PERSONS AND FAMILY

INTRODUCTION

A. Intersection of Modern Constitutional Developments and Traditional Family Law

Provisions of the 1987 Constitution - Overview of Due Process and Equal Protection
Cases

GRISWOLD v CONNECTICUT (1964) 381 U.S. 479

- Griswold, Executive Director of the planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and its
medical director as accessories for giving married persons information and medical
advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination prescribing a
contraceptive device or material for the wife’s use.

- Griswold said the statute violates Amendment (due process clause) the 14th - Sec 12, Art
II

- Purpose of the statute was to discourage extra

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family it
only prohibits distribution of marital relations and as a basic autonomous social institution. It
shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and contraceptives and not manufacture or sale primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.

ISSUES: 1. 2. WON the appellants have the standing to

Sec 14, Art II assert constitutional rights of people to The State recognizes the role of women
in nation-building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women marital
privacy and men. Art XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution Sec 1 The State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
and actively promote its total development. Sec 2 Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. Sec 3 The State
shall defend: (1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood; (2) The right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (3)
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; (4) The right of families or
family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them. Sec 4 The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but
the State may also do so through just WON the contraceptive ban statute violates right of
marital privacy (from the right of liberty) HELD: Although not stated in the Bill of Rights, it
is included in the penumbra of rights afforded to the citizens. It also sweeps unnecessarily
broadly and does not prove to be a sufficient method of family planning. It deprived married
people the due process of law by including people who are not meant to be included. Statute
struck down as unconstitutional. * What if the couples’ intention for using contraceptive was
for medical purposes and family planning? * Does it mean that people only use contraceptive
when they are having extra-marital affairs? And that if they don’t have access to
contraceptives, they will no longer engage in extra-marital affair? EISENSTADT v BAIRD
(1971) 405 US 438 Sec 1, Art III - Baird was arrested for violation of Massachusetts law No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law, nor shall
anydevicesbe denied the a by exhibiting contraceptive person and giving equal protection of
the laws. contraceptive foam to a woman when he ended his lecture at Boston University. - -
The statute prohibited the sale, lending or giving away of contraceptives unless prescribed by
a physician to married people. Its purpose is to discourage fornication (pre-marital sex) and
prevent spread of sexually transmitted disease. However, the “medical policy” was a mere
afterthought, amended after the Griswold decision in 1966 ISSUE: WON the statute is
unconstitutional for denying equal protection to unmarried people PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 4 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 HELD: Yes. It violates due process clause by providing dissimilar treatment
for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated. The deterrence of fornication
cannot reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the statute since it is riddled with exceptions
making contraceptives freely available for use in premarital sexual relations and its scope and
penalty structure is inconsistent with that purpose. The protection of public health cannot also
be reasonably regarded as the purpose of the statute since if this were the case, it would be
discriminatory and overbroad. It would appear that only married people are protected from
the evil which it intends to suppress i.e. STD. - Depriving unmarried people with
contraceptive devices is tantamount to punishing them with the risk of having illegitimate
children for fornication. So all the more that unmarried people should be given access to
contraceptives. 2 TESTS THAT JUSTIFY LAWFUL STATE INTRUSION INTO THE
FAMILY 1. 2. Is there a compelling state interest in regulating people’s rights? Is there a fit
between the state interest and the measure taken? *In both Griswold and Eisenstadt cases,
there was no fit between the state interest and the measure taken. The means employed are
not sufficient deterrent of the evils sought to avoid. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
| Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 5 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
II. CIVIL PERSONALITY STATUS – the legal condition or class to which one belongs in
society; the legal or juridical position of the individual in the society; determines the nature
and number of his rights and obligation KINDS OF STATUS A. as a member of society -
resident or non-resident alien or non-citizen B. as a member of family - single, married or
divorced - parent or child; brother or sister - legitimate, illegitimate or adopted C. as himself -
age - sex - mental condition - occupation (not a status because not inherent)
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATUS 1. inalienable 2. imprescriptible 3. can’t be renounced 4.
can’t be subject to compromise 5. rights arise from it cannot be exercised by creditors
Juridical Capacity <- CIVIL CAPACITY -> Capacity to Act Art 37 Aptitude to holding and
Aptitude to exercise of enjoyment of rights rights Fitness to be subject of Power to do acts
with legal legal relations effects Indivisible and inherent Conditional and voidable Can exist
without capacity Requires both (1) to act intelligence and (2) will. Capacity is always
presumed KINDS OF PERSONS NATURAL - human beings - products of procreation
Natural Persons JURIDICAL - artificial, abstract - product of legal fiction CC, Art 40 Birth
determines personality; but the conceived shall b it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the followin CHARACTERISTICS OF FETAL PERSONALITY 1.
limited – because it only has rights for purposes favorable to it 2. provisional/conditional –
because it should be born alive later before the rights can be claimed. But when is it
considered born alive? Refer to Art. 41, CC Birth = total separation from the mother or
removal of fetus in from mother’s womb by cutting off the umbilical cord A. Concept and
Classes of Persons CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL PERSONALITY 1. not a being, but a
quality of certain beings 2. not a physical element, but a juridical concept 3. not an object of
contract, or of possession, cannot be impaired by agreement 4. matter of public interest
PERSONALITY v CAPACITY (These two concepts are intimately related but not identical)
Personality is: is product of capacity in law external manifestation of capacity synonymous to
juridical capacity Generally, cannot be limited Specifically, may suffer limitations because
it’s merely the result of capacity to act CC, Art 37 Juridical capacity, which is fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through
death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be
lost. 3. But it can enjoy rights like inherit from will or intestacy and be given donations even
before birth CC, Art 41 For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive mother’s
womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less within 24 hours after its
complete delivered from the maternal womb. - If intrauterine life < 7 months, then the fetus
must live for 24 hours (even if life is machine sustained only) Otherwise, even if death is by
accident without which fetus could have survived (e.g. the janitor accidentally tripped on the
incubator or life support’s plug and caused the fetus’ death), kahit 22 hours pa yan, it will not
be considered alive No special sign of life required. Though complete respiration may be
indicated by crying or floating of lungs (which you can only do in case of death) Viability
(complete and independent functioning of internal organs) not required In case of doubt,
there is presumption that the child was born alive - PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
| Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 6 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
- GELUZ v CA (1961) 2 SCRA 801 Nita Villanueva had three abortions with Dr. Antonio
Geluz which Oscar Lazo, the husband, is not aware of Husband filed for damages of P3000
by virtue of Art 2206 which CA sustained ISSUE: WON husband can claim damages for the
death of the unborn fetus? HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have
civil personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus
does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child
should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There
could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for
the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents
of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the
appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered
because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on
the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in
the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in
obtaining from the doctor a large money payment. *According to Ma’am: In the Philippines,
people who seek pecuniary damages for loss of relatives are seen in a negative light. It gives
the impression that “you’re just after the money.” But it should not be the case. CC, Art 42
Civil personality is extinguished by death. - hacked him and his wife and 7 children. His wife
and six of the kids died. Of the 14 suspects, only 2 were apprehended, Ciriaco Baldesco and
Bonifacio Tirol. After they were found guilty of the crime of murder of the 7 persons, they
filed an appeal, during which Baldesco died. ISSUE: WON Baldesco can still be held liable
for his offense HELD: Court dismissed the criminal case since Baldesco is already dead.
However, Baldesco’s personality is continued in his estate (Art 42) hence the civil liabilities
will be recovered from his estate. CC, Art 43 If there is a doubt, as between two or more
persons who ar died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, presumed that
they died at the same time and resorted to◊there shall be no t Rule 123 of Sec 60 of Revised
Rules of Court only if there are no inferential/circumstantial evidences to be inferred from 1.
2. 3. 4. Both under 15 older Both over 60 younger Under 15 and over 60 younger Between
15 – 60 male or if same sex, older Under 15/over 60 & bet between the 15 and 60 Applicable
only when (1) calamity & (2) involves succession Weakness of Rule 123 according to
Ma’am: Since this presumption is based on discrimination between close ages is
not◊strength, age and sex of individuals accurately represented e.g. who will survive
between 12 and 15 years old considering they have approximately the same level of strength?
5. • • - Death means natural or physical death, as there no such thing as civil death in the
Philippines Rights and obligations are completely extinguished, while others are transmitted
to his successors After the death, personality is deemed to continue to estate PEOPLE v
TIROL (1981) 102 SCRA 558 Kosain Manipol and his family were sleeping when he heard
the dog bark. When he went to investigate, two persons have already come up to their house,
asking if they can borrow his land. After he gave his consent, Kulas arrived, flashed the light
in his face and punched him. When he fell, the assailant’s companions (more than 10 armed
men) came in - JOAQUIN v NAVARRO (1953) 93 Phil 7 Summary proceeding to resolve
the order of deaths of Joaquin Navarro, JR and his mother Angela Navarro Setting: World
War II. Battle of Manila is considered as a calamity. Also mentioned in the story was the
neighbor Francisco Lopez and three other daughters who were shot while trying to escape It
is necessary to establish succession because if JN Jr. died first, his heirs are not entitled to
inherit from their grandparents. Refer to the case for explanation of the probable causes and
speculated circumstances of their death (too many to enumerate here, refer to original!)
ISSUE: Who between the mother and the son died first? - - - - PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 7 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 Juridical Persons HELD: Inference can be derived from the evidences so no
need to use presumption. That the mother (Angela) died before her son was based on
speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which
civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1)
direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art 43 speaks about resolving doubt
when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the
Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there
shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of
calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship. Kinds of Juridical Persons (CC, Art 44) and
laws governing them (CC, A 1) 2) 3) state and its political subdivisions – governed by the
laws creating other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest cr recognizing
them corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or separate and distinct
from that of each shareholder, partner or provisions of this Code concerning partnership CC,
Art 47 Dissolution of No 2 - in pursuance of law or the charter crea B. Capacity to Act and
Restrictions Thereon 1. Presumption of Capacity STANDARD OIL CO. v ARENAS (1911)
19 Phil 363 1908 Vicente Villanueva signed a bond as surety for Codina Arenas in favor of
plaintiff 1909 The plaintiff sued on the bond; Villanueva did not appear, and was declared in
default. Wife appeared when judgment was about to be executed and asked that he be
relieved from the bond and the judgment because he was insane (declared insane by July 24,
1909) with his wife as his guardian. Case was reopened and tried and the evidence showed
that Villanueva executed the bond with full understanding of the nature and consequences of
the act performed by him although he was suffering from a monomania of great wealth. He
was, therefore, held liable on the bond. Hence appealed to the SC. ISSUE: 1. 2. WON
monomania of wealth necessarily warrants that the person does not have capacity to act
WON Villanueva was actually incapable of entering into contract at the time the bond was
executed HELD: SC affirmed the judgment of the CA. It would have been necessary to show
that 1. such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the
patient; 2. that the bond executed was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of any
other cause, that is, that there was not, or could there have been any other cause for the
contract than the ostentation of wealth and this was purely an effect of such monomania of
wealth; 3. that the monomania existed on the date the bond in question was executed.
Monomania of PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009 Page 8 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 4. MERCADO v ESPIRITU
(1917) 37 Phil 215 Domingo Mercado and Josefa Mercado were minors (under the Civil
Code), 18 and 19 years 2. Restrictions old respectively, on the date the instrument (sale of
land to their uncle) was executed so they CC, Art 6 Rights may be waived, unless the waiver
is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or seek for annulment
of contract. prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. However, in the deed
of sale they stated that they were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it; and
they made the same CC, Art 38 Minority, insanity/imbecility, state of being deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil interdiction are mere manifestation before the notary public when the
restriction on capacity to act, and do not exempt the document was prepared. incapacitated
person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts of from property
relations. wealth does not necessarily imply that the person is incapable of executing a bond
such as that in question. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not
previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue for so long as
the contrary is not proved, that is, at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy,
insane, or out of his mind; which, in the opinion of the court, has not been proved in this
case. Art 1390 (1) if one is incapable of VOIDABLE Art 1403 (3) if both is◊contract, valid
unless courts says otherwise UNENFORCEABLE unless ratified Art 1397 capacitated party
cannot◊incapable allege the incapacity of other parties Art 1399 restitution not obliged if not
benefited ISSUE: WON the dead of sale was invalid because the contractors are minors
HELD: No. The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, effected by minors
who have already passed the age of puberty and adolescence and are near the adult age, when
they pretend to have already reached their majority, while in fact, they have not, is valid, and
they cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the
obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. Their misrepresentation estopped them
from claiming the invalidity of the contract. Art 1390, CC binding at the discretion of the
Court. It does not favor the offender, come to Court with clean hands. BAMBALAN v
MARAMBA (1966) 51 Phil 417 Isidro Bambalan, a minor, executed a deed of sale of a
piece of land to the defendant, Genoveva can have◊ still civilly liable although criminally
not liable ◊Muerong. obligation except for contracts SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS
(obligations arise from…) 1. law 4. crimes/delicts 2. contracts 5. quasi-delicts 3. quasi-
contracts 6. torts REINTEGRATION OF CAPACITY 1. upon reaching age of majority 2.
civil interdiction, extinction of principal penalty 3. judicially determined competence without
guardian (for the first two, no need for court proceeding) An incapacitated person is not
exempt from obligations – civilly liable but not This is kind of confusing because he is
excluded from “all◊criminally liable. except contracts”, BUT what exactly is “not a
contract” CC, Art 39 Modify, limit or restrict capacity to act 1. age (minority) 7. alienage 2.
insanity 8. absence 3. imbecility 9. family relations 4. state of being deaf-mute 10. trusteeship
5. penalty 11. insolvency 6. prodigality - - Bambalan made no representation as to his age,
which was well known to the defendant, inasmuch as the latter was the one who purchased
the plaintiff’s cedula to be used in the acknowledgement of the document before a notary
public. Plaintiff now seeks to annul the sale. A. Minority RA 6809 - Lowers the age of
majority from 21 to 18 Contracts Art 1327 no more concept of ◊(1) unemancipated minors
cannot give consent to contract uneman-cipated minors because age of emancipation =
majority ISSUE: WON a minor’s non-representation of his age and knowledge of the other
contracting party as to the incapacity of the minor may render the sale void HELD: Yes. The
sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution. Mercado v
Espiritu doctrine is not applicable in this case, because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of
age, and the defendant knew him to be a minor. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |
Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 9 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE (1959) 105 Phil 456 - - Rosario along with her two sons
(Guillermo and Rodolfo) loaned 70,000 Mickey Mouse money from respondent saying
they’ll pay him equivalent amount after the war. They did not disclose the age of the sons so
the respondent willingly gave them the amount they were asking for. ISSUES: WON non-
disclosure of a minor’s age may render the deed void and WON the recipients are obliged to
restitute what they earned HELD: There was no misrepresentation of age, so it cannot
constitute fraud. But since they benefited from the amount, they should return it because of
Art 1399, CC. Marriage Art 35 (1), FC void ab initio Art 5, FC male or female of the age of
18 may contract marriage Crimes Art 12, RPC Periods of responsibility 9 and below*
absolute irresponsibility 9 to 15* conditional responsibility *raised to 15 such that age of
discernment is 15-18 -- unless with discernment: (a) manner of committing (b) conduct of the
offender -- for mitigated responsibility, penalty is one degree lower B. Insanity Contracts Art
1327 (2) insane/demented cannot give consent to contract Art 1328 (1) contracted in a lucid
interval is valid, but burden to prove lucid interval on prosecution Art 1399 restitution not
obliged if not benefited Crime Art 12(1) not exempt from criminal liability if lucid interval
PRESUMPTION OF SANITY a) circumstantial evidence is sufficient b) insanity must prove
to precede the act C. State of being deaf-mute Art 1327 Art 807 deaf-mute who are no read,
no write cannot give consent to contract deaf-mute may write a will but if no read, no write
can designate two (2) persons who would communicate to him the contents because he
won’t be able to testify properly◊deaf-mute cannot witness a will in court if ever the need
arises Art 820 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009 Page 10 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 D. Prodigality Art 92 (2), RC
wanton waste of one’s estate; without regard for family exposing them to want and depriving
inheritance; morbid state of mind and disposition to spend indispensable, who for this
purpose shall be designated by a competent court, in accordance with the provisions of the
Rules of Court. Art 11.2, RPC Justifying circ: in defense of family Art 13.5, RPC Mitigating
circ: immediate vindication MARTINEZ v MARTINEZ (1902) 1 Phil 182 Pedro Martinez
Ilustre appeal after CA rejected his petition for declaring his dad, Francisco, a prodigal He
was given by dad special powers of attorney but dad revoked it because son is mismanaging
their estate Son accused dad of splurging and squandering their properties by giving donation
to his second wife and her family ISSUE: WON Francisco should be declared prodigal
HELD: Since prodigality is not defined in our law, it may be inferred that the acts of
prodigality must show a morbid state of bind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the
estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the
forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate. The testimony of the plaintiff was
insufficient to support his allegations against his father. There was no evidence to show his
father has been transferring by sale or mortgage any property, which will reflect in the city
record of public deeds. The court found the defendant is far from being prodigal, and is still
in the full exercise of his faculties and still possess the industry, thrift and ability in managing
the estate. In fact, the father has increased profit while the son himself possesses propensity
to be prodigal. F. Family Relations Art 37, FC incestuous marriage Art 87, FC donation inter
vivos not allowed bet spouses Art 215, FC disqualified to testify against each other unless
indispensable to crime against him/another grand/parent Art 1109, CC prescription does not
run between husband and wife, parent and child (minority or insanity), guardian and ward
Art 1490, CC spouses cannot sell property to each other unless: (a) separation of property in
marriage settlement (b) judicial separation of property G. Absence Art 390, CC after 7 years
a person is presumed dead for all purposes except succession; if 75, 5 yrs only Art 391, CC if
there is a danger of death (4 yrs only) (a) vessel lost at sea or missing airplane (b) member of
military or armed force in war (c) other circumstances of danger of death Art 124, FC if one
spouse is incapacitated, other spouse may assume power of administration E. Civil
Interdiction Art 34, RPC Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender
during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to
the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property
and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Art 54,
CC Any male of the age of sixteen years or upwards, and any female of the age of fourteen
years or upwards, not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 80 to 84, may
contract marriage. (2) Art 123, CC For the validity of marriage settlements executed by any
person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced, the presence and
participation of the guardian shall be PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 11 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 III. PRE-
MARITAL CONTROVERSY ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is
actionable HELD: This is not the case of mere breach of promise to marry. Mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the preparations publicity, only to Breach of promise to marry walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This is contrary to good customs for
which the justice, give everyone held CC Art 19 Every person must, in exercise of rights and
performance of his duties, act withdefendant must be else his answerable in damages in
accordance with Art. 21 due, and observe honesty and good faith. NCC. Defendant is liable
for actual damages, as well CC Art 20 Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify Judgment as to moral and exemplary
damages. the latter for the same. affirmed with modifications (on amount of damages). CC
Art 21 Any person who willfully causes loss o injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or TANJANCO v CA (1966) public policy shall compensate the
latter for damage. 18 SCRA 994 CC Art 2176Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another,Arceli being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the there Santos and Apolinario
Tanjanco are damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasisweethearts. Because of the man’s promise to
delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. marry the woman, they continually
had sexual BASIS FOR HEARTBALM STATUTE (1) property (2) expectation (cultural and
societal) they used to value marriage as the only goal. Impairs honor and purity of the
deserted party Why is there no success in claiming damages for breach of promise to marry?
relationship with each other for a span of one year with the woman’s consent. When she got
pregnant, he refused to marry her. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to
recognize the unborn child to give her support plus moral and exemplary damages of
P100,000. The CFI dismissed the complaint for no cause of action. The CA set aside the CFI
decision. - No source of obligation because marriage is purely voluntary and not compulsory.
It should be freely entered into without any threat. People marry because of love, so it cannot
be imposed and thus there is no legal basis for action. In the olden days, women are seen as
used merchandise when their sweethearts abandon them. Their chances of getting married
after being rejected become slimmer. Marriage was the only goal of women. Things are
different now, especially since women can have careers. No more pressure to marry! Breach
of promise to marry is a quasi-delict (refer back to “Sources of Obligations” in Restrictions
on Capacity to Act) ISSUE: WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards set
forth in Art 21 HELD: No. In Art 21, the essential feature is seduction, that in law is more
than sexual intercourse or breach of promise to marry, but connoting essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded. The facts stand out that for one whole year, the plaintiff, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion. If she had been deceived, she would not have again yield to his embraces,
much less for one year. Besides, she is old enough to know better. Hence no case is made
under Art 21. DE JESUS v SYQUIA (1933) 58 Phil 866 Cesar Syquia courted Antonia de
Jesus who was 20 years old. Amorous relations resulted in de Jesus giving birth to a baby
boy on June 17, 1931. They lived together for one year until Antonio got pregnant again after
which Cesar left to marry another woman. Cesar recognized his paternity of first child in
writing with a letter to the priest and uninterrupted possession of natural child status for one
year • WASSMER v VELEZ (1964) 12 SCRA 648 - - Two days before the wedding
(meaning everything about the wedding was already set, as well as bridal showers and gifts)
the groom Francisco Velez suddenly flew to his home in Cagayan de Oro, leaving the bride,
Beatriz Wassmer, only this note: “will have to postpone wedding – my mother opposes it.”
The next day (day before the wedding) he sent this message through telegram: “Nothing
changed rest assured returning soon.” But he never returned and was never heard from again.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
12 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - Woman files for action for damages for
breach of promise and recognition of the child. ISSUE: WON Antonia is entitled to damages
for breach of promise to marry and kids to paternal support HELD: Promise to marry not
satisfactorily proved so the trial court was right in refusing to grant De Jesus’ prayer. Also,
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing for civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This
case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such action. - Antonia de Jesus only
entitled to the support of the first child because of Cesar’s prior recognition. No support for
the second child because no proof of paternity or recognition presented. PICCININNI v
HAJUS (1980) 180 Conn. 369 - - Marie Hajus fraudulently induced Robert Piccininni (yes,
the tennis player) to transfer properties to her name for their mutual benefit and enjoyment as
future husband and wife. Husband does not sue for her not marrying him but for cajoling him
into transferring property in her name ISSUE: WON the property is recoverable under
Heartbalm statute because the wife did not marry him HELD: Yes because marital gifts are
conditional until after marriage so recoverable. Ban on Heartbalm statutes only for issues of
the heart like anguish, moral damages, failed expectation of financial and social gains. In this
case, the petition is for recovery of unjust enrichment of deferring wife. PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 13 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 IV. DEFINITION & NATURE OF MARRIAGE FC, Art 1
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with the law, for the establishment of family and conjugal life. It is the
foundation of family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences and
incidents are governed by the law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. illegitimate parent. The parent must first prove that he can sustain his two families and
should undergo counseling. ISSUE: WON statute is unconstitutional for violation of equal
protection and due process clauses HELD: Unconstitutional for many reasons. As for the
state interests: 1) Counseling also is not even an assurance of permission 2) Protect welfare
of out custody children to compel collection and incentive to delivery of money to but there
are also other means like wage assignment, civil◊prior children contempt proceedings or
criminal penalty 3) Prevent incurring of new obligation under inclusive because new
marriage is not the only way people spend their◊ resources, over inclusive because they could
be marrying to a better financed couple. Also it only adds more children out of wedlock.
*According to Ma’am only those economically stable may marry and this ◊Beth: implication
of the ban COMMIT TO MEMORY!!! LOVING v VIRGINIA (1967) violates equal
protection clause 388 US 1, 12 - - Mildred Loving (of African and Native American descent)
marries Richard Perry Loving (a Caucasian) in violation of Virginia’s “Racial Integrity Act”
which is an anti-miscegenation statute that prohibits Whites from marrying into other races
Interesting phrase: “Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, Malay and red and
he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement
there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that
he did not intend for the races to mix.” The statute fuels “White Supremacy” because only
Whites are forbidden to intermarry, other races can marry anyone A. Marriage Models
CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIAGE 1. civil (independent of any religion) 2. institute of
public order and policy 3. natural (organic perpetuation of man) PRINCIPAL EFFECTS OF
A VALID MARRIAGE 1. emancipation from parental authority 2. personal and economic
relations between spouses 3. personal and economic relations between parent & child 4.
family relationship 5. legitimacy of sexual union and family 6. modification of criminal
liability 7. incapacity to make donations to each other 8. disqualification to testify against
each other MARRIAGE Only between man and woman Specified duties and rights of
spouses May not be subject to stipulation or terminated Breech of obligation not actionable
ORDINARY CONTRACTS May be same sex - ISSUE: WON the statute is unconstitutional
for violation of both the equal protection and due process clauses of 14th Amendment
HELD: Yes. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the basic
civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival. Decisions SC and CA of
Virginia are reversed. ZABLOCKI v REDHAIL (1978) 434 US 374, 384 - Thomas Zablocki
was denied marriage license because of non-support to prior children. Even if he marries
outside their state, it will still not be valid. The state interest of this statute was to protect the
welfare of out of custody children and prevent incurrence of new obligation by the - Have the
force of law between them Can be terminated at the agreement of parties Breach of contract
gives rise to action for damages *In both marriage and ordinary contracts, party’s consent is
necessary TERMS OF A TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1) husband as head
of family – name and domicile PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 14 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 (2)
husband responsible for support (3) wife responsible for domestic and childcare services
GRAHAM v GRAHAM (1940) /grahm/) 33 F. Supp. 936 (pronounced as her name was
purged from the registration list. Hence this action. ISSUE: WON compulsory/mandatory to
change name upon marriage HELD: No. Woman upon marriage, may elect to retain her own
surname or she may adopt the surname of her husband and the choice is hers. So long as a
person’s name remains constant and consistent, and unless until changed in prescribed
manner, and in absence of any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, state has no
legitimate concern as to name used. the legal name of any person is the one written
on◊*According to Ma’am Beth the birth certificate (CC, Art 370) IN RE SANTIAGO
(1940) 70 Phil 66 - James Sebastian Graham, plaintiff sues his former wife, Margrethe,
defendant, to recover what he was allegedly entitled by a written agreement wherein
defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a certain some of money. The agreement was that the
wife asked husband to quit his job so that he can accompany her to his travels, to which he
agreed as long as she will pay him $300 each month. The monthly payment is to be in force
until the parties no longer desire the agreement. - ISSUE: WON the agreement compels the
wife to continue paying her husband the $300 HELD: No, the contract is not valid. Marriage
contract specifies that it’s the husband’s duty or obligation to support and live with his wife,
and the wife must contribute her services and society to the husband and follow him in his
choice of domicile. Also, a private agreement between persons married or about to be
married whereby they attempt to change the essential obligations of the marriage contract is
contrary to public policy. BRADWELL v ILLINOIS (1872) 93 US (16 wall) 130 - Ernesto
Baniquit and Soledad Colares separated for 9 consecutive years, want to remarry so they
sought the aid of Atty. Roque Santiago He instituted a document that waives whatever right
of action one might have against each other but realized mistake after 19 days and cancelled
the document ISSUE: WON the document signed by the spouses legitimately terminated the
marital tie between them. HELD: No. Termination of the marriage cannot be stipulated by
the parties. Santiago guilty of malpractice and suspended for 1 year. SELANOVA v
MENDOZA (1975) 64 SCRA 69 Respondent Judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared a
document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of Saturnino Selanova and
Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw the
complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and they
waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity either one would
commit against the other. This document was also acknowledged before him as “City Judge
and Notary Public Ex Officio.” Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the
law. ISSUE: WON marriage is valid HELD: Agreement is void because it contravenes the
provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of CC Art 221. Even before the enactment of the NCC,
this court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage without judicial - Myra Bradwell was denied license to practice law JUST
BECAUSE SHE IS A FEMALE. “That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres
of action and that it belonged to men to make, ◊apply and execute the laws, was regarded as
an almost axiomatic truth” Amazing… they were able to talk to God directly. Prescribe the
qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts is unaffected by the 14th amendment
- DUNN v PALERMO (1975) 522 S. W. 2d 679 Rose Palermo is a Nashville lawyer who
married Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She has continued to use and enjoy her
maiden name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for all purposes. Tennessee had a state-
wide compulsory Registration Law. Subsequent to her marriage, she lodged with the
Registrar a change of address form listing her name as Palermo. She was advised that she
was required to register anew under the surname of her husband, or have her name purged
from the registration list. Upon her refusal to so register, PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 15 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 approval “secured beforehand” was void. While adultery and concubinage
are private crimes, they shall remain crimes, and a contract legalizing their commission is
contrary to law and consequently not judicially recognizable. Respondent is severely
censured. ASSUMPTIONS OF FAMILY LAW (Weitzman article) 1. Marriage is a
permanent, indissoluble, lifetime commitment 2. First marriages (young & no previous
marriages) 3. Main reason is procreation 4. Strict division of labor 5. White middle-class
family (property and inheritance) 6. Judeo-Christian tradition (monogamy) GOODRIDGE v
DEPT OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2003) 440 Mass. 309 14 individuals (7 couples) were
deprived of marriage license because they were the same sex - - They are professionals and
active in socio-civic activities, there was longevity in the relationship and defendants were
involved (adopted children and parents) They met all facial qualifications, list of impediment
was not presented by civil registrar (to prove that same sex marriage is one of them)
LEGISLATIVE RATIO: 1. favorable setting for procreation 2. optimal setting for child
rearing 3. conserving scarce state and private financial resources B. Requisites of Marriage 1.
intrinsic (Art 2) ESSENTIAL REQUISITES – ISSUE: 1. WON licensing law treats same sex
as impediment – presented by the plaintiff 2. WON bar of same sex couple is a legitimate
exercise of the State’s authority to regulation conduct – Court HELD: Marriage is a secular
institution. No religious ceremony is required. There are only 3 partners (2 spouses and the
State who defines the entry and exit terms) PURPOSE NOT TAILOR FIT: 1. law does not
distinguish children’s family background so why deprive children the rights when they did
not choose to be born/grow up in such a family (coitus v non coitus, e.g. adoption or
assisted), failed to address the changing realities of American society 2. best interest of the
child ≠ parent’s sexual orientation 3. homosexuals are well off and economically
independent, anyway, the same is not condition/requirement for heterosexual couples. A.
Legal capacity a. Sex – (must be between man and woman) b. c. Age – 18 and above (Art 5)
No impediment which means: (1) no previous marriage (2) family relations (not incestuous)
JONES v HALLAHAN (1973) 501 S. W. 2d 588 Marjorie Jones and her female partner were
not issued a license to marry each other in the state of Kentucky. They contend that the
failure of the clerk to issue the marriage license deprived them of three (3) basic
constitutional rights, namely, the right to marry; the right of association; and the right to free
exercise of religion. Appellants also contend that the refusal subjects them to cruel and
unusual punishment. ISSUE: WON same sex constitutional rights to marry marriage violates
- HELD: No, it does not violate any constitutionally protected right. Two females cannot
marry for marriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman. It
appears that appellants are prevented from marrying not by the statute of Kentucky but rather
by their own incapacity of entering into marriage as the term is defined. A license to enter
into a status or a relationship which the parties are incapable of entering is a nullity.
Definition of marriage says, “union of a man and a woman.” Thus, in the court’s opinion,
there is not constitutional issue involved, since there is no constitutional sanction which
protects the right of marriage between persons of the same sex. IMPLICATION OF
PROHIBITION: deprivation of protection, benefits, same reason why these◊obligations and
rights exclusive to married people couples want the benefit of marriage They do not
undermine marriage, In fact, they appreciate/ show high esteem for of marriage by asking for
it! Statute declared unconstitutional - SILVERIO v REPUBLIC (2007) 537 SCRA 273
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio wants to change his name to Mely and sex entry in his birth
certificate from male to female because of his sex reassignment (transgender). RTC granted
in 2003 CA reversed in 2006 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 16 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUE:
WON he is entitled to the change of name action HELD: NO! 1. Names are for purposes of
identification: Art 376, CC (no change of name without judicial declaration), RA 9048
(Clerical Error Law), Rule 103 (change of name) and Rule 108 (Cancellation of Correction
of Entries; substantial change) 2. Grounds for Change of Name (Sec 4, RA 9048) a. Difficult
and ridiculous, dishonorable name b. Habitual and continual use c. To avoid confusion 3.
Petitioner has not shown any reasonable cause and does not show that his name may
prejudice him 4. Case is administrative rather than judiciary 5. Change of sex not allowed
because civil status is immutable and inherent 6. No special law yet for sex change, until then
sex is determined by the sex at the time of birth as resulted by visual inspection of medical
attendant. 7. Though we get your point and sympathize with you, it’s not within the province
of the Court to amend laws. You’re barking at the wrong tree. Go to the Congress and ask
them to pass a bill for you. - Godofredo married Luida with the belief that she was a virgin.
89 days after the marriage celebration, Luida gave birth. Her husband Godofredo herein
appellant filed for annulment on the ground that she concealed her nonvirginity. ISSUE:
WON marriage is valid HELD: Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud, that is,
when the husband at the time of the marriage knew that the wife was pregnant, the marriage
cannot be annulled. Here, the child was born less than 3 months after the celebration of
marriage. Court refuses to annul the marriage for the reason that the woman was at an
advanced stage of pregnancy at the time of the marriage and such condition must have been
patent to the husband. EIGENMANN v GUERRA (1964) 5 C.A. Rep. 836 Eduardo
Eigenmann married Maryden Guerra on 1957. Two years later, Eigenmann filed an action to
annul his marriage with Guerra on the ground that he was between ages 16-20 at that time
and his mother did not give her consent to the marriage. ISSUE: WON there was parental
consent, the absence of which could render the marriage void. HELD: Consent may be given
in any form be it written, oral or even by implication. Eigenmann’s mother was present at the
time of the celebration of marriage and did not object thereto, such that consent can be
gleaned from such act. - Eigenmann is also estopped from asserting that he was a minor at
the time of the marriage celebration, having represented himself to be over 25 years of age.
Art 4 Absence of any essential or formal – void, except Art 35(2) Defect in the essential
requirement – voidable (Art 45) Irregularity in the formal requirement – no effect in validity,
but the parties responsible will be civilly, criminally or administratively liable B. Consent
freely given in the presence of solemnizing officer PEOPLE v SANTIAGO (1927) 51 Phil
68 Felipe Santiago asked his deceased wife’s niece Felicita Masilang, 18, to accompany him
on an errand Upon crossing a river and reaching municipality of San Leonardo, Satinago
expressed his sexual desire to which girl declined, but he persisted on with force against her
will The two proceeded to accused’s uncle house, Agapito Santiago who called a Protestant
minister to conduct a wedding. After the wedding, Santiago sent home the girl with some
money to buy bread. ISSUE: WON the marriage exempted him from criminal liability
HELD: No! Taking into consideration Santiago’s behavior before and after the marriage,
there is no serious intention to marry the girl except for to avoid criminal liability for the rape
case. - Girl was under duress and therefore, lack of consent (essential requisite) which makes
the marriage void BUCCAT v MANGONON DE BUCAT (1941) 72 Phil 19 2. FORMAL
REQUISITES (Art 3) – extrinsic A. Authority of solemnizing officer - Who may authorize
the marriage (Art 7) a. incumbent member of judiciary b. priest, rabbi, imam or minister of
any religious sect - duly recognized by the religion, - registered in Civil Registry - acting
within the limit of his authority PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 17 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - at least
one of the spouses is member of the sect c. ship captain and airplane chief only in Art 31 d.
military commander to which chaplain is assigned in Art 32 e. consul-general, consul, vice-
consul for Filipinos abroad *Mayors are authorized by LGC to solemnize marriage
NAVARRO v DOMAGTOY (1996) 259 SCRA 129 Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized
the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his court’s
jurisdiction. He has jurisdiction in MCTC of Sta. MonicaBurgos, but the marriage was
solemnized in Dapa which does not fall under his jurisdictional area. Mayor Rodolfo Navarro
filed this administrative complaint. ISSUE: WON respondent judge should be held liable,
and whether this will render the marriage void. HELD: Marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.
Solemnization outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction will not invalidate the marriage.
What results is an irregularity in the formal requisites of a valid marriage. Respondent judge,
by citing Art 8 of the FC as defense for the exercise of his misplaced authority, acted in gross
ignorance of the law and was therefore held administratively liable – suspension of 6 months.
- Irregularity in formal requisite – no effect in marriage validity ARAÑES v OCCIANO
(2002) 380 SCRA 402 Petitioner Mercedita Arañes charged respondent judge Salvador
Occiano for gross ignorance of the law. Occiano solemnized the marriage between herein
petitioner and the late Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license and outside
his territorial jurisdiction. Couple lived together as husband and wife until the death of
Orobia. But then since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the vast
property left by Orobia was not recognized. Respondent explained that he solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion and because the parties promised to present their license
the afternoon after the wedding. ISSUE: WON the respondent judge administratively liable.
HELD: Yes. He was faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license and for exceeding his territorial jurisdiction. He was fined P5000 and was given a
stern warning by the SC that repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt more
severely. The absence of a marriage license made the marriage void. And even if the plaintiff
retracted her complaint, that’s not how it is done. Withdrawal of complaint ≠ exoneration B.
Valid marriage license except for marriages of exceptional character Art 9 Art Art ML
obtained in habitual residence of one of the parties 10 Requirements of Filipino marriages
abroad settled in the consular office which will take over the duties of local civil registry 11
Two separate application for one marriage license which shall specify the following: 1. full
name 2. place of birth 3. age and date of birth 4. civil status 5. if previously married, how,
when, where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled 6. present residence and
citizenship 7. degree of relationship of the contracting parties 8. full name, residence and
citizenship of the father 9. full name, residence and citizenship of the mother 10. full name,
residence and citizenship of the guardian, person having charge, in case orphaned 12 Proof of
age a. original or certified copy of birth certificate b. original or certified copy of baptismal
certif c. residence certificate witnessed by 2 witnesses preferably next of kin Proof of age
dispensed with if: a. parents appear personally b. local civil registrar convinced by mere
looking (read: mukhang matanda na) c. previously married 13 If previous marriages, not
birthcert is required but: a. if no death certificate is available,◊death certificate of deceased
spouse affidavit about circumstance and civil status b. judicial decree of absolute
divorce/judicial decree of annulment/declaration of nullity c. declaration of presumptive
death 14 if 18-21, then parental consent 15 if 21-25, then parental advice 16 if anyone is
required with parental consent or advice, both shall undergo marriage counseling. Failure to
attach certificate of Art Art Art Art Art PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E.
