the receipt of gifts and outside earned income” and the
Justices comply with them, the Court has never decided “whether Congress may impose
those requirements on the Supreme Court.” Id. at 6. In short, “the limits of Congress’s
Yet replace “President” with “Justices” and the ruling below would, without
even for many years before they joined the Court. There would “be little doubt” that
“Congress’s interest in the accuracy of the [Justices’] financial disclosures falls within
the legislative sphere.” JA288. Whether they are “abiding by the Foreign Emoluments
Clause is likewise a subject on which legislation … could be had.” JA288. “So, too, is
an investigation to determine whether [the Justices have] any conflicts of interest” (even
though those laws do not currently apply to them), given that “exposing conflicts” and
“shed[ding] light” are “entirely consistent with potential legislation in an area where
Congress already has acted.” JA289. Finally, the subpoena would be “justified based on
Congress’s ‘informing function’” since, according to the district court, Congress has
“sweeping authority to investigate illegal conduct of a [Justice] before and after taking
office.” JA290.
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The district court acknowledged that “the power to investigate may not ‘extend
States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955)). It recognized that a “prime example of” congressional
“overreach is exercising the ‘powers of law enforcement; those powers are assigned
under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary.’” JA283 (quoting Quinn, 349
U.S. at 161). And it insisted that Congress lacks a “general power to investigate into
But when the district court said that “limits on Congress’s investigative authority
... do not substantially constrain Congress,” it was serious. JA269. The court refused to
for its own sake as prohibited law enforcement. JA294. And it rejected any meaningful
review of whether the subpoenaed documents are actually pertinent to the Committee’s
stated legislative purpose. JA300-01. Instead, the district court vindicated the
anything except “probably” someone’s “blood” or his “diary from when” he was “12
years old,” JA274, 214-15. No congressional subpoena could ever be invalidated under
this standard.
Ultimately, the district court lost sight of two bedrock principles. First, Article I
does not enumerate a “subpoena” power; that power has been implied from the
Necessary and Proper Clause. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927). Failing to
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harness that authority, as the district court did, would “carry us from the notion of a
government of limited powers.” NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.). Second, the office of the President—like the Supreme Court—is created
by the Constitution. Congress might have greater control over the lower courts and
constitutional scheme,” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982), means that
Congress’s power to legislatively control the occupant is severely constrained, Free Enter.
the record demonstrates, and as Speaker Pelosi recently confirmed, this investigation is
not about legislation. It is about trying to prove that the President broke the law—an
branch. But even if Congress genuinely had legislation in mind, then-Acting Attorney
General Silberman long ago explained why such legislation would be unconstitutional:
it would “establish a qualification for his serving as President (to wit, elimination of
financial conflicts) beyond those contained in the Constitution” and would otherwise
“disempower him” in the execution of his office. Ltr. from Acting Att’y Gen. Silberman
to Chairman Cannon 5 (Sept. 20, 1974), bit.ly/31k3rql. And even if Congress overcame
both these hurdles, it could never show that the vast majority of documents it has
subpoenaed from Mazars are pertinent to any stated legitimate aim. The district court’s
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JURISDICTION
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 because Plaintiffs
allege violations of federal law. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291
because Plaintiffs appeal a final judgment that disposed of every claim. The district
court entered that judgment on May 20, 2019, and Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the Committee’s subpoena for Plaintiffs’ private accounting records is
“related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.” Watkins v. United
STATEMENT OF CASE
From time to time, this Court adjudicates the legality of congressional subpoenas.
Congress has often (but not always) prevailed in those cases, since its subpoenas were
narrow and clearly furthered a legitimate task. But this Court has never seen anything
like the current House. To quote Michael McConnell: “Never before have so many
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sitting President.
This appeal is about one of those subpoenas. Two months ago, Chairman Elijah
Cummings of the House Oversight Committee issued a subpoena to Mazars USA LLP,
the longtime accountant for President Trump and several Trump entities (Plaintiffs
here). The subpoena demanded that Mazars disclose eight years of information about
6
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JA26.
featuring the testimony of Michael Cohen. JA268. Cohen had recently pleaded guilty to
numerous dishonesty-based crimes (including lying to Congress), but had not been
sentenced. JA275. Hoping that Committee members would help his quest for leniency,
Cohen agreed to provide testimony criticizing the President. Among other things,
Cohen alleged that the President had “inflated” and “deflated” his assets on “personal
financial statements from 2011, 2012, and 2013” to obtain a bank loan for a (never
materialized) deal “to buy the Buffalo Bills,” “to reduce his [New York] real estate
taxes,” and to reduce his insurance premiums. Hearing with Michael Cohen, Former Attorney
to President Donald Trump: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong.
13, 38, 160-61 (2019), bit.ly/2IrXTkX. The financial statements in question were
Chairman Cummings made clear why he was interested in hearing this testimony:
“Mr. Cohen’s testimony raises grave questions about the legality of Donald Trump’s—
expressed their agreement. E.g., id. at 107 (Hill: “I ask these questions to help determine
whether our very own President committed felony crimes”); id. at 163-65 (Tlaib: “[O]ur
7
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multiple felonies, and you covered it up, correct?”); id. at 37 (Clay: “I would like to talk
to you about the President’s assets, since by law these must be reported accurately.”);
id. at 160-61 (Ocasio-Cortez: “[D]id the President ever provide inflated assets to an
compare them?”); id. at 150-52 (Khanna: “[Y]ou have provided … compelling evidence
of Federal and State crimes, including financial fraud…. I just want the American public
at 30 (Maloney: lamenting that “while [Cohen is] facing the consequences of going to
Before issuing the Mazars subpoena, Chairman Cummings explained its purpose
in two documents. The first, a March 20 letter to Mazars, explained that the Committee
wanted to verify Cohen’s testimony that “President Trump changed the estimated value
including inflating or deflating the value depending on [his] purpose.” JA91. The
and 2013 statements produced by Cohen, and he asked Mazars “[t]o assist our review
need to verify Cohen’s testimony, as well as two “news reports” discussing events that
allegedly occurred years before President Trump was a candidate for office. JA104. In
response to Ranking Member Jim Jordan’s complaint that subpoenaing Mazars lacked
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a legitimate legislative purpose, JA101-02, the Chairman’s memo asserted that the
subpoena did not need a legitimate purpose under the House Rules, and that
individuals.’” JA106. Still, the Chairman’s memo offered four potential legislative
On April 22, Plaintiffs filed suit against Mazars, Chairman Cummings, and the
Committee lawyer who served the subpoena. JA9. Plaintiffs claimed that the Committee
lacked statutory jurisdiction to issue the subpoena and that it sought Plaintiffs’ private
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 n.14 (1975)). A few days later, the Committee
intervened in place of the individual congressional defendants, Dkt. 15, and agreed to
stay the subpoena until after the district court ruled on Plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction
motion, JA4.