A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 18 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 PD 965
Art 17 Art 18 Art 19 Art 20 Art 21 Art 22 Art 23 Art 24 Art 25 Art 26 accomplishment
suspends issuance for 90 days. (1976) mandatory family planning and responsible
parenthood 10 consecutive days of posting in bulletin board impediments noted in the
application for marriage pay for issuance of ML; indigents exempted valid for 120 days
anywhere in the Philippines, automatically cancelled at expiration Either or both are
foreigners: certificate of legal capacity to marry from consular officials Stateless persons or
refugees: affidavit showing capacity to marry Marriage certificate should state the following:
a. full name, sex and age of each contracting party b. citizenship, religion and habitual
residence c. date and precise time of the celebration of marriage d. marriage license number
e. secured parental consent if needed f. complied with parental advice if needed g. if entered
into marriage settlement, attach copy Duties of solemnizing officer a. furnish couple with
original marriage certificate b. furnish local civil registrar with duplicate and triplicate within
15 days after the marriage c. keep with him the original marriage license, quadruplicate of
the marriage certificate and affidavit of the contracting party to hold marriage elsewhere as
said in Art 8 Duties of local civil registrar a. prepare documents required by this Title b.
administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge c. exempt from documentary
stamp tax log in registry book every marriage and details marriages validly solemnized in
other countries are valid here except for the following: 35 (1) under 18 35 (4)
bigamous/polygamous except for Art 41 35 (5) mistake of identity 35 (6) void under Art 53
36 psychological incapacity 37 incestuous 38 public policy The following are exempted from
obtaining marriage license Art 27 When either or both of the parties are in articulo mortis,
even if the ailing survives (e.g. screenplay Walang Sugat) Art 28 If the residence of either
party is in a remote location and transportation is impossible (horse ride and distant walking
does not count) Art 31 Marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crews by ship
captain or airplane chief, whether in sea, in flight or stopovers Art 32 Military commander of
a unit, in articulo mortis, between civilians or members of armed forces within the zone of
military operations Art 33 Among Muslims and ethnic communities as long as in accordance
with their custom law Art 34 Man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for five years and no legal impediment REPUBLIC v CA and Angelina Castro (1994) 236
SCRA 257 - - - Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo Malvar. Their marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents aka
secret marriage. Defendant Cardenas was personally responsible for the processing of the
documents, including the procurement of marriage license. Couple did not immediately live
together, but only until Castro became pregnant. They parted ways after 4 months, thereafter
she gave birth. Baby was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas, and is now in
US. In trying to put into marital status in order before leaving to the US to follow her
daughter, she sought a judicial declaration of nullity, having discovered that there was no
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to marriage celebration. As proof Castro offered in
evidence a certification (due search and inability to find despite diligence) from Pasig Civil
Register that license number does not appear in the records. Cardenas failed to answer the
complaint, thus was declared in default. - ISSUE: WON proof of absence of marriage license
presented by Castro as evidence is sufficient to render marriage void. HELD: Yes. 1. The
certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value. It was then sufficiently proved that civil registrar’s office did not issue
marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. 2. The failure of Castro to offer any
other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the MARRIAGES OF
EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 19 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 peculiar
circumstances of the case – “secret marriage.” 3. For his failure to answer despite notices,
Cardenas was declared in default. Private respondent Castro cannot be faulted for her
husband’s lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. MORENO v BERNABE (1995)
246 SCRA 120 Marilou Moreno filed this administrative complaint against Judge Jose
Bernabe for grave misconduct and ignorance of the law. SEGUISABAL v CABRERA
(1981) 106 SCRA 67 Judge Cabrera charged with gross ignorance of the law for having
solemnized the marriage of Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy without a marriage license. - -
- She and Marcelo Moreno were married before Judge Bernabe. She averred the Bernabe
assured her that the marriage contract will be released 10 days after October 4, 1993. She
found out that she could not get her marriage contract because the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claimed that respondent judge connived with
relatives of private respondent Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. - Judge's story: Contracting
parties and their families came to him bearing a marriage contract. Their request to have the
marriage officiated was of such urgency that the judge conceded after making them promise
to deliver the marriage license that same afternoon. Unfortunately, no marriage license was
delivered. About a year later, Marlyn Jagonoy went to see the judge, telling him she needed
proof of her marriage to Jaime Sayson in order to secure the benefits accorded to Jaime's
family after his death as a soldier. The judge gave a copy of the marriage contract to Jagonoy
and told her to present the same to the local civil registrar and to have them issue her a
marriage license. Local civil registrar naturally refused to issue said license ("for the reason
that the parties have not attended the Family Planning seminar") - - ISSUE: WON the
marriage is valid and judge liable HELD: The marriage was void due to the absence of a
marriage license. The Court affirmed the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator which investigated on the case that respondent judge was liable for misconduct
for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license. It also said that the respondent
judge’s claim of good intentions could never justify violation of the law. PEOPLE v
BORROMEO (1984) 133 SCRA 106 Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
parricide, claiming that he should only be charged with homicide since he and his partner
were not legally married, there being no marriage contract executed during their church
wedding. ISSUE: WON the absence of a marriage contract is sufficient to render a marriage
void. HELD: The Court ruled in the negative, for the fact that no record of the marriage
existed in the registry is not enough to invalidate the marriage. For as long as all the
requisites for the marriage were present in the celebration thereof, the marriage subsists.
Presumption is always for the validity of the marriage. - Also, during the trial, Elias
Borromeo admitted that he was married to the victim. The Court took cognizance of this fact
and articulated that there was no better proof of marriage than the admission of one of the
parties of the existence of such marriage. Furthermore, the accused and victim have lived
together as husband and wife and even had one child. Since the presumption of law is in
favor of the marriage, all evidence points to Elias Borromeo's conviction of parricide. -
HELD: Absent the formal requisite of a marriage license, the marriage was void. Judge
should not have solemnized the marriage without first securing said license. Despite the
assertions of good faith, the judge was fined an equivalent of his three months’ salary.
ALCANTARA v ALCANTARA (2007) 531 SCRA 446 Restituto and Rosita Alcantara went
to the Manila City Hall in 1982 to look for someone who could "fix" the marriage for them,
as they had not then secured a marriage license. A “fixer” conducted the ceremony right then
and there and also contracted a priest who solemnized the marriage in 1983. - ML was issued
by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite to which neither of them resides. The parties
were given a marriage contract bearing a marriage license number that, obviously because of
a typographical error, did not accurately coincide with the original marriage license number.
ISSUE: WON the irregularities in the issuance of the marriage license are sufficient to render
the marriage void. HELD: Since the marriage was contracted before the effectivity of the
Family Code, Article 53 of the Civil Code applies. It states that "no marriage shall be
solemnized the following requisites are complied with: (1) legal capacity of the contracting
parties; (2) their consent, freely given; (3) authority of the PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 20 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 person performing the marriage; and (4) a marriage license, except in a
marriage of exceptional character. In this case, a marriage contract bearing the marriage
license number and a certification from the civil registrar were presented as evidence. - The
inconsistency between the number (7054033) in the license indicated in the certification of
the municipal civil registrar and the number (7054133) typed onto the marriage contract was
considered a typographical error and therefore had no bearing. - The fact that neither of the
contracting parties was a resident of Carmona, Cavite was seen as an irregularity that cannot
invalidate the marriage. - Plaintiff should not be made to benefit from his own action and be
allowed to extricate himself when situation is no longer palatable to his taste/lifestyle (he has
three children with mistress and chargeable of concubinage) - They contracted second
marriage (religious) after less than a year which used the same ML and marriage contract
ISSUE: WON the ceremony herewith described fulfilled the formal requisite of a marriage
ceremony. HELD: Yes. There was a proper ceremony: signing a statement that declares that
they take each other as husband and wife is sufficient. In short, the declaration of the parties
need not be verbal. Article 6 of the Family Code clearly articulates that no particular form of
marriage ceremony is required. For as long as the contracting parties personally appear
before a solemnizing officer and make a declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife, the formal requisite of
ceremony is complied with. MADRIDEJO v DE LEON (1930) 55 Phil 1 Flaviana Perez was
married to Pedro Madridejo in articulo mortis. She died the day after the wedding. The priest
who solemnized the marriage failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary. ISSUE: WON the failure to send the copy of marriage certification
would render the marriage void. HELD: No. The failure of the priest to send a copy of the
marriage certificate is a mere irregularity. Consequently, the marriage was valid. C.
Ceremony - No prescribed form of ceremony, what matters is: (Art 6) a. personal appearance
of spouses (No proxy allowed. Marriage via webcam, unlikely to be valid.) b. take each other
as husband and wife in presence of solemnizing officer c. sign marriage certificate d. at least
two witnesses of legal age - Where can the marriage be solemnized? (Art 8) a. chambers of
judge, open court, church, chapel or temple b. office of consul-general, consul, vice consul c.
EXCEPT - articulo mortis (Art 27) - remote place, no means of transportation (Art 28) - both
parties’ written request, sworn statement (Art 8) MARTINEZ v TAN (1909) 12 Phil 731
Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan sent a petition to the justice of the peace stating that they
wanted to enter into a contract of marriage. The justice of the peace, the two contracting
parties, and two witnesses of legal age, then signed a document ratifying the above petition
and affirming that the signatories were actually present on the day indicated in the justice's
office. Martinez and Tan were then issued a certificate of marriage. The justice pronounced
them man and wife. Martinez and Tan did not live together as husband and wife after the
ceremony because Martinez parents were against the relationship. 3. PRESUMPTION O
F MARRIAGE CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solida or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolub children, the community of property during
marriage, the au validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unla Sec 3 (aa),
Rule 131 of Rules of Court That a man and wom have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; Marriage contract is only of evidentiary value, there are also other means to prove
the existence of marriage: a. birth or baptismal certificate of children bearing the name of the
spouses as parents b. couple’s public cohabitation as spouses c. testimonies from witnesses d.
documentary photos and videos of the wedding TRINIDAD v CA, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad (1998) 289 SCRA 188 Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of
Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix. - When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named
children, he left four parcels of land. Arturo Trinidad, born July 1943, claimed to PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 21 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - be the legitimate son of Inocentes making him a
compulsory heir. Lourdes and Felix, on the other hand, denied Arturo's claim, contending
that Inocentes died single. Arturo now has to prove that Inocentes and his mother were
validly married and that he was born during the subsistence of said marriage. ISSUE: WON
Inocentes and Arturo’s mother were validly married HELD: The Court cited a particular case
which ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in
litigation, said marriage may be proven by (a) the testimony of a witness to the matrimony,
(b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock,
(c) the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and (d) the
mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. For his part, Arturo was only able to
present a certificate from the local civil registrar that all documents of birth, marriage, and
death (in Aklan) were either burned, lost, or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of the
municipality. In place of the marriage contract, petitioner presented two witnesses, one
testified that she was present during the nuptials, and the other that the couple cohabited as
husband and wife. This last witness also stated that she visited the couple's house at the time
of petitioner's birth. Tolentino's annotation to Article 23 of the Family Code might prove
relevant to this case: There is a prima facie presumption that a man and a woman living
maritally under the same roof are legally married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they held themselves out as being, they
would be living in constant violation of decency and law. The presumption of marriage is
rebuttable only by cogent proof to the contrary. Since Arturo's witnesses attested to his
parents' public cohabitation as husband and wife, marriage can be presumed. The other party
then bears the burden of proof in contesting the marriage of Arturo's parents. VDA. DE
JACOB v CA and Pedro Pilapil (1999) 312 SCRA 772 Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claims to be
the surviving spouse of Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratrix of his
estates by virtue of a reconstructed marriage contract between them. Pedro Pilapil, the
doctor's alleged adopted son, claims that the marriage between Tomasa and Dr. Jacob was
void since (1) no marriage license and (2) only a reconstructed marriage contract. HELD:
Regarding the first issue, the Court recognized that the contracting parties have been living
together as husband and wife for more than five years before the solemnization of the
marriage so that they were exempt from the marriage license requirement. In answer to the
second issue, the Court explained that though the primary evidence of a marriage must be an
authentic copy of the marriage contract, secondary evidence proving the same is admissible
provided that (1) due execution of the document and (2) subsequent loss of the original
instrument are first proven. Both (1) and (2) were in fact established from the preponderance
of evidence presented during the trial; photographs of the wedding, letter of the solemnizing
officer, statement of the officer that the marriage certificate was lost, etc. Also, the testimony
of one of the parties to the marriage has been held admissible as proof of the fact of marriage.
Furthermore, the presumption in cases like this is always in favor of marriage. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. SEVILLA v CARDENAS
(2006) 497 SCRA 428 Sevilla asks for a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Cardenas on
the ground that the marriage was solemnized without the parties' first securing a marriage
license. Cardenas argued to the contrary, saying that they were married in civil rites with
Marriage License No. 2770792. The local civil registrar was asked to furnish evidence
affirming the existence of said marriage license. The representative who appeared in court
claimed that they could not find the registry book supposedly containing the relevant
information to this case because the person in charge has already retired. - Irrelevant but
interesting facts: Intertuhod sex and knee fetish. Guy’s mom sent guy to Spain to go to med
school, but while he was there he didn’t really study HELD: Loss of the registry book cannot
be taken as proof of the non-issuance of a marriage license. No certification like in Alcantara
case saying that due PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,
A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 22 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 search was conducted.
Instead, the letter said that “no full attention given bec of loaded work” - The presumption of
the law is in favor of the validity of the marriage so that in the absence of sufficient evidence
against it, the marriage subsists. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 23 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 V. VOID
& VOIDABLE MARRIAGE A. Void Marriages 1. GROUNDS I. II. 1. 2. 1936 1941 1943
1949 Arturo Mendoza married Jovita De Asis Mendoza married Olga Lema, with subsisting
marriage Jovita died in 1943 Mendoza married Carmencita Panlilio, it was for this last
marriage that he was prosecuted for bigamy. HELD: Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy for the
third marriage because marriage with Lema was void for bigamy, being contracted when De
Asis was still alive. When he wed Panlilio, his marriage with De Asis was no longer
subsisting by reason of the latter's death. TOLENTINO v PARAS (1983) G.R. No. L-43905
Art 4 – Absence of formal or essential requisite Art 35 – Marriages void ab initio one is
under 18 years old solemnized by a person not authorized to perform marriage, except when
either or both spouses believe in good faith that he has the power to do so solemnized
without a valid marriage license bigamous or polygamous except under Art 41 mistake of
identity subsequent marriage void under Art 53 Age – essential requisite Solemnizing Officer
– formal requisite Marriage License – formal requisite Legal impediment – essential requisite
Consent – essential requisite - - Serafia Tolentino files for rectification of deceased
husband’s death certificate to place her as surviving spouse Tolentino contracted a marriage
with Maria Clemente during the subsistence of a prior marriage. He was convicted of and
served sentence for bigamy. After completing the term for his conviction, he went back to his
second wife. Tolentino's death certificate had the name of the Maria Clemente as the
surviving spouse instead of Serafia. 3. 4. HELD: Serafia, the first wife, is Tolentino's
surviving spouse. Tolentino's conviction for bigamy is the best proof that his second
marriage was void. WIEGEL v SEMPIO-DY (1986) 143 SCRA 499 Karl Wiegel files for
annulment of marriage with Lilia Olivia because she previously married Eduardo Maxion.
However Lilia says that the marriage was contracted under duress. Although woman believes
the marriage is void, when the husband learned about Olivia's previous marriage, he filed for
a declaration of nullity. HELD: Olivia's first marriage is merely voidable, her consent being
vitiated by force. Her second marriage is void because it was contracted while a prior
marriage was subsisting. Although the marriage is void, Sempio-Diy says that there should
be legal declaration of nullity for void marriages or final judgment of annulment for voidable
marriages SC dismisses case saying marriage is not a matter of private contract and personal
adventure. *The decision laid down in this case had NO LEGAL BASIS. The Civil Code
does not require a final judgment of nullity in marriages void ab initio. To quote Ma’am
Beth: “Inimbento lang yan ni Sempio-Diy!” 5. 6. FC, Art 40 Absolute nullity of the previous
marriage for the purpose of remarriage may be invoked only through a judicial declaration of
nullity - - This provision is retroactive, regardless when the marriage was celebrated. (See
Atienza v Brillantes.) Judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage protects the spouse
and prevents a subsequent marriage contracted by him/her from becoming bigamous. Also,
so that everything will be crystal clear between the two ex-spouses. Other uses of judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage: o Liquidation, partition and distribution o Separation of
property between spouses o Custody and support of children o Delivery of children’s
presumptive legitime PEOPLE v MENDOZA (1954) 95 Phil 845 PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 24 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 TERRE v TERRE (1992) 211 SCRA 6 1950; the Family Code became
effective August 03, 1988). - - Dorothy and Jordan Terre met when the latter was in law
school. Jordan was persistent in asking for Dorothy's hand in marriage, even explaining to
her that her marriage to a certain Mercelito enveigled the◊Bercinilla was void ab initio
because they were first cousins. woman He further reiterated that there was no need for
Dorothy to secure a court declaration regarding the nullity of that marriage. Convinced with
Jordan's word, the two entered into a contract of marriage. Years later, Jordan suddenly
disappeared. It was found out that he married a certain Vilma Malicdem, giving Dorothy a
ground for filing against him a case of bigamy. Btw, Dorothy spent for his law school
expenses and even gave him allowances. - - The Court answered this by stating that Article
40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code,
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,
said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." Judge Brillantes has not
shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. -
BORJA-MANZANO v SANCHEZ (2001) 354 SCRA 1 Complaint filed by lawful wife of
late David Manzano whom respondent wed with Luzviminda Payao despite status of
“separated” HELD: That the contracting parties have been living apart from their respective
spouses for years did not dissolve those marriage bonds. Even free and voluntary
cohabitation cannot severe the ties of a subsisting previous marriage. Furthermore, marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to
marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It cannot serve as
a justification for solemnizing a subsequent marriage. Manzano and Payao's marriage is void
for being bigamous. Respondent judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. APIAG v CANTERO (1997) 268 SCRA 47
Maria Apiag and Judge Cantero were married in a ceremony supposedly set up by their
parents. Two children were born out of their union. The judge then left Apiag with no
financial support whatsoever for her and the children. Maria learned later on that the judge
had contracted a second marriage. She then filed a case of bigamy and falsification of
document against the judge. HELD: The Court reiterated the rule that a marriage though void
still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party thereto can marry again,
otherwise the second marriage will also be void (Article 40 of the Family Code). ISSUE:
WON Jordan may be charged of bigamy HELD: A judicial declaration that the first marriage
is void is essential for contracting a subsequent marriage. Dorothy's marriage to Terre is void
for being bigamous. Even if the court were to assume for the sake of argument that Jordan
Terre held in good faith the mistaken belief that Dorothy's marriage to Bercenilla was void ab
initio, a case of bigamy will still follow. His first marriage to complainant Dorothy must be
deemed valid and his second marriage to Vilma Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous. -
Even if void marriage, it still needs judicial declaration. *Ma’am Beth: “Jordan is very
inconsistent. Whatta lousy lawyer.” ATIENZA v BRILLANTES (1995) 243 SCRA 32 Judge
Brillantes and Zenaida Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony solemnized by a town
mayor and without a marriage license. They went through another marriage ceremony, again
without securing the necessary marriage license. - Judge Brillantes then married Yolanda De
Castro, saying that he was free to marry because under the Civil Code his first marriage was
void. HELD: Judge's marriage to Ongkiko was void, but using Article 40 of the Family
Code, he should have first secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous
marriage. Judge Brillantes argued that the provision does not apply to him since his first
marriage was contracted in 1965 and was still governed by the Civil Code (which came into
effect August 30, - - However, Judge Cantero's second marriage took place before the
promulgation of Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy (1986) and before the effectivity of the Family Code
(1988). Hence, the doctrine in Odayat v. Amante, where no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages, is applicable to his case. The judge was free to
contract a second marriage without court declaration of the nullity of the first marriage. And
since the charge of PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009 Page 25 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - - falsification is based on a
finding of guilt in the bigamy charge, failure of the bigamy aspect would likewise render the
falsification angle invalid. The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short
of court standards. However, this mistake should not totally destroy his career and deprive
him or his heirs of the fruits of his labor. For such conduct, the court would have imposed a
penalty. But in view of his death, dismissal of the case was ordered. It turns out Apiag and
Cantero were only childhood sweethearts and married to save face because the woman got
pregnant. Speculatively, the Apiags were after their share in Cantero’s retirement benefits.
Interesting phrase: “Youthful mistake should not forever haunt judge. Man is not perfect.”
Art 36 – Psychological incapacity - (2) compulsive gambling or unbearable jealousy, (3)
sociopathic anomalies like sadism or infliction of physical violence, constitutional laziness or
indolence, drug dependence, or some kind of psychosexual anomaly. Either party to the
marriage can file for a declaration of nullity. A spouse's psychological incapacity does not
bar him or her from initiating the action for the declaration of nullity. III.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY An innovation of the Family Code, derived from Art
1095 of the Canon Law Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. In fact, a
psychologically incapacitated party does give a valid consent. The problem lies in his or her
inability to fulfill the obligations arising from that consent. An example of vice of consent is
insanity. No examples given of psychological incapacity because doing so would limit the
applicability of Article 36 under the principle of ejusdem generis. The psychologically
incapacitated person is not disqualified from marrying again, especially if he/she can find a
partner who would be able to accept his personality. The fact of his or her psychological
incapacity would be revealed anyway in the application for a marriage license for the second
marriage and the other party is thus placed on guard to conduct discreet investigation about
the matter. The following grounds may be mentioned as manifestations of psychological
incapacity, according to Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila; (1) homosexuality or lesbianism, (2) satyriasis or nymphomania, (3)
extremely low intelligence, (4) immaturity, (5) epilepsy, (6) habitual alcoholism, and (7)
criminality. Other manifestations, according to other experts on church annulment, would be
(1) refusal of the wife to dwell with the husband after the marriage, GUIDELINES LAID
DOWN IN REPUBLIC v MOLINA 1. burden of proof is on the plaintiff, subject to
investigation for collusion 2. root cause must be medically/clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint and explained in the decision 3. exist at the time of the marriage 4. incurable 5.
grave enough to bring about the incapability to fulfill marital obligation 6. cannot perform
Art 68-71, 220-221 and 225 7. decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
Catholic Church should be observed 8. state participation to protect sanctity of marriage
through the fiscal or prosecuting attorney MAIN REQUIREMENTS FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 1. juridical antecedence (prior to the marriage) 2.
incurability 3. gravity SANTOS v BEDIA-SANTOS (1995) 240 SCRA 20 Leouel Santos
and Julia Bedia contracted a marriage in 1986. They often had quarrels because of their
living arrangement. They lived with the wife’s parents who always intervened in their
conjugal affairs. Julia then left for the United States as a nurse. After seven months, she
called her husband to tell him she will return the following year. She never went home
though. - - - - Leouel tried to locate her when he was assigned in US for training (he wa
member of the Armed Force) but his search was to no avail. Leouel then filed for a
declaration of nullity of marriage, arguing that Julia's failure to return home and
communicate with him for more than five years clearly shows her being psychologically
incapacitated. ISSUE: WON Julia is psychologically incapacitated HELD: NO. The facts
were not enough to show psychological incapacity. What was shown was lack of willingness
to comply with marital obligations. Through dicta, the Court also explained that: (1) There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of -
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
26 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. (2) That the provision is open to abuse. To
prevent this, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent the collusion between parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (3) In deciding the case, the judge must be guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. REPUBLIC v CA and
Roridel Molina (1997) 268 SCRA 198 Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. intercourse even if neither party is impotent. The
wife wanted to annul (instead of declaration of nullity?) the marriage but the husband did not.
HELD: The Court first explained that the action to declare a marriage void can be initiated by
either party, even by the one who's incapacitated. This makes it immaterial to determine
which spouse refuses to have sex with the other. It then went on to articulate that "one
marital obligation is to procreate based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage." Insofar as the case
presented a breach of marital obligation, there is psychological incapacity. *According to
Ma’am Beth: Abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder. It demonstrates utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. Senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity. *Also: Tsoi’s
love for his wife is exceptional. He doesn’t mind the risk of divulging to the public his
package size to be discussed by law students in perpetuity if only to save their MARCOS v
MARCOS (2000) 343 SCRA 755 Both spouses areΛ marriage. Poor guy. members of AFP
and PSG for Marcos - - She claimed that a year after their marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of immaturity and irresponsibility (i.e. spent all his time with his friends, depended on his
parents for support, was dishonest about their finances, was habitually quarrelsome). He also
lost his job and from then on Roridel became the family's breadwinner. The couple had been
living separately for more than three years as of the commencement of this hearing. HELD:
What existed in this case were irreconcilable differences or conflicting personalities, which
in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. Court further said that it is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness. - - “Mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.” - -
Brenda married Wilson Marcos and had five children with him. Marcos was discharged from
his job and this led to a series of quarrels with his wife, in which he did her physical harm.
He was also wont to mistreating his own children. The couple then started living separately.
At one time, the wife went to her husband's house to look for their son. He was gravely
angered by this ran after her with a samurai. For failing to find work and treating his family
violently, the Regional Trial Court found the husband psychologically incapacitated. This
decision was denied by the Court of Appeals, reasoning that, taking the totality of the pieces
of evidence presented, psychological incapacity was not manifest. TSOI v CA (1997) 266
SCRA 324 - The case of the two incher Chinese (3 in when erect) Ten months after marriage,
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao still did not engage in sexual HELD: Supreme Court referred to
the guidelines laid out in Republic vs. Molina. It ruled the case in the negative, stating that
(1) (based on juridical antecedence) there was absolutely no showing that Marcos' defects
were already present at the inception of the marriage. It was only after he lost his job that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the
family home. Also, (2) (based on incurability) there PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 27 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 was no showing that his defects were incurable, especially now that he's been
gainfully employed as a taxi driver. Through dicta, the Court further articulated that Republic
vs. Molina included the "medical and clinical identification" of the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The Court even declared that Article 36
should not be equated with a divorce law or legal separation. It is not a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It is not legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted on psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. (At best, the evidence
presented by the wife in this case refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring
a marriage void.) CHOA v CHOA (2002) 392 SCRA 198 Case of the incompetent
psychologist; incompatibility Alfonso Choa filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage
based on his wife's psychological incapacity. The case went to trial with the Alfonso
presenting evidence. To this the wife replied with a Motion to Dismiss or Demurrer to
Evidence (which is an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether
true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue). The RTC and CA denied the wife's
Motion to Dismiss. ISSUE: WON wife's (1) immaturity, (2) lack of attention to their
children, and (3) lack of intention of pro-creative sexuality constitute psychological
incapacity. HELD: The evidence adduced by Alfonso merely shows that he and his wife
could not get along. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence
or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. The Court here is of the opinion
that a medical examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity
adequately. Here the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity - the lack of medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination only worsens the situation. PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 28 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 ANTONIO v REYES (2006) 484 SCRA 353 Case of the pathological liar - -
Antonio filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Reyes, whom he alleged is
psychologically incapacitated, as manifested in her habitual lying (that one brother-in-law
attempted to rape and kill, that she was a psychiatrist and free-lance voice talent who's
distinguished performer, etc.) There were psychiatrists who testified for both parties. One
used the Comprehensive PsychPathological Rating Scale (CPRS) and said that Reyes passed
the test and so was not psychologically incapacitated. The doctor from the opposing party
countered the finding, saying that the test was not reliable. TC declared the marriage null and
void. Before its announcement of its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese
of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of petitioner and respondent on the ground of lack
of due discretion of both parties. This decision was upheld by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal but stipulated that only Reyes was impaired by a lack of due
discretion. Same decision was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. CA held otherwise,
saying there was insufficient evidence. as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would
be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by Reyes and
misrepresentation under Articles 45(3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the
consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying
spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of Reyes point to her own inadequacy to cope
with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
REPUBLIC v CUISON-MELGAR (2006) 486 SCRA 177 The wife filed for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on her husband's psychological incapacity as manifested in his
immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, continual laziness, and
abandonment of the family. HELD: The totality of evidence presented by the wife was
completely insufficient to establish psychological incapacity. (1) The wife alone testified in
support of her complaint. (2) She failed to establish the fact that at the time of the celebration
of the marriage her husband was already suffering from a psychological defect. (3) There
was no evidence showing that the husband was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by the wife are ground for legal separation. *Ma’am
Beth points out the inconsistency in the rules: No need for expert psychological opinion but
presenting such will “strengthen” your case, as the court decision said something like “could
have increased her chances of winning” PARAS v PARAS (2007) 529 SCRA 81 Rosa Paras
filed for a declaration of nullity of her marriage to Justo Paras on the ground of psychological
incapacity as manifested in his infidelity, failure to support his children, abandonment of the
family, and falsification of documents. Death of their two children, the family flew to States
to recover. When they family return, Justo said that Rosa became cold to him They had a
gasoline station which the husband usually gives for free for the city government since he
used to be the mayor The existence of an illegitimate child Cyndee Rose Paras with an
alleged concubine named Loida Ching. HELD: While was nothing caused by appeared to the
above allegations were true, there in the records showing that they were psychological
incapacity. Justo's acts have been the result of irreconcilable - HELD: (1) The root cause of
respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts (there was no personal examination, but Court
cited Molina ruling saying that the personal examination of the subject by the physician is
not required), and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. (2) That the psychological
incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of the marriage. (3) That the gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is
sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The lies
attributed to the respondent indicate a failure on her part to distinguish truth from fiction, or
at least abide by the truth. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as
well to any legal or emotional commitments. (4) That the Court of Appeals erred when it did
not consider the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church. Through dicta,
the Court also draw a distinction between the wife's pathological lying and the implications
of Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifying that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 29 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 differences
between him and his wife caused by the death of their children and his failure in his
professional endeavors. There was then no evidence that Justo's defects were present at the
time of the marriage and only after he lost the mayoralty election. TONGOL v TONGOL
(2007) 537 SCRA 135 Husband filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage based on his
wife's psychological incapacity as manifested in her being given to tantrums, irritability, and
want of dominance. *Stepbrothers and stepsisters are not included in the list. Reasons why
above mentioned marriages contravene public policy: 1. Recessive genes of families get
expressed 2. Causes confusion in the family tree (what is the relationship of a father to his
child with his daughter?) 3. Legit child and adopted child are presumed to have been raised
as real siblings 4. For Par 9 -> complete moral perversion. Ethics! - A certain Dr. Villegas
examined the wife and concluded that she was suffering from an “Inadequate Personality
Disorder” with hysterical coloring which rendered her psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. VI. Art 41 – subsequent marriage
UNLESS there is a “declaration of presumptive death” of spouse in appropriate cases Art 44
– if both spouses contracted remarriage from absence in bad faith (as to absence of one
spouse) VII. HELD: Dr. Villegas failed to link the wife's personality disorder to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity since (1) he was not able to satisfactorily explain if her
personality disorder was grave enough to bring about disability to comply with marital
obligations, (2) there was no evidence that such incapacity was incurable. Also, the
psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses - here, the spouses' differences and misunderstandings basically revolve
around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the management of their business. In
sum, it was not disputed that the wife was suffering from a psychological disorder. However,
the totality of the evidence presented did not show that her personality disorder is of the kind
contemplated in Article 36. 2. PERIOD TO FILE ACTION OR RAISE DEFENSE FC, Art
39 The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe. (As amended by RA 8533, approved Feb. 23, 1998) - Under E.O. 277, for
marriages contracted before the Family Code took effect, the action for the declaration of
nullity based on psychological incapacity prescribed in ten years - that is, ten years after
1988, or 1998. But R.A. 8533 now makes all actions under Article 36 imprescriptible. It’s
gonna be here forever, at least, until this law gets repealed. Mere lapse of time cannot give
effect to marriage or any other contract that is null and void. - IV. 1. 2. Art 37 – Incestuous
marriage between ascendants and descendants between brothers and sisters, whether
halfblood or full-blood Art 38 – Violation of public policy 3. EFFECTS OF NULLITY *For
provisions refer to the table in the appendix NIÑAL v BADAYOG (2000) 328 SCRA 122 V.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. between collateral relatives up to the 4 degree, illegitimate or
legitimate between step-parent and step-children between parent-in-law and child-in-law
between adopter and adopted surviving spouse of adopter and adopted between surviving
spouse of adopted and adopter between legitimate children of adopter and adopted between
adopted children of same adopted if one kills own or other wife with the intention to marry
another or the victim’s spouse th - Niñal and Badayog were married in 1974. Niñal shot his
wife Bellones in 1985, causing her death (why didn’t they convict him of parricide???). After
a year and a half, Ninal contracted a second marriage with Badayog without a marriage
license. They executed an affidavit stating they have cohabited for at least five years. Ninal
died in 1997. His children with Bellones seek a declaration of nullity of Ninal's marriage
with Badayog. - PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009 Page 30 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - It is assumed that the validity
or invalidity of the second marriage would affect the children's successional rights. HELD:
Niñal and Badayog's marriage is void for lack of marriage license. They are not exempt from
acquiring a marriage license because their five-year cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law
but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Of the five years that
they had cohabited, only 20 months were without any legal impediment. Other than for
purposes of remarriage (see Article 40 of the Family Code), no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. * This is weird Niñal should have been disqualified
to marry Badayog because of Art 38 Par 9 (kills own or other wife with the intention to
marry another or the victim’s spouse) DOMINGO v CA and Delia Soledad Avera (1993) 226
SCRA 572 Soledad Domingo filed for separation of property and declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Roberto Domingo. They were married 1976, but unknown to Soledad, Roberto
was previously married to a certain Emerlinda de la Paz. She came to know of the first
marriage only after Emerlinda sued them for bigamy. Roberto claimed that Soledad's petition
for a declaration of nullity was superfluous in that their marriage was void ab initio. On the
other hand, Soledad insisted on the necessity of the judicial declaration of nullity, not for
purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of
the properties acquired during coverture. HELD: Judicial declaration of nullity can be
invoked for purposes other than remarriage. Separation of property is also one of the effects
of judicial declaration of nullity. The Court further asserted that a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged of bigamy. *Emphasis on the word “ONLY” / “SOLELY”
in Art 40, FC *Ma’am Beth thinks this is a weird case because usually it’s the first wife that
files bigamy against husband. Here, it’s the second wife. DE CASTRO v ASSIDAO-DE
CASTRO (2008) GR No. 160172 - - Reinelle Anthony De Castro impregnated Annabelle
Assidao, a government dentist. Their marriage license expired so they (falsely) executed an
affidavit stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for five years. By
virtue of this affidavit, they contracted a marriage. The parties, however, lived separately
after the marriage's celebration. Assidao filed a complaint for child support, asserting that she
was validly married to De Castro and that her daughter was De Castro's legitimate child.
HELD: The execution of the false affidavit stating that the parties had been living together as
husband and wife cannot be considered as a mere irregularity. They were married without a
valid marriage license and so their marriage was void ab initio. - The child born to them was
illegitimate; however, it does not free De Castro from the duty of providing financial support
since he has been declaring her as a dependent in tax exemption and even signed in her birth
certificate. B. Voidable Marriages Valid until annulled by a competent court Can be
convalidated (ratified or annulled) either by free cohabitation or prescription Cannot be
impugned upon death of either party 1. Grounds for Annulment FC, Art 45 Grounds for
voidable marriages 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 18-21 yrs old but no parental consent any party of unsound
mind consent obtained by fraud consent obtained by force, intimidation, undue influence
incurable physical incapacity to consummate the marriage (im incurable and serious STD,
existing at the time of the marriag gonorrhea are curable) For Par 4: PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 31 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - Violence – use of serious or irresistible force to wrest consent
(Art 1335, CC) Undue influence – improper advantage of power over the will of the other,
depriving the latter of reasonable freedom of choice, threat to enforce a legal claim does not
invalidate consent to a marriage Reverential fear – fear of causing distress, disappointment or
anger on part of the victim For Par 5: IMPOTENCY is different from STERILITY.
Impotency cannot harden up, so no sex is possible. Sterility, on the other hand, is
characterized by low spermatozoa count. However, the fact that intercourse is possible, there
remains a possibility, no matter how low or tiny, for the husband to sire a child. - Old age is
not a ground because one who marries an old person should have been prepared for the
other’s impotence. DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION: If wife remains a
virgin after three years of living together, the presumption of impotency commences unless
proven otherwise. 533 F. Supp. 623 Maria Moe and Raoul Roe, together with their child
Richard Roe sought the declaration of a New York Domestic Relations Law requiring
parental consent as unconstitutional. Relevant portions of the said law provides that all male
applicants for a marriage license between 16 and 18, and all female applicants between 14
and 18 must obtain the written consent of both of their parents. Maria was 15 and Raoul, 18,
when this case was initiated. They continue to be prevented from marrying because Marias'
mother refuses to give her consent to their union. Plaintiffs contend that the NY Law was
unconstitutional since it deprived them of liberty guaranteed to them by the Due Process
Clause. HELD: The constitutional rights of children cannot be equated to that of adults
because of: (1) the peculiar vulnerability of children, (2) their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed and mature manner, (3) the importance of parental role in child-
rearing. Court also explained that the State interests espoused in the NY Law are the
protection of minors from immature decision-making and the prevention of unstable
marriages. The law also assumes that parents naturally act in the best interest of their FC, Art
46 What do you mean by fraud in Art 45 (3)? Concealment of: children, so that parental
consent cannot be 1. final conviction of moral turpitude dispensed with. 2. 3. 4. pregnancy by
man other than husband STD Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism *for Nos 3 and 4: Incurability of the STD does not factor in because the main
issue is the concealment of the fact of having an STD Can be a ground for Art 36 if proven to
exist at the time of marriage Art 47 Who may file the action and when (see Table)
RATIFICATION cures defect existing at the time of marriage and validates the marriage
PRESCRIPTION bars the remedy because of the lapse of the period provided by the law for
bringing the action to annul KATIPUNAN v TENORIO (1937) 38 OG 71 Marcos Katipunan
sought annulment of his marriage to Rita Tenorio on the ground of latter's insanity. - There
was no proof that Tenorio was insane at the time of the celebration of the marriage. HELD:
No ground for annulment. Insanity that occurs after the celebration of the marriage does not
constitute a cause for nullity. SUNTAY v COJUANGCO SUNTAY (1998) 300 SCRA 760
Emilio Suntay married Isabel Cojuangco. Prior to the marriage, Emilio was already suffering
from schizophrenia. The trial court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of
Emilio's insanity. Now, Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay wants to assert her claim as Emilio's
legitimate heir. HELD: The marriage was voidable, unsound mind being a ground for
annulment and not for declaration of nullity. Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay should FC, Art 49
Pendency of the decree thus be accorded the same rights as acknowledged a. support of the
spouse (pendent elite) natural children. She was a legitimate heir of Emilio b. custody and
support of the children c. visitation rights of the other parent and their grandmother. - There
was a difference in the dispositive (fallo) and the body of the court decision. In case of RPC,
Art 344 Prosecution of the crimes adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of void), the decision discrepancy (voidable and not lasciviousness should be read as a
whole. MOE v DINKINS (1981) FC, Art 48 The need for a prosecuting attorney to prevent
collusion or suppression/fabrication of evidence between parties. Stipulation of fact or
confession of judgment not to be accepted. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.
E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 32 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
BUCCAT v BUCCAT (1941) SUPRA Godofredo Buccat married Luida Mangonon with the
belief that she was a virgin. Luida gave birth 89 days after the celebration of the marriage.
Godofredo then filed for annulment on the ground that she concealed her non-virginity.
HELD: It was not believable for the husband to not have known his wife's state, her
pregnancy being in the advanced stage (sixth month). The Court refused to annul the
marriage, saying that there was no misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the wife.
AQUINO v DELIZO (1960) 109 Phil 21 Fernando Aquino married Conchita Delizo, four
months after the celebration of the marriage, Delizo gave birth. Aquino then filed for
annulment on the ground of fraud or concealment of pregnancy. HELD: Since Delizo was
naturally plump, Aquino could not have known that she was four months pregnant at the time
of the marriage. According to medical opinion, even on the fifth month of pregnancy, the
enlargement of the woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus and hardly noticeable. It is
only on the sixth month of pregnancy that the roundness of the woman's abdomen becomes
apparent. REMANDED FOR RETRIAL ANAYA v PALAROAN (1970) 36 SCRA 97
Aurora Anaya wanted to annul her marriage to Fernando Palaroan on the basis of his failure
to disclose his relationship with another woman prior to their marriage. HELD: There was no
ground for annulment. Neither violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration. Also,
threat cannot come from lawful actions such as threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar
based on immorality. He was also not kidnapped by his wife's relatives, there being many
occasions for him to escape. - If guilty of seduction, a man cannot avoid marriage by duress
(come to Court with clean hands) MARRIAGE NOT ANNULLABLE. JIMENEZ v
CANIZARES (1960) 109 Phil 273 Joel Jimenez filed for annulment on the ground of his
wife's impotency, claiming that her vagina was too small to allow penetration. - Remedios
◊Canizares refused to have physical exam despite repeated orders by the court contempt of
court for noncompliance and constitutes collusion HELD: Since the only evidence presented
was Jimenez's testimony, there was no sufficient basis to establish the wife's impotency. For
all intents and purposes actually, because only the testimony of the husband, the presumption
of the law is in favor of potency. REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SARAO
v GUEVARRA (1940) 40 OG 15 Supp 263 In the afternoon of their wedding, Sarao tried to
have carnal knowledge of Pilar Guevarra, but the latter showed reluctance and begged him to
wait until evening. When night came, he again approached the wife, but through he found the
orifice of her vagina sufficiently large of his organ, she complained of pains in her private
parts and he noticed oozing there from some matter offensive to the smell. - Only married her
to evade a premarital affair with a close relative and no intention to become husband and
wife. - ISSUE: WON disclosure of previous relationship is fraud HELD: NO because fraud
as a vice of consent in marriage is limited to those enumerated by law, which in this case
would be those mentioned in Article 86 of the Civil Code. If we were to read the later
provision of the Family Code into this scenario, the clause "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune, or chastity" of Article 46 would bar Anaya's
action for annulment. RUIZ v ATIENZA (1941) 40 OG 1903 Jose Ruiz impregnated Pelagia
Atienza. He was fetched from his residence by Atienza's relatives who allegedly intimidated
him into marrying her. An uncle of Atienza was even said to have threatened to file
immorality charges against Ruiz that would prevent his admission to the Bar. - Because of
this, coitus had not been successful, and after the first night every attempt the plaintiff’s part
to have a carnal act with his wife proved a failure, because she complained of pains in her
genital organs and he did not want her to suffer. Upon the advice of a physician and with the
plaintiff’s consent, an operation was performed in which the uterus and ovaries were
removed. The surgery rendered her incapable of procreation, but she could copulate.
Plaintiff, however, since witnessing the operation, lost all desire to have access with his wife.
Now, he asks for annulment. - ISSUE: WON their marriage can be annulled based on the
defendant’s incapacity to procreate HELD: The incapacity for copulation was only
temporary. The defect must be lasting to be a ground for annulment, because the test of
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
33 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 impotence is not the capacity to reproduce, but
the capacity to copulate. ANNULMENT DENIED. PEOPLE v SANTIAGO SUPRA FC, Art
43 Effects of termination by reappearance: (1) (2) children of the subsequent marriage
conceived prior to its termi 2. Marriage when one spouse is absent ACP/CPG dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse cont share of the net profits of the ACP/CPG property shall be
forfeite a) common children b) if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a pr c)
in default of children, the innocent spouse; Donations by reason of marriage remain valid,
except that i faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operat FC, Art 41 Is
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
absent for consecutive years, the spouse had a well-founded belief that the(4) Thespouse
wasspouse may revoke the designation of the absent innocent already dead. beneficiary in
any insurance policy, even if stipulated as irrevoca Where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in theThe spouse of Art 391 ofdisqualified toan absence (5)
provisions in bad faith the Civil Code, inherit from innocent s of only two years shall be
spouse present must institute a presumptive death of the absentee, ◊sufficient without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (3) *In CC, seven years is
required for presumptive death and four years if there is presence of danger of death. Period
of time decreased in FC because of modernized and faster means of communication
technology. There is virtually little or no excuse for a spouse not to contact his family for a
long time. *In CC, there has to be a “general belief” which includes the belief of one’s
community regarding the whereabouts of one spouse. Now in the FC, it is only “well-
founded” belief because people today no longer care much about their neighbors like in the
yesteryears. FC, Art 44 If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary ◊dispositions by operation of law. FC, Art 42 The
subsequent marriage automatically terminated absent spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it A sworn statement of the fact and
circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the
parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed. - - No matter how long it took the spouse absent to appear, the
subsequent marriage will still become void. Because you only presumed him/her to be dead,
and that is a rebuttable presumption. If the reappearing spouse did not file the “affidavit of
reappearance” he/she cannot remarry because he is “dead” until he declares he’s alive. (So
the two spouses couldn’t possibly come to an agreement to not file an affidavit so the
subsequent marriage may subsist.) PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 34 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 OLD
RULES IN THE CC the marriage. Furthermore, the court also pointed out that ME and even
AJ herself believed Arthur was dead, as evidenced by her treating FH person step CC, Art 83
Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
suchas her with father. any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or YU v YU (2006)
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at SCRA 485 the second
marriage without the spouse 484 the time of present having news of the absentee being alive,
or if the absentee, Custody of child pending for less than case years, though he has been
absent annulment seven is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent - 390 and 391. TheYu files for contracted
shall be valid Eric Jonathan marriage so an annulment case in marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to Articles Pasig in any of the three cases until declared null and
void by a competent court. RTC for wife’s psychological incapacity Caroline Yu seeks
custody of their child, Bianca, in litis pendentia (pending case) CC, Art 85 May be annulled
for any of◊Pasay RTC the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: - former
husband has jurisdiction be dead was inArt 49 Pasig RTC or wife believed to because of fact
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the living and the marriage
with such former husband or wife was then in (incidents of a pending decree shall be
specified force; by court wherein the declaration for nullity was filed) JONES v
HORTIGUELA (1937) - Custody goes to father because mother is unfit 64 Phil 179 Step-
daughter versus step-father Marciana Escaño died and a proceeding regarding her estate was
commenced. Her second husband Felix Hortiguela), the petitioner and daughter of her first
marriage, Angelita Jones, the respondent, were appointed as the heirs. The partition of her
estate was approved by the court. A year later, AJ filed a motion to declare her the only heir,
since she claims that the marriage between ME and FH was null and void. Jan 1918 ME’s
first husband, Arthur Jones (Arthur), went abroad and was never heard from again. Oct.
1919ME asked her husband to be judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th of the said
month, the court issued and order declaring that Arthur is an absentee and the declaration will
not take effect until 6 months after its publication. It was then published in the succeeding
months. April 1921 Court issued another order, saying that the judicial decree has taken
effect. May 1927FH and ME got married. AJ now contends that the decree should be
understood as not having taken effect from Oct 1919, the date it was first published, but in
April 1921, the date the court held that the decree has taken effect. Therefore, from that date
until the time of the second marriage, only 6 yrs and 14 days has elapsed, thus, in accordance
with sec 3 par 2 of GO no. 68, their marriage was void. ISSUE: WON the second marriage
was void. HELD: No. For the celebration of marriage, the law only requires that the former
spouse be absent for 7 consecutive yrs at the time of the 2 nd marriage. The date that should
be considered therefore, is Jan 1918, when Arthur left and was never heard from again.
Therefore, when the 2nd marriage was celebrated, Arthur was already absent for more than 9
yrs. Also, the fact that their marriage doesn’t appear in the register does not affect the validity
of TAMANO v ORTIZ (1998) 291 SCRA 584 1958 Senator Mamintal Abudul Jabar
Tamano married Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano in civil rites. 1993 Tamano married Estrelita
Tamano in civil rites too 1994 Tamano died - Zorayda and son filed for the declaration of
nullity because of bigamy - Misrepresentations of Tamano as divorced (they never divorced)
and Estrelita as single (annulment was not final and executory for non-compliance indicates
lack of intention to invoke Muslim practice of polygamy◊with Art 53) - Estrelita contends
that RTC has no jurisdiction because they were Muslims, hence jurisdiction belongs to
Shari’a Courts HELD: Shari’a Courts have jurisdiction only over marriages solemnized in
Muslim rites. Law is silent as to marriages performed both civilly and Muslim. On the other
hand, exclusive jurisdiction of all kinds of marriage (civil and Muslim) belongs to RTC.
Besides, they did not perform wedding ceremony in accordance to Muslim customs. -
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
35 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 VI. LEGAL SEPARATION A. Grounds for
Legal Separation MUNOZ v DEL BARRIO (1955) 51 OG 5217 Jose del Barrio maltreats the
wife - Judge attempts to reconcile but wife declines, she pushes for her petition for legal
separation on the ground that husband attempted at her life HELD: Petition of legal
separation not granted because there was intent to kill was not established. The man only
used his bare hands/fists. *Ma’am Beth finds this ruling ridiculous because FC, Art 57
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s bare hands are in itself 1. Repeated physical violence against lethal
weapons. Likewise, what about martial artists? a. petitioner b. petitioner’s child
GANDIONGCO v PEÑARANDA (1987) c. common child of petitioner and respondent 155
2. Moral or physical pressure to convert religious or political beliefs SCRA 725 May
1986Teresita filed petition for legal separation 3. Attempt to corrupt or induce (a) petitioner,
(b) petitioner’s child and (c) common child of petitioner and on the ground of husband
Froilan’s respondent into prostitution or connivance in such a practice 4. Respondent’s final
judgment of conviction for more than six years, evenconcubinage, petition for support and if
pardoned 5. Habitual alcoholism, drug addiction payment of damages 6. Lesbianism or
homosexuality Oct 1986 Teresita filed a criminal suit 7. Bigamous marriage, here or abroad
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion For which Froilan files certiorari that civil and 9. Attempt
at the life of the petitioner pendente lite should be suspended because of 10. Abandonment
without justifiable cause for one year OLD RULE IN THE CC CC, Art 97 1. adultery (wife)
or concubinage (husband) 2. attempt at the life of the other criminal charges. That they
should wait until the decision in criminal case comes, before civil can proceed. HELD:
Denied Froilan’s certiorari. 1986 Rules on Criminal Procedure states that civil may proceed
ahead of or simultaneously with criminal charge. Likewise, no criminal proceeding is
necessary in the action for legal separation. All that is needed for legal separation is
preponderance of evidence. LAPUZ SY v EUFEMIO SY (1972) 43 SCRA 177 Carmen filed
petition for legal separation against husband Eufemio Eufemio Discovered that he cohabits
with Go Hiok - Eufemio countered that marriage with Carmen is void ab initio because he
was married to Go Hiok first, under Chinese customs Carmen died and her father took over
the case in her place HELD: Carmen’s death extinguished the claim for nullity of marriage.
Action for legal separation is purely personal even if property relations are involved. These
rights are mere effects of a decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without
the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these
claims are merely rights in expectation. DELA CRUZ v DELA CRUZ (1968) 22 SCRA 333
Case of the mahjongera wife and overworked husband *Compare CC with FC grounds. The
FC expanded the grounds for legal separation and liberated the bias in concubinage by
changing it to “sexual infidelity.” PEOPLE v ZAPATA AND BONDOC (1951) 88 Phil 688
Andres Bondoc filed against wife Guadalupe Zapata and Dalmacio Bondoc - Wife and
paramour repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse during 1946 Wife pleaded guilty and
served sentence Husband filed another case, which defendants allege as double jeopardy
HELD: Adultery not a continuous crime. Each commission is a different count which can be
punished separately. 1) plurality of facts performed during separate period of time 2) unity of
penal provisions infringed upon 3) unity of aim or purpose What Andres forgave/condoned
was the previous acts and not the subsequent acts. Besides excuse of the paramour that he
doesn’t know the woman is already married is untenable because they were previously
reprimanded. He shouldn’t have tolerated her when she approached him for the second time.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
36 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - Estrella files petition of separation of
property against husband Severino because of mismanagement of business enterprise
Husband never slept in conjugal dwelling, would rather stay alleged abandonment Wife even
alleged that husband has concubine◊in his office named Nenita Hernandez RTC grants
Nenita’s petition for legal separation and division of conjugal assets B. Defenses against
Legal Separation FC, Art 56 1. Condonation (forgiveness) 2. Consent (permission) 3. 4. 5. 6.
HELD: Mere physical separation does not constitute abandonment. Husband continues to
support wife and children despite absence. She was even able to play mahjong from the
husband’s sustenance. Abandonment defined in Art 178 & in Gay v State: for desertion of
one spouses to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations
and duties and rights with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is to forsake entirely.
Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means giving up absolutely and with intent never again to
resume or claim one’s rights or interests. Concubinage and mismanagement of business was
not established either because he actually increased the assets. ONG ENG KIAM v ONG
(2006) 505 SCRA 76 Lucita files a petition for legal separation against Chinese husband on
the grounds of repeated physical abuse. He would usually beat her up or utter abusive
language to her in front of customers. After 20 years of marriage and 3 kids, she decides to
separate from her husband and went to her family. Husband retorted: - Denied all allegations
of Lucita, they only fight over the discipline of children - Ulterior motives of Lucita’s family
was to encumber their conjugal properties - It was her who abandoned them when she left the
conjugal home - His son, Kingston and other of his employees testified for him To which
wife answered: - Positive identification is always stronger than mere denial - She would not
sacrifice/trade her comfortable life and love of her children with the interests of her family if
nothing’s really wrong she left with justifiable cause, because if she didn’t, the beating will
continue - Kingston has been with his father since he was child while the other witnesses’
livelihood depends on the husband. - PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION GRANTED.
Connivance (involvement of 3rd party and active participation considered as connivance
Recrimination (both has given grounds for legal separation, co Collusion (agreement between
spouses) Prescription (Art 57) *Ma’am Beth’s Pangalangan) mnemonics: 4C and RP (Raul
STIPULATION OF FACTS v CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT - Stipulation of facts is the
agreement between spouses of certain details and circumstances. It is not accepted because it
can be tantamount to collusion - Confes
sion of judgment, on the other hand, is when one party admits guilt from which decision is
solely based PEOPLE v SANSANO & RAMOS (1933) 58 Phil 73 - 1919: Mariano Ventura
and Ursula Sansano got married and had a child. Shortly after that, Mariano disappeared to
Cagayan and abandoned his family. - Wife did not have any means of survival so she
resorted to cohabiting with Marcelo Ramos. 1924: Mariano returned and filed for adultery, to
which both Sansano and Ramos were sentenced After conviction, Ursula begs for
forgiveness and for Mariano to take her back. The latter denied and told her to go do what
she wants to do, so she returned to Ramos while he went to Hawaii. Mariano went back to
file for divorce (under Act 2710) ISSUE: WON husband consented to adultery and therefore
barred from action HELD: YES. Because he gave wife freedom to do whatever she would
like to do. OCAMPO v FLORENCIANO (1960) 107 Phil 35 1938 - Jose de Ocampo and
Serafina got married 1951 - Serafina ♥ Jose Arcalas Husband sends wife to Manila to
study cosmetology for a year where she also had relationship with other men. 1952 - Left the
husband and lived separately 1955 - Husband caught wife in the arms of Nelson Orzame and
then told her he wanted legal separation to which the wife agreed as long as she will not be
criminally charged PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009 Page 37 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUE: WON there had been
collusion in the form of confession of judgment by the wife HELD: Though the wife
admitted her guilt, which constitutes confession of judgment, the husband also presented
other evidences to support the allegation. Refusing to answer is not necessarily collusion.
Also, the husband had no duty to search for wife because it was her who left the house and so
it was her duty to return or at least inform the husband of her whereabouts. Hence, collusion
may not bar the action for legal separation. SARGENT v SARGENT (1920) 114 A. 428
Husband suspects the wife to be committing adultery with their driver, Charles Simmons. To
support his allegations, he hired several detectives and enjoined his servants to keep a close
eye on the actions of his wife. They staged a raid to catch the wife red handed of the crime
alleged of her. ISSUE: WON the husband connived employees to set-up his wife’s adultery
with his - - Demobilized military man files a petition for legal separation against his wife for
her cruelty and abusive behavior He says she tortures him at night, forcing him to have sex
with him and if he declines, she would resort to ear pinching, hair pulling and using of
obscene language This deprived him of rest and sleep so he had no choice but to give in to
her wishes ISSUE: WON having sex constitutes condonation HELD: YES. Because in his
case, everything was done voluntarily. Sharing the same bed and continual sexual relations is
a conclusive evidence of condonation. Decision would have been different if he was the wife
because of physiological difference in the strength of man and woman. BUGAYONG v
GINEZ (1956) 100 Phil. 620 Benjamin was a US serviceman, he left his wife Leonila in the
care of his sisters as she goes to school Valeriana Polangco wrote to him about rumors of
wife’s adultery; wife then goes away from the sister-in-law’s house and stayed at her mom’s
place Leonila wrote to Benjamin as well about a certain Eliong who kissed her in school
Benjamin went home and searched for her They stayed together for 2 nights and 1 day at his
cousin, Pedro’s house Verified the truth which made her pack up and walk away ISSUE:
WON Benjamin’s act of searching for and sleeping with his wife constitutes condonation
HELD: Yes. Because even if not yet proven, he had a belief in mind that his wife was already
unfaithful yet he still tried to take her back. The ponencia relied mostly on US cases. COURT
DENIED PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION. MATUBIS v PRAXEDES (1960) 109
Phil. 789 Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes agreed to live separately from each other, they
even instituted a document that allows them to get themselves a new mate without the
intervention of the other. Jan 1955: Man cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado April 1956:
Wife the◊filed for concubinage - TC dismissed because of prescription and consent decision
appealed from in the SC HELD: SC affirmed RTC because there was express consent, hence
she deserved no sympathy from the court. Also, the action was not instituted within a year of
cognizance. HELD: YES. Petitioner could have taken steps which would prevent him from
casting doubts on the fidelity of his wife but instead it appeared that he even facilitated his
wife’s wrongdoing. It is to be inferred from his conduct that he did desire his wife to commit
the offense in his absence, and that helping as he did to afford the opportunity which brought
about the desired result, he was consenting thereto. *What could have Mr. Sargent done to
prevent occurrence of connivance? He could have just fired Simmons or brought his wife
with him on his business trips. BROWN v YAMBAO (1957) 102 Phil 168 William Brown
files a petition for legal separation against his wife Juanita Yambao who got pregnant by a
certain Carlos Field while he was interred in Intramuros (ground: adultery) - Wife did not
reply, so fiscal intervened and found that there was no collusion. However, the fiscal also
found that the petitioner was barred from filing the action because he had a concubine (Lilia
Delito) himself Petitioner says that the fiscal’s only duty was to ensure no collusion took
place and not stand in place of the wife Fiscal further added that petitioner was also
prescribed from action because he learned about the cause in 1945 but only file ten years
later. COURT DENIED LEGAL SEPARATION. WILLAN v WILLAN (1960) 2 A11 E.R.
463 Case of the battered husband PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 38 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 C. When to
file/try actions REQUISITES FOR LEGAL SEPARATION Art 57 The petition must be filed
within 5 years from the time of occurrence of cause (as compared to the double period of
CC) Art 58 6 months cool off (but does not override provisions of Art 49 regarding pendency
of decree i.e. support pendente lite, support of spouse and children and visitation rights) Art
59 steps taken towards reconciliation Art 60 stipulation of facts and confession of judgment
should not be accepted in court or participation of fiscal or prosecuting attorney to prevent
collusion CONTRERAS v MACARAIG (1970) 33 SCRA 222 1952 Elena and Cesar were
married, had three children 1961 Cesar met Lily while working for his father’s business Sept
62 Lubos, the driver, told her that husband was living with a woman in Singalong Apr 63
More rumors about her husband being seen with a pregnant woman May 63 Husband was
usually away and back for only 2-3 days; Elena declined to raise the issue lest it drive her
husband away more - Asked father-in-law and sister-in-law to talk top and convince her
husband to come back to her - Employee saw him with a baby on his arms - Elena talked to
Lily who said that it was Cesar who refuses to leave her Apr 63 Elena, with of their two
children, tried to convince Cesar to go home, the latter refused to return to legitimate family
Dec 63 Plaintiff filed petition for legal separation RTC said that wife became cognizant of
husband’s infidelity on Sept 1962 (Lubos’ report) SC granted legal separation because wife
was only cognizant of husband’s infidelity when she confronted him and got told that he
doesn’t intend to return to them anymore. Hence, there was no prescription. SOMOSA-
RAMOS v VAMENTA (1972) 46 SCRA 11 Lucy Somosa Ramos files petition for legal
separation concubinage and attempt on her life by husband Clemente (1972 so CC was
applicable) She seeks preliminary mandatory injunction to recover her paraphernal and
exclusive property ISSUE: WON Art 103 bars judge from such an action HELD: No. It is not
an absolute bar. Management of property may be decided right away especially if the
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
39 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 other spouse may encumber or alienate
petitioner from her rightful share in the assets. the HELD: Wife not asking for support from
husband’s personal funds, rather from the conjugal properties. Also, the allegation of her
adulterous relationship was not sufficiently established. It is enough for the court to ascertain
the kind and amount of evidence even by affidavits only or other documentary evidence
appearing in the records. It was also shown that he was capable of providing the said amount.
D. Effects of Filing of Legal Separation Art 61 a) entitled to live separately b) third person
may be appointed manage their ACP/CPG Art 62 pendency of the case, Art 49 applies a)
support of the spouses to b) c) support and custody of children visitation rights for children
DE LA VINA v VILLAREAL (1920) 41 Phil 13 Narcisa Geopano files divorce complaint
against husband who committed concubinage with Ana Calog and booted her out of the
conjugal home in Negros Occidental She lived with her daughters in Iloilo, and now seeks
divorce (this case is in 1920), partition of property and alimony - Husband rebuts that the
court has no jurisdiction over invokes husband’s right◊the case since their domicile was in
Negros Occidental to fix the marital domicile and wife’s duty to follow. Likewise, the
husband’s right to administer marital assets (since wife wants separation of property) WON
No. Husband abolishes◊the wife’s domicile is still the same with husband’s. this right the
moment he furnishes cause for the wife to leave him and ground for divorce. She may
acquire separate domicile from her husband. Also, he displaced her from the conjugal
dwelling in the first place. Thus, court had jurisdiction over the case. WON the wife can
obtain preliminary injunction Yes.◊against husband’s encumbering and alienating of their
conjugal property. The husband’s administrative power must be curtailed to protect the
interest of the wife. Even though wife doesn’t have the right to administer, she has the right
to share. REYES v INES-LUCIANO (1979) 88 SCRA 03 - Celia Ilustre-Reyes files petition
for legal separation on husband Manuel Reyes on the ground of attempt to her life. (Attacked
twice, would have been dead if not saved by father and driver.) - Husband does not want to
give her pedente lite because he allege that she has adulterous relationship with her physician
and the price she was asking was too high PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.
E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 40 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
BAÑEZ v BAÑEZ (2002) 374 SCRA 340 RTC granted legal separation to Aida and Gabriel
for husband’s sexual infidelity, dissolution of CPG and division of conjugal assets Wife kept
on asking things and damages from her husband through the court RTC denied the damages
but gave due course to the execution pending appeal. CA set aside the RTC ruling for
husband to vacate the residential house and surrender the motor vehicle. HELD: Legal
separation is not subject to multiple appeals. Its effects are incidents of the final judgment
and not distinct matters. LA RUE v LA RUE (1983) 304 S. E. 2d 312 - Plain housewife’s
contribution to the CPG - 1950 husband and wife got married, wife worked for the first seven
years but stopped at the request of her husband - Married for 30 years, housewife performed
her duties like caring for the children and attending to husband’s needs until the relationship
went sour - Obtained divorce but wife was awarded only with alimony and health insurance -
Court denied her claim to one half of the conjugal assets because she made no contributions
thereto ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to equitable distribution HELD: Yes, because she
contributed her earnings in the early days of the marriage and then her service as a frugal
homemaker in the subsequent years. - - - Upon his return, he took them to Cebu Rosario
asked permission to bring them to Manila for grandfather’s funeral, were given 2 weeks
Rosario did not return them but instead filed for civil case for custody grant, because he is
already living with another woman and the kids want to stay with her RTC orders her to
return the kids to him within 24 hours HELD: Custody of children is never final and always
subject to review for the best interest of the children. However, until decision is modified, the
custody is to the fathers. Besides, Rosario is just living in the charity of her brothers.
LAPERAL v REPUBLIC (1962) 6 SCRA 357 Elisea obtained legal separation decree from
husband Enrique Santamaria, so now she wants to revert to her maiden name. She is a
businesswoman and afraid that confusion as to the name will lead her finances to the
dissolution of conjugal property. Art 372 mandates that woman retains the name used prior to
legal separation, because it is indicative of status and legal separation affected no change to
her status. HELD: SC denied her petition because she relied on the fact of her legal
separation and that there was no conjugal property to fear of because it has been dissolved
with the decree of legal separation. Likewise, they cannot allow easy circumvention of Art
372. CASE DISMISSED. E. Effects of Legal Separation Decree Art 63 1) Live separately
from each other 2) ACP/CPG dissolved; offender no right to any share in the net profits,
forfeit in favor of common children, children of guilty, and innocent spouse 3) Custody of
minor children goes to innocent spouse (subject to Art 213) 4) Guilty spouse disqualified as
intestate heir Art 64 revoke all donations, beneficiary in any insurance policy within 5 years
MATUTE v MACARAIG (1956) 99 Phil 340 Armando files petition for legal separation
against wife Rosario because of adultery with brother and brother-in-law Legal separation
granted; custody of four minor children to father Father left them in sister’s care in Davao
and then went to US; Rosario lived with them there F. Reconciliation There should be
voluntary and mutual consent of the spouses to reconcile. CPG not automatically revived. Art
67 applies. Art 65 Joint manifestation under oath in the same court as legal separation Art 66
Consequences of reconciliation: 1) legal separation proceedings shall be terminated if still
pending 2) final decree set aside, but the separation of property and forfeiture remains, unless
they revive former regime Art 67 Agreement to revive former regime shall specify: 1) what
to contribute anew to restored property regime 2) what to retain in separate property 3)
names of all the creditors PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 41 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 42 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 VII. DIVORCES Is there divorce in the Philippines?
There is just relative divorce. BUT BUT! It recognizes two kinds of divorce: foreign divorce
and Muslim divorces. A. Foreign Divorces FC, Art 15 Nationality theory applies in the
Philippines. Philippine laws follow Filipinos anywhere they go. FC, Art 26 Marriages valid
where celebrated are valid everywhere except when 1) one is below 18 2) bigamous, not
under Art 41 3) mistake as to identity of other party 4) void under 53 for non-compliance 5)
psychological incapacity 6) incestuous 7) public policy PROOFS FOR FOREIGN LAWS
TO APPLY/ BE RECOGNIZED IN OUR JURISDICTION 1) Provision of the foreign law
2) Celebration of marriage in accordance to those provisions VAN DORN v ROMILLO
(1985) 134 SCRA 139 - Alicia married Upton, US citizen in Hong Kong. Later on in 1982,
they obtained divorce in Nevada. Shortly after that, Alicia contracted another marriage with
Van Dorn. 1983 Upton files suit in Pasay RTC for nonapplication of divorce decree to Alicia
and hence his right to administer the conjugal property in Ermita, the decision◊Galleon Shop
- Alicia files for dismissal which the RTC denied assailed in SC HELD: Upton is estopped
from the claim because he declared in Nevada that there were no conjugal assets. He is
American and US law applies to him, therefore, Alicia is no longer his wife. “The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.” Petition of Alicia granted.
Upton’s case dismissed. Prevents the situation wherein you are married to your husband but
your husband is no longer married to you. *Ma’am Beth likes this decision because it proves
that we don’t need new laws. We only have to think out of the box. A change of focus is all
we need. Philippine laws apply to Filipino, ergo, foreigners cannot use our laws against our
citizens. Their own laws shall apply to them. Bravo! PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 43 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 QUITA v CA & DANDAN (1998) 300 SCRA 592 1941 Fe and Arturo got
married, no children 1954 Fe got final judgment of divorce with Arturo; woman remarried
twice 1972 Husband dies without will - Blandina Dandan and her six children with Arturo
Padlan presents themselves as heir of the decedent - Ruperto Padlan intervened - RTC grants
succession to Quita and Padlan HELD: RTC failed to establish Quita’s citizenship which is
material to the resolution of case. If proven that she was no long a Filipino citizen, then she
was no longer the wife of Padlan and divorce decree binding on her (application of Van
Dorn) - Time of divorce is the most material and not the time of the marriage - Remanded the
case to determine the citizenship of Quita at the time of divorce LLORENTE v CA &
LLORENTE (2000) 345 SCRA 592 1927-57 Lorenzo enlisted as US Navy 1937 Paula
married Lorenzo 1943 Lorenzo’s naturalization in the US 1945 Lorenzo went home to find
out that Paula got pregnant by his brother Ceferino 1945 birth of Crisologo Llorente who was
illegitimate and fatherless in his birth certificate - Lorenzo refused to lived with Paula and
instead drew a written agreement witnessed by her dad and stepmom that they will dissolve
the marital union and she will have no claims to the conjugal assets, without charges for
criminal act 1952 1958 1981 1985 RTC CA SC Divorce decree became final in the States
Lorenzo married Alicia who’s unaware of his previous marriage with Paula; begot 3 children
Lorenzo drafted his last will and testament Lorenzo died Assigned Paula as administratrix,
she being the legal surviving wife Alicia declared as co-owner Remand for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will. There were four significant point in time: 1) divorce 2) marriage
to Alice 3) execution of will 4) death Citing Quita, once proven that Lorenzo’s citizenship is
American at the time of divorce, then the divorce will be valid and should be recognized -
Validity of the will is governed by laws of the country in which they are remand to the court
for further clarification SC recognizes the◊executed divorce decree and upholds the marriage
of Alice and Lorenzo - PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,
A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 44 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 GARCIA v RECIO
(2001) 366 SCRA 437 Rederick and Editha Samson married in Australia in 1987, then
divorced in 1989 1992 Rederick became US citizen 1994 Rederick married Grace 1995
Grace and Rederick lived separately and then Grace files for nullity on ground of Red’s
bigamy RTC recognized the divorce obtained in Australia and did not question respondent’s
lack of capacity to marry HELD: Respondent’s legal capacity to marry cannot be determined
because he failed to produce the foreign law as well as the decree proving his capacity to
marry. Not sure if he was granted absolute or probationary divorce. VIII. DE FACTO
SEPARATION FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect
the regime of ACP except that: 1. 2. 3. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses
to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported When the consent
of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall
be obtained in a summary proceeding In the absence of sufficient community property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The
spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial
authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the B. Muslim
Divorces Governed by Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Presidential
Decree No. 1083) Divorce or Talaq (Chapter 3) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Repudiation of the wife by
the husband (talaq) Vow of abstinence by the husband (ila) Injurious assimilation of husband
(zihar) Acts of imprecation (li’an) the wife by the Redemption by the wife (khul’) Exercise
by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwid) judicial decree (faskh) YASIN v
JUDGE, SHARI’A (1995) 241 SCRA 606 Hatima Yasin seeks to use her maiden name again
after being divorced to Hajin Idris Yasin, who has already remarried. Shari’a court dismissed
her petition because there has to be change of name. HELD: No need to have court
proceedings for change of name because her legal name is the one entered in the civil
register. When the marriage ties no longer exists as in the case of death of husband or
Muslim divorce, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in
her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her husband's name is
optional and not obligatory for her. FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband and
wife shall not affect the regime of CPG except that: 1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal
home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported 2.
When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial
authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding 3. In the absence of sufficient
community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate
property of the other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds FC, Art 239 When a husband and
wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial
authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouses is required by law but
such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court
alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying
the transaction and if none shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason
why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed
by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. FC, Art 242 Upon filing of the
petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required,
of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted,
on or before the date set in the said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be
accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the
spouse concerned. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009 Page 45 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC, Art 246 If the petition is
not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on
the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of
the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the
subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses. FC, Art
247 The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. - being considered
as immoral and gross misconduct The only thing resolved in this case is that they cannot be
considered immoral in the eyes of their own religious group but it does not deny the fact that
the relationship is still not legally binding on them. PEREZ v CA and Ray Perez (1996) 255
SCRA 661 1996 Ray and Nerissa got married in Cebu. 1992 After 6 miscarriages, 2
operations and a high risk pregnancy, she finally gave birth to Ray Jr. 1993 The family went
to Cebu but only Nerissa went back to the US although they all had round trip tickets because
Ray had to stay behind and take care of ill mother. - She came back no longer in good terms
with husband RTC followed tender years presumption CA reversed and gave custody to
father Art 213 can be taken to mean separation (legal or de facto) and should take into
account all relevant info (material, “shall not be separated” from mother is mandatory unless
unfit◊social, moral) financial capacity not determinative as◊to exercise sole parental
authority long as both have ample means of support When husband questioned wife’s nature
of work and it’s incapability to care for child: - It’s nothing that can’t be handled. Shifts can
be adjusted so she can attend to the child. There are also daycare centers and she could
always take a leave until the child can manage on its own. Petitioner also invites mother to
join them in the States so she could look after the child. Husband will also just leave the care
of the child to his mother because of the nature of his work as a doctor Besides, nothing can
be more heart rendering that the wife’s situation who waited so long to have a child only to
be deprived from her before the first year. PETITION GRANTED. CA SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED. RTC REINSTATED. For immediate execution. ESTRADA v ESCRITOR
(2006) 492 SCRA 1 Administrative case against an employee of the Supreme Court who is
living with a man not her husband Declaration of Pledge of Faithfulness practice of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses immunized them from PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.
E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 46 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 IX.
RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND & WIFE A. Cohabitation, Mutual
Love and Respect (e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage
in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's
movement or conduct: (f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the
purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; (g) Causing or attempting to cause the
woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force
or threat of force, — Any harm, or through intimidation RPC, Art 247 Death or physical
injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances.physicallegally married person who having
directed against the woman or both of them surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them orher child or her/his
immediate family; in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
destierro. conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional
or If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from
punishment. psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be
under to, the These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughterslimited eighteen following acts: years of age, and their seducer,
while the daughters are living with their parents. (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish,
public ridicule or shall otherwise have consented to the Any person who shall promote or
facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal infidelity of the other spouse shall not be
entitled to the benefits of this article. and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children. Sec 26 Battered Woman
Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised
Penal Code. In the determination of the state of mind of the woman FC, Art 68 The husband
and the wife are obliged to live together, who was mutual love, respect andwoman syndrome
at the observe suffering from battered fidelity and render mutual time of the commission of
the crime, the courts shall be help and support. assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.
Sec 28 Custody of children. – The woman victim of violence shall be entitled to the custody
and support of CC, Art 34 When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails
to render aid or protection to any person in case her child/children. Children below seven (7)
years old of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for
damages, and the city or municipality shall be older but with mental or physical disabilities
shall subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be
independent of any criminal proceedings, and a automatically be given to the mother, with
right to preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action. support, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law) A victim who
is suffering from battered woman syndrome Sec 2 Rape as a Crime Against Persons. — The
crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under shall not be
disqualified from having custody of her Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise
known as the Revised Penal Code. children. In no case shall custody of minor children be
given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from battered woman syndrome. RA
9262 (Anti VAWC Act of 2004) Sec 5 Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.
- The crime of violence against women and NARAG v NARAG (1998) their children is
committed through any of the following 291 SCRA 451 acts: - Dominador was a teacher at
St. Louis College of (a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her Tuguegarao when he
met Gina Espita, a 1st year child; (b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child 17 yo
student. They had a relationship and physical harm; Dominador abandoned his family to live
with (c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child Gina. physical harm; Dominador used
power as Sangguniang (d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of Panlalawigan to secure
employment for Gina at imminent physical harm; the DTI. PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 47 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 - 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. - - Dominador’s wife instituted a
disbarment proceeding against him for immorality, but after one year she wanted to withdraw
her complaint saying She fabricated allegations in complaint to humiliate and spite husband
Love letters between two guilty were forged She suffered from emotional confusing due to
extreme jealousy Denied Gina and Dominador ever had a relationship Dominador never left
the family But a year later, Julieta filed the same case again due to her husband’s continuous
threat. Dominador filed his answer He never threatened, harassed, or intimidated her He
never abandoned family, he loves them. He protected & preserved family. Julieta and two
sons drove him out of their house. Julieta is emotionally disturbed – incurably jealous and
possessive, violent, vindictive, scandalous. Julieta’s rich and she abhors poor, he is poor he
was beaten, battered, brutalized, tortured, abused and humiliated by Julieta in public and at
home so he filed for annulment because they cannot exist together She has disgraced, shamed
and humiliated him by telling everyone everywhere that he’s worthless, good-for-nothing,
evil and immoral Denied relationship with Gina. No kids either. Love letters: inadmissible as
evidence He is old thus, unfit to do things alleged by Julieta. Investigating officer: indefinite
suspension from practice of law. He never denied love letters, didn’t disprove adulterous
relationship. Denying two kids (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) ground for
disciplinary action. IBP: affirmed investigating officer’s recommendation & granted
disbarment denials without proof are insufficient. His accusations against Julieta were not
proven. Providing for his family, giving them a comfortable life, his being a successful
lawyer and seasoned politician do not necessarily mean that he’s morally fit. He has duties to
his children (support, educate, instruct according to right precepts and good example, give
love, companionship, understanding, moral & spiritual guidance) and to his wife (observe
mutual love, respect & fidelity & render help and support). He failed to fulfill these duties.
He was away most of the time because of his paramour not because of work as he alleges.
Son’s testimony proved that he abandoned his family which even affected his son’s own
family. Dominador did not merely contract a marriage, he should have been a partner who
lived up to his promise to love & respect his wife & remain faithful to her until death.
GOITIA v CAMPOS RUEDA (1916) 35 Phil 252 Elisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were
married on January 7, 1915. They established their residence, where they lived together for a
month after which plaintiff returned to her parents. She alleged that defendant demanded of
her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals. She refused to perform any
act other than legal and valid cohabitation. Defendant continued demanding such acts from
her. Her continued refusal exasperated him, inducing him to maltreat her by word and deed
and inflict injuries upon her lips, face and different body parts. Thus, she was obliged to
leave the conjugal abode and is now asking for support. CFI held that defendant cannot be
compelled to support wife, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree
granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant. ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to
support outside conjugal abode HELD: Yes. The rule established in Art. 149 of the Civil
Code is not absolute. The doctrine that neither spouse cannot be compelled to support the
other outside the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting them a
divorce or separation is not controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to
leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode
and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. The nature of the duty of affording mutual
support is compatible and enforceable in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not
create any illicit situation. A judgment for separate maintenance is a judgment calling for the
performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. Moreland, concurring:
A husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his
wife imposed by law; and where a ISSUE: WON Dominador should be disbarred HELD:
Yes. A lawyer should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral (shameless showing
indifference to opinion of good members of society) or deceitful conduct, should not behave
in scandalous manner, in public or in private to the discredit of the legal profession. These
are continuing requirements/qualification of all members of bar. This includes prohibition
against adulterous relationships. Burden of proof of gross immorality for abandoning his
family proved when Julieta presented witnesses who attested to adulterous relationship
between Gina & Dominador. Even Gina’s brother admitted that Gina and Dominador had
two children. Even though Julieta has burden of proof, he needs to show that he is morally fit
to remain a member of bar. His PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 48 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 husband,
by wrongful, illegal and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him,
he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital
relation and repudiate his duties thereunder. Cohabitation includes normal sexual intercourse
only. Husband has to support wife because she had just cause for leaving. *Who determines
what is acceptable form of sex? The spouses! Not the judge nor the society! * Why is
missionary position prescribed by the church? Because it gives the least satisfaction. Sex is
not meant to be for pleasure but for procreation only. WARREN v STATE (1985) 255 Ga.