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Dkt. 11-1; 20; 24. Yet after those briefs were submitted, and just two business days
before the preliminary-injunction hearing, the district court sua sponte announced that
the hearing would also be the final trial on the merits. Dkt. 25. Plaintiffs objected,
noting that the Committee had not sought dismissal or summary judgment and, thus,
the parties had not adequately briefed the merits. Dkt. 29. The district court overruled
The district court entered judgment for the Committee. JA269. It first concluded
Employing these “guideposts,” JA294, the district court upheld the subpoena.
Finding the Chairman’s April 12 memo to be “the best evidence” of the subpoena’s
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purpose, JA287, the district court considered and endorsed each of the four purposes
The district court entered summary judgment against Plaintiffs. JA308. Then,
after issuing a 41-page opinion and describing the issues in this dispute as “important”
and “serious,” JA169-70—the district court denied a stay pending appeal, holding that
Plaintiffs’ claims did not even “present[] ‘serious legal questions.’” JA304-07. Plaintiffs
filed a notice of appeal the next day. JA37. The Committee again agreed to stay the
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Mazars subpoena is not “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task
of the Congress.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. It is beyond the Committee’s statutory
jurisdiction and does not further a legitimate legislative purpose. The Committee is not
legislating—it is exercising “powers of law enforcement.” Quinn, 349 U.S. at 161. The
Committee admits that the whole point is to discover “whether the President may have
engaged in illegal conduct.” JA107. The events that led to the subpoena’s issuance, the
public statements surrounding the subpoena, the nature of the demand itself, and other
investigate alleged legal violations—power that is vested in the Executive, not Congress.
To be sure, the Committee has pointed to potential legislation that the subpoena
could theoretically further. But Congress cannot shoulder the burden of establishing a
Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Claiming that the fruits of
an investigation might lead Congress to amend existing law cannot transform a law-
investigative powers, which rest on the Necessary and Proper Clause, would be truly
limitless. Congress can always claim that a desire to see whether a law has been broken
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Regardless, the legislation that the Committee is contemplating targets “an area
in which Congress is forbidden to legislate.” Quinn, 349 U.S. at 161. The Committee
asserts that Congress can extend federal conflict-of-interest restrictions to the President
the President (like the Supreme Court and unlike other offices and courts) is created by
office’s qualifications. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995); Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969). Nor can Congress interfere with the President’s
“responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” PCAOB, 561 U.S. at
493. The species of legislation that the Committee has in mind here would do both.
Silberman Letter 5.
The subpoena’s breadth underscores how far removed it is from any legitimate
purpose. Naturally, “the records called for by the subpoena” must be “pertinent to the
inquiry.” McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 380 (1960). The Committee cannot
possibly argue that all accounting records since 2011, all engagement letters between
Plaintiffs and Mazars, and “all communications” where Mazars voiced “concerns”
about Plaintiffs’ accounting practices, JA109, are pertinent to a legislative agenda. The
Court either must narrow the subpoena or invalidate it, since a subpoena cannot stand
unless it is “good in its entirety.” United States v. Patterson, 206 F.2d 433, 434 (D.C. Cir.
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That the Committee has no legitimate legislative purpose should have ended this
case, as legislation is the only purpose that the Committee ever advanced in court. But
it did not; the district court invoked the impeachment power on the Committee’s behalf.
That was remarkably inappropriate. Even in mine-run cases, courts should not raise
arguments for sophisticated litigants. That is doubly true here, where the law prohibits
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 204. And it is triply true when that retroactive rationalization is
Committee did not invoke impeachment because that is not why it issued the Mazars
subpoena. The one thing the parties agree on is that this case is not about impeachment.
Finally, affirming the district court would betray the admonition that Congress’s
subpoena power “is not unlimited.” Id. at 187. The Committee believes it has a general
warrant authority: it can investigate any person, about any matter, at any time, with no
limitation on relevance or scope. The district court accepted all of that, and then kept
going. According to the district court, Congress can subpoena the records of anyone to
“inform” the public about whatever it finds. And courts cannot review the subpoena’s
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with a Constitution that gives Congress only “limited” powers, Marbury v. Madison, 5
ARGUMENT
“No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a
legitimate task of the Congress.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200. The Committee’s subpoena
flunks that test. It is beyond the Committee’s statutory jurisdiction. And it does not
further any legitimate legislative purpose or any other legitimate congressional task. The
subpoena thus exceeds Congress’s constitutional authority. The district court disagreed
and granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs. That ruling, which is reviewed de
novo, Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Semonite, 916 F.3d 1075, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2019),
should be reversed.
can reach the parties’ constitutional dispute. Rumely v. United States, 345 U.S. 41, 42-43
(1953). As Plaintiffs argued below, the Mazars subpoena exceeds the Committee’s
jurisdiction because the House Rules do not authorize oversight of the President—let
The district court (implicitly and incorrectly) rejected this argument. JA270-71.
It noted that the Committee has jurisdiction to “review and study ... the Executive
Office of the President.” House Rule X, cl. 3(i). But “the ‘Executive Office of the
President’ ... does not include the Office of the President.” Kissinger v. Reporters Comm.