151 Daniel Warren was convicted for rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife while they
were living together as husband and wife. He appealed to dismiss the indictment. His
grounds: 1. Rape statute implies marital exclusion thus husband cannot be guilty of raping
wife. 2. Aggravated sodomy statute provides for marital exclusion, too. 3. Interpreting the
above-mentioned laws otherwise would be tantamount to new interpretations & application
of such would deny him of his due process rights. ISSUE: WON marital exclusion is implied
in the rape and aggravated sodomy statutes HELD: No. There has never been an express
marital exemption in Georgia rape statute. Theories/bases for thinking that marital exclusion
exists in rape statute: (a) Lord Hale – by giving matrimonial consent, wife gave up herself in
this kind unto husband and she can’t take that back (b) Subsequent marriage doctrine of
English law - if marriage between a rapist and his victim extinguishes criminal liabilities then
corollary, rape within marital relationship should be given that immunity (c) Medieval time –
wife is husband’s chattel or property thus rape, thus man is merely using his own property (d)
Unity of person theory – husband and wife become one, with wife incorporating her
existence to that of the husband, thus husband cannott be convicted of raping himself.
Justifications: (a) prevent fabricated charges (b) prevent wives from using rape charges for
revenge (c) prevent state intervention so as not to All of these theories and justifications
are◊thwart possible reconciliation passé. Equal protection of the laws is being practiced now.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge with a female forcibly and against her will. It
violates the moral sense and personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim. Implied
consent to such in marriage conflicts is absurd and against the constitution. During era of
slavery, rape was seen negatively and not acceptable even to chattels. Sodomy is the carnal
knowledge and connection against the order of nature by man with man or in same unnatural
manner with woman. There has been no implied marital exemption under this statute even in
earlier times. Consent is not a defense unlike in rape. Anyone who voluntarily participates is
guilty. There is due process. Due process merely requires that law give sufficient warning so
men may avoid what is forbidden. Statutes concerned are plain and broadly written. This may
be the first application to this particular set of facts but it is not an unforeseeable judicial
enlargement of criminal statutes that are narrowly drawn. There is no marital exemption in
rape. A person commits rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against
her will. THURMAN v CITY OF TORRINGTON (1984) 595 F. Supp. 1521 Between early
October 1982 and June 10, 1983, Tracey Thurman notified the police officers of the City of
repeated threats upon her life and the life of her child, Charles Thurman, Jr., made by her
estranged husband, Charles Thurman. This includes breaking her windshield while she was
in the car, where he was convicted of breach of peace, and stabbing her repeatedly. Attempts
to file complaints by wife against husband based on threats of death and maiming her were
ignored and rejected by the police because of an alleged administrative classification that
affords lesser protection when the victim is a woman abused by a spouse or boyfriend, or a
child abused by a father or stepfather. ISSUES: WON the administrative violates the equal
protection clause classification HELD: Yes. A man is not allowed to physically abuse or
endanger a woman merely because he is her husband. A police officer may not knowingly
refrain from interference in such violence, and may not automatically decline to make an
arrest simply because the assaulter and his victim are married to each other. Whatever may
be said as to the positive values of avoiding intra-family controversy, the choice in this
context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex. PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 49 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 SUB-ISSUES 1. Dismissal of claims of son - Correct. Condition to stay
away from son is not one of the conditions after arrest. There is failure to adequately allege
denial of equal protection 2. Allegation of custom or policy - A pattern emerges that
evidences deliberate indifference on the part of the police department to the complaints of
Tracey and its duty to protect her. Such indifference raises an inference of custom or policy
on the part of municipality. 3. Unidentified police officers - Okay because case was
dismissed even before plaintiff had an opportunity to discover identity of unidentified
defendants. 4. Pendent Jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claim- The court has discretion
to exercise this power. At the instant case, court declines to exercise because needless
decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice
between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. PEOPLE
v LIBERTA (1984) 64 NY 2d 152 Mario and Denise were married but when he started
beating her she sought temporary protection from her husband. The order was granted and
Mario was directed to move out, stay away from the family home, stay away from Denise
and he may only visit their child once a week. - Mario wanted to visit son but Denise did not
allow him to go the house so they met instead in the motel where Mario was staying on the
condition that they be accompanied by a friend. However, the friend left upon their arrival at
the motel. Mario then attacked Denise, threatened to kill her and forced her to perform
fellatio on him and to engage in sexual intercourse w/him. 2 ½ year old son was there all the
time and Mario even forced Denise to tell their son to watch what was happening. They were
allowed to leave afterwards. - Mario was convicted for rape and sodomy both in their 1st
degrees. However, Mario contends that: o They are married thus he is covered by marital
exemption to rape and sodomy. o Rape and sodomy statutes are unconstitutional because it
treats married and unmarried persons differently. ISSUES: 1. WON Mario is covered by the
marital exemption 2. WON the statutes are unconstitutional for violating equal protection
clause HELD: 1. NO. Male guilty of rape when he engages in sexual intercourse with female
by forcible compulsion. Female is any female person not married to actor. Sodomy means
engaging in deviate sexual intercourse (sexual conduct between persons not married to each
other consisting of contact between penis and anus, mouth and penis, or mouth and vulva.
Not married phrase means there is marital exemption for both. But it has exemptions. One of
which is when spouses are living apart pursuant to a valid and effective (a) order issued by
court of competent jurisdiction requiring such living apart (b) decree of separation (c) written
agreement of separation, they are considered to be not married. Thus, forcible rape or
sodomy in this instance would be punishable. In this case, Denise and Mario were
technically, not married, by virtue of the temporary order of protection. 2. 3. Constitutionality
of Marital Exemption Married man ordinarily cannot be convicted of forcibly raping or
sodomizing his wife (marital exemption). State is allowed to make classifications as long as
there is a rational basis for doing so and it does not arbitrarily burden a particular group. No
rational basis for distinguishing between marital and non-marital rape. Rationales are archaic.
(See People v Liberta explanations on theories). Imposing a marital exemption does not
further the cause it purportedly protects which is marital privacy (e.g. Prevent state
interference to protect privacy – not justified by allowing husband to forcibly rape his wife;
Disrupt marriage – the act of rape/sodomy in itself would disrupt the marriage and
reconciliation is quite impossible; wife will present fabricated info – criminal justice system
can take care of this). Marital rape is more violent and traumatic than non-marital one. IT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Constitutionality of Exemption for Females – Only males can be
convicted of rape in the 1 st degree. Reason: It aims to protect chastity of women and their
property value to father/husbands. Treating people differently based on gender can only be
justified by its substantial relation to the achievement of an important governmental
obligation. State defense: (a) only females can become pregnant – it’s not the main purpose
(b) female faces probability of medical, sociological and psychological problems unique to
her gender – archaic and overbroad generalization (c) women cannot actually rape men or if
it happens, it’s rare – not tenable either. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E.
A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 50 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 They
need to present an exceedingly persuasive justification for classification. Show that
genderbased law serves the government’s interest better than a gender-neutral one. As it is,
only females who forcibly rape males benefit from the present statute. LIKEWISE, IT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. After 22 years, Aurelia filed a case for separate maintenance due
to infidelity and cruelty. 10 years prior to the institution of the case, Rafael was guilty of
repeated acts of infidelity with four different women. Even after the institution of the case it
was shown that he has had an illicit relation with another woman. The incorrigible nature of
the defendant in his 4. Strike out only the unconstitutional parts since relations with other
women coupled with his lack the statute is of major importance. It’s not of consideration and
even brutality caused entirely void anyway. Aurelia to leave the conjugal home and for her to
5. Due process is observed. His act was already establish her own abode. Their final
separation criminal when he attacked Denise. occurred on April 1947. There was no
sufficient evidence to establish the cruelty of the husband but there were sufficient B. Fixing
the Family Domicile evidence to establish the infidelity of the husband. ISSUE: WON the
wife is the court shall decide. FC, Art 69 The husband and the wife shall fix the family
domicile. In case of disagreement,entitled for separate support from her husband.
TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO (1966) 17 SCRA 674 - Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño
were married in 1948. In 1950, defendant Escaño obtained a foreign divorce in Nevada. She
further sought papal dispensation of the marriage although no document proving the same
was presented. Escaño’s marriage to American Rusell Leo Moran in the US in 1954, which
was later blessed with three children ISSUES: 1. WON divorce is valid 2. WON Court may
then compel Escaño to cohabit with Tenchavez HELD: 1. Divorce is invalid for a foreign
divorce decree cannot be recognized in the Philippines especially if it was granted by court of
the place which was not the parties’ bona fide domicile and on a ground not recognized by
our law, which does not allow absolute divorce. Even in private international law, foreign
decrees (especially those confirming or dissolving a marriage) cannot be enforced or
recognized if they contravene public policy. HELD: YES - In order to entitle a wife to
maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from the husband it is not
necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the home. Perverse and illicit
relations with women outside the conjugal home are sufficient grounds. - Ruling in Arroyo v.
Vasquez de Arroyo is not applicable because in the Arroyo case the only grounds that were
alleged was cruelty and that charge was not proven. In the present case, the charge of cruelty
was also not proven but the Aurelia also accused her husband of infidelity and that charge
has been proven (repeated acts of conjugal infidelity) and the husband appears to be a
recurrent, if not incurable offender. This fact gives the wife an undeniable right to relief. -
Goitia v. Campos Rueda – husband cannot by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from
the duty to support his wife. When he drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he
cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations
and repudiate his duties. GARCIA v SANTIAGO (1928) 53 Phil. 952 - 1910 Cipriana Garcia
♥ Isabelo Santiago married 1925 Cipriana compelled to leave conjugal dwelling: 1.
continued family dissensions 2. Alejo, Isabelo’s son by his first wife seduced Prisca Aurelio,
Cipriana’s daughter by her first husband. Prisca gave birth to a child. Isabelo, instead of
requiring his son to marry Prisca, refused to interfere and he seemed to tolerate their illicit
relationship. 3. Isabelo has conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejo to
foster latter’s whims and caprices and thus, damaging and - 2. No. It is not within the
province of courts to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to the other. However, a spouse who unjustifiable deserts the conjugal abode
can be denied support. DADIVAS v VILLANUEVA (1929) 54 Phil. 92 Aurelia Dadivas de
Villanueva married Rafael Villanueva and they had three children. (18, 10, 9) PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 51 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - prejudicing Cipriana’s rights. Some of these properties
include lands acquired during their marriage with money belonging to the conjugal
partnership. Land annually produces 4,500 cavanes of palay at P4.00/cavan. Other
allegations of Cipriana/Prayers to the Court: 1. Their separation is necessary to avoid
personal violence. She could not live in the conjugal dwelling due to the illicit relationship of
Alejo and Prisca tolerated by Isabelo. 2. She is entitled to P500 pendente lite monthly
pension from conjugal partnership. However, Isabelo refused to provide for her support
despite her demands. 3. She should be in-charge of the administration of the property of their
conjugal partnership because Isabelo is unfit to do so. He exhibits immoral conduct and acts
by publicly maintaining an illicit relationship with Geronima Yap. Isabelo answered with a
general denial. CFI dismissed husband, he claims the right to fix the residence of the family.
After plaintiff filed a petition for pendente lite with the CFI. CFI granted a monthly
allowance of P75. The defendant then filed a petition wherein he elected to fulfil his
obligation as fixed by the trial court to receive and maintain plaintiff at his residence in Pasay
City. CFI denied the petition. CA presented to SC for Adjudication. ISSUE: WON a wife is
entitled to receive support from her husband where she refused to live with him on account of
some misunderstanding she had with the husband’s immediate relatives. HELD: No.
Defendant-appellant gave the option to support wife at conjugal dwelling apart from his
parents’ home. Should plaintiff refuse, he is under no obligation to give any support. The
wife cannot be compelled to live with her husband but support can be denied to the spouse
who left. DEL ROSARIO v DEL ROSARIO (1949) 46 OG 6122 Plaintiff Genoveva del
Rosario, a widow with 2 kids and defendant Teoderico del Rosario, a mechanic, widower
with a son got married. They lived together in the house of defendant's mother. Because of
petty quarrels, plaintiff left the conjugal home in 1942. ISSUE: WON plaintiff is justified in
leaving and is entitled to support RATIO: Yes. As the marriage vow does not include making
sacrifices for the in-laws, there is legal justification for wife’s refusal to live with husband,
taking into account the “traditional hatred between wife and her mother-in-law” (nyahaha). It
is true that wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish the
residence (Art 58, CC), but this right does not include compelling wife to live with mother-
in-law, if they cannot get along together. Alimony will be set according to husband’s ability
to pay. ISSUES/HELD: 1. WON their separation is justified - YES. They were having a
stormy life prior to the separation due to the frequent fights. Isabelo ordered her to leave the
house and threatened to ill-treat her if she returned. Prisca’s situation is embarrassing for her
mother. Highly possible that Alejo caused Prisca’s pregnancy. Compelling them to cohabit
could lead to further quarrels. 2. WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal
- NO. Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentary evidences even
show that it was acquired by him before their marriage. 3. WON Cipriana is entitled to P500
monthly maintenance = NO. That’s too much. P50 is enough. ATILANO v CHUA CHING
BENG (1958) 103 Phil. 255 Pilar Atilano (plaintiff-appellee), 19 years old, married Chua
Ching Beng (defendant-appellant) on May 1951. They lived in Manila with the parents of the
Ching Beng. In October of that year, the couple went back to Zamboanga for a vacation in
Pilar’s parents. She stayed behind, telling the defendant that she would go back to him later.
On September 1953, however, she filed a complaint of support against her husband, alleging
estrangement since October 1952, incessant bickering and his inability to provide a home for
them without his parents. Defendant did not disclaim obligation to support; however, he
expressed his desire to fulfil his obligation if she returns to Manila and lives with him in a
domicile separate from his parents. As the C. Mutual Help and Support FC, Art 68 The
husband and the wife are obliged to: 1. live together, 2. observe mutual love, 3. 4. respect and
fidelity, render mutual help and support FC, Art 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for
the support of the fa obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the abse
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits properties. PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 52 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 allowance of wife of $50 a expenses shall be $800 CC,
Art 111 The husband is responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family.
Thesemonth; awarded met for wife’s attorney; paraphernal property. In buy first from the
conjugal property, then from the husband's capital, and lastly from the wife'sand as an
alternative, case a modern house husband and wife shall contribute there is a separation of
property, by stipulation in the marriage settlements, the elsewhere. proportionately to the
family expenses. ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to relief FC, Art 199 Whenever 2 or more
persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolveactionthe ff persons in the at
HELD: No. To maintain an upon such as the one order herein provided: bar, the parties must
be separated or living apart 1. spouse from each other. Parties are not living apart and 2.
descendants in the nearest degree wife has been supported in the same manner 3. ascendants
in the nearest degree without complaint. As long as home is maintained 4. brothers and
sisters and the parties are living as husband and wife it may be said that the husband is
legally supporting his wife and the purpose of the marriage shall be divided FC, Art 200
When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the
sameis being carried out. As for attorney’s fees, it is only allowed to the between them in
proportion to the resources of each. successful party in litigation only where allowance is
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one
of them to furnish the support provided by the statute. provisionally, without prejudice to his
right to claim form the other obligors the share due from them. When two or more recipients
at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it,
should 12 established in the preceding Article shall be followed, the latter not have sufficient
means to satisfy all claims, the order Phil 453 unless the concurrent obliges should be the
spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be - Arturo
Pelayo is a physician who was called on preferred. by the defendants (parents of the husband)
to PELAYO v LAURON (1909) MCGUIRE v MCGUIRE (1953) 157 Neb. 226 - Lydia (66)
and Charles (80) McGuire were married. They have known each other for 3 years and wife
knew of husband’s extraordinary frugality. - She has two daughters from previous marriage,
whose education was supported by the second marriage. They are now married and living in
different states. They inherited an 80-acre farm from first husband and Lydia transferred her
interest to her daughters but she can have the rent money which she uses to visit her
daughters. Wife testified that she used to raise chickens and her profits were used to buy
clothing and groceries because husband gave her very little money, did not give her clothes
except for a single coat and never took her to a movie. Their house was not equipped with a
bathroom and kitchen was not modern. The furnace was not in good condition and she had a
hard time scooping coal for it. The car did not have an efficient heater. She could not raise
chickens anymore due to the 3 abdominal operations she went through which her husband
paid for. Because of these, wife filed an action for equity to recover suitable maintenance and
support money, and for costs and attorney’s fees. District Court decreed that wife was legally
entitled to use the credit of the husband and obligate him to pay for certain items in the nature
of improvements and repairs, furniture, and appliances for the household; purchase a new
automobile with an effective heater in 30 days; pay travel expenses of wife to visit each
daughter at least once a year; wife be entitled in the future to pledge the credit of the husband
for what may constitute necessities of life; personal - attend to their daughter in law who was
about to undergo labor. Plaintiff tried his best to help her deliver, but she died due to
childbirth. Plaintiff is now asking for due compensation for his services amounting to P500.
Defendants claim that her delivery at their domicile was only incidental, and that it was her
husband who should pay for the services rendered by the plaintiff. ISSUE: Who between the
parents-in-law and the husband is liable for the payment of Pelayo? HELD: The husband,
because rendering of medical assistance in case of illness comprises one of the mutual
obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. It is improper for plaintiff
to have brought action against the defendants simply because they were the parties who
called the plaintiff. The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by
virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract
entered into between them and the plaintiff. They are strangers with respect to the obligation
that devolves upon the husband to provide support. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
| Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 53 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law
B2012 D. Management of the Household FC, Art 71 The management of the household shall
be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses shall for such management shall be paid
in accordance with the provisions of Art 70. CC, Art 115 The wife manages the affairs of the
household. She may purchase things necessary for the support of the family, and the conjugal
partnership shall be bound thereby. She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husband
fails to deliver the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious objects is voidable,
unless the transaction has been expressly or tacitly approved by the husband, or unless the
price paid is from her paraphernal property. YOUNG v HECTOR () 740 So. 2d 1153 E.
Exercise of Profession FC, Art 73 Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only
on valid, serious and moral grounds In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether
or not: 1. the objection is proper 2. benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or
thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent The
foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. CC,
Art 117 The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However,
the provided: 1. His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and
2. His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. In case of disagreement on this
question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be
consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper
and in the best interest of the family. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 54 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 is
approximately proportionate to either their traditional participation in the targeted activities
or their proportion of the population, whichever is higher. Otherwise, the following should be
stated in the program/project paper, proposal or strategy; (a) The obstacle in achieving the
goal; (b) The steps being taken to overcome those obstacles; and (c) To the extent that steps
are not being taken to overcome those obstacles, why they are not being taken. 6. Assist
women in activities that are of critical significance to their self-reliance and development.
Sec 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. — Women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall
have the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that
of men under similar circumstances. In all contractual situations where married men have the
capacity to act, married women shall have equal rights. To this end: RA 7192 Women in
Development and Nation-building Act AN ACT PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF
WOMEN AS FULL AND EQUAL PARTNERS OF MEN IN DEVELOPMENT AND
NATION BUILDING AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 1. Title. — This Act shall
be cited as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act." Sec 2. Declaration of
Policy. — The State recognizes the role of women in nation building and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provided women
rights and opportunities equal to that of men. To attain the foregoing policy: 1. A substantial
portion of official development assistance funds received from foreign governments and
multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set aside and utilized by the agencies
concerned to support programs and activities for women; 2. All government departments
shall ensure that women benefit equally and participate directly in the development programs
and projects of said department, specifically those funded under official foreign development
assistance, to ensure the full participation and involvement of women in the development
process; and 3. All government departments and agencies shall review and revise all their
regulations, circulars, issuances and procedures to remove gender bias therein. Sec 3.
Responsible Agency. — The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) shall
primarily be responsible for ensuring the participation of women as recipients in foreign aid,
grants and loans. It shall determine and recommend the amount to be allocated for the
development activity involving women. Sec 4. Mandate. — The NEDA, with the assistance
of the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, shall ensure that the different
government departments,
including its agencies and instrumentalities which, directly or indirectly, affect the
participation of women in national development and their integration therein: 1. Formulate
and prioritize rural or countryside development programs or projects, provide income and
employment opportunities to women in the rural areas and thus, prevent their heavy
migration from rural to urban or foreign countries; 2. Include an assessment of the extent to
which their programs and/or projects integrate women in the development process and of the
impact of said programs or projects on women, including their implications in enhancing the
self-reliance of women in improving their income; 1. 2. Women shall have the capacity to
borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangement under the same
conditions as men; Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector
programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non-material resources and shall enjoy equal
treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs; 3. Women shall have equal
rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and 4. Married women shall
have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passport, secure visas and other
travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses. In all other similar
contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity to act which
shall in every respect be equal to those of men under similar circumstances. Sec 6. Equal
Membership in Clubs. — Women shall enjoy equal access to membership in all social, civic
and recreational clubs, committees, associations and similar other organizations devoted to
public purpose. They shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges accorded to their
spouses if they belong to the same organization. Sec 7. Admission to Military Schools. —
Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, consistent with the needs of the
services, women shall be accorded equal opportunities for appointment, admission, training,
graduation and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police not later than the fourth academic year
following the approval of this Act in accordance with the standards required for men except
for those minimum essential adjustments required by physiological differences between
sexes. Sec 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage. — Married persons who devote
full time to managing the household and family affairs shall, upon the working spouse's
consent, be entitled to voluntary Pag-IBIG (Pagtutulungan — Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at
Gobyerno), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) or Social Security System (SSS)
coverage to the extent of one-half (1/2) of the salary and compensation of the working
spouse. The contributions due thereon shall be deducted from the salary of the working
spouse. 3. Ensure the active participation of women and women's organizations in the
development programs and/or projects including their involvement in the planning, design,
implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation thereof; Collect sex-disaggregated
data and include such data in its program/project paper, proposal or strategy; Ensure that
programs and/or projects are designed so that the percentage of women who receive
assistance 4. 5. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009 Page 55 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 The GSIS or the SSS, as the
case may be, shall issue rules and regulations necessary to effectively implement the
provisions of this section. Sec 9. Implementing Rules. — The NEDA, in consultation with
the different government agencies concerned, shall issue rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the effective implementation of Sections 2, 3 and 4, of this Act within six (6)
months from its effectivity. Sec 10. Compliance Report. — Within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this Act and every six (6) months thereafter, all government departments,
including its agencies and instrumentalities, shall submit a report to Congress on their
compliance with this Act. Sec 11. Separability Clause. — If for any reason any section or
provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions
hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Sec 12.
Repealing Clause. — The provisions of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil
Code of the Philippines, as amended, and of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the Family Code of the Philippines, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. executed.
The only evidence offered was testimonies of the defendant and her counsel. - Appellant
Silva, however, was married to one Priscilla Isabel of Australia during such time. It was only
after May 1945, when he was sent back to US for medical treatments of his battle wounds,
did he divorce Priscilla. To add, on May 9, 1948, he contracted another marriage with
coplaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva. ISSUES: 1. 2. WON appellant’s deception and fraud
justified award of damages to defendant Yes WON defendant misrepresented herself as Mrs.
Silva - Yes HELD: 1. Yes. If appellant revealed his true situation, appellee would never have
agreed to be with appellant. Esther’s loss of employment in the Girl Scout’s Davao Council
was ultimately a result of Silva’s deception and she should be indemnified therefor. His
concealment of his real status was not mere dolo but actual fraud. He Sec 13. Effectivity
Clause. — The rights of women and all should then stand solely liable for any and all the
provisions of this Act shall take effect immediately upon its publication in the Official
Gazette or in two (2) damages arising therefrom. Moreover, Esther newspapers of general
circulation. acted in good faith since Silva formerly introduced her as Mrs. Silva, sent her
letters thus addressed which implied authority to use his name. F. Use of Surname 2. Yes. In
the face of evidence, it is safe to conclude that no marriage had really taken place. It is not
CC, Art 370 A married woman may use: proper for Esther to continue representing 1. Her
maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname (e.g.as the wife of Saturnino
considering that herself Miriam Defensor-Santiago) 2. Her maiden first name and her
husband's surname (e.g. Loi Ejercito) the time, he was still married to Priscilla at 3. Her
husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she Isabel. And as as "Mrs." 370
CC, a married woman is his wife, such per Art (e.g. Mrs. Francis Pangilinan) is authorized to
use husband’s surname, impliedly, it also excludes others from doing CC, Art 373 A widow
may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with
Article 370. likewise. 162 SCRA 66 - Private respondent Consuelo David ♥ Arturo CC, Art
378 The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to
the latter. Tolentino (yes, the one who annotated the law) in 1931. SILVA v PERALTA
(1960) - Marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943 110 Phil 57 pursuant to the law
during the Japanese Defendant Esther Peralta accompanied younger occupation by a decree
of absolute divorce on sister Florence in the latter’s arrest and the grounds of desertion and
abandonment by investigation. the wife for at least 3 continuous years. There, defendant met
plaintiff Saturnino Silva, a - Arturo Tolentino married Pilar Adorable but she US citizen and
officer of the US Army. Silva then died soon after the marriage. started courting Esther and
she later accepted his proposal of marriage having been made to - Constancia married Arturo
Tolentino on April 21, believe that he was single. They started living 1945 and they have 3
children. Constancia together as common-law husband and wife and Tolentino is the present
legal wife of Arturo bore a son, Saturnino Silva, Jr. Tolentino. They were married on Jan 14,
1945. However, - Consuelo David continued using the surname no documents of marriage
were prepared nor Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time TOLENTINO v CA (1988)
CC, Art 377 Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages
and other relief. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009 Page 56 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - that the complaint was filed.
Her usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino
(brothers and sisters). RTC: Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of
Tolentino CA: reversed RTC - ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioner’s cause of action has already
prescribed 2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the
surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced. HELD: 1. Yes - Art 1150 CC
The time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special provision which
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. Art 1149 CC Period
of prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues. The action has long prescribed
because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil Code took effect on August
30, 1950; She acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname
Tolentino in 1951. She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that
Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November 23,
1971 or 20 years after she obtained knowledge. 2. No Philippine law is silent whether or not
a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of her husband because there are no
provisions for divorce under Philippine law. Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of
the CC: the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband’s surname. She cannot be
prevented from using it, but neither can she restrain others from using it (bias much?). Art
371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to
absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce more akin
to death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as “Mrs. of
the husband” even if he has remarried. If the appeal would be granted the respondent would
encounter problems because she was able to prove that she entered into contracts with third
persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname
Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of
right. There is no usurpation of the petitioner’s name and surname. Usurpation implies injury
to the - - interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of
identity Element of usurpation o Actual use of another’s name o Use is unauthorized o Use of
another’s name is to designate personality or identity of a person None of these elements
were present in the case Silva v Peralta was cited by the petitioner but the case is not
applicable. In Silva, it was not mere use of the surname that was enjoined but the defendant’s
representation that she was the wife of Saturnino Silva, there was usurpation of the status of
the wife. YASIN v SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT (1995) 241 SCRA 606 - SUPRA No need
to file petition to revert to use of maiden name after divorce since marital ties have been
completely severed. - - - - PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 57 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 G. Relief
from Courts 1. On sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff
to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a FC, Art 72 When one of
the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugalof jealousy towards which husband in an
disposition union or commits acts her tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or
to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. was present. aggravated
degree. No sufficient cause Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide
for the separate maintenance of the PEREZ v PEREZ (1960) wife since this recognizes the
de facto separation of 109 Phil 657 the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair -
Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, must be seen as impossible, and separation
must be filed a civil case against defendant Angela necessary, stemming from the fault of the
husband. Tuason de Perez at the CFI Manila. She is under obligation to return to the
domicile. He wants to declare his wife as prodigal and place under guardianship based on the
following “When people understand that they must live allegations: together…they learn to
soften by mutual o she was squandering her estate on a young accommodation that yoke
which they know they man named Jose Boloix cannot shake off; they become good husbands
and o she was spending the conjugal partnership wives…necessity is a powerful master in
teaching of gain the duties which it imposes…” o defendant has expressed her desire to
marry (Evans v. Evans) and have children with Jose Boloix, if only to embarrass her husband
2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is CFI dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction not within the province of the courts to compel one ISSUE: WON the case falls
under the jurisdiction of the CFI or the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court. HELD: RTC has
no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court which has jurisdiction.
Material injury pertains to personal injury (personal relations between man and wife) and not
patrimonial or financial. ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921) 42 Phil 54 Plaintiff Mariano and
defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a
few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their
common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was
compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn
prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an
allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. - CFI ruled in favor of the
defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff then
asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the
defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife. ISSUES: of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property
rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland
have done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the
defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not
entitled to support. 1. 2. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or
permanent mandatory injunction HELD: PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E.
A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 58 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 X.
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT is an
agreement entered into before marriage and, in consideration thereof, between an intended
husband and wife, by which the enjoyment or devolution of property is regulated. A contract
entered into by those who are to be united in marriage, in order to establish the conditions of
their conjugal partnership with respect to present and future property. FC, Art 77 The form of
marriage settlement: 1. in writing 2. signed by the parties 3. before the celebration of the
marriage Prejudice against third persons: registered in the local civil registry the proper
registries of property. FC, Art 78 A minor, who according to law, may contract marriage may
shall be valid only if the persons designated in Art 14 to give c agreement, subject to the
provisions of the Title IX of this Code. * Art 14 FC – father, mother, surviving parent or
guardian, or persons having legal charge of them * Title IX – Parental authority * By
applying principles of statutory construction, Art 14 which is specific provision for marriage
shall prevail FC, Art 79 For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a been
pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall b competent court to be made a
party thereto. A. General Provisions FC, Art 74 The property relations between husband and
wife shall be governed in the following order: 1. by marriage settlements executed before the
marriage 2. by the provisions of this Code 3. by the local customs FC, Art 80 In the absence
of a contrary stipulation in a marriage set governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the
place of the celebration This rule shall not apply: 1. Where both spouses are aliens 2. With
respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting p the country where the property is
located 3. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered int foreign country whose
laws require different formalities for its FC, Art 75 The future spouses may, in the marriage
settlements, agree upon the regime of ACP, CPG, complete separation of property or any
other regime. In the absence of marriage settlement system of absolute community property
as established in this Code Art 81 Everything stipulated in the settlement or contracts referre
FC, shall govern. future marriage, including donations between the prospective spous
marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depe FC, Art 76 In order that
any modification in the marriage settlement may be valid, it must be valid. of the marriage,
subject to the provisions of Art 66, 67 , 128, 135 and 136. Art 66 Reconciliation after legal
separation: Separation of property and forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse shall
subsist, unless spouses agree to revive their former property regime Agreement to revive
former property regime shall be executed under oath and specify 1. Properties to be
contributed anew to the restored regime 2. Those to be retained as separated properties of
each spouse 3. Names of all their creditors, address and amount owing to each If spouse
without just cause abandons the other OR fails to comply with his/her obligations to the
family: Petition for judicial separation of property or authority to be the sole administrator of
the conjugal partnership Sufficient causes for separation of property voluntary judicial Art 67
COLLECTOR v FISHER (1961) 110 Phil 686 Walter and Beatrice Stevenson, both British
citizens were married in Manila where they lived until they established permanent residence
in California in 1945. Walter died in 1951 and instituted his wife as sole heiress to real and
personal properties in the Philippines, which were assessed for estate and inheritance tax.
ISSUE: WON in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, the net estate should be
deducted as the share of the surviving spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal
partnership. HELD: Yes. It should be deducted from net estate. It is a well-known doctrine in
our civil law that in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are
presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired
during their marriage. WHARTON’S PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTIONS apply. Property
relations of the Stevensons should be determined by the rational laws of the husband. Art 128
Art 135 Art 136 Spouses joint filing of petition for voluntary dissolution of
ACP/CPG/separation of their common properties PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |
Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 59 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
Under Art 1325 OCC, one spouse is a foreigner and there is no ante-nuptial agreement, it is
the national law of the husband that becomes the dominant law in determining the property
relations of such spouses. But since both spouses are foreigners, it is British law that should
apply. However, as there is no proof of what the law of England is in this matter and the
court is justified to indulge in processual presumption, that the law of England on this matter
is the same as our law. FC, Art 85 Donation by reason of marriage of property subject to en
the encumbrance, and the property is sold for less than the total amo liable for the deficiency.
If the property is sold for more than the total to the excess. DOMALAGAN v BOLIFER
(1916) 33 Phil. 471 - Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered into a verbal contract
wherein the former was to pay defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of the former’s
son Cipriano Domalagan with the defendant’s daughter, Bonifacia. B. Donation Propter
Nuptias Jorge Domalagan paid the sum of P500 plus P16 as hansel or token of future
marriage. However, the Bonifacia married one Laureano Sisi. 1. Requisites for donations
Upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan demanded return of the said sum of P516 plus
FC, Art 82 Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration,
inarising from the fact that interest and damages consideration of the same, and in favor of
one or both of the future spouses. he was obliged to sell his real property in Bohol to come up
with the sum. REQUISITES FOR DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS Defendant denied
complaint and alleged that it (DPN) did not constitute a cause of action. 1. made before
celebration of the marriage RTC: No evidence to show that plaintiff suffered 2. made in
consideration of the marriage any addtl damages. Ruled in favor of plaintiff for the return of
P516 plus 6% interest from Dec 17, 3. made in favor of one or both of the future 1910 plus
costs. spouses DONATIONS EXCLUDED 1. in favor of the spouses after the marriage
(ordinary wedding gifts) 2. in favor of future spouses, made before the celebration of
marriage, but not in consideration 3. in favor of persons other than the spouses, even though
they may be founded on the marriage * governed by provisions on ordinary donations WHO
MAY DONATE 1. the spouses to each other 2. the parents to one or both of the spouses 3.
by third persons to one or both of the spouses DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS Does not
require express acceptance May be made by minors (Art 78) If present property is donated
and property regime is not ACP, limited to 1/5 Grounds for revocation in Art 86
ORDINARY DONATIONS Express acceptance necessary Cannot be made by minors No
limit to donation of present property provided legitimes are not impaired Grounds for
revocation are found in law on donations ISSUE: WON Domalagan can demand his P516
since no marriage took place HELD: YES. The amount constitutes DPN since it fulfills all
the requirements, thus it may be revoked. Verbal contracts are valid even if it not clothed in
the necessary form. SERRANO v SOLOMON (1959) 105 Phil 998 Melchor Solomon
executed a supposed deed of DPN, stating among others that if there are no children and wife
dies first, all of his properties and all properties acquired during the union will be inherited
by those who reared the wife. The wife Alejandria Solomon died less than 9 months later
without issues, upon which Estanislao Serrano, the uncle who reared her instituted this action
to enforce the deed. - CFI: Donation was not a donation propter nuptias because it was not
made in consideration of marriage and it was not made to one or both parties of the marriage
ISSUE: WON the donation made by Melchor can be considered as a donation propter
nuptias. HELD: NO and the alleged donation is null & void. CFI decision affirmed.
Estanislao won’t get anything. Whether you apply Art 1327 of the old CC or Art. 126 FC,
Art 83 These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in CC,
insofar as they are not of the new CC, the result would be the same, modified by the
following articles. donations propter nuptias are only those bestowed (1) before the
celebration of marriage, (2) in consideration of the same and (3) upon one or both of the
spouses. Melchor’s donation violated PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 60 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 conditions
2 and 3. It was not in consideration solely of the marriage, it had additional terms like the
marriage had to be childless and one of the spouses had to die before the other. Also, it was
not in favor of Alejandria. Instead, it was in favor of her parents and those who raised her.
Based on Manresa’s commentary, donations granted to persons other than the spouses even
though founded on the marriage are excluded. It’s not a donation inter vivos (during their
lifetime) either, because donee never accepted it by same instrument of donation or in
separate document as required by law. It’s not a donation mortis causa (upon death) either. It
has to be governed by provisions on the disposition execution of wills to be appreciated as
such. Besides, donor is still alive. It will only be operational upon his death. SOLIS v
BARROSO (1928) 53 Phil 912 - Spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a DPN
of certain lands in a private document in favor of their son Alejo and his soon-to-be-wife
Fortunata Solis, in consideration of their upcoming marriage. One condition of the donation
is that in case one of the donees dies, half of the lands thus donated would revert to the
donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. On the same month, Alejo and
Fortunata got married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession of the
donated lands to them. A month later, Alejo died. In the same year, Juan also died. After
Juan’s death, Maxima recovered possession of the donated lands. Surviving donee, Fortunata
filed an action against Maxima (surviving donor) et al and demanded: 1. the execution of the
proper deed of donation according to law, 2. transfer of one-half of the donated property to
her 3. to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its fruits - CFI granted the
plaintiff’s prayer, basing its judgment on Art 1279 of the Civil Code. It ordered the
defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata, valid in form to transfer to her
the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation. ISSUE:
WON the private document is valid as DPN HELD: NO. DPN is governed by laws on
donation. Art 633 provides that for a donation of a real property to be valid, it must be made
in a public instrument. The only exception to the rule are onerous and remuneratory
contracts, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then
governed by the rules on contracts. Because the DPN by the spouses were made in a private
instrument, it is not valid and does not confer any rights. PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 61 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 MATEO v LAGUA (1969) 29 SCRA 864 Spouses Lagua donated half of
their owned land to their son Alejandro in consideration of his marriage to Bonifacia Mateo.
This was executed in a public document. Alejandro died so his son would succeed in the
ownership of the land. The father in law continued tending the farm and giving the wife her
share in the fruits. Until the sustenance stopped and the wife discovered that the father-in-law
sold the land. The wife successfully moved for the annulment the sale in a court proceeding.
However, the Laguas subsequently filed for the annulment of the donation because it
neglected their own support as well as the legitime of their other son. Alejandro’s younger
brother, Gervacio, filed a suit for annulment on the ground that it prejudiced his legitime. -
Bonifacia (the wife) appealed the decision raising the following errors: o Validity of the DPN
have been determined in a previous case o Action to annul the donation has already
prescribed since the case was filed 41 years after the donation o DPN is revocable only for
any grounds enumerated in Art 132 of the New Civil Code o Determining the legitime of the
Lagua brothers in the hereditary estate of Cipriano the CA should have applied the provisions
of the Civil Code of 1889 and not Art 888 NCC ISSUE: WON an onerous DPR may be
revoked HELD: YES, DPN is without onerous condition and based on liberalities are subject
to annulment due to inofficiousness. If proved that the value of the DPN exceeds the
disposable free portion of the donor, it may be revoked. However, in this case, no evidence
takes◊was adduced as to the burdensome nature of the DPN. - future property effect upon
death (by will or mortis causa) 3. Grounds for revocation of DPN 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. FC, Art 86
Donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the don if the marriage is not celebrated
or judicially declared voi settlements, which shall be governed by Art 81 when the marriage
takes place without the consent of the par when the marriage is annulled and the donee acted
in bad fai upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse if it is with a resolutory
condition and the condition is complied when the donee has committed and act of ingratitude
as spec * What does Par 2 mean? The donor is not the parent who did not give consent. *
What is a resolutory condition? The DPN is already received which enjoyment is subject to
termination upon happening of the future and uncertain event. In other words done is
forbidden to do something. (E.g. Car is given but it will be revoked if you use it anywhere
outside NCR.) * Grounds of revocation in this article is not by operation of law. Those which
revokes by operation of law are the ff: 1. if the DPN is stipulated in the marriage settlement
and no marriage took place (Art 81) 2. for void ab initio and subsequent marriages in a
spouse’s presumptive death, provided the donee acted in bad faith (Art 43 (3) in relation to
Art 50) * Art 765, CC – Acts of ingratitude (1) If the donee should commit some offense
against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his
parental authority; (2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act
involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has
been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under 2. Donation propter
nuptias of his authority; present or future property (3) If he unduly refuses him support when
the donee is legally or morally bound to give FC, Art 84 If the future spouses agree upon a
regime other than thesupport to community of property absolute the donor. donate to each
other in their marriage settlements more than 1/5 of their present property considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the takes effect upon ◊provisions on the
wills. DONATIONS OF - present property celebration of marriage PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 62 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 4. Void donations WHAT ARE VOID DONATIONS 1. between
spouses during marriage 2. direct or indirect (e.g. stepchild or child of the other spouse and a
person whom the spouses is presumptive heir at the time of donation) REASONS FOR
PROHIBITION 1. donation inter vivos is dictated by principle of unity of personality of
spouses during marriage 2. prevent weaker spouses from being abused by stronger spouse,
whether by abuse of affection or threats of violence 3. protect creditors 4. prevent indirect
modification of the marriage settlement PROHIBITION IS ALSO APPLICABLE TO 1.
common-law marriages 2. parties living in a state of adultery or concubinage * Reasons:
possibility of undue influence and that if ruled otherwise, those living in guilt would be better
off than those in legal union NAZARENO v BIROG (1947) 45 OG 11 Supp 268 ISSUE:
WON plaintiff, Nazareno, may recover title and possession of a parcel of land described
here? HELD: NO. Not only did he lose ownership of the two portions of the land that the
Birogs and Ariolas possess, he signed a deed in favor of Ariola on the third and last portion;
therefore, he is estopped from claiming the land. More importantly, appeal must be dismissed
since plaintiff has no cause of action. The deed of donation upon which he bases his claim to
land is null and void since it is made by the donor to a grandchild of his wife by the wife’s
previous marriage. The donation falls under the prohibition in Art.1335, CC. Neither has the
plaintiff acquired the land by prescription for there is no evidence that he ever possessed it or
claimed it against his grandfather (as evidence in deed in favor of Ariola, signed by Nazareno
as witness). MATABUENA v CERVANTES (1971) 38 SCRA 284 While Felix Matabuena
and Petronila Cervantes were living as common law spouses, the man donated to her a parcel
of land. They eventually got married and Felix died, leaving behind his properties to his wife
Petronila. Felix’s sister Cornelia questions the validity of the donation and claims ownership
over her brother’s estate. ISSUE: WON the ban on donation inter vivos applies when the
donation was made during common law relationship HELD: Yes, common law spouses fall
within the prohibition hence the donation is null and void as contrary to public policy.
HARDING v COMMERCIAL UNION (1918) 38 Phil 464 Mrs. Harding bought an
insurance policy for the car her husband gave her. A few days later, the car was totaled in a
fire. The insurance company refused to pay saying that the donation of husband to the wife
was void. ISSUE: WON the car was validly donated by the husband to the wife HELD: YES.
The car may be considered as a moderate gift. Whether a gift is moderate or not would
depend upon the circumstances of the parties, in this case, nothing was disclosed by the
record. Also, the insurance company is not the proper party to question the moderateness of
the gift. It can only be raised by persons who bear such a relation to the parties making the
transfer interfere with their rights or interest. SUMBAD v CA Andrea◊ Alberta Aben
Daughter Alberta ♥ Mariano Meleno Nazareno ◊(1999) - Rodriguez ♥ Juan Aben
Bonifacio Nazareno (plaintiff) When Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to Cirilo
Braganza. Andrea and her second husband Cirilo had no offspring. Cirilo executed a deed of
donation of land to his then six-year old step-grandson Bonifacio. The donation was accepted
in the same deed by Alberta and Mariano, parents of Bonifacio. Cirilo continued to possess
and enjoy the land. Beginning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the land: 1930 71 ares and 30
centares to Birog for 1, 100 (paid) 1933 2 hectares to Birog for 2, 200 (initially with
remaining balance of 300, later paid 275, wrote promissory note for 25) 1934 1 hectare and
70 ares to Ariola for 1, 600 (balance of 600, promissory note for that sum payable at end of
Feb or March 1935) These two buyers immediately took possession of the land and
cultivated them. Cirilo died on Dec.1934 and since Ariola had not paid by Feb1935, plaintiff
wrote him a letter demanding the payment. Pedro Braganza (brother of Cirilo) collected
balance of 25 from Birog in March 1935). PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.
E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 63 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 308
SCRA 75 Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agata’s husband, George Tait, Sr., lived in a
common-law marriage with Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a certain parcel of unregistered
land in Sitio Sumat, Bontoc. George died in 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria Tait sold lots
included within the Sum-at property in favor of the private respondents who purchased the
lots on the strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the seller, Maria,
to be the owner of the property in question. In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice
Tait brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of
possession with damages against private respondents, alleging that they are the children and
compulsory heirs of George and Agata. They claim that after the death of their mother, their
father sold the Otucan property and used the proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot in
Sum-at, Bontoc and that from 1982 to 1983, Maria sold lots included within the Sum-at
property to private respondents without their knowledge and consent. They further alleged
that although the private respondents were warned that the Sum-at property did not belong to
Maria they still purchased the lots from Maria and that Maria had no right to sell the Sum-at
property so the deeds of sale are null and void and did not transfer title to private
respondents. During the trial, petitioners and defense presented several witnesses. ISSUES:
1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with respect to the forgery of the deed of
donation should be given credence. NO. The court agreed with the trial and appellate court’s
decision that Eillenger’s testimony is “vague and incredible” and incapable of impugning the
validity of the public document. Forgery should be proven by clear and convincing evidence,
and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same. Not only is Shirley Eillenger’s
testimony difficult to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as she anticipated the questions
of petitioner’s counsel. Petitioner’s should have presented handwriting experts to support
their claim that George’s signature on the deed of donation was indeed a forgery. by C.A.
Nos. 270 and 641, to administer oaths. In accordance with the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed, it is to be presumed that the deputy clerk of court who
notarized the deed of donation in this case was duly authorized by the clerk of court. 3. WON
deed of donation contravenes Art 133, CC NO. Art 133 provides that “every donation
between spouses during the marriage shall be void.” This prohibition does not apply when
the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing.” This prohibition extends to common-law relations (Matabuena v Cervantes). In
fact, Art 87, FC provides that “every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which
the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition
shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.”
However, this point is being raised for the first time in the SC. Litigants cannot raise an issue
for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.
Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were unable to present evidence
in support of such a claim. The evidence on record does not show whether George was
married to Maria and, if so, when the marriage took place. If Maria was not married to
George, evidence should have been presented to show that at the time the deed of donation
was executed, George and Maria were still maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice
Tait’s (one of the witnesses presented) testimony is only to the effect that in 1941, Maria
became their stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George and Maria continuously
maintained common-law relations until the date when the donation was made (April 2,
1974). * In short, the donation was valid because there was no evidence to support the
allegation that George was married to Maria. There was also no evidence that the two were
still living as commonlaw spouses at the time the donation was made. CHING v GOYANKO
JR. had seven◊(2006) 506 SCRA 735 - Joseph Goyanko Sr ♥ Epifania dela Cruz
children who are the respondents in this case - Respondents claim that their property was
named after their aunt Sulpicia Goyanko because their father was a foreigner so Sulpicia had
to sell it to Joseph first before Joseph was able to sell it to his common law wife petitioner
herein Maria Ching 2. WON the deed of donation is invalid under Art 749 CC, which
requires a public instrument as a requisite for the validity of donations of immovable
property. NO. Petitioners contend that the person who notarized the deed had no authority to
do so. However, the acknowledgment clause states that the person who notarized it was the
deputy clerk of court who acted “for and in the absence of the clerk of court who is
authorized, under Sec. 21 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
64 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - Ching claims to be the owner who purchased
the property for a certain price RTC and CA dismissed the case because of overwhelming
evidence that she was concubine C. System of Absolute Community 1. General Provisions
ISSUE: WON the sale to the concubine was valid HELD: NO. It falls under the prohibited
donation between spouses. FC, Art 88 The absolute community of property between spouses
shal marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the c other time shall be
void. FC, Art 89 No waiver of rights, interests, shares and effects of case of judicial
separation of property. When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or
same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as prov such waiver may
petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent credits. FC, Art 90 The provisions on co-
ownership shall apply to the ACP b this Chapter. 2. What constitutes community property
FC, Art 91 Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriag all the property
owned by the spouses at the time of the celebr FC, Art 92 The ff shall be excluded from the
ACP: 1. 2. 3. acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, by either spo any, unless it is
expressly provided by the donor, testator or property for personal and exclusive use of either
spouse. However, jew acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legi fruits as
well as the income, if any, of such property FC, Art 93 Property acquired during the marriage
is presumed to one of the excluded therefrom. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |
Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 65 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
3. Charges upon the ACP separate property, deductible for his share upon FC, Art 94 The
ACP shall be liable for: liquidation (1) The support of the spouses, their common children,
and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be
governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted
during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the * Example
of ante-nuptial debt in Par 9: amortization community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse
with the consent of conjugal dwelling or family vehicle (3) Debts and obligations contracted
by either spouse without the consent * Difference between Par 1 and Par 2 may have been
benefited; * Difference between Par 4 and Par 5 (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses,
including major or minor repairs (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made
during marriage upon the by the family; FC, Art 95 Whatever may be lost during the
marriage in any game of (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete
agambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne professional or vocational
course, or other activity for selfimprovement; community but any winnings therefrom shall
form part of the commu (7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both
spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive * course or other
activity for giving double loss to the purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational To discourage gambling, self-improvement; (9) Ante-nuptial debts of either
spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Catholic virtues of reflection of
Article, the support children of either◊illegitimate gambler spouse, and liabilities incurred by
either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the If the winning ticket in belottery/sweepstakes
given be * payment of which shall a considered as advances to deducted from the share of
the debtor-spouse upon liquidation ofto spouse by a and the community; friend, it is
considered a donation (10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found
to be groundless. under Art 92 (1) and winnings will not form part of ACP unless expressly
provided paragraph If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing
liabilities, except those falling under by donor. (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for
the unpaid balance with their TABULAR FORM OF ART. 94 (Ma’am Beth’s Lecture)
DEBTS & OBLIGATIONS TAXES & EXPENSES SUPPORT 2 incurred by: administrator
-spouse, both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other 4 including minor or
major repairs upon community property 1 of spouse, common exclusive/ separate OR
ACP◊children, legitimate children - For illegit: advance, subject to reimbursement upon
liquidation 6 commence or complete education (professional or vocational) e.g. language,
speech power, leadership, law, culinary - by either spouse 8 value donated/promised to
children for commencement and completion of education - no age limit - 3 incurred by one
without the consent of the other to the extent that family may have been benefited (E.g. failed
business which was initially ok) 7 antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as benefited the
family (no consent of other spouse needed) 9 antenuptial debts, that do not benefit family, for
support of in case of insufficiency of 5 mere ◊illegitimate children or crime/quasi-delict
preservation of separate property used by the family 10 litigation between spouses, unless
groundless PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-
2009 Page 66 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 4. Ownership and disposition of the
ACP 5. Dissolution FC, Art 99 The ACP terminates 1. death of either spouse (Art 103) FC,
Art 96 The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to(Art 63
& 64) 2. legal separation of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the or declared void (Art 50 proper remedy, 3. annulled court by the wife for a to
52) which must be availed of within 5 years from the date of the contract implementing
separation of property during the marriage (Art 134 to 4. judicial such decision. 138) In the
event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority FC, Art 100 The separation in
fact between husband and wife shall or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a 1. offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live t the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before theto be is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. offer supported 2. 3. * Ma’am Beth thinks this is wrong because it
does not take into consideration the expertise of the husband and the woman. What if the
wife is a BA major while the husband does not know a damn thing about economics, shall his
economic decision still prevail? * Okay, you say that it’s not totally unfair because she can
go to Court and assert her views. But is that sufficient remedy for the wife? Unless you really
want to escalate the fight, resorting to judicial settlement is like raging a war. It will only turn
minor agreements into major brawl. Plus the cost of lawsuit, it just makes matters worse!
When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the o obtained in a summary
proceeding In the absence of sufficient community property, the separa liable for the support
of the family. The spouse-present sha given judicial authority to administer or encumber any
specifi fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share FC, Art 101 If a spouse without a
just cause abandons the other or fai the aggrieved spouse may petition to the court: 1.
receivership 2. judicial separation of property 3. authority for sole administration of ACP,
subject to precaution The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph ref
1. marital 2. parental 3. property relations FC, Art 97 Either spouse may dispose by will of
his or her interest in the community property. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the
other when he or she ha returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period
o give any consent of as other. However, either shall be FC, Art 98 Neither spouse may
donate any community property without theinformation theto his/her whereabouts spouse
prima facie the conjugal dwelling. may, without the consent of the other, make moderate
donations occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. * Remedies of spouse present in
case of abandonment (Art 101) 1. receivership 2. judicial separation of property 3. authority
to be the sole administrator of ACP * Presumption of abandonment - Absent from conjugal
dwelling for three months - Failed to inform other of whereabouts for three months
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
67 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 6. Liquidation of assets and liabilities 1. 2. 3. 4.
3. extra-judicial agreement (only if there are no debts) * 1 year prescription period is not
practical. Filipinos have apply: FC, Art 102 Upon dissolution of the ACP, the following
procedure shall a tradition of one year of mourning (babang An inventory shall be prepared,
listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of
each spouse. luksa). The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be spouse
said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94. * Who
may challenge validity? Heirs of the deceased * If no liquidation, any encumbrance or
disposition is 5. 6. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter beit, you keep it forever) void (you can’t sell * Mandatory constitute its The net
remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall for subsequent marriage to be
separate divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division
was this according no logical reason for agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or◊to
property unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For
purpose Tolentino of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with
Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the
market value of the community property at the time of the FC, Art 104 Whenever the
liquidation of the community properties of celebration of the marriage and the market value
at the time of its dissolution person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultan
The presumptive legitimes of the common children each community shall be determined
upon such proof as may be c Article 51. of doubt as to which community the existing
properties belong, Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partitioncommunities
in proportion to the capital and duration of each. of the properties, the on which it is situated
shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the choose to remain. Children below the age
of seven years * The clause “before the effectivity of this Code” court has decided otherwise.
In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the is there
because simultaneously liquidation of two or best interests of said children. * How to apply
the forfeitures in Art 43(2) and Art 63(2) NET ASSETS what remains after payment of
community debts and obligations - NET PROFITS in Par 4 above, “shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution” more marriages is no longer
legally possible under FC which imposes a mandatory requirement for marriages subsequent
to an unliquidated marriage to have complete separation of properties. ONAS v JAVILLO
(1934) 59 Phil 733 - Crispulo Javillo married Ramona Levis and they had 5 children. After
Ramona’s death, he married Rosario Onas and they had 4 children. - During his first
marriage 11 parcels of land were How to compute net acquired; while in his 2nd marriage 20
parcels of profit: land were acquired. - Partition was made on the claim that the Market value
properties of the 2nd marriage were products of – debt of community the first marriage. net
assets or remainder Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that – market value at marriage
was made by the administrator of the estate of NET PROFIT her husband. She alleges the
following errors: o All the properties acquired during the second marriage were acquired
with the properties FC, Art 103 Upon the termination of the marriage by death proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased. of the first marriage. o TC erred in approving the
partition dated If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the community property September 9, or extra-judicially within six months from the
death of the deceased spouse 1931, notwithstanding that the period, no liquidation is made,
any disposition or encumbrance involving same did not property of the terminated of the the
community include all properties marriage deceased. shall be void. Should the surviving
spouse contract a subsequent marriage ISSUES and RULING: mandatory regime of
complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage. * Liquidate CP within 1 year from death of spouse. How? 1. judicial settlement in
testate or intestate proceedings 2. judicial action, or ordinary action for partition 1) WON the
community partnership shall continue to exist between the surviving spouse and the heirs of
the deceased husband or wife - NO When the marriage is dissolved, the cause that brought
about the community ceases, for the principles of an ordinary partnership are not PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 68 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - applicable to this community, which is governed by
special rules. Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to have any effect for
community of property is admissible and proper in so far as it conforms to unity of life, to the
mutual affection between husband and wife, and serves as a recompense for the care of
preserving and increasing the property; all of which terminates by the death of one of the
partners. Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annulled or when during
the marriage and agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal property. The conjugal
partnership exists as long as the spouses are united. - 1/26 to each of the children of the 2nd -
19/195 to◊marriage 2. All other properties acquired during the 2nd marriage each children of
the 1st marriage; - 2/65 to each children of the 2nd marriage; 28/65 to the surviving spouse
HELD: Since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of each spouse cannot be
determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided
between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership 2)
WON the properties of the second marriage can be claimed as products of the properties of
the first marriage - NO Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution of
the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the acquisition be made by his or
her lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own capital, in which the other consort, or his
or her heirs, can claim no share. 3) WON the partition that was approved by the lower court
is valid - NO Was based on the erroneous assumption that the properties of the second
marriage were produced by the properties of the first marriage. ** The property
corresponding to the first marriage consists of the 11 parcels of land. The remaining 20
parcels of land were acquired during the second marriage. VDA DE DELIZO v DELIZO
(1976) 69 SCRA 216 - This is about two cases involving the partition of the conjugal
properties two marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo. He first married Rosa Villasfer which
lasted for 18 yrs (1891-1909) and they had 3 children. He then married Dorotea de Ocampo
which lasted for 46 yrs (1911-1957) and they had 9 children. In 1957 Nicolas died (90 yrs
old). - Court originally adjudicated of the land to the 3 children from the 1st marriage, to the
surviving spouse and in equal shares to the children of both marriages. This was modified in
consideration of the fact that, only the Caanawan property (67 hectares) was shown to be
acquired during the first marriage and only 20 hectares of which was made productive during
this time. However, it is from the fruits of this property that enabled the spouses in the 2 nd
marriage to acquire - 8/39 (1/6 +◊all other future property. 1. Caanawan property and on
P.Campa 1/26) to each of the children from the 1st marriage; 1. 2. 3. 1st conjugal partnership
entitled to 18/64 of the whole estate (18 yrs) 2nd conjugal partnership entitled to 46/64 of the
whole estate (46 yrs) The share of Nicolas Delizo is of the net remainder of CPG of both
marriages or 32/64, divided into equal shares among all his heirs (all 13 of the kids) Thus…
the final sharing 1. Rosa’s share: 9/64 of the whole estate, to be divided among their ◊scheme
is 3 kids (142/1664 each) 2. Dorotea’s share: 23/64 of the whole estate + her share in
Nicolas’ estate (662/1664) 3. Nicolas’ share: 32/64 of the whole estate to be divided into 13
equal parts (64/1664 each) PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 69 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 D.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains 1. General Provisions 2. Exclusive Property FC, Art 109 The
following shall be exclusive property of each spouse: (BY DIRECT ACQUISITION OR
ORIGINALLY EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY 1. brought to the marriage as his or her own 2.
acquired during marriage by gratuitous title FC, Art 105 In case the future spouses agree in
the marriage settlements shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions
in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. (BY SUBSTITUTION) 3. acquired by
right of redemption, by barter or by exchange w The provisions of this Chapter shall also
apply to conjugal partnerships of gains spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights 4. purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or the husban
other laws, as provided in Article 256. E.g. of OWNED PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE FC,
Art 106 . Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife 1. property
owned before the marriage proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties 2. acquired prior to marriage under defective spouses through their efforts or by
chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriagedefectthe partnership, the the title where or of
was cured during gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be marriage
agreed in the marriage settlements. 3. FC, Art 107 The rules applied in Art 88 and 89 also
apply to CPG. Art 88 – ACP begins at precise moment of celebration of marriage Art 89 –
prohibition on waiver of rights, interest, shares and effects of ACP during marriage
NATURE OF INTEREST 1. There is no co-ownership, instead partnership 2. Each spouse
has mere inchoate rights or expectancy over partnership property during marriage 4. 5. those
alienated by spouse prior to marriage but reacquired during due to annulment, rescission or
resolution of the contract, or revocation of donation, by virtue of which it was alienated
property actually delivered to spouse during marriage where cause or consideration came
from such spouse prior to the marriage property bought by installment prior and fully paid
only during marriage but ownership already vested on buyer-spouse prior to the marriage;
amount paid by CPG must be reimbursed upon liquidation E.g. of ACQUISITION BY
GRATUITOUS TITLE 1. property acquired during marriage through testate (heir, devisee or
legatee) or intestate FC, Art 108 The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the
succession or by donation conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements. received as 2. proceeds of insurance where
beneficiary of another person’s policy 3. gratuity given as bounty or out of pure liberality by
employer for long dedicated service (distinguished from pension which is conjugal property
under Art 117, FC) 4. unearned increment (increase in value due to ordinary course of time
e.g. modernization of a parcel of land) 5. moral damages awarded for personal injury
sustained E.g of OTHER SEPARATE PROPERTY 1. collection of credits belonging to one
spouse exclusively 2. money through mortgage, if not used for benefit of CPG 3. properties
in co-ownership FC, Art 110 The spouses retain the ownership, possession, adm strict
dominion Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer◊properties. the administration
means of a public instrument (notarized) which shall be recorded in property is located.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
70 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC, Art 111 A spouse of age may mortgage,
encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of his/her exclusive property, HELD: without the
consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court The land belongs to Rodriguez. She is
allowed to retain ownership of the property she brought into the second marriage (Art 36
CC). She merely had Hilarion administer her property for her. There is no law that prohibits
this but it cannot be FC, Art 112 The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse
administered by wife’s property that he is concluded that the the other terminates the
administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be turned
overbecause he administering becomes his simply to the owner-spouse. has done so for a
long time. PEOPLE’S BANK AND TRUST CO v REGISTER OF FC, Art 113 Property
donated or left by will to the spouses pertain to the donee-spouse as his or her own exclusive
propertyDEEDS (1934) 60 Phil 167 without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper.
Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of instrument entitled “Agreement
and FC, Art 114 If the donation are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be of Trust” in
which Dominga Angeles, Declaration donee-spouse, whenever they have been advanced by
the CPG. married to Manuel Sandoval living in Palawan, conveyed in trust her paraphernal
property, trustee FC, Art 115 Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, was to and
similar mortgage constituted on such usufructs redeem benefits property on gratuitous or
onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case. with funds derived from the rents or sale
thereof, grant a loan of P10000 with which to redeem mortgage and collect the rents to be
derived LIM v GARCIA (1907) from said property while remained unsold. 7 Phil 320 -
Hilario Lim died in 1903 leaving a widow ISSUES: (defendant) and 9 children (plaintiffs)
and an 1. WON the rents collected are fruits of the interest in P50000 estate. The children
contend wife’s property which therefore belongs to that certain properties should not be
included in CPG, the conjugal property because Lim bought these 2. WON management
belongs to husband into the marriage. The children also allege that 3. WON contract is null
and void since husband the RTC erred in including from the inventory did not give consent
three parcels of land which Lim’s widow claim to be paraphernal property acquired by
exchanging HELD: Wife, as owner and administratrix of her properties exclusively
belonging to her. paraphernal property, may appoint trustee to collect There is a presumption
in Art 1407 CC that all the fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet estate of the married
couple will be considered conjugal property since they still have to answer to CPG property
unless it is proven that is was part expenses in the administration and preservation of of the
separate estate of husband or wife. the paraphernal property.
She may likewise do such without consent of the husband, subject to recourse HELD: The
three parcels of land were acquired by the by husband or his heirs, thus rendering such
widow through exchanging properties which she contract merely voidable or void. inherited
from her father. Thus they are paraphernal. The evidence presented by the children was not
PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES v POIZAT (1925) sufficient to overcome the presumption
that the 48 Phil 536 properties included in the conjugal property belong Gabriela Andrea de
Costen executed in favor of there. Unless it is proven that the property is her husband, Juan
Poizat a general power of part of the separate estate of one of the attorney which among other
things authorized spouses, it will be considered conjugal him “in her name, place and stead,
and making property. use of her rights and actions” to borrow money and execute a mortgage
over he properties now RODRIGUEZ v DELA CRUZ (1907) in question. 8 Phil 665 -
Defendant secured a loan of P10,000 from - Plaintiff Matea Rodriguez is second wife of
plaintiff to pay a mortgage; however mortgage Hilarion dela Cruz while defendants are
Hilarion’s executed by husband signed merely in his own children by his first wife; this is an
action to name and not as attorney-in-fact. For failure to recover parcels of land in question
from pay loan, property foreclosed and later sold at defendants. auction to plaintiff. Wife
opposes confirmation of auction sale on - Matea claims that property given to her by her
ground that mortgage was null and void since deceased father but in prior action by husband
was unauthorized. defendants for partition of Hilarion’s property, lower court adjudged lands
in question to them HELD: The husband exceeded the scope of his on theory that such lands
were acquired during authority. Defendant may have had authority to Hilarion’s first
marriage. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-
2009 Page 71 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 borrow money and mortgage real
property of wife but law specifies how and in what manner it should be done, which was not
duly complied with in this case. Mortgage in question executed by him only and not on
behalf of wife, thus it is not binding on his wife. * One word could have changed everything:
“for” or “by” CASTRO v MIAT (2003) 397 SCRA 271 - Spouses Moises and Concordia
Miat bought a piece of land in Paco on installment basis on May 17, 1977. Concordia died
the following year. However, it was only on December 14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay
its balance because he went to UAE to work. He secured his title over the property in his
name as a widower. There was also a dispute to the ownership of the two children (Romeo
and Alexander) of the property. HELD: Since the spouses were married before the effectivity
of the FC, the provisions of CC apply. Records show that the Paco property was acquired by
onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund, hence it is clearly conjugal. Art
160 of CC provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains to the husband or the wife. The presumption
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. 3.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains a. Presumption that property is conjugal FC, Art 116 All
property acquired during the marriage wh made, contracted or registered in the name of one
or both spou the contrary is proved. Important points regarding conjugal nature of properties:
1. presumption applies even if manner in which property was acquired is not shown 2. the
party invoking this presumption must first prove that the party was acquired during the
marriage 3. proof of acquisition during marriage is a condition for the operation of this
presumption 4. presumption of prevails over ordinary rules of accession 5. presumption is
rebuttable by strong, clear and convincing evidence 6. presumption is stronger when creditors
are involved 7. the burden of proof is on the party asserting that the property is exclusively
owned by a spouse In overthrowing the conjugal character… • RECITALS IN DEED OF
SALE is not sufficient because to permit such would make a spouse a sole arbiter of
character of property acquired during marriage • • • • PROPERTY IN NAME OF ONE
SPOUSE is likewise not enough to dispute the conjugality of a property BUT if there is no
date of acquisition, the fact that the title is named after the spouse makes the property
exclusive o That’s why you should keep not only the title but also the deed of sale PROOFS
OF PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY o possession of some paraphernal funds under her
administration and available for investment o sufficiency of such funds for price of property
o investment of such funds in property in question SOURCE OF FUNDS is not material to
the conjugality or exclusivity of property because it is rather difficult to determine
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ONE SPOUSE that the property in question is conjugal is a
strong evidence against the party making admission or his/her heirs PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 72 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 JOCSON v CA (1989) 170 Moises Jocson ◊SCRA 333 - Emilio
Jocson ♥ Alejandra Poblete & Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is married to Ernesto
Vasquez. The mother Alejandra died intestate, and so did the father Emilio in 1972. - June
20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing validity of 3 documents executed by Emilio (their
father) during his lifetime. He prays that the following be declared null and void and that the
properties involved be partitioned between him andhis sister: 1. Deed of Sale executed July
27, 1968 wherein Emilio sold to Agustina 6 parcels of land in Naic, Cavite for P10,000.00.
Deed included Emilio’s manifestation that the lands were sold at a low price because it was
his loving, helpful and thoughtful daughter who bought the property. He says his son
possesses such qualities too. He further claims that the sale did not violate any law and that
he did not touch his wife’s properties. He acknowledged receipt of payment. 2. Deed of Sale
executed July 27, 1968, selling 2 rice mills and a camalig in Naic, Cavite to Agustina for
P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged receipt too. 3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Adjudication with Sale executed March 9, 1969 wherein Emilio and Agustina, excluding
Moises, extrajudicially partitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing such into 3. Emilio
sold his share to Agustina. All documents were executed before a notary public. Nos. 1 and 2
were registered with the Register of Deeds. Old certificates were cancelled and new
certificates issued in the name of Agustina. Moises allegations: 1. #1 is null and void because
his father’s consent was obtained by fraud, deceit, undue pressure, influence and other illegal
machinations. He also alleges that property was sold for a simulated price considering that
his sister had no work or livelihood of her own. Also, he claims that the contract is fictitious,
simulated and fabricated. 2. Same allegations re #2 and #3 with additional allegation that he
was deliberately excluded and they intended to defraud him of his legitimate share. He also
claims that defendants were employed in their parents’ business and they must have used
business earnings or simulated consideration in order to purchase the properties. 3. No real
sale between dad and daughter living under same roof. 4. Dad didn’t need money since sold
properties were all income-producitng. 5. - - - - - #1 and #2 are unliquidated conjugal
properties that Emilio can’t validly sell. 6. #3: he only questions sale of dad’s share to sister
but not extrajudicial partition. RTC decided in favor of petitioner. Documents were simulated
and fictitious because: 1) no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties, 2) prices were
grossly inadequate tantamount to lack of consideration at all, 3) improbability of sale
considering circumstances. Designed to exclude Moises. RTC further declared #1 and #2
properties as conjugal by virtue of registration papers which declared: “Emilio Jocson,
married to Alejandra Poblete.” Ordered registration of propertiy to two children. CA
reversed. Nos. 1 and 2 barred by prescription because annulment of contract based on fraud
must be filed 4 years from discovery of such which begins on the date of the registration with
the Register of Deeds. All documents actually and intended to be binding and effective
against Emilio. Proof of such: issuance of new titles. Partition with sale in Number 3 is valid
since it was done in accordance with New CC Art. 996 on intestate succession and Moises’
1/3 share has not been prejudiced. ISSUES & RULING: 1. WON suit is solely based on
fraud and as such is barred by prescription. - NO. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as
when consent’s obtained by fraud is voidable (CC, Art. 1330) and action for annulment must
be filed within 4 years from time of discovery of fraud (CC Art. 1391 par.4). Discovery
means the time when contract was registered with Register of Deeds (Gerona v. De
Guzman). - If this was the only consideration, then it is barred by prescription. But he further
assailed that sale was without consideration since amount paid were merely simulated.
Contracts witho cause or consideration produce no effect whatsoever (CC, Art 1352). A sale
with simulated price is void (CC, Art 1471 and 1409[3]) and action for declaration of its
nullity does not prescribe (CC, Art 1410). 2. WON sales were without consideration. - NO.
Since Moises alleges such, it is incumbent upon him to prove his allegations, especially since
documents show that his dad (vendor) acknowledged receipt of price and they are notarized.
He failed to do so and thus he was not able to overcome the presumption that a contract is
with consideration (CC Art. 1354). Even his own witness contradicted his claim that his
sister and her husband had no source of income. Witness Bagnas said that Agustina and
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
73 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 Ernesto were into buy and sell of palay and
rice. Even he himself said that he didn’t know if his sister had other businesses. Agustina
testified that she was into buy and sell even prior to her marriage. 3. WON prices were
simulated - NO. No proof of inadequacy of price. In fact, purchase price was higher than
assessed value (#1: P10k vs. P8920.00, #2 P5k vs. P3,500, and #3 P8k vs. P24,840.00).
Besides difference between market value and purchase price is understandable considering
father’s filial love for his daughter. Gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect the
contract except perhaps an indication of defect in consent (CC Art. 1470). No proof of
defective consent. 4. WON sale is improbable. - NO. Improbability of sale is purely
speculative. Not relevant considering that all essential requirements for contract are clearly
present: consent, object and cause. 5. WON properties in #1 and #2 were conjugal properties
of Emilio and his wife. - NO. CC, Art. 160 provides that all property of marriage is presumed
to belong to CP unless proven otherwise. Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for
party who invokes this to prove that properties were indeed acquired during the marriage
(Cobb-Perez v Lantin). Thus, Moises has to present proof that properties in question were
indeed obtained during the marriage of their parents before he can invoke the presumption.
However, titles used by RTC in declaring properties as CP (see RTC decision in bold letters)
are insufficient proof. Doesn’t say when properties were obtained. Acquisition of title (actual
owning of land) is different from registration. Possible that Emilio acquired properties when
he was still a bachelor and only registered such after marriage. - “Married to” phrase is a
mere description of Emilio’s civil status at the time of registration (Litam v Rivera). It should
be interpreted as Emilo is the owner, property registered in his name alone and that he is
married. Consistent with the principle that registration of property in name of only one
spouse doesn’t negate possibility of it being conjugal (Bucoy v Paulino). Both require
sufficient, clear and convincing proof to rebut the presumption. Moises should have
presented sufficient proof to show that properties were acquired during the marriage so that
he may enjoy the presumption under Art. 160. Due to lack of proof, presumption does not
exist, thus, properties are considered exclusive to Emilio. Case of the sickly man
Teresita♣FRANCISCO v CA (1998) 299 SCRA 188 - - - - - (petitioner) is Eusebio’s
(private respondent) legal second wife. Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio
Francisco (private respondents) are children of Eusebio by his first marriage. Teresita’s
allegations: 1. Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, they have acquired properties in
Barangay Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal which were
administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease
and cancer, which rendered him unfit to administer them. 2. Private respondents succeeded in
convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita to
administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, thus
enjoining its enforcement and sought to be declared administratrix of properties in dispute.
RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding that Teresita did not show that said
properties were acquired during the second marriage, or that they pertained exclusively to
her. As such, those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and he has the capacity to
administer them. On appeal, CA affirmed this decision. Teresita files this petition, claiming
that: 1. CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of new CC as said title has already
been repealed by art. 253, FC 2. It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC However, issue
in Teresita’s reply: WON Art. 116, FC applies to this case as Art. 253 of the same Code
[which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code" 4 ISSUE: WON properties
are not conjugal but capital properties of Eusebio exclusively. HELD: - YES. Petition denied.
Arts 158 and 160 CC have been repealed by the FC, specifically by Art 254, FC (not Art
253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 in relation to Art 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art. 158
and 160 does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect prior vested rights. Rights accrued
and vested while these articles were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then be resolved
based on provisions of CC. - Art 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this presumption must first show
proof of acquisition during the coverture (marriage). The presumption refers only to the
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
74 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - - - - - - property acquired during the
marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with
strong, clear and convincing evidence showing exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. In
this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she
claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio. As regards land in
Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut Eusebio’s testimony that he inherited the same from his
parents. She even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in
the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. Whether Eusebio
inherited the property before or after his 2nd marriage is inconsequential as the property
should be regarded as his own exclusively, pursuant to Art 148, CC. Acquisitions by
lucrative title refer to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either
spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be
assumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second
marriage, the land would still be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him,
“during the marriage, by lucrative title.” As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner
showed building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although
in the name of Eusebio and the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name
alone in support of her claim that it was conjugal property. These, however, do not prove that
the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. The fact that one is the
applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is
conjugal or not. They even counter her claim as her documents all described Eusebio as the
owner of the structures (Art 1431, CC; Rule 129(4), Revised Rules on Evidence). Further,
she cannot argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio has thereby
become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the
expense of their partnership (Art 158(2), CC). Presumption of conjugality for lack of absence
of evidence on the source of funding (Art. 160, CC) cannot be invoked because there is also
lack in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage. Certificate of title upon
which petitioner anchors her claim over the property at San Isidro is inadequate. The fact that
the land was registered in the name of “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco,” is
no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of - title
and registration thereof are two different acts. Registration merely confirms title already
existing and the phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio.
Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator of the properties considering that
the assets are exclusively his capital. Even if the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot
administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not so ill as to incapacitate him to administer
property. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-
2009 Page 75 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 b. Properties that compose the CPG
Only net income or fruits of exclusive property of the spouses become conjugal. Expenses
for production, administration and preservation should be taken from the gross fruits and the
FC, Art 117 The following are CP properties owner-spouse is entitled to retain the gross 1.
acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense income until these expenses are
paid. be for of the common fund, whether the acquisition Circumstances under Art 119 FC
the partnership or for only one of the spouses - 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. labor, industry, work or
profession of either or both fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the
marriage treasure found by the spouses on the hidden fruits from the exclusive property
property of either of them is conjugal share of either spouses in the hidden treasure which the
law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the if property where the treasure is
found is owned treasure is found by one of the spouses and found by a stranger, occupation
such as fishing or hunting one-half share of the each of the property goes livestock existing
upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number ofowner kind brought to the
to the conjugal partnership marriage by either spouse if property where the loser-spouse,
though. by chance, e.g. winnings from gambling or betting. Losses shall be borne exclusively
bytreasure is found owned by SHARE OF SPOUSES IN HIDDEN TREASURE ONEROUS
TITLE - TEST: origin of the money invested in the purchase, e.g. if it came from the
conjugal fund, the property acquired is conjugal SPECIAL RULES ON LIFE INSURANCE:
If the beneficiary is the insured himself or his estate o If the premiums were paid with the
conjugal funds, the proceeds are conjugal o If the premiums were paid with separate funds,
proceeds are separate o If the premiums were paid partly with conjugal funds, and partly with
separate funds, the proceeds will be partly conjugal and party separate If the beneficiary is
the other spouse o If one spouse gets insurance, assigned as beneficiary himself and the other
spouse: Proceeds belong to the other spouse even if the premiums are paid out of conjugal
funds but he/she should also reimburse half to the conjugal partnership o If spouses are
insured, the surviving spouse gets the proceed with no obligation to reimburse (considered
reciprocal donations) o If the insurance comes from a third person, exclusive property of the
beneficiary-spouse Reconcile this provision with Art 114 which says that onerous titles are
separate property even if CPG funds were used, subject to reimbursement. LABOR,
INDUSTRY, WORK OR PROFESSION OF EITHER OR BOTH OF THE SPOUSES
includes all income whether in form of wages, pensions or retirement pay, honoraria,
salaries, commission, bonuses, back pays, practice of profession, income from business even
if capital comes from the exclusive properties of one of the spouses teacher’s gratuity under
special law is not conjugal because it is remuneratory FRUITS FROM COMMON AND
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY stranger and found by one of the spouses, onehalf share of finder
is conjugal FC, Art 119 Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period may be
collected during the marriage in partial payments or by i property of the spouse. However,
the interests falling due during conjugal partnership. * Illustration of Art 119: The wife lent
money to another before her marriage at interest, payable in installment for 10 years. The
interests falling due during the marriage are conjugal, but the installment payments on the
principal loan belong to the wife exclusively. ZULUETA v PAN-AM (1973) 49 SCRA 1 -
Spouses Rafael and Carolina Zulueta together with their daughter were passengers of Pan
Am. Mr. Zulueta left the terminal and went to the beach in search for a place where he could
relieve himself (where it would not be visible for the people in the plane and in the terminal).