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for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980); accord Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1299
(D.C. Cir. 1993). “The Executive Office of the President consists of a small group of
federal agencies that most immediately aid the President on matters of policy, politics,
administration, and management,” JA271, and the President is not an agency, Franklin
This Court should invalidate the Committee’s subpoena on statutory grounds for
two reasons. First, the Court must avoid serious constitutional issues if possible. Infra
II.B.1. Second, a “‘clear statement’ rule” applies “to statutes that significantly alter the
balance between Congress and the President.” Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289
(D.C. Cir. 1991). Both rules apply with equal force to the House Rules. Rumely, 345 U.S.
at 45. Hence, if the Committee wants roving jurisdiction to investigate the personal
finances of the President himself, Congress needs to clearly provide that authority first.
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 201; Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Tobin
v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1962). It has not done so. Even if the
Committee has broad statutory jurisdiction over “the operations and administration of
the Executive Branch,” JA270, that does not mean it has jurisdiction over the President.
always been controversial. “The powers of Congress ... are dependent solely on the
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Constitution,” and this power is not “found in that instrument.” Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168, 182 (1880); accord McGrain, 273 U.S. at 161; Note, Congressional Power to
For over a century, however, the issue was not joined. “There was very little use
of the power of compulsory process in early years to enable the Congress to obtain
facts pertinent to the enactment of new statutes or the administration of existing laws.”
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 192-93. In those days, Congress mostly employed compulsory
process to investigate its own members, id. at 192, a power it does expressly hold, Art. I,
§5, cl. 2. “It is not surprising,” then, that “[t]he Nation was almost one hundred years
old before the first case reached the Court to challenge the use of compulsory process
That case was Kilbourn. There, Congress asserted “unlimited” power to issue and
enforce subpoenas, which “it must be presumed … was rightfully exercised.” 103 U.S.
at 181-82. In pressing this view, Congress offered two arguments: first, “the House of
Commons of England” held this power; and second, the power was “necess[ary]” to
The Supreme Court rejected the first argument. Unlike Congress, “the assembled
Parliament exercised ... the judicial authority of the king in his Court of Parliament.” Id.
The “powers and privileges of the House of Commons of England,” in other words,
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the United States—a body which is in no sense a court, which exercises no functions
derived from its once having been a part of the highest court of the realm.” Id. at 189;
The Court then determined that it did not need to pass on “the existence or non-
existence of such a power in aid of the legislative function.” 103 U.S. at 189. Another
constitutional error rendered that issue immaterial: the “power” exercised by the House
in Kilbourn was “judicial and not legislative,” which violated the fundamental maxim that
exercised by another.” Id. at 192-93. As a result, the Court could assume that Congress
had an implied subpoena power, since the investigation was unconstitutional in any
It was not until 1927 that the Supreme Court decided “whether [the subpoena]
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.” McGrain, 273 U.S.
at 161. The Court decided that issue in Congress’s favor, holding that “the power of
legislative function.” Id. at 174. The Court was equally clear, however, that “neither
house of Congress possesses a ‘general power of making inquiry into the private affairs
of the citizen’”; Congress may not “‘assume[] a power which could only be properly
a “matter” for which “valid legislation could be had.” Id. at 170-71 (quoting Kilbourn,
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The Supreme Court has drawn these lines ever since. Congressional inquiries
“must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.” Watkins,
354 U.S. at 187. That usually means subpoenas need a “legitimate legislative purpose.”
Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501 n.14. The Supreme Court “has not hesitated” to invalidate
subpoenas “when it found Congress was acting outside its legislative role.” Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). And it has not allowed Congress to be “the final
judge of its own power and privileges.” Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 199. Specifically, four legal
rules demark the line between a subpoena with a legitimate legislative purpose and one
First, “the records called for by the subpoena” must be “pertinent to [the
ensures that Congress is “coping with a problem that falls within its legislative sphere.”
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 206. If the congressional subpoena is not “reasonably ‘relevant to
the inquiry,’” then it lacks a legitimate purpose. McPhaul, 364 U.S. at 381-82; accord Hearst
v. Black, 87 F.2d 68, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Bergman v. Senate Special Committee on Aging, 389
F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The “burden is on the court to see that the
Second, “the power to investigate ... cannot be used to inquire into private affairs
unrelated to a valid legislative purpose.” Quinn, 349 U.S. at 161; accord Eastland, 421 U.S.
at 504 n.15. Put differently, “there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of
exposure.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200; accord Exxon, 589 F.2d at 588. “Investigations
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Third, Congress cannot exercise “any of the powers of law enforcement; those
powers are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary.” Quinn,
349 U.S. at 161; accord Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. “Lacking the judicial power given to the
Judiciary” or the executive power given to “the Executive,” Congress “cannot inquire
into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches” or
otherwise “trench upon Executive or judicial prerogatives.” Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111-
12; accord McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
forbidden to legislate.” Quinn, 349 U.S. at 161. “The subject of any inquiry always must
be one ‘on which legislation could be had.’” Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504 n.15; accord Exxon,
589 F.2d at 588. Legislation, by definition, cannot be had when it would violate the
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court held it has no “role in this context to evaluate the constitutionality of proposed
information concerning a subject on which it “is forbidden to legislate.” Quinn, 349 U.S.
at 161. The court seemed to agree, emphasizing over and over that “the subject of any
inquiry always must be one on which legislation could be had.” JA285 (cleaned up);
JA283, 287, 288, 291, 299. Because valid legislation could not “be had” if it would be
unconstitutional, the court had to decide whether this subpoena is designed to advance
unconstitutional legislation.
Tobin illustrates the point. There, the House subpoenaed the executive director
of the Port of New York Authority. The Authority—a “bi-state agency ... between New
York and New Jersey”—had been created via “the compact clause of the Constitution.”
306 F.2d at 271. “Congress consented to the compacts but expressly retained ... ‘the
right to alter, amend or repeal’ its resolutions of approval.” Id. Later, as part of a
‘involving the activities and operation of interstate compacts.’” Id. Mr. Tobin countered
that Congress lacked “the power, under the compact clause of the Constitution, to
‘alter, amend or repeal’ its consent to an interstate compact, which was the stated
purpose of the Subcommittee’s investigation.” Id. at 272. This Court dodged these
“serious constitutional questions” by holding that Congress had not “authori[zed] ...