He came to a place abound 400 yards away from the terminal. He was gone for almost one
hour (but before the plane left) and PanAm was contending that it could have not taken him
that long relieve himself and that there were eight commodes at the terminal toilet for men. -
Capt. Zentner claims that Mr. Zulueta has been off-loaded “due to drinking” and belligerent
attitude but according to plaintiff (Zulueta) the order to off-load all Zuluetas, their luggage
and overcoats and other effects hand-carried by them came as a result of the altercation that
happened between Capt. Zentner and Mr. Zulueta when the latter was not cowed by the
arrogant tone of Capt. Zentner. After Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, Capt. Zentner had the
intention of keeping him stranded for a minimum period of one week at a cost of $13.30 per
day. - In an action for damages against PanAm, the Zuluetas were awarded moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney fees. This was PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 76 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 - based on a breach of contract of carriage coupled with a quasi-delict.
Pending appeal, the spouses separated and Mrs. Zulueta entered into a compromise
agreement with PanAm, wherein she settled for P50,000. She filed for the dismissal of the
case which was denied since a wife cannot bind conjugal partnership without the husband’s
consent, except in cases provided by law. - ISSUE: WON the award for damages is part of
the conjugal partnership HELD: YES. The damages arose from a breach of the Zulueta’s
contract of carriage with PanAm from which they paid their fare with funds presumable
belonging to the conjugal property. The damages therefore, fall under Art 153 CC, the right
thereto having been acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The damages do not fall
under Art 148 CC as exclusive property of each spouse. Further, “that which is acquired by
right of redemption or by exchange with other property belong to only one of the spouses”
and “that which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or husband” belong
exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that what is acquired with money
of the conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof. MENDOZA v REYES
(1983) 124 SCRA 154 Ponciano Reyes is the husband of Julia de Reyes who executed a deed
of sale of 2 parcels of land with their improvements in favor of (petitioners) spouses
Mendoza. The land in question was bought on installment basis from JM Tuazon & Co.
represented by G. Araneta. Since the spouses were always in arrears in the payment of the
said land because of lack of money, they had to borrow from RFC (Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation). Thus, they loaned money for purposes of completing the construction of a one-
storey building and paying balance of price of lot. - A corresponding deed of absolute sale, in
which Julia Reyes was named as vendee and her husband signed under the phrase, “with my
marital consent,” was executed by Araneta on Nov 1948. From thereon, the spouses secured
another loan for the payment of balance of lot and additional security, for the defrayment of
the expenses incurred in the repairs, etc. As a result the transfer certificates of said lots issued
by Registry of Deeds were in the name of “Julia Reyes married to Ponciano Reyes.” The
mortgage contracts executed by spouses in favor of RFC were duly registered as well.
Spouses put up a school and a camarin in the lots. When the school was transferred
someplace else, the camarin was leased to - Mendoza spouses in 1952 for ten years. The
contract of lease was signed by Julia as lessor with marital consent of Ponciano. Because of
failure to pay their obligations to RFC, spouses asked for extension on their obligation and
was granted such. On March 1961, while they were separated in fact and her husband was in
Pampanga, Julia sold the lots to the Mendoza spouses without the knowledge and consent of
Ponciano. Thus, he filed a case for the annulment of the deed of sale, stating that the
properties were conjugal properties and that she sold them without his knowledge or consent.
ISSUES: 1. WON the deed of sale was null and void on grounds that the property is conjugal
property, which means Julia is prohibited from selling such without consent of spouse. 2.
WON issue of estoppel can be raised against Ponciano. HELD: 1. YES. Property is conjugal
following the presumption found in Art 160 CC, which states that all property of the
marriage must be presumed to belong to the CP unless it be proved that it pertains to
exclusive property of spouses. This presumption is strong as stated in Art 153, CC, which
provides that such presumption must be overcome by one who contends otherwise. The only
character that they could come up with to rebut the presumption is Julia’s testimony, which is
contrary to Araneta’s records as well as info on mortgage contracts (which are favorable to
her husband). Precedent states that it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property. That proof of
acquisition of property in dispute during the marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative. Thus, the property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage.
The records show that the funds used to buy the lot and build the improvements came from
loans obtained by the spouses. Art 161 states that all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband and wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership.
Thus, the lands are conjugal properties of both spouses. 2. NO. The principle of estoppel
rests on rule that whenever a party has intentionally led the other to believe a particular thing
true to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising from his act, declaration or
omission, falsify it. It can be invoked only between persons making the misrepresentation
and person to whom such PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 77 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
misrepresentation is addressed. There is no showing that Ponciano led the Mendozas to
believe that the land wasn’t conjugal. It cannot be considered to have acted in good faith
because the RFC mortgages were already registered in Registry of Deeds by the time the
contract of lease was registered. Moreover, they initially demanded Ponciano’s consent when
they leased the property but dismissed it upon sale. VILLANUEVA v TAC (1990) 192
SCRA 21 - Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were owners in fee simple of Lot
13. Upon their death, their children, Modesto and Federico Aranas, adjudicated the land to
themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition. North portion belonged to Federico, and
south portion, described as Lot 13-C under Torrens title in Modesto’s name. - Modesto’s
wife Victoria died in July 1971. Modesto himself died in April 1973. They had no children. -
However, it appeared that Modesto was survived by two illegitimate children named
Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro Aranas who borrowed P18,000 from respondent Jesus
Bernas. In the loan, as security, they, as absolute coowners, mortgaged to Bernas Lot 13-C.
Raymundo Aranas, a relative was there as witness. The siblings failed to pay the loan. Bernas
then acquired ownership over the land, cancelled the siblings’ title and issued another in his
name. About a month later, witness Raymundo Aranas and his spouse Consolacion
Villanueva filed a complaint with RTC of Roxas City asking that they be declared co-owners
of the land and title of Jesus Bernas over Lot 13-C be cancelled on the ground of their alleged
discovery of 2 wills. Modesto’s will: bequeathed to his illegitimate children all his own
capital property and all interest in his conjugal partnership with his wife Victoria . Victoria’s
will: bequeathed to spouses Aranas and Villanueva, and to the illegitimate children of her
husband all of her interests, rights and properties, real and personal, as her net share from
conjugal partnership with husband. ISSUES: 1. WON Villanueva had right over Lot 13-C
and improvements thereon by virtue of Victoria’s will. 2. WON improvements on said lot
was conjugal. HELD: 1. NO, Victoria died 2 yrs ahead of her husband. She never inherited
any part of Lot 13-C which she could bequeath by will to anybody. Moreover, even if
Modesto’s acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took place during the marriage, the lot
would still be regarded as his 2. own exclusive, private property because it was acquired
during the marriage by lucrative title. NO. If improvements on Lot 13-C were conjugal,
Villanueva may have acquired a right over them by succession. However, proof as regards
when the improvements were made on the exclusive property and the source of funds used
was not presented. Therefore, the presumption that it belongs exclusively to the husband
stands. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
Page 78 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 irrespective of in whose name the
property was acquired. The initial P1000 payment was paid exclusively with money
belonging to Macaria. But the 2 FC, Art 118 Property bought on installment paid partly from
other payments were paid by conjugal funds. conjugal funds belongs to the buyer/s if full
ownership was vested The deeds show that the loans used to pay both before the marriage
such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the
partnership both spouses both installments were made out to or by either or as spouses shall
be reimbursed by the owner/s upon liquidation of jointpartnership Loans thus become
obligations the borrowers. of CPG and money loaned is conjugal property. SIMPLIFIED: FC
does not look at the source of funds. - While the mortgage is on Macaria’s paraphernal In
cases where the property is partly paid by either property, the mortgage to secure the loan is a
the CPG or exclusive property, the time of vesting purely accessory obligation that the
lenders ownership is what matters. Though under CC, the could waive if they so chose,
without affecting basis was “who paid more”. the principal debt which was owned by the
conjugal partnership, and which the creditors * How do you reconcile this provision with Art
109 can enforce exclusively against the conjugal (4) which that which includes anything
“purchased property if they so desired. with the exclusive money of the wife or the - Since
the fishpond was purchased partly with husband” in the exclusive property of the spouse?
conjugal and partly with separate funds, justice requires that the property be held to belong to
CASTILLO v PASCO (1964) both patrimonies in common, in proportion 11 SCRA 102 to
the contributions of each to the total - Marcelo Castillo Sr., a widower ♥ Macaria Pasco,
purchase price. An undivided 1/6 is a widow who had survived 2 previous husbands.
paraphernal and the remaining 5/6 is conjugal. - 1932 The Gonzales couple, as co-owners of
the - Payment by the widow of the mortgage debt litigated fishpond, executed a deed of sale
after Marcelo’s death does not result in an conveying said property to spouses Marcelo
increase in her share in the property but merely Castillo and Macaria Pasco for P6,000 which
was creates a lien in her favor. payable in 3 installments: P1,000 upon execution - Since the
fishpond is undivided property of of the deed, P1,000 within 1 month without Macaria and
the conjugal partnership with interest and P3,000 after 1 year with 11% Marcelo, his heirs are
entitled to ask for its interest. partition and liquidation. The ultimate interest of - 1933
Marcelo died and his widow married her 4 th each party must be resolved after due hearing,
husband, Luis San Juan in June 1934. The taking into account: petitioners, children and
grandchildren of a) Macaria’s 1/6 direct share Marcelo by his previous marriage, a filed a b)
Her half of the community property complaint for partition and accounting of the c) Her
successional rights to a part of fishpond in CFI of Bulacan. Marcelo’s share pursuant to the
LC declared the fishpond as paraphernal governing law of succession when he property,
since even before the marriage, died Macaria was a woman of means while Marcelo d) Her
right to reimbursement for any had a salary of only P80 a month. CA affirmed amount
advance by her in paying the the CFI decision. mortgage debt. Installments were paid in the
ff manner: 1) paid by Macaria with her exclusive LORENZO v NICOLAS (1952) money 91
Phil 686 2) paid with proceeds from a loan from Dr. - Magdalena Clemente ♥ Manuel
Lorenzo Jacinto, to whom the fishpond was Manuel died in 1929 and Magdalena died five
mortgaged by both spouses years later. During their marriage, they had no 3) paid from a
loan secured by a mortgage children. However, they had children in their on 2 parcels of land
assessed in the previous marriages. name of Macaria - Plaintiffs are Manuel’s kids from his
first marriage, while the defendants are Magdalena’s ISSUE: WON the 2nd and 3rd
installments were paid grandchildren from her first marriage. with conjugal funds. Subject of
the petition is 2 parcels of land, the sale of which (to respondents) the petitioner HELD:
prays to be declared null and void since they are - Under the Spanish CC, the law applicable
here, part of CPG. the property acquired for onerous consideration These lots were friar land
which Magdalena during the marriage was deemed conjugal or bought on an installment
basis: separate property depending on the source of c. Property Purchased by Installment the
funds employed for its acquisition, PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 79 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 a) - Lot 6:
she paid P169.16 before her marriage to Manuel. The P833.32 balance was payable in
installment – P25.32 on the 1st year and P42 each year after. b) Lot 5: she paid P116.84
before her marriage with Manuel. The P850.32 balance was payable by installment of P52.32
on the 1st and P42 on each succeeding year. The receipts of the subsequent payment were
made in the name of Magdalena only. CA found them to be her paraphernal property. CC,
Art 158 Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, mad advancements from the
partnership or through the industry of eithe partnership. Buildings constructed, at the expense
of the partnership, during the pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be
reimbu ISSUE: WON Lots 5 and 6 are conjugal property. NO RATIO: They are her
paraphernal property, thus petitioners are not entitled to the land. Lot 6 was purchased in her
own name and for her own exclusive benefit before her marriage to Manuel. She paid the
initial installment before the marriage and the balance was paid during the marriage. All the
receipts for the installments paid, even during Manuel’s lifetime, were issued in Magdalena’s
name and the deed of sale of Lot 6 was made in her name despite the fact that Manuel was
still alive. The acquisition of Lot 5 was the same as Lot 6. Under Act No. 1120 of the
alienation of Friar Lands, the certificate is only an agreement to sell and does not vest
ownership of the land. Since the receipts for the installments paid were issued in her name
and the deed of sale in her name, this shows that the property belonged to her; ownership had
been vested on the buyerspouse BEFORE the marriage. Since the installments paid during
the marriage are deemed conjugal, there being no evidence that they were paid out of funds
belonging exclusively to Magdalena, such amounts should be reimbursed to the CPG. *
Ma’am Beth says that this is more correct than Castillo v Pasco * CC has a rule for (1)
ordinary improvements made by the spouses on separate property of each of them, and
another rule if (2) the conjugal partnership constructs a building on land belonging to either
spouse. Land which is separate property becomes CPG if conjugal funds built anything on it.
…ON THE OTHER HAND * FC provides for a uniform rule for the two circumstances. A.
cost of improvement made by CPG on separate property + resulting increase in the value of
improved separate property > value of the principal property at the time of the improvement
∴ entire property becomes CPG, CPG reimburses spouse at liquidation B. cost of
improvement + resulting increase in value of the improved principal property < value of the
principal property at the time of improvement ∴ principal property and improvement
belongs to owner-spouse, subject to reimbursement CPG – accessory If improvement i.e. the
house, is worth 2 M Exclusive – principal d. Rules on Improvement Then the estimated value
of house and lot is at 10.5 M Value of the FC, Art 120 The ownership of improvements,
whether for utility or adornment, made Resulting on the Cost of principal increase in value
spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses improveme + property at the the conjugal partnership or to the original owner-
spouse, subject to the nt following rules: of the improved time of the principal property
improvement When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and 10.5
M – (2 M + 5 the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the M) 2M 10.5 M
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-
spouse at the time of the 3.5 M improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained 5.5
M reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. In either case, the ownership of the entire
property shall be vested upon the reimbursemen improvement belongs to ownerthe time of
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. spouse ∴ Principal property and 10.5 M *
Ma’am Beth’s take on this: This is unjust (luge to use her term), because you only get the
value of the property at the time of improvement. Plus the fact that the reimbursement
happens at the liquidation of the CPG which is roughly 20-40 years later, thus PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 80 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 because of the delay of payment, the amount has already
devaluated. * Nevertheless, later reimbursement is pragmatic in this case because when a
person engages in any construction or improvement in properties, the cash is usually wiped
out. CALIMLIM-CANULLAS v FORTUN (1984) 129 SCRA 675 - Petitioner Mercedes
Calimlim-Canullas ♥ Fernando Canullas were married on Dec 19, 1962 and
had 5 kids. They lived in a small house on a residential land in question located at Bacabac,
Pangasinan. After Fernando’s dad died in 1965, Fernando inherited the land. In 1978,
Fernando abandoned his family and was living with private respondent, Corazon Daguines.
During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage in a judgment
rendered on Oct 21, 1981 by the then CFI of Pangasinan which judgment has become final.
On April 15, 1980, Fernando sold the property with the house on it to Daquines, for P2000.
In the document of sale, Fernando described the house as “also inherited by me from my
deceased parents.” Unable to take possession of the lot and house, Daguines initiated a
complaint on June 18, 1980 for quieting of title and damages against Mercedes. The latter
resisted and claimed that the house where she and her kids lived, including the coconut trees
on the land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry; that the sale
of the land together with the house and improvements to Daguines was null and void because
they are conjugal properties and she had not given her consent to the sale. ISSUE: 1. WON
the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave
the land the character of a conjugal property - YES 2. WON the sale of the land together with
the house & improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the
transaction. HELD: 1. Under Art 158 CC, the land and building belong to the CPG but CPG
is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a
creditor to the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed
at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Conversion of land from exclusive to conjugal
property should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first
constructed thereon; thus, 2. the land and house are conjugal property and could not have
been sold to Daguines without Mercedes consent. The contract of sale is null and void for
being contrary to morals and public policy. Under the law, spouses are prohibited from
selling property to each other, subject to certain exceptions. This prohibition also applies to
common-law relationships. e. Charges upon the CPG FC, Art 121 The conjugal partnership
shall be liable for: 1. support: spouse, common children, legitimate children of either spouse;
support of illegitimate children governed by the provisions of on Support 2. all debts and
obligations contracted during the marriage a. by the designate administrator-spouse for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, b. by both spouses c. by one of them with the
consent of the other 3. debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent
of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited 4. all taxes, liens, charges
and expenses including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property 5. all
taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either spouse 6. expenses to enable their spouse to commence or complete a
professional , vocational or other activity for self-improvement 7. ante-nuptial debts of either
spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family 8. value of what is donated
or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity
for self-improvement 9. expenses of litigation between spouses unless the suit is found to be
groundless If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the
spouse shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS OF ACP AND CPG 1. - Art 94 (5) and Art 121
(5): In obligation to taxes and expenses pertaining to preservation of separate property, ACP
provides that it should be “used by the family” while CPG does not have such qualification.
The reason behind this is that CPG has interest in the preservation of separate properties
since its fruits belong to the conjugal funds. On the other hand, a separate property of the
spouses is usually beyond the reach of ACP hence, the express requirement. Art 94 (9) does
not have a counterpart in Art 121: Ante-nuptial debts, liabilities and support of 2. PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 81 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 The conjugal properties shall be liable for all debts and
obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband for the support of the family. The
husband’s creditor may bring his action not, as a general rule, against FC, Art 122 The
payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife the paraphernal properties,
but against the fruits the income the family. not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded toand benefit ofof such property of the wife. Since the fruits of
exclusive property belong to Neither shall the fines and indemnities imposed upon them
bethe CP. to the partnership. charged However, the payment of personal debts contracted by
eitherThe debts contracted by the husband during the spouse imposed upon them, as well as
the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership
marriage, for and in the exercise of an industry asset AFTER the responsibilities enumerated
in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should or profession
by which he contributes toward the have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes support of the family are not
his personal and above-mentioned. illegitimate children. Spouse can only resort to a
financially capable ACP in case of absence or insufficiency of exclusive property. CPG
instead has Art 123. private debts and the products or income from the wife’s own property,
which, like those of her husband’s are liable for the payment of the FC, Art 123 Whatever
may be lost during the marriage in any game of change, or in betting, sweepstakes or any
other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser
and shall not be be excepted from the marriage expenses, cannot charged to the conjugal
partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the CPG. payment of such debts.
JAVIER v OSMEÑA (1916) 34 Phil 336 - Florentino Collantes was married to Petrona
Javier who inherited from her parents 2 parcels of land. To perfect her ownership, she
acquired from her father’s second wife the usufructuary right on properties for P3,000. -
Florentino (husband), who succeeded Petrona’s father as a commission merchant in their
family business in Manila, acquired the debt of Petrona’s father and became indebted to
Tomas Osmeña (one of the chief clients) in sum of P4,000-P5,000. - Unable to pay, judgment
was rendered in favor of debtor Osmena. The sheriff despite the protests of Petrona sold off
the two parcels (separate property of Petrona) of land at an auction where Osmeña was the
successful bidder. - Petrona sought to have the sale annulled and to recover her property. The
defendant Osmeña contended that even though land was separate property of Petrona, the
usufructuary right belongs to the CP since it was purchased using CP funds. Defendant
prayed that the revenues from both properties, being CP, should be made liable for the debt.
ISSUE: WON debts should be paid out of fruits and revenue of the parcels of land which
belong to wife exclusively. HELD: Art 141 OCC interest collected or relation, coming from
that which belongs community property. says the fruits, revenues or accrued during the
marriage the conjugal properties or from to one of the spouses, are As to whether the
defendant’s prayer for an appointment of a receiver is to be granted, Art 1984 says that the
wife has the right to manage her paraphernal property and (Art 1412) says that the husband is
the administrator of the CCP. Thus, appointment of a receiver shall deprive the spouses of
these rights; moreover, there is no need for it. COBB-PEREZ v LANTIN (1968) 23 SCRA
637 Damaso Perez purchased leather materials from Ricardo Hermoso for his shoe
manufacturing business. Unable to pay his debt to the latter, a civil case was filed by
Hermoso. Consequently, the Sheriff of Manila levied upon the shares of common stock in
Republic Bank registered in the name of Mr. Perez. Mercedes Ruth Perez claims that said
shares are conjugal assets and that the debt acquired by her husband was a personal one, not
being able to benefit the CPG. ISSUES: 1. WON the debt of Mr. Perez is a personal debt –
NO. 2. WON the CPG is liable for the said obligation – YES. HELD: Fruits of the shoe
manufacturing business went to the support of the family/benefit of the CPG. The debts
incurred by the husband for and in the exercise of industry (shoe manufacturing, in this case)
or profession by which he contributed to the welfare of the family cannot be considered as
his personal debt. As the CPG benefited, the said shares are liable. (It was conceded that the
shares are conjugal property even if they are registered under the name of Mr. Perez, having
no evidence as to when they were acquired.) DBP v ADIL (1988) 161 SCRA 307 Art 1358
OCC states that the fruits of paraphernal properties form part of the assets of the conjugal
partnership and are liable for the payment of the expenses of the married couple. PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 82 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - - - - Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte
obtained an agricultural loan of P2000 from Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB which is
now DBP), which is evidenced by a promissory note payable in 10 equal yearly
amortizations. After 10 years, they were still unable to pay the loan. Thus, Confesor, who
was a member of Congress, issued a second promissory note acknowledging the loan and
promising to pay on or before June 15, 1961. He further agreed to the foreclosure of the
mortgage if and when he fails to pay. Another stipulation is that if he secures a certificate of
indebtedness from the government for his back pay, he will be allowed to pay amount out of
it. The amount remained unpaid on the specified date. Thus DBP filed a complaint against
the spouses on Sept. 11, 1970. The City Court of Iloilo decided in favor of DBP and ordered
the spouses to pay the debt with interest. CFI of Iloilo reversed this decision and dismissed
the complaint against the spouses. ISSUES: 1. WON the right of prescription may be waived
or renounced - YES 2. WON the second promissory note it binding on the conjugal
partnership - YES HELD: Yes on both issues. Art 1112, CC right to prescription may be
tacitly renounced resulting from acts which imply abandonment of such right. The
prescription with regard to the first promissory note had set it. However, the second
promissory note acknowledged the debt and even promised to pay the same thus, the right to
prescription was effectively and expressly renounced. - In Villaroel v. Estrada – the debt
barred by prescription cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract recognizing and
assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable. Prescription only bars the
remedy, which is the payment of the debt, but it does not bar the debt itself. The new promise
made by Confesor constitutes a new cause of action. CFI claims the second promissory note
is not binding pursuant to Art 166 NCC: unless wife is spendthrift, serving civil interdiction
or confined in leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber real property of the CP
without her consent. Thus, the CFI held that in signing the new promissory note alone,
Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife. HOWEVER, Art 165 CC states that the husband is
the administrator of CP. Thus, all debts and obligations which he contracts for the benefit of
the CP are chargeable to the CP. He, Confesor, signed the second promissory note for the
benefit of the CP, thus, CP is liable for obligation. LUZON SURETY v DE GARCIA (1969)
30 SCRA 111 Ladislao Chavez (as principal) and petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc. (as
surety) executed a surety bond in favor of PNB to guaranty a crop loan granted to Ladislao
Chavez in the sum of P9,000. Vicente Garcia, Ladislao Chavez and Ramon B. Lacson, as
guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound themselves, jointly and
severally, to indemnify Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against any and all damages, losses, costs,
stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which it may
incur. PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety to recover the
amount of P4,577.95, in interest, attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit. - A third party
complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Ramon Lacson and Vicente Garcia was instituted by
Luzon Surety. - A writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the satisfaction of the claim of
petitioner in the sum of P8,839.97. Then a writ of garnishment was issued levying and
garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses, from their sugar plantation registered in
their names. - Garciasfiled a suit for injunction and the TC ruled in their favor. ISSUE: WON
the CPG, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, can be held liable on an
indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a 3rd party in favor of a
surety agreement. -NO HELD: A CP under Art 161 is liable only for such ‘debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the CP.’ The husband is the
administrator of the conjugal property, however, only obligations incurred by the him that are
chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his
career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of
the family. Thus, there must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses. And in this case there is none. Nor can there be,
considering that the benefit was clearly intended for a third party – Ladislao Chaves. Acting
as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement is not an act that would benefit
the conjugal partnership. While the husband, by signing the indemnity agreement may be
said to have added to his reputation or esteem and to have earned the confidence of the
business community, such benefit even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful
to come within the express terms of the provision. To make a CP respond for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
83 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 NCC which is to show the utmost concern for
the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. AYALA INVESTMENT v CHING
(1998) 286 SCRA 272 - Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a loan of P50,300,000 from
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Alfredo Ching, the Executive VP
of PBM signed a surety to the loan, making himself liable with PBM’s indebtedness to
AIDC. Upon PBM’s failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case to recover the sum of money
from PBM and Ching. A writ of execution was issued wherein the properties of Ching were
to be levied and scheduled for auction. The 3 properties involved were conjugal properties of
Ching and his wife; thus, Ching asked that the auction sale upon said properties be enjoined
because such are part of the CPG and could not be held liable to answer for a loan that did
not redound to the benefit of his family. The auction still took place and AIDC being the only
bidder acquired the properties. As such, Ching instituted an action in the court to declare the
sale null and void. RTC and CA ruled in his favor, giving the sale no legal effect. ISSUES: 1.
WON the CP is liable for a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his
employer. - NO 2. Was act of the husband, in securing the loan, part of his industry, business
or career from which he supports his family? - NO HELD: 1. The execution of the surety
agreement did not redound to the benefit of the family since it was a corporate loan extended
and used by PBM. Art 161(1), CC and Art 121 (2), FC are clear in requiring that the loan
obtained should be for the benefit of the partnership or should redound to the benefit of the
CP in order for the CPG to be held liable. Burden of proof of showing that it does lies in
creditor-party litigant and the AIDC presented no such proof. Moreover, actual benefits must
redound to CPG and it’s not enough that the transaction be one that would normally produce
benefit for the partnership. It must do so, in fact where such benefits directly result from the
loan; such are what is contemplated by the law. 2. Signing as a surety is not an exercise of an
industry or profession of Ching. Neither is it an embarking in a business or an act of
administration for the benefit of the family. 280 SCRA 361 - Oct 89: Manuel Abelardo and
his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached the wife’s father Honorario Carlos and
requested him to advance $25,000 for the purchase of house and lot in Parañaque. Petitioner
issued a check in the said full amount to the seller of the property to enable and assist the
spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own July 91: Carlos inquired
about the status of the loan. The spouses acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they
were not yet ready to settle it. Respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner’s
inquiries by making various threats against the petitioner. Aug 94: Formal demand was made
by Carlos but spouses failed yet again to comply Oct 94: Petitioner filed a complaint for
collection of the sum and damages against spouses in Valenzuela RTC Spouses having been
separated in fact for more than a year prior to filing of complaint, submitted separate
answers. Wife admitted securing a loan together with husband but claimed that loan was
payable on a staggered basis. Husband claimed that sum was not a loan but his share of
income on contracts in reviving the petitioner’s construction business RTC ruled in favor of
petitioner Carlos CA reversed decision and dismissed the complain for insufficiency of
evidence ISSUE: - WON $25,000 or its equivalent PhP625K was in the nature of a loan. -
YES - WON loan is liability of both spouses. - YES HELD: 1. The petitioner was able to
prove it as a loan by a preponderance of evidence in providing the check he issued, the
acknowledgement of the wife of their accountability, and the petitioner’s demand letter sent
and received by respondent. Husband’s claim that it is his rightful share as income, profit or
salary is untenable because there is no showing that he is a stockholder, an employee or an
agent of the corporation. The acknowledgement of the loan made by the wife binds the
conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family because it was
used to purchase the house and lot which became their conjugal home. Pursuant to Art 121
No. 2 & 3, even with the alleged lack of consent of respondent-husband, defendanthusband
and wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. 2. CARANDANG v
HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN (2006) 508 SCRA 469 CARLOS v ABELARDO (2002)
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
84 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - Quirino de Guzman and Arcadio and Luisa
Carandang are corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS) MBS increased
its capital stock and was subscribed by Arcadio and Luisa Carandang Quirino de Guzman
claims that these subscriptions were paid by him, so he sent a demand letter to Arcadio and
Luisa Arcadio and Luisa refused to pay claiming that they had a pre-incorporation agreement
where Quirino promised to pay for stock subscriptions by Arcadio and Luisa without costs in
exchange for Arcadio’s technical expertise, etc. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Quirino and
ordered Arcadio and Luisa Carandang to pay Quirino f. Administration of the CPG FC, Art
124 The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal p jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of admin encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be p the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withd ISSUE: WON the purported liability of
Arcadio and Luisa Carandang were joint and solidary HELD: YES, for marriages governed
by CPG, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their
conjugal partnership and it is the partnership, which is primarily bound for its repayment.
When the spouses are sued for the enforcement if the obligation entered into by them, they
are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as
independent debtors, such that the concept of joint and solidary liability, as between them,
does not apply. Either of them may be sued for the whole amount, similar to that of a solidary
liability, although the amount is chargeable against their conjugal partnership property FC,
Art 125 Neither spouses may donate any conjugal property witho may without the consent of
the other, make moderate donations f occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
FELIPE v HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON (1983) 120 SCRA 628 - Maximo Aldon ♥
Gimena Almosara. They bought several parcels of land which were divided into 3. -
Gimena, sold an unregistered 16 ha conjugal land in San Jacinto, Masbate without the
consent of her husband, Maximo, to Eduardo and Hermogena Felipe. - Maximo’s heirs filed
an action for annulment of the sale in 1976, claiming they were the rightful owners of the
properties. They claim that they orally mortgaged the lands to the spouses and an offer to
redeem the mortgage was refused by the Felipes. The Felipes contend that they purchased the
land and it was delivered to them. TC declared the Felipes as the lawful owners and the
complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. - CA reversed TC and declared the sale as invalid
and ordered an accounting of the produce of the land since 1951 and payment of the net
monetary value of the profits after deducting P1800. CA ratio: 1. if transfer was through an
oral contract of mortgage: redemption allowed anytime upon repayment of P1,800.00 2. if it
was done through sale: redemption is improper 3. what really transpired: Deed of Purchase &
Sale executed by Gimena in favor of the Felipe spouses 4. sale was not forged but invalid
since deed was executed without the consent of Maximo since the lots were conjugal
(presumed as such because were purchased during marriage). This was properly raised in the
pleading considering the fact that complaint alleges that lands were purchased from Gimena
and Maximo. • Felipe’s claim: since deed is not a forgery, it authenticity and due execution is
beyond question. This is a question of fact that SC cannot consider. They’re only concerned
with questions of law. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,
A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 85 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUES: 1. WON the
sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid - NO 2. WON Gimena and her children can ask
for an annulment of contract - NO 3. WON petitioners have acquired the land by acquisitive
prescription - NO 4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is barred by the
statute of limitations - NO HELD: 1) WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid.
NO • Note the following e
lementary rules: • GIMENA - It’s only subject to annulment of husband during marriage
because he was the victim who had interest in contract, whereas Gimena was partly
responsible for defect. Gimena is barred from doing this during and even after the marriage.
CHILDREN – While marriage was still subsisting, they could NOT seek for its annulment
since their right to the lands was merely inchoate or expectant. But upon death of Maximo,
they acquired the right to question the defective contract in so far as it deprived them of their
hereditary rights in their dad’s share in lands. Maximo’s share is ½ and they are entitled to
2/3 of such; remaining 1/3 belongs to Gimena. • 1. 2. CC, Art 165: husband is administrator
of CP • CC, Art 166: subject to certain exceptions, husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the CP without wife’s consent 3. CC, Art 172: wife cannot bind CP without
husband’s consent except in cases provided by law Since Gimena sold lands belonging to CP
without husband’s consent and such sale is not covered by instances “except in cases
provided by law”, the sale is defective. Not invalid, as held by the CA, because that term is
imprecise when used in relation to contracts because the CC uses specific names in
designating defective contracts. It can either be: 1. rescissible (art. 1380) – when all essential
elements are untainted (Gimena’s consent was tainted) 2. voidable (art. 1390) 3.
unenforceable (art. 1403) 4. void/inexistent (art. 1409) Deed of sale is a voidable contract.
Under A1390 CC, among the voidable contracts are – “those where one of the parties is
incapable of giving consent to the contract.” Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the
contract of sale since the consent of both spouses is needed. This is further supported by CC,
Art 173, which provides that contracts entered by husband without wife’s consent when such
is required, are annullable at her instance during marriage and within 10 yrs from questioned
transaction. The contract is not rescissible for in such a contract all the essential elements are
untainted but Gimena’s consent was tainted. Neither can the contract be classified as
unenforceable, since it does not fit any of those described in Art 1403 CC. Finally, it cannot
be void or inexistent because it is not one of those in Art 1409 CC. Thus, it must be a
voidable contract. 3. WON petitioners have acquired land by acquisitive prescription - NO
They bought lands in bad faith proven by ff instances: a. Vicente, son of the Felipe spouses,
attempted to have Gimena sign a ready-made document purporting to sell the disputed lands
to the Felipes in Dec. 1970. They knew land did not belong to them. b. Said document was
for purpose of obtaining Gimena’s consent to the construction of irrigation pumps on the
lands. If they were the owners, why did they have to get her consent? c. Improvements were
only being made in 1970 when sale was in 1951. d. Declaration of prop made only in 1974. e.
No attempt to obtain Maximo’s signature despite fact that Gimena and Hermogena were
close relatives. Given that they did possess the lands, possession in bad faith is covered by
extraordinary prescription which lapses in 30 yrs. Sale was in 1951 and case filed in 1976, 30
yrs had not yet lapsed. 4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is barred by
the statute of limitations - NO Their right of action accrued from death of father in 1959 and
they are given 30 yrs to institute it (CC Art. 1141). Action filed in 1976, thus still within
allowed time. * CONTRACT WITHOUT CONSENT: merely voidable under CC, but under
FC it is void (Art 125 FC) TINITIGAN v TINITIGAN (1980) 100 SCRA 619 Severino
Tinitigan Sr, on Sept. 17, 1975 filed a motion in a pending case seeking judicial approval of
the sale of a 2-storey residential house and lot which are conjugal properties located at Pasay
City. Tinitigan contends that the proposed sale of the property for P300,000 to Quintin Lim,
was necessary to pay outstanding conjugal obligations that were overdue in the amount of • •
• 2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for annulment of contract - NO PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 86 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - P256,137.79 and to forestall the foreclosure of mortgaged
conjugal properties. CFI issued an order granting Tinitigan “authority to sell the house and
lot in Pasay City, in favor of Quintin Lim, if he is a Filipino citizen, for P300,000.” CA
upheld orders of respondent Judge that approves the sale of the conjugal property. wife, also
for the same purpose, in the case where she may legally bind the partnership.” GUIANG v
CA (1998) 291 SCRA 372 Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to find a job as an Overseas Filipino
Worker in June 1989 but she fell victim to illegal recruiters and had to stay in Manila. A year
later she successfully found a job in the Middle East. Her husband Judie Corpuz since then
rarely went home and stayed most of the time at his workplace. After hearing about her
father’s plan to sell the remaining half of the lot, daughter Harriet wrote to inform her
mother. Gilda expressed her disapproval but Judie pushed through with the sale to the
Guiangs. - When she returned, Gilda gathered her children who were staying in different
households and stayed in their house in Negros. She also discovered that her now ex-husband
had another wife. Guiangs charged Gilda of trespassing for staying in their house wherefore
the Corpuzes later agreed to leave the house in an amicable settlement. - Gilda then instituted
against seeking to annul the sale of land between Judie Corpuz and the Guiang couple. - RTC
ruled in Gilda’s favor, declaring the sale null and void; the CA upheld this decision. Hence
this appeal. ISSUE: 1. Whether Judie’s execution of ‘Deed of Transfer of Right’ for the
Guiangs was void or merely voidable 2. WON Gilda ratified the said contract when she
entered into the amicable settlement with the Guiangs. HELD: 1. The deed was void. The
property was acquired during the marriage of Judie and Gilda Corpuz. When Judie offered to
sell the remaining half, Gilda’s consent was totally lacking, contrary to the claim of the
Guiangs invoking Art 1390(2) CC that it was only vitiated hence merely voidable. The case
at bar falls under Art 124, FC which states ‘xxx the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void’. 2. No, void contracts cannot be ratified. The entry
into amicable settlement would not have any effect in the contract since it was void. **FC
applied in this case since the sale was done in 1990 RELUCIO v LOPEZ (2002) 373 SCRA
578 Imelda Relucio, the mistress of Alberto Lopez, assails the appointment of Alberto’s
legitimate ISSUE: WON the order to sell the conjugal property rendered by Judge Navarro is
valid. HELD: Petitioners Teofista Tinitigan, et al, argue that the order authorizing Severino
to sell the property is void, because he had no authority to sell it, they being under the
administration of his wife Teofista. This has no legal basis. Art 165 CC states: “the husband
is the administrator of the CP,” which is the general rule. Though Art 1658 states that “the
wife may be express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer
the conjugal partnership property.” Other provisions in the Code also speak of administration
by the wife pursuant to a judicial decree. However, such provisions are not applicable in this
case. The judicial decree on Oct 29, 1975, appointing Teofista as administratrix of the CP
cannot be treated as an exception because it was issued only after the CFI of Rizal granted
Severino the authority to sell the property. Besides, her appointment was not absolute since it
was subject to certain conditions that were agreed upon. Thus, the conclusion is that Severino
did not cease being the administrator of their conjugal properties at the time the motion for
judicial approval of the sale was granted. Being the administrator, however, does not give
him the outright authority to alienate or encumber assets. This would require the express or
implied consent of Teofista subject to certain exceptions. Art 166 NCC states that “unless the
wife has been declared incapacitated, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any property
of the CP without her consent” wherein the court may compel her to grant it if she
unreasonably refuses to give consent. This is why Severino sought judicial approval. The sale
was necessary to answer for a big, conjugal liability which might endanger the family’s
economic standing. The case at hand actually is one wherein the wife’s consent is not
required and impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary. According to Art 171 NCC,
“the husband may dispose of the CP for the purposes specified in Art 161 and 162.” In
general, these articles deal with the obligations of the CP. Art 161, Par 1 provides that “the
CP shall be liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the CP, and those contracted by the PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 87 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - - wife’s
(Angelina Mejia Lopez) as the sole administratix of conjugal partnership of properties,
forfeiture, etc. Alberto allegedly abandoned Angela and their four children and had
maintained illicit relationship with the petitioner, Relucio. In the course of their cohabitation,
they have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or
controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and
properties through the actual contribution of money, property, industry of Alberto and
Relucio Angela, the wife and the four children did not benefit from the said properties
Alberto has also sold, disposed of, transferred assigned, cancelled, removed, stashed away
and alienated their conjugal properties from Angela, hence the petition to become the
administratix of the said partnership Angela prays that Alberto do the following: o Account
their conjugal partnership property o Give support to respondent and her children o Turn over
his share in the co-ownership with petitioner (Relucio) o Dissolve his conjugal partnership or
absolute community property with respondent - - - After a visual inspection of the lots,
petitioner met with both the spouses and made a definite offer to buy the properties. After
negotiation, Edilberto (only) and petitioner agreed upon the purchase price of P1.5M for
Taytay property and P2.1M for Makati property. Agreement was handwritten by petitioner
and signed by Edilberto. Purchase was on installment basis and down payment through
checks was made by petitioner. The following day, Norma, the spouses and the real estate
broker met to incorporate notations and revise contracts to sell. At yet another meeting,
petitioner was surprised to learn that spouses were backing out of the agreement because they
needed “spot cash” for the purchase price. Norma Camaisa refused to sign contract to sell.