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The Tobin court was relieved that it could “avoid … constitutional adjudication”
by narrowly reading “the authorizing resolutions” not to permit the investigation into
“the documents demanded by the subpoena in question.” Id. It understood the “gravity
... of the constitutional questions,” id. at 272, and expressed frustration at being pressed
broad questions broadly,” id. at 274. At the same time, the Court understood that
The lesson Tobin taught, according to the district court, is that it should “sidestep
n.30. That is right. The avoidance canon means a court “will not decide a constitutional
question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.” Nw. Austin
Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 205 (2009). If possible, then, the district
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court should have resolved this case in a way that avoided deciding whether Congress’s
it must be answered. Federal courts do “not shrink from [their] duty ‘as the bulwark of
The district court disagreed; it believed that answering the constitutional question
subject on which it could validly legislate is hardly advisory. An “‘advisory opinion’ is ...
what you call a decision that does not resolve an actual case or controversy.” Ill. ex rel.
Barra v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 704 F.2d 935, 941 (7th Cir. 1983). Put differently,
than an advisory opinion ... is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of
the defendant towards the plaintiff.” Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987). Settling this
constitutional issue against the Committee would not just affect its behavior toward the
The district court’s reliance on United States v. Rumely was equally misplaced.
JA303. Mr. Rumely “refused to disclose to the House Select Committee on Lobbying
Activities the names of those who made bulk purchases of [certain] books.” 345 U.S.
41, 42 (1953). The Court invoked the avoidance canon, noting that the “duty to avoid
but also to congressional action by way of resolution.” Id. at 45. Courts, in other words,
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must refrain from deciding whether Congress exceeded its constitutional authority
“unless no choice is left.” Id. at 46; see id. at 48 (“Grave constitutional questions are
matters properly to be decided by this Court but only when they inescapably come
before us for adjudication.”). Thus, in Rumely, too, the Court avoided “constitutional
questions [that] have farreaching import.” Id. at 43. But not by bypassing them. The Court
held that the Committee had exceeded its statutory authority. Id. at 47-48.
The district court expressed deep concern over deciding “abstract constitutional
questions about prospective legislation that is not yet law.” JA303-04 & n.30. While the
issues here are not altogether abstract, infra II.C.2, II.C.4, the concern was
understandable. Rumely and Tobin similarly lamented having to decide big constitutional
issues “in such ill-defined circumstances.” JA303. The blame for this situation, though,
must be laid at the Committee’s doorstep. Given Congress’s broad legislative powers,
most subpoenas do not raise serious constitutional disputes over whether valid
legislation could follow. This case is the exception. The Mazars subpoena compels
disclosure of the President’s confidential financial documents and, in defense of this bold
demand, the Committee claims sweeping authority to legislatively control the office of
the President. Congress must have known that this demand would provoke serious
had.” Exxon, 589 F.2d at 588; accord Tobin, 306 F.2d at 275 n.9 (noting “that no such
massive investigation of a compact agency had ever been initiated by Congress before”).
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burden” to answer these constitutional questions. Tobin, 306 F.2d at 275. Unless, of
As in Tobin and Rumely, Plaintiffs offered the district court that option. Having
declined it, the court was required to take the step that Tobin and Rumely avoided: to
decide whether the subpoena concerns “a subject ‘on which legislation could be had.’”
JA287. But the court refused. It instead upheld the subpoena without ever deciding the
The district court’s decision to shrink from its judicial duty was legal error. This Court
that, “though not wholly distinct from its legislative function,” is “a critical
responsibility uniquely granted to Congress under Article I.” JA283. The court then
held that the Committee’s investigation of the President is a legitimate exercise of that
“‘informing function.’” JA289, 290 n.24, 298. That is incorrect. The “informing
to the President.
corruption, inefficiency or waste” must be part of “the legislative process.” 354 U.S. at
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187. It can be “justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process,” id. at 197, and
cannot “be inflated into a general power to expose” private information, id. at 200,
without a tie to valid legislation—are constitutionally illegitimate. That is what the Court
meant when it held that “there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of
Government.” Id. at 200 n.33 (emphasis added). Congress can conduct “probes into
at 187 (emphasis added), because such probes are an adjunct to the legislative process.
Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001); accord La. Public Service Comm’n
v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 357 (1986). Investigating agencies and departments is thus integral
to Congress’s power “to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.” Barenblatt, 360
U.S. at 111. But since the Constitution creates the office of the President, he is not an
agency that Congress creates or controls, and the Committee’s “informing function”
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The district court acknowledged that Watkins “refers to the informing function
in connection with ‘agencies of the Government,’” but concluded that this reference is
Attorney General—rather than a limiting principle.” JA290 n.24. In the district court’s
view, “the original conception of that function as embraced ... in Rumely was not so
limited.” JA290 n.24. But the “original conception” of the informing function did not
come from Rumely. It came from McGrain, where the Court framed and applied the
principle exactly like Watkins. The McGrain Court explained that “the administration of
the Department of Justice” was a subject “on which legislation could be had” because
“the functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the Attorney
General, and the duties of his assistants are all subject to regulation by congressional legislation”
and “under such appropriations as in the judgment of Congress are needed from year to year.” 273
Rumely did not alter this understanding. The decision did not speak “more
JA290 n.24 (quoting Rumely, 345 U.S. at 43). The Court merely quoted Woodrow
Wilson’s writings and noted that the government had “asked” the Court to adopt the
function.” 345 U.S. at 43. But the Court declined that invitation. It cautioned that “the
‘rights’ which [the informing] function implies” should not be pushed “to their logical
extreme,” that this function is “‘limited’” by other constitutional principles, and that
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Wilson never anticipated Congress would use this power to investigate private
individuals—a new problem of “wide concern.” Id. at 43-44. Of course, the Rumely Court
powers was, at most, “dictum.” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 777 (1962)
The notion that Rumely endowed Congress with a unique “informing function”
to which Watkins must be reconciled is therefore untenable. McGrain and Watkins are
the relevant decisions, and they hold that “[t]he power to inform is ... no broader than
the power to legislate.” Id. at 778. This is not “artificial line-drawing” that is “antithetical
to the checks and balances inherent in the Constitution’s design.” JA290 n.24. It
respects “the division of the powers of the government among the three departments”
by confining Congress to the legislative arena. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 192. Congress can
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200 & n.33. But that reasoning is inapplicable to the President.
Arming Congress with an “informing function” where it lacks legislative power is what
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with a search for hidden “‘motives of committee members.’” JA284 (quoting Watkins,
354 U.S. at 200). The difference between “purpose” and “motive” is important. The
court knew it needed to identify the “purpose of the Mazars subpoena” to decide if that
purpose is legitimate. JA287. It also recognized that the purpose can be distilled from
varied sources. “Relevant evidence includes the resolution authorizing the investigation,
(citing Shelton, 404 F.2d at 1297); accord United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303, 308-09
(D.D.C 1959) (finding improper purpose based on “the things said and done by [the
committee’s] chairman, counsel, and members”); Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175,
1182 (D.D.C. 1970) (finding improper purpose based on the “face” of a congressional
“Report”). The subpoena’s “legislative purpose,” at bottom, “must be gleaned from the
evidence before the court.” United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.D.C. 1956).
In other words, courts must discern for themselves what the Committee’s actual
barred. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 204. While “the mere absence of public statements
proof of an invalid purpose,” courts must “consider what Congress has said publicly to
decide whether it has exceeded its authority.” JA285 (citing Shelton, 404 F.2d at 1297).
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There is no other way to apply a “legitimate legislative purpose” test. E.g., McGrain, 273
U.S. at 178 (deferring to Congress only after looking at “the subject-matter” of the
investigation and determining that legislation “was the real object”); Barenblatt, 360 U.S.
at 152 (checking to make sure “‘the primary purposes of the inquiry were in aid of
legislative processes’”); Cross, 170 F. Supp. at 309 (giving the relevant materials “a
reading and realistic construction” and concluding that the committee was “usurp[ing]
Icardi, 140 F. Supp. at 388 (holding that “if the committee is not pursuing a bona fide
legislative purpose … , it is not acting as a ‘competent tribunal’, even though [the same
discerning what the Committee is doing, not why the Committee is doing it. The question
is whether the Committee—based on what it is doing and what it has stated publicly—
court repeatedly characterized Plaintiffs as challenging why the Mazars subpoena was
issued, i.e., for “sinister” reasons like “political retribution.” JA69, 284-85, 298. While
the court was right that controlling precedent bars it from “question[ing] whether the
Committee’s actions are truly motivated by political considerations,” JA269, that did
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not eliminate its duty to review the evidence to determine whether the subpoena’s actual
purpose is legislative.1
element of criminal contempt.” JA300. To be sure, the issue has arisen most often in
that posture. But contrary to the court’s suggestion, “pertinency” is also required in
Bergman, 389 F. Supp. at 1130. Plaintiffs cited these decisions below, but the district
must be pertinent to its avowed purpose. All agree that a subpoena can be challenged
as beyond the issuing committee’s statutory jurisdiction. JA300-01. And that inquiry
plainly requires courts to determine whether a request falls within the committee’s
1
This precedent is why Plaintiffs have not yet attacked Congress’s motives. Had
the Committee subpoenaed Plaintiffs for their records, they could have raised First
Amendment defenses, including political retribution. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 509 n.16. But
since the Committee abandoned its direct pursuit of this information, JA273-74, and
demanded the documents from a third-party custodian, Plaintiffs can only contest the
subpoena’s legitimate legislative purpose. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501 n.14. The court thus
was correct that Plaintiffs “have not asserted that disclosure of the records sought from
Mazars would implicate any ‘specific individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.’” JA284
n.22. But that is not because the argument lacks merit. This investigation was motivated
by political retribution. Plaintiffs proffered evidence to that effect in their complaint so
they can raise the First Amendment issue should the Supreme Court revisit this peculiar
and unwarranted dichotomy in its jurisprudence.
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purview. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 506. Plaintiffs similarly can challenge a subpoena as not
comprehensive immigration reform, for example, could not be a legitimate purpose for
“within its legislative sphere” and ensures witnesses are not “compelled to make
disclosures on matters outside that area.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 206; see Bergman,
389 F. Supp. at 1130. This pertinency requirement therefore “is not wholly different
from nor unrelated to the element of pertinency embodied in the criminal statute” for
congressional contempt. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 206. And although Congress cannot be
penalized if an otherwise valid investigation turns out to be a dead end, JA285-86, its
demand must be “reasonably relevant” to the purpose it gave when issuing the
Mazars subpoena can be upheld under the correct legal framework. The Committee
claims the subpoenaed information will allow it to determine four things: (1) “whether
the President may have engaged in illegal conduct before and during his tenure in
office”; (2) “whether he has undisclosed conflicts of interest that may impair his ability
to make impartial policy decisions”; (3) “whether he is complying with the Emoluments
Clauses of the Constitution”; and (4) “whether he has accurately reported his finances
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to the Office of Government Ethics and other federal entities.” JA107. None of these
1. Illegal Conduct
The district court upheld the Mazars subpoena as an effort “to investigate
whether the President may have engaged in illegal conduct.” JA107, 289-90. If this
investigations, then nothing does. It should not be affirmed on appeal (as the district
it “must not be confused with any of the powers of law enforcement.” Quinn, 349 U.S.
at 161. This principle is rooted in Articles II and III of the Constitution, which
“assign[]” law-enforcement powers to the executive and judicial branches alone. Id. This
principle is also rooted in Article I, since Congress cannot exceed its enumerated powers
and nothing in Article I gives it a law-enforcement power. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187;
“permissible” in the first place if tries to exercise powers that Congress does not have.
power, it does not matter whether Congress is “coordinating” with federal or state law-
enforcement officials. JA294. Congress simply cannot “trench” on the executive’s law-
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F.2d at 1038; Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015). The key
question is the “nature” of the power the Committee is exercising: legislative (legitimate)
If the nature of the investigation is law enforcement, Congress cannot cure this
legislation.’” Shelton, 404 F.2d at 1297. In other words, Congress cannot launch an
investigation to determine whether someone broke the law, and then justify the
that the person allegedly broke. Congress could always make this (non-falsifiable)
erase the lines separating the branches of government, courts have wisely rejected it.
E.g., Icardi, 140 F. Supp. at 387-88 (holding that subcommittee could not “cure the
investigating “‘whether the Federal statutes were inadequate in any respect or had been
improperly administered’”).