ISSUES: 1. WON sale of real properties of the spouses have already been perfected. - NO 2.
WON the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without his wife’s written
consent. - NO 3. WON Court may intervene to authorize the transaction. - NO HELD:
According to Art 124 FC, the law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the
husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife.
Otherwise, the disposition is void. Even though Norma was aware of, even caused the
advertisement in the newspaper, and participated in the negotiations for the sale, mere
awareness of a transaction is not consent and her written consent to the sale is required by
law for its validity. Art 124, FC also states that court authorization is only resorted to in cases
where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. Petitioner failed to allege and
prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the
absence of such, court authorization cannot be sought. ISSUE: WON the petitioner has cause
of action (affected in anyway) by the respondent’s petition for appointment as sole
administratix of conjugal properties? HELD: NO! The petitioner (Alberto’s mistress) is not
an indispensable party nor a real party-in-interest because Alberto can fulfill the relief sought
by Angela even without the participation of Relucio. The cause of action arises only between
the husband and the wife who have right-duty obligation between each other. The mistress is
a complete stranger to them. Any judgment would be valid and enforceable against Alberto.
The administration of the property of marriage is entirely between the spouses to the
exclusion of other persons. Or simply put: No need for Relucio to intervene, she has nothing
to do with the affairs of the spouse. JADER-MANALO v CAMAISA (2002) 374 SCRA 498
Petitioner Thelma Jader-Manalo came across respondent spouses’ ad in Bulletin Today
selling their 10-door apartment in Makati and another property in Taytay, Rizal. - Interested
in both properties, petitioner negotiated for its purchase through the spouses’ real estate
broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno. g. Dissolution of the CPG FC, Art 1. 2. 3. 4. 126 The conjugal
partnership terminates: upon the death of either souse when there is a decree of legal
separation when the marriage is annulled or declared void in case of judicial separation of
property during the marriage to 138 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 88 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 h.
Liquidation of Assets and FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband and wife shall
not affect the regimeofCPG except that: 1. 2. 3. spouse who leaves the conjugal home or
refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the Liabilities be supported consent
of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall
be obtained FC, Art 129 Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, t in a
summary proceeding 1. An inventory solidarily liable absence or insufficient community
property, the separate property shall be shall be prepared, listing separately all the prop of the
family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a properties proceeding, be given
judicial authority summary of each spouse. to administer or encumber any specific separate
property 2. the other spouse sand use the fruits partnership in payment of p of Amounts
advanced by the conjugal or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share be credited to the
conjugal partnership as an asset thereo Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or
her e the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership o FC, Art 128 If a spouse
without a just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the
family, partnership. the aggrieved spouse may petition 4. The debts and obligations of the
conjugal partnership shall 1. for receivership insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be
solidarily li 2. for judicial separation of property properties, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (2) of 3. for authority for sole administration of ACP The obligations
to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph: 6. 1. marital 2. parental 3. property
relations. 3. 5. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses sha Unless the
owner had been indemnified from whatever source benefit of the family, belonging to either
spouse, even due to fo conjugal funds, if any. 7. The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties sh equally between husband and wife, unless of A spouse is deemed to
have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any
intentiona different propo settlements has failed within the same period to returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of 3 months or or unless there has
been a voluntary waiver or forfe give any information as to his/her whereabouts shall be
prima facie presumed to have no legitimesof returning to the 8. The presumptive intention of
the common children shall b conjugal dwelling. Article 51. 9. In the partition of the
properties, the conjugal dwelling and t agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
spouse wi choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are d has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the c interests of said children. When is
inventory not necessary? (Tolentino, p. 472) 1. when one of the spouses, or his heirs, should
renounce the benefits of partnership 2. when separation of property has preceded the
dissolution of the marriage 3. when partnership is dissolved by death of one of the spouses
and the deceased leaves no heir except the surviving spouse 4. when dissolution is caused by
legal separation, and the share of the guilty spouse is forfeited to the innocent spouse, there
being no children * Par 2 and 3 are called “mutual restitution” which cannot be found in the
dissolution of ACP (Art 102) * Dissolution of CPG has 9 steps, while ACP only has 6, and
it’s all because of the mutual restitution part. FC, Art 130 Upon the termination of the
marriage by death, the c same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If
no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse s judicially or extra-
judicially within six months from the death of the period no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involvin marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse
contract a subsequent marriage with mandatory regime of complete separation of property
shall gove PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-
2009 Page 89 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 during the liquidation more estate of
FC, Art 131 Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two or of
themarriages deceased, such right cannot by the same person before the effectivity of this
Code is carried out simultaneously be impaired by Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
which is a of evidence. income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as
may be considered according to the rulesprocedural In case of doubt as to which partnership
the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different rule.
partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each. Be it noted however that with
respect to “spouse”, the same must be the “legitimate spouse” (not common-law in the
appraisal are FC, Art 132 The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased
persons shall be observed spouses who and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and
other matters which mothers of the children here). are not expressly determined in this
Chapter. FC, Art 133 From the common mass of property support shall be given to the during
the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered shall
be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to
them. - SANTERO v CFI OF CAVITE (1987) 153 SCRA 728 Petitioners Princesita Santero-
Morales, Federico Santero and Willy Santero are the children begotten by the late Pablo
Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and
Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven children begotten by the same Pablo
Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo
Santero since neither of their mothers, was married to their father Pablo. - Even before the
Court could act on the instant petition, private respondents filed another Motion for
Allowance dated March 25, 1985 with the respondent court to include Juanita, Estelita and
Pedrito all surnamed Santero as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz
praying that an order be granted directing the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo to deliver
the sum of P6,000 to each of the seven children of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the
estate of Pablo Santero. ISSUE: WON the natural children Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and
Miguel should be granted an allowance out of the hands of the property administrator of
Pablo Santero? HELD: YES. The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully
employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor
of their right to allowance under Article 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to
the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives
support to the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private
respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. -
Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to
the children the right to receive support E. Separation of Property and Administration of
Common Property by One Spouse 1. Judicial separation of property for sufficient cause FC,
Art 134 In the absence of an express declaration in the marria spouses during the marriage
shall not take place except by judic either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. COMPLETE
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY may be had thru: 1. in the marriage settlement 2. judicial
decree a. voluntary (Art◊conventional by operation of law (Art 103◊136) b. sufficient cause
(Art 135) 3. compulsory and Art 130) when there is no liquidation of property regime of first
marriage FC, Art 135 Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause (BY
PRESENTATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT) 1. civil interdiction 2. judicially declared an
absentee 3. loss of parental authority by court decree (Art 228 and 229) (PROOF 4. 5. 6. OF
CAUSE IS NEEDED) abandonment or failure to comply with family and marital obli abuse
of power of administration granted in the marriage sett de facto separation for at least one
year and reconciliation is h In the cases provided for in Number 1, 2 and 3, the presentation
of t shall be enough basis to grant of the decree of judicial separation of pr GARCIA v
MANZANO (1958) 103 Phil 798 Gonzalo Garcia filed an action against his wife,
Consolacion Manzano, for the declaration of the separation of their conjugal partnership
property on the ground that they have been living separately since 1948 and that all attempts
at reconciliation between them have failed. As a result of their joint efforts, they accumulated
real and personal properties. That since their separation, Consolacion assumed complete
management and administration of the CP. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.
E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 90 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - -
He alleges mismanagement of the CPG since she was exclusively enjoying the fruits of it,
she refused to turn over to Gonzalo his rightful share or allow him participation in the
partnership, she conducted fictitious transfers and alienation of property to third persons and
that she neglected to file income tax returns. TC dismissed complaint for failure to state a
cause of action upon motion of Consolacion judicial - ISSUE: WON Garcia is entitled to a
declaration of separation of properties. - NO - HELD: His complaint did not establish a case
for separation of properties. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of complete
separation as not harmonious with the unity of the family and the mutual affection and help
expected of the spouses, the OCC and NCC require that separation of properties shall not
prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or
by formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage; and in the latter case, it may
only be ordered by the court for the causes specified in Art 191, CC. In the system
established by the NCC, the wife does not administer the conjugal property unless with the
consent of the husband, or by decree of the court and under its supervision with such
limitations as the court may deem advisable. In the event of such maladministration by the
wife, the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial separation of properties but in
revoking the power granted to the wife and resuming the administration of the communal
property and the conduct of the affairs of the CP. He may enforce his right of possession and
control of the conjugal property against his wife, and seek such ancillary remedies as may be
required by the circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized
alienations or encumbrances, upon proper action filed for that purpose. For this reason, Art
167, 172 and 178 CC contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife against the
abuses of her husband because normally, only the latter can commit such abuses. Therefore,
he cannot claim that he should be entitled to the same remedies. PARTOSA-JO v CA (1992)
216 SCRA 692 - Jose Jo cohabitated with three women and he fathered 15 children. The
petitioner in this case claims to be his legal wife (Prima) with whom he had a daughter
named Monina Jo. Prima claims that when she left Dumaguete City it was their agreement
that she was temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and
for Jose to visit and support her. - In 1980 – Prima filed an action for judicial separation of
conjugal property and this was consolidated with her earlier petition for support. In the
disposition of the trial court it was held that Prima was legally married to Jose Jo and
therefore entitled to support as the lawfully wedded wife and Jose Jo was ordered to give a
monthly support of P 500. There was no definite disposition as to the judicial separation of
conjugal property. CA upheld the TC decision but complaint for the judicial separation of
conjugal properties was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation
by agreement was not covered by Art 178, CC. However, the penultimate paragraph of the
decision provides: “It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are
considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of property
under Art 178, Par 3 CC, which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.”
ISSUES: 1. WON a final judgment rendered by the LC may be modified if the dispositive
portion did not contain the decision extensively discussed in the body of the decision. - YES
2. WON the separation of the parties was due to their agreement. - NO 3. WON Prima is
entitled to judicial separation of property. - YES HELD: 1. The dispositive portion of the
decision was incomplete insofar as it carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the
decision. - The penultimate paragraph of the decision of the trial court ruling should have
been embodied in the dispositive portion. It was based upon the findings that Prima and Jose
were legally married and the properties mentioned were acquired during the marriage
although they were registered in the name of a dummy. 2. The CA ruling that an agreement
to live separately without just cause was void under Art 221 of the CC and could not sustain
any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Thus, the only remedy available was that
of legal separation. - However, the separation was due to abandonment. They merely agreed
that she would live with her parents while she was pregnant, and when she returned, he
refused to accept her. This clearly demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their
conjugal relationship; moreover, from 1968-1988 when the court finally decided to award
support, Jose never gave financial support. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.
E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 91 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 3. - -
- On the grounds of abandonment and also failure without just cause to comply with his
obligations as husband and father; apart from refusing to admit Prima his lawful wife, to their
conjugal home, she is entitled to a judicial separation of property. Court held that,
“abandonment is the departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return,
followed by a prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing
in the least for one’s family although able to do so.” And the FC states that the aggrieved
spouse may petition for judicial separation when there is: Abandonment by a spouse of the
other without just cause Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the
family without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse. The physical
separation of the parties coupled with the refusal by Jose to give support sufficed to
constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. FC
allows judicial separation of property when the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Since the LC found that Jose is the
real owner of the properties, these must be divided between them on the assumption that they
were acquired during their marriage. attorney’s fees, with legal interest form date of original
complaint until fully paid plus costs. ISSUES: 1. WON separation of husband from his wife
constitutes abandonment in law that would justify the separation of conjugal partnership
property - NO 2. WON the husband’s failure and/or refusal to inform his wife of the state of
their business is an abuse of his powers of administration of the CP as to warrant a division
of matrimonial assets NO HELD: 1) There was only mere physical separation and not real
abandonment. Abandonment contemplated by the law must be of physical estrangement,
moral and FINANCIAL desertion. Based on how abandonment was used in Art 178, in order
for desertion of one spouse to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of
marital relations and duties and rights with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is
to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means giving up absolutely and with
intent never again to resume or claim one’s rights or interests. - Here, Severino did not seem
to have the intention to leave his family permanently since he continued to give support
despite his absence which thus negates any intent not to return and resume his marital duties
and rights. - Since separation in fact between spouses does not affect the CP except if the
husband abandons his wife without just cause, (Art 178, CC) claims of the Estrella of
concubinage on part of Severino must be regarded as efforts at bolstering her claim of
abandonment which shall justify, under the law, a judicial separation of conjugal assets.
There is no strong corroborated evidence that demonstrates the existence of illicit relations
between Nenita and Severino. Neither has he been mismanaging funds since he actually
increased the value of their assets by over a million pesos. 2) For abuse to exist, it is not
enough that the husband perform acts prejudicial to his wife or commit acts injurious to the
partnership. There must be an act willfully performed and with utter disregard of the
partnership by the husband that would be prejudicial to the wife, evidenced by the repetition
of deliberate acts and/or omissions. It is not condoning the husband’s separation from his
wife. Instead, is that there is an insufficiency or absence of cause of action. Remedies of Art
167 and 178 are aimed at protecting the CP. And they must exercise restraint since they are
trying to preserve union of spouses; a judgment ordering a separation of assets where there’s
no real abandonment may eradicate the possibility of reconciliation. Alimony increased from
P2000 to P3000. Attorney’s fees must also be borne by defendant since he left DELA CRUZ
v DELA CRUZ (1968) 22 SCRA 333 - SUPRA - Estrella ♥ Severino dela Cruz and
blessed with six children. They acquired seven parcels of land at Bacolod Cadastre
and three parcels at Silay Cadastre. These are all registered in their names. They are also
engaged in various business ventures. - She filed a complaint praying for the separation of
property, monthly support and payment of attorney fees and costs. - In 1949, she claims that
she already suspected that Severino was sleeping around which was only confirmed by a note
she found in his shirt in 1951. She confronted him about it and he promised her to forsake his
mistress which he failed to do - Since 1955, he never slept in conjugal dwelling, but only
paid short visits. She contends that he abandoned her and their children to live in Manila with
his mistress, Nenita Hernandez. And that after 1955 until the time of the trial, he had never
visited the conjugal abode and when he was in Bacolod, she was denied communication with
him. - RTC ordered separation and division of the conjugal assets (valued at P500,000),
directing the Severino to pay to Estrella P20,000 as PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
| Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 92 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law
B2012 the conjugal abode and has given cause for plaintiff to seek redress in courts. - 2.
Voluntary separation of property The kids by first marriage should be notified of the
proceedings and their names and addresses, as well as the names and addresses of the kids by
second marriage, be furnished by them. LACSON v SAN JOSE (1968) 24 SCRA 837 FC,
Art 136 The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court forLacson ♥ Carmen
San-Jose Lacson on - Alfonso the CPG and for the separation of their common
properties. Feb 14, 1953 with 4 children. - creditors of9, 1963 Carmen left the the petition
and All creditors of the ACP or of the CPG, as well as the listed personal On Jan the spouse
shall be listed in conjugal home notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures
to protect the creditors andManila. She filed a pecuniary and began living in other persons
with complaint interests. on March 12, 1963, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
for custody of the kids and their support. IN RE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF SPOUSES BERNAS (1965) - An amicable settlement
was however reached 14 SCRA 327 between the spouses with regard to custody of the kids
(wherein the 2 older kids go to their dad - Jose and Pilar Bernas were married in Dec 1932
and the 2 younger ones to their mom), support and they had 2 kids. During the marriage they
and separation of property. This was later acquired 12 parcels of land and two buildings.
approved by the CFI, stating that it was - 30 years later, they executed an “Agreement for
conformable to law. Dissolution of conjugal partnership and Later, Carmen filed a complaint
praying for the separation of property” believing that this will custody of all the kids. This
was granted by the redound to their mutual advantage, benefit and CA who declared the
agreement null and void gain, and preserve peace and harmony and insofar as the custody of
the kids was concerned. prevent friction, dissension and confusion between their heirs since
Jose had 2 sets of ISSUE: WON the compromise agreement and the children. After the
execution of this contract, judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement they filed
with the court the aforementioned are conformable to law. - YES petition. - LC denied the
petition since under Art 192 CC, a HELD: It is valid with respect to the separation of CP can
only be dissolved once legal separation property between the spouses and the dissolution of
has been ordered, which can only happen upon the CP since this is allowed by law provided
judicial civil interdiction, declaration of absence or sanction is secured beforehand. Such
approval was abandonment (Art 191, CC). obtained and it does not appear that they have
creditors who will be prejudiced by the - The spouses claim that Art 191 allows voluntary
arrangements. judicial separation or property during the marriage subject to judicial approval.
Further, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least 5 years and it is but proper to
sever their ISSUE: WON voluntary separation of property during financial and proprietary
interests. Court cannot marriage is allowed by law force them to live with each other and
render conjugal rights to the other (Arroyo v Vasquez de HELD: YES. The CP may be
dissolved by agreement Arroyo). of the spouse if it has judicial approval. But even though
Jose has kids by his first marriage, their However, in the approval of the regime and names
were not included in the agreement or dissolution, the court doesn’t accord recognition nor
approval of the petition whereas his kids by second legalize de facto separation. It’s
abnormal and marriage and his second wife are. Neither were the fraught with grave danger
to all concerned (Arroyo v. kids by first marriage notified of such. In fact, no Vasquez de
Arroyo). Spouses are obliged to live notice appears to have been given to the kids by
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and second marriage, although the danger of
substantial render mutual help and support (CC, Art 109). injury to their rights would seem
remote. There’s virtue in making it as difficult as possible for - Also, the dissolution of the
CPG of the second married couples to abandon each other merely due marriage cannot take
place without first to whims and caprices. General happiness of married dissolving the CPG
of the first marriage wherein life is secured by its indissolubility. When people the kids of
that marriage have an interest. The understand that they must live together, they agreement
may affect the rights of the kids by become good spouses from necessity of remaining first
marriage since Art 189 CC states that “in such. Necessity is a powerful master in teaching
case of doubt, the partnership property shall be duties which it imposes. (Arroyo v Vasquez
de divided between the different partnerships in Arroyo). proportion to the duration of each
and to the prop belonging to the respective spouses.” PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 93 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 With regard to the custody and support of the children: all the children,
including the Enrique and Teresa, were below 7 year old then Art 363 CC specifically
commands that no mother shall be separated from her child under 7 year old unless court
finds compelling reasons for such measure. Ratio for Art 363: Avoid tragedy where mom has
seen her baby torn away from her. Compelling reasons must be rare if mom’s heart is not to
be unduly hurt. If mom has erred such as in adultery, imprisonment and divorce will be
sufficient punishment. Her moral dereliction will not affect the baby who has yet to
understand situation. Provision is mandatory and the compromise judgment by separating 2
elder children who were below 7 year old from their mom was null and void for violating the
provision. No compelling reason was given for taking away 2 children from Carmen. CFI
decision on MFR regarding compromise judgment only presented a mere hint. Courts cannot
proceed on mere insinuations. Enrique and Maria are now above 7 yo, thus issue regarding
awarding their custody to their mom has become moot and academic. But, Court should still
uphold their agreement regarding custody. Art 356 CC provides that every child is entitled
to: 1. parental care 2. receive at least elementary education 3. moral and civic training by
parents/guardians 4. right to live in atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and
intellectual development Child’s welfare should not be subject to parents’ sayso or mutual
agreement alone. Court should ascertain in whose custody the child can better be assured the
rights granted by law. Evidence should be presented and court should not merely rely on
compromise judgment in determining fitness of each parent to be custodian of children.
Besides, Enrique (11), since he’s now over 10, should be given the choice of the parent he
wishes to live with. If any child will be finally awarded to mom, P150 monthly support is
insufficient considering that prices of commodities and services have increased and kids are
now of school age. CFI may increase such amount according to need of each child.
MAQUILAN v MAQUILAN (2007) 524 SCRA 166 DOCTRINE: Voluntary separation of
property may take place while other cases are pending. Proceedings for the same do not
require the intervention of the Solicitor General. Final judgment of adultery is not punished
with civil interdiction, thus it is not a ground for judicial separation of property. PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 94 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 3. Liquidation and dissolution of property 4. Sole
administration of other spouse’s property FC, Art 137 Once the separation of property has
been decreed, the FC, Art 142 The administration of all classes of exclusive proper this code
(Art 102 and 129). to the other spouse (only acts as a trustee) During the pendency of the
proceedings for separation of property, the1. spouses and their children. 2. 3. 4. guardian of
the other judicially declared an absentee civil interdiction fugitive from justice or in hiding as
an accused in a criminal ca If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence,
con FC, Art 138 After dissolution of the ACP or the CPG, the provisions appoint a suitable
person to be the administrator. on complete separation of property shall apply. FC, Art 139
The petition for separation of property and final judgment granting the same shall be
administration is given in local civil registries and registries of property. In previous cases
(ACP/CPG), common property case of incapacity. Exclusive property may be administered
by the other spouse but court proceeding is required. FC, Art 140 The separation of property
shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors FC, Art 141 The spouses may,
in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for
a decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of
property following instances: 1. civil interdiction terminates ADVANTAGES: 2. absentee
spouse reappears 1. simple; no common marriage settlements 3. when the court is satisfied
that the spouse granted the power of administration in the properties hence no will not
liquidation again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said administration 4. when
the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal separation resumes
common life with the 2. neither spouse can be accused of being other interested in other’s
properties 5. when parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived
thereof 6. when the spouses who have been separated in fact for a least one year, reconcile
and resume common life DISADVANTAGES: 7. when after voluntary dissolution of the
ACP or CPG has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses, 1.
inconsistent with the property may thereafter they agree to the revival of the former property
regime. No voluntary separation of community of life and be interest which marriage is
supposed to granted. E. Regime of Separate Property create The revival of the former
property regime shall be governed by Art 67. 2. based on distrust and not favorable to the Art
67 Agreement to revive former regime shall specify: 1) what to contribute anew to restored
property regime 2) what to retain in separate property 3) names of all the creditors 3. 4. 5.
WHEN 1. 2. 3. family ordinarily unfavorable to the wife who usually is unemployed and
dependent on the husband for support may lead to constant disputes on sharing and family
expenses against Filipino custom which is trust and sharing in the spouses MAY
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY EXIST? by agreement in marriage settlement decree by
court in proper cases separation of property cannot be converted to any other property regime
during marriage FC, Art 143 Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settle shall be
governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisio FC, Art 144 Separation of
property may refer to present or future p latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate
shall pertain KINDS OF SEPARATE PROPERTY 1. as to extent a. total PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 95 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 2. This provision applies to: 1. live-in partners a. no legal
impediment to marry b. hence, not applicable to concubinage * Coexistence of CSP and
ACP/CPG is possible. and adulterous relationships However, in default of a stipulation to the
regime of c. exclusive to each other properties outside the CSP, ACP shall apply. d. real
continuous cohabitation e. the goal is to encourage future marriage FC, Art 145 Each spouse
shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate 2. void all
earnings without the need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong marriages
from his or her profession, a. public policy business, industry and all fruits, natural, industrial
or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property. b. absence of
requisites c. except bigamous marriages b. partial as to kinds of property a. present property
b. future property c. both present and future property * Does not include fruits of their
exclusive properties F. Property Regimes of Unions Without Marriage FC, Art 147 When a
man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. (The next line was not in the CC, an innovation of FC in favor of
housewives.) For purposes of this article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household. (Unlike ordinary partnership) Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only
one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendant. In the absence of descendant, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination
of the cohabitation. FC, Art 146 Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to
their income FC, Art 148 In cases of cohabitation not falling under the precedin default
thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property proportion be The liability of the spouses to the
creditors for family expenses shall, however,to their respective contributions. In the absence
of proof t shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption sh credit. If one of
the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party w another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in th The foregoing rules shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad * Compared with Art 98 and Art 125, this Article does not provide for donations by
reason of charity or occasion of family rejoicing or family distress. YAPTINCHAY v
TORRES (1969) 28 SCRA 489 Isidro Yaptinchay and Teresita Yaptinchay have been living
together openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 years Isidro’s alleged legitimate
wife is Josefina Yaptinchay with whom he has a daughter named Virginia Yaptinchay. Isidro
died intestate and upon his death, Teresita sought her appointment as special administratrix
and then as regular administratrix of Isidro’s estate A few days later, the lower court
appointed Teresita as administratrix. Josefina then registered her opposition saying that
Teresita is not a legitimate heir of Isidro and had no right to institute the proceeding for the
settlement of Isidro’s estate, much less procure the appointment as administratrix. At the
same time, Josefina and her children sought the appointment of Virginia as special
administratrix and Josefina as the regular administratrix. LC granted Josefina and her
children’s petition and appointed Virginia as special administratrix. Teresita then filed a
petition seeking action for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during her
cohabitation with Isidro. LC issued a restraining order to withhold the Virginia and Josefina
from disposing any of the properties, specifically including a house in Forbes Park Virginia
and Josefina resisted the restraining order and posited that Teresita was not entitled to the
injunction because her right to the properties is still doubtful and is in dispute PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 96 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - LC lifts the restraining order and orders Teresita not to
divest Virginia her possession of the Forbes Park property; however it also enjoined Virginia
from selling, disposing or encumbering said property in any matter pending resolution of the
disputes Teresita alleges that the Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by her and
Isidro and she even contributed using her own exclusive funds Josefina and Virginia dispute
this claim and say the house was built with Isidro’s funds alone and without Teresita’s
intervention. Teresita presents proof that she obtained loans when the Forbes Park house was
under construction. - without the benefit of marriage, are co-owners of the jeepney. The
motion was denied. The court based their decision on Article 144 CC which provides that
when a man and a woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership ISSUES: 1. WON the preliminary injunction could be granted in favor of
Teresita 2. WON Teresita can claim that she co-owned the house with Isidro by the fact that
they were common-law spouses HELD: 1. Injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the
court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of
abuse. Although Teresita presented loans that she had contracted during the period when said
house was under construction as proof of ownership, evidence was wanting which would
correlate such loans to the construction work. Thus, assertion that the North Forbes Park
house is petitioner's exclusive property is unsupported and may not be permitted to override
the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on Isidro’s lot at his
instance, and during his marriage with Josefina, is part of the estate that should be under the
control of the Virginia 2. Before a common-law spouse can claim coownership of their
spouse’s properties, there must be a clear showing that the commonlaw spouse had, during
cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. JUANIZA v
JOSE (1979) 89 SCRA 306 Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had
been cohabiting with defendantappelant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 yrs. Jose was the registered
owner and operator of a passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight
train resulting in the death of 7 and physical injuries to 5 of its passengers. In the resulting
case for damages, the CFI rendered decision ordering Jose and Rosalia (the mistress) to
jointly and severally pay. Rosalia filed MFR praying that she should not be liable to pay for
damages since the decision was based on the erroneous theory that she was living together
with Jose as husband and wife ISSUES: 1. WON Art 144 is applicable in a case where one of
the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry - NO 2. WON Rosalia,
who is not a registered owner of the jeep can be held solidarily liable for damages with the
registered owner - NO HELD: 1. It has been consistently ruled that the coownership
contemplated in Art 144, requires that the man and woman living together must not be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Jose is legally married to Socorro, there is an
impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia. Thus, Rosalia cannot be a co-owner of
the jeep. The jeep belongs to the CP of Jose and Socorro. There is therefore no basis for the
liability of Rosalia for damages arising from the death of and physical injuries suffered by
the passengers. 2. Rosalia, who is not the registered owner can neither be liable for damages
caused by its operation, because only the registered owner is responsible. VDA DE
CONSUEGRA v GSIS (1971) 37 SCRA 315 - Jose Consuguera contracted 2 marriages. 1st
marriage was with Rosario Diaz where they had 2 children. 2nd marriage was with Basilia
Berdin with 7 children. Later he died. Both marriages were contracted in good faith. As a
member of GSIS, he was entitled to both a retirement insurance and life insurance. The life
insurance was paid to Berdin and her children who were the designated beneficiaries named
in the policy. The retirement policy did not designate a beneficiary. Hence, the petition.
GSIS: ½ to Rosario (8/16) and ½ to Basilia (1/16 between Basilia and their seven children).
CFI: Same with GSIS. ISSUE: WON Basilia is entitled to the proceeds of the retirement
benefits because she was just the second wife. HELD: Yes. The marriage was contracted in
good faith and so it is just and fair for them to receive it. Not just because the retirement does
not name a beneficiary, means that it should follow what was PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 97 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 written in the life insurance benefits. It is just and fair to recognize the
second wife it being that the marriage was done in GOOD FAITH. Provisions on retirement
came when Com Act 186 was amended by RA 660 on 1951 which means that there was no
intention for the life insurance beneficiaries to automatically be the retirement beneficiaries
also. Besides, it is also required for the member to specifically write the name of the
beneficiary. *Ma’am Beth asks: When do you consider good faith in marriages? Only with
regard to belief in the authority of the solemnizing officer. MAXEY v CA (1984) 129 SCRA
187 Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903 in ‘military
fashion’ according to their children (which the courts did not recognize). They had 6
children: John Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred, and George. Except for the
youngest son, all the children were born before the disputed properties were acquired. They
had their church marriage in 1919, and sometime after, Regina Morales died. The disputed
properties were acquired in 1911 and 1912 before the 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales
Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried in 1953, his
second wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the
respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra. This sale according to the petitioners
was unknown to them until in 1961. Petitioners sought to annul the sale arguing that the
properties were common properties of their parents. Trial court applied Art. 144 of the Civil
Code stating that “When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.” Trial court ruled in their favor annulling the sale and order the
return of the land to them plus other costs. Court of Appeals reversed stating that lands in
question were exclusive properties of Melbourne Maxey since Regina Morales was in no
position to be able to contribute jointly to the acquisition of property. ISSUES: 1. WON
properties were Melbourne Maxey’s exclusive property 2. WON the phrase “joint efforts”
was limited and pertained only to monetary contributions HELD: 1. NO. The said properties
were products of the joint efforts and industry of Melbourne and 2. 3. Regina even if they
were not legally married at the time of its acquisition. NO. SC ruled contrary to CA, stating
that CA limitedly construed the phrase “joint efforts” and confined them to mean financial
effort. SC recognized that even without the benefit of marriage, Melbourne and Regina lived
together and assumed the roles of husband and wife, Regina as ‘administrator’ of their
domestic affairs while Melbourne works in the colonial government. SC recognizes woman’s
contribution to the co-ownership of unmarried couples even if she is not working outside the
home. SC said that this was the correct interpretation of the Civil Code because the woman
cannot be expected to give up her role as homemaker and go out to earn an income.
VALDES v RTC (1998) 260 SCRA 221 - Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were
married on Jan 5, 1971. In 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
the QC RTC, pursuant to Art 36, FC (mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their
essential marital obligations) which RTC granted. Ex-spouses were directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art 147, FC, and to
comply with the provisions of Art 50-52, FC, within 30 days from notice of this decision.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of the direction of compliance with Arts 50-52
asserting that the FC contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common
property in "unions without marriage." - RTC thus clarified that considering that Art 147
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts
of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, ex-spouses will own their family
home and all their properties for that matter in equal shares. - In the liquidation and partition
of properties owned in common by the ex-spouses, the provisions on ownership found in the
CC shall apply. And on the issue of disposing the family dwelling, considering that this
Court has already declared the marriage as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art 147, the
property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership and
provisions of Arts. 102 and 129 of the FC finds no application. Petitioner’s MFR was denied
and in his recourse to the SC, he submits that Art 50-52 should be controlling. ISSUE: WON
provisions Art 50-52 are controlling – NO. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof.
E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 98 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
HELD: TC correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by the
provisions of Art 147 (a remake of Art 144, CC) or Art 148, FC. The particular kind of co-
ownership in Art 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or
without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision refers to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Art 147 has clarified Art 144, CC and now expressly provides that: o Neither
party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership property,
without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and o In the case of a void
marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of
their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default
thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation (Art 147) or declaration of nullity of the marriage (Arts 43, 50, 51, FC). When
the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the ACP or CPG, as the case may be, if so existing
under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. - The
rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the ACP or the CPG, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled),
are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have
coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable
marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership
subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found
in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the
property regime of the spouses. NICDAO CARINO v LEE CARINO (2001) 351 SCRA 127
Case of the Susan-loving police - 1969 Santiago Carino ♥ Susan Nicdao, had 2
daughters - 10 Nov 1992 Santiago Carino married Susan Yee, no child after
almost 10 years of cohabitation 23 Nov 1992 he passed away under the care of Susan Yee
who likewise spent for his medical and burial expense - Nicdao was able to collect P146,000
from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM and PAG-IBIG while Yee received a total
of P21,000 from GSIS Life and Burial as well as burial benefit from SSS. Yee filed a petition
to order Nicdao to return to her ½ of the P146,000 collectively dominated as “death benefits”
- RTC find in favor of the petitioner based on the ground that the deceased marriage to
Nicdao is void ab initio for wanting of a marriage license ordering the respondent to pay
P73,000 and cost of litigation CA upheld RTC ISSUE: WON Yee is entitled to half of the
“death benefits” of Carino given to Nicdao HELD: No. Yee (second wife) is not entitled to
the said share of the death benefits given to Nicdao. Since both marriages are void, the first
marriage lacking marriage license and the latter characterized as subsequent marriage
contracted without judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. The property
regime applicable to both marriages is governed by Art 147 and 148 FC. Marriage to Nicdao:
covered by Art 147 which covers unions of two parties and not barred from contracting said
marriage but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void for other reason, such in this case
when the marriage of the petitioner to the deceased is to be declared void due to lack of
marriage license. Under the said provision the properties acquired during the subsisting
cohabitation is deemed to be obtained by the parties’ joint efforts, work or industry and shall
be owned by them in equal shares. THUS: half of the disputed “death benefits” of the
deceased shall be given to Nicdao and the other half shall pass by intestate succession to his
legal heirs who are his children with Nicdao. Marriage to Yee: governed by Art 148 which
refers to the property regime of unions between parties PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 99 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 who are cohabiting without marriage and is likewise barred to contract
marriage since a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Nicdao is n
ot obtained before obtaining said marriage to Yee. In this property regime the properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
ownership, however wages, salaries earned by each party is regarded as his exclusive
property; it follows therefore that since these benefits were accrued by the deceased through
his contributions to these agencies while he was serving as a policeman then these benefits
exclusively belong to him—unless respondent Yee gives proof to the contrary and thus she
claim these said benefits. RIVERA v HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA (2006) 496 SCRA 135 -
1913 or 1914, Romualdo Villanueva ♥ Amanda Musngi Amanda died on April 20, 1963.
While Romualdo’s marriage with Amanda was still subsisting, he cohabited with Pacita
Gonzales and both lived as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage from 1927 to
1963. - In the course of their cohabitation, Pacita and Romualdo acquired several properties.
ISSUE: WON the real properties acquired by Pacita and Romualdo were equally owned by
them – Depends on the date of acquisition (relative to Amanda’s death) and proof of Pacita’s
contribution HELD: - Because the cohabitation of Pacita and Romualdo from 1927 to 1963
was adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article
144 CC, which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from
getting married. - According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza v. Jose, no co-ownership
exists between parties to an adulterous relationship. - In Agapay v. Palang, Court expounded
this doctrine by declaring that in such a relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to
prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay
claim to any portion of it. Presumption of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
Here, the records show only four properties acquired by Pacita and Romualdo between 1927
and 1963 which they registered in both their names. The records are devoid of any evidence
that Pacita contributed anything to the acquisition of these properties. None of these four
parcels should accrue to the petitioners. There is only one parcel of land that is registered
solely in Pacita’s name. Because Romualdo never actually challenged the validity of the - -
registration of this land under Pacita’s name, this land should accrue entirely to her heirs.
There is also one property acquired by both Pacita and Romualdo after Amanda’s death in
1963. This must be governed by rules on coownership pursuant to Article 144 CC. Hence,
half of it should pertain to Pacita’s heirs and the other half, to Romualdo’s. The rest of the
properties registered in Romualdo’s name were also acquired after Amanda’s death, and
therefore pursuant to Article 144 CC, half of it should pertain to Pacita’s heirs, the other half,
to Romualdo’s. SAGUID v CA (2003) 403 SCRA 678 Gina was then 17 years old and
legally married, when she met Jacinto. Since she was separated in fact from her husband, she
cohabited with Jacinto. They lived in the house built on the lot of Jacinto’s father. Jacinto
worked as a patron of their fishing vessel. Gina first worked as a fish dealer (in Marinduque),
then as an entertainer in Japan. After 9 years, the couple decided to separate. - Gina asks that
she be declared the sole owner of the personal properties (appliances, furniture), which she
purchased with her income as fish dealer during their cohabitation, and that 70,000 be
reimbursed to her as her share in the construction of their house. The latter’s funding being
fruits of her income as an entertainer. - Jacinto, on the other hand, claims that the petitioner
had no share in the construction of the house and that she couldn’t have bought the
mentioned personal properties as selling fish was just a pastime for her. It was resolved that
both parties contributed to their joint account (from which the funds for acquiring said
properties came from), but there is no sufficient proof of their respective shares. ISSUE:
WON the properties in dispute shall be adjudicated in favor of Gina alone - NO HELD: Gina
is not legally capacitated to marry, but she nonetheless cohabited with Jacinto. As such, Art
148 of the FC shall apply to the properties acquired during their cohabitation. Their share in
the common property shall be determined by the each of the parties’ “actual” contribution.
Therefore, since the receipt presented as evidence only stated P11,413 was spent for the
purchase of construction materials, then this is amount which shall be given to Gina. With
regard to the personal properties, since there is an absence of proof, it is presumed that Gina
and Jacinto’s actual contributions are of equal amount. The amount of P111,375, said amount
shall be divided equally. Thus entitling Gina to a reimbursement of P55,687.50 as her share.
SAN LUIS v SAN LUIS-SAGALONGOS (2007) PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |
Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 100 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law
B2012 514 SCRA 294 Felicisimo San Luis, a former governor of Laguna, contracted three
marriages in his lifetime. - 1st: Virginia Sulit with 6 children (Rodolfo, Mila Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel, petitioners). - 5 years after his first wife’s death, he married an
American citizen named Merry Lee who begot him an only son. However, Lee obtained a
divorce decree in Hawaii after five years of marriage. One year after the divorce decree was
granted, he married the respondent Felicidad Sagalongos San Luis, they had no children.
Upon Felicisimo’s death, Felicidad applied for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
asset and the settlement of the decedent’s estate with her as the administrator in Makati RTC.