Cummings admitted as much. His original request to Mazars cited a solitary purpose:
verifying Cohen’s testimony that Plaintiffs “inflat[ed] or deflat[ed] the value of assets”
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members admitted at the Cohen hearing, the Committee wanted to know if Plaintiffs
committed bank fraud, insurance fraud, or tax evasion. Likewise, in the Chairman’s
follow-up memo, the very first justification he gave for the Mazars subpoena was “to
investigate whether the President may have engaged in illegal conduct,” JA107—classic
law enforcement. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. at 387. Even without these statements, the nature
something federal prosecutors might issue; especially telling is the request for “all
practices. JA26. The subpoena is also laser-focused on the businesses and finances of
one person—a particularity that is the hallmark of executive and judicial power, not
legislating. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 195; Icardi, 140 F. Supp. at 387. The subpoena’s
President, and the district court’s invocations of Whitewater and Watergate do not
those scandals, but the district court identified no subpoenas that the committees issued
litigated, and upheld. That is because the lion’s share of the Watergate and Whitewater
independent counsel, and grand juries), not Congress. When some of those subpoenas
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were upheld, the courts were careful not to suggest that Congress had similar power.
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 n.19 (1974) (“We are not here concerned
with … congressional demands for information.”); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1277-
grand-jury subpoena would prevail against “a congressional hearing” since that “issue
Nor did any court ever consider whether the congressional investigations into
Committee does not invoke here. Infra III. In the one litigated case that Plaintiffs found
“Congress may have, quite apart from its legislative responsibilities, a general oversight
power” because the House had “begun an inquiry into presidential impeachment.”
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732 (D.C. Cir.
1974). And far from recognizing “sweeping” congressional authority to investigate the
President, JA290, this Court refused to enforce Congress’s subpoena. 498 F.2d at 733.
Reaching the same judgment here thus would not “roll back the tide of history,” JA290,
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even assuming these two investigations count as “history” in any meaningful sense, cf.
2. Conflicts of Interest
The district court upheld the Mazars subpoena as part of “an investigation to
determine whether the President has any conflicts of interest.” JA289. Indeed, the
House has proposed “several pieces of actual legislation” that would impose conflict-
of-interest restrictions on the President. JA291. This made the subpoena legitimate,
according to the district court, because “it lies within Congress’s province to legislate
regarding the ethics of government officials.” JA289, 301. That is wrong. There is a
reason why the federal conflict-of-interest laws that govern other executive-branch
officials exclude the President: Article II of the Constitution. With respect to the
President, this is “an area in which Congress is forbidden to legislate.” Quinn, 349 U.S.
at 161.
The Constitution vests “[t]he executive power ... in a President of the United
States of America,” Art. II, §1, cl. 1, delineates the qualifications for President, cl. 5, and
entrusts the President alone to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” §3.
scheme.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 749; accord Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1286 (Tatel, J., concurring
2
Plaintiffs could have pointed out these distinctions had the Committee relied
on Watergate and Whitewater in its briefing below. But because the district court raised
these examples itself, and declined to allow any summary-judgment briefing, JA280-81,
Plaintiffs were not afforded that chance.
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in part and dissenting in part) (noting “the unique nature of the Presidency”). The
President is not a creature of statute. Congress did not create the office of the President,
it did not establish the qualifications for holding that position, and it cannot impair the
severely constrained in the ways it can regulate the President. Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes,
37 U.S. 524, 610 (1838). Extending federal conflict-of-interest laws to the President (or
imposing new ones on him) would exceed Congress’s narrow legislative authority over
First, such legislation would change or expand the qualifications for serving as
President. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779; Powell, 395 U.S. 486. The Supreme Court has held that
Congress lacks “the power to add to or alter the qualifications of its Members.”
Thornton, 514 U.S. at 787. “Congress” instead “is limited to the standing qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution.” Powell, 395 U.S. at 550. That rule applies equally to the
President. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 803. Because Congress cannot “add to the constitutional
qualifications for holding federal elective office,” Walker v. United States, 800 F.3d 720,
723-24 (6th Cir. 2015), its legislative purpose here is invalid. Requiring the President to
“‘divest all financial interests,’” hold them “‘in a qualified blind trust,’” or refrain from
“conducting business directly with the Federal Government,” JA291, would “establish
a qualification for his serving as President (to wit, elimination of financial conflicts)
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interfere with his ability to exercise the duties of his office. “‘The Nation’s ‘executive
Power’ is vested in him alone.’” Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1286 (Tatel, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). “It is his responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.” PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 493. But federal conflict-of-interest laws prevent every
executive-branch official from participating in matters in which “he, his spouse, minor
these conflict-of-interest laws to the President would violate “the basic principle that
[he] ‘cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to supervise that
goes with it,’ because Article II ‘makes a single President responsible for the actions of
the Executive Branch.’” PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 496-97. That is why “‘disqualification of
would wipe out” the Presidential Records Act and the STOCK Act. JA303. That was
an incorrect assumption.
The Presidential Records Act does not add or alter the qualifications for office.
And when crafting it, “Congress was ... keenly aware of the separation of powers
concerns that were implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of the President’s
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daily operations.” Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 290. Congress “sought assiduously to minimize
outside interference with the day-to-day operations of the President and his closest
advisors and to ensure executive branch control over presidential records.” Id.; accord
CREW v. Trump, __ F.3d __, 2019 WL 2261089, at *6 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2019). The
Presidential Records Act thus did not cause a “disruption of executive functions
606 F.2d 654, 667 n.27 (5th Cir. 1979). The legislation Congress is contemplating here
Nor is the contemplated legislation anything like the provision of the STOCK
Act that the district court invoked, i.e., the provision barring the President and other
officials from making use of “‘nonpublic information derived from” their position “‘as
a means for making a private profit.” JA302-03 (quoting Pub. Law No. 112-105, §9).
This provision seeks to keep the President from personally profiting from his office.
The conflict-of-interest laws, by contrast, would influence and control who can serve
as President and would interfere with the President’s ability to “‘fulfill his manifold
duties and functions.’” Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1286 (Tatel, J., concurring in part and
laws to the President cannot be justified based on the mere existence of a recently-
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3. Foreign Emoluments
The district court held that access to Plaintiffs’ confidential financial “records
will assist” the Committee “in monitoring the President’s compliance with the Foreign
Emoluments Clause[].” JA269. But this purpose is just another attempt to engage in
prohibited law enforcement. It does not matter that the Committee wants to know
statute; “the Constitution and valid federal statutes” are both “the supreme law.” Alden
This rationale also has no bounds. The Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to
anyone holding an “Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States].” Art. I, §9.
§7342(a); 6 O.L.C. Op. 156-59 (1982). If Congress’s mere interest in “monitoring ...
compliance with the Foreign Emoluments Clause” is a legitimate purpose, JA269, then
the Committee could subpoena the accounting records of anyone at any time to see
whether a federal employee accepted foreign emoluments. This cannot be a valid use
It had to abandon this point. The only authority that the Constitution gives Congress
is to “Consent” to foreign emoluments. Art. I, §9, cl. 8. The Committee could not
genuinely argue that the House is considering approving the President’s alleged
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acceptance of foreign emoluments, however, given the House Democrats’ suit against
him and their many public statements on this issue. E.g., Press Release, Rep. Nadler (Oct.
vindicate their “right and … responsibility to prevent the president from corrupting his
office”); Ltr. from House Judiciary Democrats to Chairman Goodlatte (Jan. 24, 2017),
inescapable conflict of interest” (emphasis added)).3 Any suggestion that the “real object”
of this subpoena, McGrain, 273 U.S. at 178, is to see whether the President has accepted
At the very least, the Mazars subpoena is not pertinent to an investigation into
foreign emoluments (or conflicts of interest, for that matter). Even under the House
private businesses”; they did not become “emoluments” until the President “took his
oath of office.” Ltr. from House Judiciary Democrats, supra. Thus, large swaths of the
Mazars subpoena are not even arguably relevant to “the President’s compliance with
3
The district court should not have resurrected the argument on the Committee’s
behalf. “Congress” may or may not be “required to announce its intentions in advance.”
JA285. But, like any litigant, the Committee is subject to the ordinary rules of waiver
and forfeiture. United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1014 n.1 (7th Cir. 2011); Cissell
Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 101 F.3d 1132, 1143 (6th Cir. 1996). It was inappropriate
for the district court to invoke potential legislative purposes for the Mazars subpoena
that the Committee chose not to press in court.
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No. 2 (“engagement agreements and contracts”), Item No. 4 (“memoranda, notes, and
The district court concluded that it lacked authority to narrow the subpoena.
JA304. That is incorrect. Supra II.B.4; e.g., Bergman, 389 F. Supp. at 1130-31. But if
subpoenas are an all-or-nothing proposition, then the answer must be nothing. Patterson,
206 F.2d at 434. Otherwise, Congress could easily circumvent limits on its constitutional
power by bundling a legitimate demand with an illegitimate one. For example, Congress
4. Financial Disclosures
The district court held that the subpoena advanced the Committee’s interest in
evaluating “the accuracy of the President’s financial reporting” in accordance with the
Ethics in Government Act. JA287-88. Again, this is paradigmatic law enforcement. The
Committee wants to know if he broke this law. And the assertion that discovery of
exactly the type of non-falsifiable remedial justification courts reject. Supra II.C.1.
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from as far back as 2011—is vastly overbroad if the Committee is relying on its stated
interest in knowing whether the President’s financial disclosures from 2018 were
accurate. JA35.
Last, the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act that require the President
effort to “strengthen[]” or “enhance[]” them is too. JA287-89, 302 (citing 5 U.S.C. App.
4 §§101(a), (f); 102(a), (b); 103(b)). The President has voluntarily complied with those
statutory requirements. But compliance is not the measure of constitutionality. See Year-
End Report, supra, at 4-6. That Congress can require other executive-branch officials
and lower-court judges to submit financial disclosures, Duplantier, 606 F.2d at 666-68,
does not mean it can require the President or the Justices to do so. It is unfortunate
that the Committee is forcing this Court to test “the limits of Congress’s power,” id.
at 7, in this regard. But the Constitution was designed so the President (like the Supreme
Court) would operate “free from risk of control, interference, or intimidation by the
other branches.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 761 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Ethics in
interferes with the independence that is imperative to the functioning of the office of a
President.” Id.
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III. The Committee’s subpoena does not further any non-legislative task of
Congress.
As explained, the Constitution never expressly gives Congress the power of
“Subpoena Clause.” The subpoena power is, at most, implied by the Necessary and
Proper Clause—which means it must be “derivative of, and in service to, a granted
power.” NFIB, 567 U.S. at 560. For the reasons detailed above, the Mazars subpoena
does not advance Congress’ legislative powers. But the Constitution also grants Congress
non-legislative powers. Each House can “punish its Members for disorderly Behavior,
and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a member.” Art. I, §2, cl. 2. And the
House and Senate can, respectively, impeach and try impeachments. Art. I, §2, cl. 5; §3,
cl. 6. These powers are “judicial” in nature. Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219, 226 (1914);
legislative powers, the Committee has not invoked them. The Mazars subpoena has
nothing to do with internal House discipline, and the Committee has never tried to
defend it under the House’s impeachment authority. Indeed, the word “impeachment”
briefs. The only time the word was invoked below was at the hearing, when the district
court declared that “[t]his is not an impeachment proceeding.” JA238. The Committee
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did not disagree. It has consistently defended the Mazars subpoena as an exercise of its
Plaintiffs were thus understandably surprised when, in its opinion, the district
court sua sponte invoked the “impeachment” power as a justification for the subpoena.
JA290. The district court held that the House’s impeachment authority allows it to
“investigate[] a sitting President for alleged law violations[] before initiating impeachment
proceedings.” JA290. “It is simply not fathomable,” the district court stated, “that a
Constitution that grants Congress the power to remove a President for reasons
including criminal behavior would deny Congress the power to investigate him for
inquiry.” JA290.
But what is truly “not fathomable” is that an Article III court—in a constitutional
dispute between Congress and the President—would itself invoke the specter of
States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293, 296 (1936); Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
It is the most serious clash between Congress and the President contemplated by our
Constitution, and it entails massive costs to our nation’s economy, national security,
diplomacy, and political health. The Framers took great pains to ensure this “‘awful
discretion’” could not be invoked by “‘a small number of persons’”—much less a single
district judge. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234 (1993) (quoting The Federalist
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The Committee’s failure to invoke its non-legislative powers should have been
the end of it. The Committee is perfectly capable of defending its own subpoena, and
governmental parties are not exempt from ordinary rules of litigation like waiver and
forfeiture. The district court overstepped its institutional role by raising arguments the
Committee never made. Under “the principle of party presentation,” courts must “rely
on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral
arbiter of matters the parties present.” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008).
Our “‘adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is
best for them,’” and “‘this must be particularly true of counsel for the United States,
the richest, most powerful, and best represented litigant to appear before us.’” Id. at
244-45.
The Committee had an obvious reason for not arguing that the Mazars subpoena
is related to the House’s impeachment authority: it’s not true. See Marshall v. Gordon, 243
U.S. 521, 547 (1917) (refusing to credit Congress’s assertion that “the House was …
Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 193 (similar). Speaker Pelosi has steadfastly denied that the House’s
investigations are in any way related to impeachment. In March, she unequivocally told
the Washington Post, “I’m not for impeachment.” Nancy Pelosi on Impeaching Trump:
“He’s Just Not Worth It”, Wash. Post (Mar. 11, 2019), wapo.st/2KsATVx. In late May,
the Speaker reiterated that “any suggestion that Democrats are planning to pursue
impeachment ‘simply isn’t the truth.’” Pelosi Says Democrats “Not on a Path to Impeachment”
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Despite Trump’s “Stunt”, CBS News (May 23, 2019), cbsn.ws/2VM9z6H. After she
received the district court’s ruling in this case, the Speaker boasted that the Committee
had prevailed despite “the fact the House Democratic caucus is not on a path to
impeachment.” Pelosi Says White House Is “Crying Out for Impeachment”, CNN (May 23,
2019), cnn.it/2XwwGnm. Just four days ago, the Speaker again told senior Democratic
leaders that “she isn’t open to the idea” of impeachment, and Chairman Cummings
“sided with Pelosi.” Pelosi Tells Dems She Wants to See Trump ‘in Prison’, Politico (June 5,
thus was not only inappropriate under the separation of powers and ordinary principles
meaningful limits on Congress’s subpoena power. If not, then it must be wrong. “The
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176; accord United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-68 (1995). Congress’s subpoena power is no exception.
The Supreme Court has never described that power as “broad” without simultaneously
warning it is “not unlimited.” E.g., Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504 n.15 (“[T]he power to
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power of inquiry … is not unlimited.”); Quinn, 349 U.S. at 161 (“[Congress’s] power to
So far in this litigation, the Committee has refused to recognize any limits on its
subpoena power. It insists that it can investigate “any matter” at “any time.” Dkt. 20 at 18.
When the district court asked the Committee “where you think the limits are,” it could
only muster two examples of things it could not subpoena: “the President’s blood”
(“probably”), and “the President’s diary from when he was … 12 years old” (again, only
government power.
Yet the district court endorsed this unchecked view of Congress’s subpoena
power—if anything, it went further. In the district court’s view, Congress can subpoena
anyone to investigate the private life of any federal employee or official, either to search
or to simply “inform[]” the public, JA282-83, JA289. There are no enforceable limits
“pertinent” to the investigation, JA300-01; and it is does not matter whether Congress’s
legislative goals are unconstitutional, JA303. This cannot be right. It “is belied by the
entire structure of the Constitution,” with “its careful enumeration of federal powers
and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the Federal Government are
reserved.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000); accord Shelby Cty. v.
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Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013). Unless this Court is prepared to say that Congress’s
unenumerated subpoena power is truly limitless, it cannot affirm the district court’s
judgment.
The district court was unbothered by the limitless nature of its decision because,
according to its calculations, “no [precedent] since Kilbourn from 1880 … has interfered
with a congressional subpoena” based on the principles Plaintiffs invoke here. JA305.
Of course, Congress has never used its subpoena power to rummage through the
private financial records of a sitting President either, so the district court’s observation
were blocked in Watkins, Rumely, and Tobin—to name a few cases. The Supreme Court
“has not hesitated to sustain the rights of private individuals” against congressional
subpoenas “when it found Congress was acting outside its legislative role.” Tenney, 341
* * *
The district court held that Plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence to “support the
judicial function.” JA294. That was incorrect. But it has also been overtaken by recent
events. Speaker Pelosi has now admitted what this investigation is actually about: “I
don’t want to see him impeached,” she told senior Democratic leaders. “I want to see
him in prison.” Politico, supra; Nancy Pelosi Doesn’t Want Trump Impeached: “I Want to See
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clearer admission that the Committee has never been interested in legislating. It wants
to see if the President broke the law. From the founding, however, the “successful
working” of our tripartite system has required that “persons intrusted with power in
any one of these branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided
to the others, but that each shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of
the powers appropriate to its own department and no other.” Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 191.
That is still true. The Committee has no more power to engage in law enforcement than
to institute proceedings that are “clearly judicial” under the pretense of lawmaking. Id.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the district court and remand with instructions to
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s/ William S. Consovoy
Stefan C. Passantino William S. Consovoy
MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP Cameron T. Norris
1000 Maine Ave. SW, Ste. 400 CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC
Washington, D.C. 20024 1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700
(202) 747-9582 Arlington, VA 22209
spassantino@michaelbest.com (703) 243-9423
will@consovoymccarthy.com
Counsel for Appellants The Trump Organization,
cam@consovoymccarthy.com
Inc., Trump Organization LLC, The Trump
Corporation, DJT Holdings LLC, Trump Old Patrick Strawbridge
Post Office LLC, and The Donald J. Trump CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC
Revocable Trust Ten Post Office Square
8th Floor South PMB #706
Boston, MA 02109
patrick@consovoymccarthy.com
Counsel for Appellant President Donald J. Trump
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with Rule 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 12,799 words,
excluding the parts exempted by Rule 32(f) and Circuit Rule 32(e)(1). This brief also
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I filed a true and correct copy of this brief with the Clerk of this Court via the
54