The children from the first marriage opposed this petition. Their contentions are as follows: o
Case should have been filed at Sta. Cruz, Laguna o Marriage between them is null and void
because it is bigamous, the marriage between their father and Merry Lee was still subsisting -
In response, Felicidad adduced the decree of divorce in order to prove Felicisimo’s capacity
to marry. She also invokes the Quita and Van Dorn ruling wherein divorce by alien spouses
is likewise valid to the Filipino spouse. Notwithstanding the divorce decree she offers, the
evidentiary value as laid down in the Garcia case was not complied with. ISSUE: WON
pending the determination of validity of the foreign divorce, Felicidad has legal standing to
apply for letters of administration. HELD: YES. She may request for letters of administration
because she qualifies as an “interested person” by virtue of their cohabitation. If she proves
the validity of Felicisimo’s divorce and consequentially, his capacity to marry but fails to
prove the validity of their own marriage, she may be considered as a co-owner under Art 144
of CC (Art 147 FC). Likewise, if in the case she fails to prove the validity of both the divorce
and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Art 148 CC (regime of limited co-
ownership). PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-
2009 Page 101 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 XI. THE FAMILY FAMILY may
be defined as a natural and social institution founded on the conjugal union, binding together
the individuals composing it, for the common accomplishment of the individual and spiritual
ends of life, under the authority of the original ascendant heading it. (Tolentino, SempioDiy)
BASES OF THE FAMILY 1. matrimonial union 2. relationship within the degree determined
by law, whether illegitimate or legitimate 3. adoption IMPORTANCE OF THE FAMILY 1.
the family is an essential factor in the general, social and even political life 2. constant living
together of husband and wife, and of parents and children, contributes to the development of
a strong sense of duty an aptitude for heroic sacrifice and of the love by future generations of
the traditions and moral concepts of those who preceded them 3. it is an indispensable
element of social cohesion and equilibrium 4. the vitality and strength of the State depends
upon the solidarity of its nucleus which is the family - E.g. spiritual relations, sexual relations
of the spouses, career or profession that parents should choose for their children, practice or
customs in the domestic life, distribution of children’s inheritance (although law provides
150 Family relations include: Between husband and wife Between parents and children
Among other ascendants and descendants Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
halfblood FC, Art 1. 2. 3. 4. * Half-blood means having one common parent CLASSES OF
FAMILY RELATIONS 1. Natural – by consanguinity or affinity 2. Civil – created by law
e.g. adoption 3. Religious – created by sacraments such as baptism and confirmation (ninong
& ninang) Family relations exist even when they are not living together Other relatives living
with the family are members of the household, but not of the family Nephews, nieces,
cousins, aunts or uncles are inconsistent with the Filipino culture Illegitimate children
are◊not relatives included at least in the family of their mother -> Sempio-Diy is wrong!
Relatives include both the husband’s and the wife’s - A. Members of the Family 1. Nature
and Scope of Family Relations 2. Support FC, Art 194 Support = everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwe transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. FC,
Art 149 The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which
public policy be supported referred to in the The education of the person entitled to cherishes
and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law training for some
professional, trade or vocation, even beyond age of the family shall be recognized or given
effect. going to and from school, or to and from place of work. It is only the external aspect
of family relations that is governed by law 1. Internal aspect sacred to the family and
inaccessible to law E.g. spiritual relations, sexual relations of the spouses, career or
profession that parents should choose for their children, practice or customs in the domestic
life, distribution of children’s inheritance (although law provides for equal legitimes of
children) BASIS: law must respect the freedom of action of man within his spheres 2.
External aspect BASIS: it is only here that third persons and public interest are concerned *
CC didn’t include transportation, but FC did because it is possible for one to save up on other
expenses like food and clothing but not on transportation expenses, especially if the place is
not reachable by walking. * Full extent means “indispensable” and “financial capacity”. This
phrase is also seen in the two succeeding provisions for support of family members and
illegitimate brothers and sisters. * “Even beyond age of majority” PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 102 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 FC, Art 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. * Rule on support is different from rule on inheritance
195 Obligation to support each other to the whole extent FC, Art 199 Whenever two or more
persons are obliged to give s spouses persons in this order: legitimate ascendants and
descendants 1. spouse parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate 2. descendants
in nearest of the latter and illegitimate children degree (grandchildren) 3. ascendants in
nearest degree parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate or brothers and sisters
4. illegitimate children of the latter (grandchildren) legitimate brothers and sisters, whether
full or half-blood FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two or mo
between them in proportion to the resources of each. In case of urgent need and by special
circumstances, judge may order to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due
from them. FC, Art 196 Brothers and sisters, not legitimately related, whether full or half-
blood If two the brother or support at the same time from one obligor, follo each other to the
full extent EXCEPT only when the need for support ofrecipients claimsister, child will be
preferred. imputable to the claimant’s fault or negligence. * The exception does not apply to
legitimate siblings so in a nutshell, if you have a lazy and irresponsible brother, he can
lawfully ask for your support which you are obliged to give. FC, Art 197 For the support of
legitimate ascendants by: (1) descendants, legit/illegitimate; and * The spouse has better
opportunity to look for other means to support him/herself than the child. FC, Art 201
Proportion of support stipulated in Art 195 and Art 196: re FC, Art 202 Support may be
increased or reduced according to the red of obligor. (2) - FC, Art 203 The obligation to give
support shall be demandable from needs it for maintenance, but is payable only upon
demand. only separate property of person obliged to give support shall be answerable in
default of separate property, ACP and CPG will advance support, * No obligation to pay
arrears in support. Support is liquidation brothers and sisters, legit/illegitimate What
properties are liable for the support of the following relatives? 1. 2. 3. spouse common
children of spouse children of spouse by another marriage Illegitimate children of either
spouse ACP/CPG ACP/CPG ACP/CPG (because they are still legitimate!) CPG: separate
property of the parent-spouse, but if the same is insufficient, the CPG if financially capable
(read: all legal obligations of the community are covered). The support paid to the child shall
be deducted from the share of the parent-spouse at the time of liquidation of the partnership
not retroactive. It is no longer indispensable since one has survived even without the support
(although refer to Art 206 and 208). In other words, no reimbursement can be done with
support. * Ma’am Beth says: If you’re a legitimate child, everything just trickles down to
you. You don’t have to ask for support or anything because you just go to the dining table
and there’s food waiting for you. 4. FC, Art 204 The supporter have the option to fulfill the
obligation 1. paying the allowance fixed 2. maintaining in the dwelling the person who has
the right to thereto *Example of a moral obstacle: a wife does not want the husband to keep
an illegitimate child with them - stepbrother and stepsister has affair FC, Art 205 The right to
receive support under this Title shall not be le FC, Art 198 Pendente lite of legal separation,
annulment supported from properties of ACP/CPG. *Creditors cannot go after the support
because it is “indispensable,” hence essential to survival of recipient. After final judgment,
duty to mutual support between spouses ceases court says guilty spouse should support
innocent spouse, specifying terms of such order. FC, Art 206 When, without knowledge of
the person obliged to g have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appear
reimbursed. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-
2009 Page 103 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC, Art 207 When the person
obliged to support another unjustlyCC, Art 305 fails to give support funeral arrangement
shall be i refuses or Duty and right to make by the latter, any third person may furnish
support to the needy individual, In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers
support. obliged to give support. This Article shall apply particularly when casefather or
mother of paternal shallthe age of majority the of ascendants, the a child under have better
right. unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed.
FC, Art 208 In case of contractual support or that given by will support shall be subject to
levy on attachment or execution. CC, Art 306 Every funeral shall be in keeping with the
social position Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment circumstances
manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. SPECIAL RULES ON
CONVENTIONAL SUPPORT 1. by contract (inter vivos) or by will (mortis causa) 2.
subject to modifications as circumstances may arise beyond the contemplation of the parties
LACSON v LACSON (2006) 499 legitimate◊SCRA 677 - Edward (petitioner) ♥ Lea
Daban-Lacson (respondent) children: Maowee and Maonaa - Father abandons the family
but mother did not badger him for support, relying on his note in 1975 saying he would
support his daughters Despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of
valuable lands, Edward did not support the family since 1976 To provide for her daughters,
Lea borrowed from her brother, Noel Daman the amount of P400KP600K In 1995, Lea filed
an action for support and the RTC ordered Edward to compensate plaintiffs support of
P2.496 M which is total of 18 years of support in arrears CA dismissed Edward’s appeal
ISSUE: 1. WON the support should be computed from 1976 to 1994/WON his obligation
began upon a legitimate demand in 1995 wherein the action for support was filed (Art 203
FC) 2. WON the amount advanced by Noel Daban should be reimbursed HELD: 1. YES. As
early as 1975, Lea already requested or plead for support from her husband, which was no
less a demand. 2. YES. Pursuant to Art 207 FC, Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement.
Failure on the part of the father is established. It is also necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.
CA and RTC affirmed. * How would you reconcile CC, Art 25 (i.e. thoughtless extravagance
in expenses for leasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency) with
CC Art 306? Ma’am Beth says they are in conflict but didn’t explain any further. CC, Art
307 The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed w expression, his religious beliefs
or affiliation shall determine the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make
arra other members of the family. CC, Art 308 No human remains shall be retained, interred,
disposed o mentioned in the support provision. CC, Art 309 Any person who shows
disrespect to the dead, or wro family of the deceased for damages, material and moral. CC,
Art 310 The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall b chargeable to the conjugal
partnership property, if the deceased is PENOBSCOT AREA HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
CORP. v CITY OF BREWER (1981) 438 A. 2D. 14 - Plaintiff wants to build a house for six
retarded adults/older minors in an area zoned for a single family residential use The city
prohibited the plaintiffs because six retarded adults do not fall within the definition of
“family” According to the ordinance, the requirements for classification as a according to
Ma’am Beth, this is◊family are: 1) does his own cooking significant because of the
assumption that families have meals together 2) which means a traditional family-like
structure of◊domestic bond exists household authority. The staff of the “nut house” cannot
be considered as central figure of “resident” authority because they a. would not necessarily
reside in the home b. would serve in a rotating basis 3) quality of cohesiveness and
permanence a. the average stay of a resident would be one and one-half years b. they would
not control “the choice of who the incoming residents would be nor when other residents
would leave” *Ma’am Beth’s obiter: A house with six nuts in it in a middle of a peaceful
suburbia would undermine the community’s serenity. 3. Funerals PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 104 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 *Applicability of definition of family in the Philippines: The presence of a
permanent figure of household authority may be problematic in families with OFW parents.
(And then she goes on to tell stories about their family, with Dean Pangalangan being in HK
now for some professorial tasks, she goes there almost every two weeks to visit him. That the
airplane fare costs just as much as the ticket to Davao. Or roughly P12,000! Whoa!) And so
the Congress should craft a definition that reflects our culture and the demand of the times.
required to exert efforts to arrive at a settlement before an action is instituted. GUERRERO v
RTC & HERNANDO (1994) 229 SCRA 274 - Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are
brothers-in-law because their wives are half-sisters. They both claim ownership of a lot. -
RTC ruled that the parties should have alleged in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a
compromise was exerted since they are members of the same family. FC, Art 151 No suit
between members of the same family shall HELD: Brothers-in-law are from members
complaint prosper unless it should appear not the verified of the same family as enumerated
in Art 150. No or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed earnest efforts toward a compromise
are needed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromiseRTC (1999) HONTIVEROS v under CC *CC, Art 2035 – uncompromisable
matters: a) civil status of persons (e.g. paternity and filiation) b) validity of a marriage or
legal separation c) any ground for legal separation d) future support e) future legitime f)
jurisdiction of courts ”…because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle
than a litigation between members of the same family.” MENDOZA v CA (1967) 19 SCRA
756 Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza (private resp) instituted the case against her husband Cecilio
(plaintiff) When husband departed to US to further his medical studies and profession, he did
not provide his pregnant and sickly wife with maintenance and support Wife filed action but
husband moves for its dismissal on the grounds no efforts to compromise were made HELD:
No valid compromise can be made with matters regarding future support. MENDEZ v
BIONSON & EUGENIA (1977) 80 SCRA 82 - Mendez and 11 others argue that the court
erred in dismissing their complaint against the Bionsons for lack of earnest efforts being
exerted by the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement before the action was instituted, the
parties being members of the same family. HELD: The litigants are not family members
within the contemplation of the law. The parties are collateral relatives who are not brothers
and sisters. Only members of the same family are 309 SCRA 340 Spouses Agusto and Maria
Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages in their land registration against Agustos’s brother
Gregorio and the latter’s wife, Teodora Ayson. Teodora and Gregorio denied they are
married. RTC: dismissed case because it did verify as required by Art 151 FC and therefore it
did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise. HELD:
Whenever a stranger is party to a case, Art 151 will not apply. Maria, a sister-in-law of
Gregorio is considered a stranger since the law does not consider in-laws as members of the
same family. Teodora, is also a stranger to Augusto. Remanded to RTC for further
proceedings. B. The Family Home FC, Art 152 The family home, constituted jointly by the
husband an the dwelling house where they and their family reside and the land on - -
Unmarried head can mean live-in partners, eldest sibling/child or widow Cannot be a family
home if you do not own the land it is situated on Beneficiaries cannot constitute his own
family home; otherwise they can migrate from one place to another and have lots of family
home to the prejudice of creditors There should be actual occupancy. It does not matter if a
portion of the house is devoted for commercial purposes as long as the family resides on it.
FC, Art 153 The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lo From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its bene continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or extent of the value allowed by the law. PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 105 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 * Difference between CC and FC rules on constitution of family home: CC
requires judicial declaration (done by filing a petition and with the approval of the proper
court) OR extrajudicial (done recording of a public instrument in the proper registry) for the
constitution of a family home. But no one does that, so the FC makes the constitution of a
family home automatic. FC, Art 154 The beneficiaries of a family home: 1. husband & wife
or an unmarried head of family FC, Art 160 When a creditor whose claim is not among those
me and has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actual apply to court for an
order directing the sale of the property under e actual value of the family home exceeds the
maximum am constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum all
improvements introduced by the person/s constituting the family hom beneficiaries, the same
rule and procedure shall apply. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for the
family hom 1 be applied first to the amount mentioned in Art 157 2 then to liabilities under
the judgment and costs (A155) 3 delivered to the judgment debtor 2. parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, illegitimate or legitimate, who are: * Judgment debtor is
not a preferred debtor like in a. living in the family home Art 155 b. depend upon the head of
the family for legal - All three requirements (family relations, actual residence and
dependence for legal support) must be present to become a beneficiary So if the wife dies,
the mother-in-law becomes a stranger to the husband and is no longer considered as
beneficiary of the family home. FC, 1. 2. 3. 4. * Ma’am Beth does not think it’s a wise move
for creditors to go after the family home because he puts his debtor in a more financially
precarious situation and the creditor is not a priority. FC, Art 161 For the purposes of
availing of the benefits of a famil constitute, or be the beneficiary of only one family home.
Art 155 The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, The provisions of this
Chapter shall also govern existing FC, Art 162 or attachment non-payment of taxes
applicable. debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home debts secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material
for the construction of the building * According to Tolentino, Par 4 may also apply to repairs
and improvements done to the family home to avoid redundancy of Par 2 since construction
of the home would always be before the constitution of the family home. FC, Art 156 Family
home must be part of the ACP or CPG or of the exclusive properties either spouse with
consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of the family on his or her own
property. Subject of conditional sale on installments: where ownership is reserved by the
vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price, it may be constituted as a family
home. FC, Art 157 The actual value of family home shall not exceed municipalities) and
P200,000 in rural, as may fixed by law. * Considering this “price tag” imposed on family
homes, realistically speaking, there is no family home in the Philippines anymore. The law
must first seek actuarial computation to update the equivalent value in today’s economy. FC,
Art 158 It may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner/s with the
person constituting the same, the latter’s spouse and majority of beneficiaries of legal age
FC, Art 159 Family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses family for a
period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary a compelling reason. Rule
shall regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 106 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 SIARI VALLEY ESTATES v LUCASAN (1960) 109
Phil 294 - Parcels of land owned by Filemon Lucasan were sold by the sheriff at a public
auction to satisfy a judgment rendered against him. Lucasan opposed with respect to one
parcel. He contends that the land is where he and his wife extrajudicially constituted a family
home hence the land is exempt from execution. ISSUE: WON the property is a family home
and exempt from execution for money judgment? HELD: NO. A family home constituted
after a debt has been incurred is not exempt from execution. Even if the declaration of family
home predates the money judgment, the family home may still be liable as long as it is for
payment of a debt incurred before the constitution. Otherwise, debtors who aim to
circumvent the law may prejudice creditors. MODEQUILLO v BREVA (1990) 185 SCRA
766 - Jose Modequillo is to indemnify the relatives of Audie Salinas who died in a vehicular
accident (1976 Mar 16) involving the former. In 1988 January 29, CA held that the damages
are to be satisfied on his goods and chattels which include a parcel of residential land.
Modequillo executed a motion to quash and/or set aside since the same residential land is
where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as
such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Art 152 and 153 of the FC
except for the liabilities enumerated in Article 155. Also, the said judgment debt is not one of
those listed in Article 155. ISSUE: WON the said residential land has the characteristic of a
family home and thus is exempted from execution HELD: NO. - The plaintiff misinterpreted
Art 162 of the FC which provides that “all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of FC are considered family homes and entitled to benefits of a family home” to
be retroactive. Art 152 and Art 153 cannot be applied retroactively. Art. 152, which pertains
to the automatic constitution of family home by mere actual occupation, cannot be invoked
by the plaintiff. - Also, the debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was
incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment
arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the
effectivity of the FC on August 3, 1988. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E.
A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 107 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
TANEO v CA (1999) 304 SCRA 308 Pablito Taneo filed an action against the conveyance of
his land to private respondent. The money judgment of RTC was affirmed by CA. Taneo
alleges that the lands in question are exempt from execution for being a family home
(extrajudicially constituted by his father as early as 1964). ISSUE: WON the family home is
exempt from execution HELD: NO. Art 153 does not apply to family homes occupied prior
to the effectivity of FC and exempted from obligations incurred prior to that same date (Aug
3, 1988). Art 162 is not retroactive considering that the debt preceded the FC (1964). Also, a
family home should be erected on the land owned by the members of the family (owned by
Plutarco Vacalares). VERSOLA v MADOLARIA (2006) 497 SCRA 385 - Dr. Ong Oh
granted P1M loan to Dolores Ledesma - Ledesma sold her house and lot located in Tandang
Sora to spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola for P2.5M. Spouses paid Ledesma P1M as
downpayment with remaining balance in monthly installments Spouses Versola applied for a
2M loan with Asiarust Bank in order to raise the full amount that Ledesma demanded -
However, the spouses were not able to get the loan because Asiatrust Bank discovered a
notice of levy on execution was annotated on the title in connection with Ledesma’s
obligation to a certain Miladay’s Jewels, Inc., in the amount of P214,284. Because of this
annotated encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real Estate Mortgage and refused to
release the P2M loan of petitioners. Dr. Ong Oh filed Complaint after the trial, the RTC and
CA ordered spouses Versola to pay Dr. Ong Oh 1.5M with legal interest Dr. Ong Oh filed a
Motion for Execution and because of this, the sheriff sold at public auction the property of
spouses Versola. Spouses Versola failed to redeem said property, thus a Sheriff’s Final Deed
of Sale was issued in favor of Dr. Ong Oh. Dr. Ong Oh filed and Ex Parte Motion for
Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of spouses Spouses Versola
opposed said motion on the ground that the property sold is the family home of petitioners
which according to them is exempt from execution pursuant to Art. 155 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: WON petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is exempt from
execution? HELD: NO Court finds that petitioner’s assertion for exemption is a mere
afterthought. It was only after almost two years from the time of the execution of sale and
after the Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale was issued did petitioners rigorously claim that the
property in question is exempt from execution. - Such claim for exemption should be set up
and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of property at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming exemption. - There was also no showing that petitioners
adduced evidence to prove that it is indeed a family home. Instead of substantiating their
claim, petitioners languidly presupposed that the sheriff had prior knowledge that the said
property was constituted by them as their family home. Note: A family home is a real right
which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place
and the land in which it is situated and it cannot be seized by creditors except in certain
special cases. VENERACION v MANCILLA (2006) 495 SCRA 712 - In 1995, Elizabeth
Mendinueta secured a P1.2M loan from Charlie Mancilla. She mortgaged her residential
house and lot. The title indicated that she was “single” Mendinueta failed to pay upon
maturity so the property was foreclosed. She admitted her failure but claims that she secured
a loan from Banco Filipino to pay Mancilla. All she’s asking for now is the reduction of the
monthly interest. It turns out that Elizabeth is cohabiting with a certain Geronimo Veneracion
with whom she has three kids, one of whom is Mary Grace (petitioner). Mary Grace seeks
the nullity of judgment against the mortgage based on the following facts: o Geronimo paid
for the monthly installments of property since Elizabeth had no source of income o Family
home is not liable for the execution bec Geronimo did not consent in mortgage (FC 154) o
Decision of RTC prejudiced their right to their family home and hereditary rights ISSUE:
WON the family home may be executed with the spouse’s consent wanting HELD: NO. First
there should be proof that it was indeed a conjugal home and that their father spent for the
acquisition. They failed to append PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 108 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 receipts
of payments made by the father. Unsubstantial claim of mother’s lack of source of income
because she was able to borrow from Banco Filipino. Mother never alleged that said property
was conjugal and was the family home, she only wanted reduction of accrued interests.
PATRICIO v DARIO III (2006) 507 SCRA 438 Marcelino Dario died intestate. He survived
his wife Perla (petitioner) and two sons Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III (respondent) who
extrajudicially settled the estate of their father. Marc wants to partition the property and
terminate co-ownership. RTC ordered the partition: 1/6 to Marc and Marcelino III then 4/6 to
Perla CA family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as
there is a minor beneficiary Marcelino III has a minor son named Marcelino Lorenzo Dario
IV who is a grandson of Marcelino and Perla, hence, a minor beneficiary of the family home
ISSUE: WON a family home can be partition at the death of the head of the household
notwithstanding the presence of a minor beneficiary (Art 154 and 159) HELD: YES. The
minor beneficiaries of a family home contemplated in Art 159 must not only actually reside
in the home but must also be dependent on the head of the family for legal support. Although
a grandson is included in the family relationship required of beneficiaries stipulated in Art
154, the grandson cannot be viewed as dependent on his grandparents for support because his
ascendants of nearest degree, the parents are capable of providing him support. The law
imposes primary obligation of child support to parents, in default of which the grandparents
take place. ARRIOLA v ARRIOLA (2008) GR No. 177703 Fidel Arriola had two marriages.
After his death, his sons John Nabor Arriola (respondent – son with the first wife) and
Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioner – son with the second wife, Vilma) wanted to partition
his estate through public auction. Petitioner refused to include in the auction the house
standing on the subject land because he says that it is their family home. ISSUE: WON the
land on which the house stands may be included in the public auction HELD: NO. Although
the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition postulated by the CA, suspensive
proscription imposed by FC Art 159 shall be observed. Since Fidel built the house out of his
exclusive properties and stayed there for 20 years, by operation of FC Art 153 the house is
automatically constituted as family home. FC Art 152 extends the scope of family home not
only to the dwelling structure but also on the lot on which it stands. Petitioners and
respondents should not touch the house until 10 years has lapsed (2013). All other lands
outside the family home are subject to immediate partition through public auction.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
109 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 XII. PATERNITY AND FILIATION A.
Legitimate Children 1. Kinds of Filiation ISSUE: WON the children by the second marriage
are illegitimate HELD: No. No cogent proof that Lucio and Marcelina were not married, so
the presumption of marriage shall prevail. There was no legal impediment for Perido to
marry at the time of the birth of his eldest child by his second marriage. Perido’s first wife
died long before. LIYAO, Jr. v LIYAO et al (2002) 378 SCRA 563 Corazon Garcia was
married to Ramon Yulo but FC, Art 163 The filiation of children may be by nature or by
adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or had two living separately for 10 years, but
legitimate. children Bernadette and Enrique William Liyao Sr was married to Juanita Tanhoti
1. By nature Liyao, with two daughters Tita Rose and Linda a. Legitimate Christina b.
Illegitimate Corazon cohabited with Liyao and begot a son, 2. By adoption William Liyao Jr.
in White Plains - parents areclaims that he is the illegitimate child of FC, Art 164 Children
conceived or born during the marriage of the Liyao Jr. Liyao Sr. and asks the latter’s legal
family for Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm
of the husband or heir of a donor or both are recognition as compulsory that likewise
legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them Proofs: in a
written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument
shall be recorded in the civil a. Liyao Senior paid medical and hospital registry together with
the birth certificate of the child. expenses, food and clothing during Junior’s birth Who are
legitimate children? And what does b. Liyao Senior asked his confidential conceived OR
born mean? secretary to secure a copy of Liyao Junior’s 1. conceived before M, born during
M birth certificate and open a bank account 2. conceived during M, born during M for him
wherein he deposited amounts on 3. conceived during M, born after dissolution of a weekly
basis M c. Liyao Senior would bring Liyao Junior to the office and introduce him as the
“good a. BIOLOGICAL - NATURAL looking son” and had their pictures taken together
PERIDO v PERIDO (1975) d. Continuous possess and enjoyment of the 63 SCRA 97 status
of a recognized and/or acknowledge child through direct and overt acts e. A note saying “To
Cora, Love From William” - Felix, Ismael and f. Testimony of neighbors saying◊LUCIO ♥
BENITA TALORONG that he is Margarita the son of Cora and William But Benita died, so
Lucio remarried RTC declared William as spurious illegitimate son - LUCIO ♥
MARCELINA Eusebio, Juan, for preponderance of evidence Maria, Sofronio
and◊BALIGUAT Gonzalo CA reversed because of presumption of Lucio died in 1942 and
Marcelina died in 1943 legitimacy so long as marital intimacy between - Margarita is the
only living child in the first the husband and the wife was physically marriage. Felix survived
by his 8 children. Ismael possible. Gave weight to the they are the petitioners in this Corazon
and◊testimonies that had 5 children. Ramon Yulo were seen together case when she was
supposed to be cohabiting with Lucio Perido’s heirs from both marriages Yulo. executed an
extrajudicial partition of his estate Birth certificate and baptismal certificate saying The first
marriage heirs had second thoughts Yulo as the father is not sufficient to establish about the
illegitimacy and successional rights of paternity in absence of evidence that Yulo had the
second marriage heirs direct involvement in placing his name there. There was no signature
in the said documents - Their reason was that the children of the 2nd even in the passbook of
the bank account he marriage were born out of wedlock even before opened for Corazon and
Junior. the death of Lucio’s first wife and that the land certificate did not indicate that Lucio
is not HELD: The law favors the legitimacy rather than married to another. the illegitimacy
of the child. Liyao Jr cannot choose his own filiation. If Corazon’s husband, Yulo,
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
110 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 does not impugn the legitimacy of the child,
then the status of the child is fixed and the child cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s
alleged paramour. SSS v AGUAS (2006) 483 SCRA 383 Pablo Aguas died so his wife
Rosanna Aguas claims death benefits from SSS, stating as minor beneficiary their daughter
Jeylnn. Leticia Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, objected to Rosanna’s claim alleging that: a.
Rosanna abandoned their family 6 yrs before b. Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna c.
Rosanna had several children with a certain Romeo dela Peña SSS suspended the pension
benefits Rosanna and Jeylnn were receiving SSS, upon investigation, concluded that: a.
Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna & Jenelyn (Jeylnn) were Rosanna’s children with
Romeo b. Rosanna abandoned her husband more than six years before and lived with Romeo
while pregnant with Jenelyn (Jeylnn) c. Pablo was not capable of having a child with
Rosanna as he was under treatment SSS refused to resume pension benefits and ordered
refunds from Rosanna Rosanna filed claim for restoration of pension benefits at the Social
Security Commission (SSC) Rosanna added Janet Aguas to the petition for claims SSC
summoned several people for clarificatory questions regarding the case. Further
investigation, it upheld the order to suspend Rosanna’s pension and have her refund the paid
benefits due to their conclusion that Rosanna married Romeo during the subsistence of her
marriage with Pablo, and that Jeylnn was her daughter with Romeo CA reversed the SSC
decision and ordered resumption of Rosanna’s pension benefits ISSUE: WON Jeylnn, Janet
and Rosanna were entitled to the SSS death benefits of Pablo as Pablo’s children and Only
Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right♣spouse HELD: YES to Jeylnn to a monthly
pension. As proved by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the certified
signature of Pablo and was certified by the civil registrar, she was born during Rosanna and
Pablo’s marriage. Art 164 provides that children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate. In the absence of proof to establish impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes
the birth of the child, the presumption of legitimacy shall subsist and is conclusive. Doctor
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009♣only
treated Pablo for♣Page 111 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 tuberculosis, he
cannot say if he was infertile. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right
of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his ♣ Janet’s date of birth was not substantially
proven ♣heirs. - NO to Janet Civil registrar did not certify the presented birth certificate of
Janet which could have proved that Janet was born during the subsistence of Rosanna’s
Rosanna passed the first qualifying factor♣marriage with Pablo NO to Rosanna Rosanna
did not pass the second♣for claims, that she is the legitimate spouse qualifying factor, that
she was dependent on Pablo for support since they were separated in fact After the birth of
the child, the Whiteheads wished not to go through the surrogacy contract. The Sterns filed a
complaint for possession and ultimate custody of the child. Lower court granted the Sterns
custody and ordered termination of Whitehead’s maternal rights Whiteheads immediately
fled to different places to evade the surrendering Baby M for custody and named her Sara
Elizabeth Whitehead ISSUE: WON the surrogacy contract was enforceable and valid HELD:
No. The contract was in direct conflict with existing statutes and public policies regarding 1)
involvement of money in connection with adoption (tantamount to baby-selling) 2) laws
requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights is
ordered or adoption is granted and 3) making surrender of custody and consent to adoption
revocable in private placement adoptions. Secondly, although the custody was properly
granted to the father since evidence clearly proved it to be in the best interest of the child, the
termination of maternal rights and visitation rights is contrary to law. *M stands for Melissa.
Wiki tells us that Melissa Stern formally terminated Whitehead's parental rights and
formalized Elizabeth Stern's maternity through adoption proceedings. JOHNSON v
CALVERT (1993) 851 P.2d 776 Mark and Crispina was a married couple. Crispina had to
undergo hysterectomy so she couldn’t bear children anymore. The couple considered
surrogacy. By a common friend, they were able to meet such person by the name of Anna
Johnson who was a nurse. They entered into a contract wherein: o Anna would be implanted
with an embryo containing the sperm and egg cells of the couple. o Anna will turn over all
rights over the child. o Couple will pay 10,000 in installments. o Couple will pay 200,000 life
insurance for Anna. o Relations deteriorated between the couple and Anna. Blood tests show
that Anna IS NOT the genetic mother. TC ruled: Couple was the “genetic, biological, and
natural” parents. CA affirmed. ISSUE: WON Anna can claim custody of the child HELD:
NO. Since both parties gave acceptable proof of maternity: Anna as the gestational mother.
Crispina is the genetic mother. The case will be decided on the parties’ intention or from
whom the b. BIOLOGICAL – ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION is the impregnation of a female with the semen from male
without sexual intercourse. Even without the initial consent, the child can still be legitimated
so long as the husband subsequently gives his consent BEFORE the child is born through AI
Can be homologous (sperm of the husband), heterologous (sperm of a donor) or combined (a
combination of the two) That the child was born of AI is not reflected in the birth certificate
A child can have as much as five parents: FATHER MOTHER 1. Biological (source of 1.
Legal/social sperm) 2. Genetic (egg donor) 2. Legal/Social 3. Gestational (not surrogate)
*Ma’am Beth hates the word “surrogate” because it is a misnomer. IN RE BABY M. (1988)
109 N.J. 396 - Mary Beth Whitehead agreed for a fee of $10,000 to be artificially
inseminated with the semen of another woman’s husband (William Stern), to carry the child
so conceived to term, and after its birth, to surrender it to the natural father Surrogacy
contract means absolute termination of parental ties to◊and his wife the gestational mother
upon birth Elizabeth Stern was not infertile, like was was stated in the contract, rather she
had multiple sclerosis which may have serious implication on her pregnancy PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 112 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 mental concept of the child emanated. In this case, the
couple was considered the “prime-movers”. The agreement was not inconsistent with Public
Policy. Gestational surrogacy differs from adoption: - Child was not born. - Anna wasn’t the
genetic mother. - The payment was for the “service” Judgment of CA affirmed. IN RE
ADOPTION OF ANONYMOUS (1973) 345 N.Y.S. 2d 430 During the first marriage,
husband A and wife B had a baby born of consensual AID (Artificial Insemination Donor).
Husband A and wife B were registered parents in the birth certificate. A and B separated and
later divorced but their decree declared the child to be legitimate. Wife B and child got
support while husband A had visitation rights. They were not remiss on their parental duties.
Wife B later remarried husband D. Husband D wanted to adopt wife B’s daughter but
husband a refused to give consent. ISSUE: WON husband A’s consent is required for
husband D’s petition for adoption considering that the child was conceived through artificial
insemination from an unknown third party donor. HELD: YES. The Domestic Relations Law
requires consent of both ‘parents’ over the adoption of a child born in wedlock. The
dispensary circumstances (abandonment, divorce due to adultery, insanity, etc.) were not
present in the case. The term ‘father’ is not limited to the biological or natural father, for
what is considered is the legal relationship of father and child and vice versa. The child
cannot be considered illegitimate since it was born during the marriage and not in
circumstances of infidelity since it was a medically-assisted procedure where the husband
and wife freely consented. LEGAL ISSUES IN HUMAN EGG DONATION AND
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY Is it possible to ask a woman to carry a child in her womb
for nine months without giving anything in return? Unless you can find someone whose
hobby is to get pregnant and give birth, it is quite an impossibility to have free surrogacy.
This is vulnerable to abuse of women in lower social economic classes. - Ma’am Beth tells
about the travails of pregnancy and even asked a pregnant student in the class to share her
prenatal experiences. What would be the relationship if a woman carries the embryo formed
by her daughter and her daughter’s husband? This was an actual case in an African country
wherein the grandmother bore the child of her daughter. 2. Impugned Legitimacy FC, Art
166 Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the follow 1. physical impossibility for
the husband to have sex with w immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: a.
physical incapacity (impotence) b. living separately c. serious illness 2. biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not ha provided in Par 2 Art 164 3. conceived through
artificial insemination, the written autho through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influen What’s so important about the first 120 days? It refers to the first trimester
when it cannot be known if a woman is pregnant. She may not even be aware that she is
pregnant. During the second trimester, the tummy begins to bulge and so pregnancy becomes
evident. *The presumption is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception. Proof to the contrary would have to be clearly
and convincingly established. *Serious illness of the husband in Par 1C must be of such a
nature as to exclude the possibility of his having sexual intercourse with his wife. *Biological
reasons pertain to blood typing and DNA testing BLOOD TYPE O Father’s blood type A B
AB Mother’s blood type O O O, A O, B A, B A O, A O, A O, A, B, AB A, B, AB B O, B O,
A, B, AB O, B A, B, AB AB A, B A, B, AB A, B, AB A, B, AB Blood typing is conclusive
only in non-paternity, wherein a child’s blood type is not a possible product of the blood
types of the mother and the alleged father. In regard to confirming paternal ties, it can only
go as far as saying that a man is a possible father. *Ma’am Beth’s friends from UP Med
thinks that the law that only fathers can impugn legitimacy despite scientific proof that he is
not the father, is dumb. The law should do away with its presumptions if there is convincing
proof to overturn it! Everybody knows what happened, but law is not about truth but what
can be proven. Why is it all about “paternity” and not “maternity”? Because mothers are with
their babies since birth. Fathers are essentially unattached to their child, so there’s a lot of
room for doubts. There is no maternity because who will know better than the woman if a
child is not hers. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009 Page 113 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ANDAL v MACARAIG
(1951) 89 Phil 165 The legitimacy of Mariano Andal is assailed by his paternal grandmother
Eduvigis Macaraig. The action was to impugn the child’s ownership as legitimate heir of the
land given by defendant to the deceased father (Emiliano) of the child as donation propter
nuptias. If the son was illegitimate, the land would revert back to Eduvigis. If legitimate, the
land remains with the child. The grounds for said illegitimacy is as follows: o Emiliano was
afflicted with tuberculosis such that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. o Wife
had illicit sexual relationship with her husband’s brother, Felix when the latter came to live
with them and help Emiliano work his farm. o Eventually, Maria Dueñas eloped with Felix. o
Emiliano died without the presence of the wife who didn’t even attend the funeral. ISSUE:
WON the son was Emiliano’s legitimate child and thus entitled to inherit from his estate.
HELD: YES. Mariano Andal was legitimate son of Emiliano, he having been born within
three hundred days following dissolution of marriage. (January 1, 1943 – June 17, 1943)
Presumption of legitimacy can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for
the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child. According to Manresa, impossibility of access means: o Absence
during initial period of conception o Impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable o
Imprisonment, unless cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations.
Also, the fact that wife committed adultery is not sufficient to overturn legitimacy. Husband
still had access to the wife. His sickness does not prevent carnal intercourse. Further, cases
show that tuberculous patients are inclined to be more sexually active (because they are
“bedridden”). JAO v CA (1987) 152 SCRA 359 Perico Jao (private respondent) and Arlene
Salgado (petitioner) lived together as husband and wife. - Arlene gives birth to Janice Marie
and claims that Perico is the father. Perico denies paternity of the child. - - They both
subjected to blood typing test which eliminated Perico as the possible father of Janice.
However, RTC still ruled that Janice is child of Perico and entitled to support from him. CA
reversed following the conclusive and indisputable evidence of Perico’s non-paternity and
discrepancies in the time when the two began cohabiting. What can be inferred from the
dates is the possibility of Janice being conceived prior to cohabitation of Salgado and Jao.
Jao also previously filed a complaint to delete his name as the father of the child. ISSUE:
WON blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove non-paternity. HELD: Yes.
Blood grouping test can establish conclusively that a man is not a father of the child, but not
necessarily that a man is the father of a particular child. Cohabitation of the supposed father
and the mother cannot be a ground for compulsory recognition, if such cohabitation could not
have produced the conception of the child. FC, Art 167 The child shall be considered
legitimate although the mot have been sentenced an adulteress. *Why would a woman do
that? Because she just wants to scorn or humiliate her husband. *The rule is to protect the
children and secure their status from the passions of their parents. As long as there is access
between husband and wife, mere fact that the wife was an adulteress or she was raped will
not throw presumption of legitimacy. *Ma’am Beth quote: “Why would you do that to make
your husband jealous? There must be some other way! Yes, you’ll make him jealous but he’ll
kill you too! Congratulations!” MACADANGDANG v CA & MEJIAS (1980) 100 SCRA 73
Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. She had an affair with Antonio
Macadangdang in March 1967. Mejias and Anahaw separated after that. In October 1967 (or
after 210 days), Mejias gave birth to a boy named Rolando Macadangdang as reflected in the
baptismal certificate. Mejias sued Macadangdang to recognize Rolando as his son ISSUE:
WON Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of Mejias and Anahaw WON
Mejias may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband,
the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard HELD: Rolando is presumed to be
the legitimate child of Mejias and Anahaw. The child was born within 300 days after the
spouses separated. No proof was PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 114 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 present to
show that sexual intercourse between them was impossible. In fact, the wife continuously
visits her four children in her mother’s house where her husband also stays. Only the husband
can impugn the legitimacy of the child. - the child is registered in other municipalities the
child is given other names *Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
If the husband marriage within 300 use after such FC, Art 168 If the marriage is terminated
and the mother contracted another clearly didn’t make days of such right or has desisted from
such intention, the heirs cannot termination, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof
to the contrary: bring the action. 1. 2. Born before 180 days after solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage,
provided it be born within 300 days after the termination of the former marriage. FC, Art 171
When can heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation o A child born after 180 days
following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been 1. if the
husband should die before the expiration of the period fi conceived during such marriage,
even though it be born within the 300 days after the termination of the former action
marriage. 2. if he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having d 3. if the child
was born after the death of the husband Illustration: 300 days 1st 2nd CABATBAT-LIM v
IAC (1988) 166 SCRA 451 Dra. Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat’s estate is Terminatio 2nd
fought over by her sisters and the children of her 180 days n marriage deceased brothers and
her allegedly only child with Proceso Cabatbat, Violeta Cabatbat-Lim So in a nutshell, the
critical point is the 180 days (petitioner) after the subsequent marriage. RTC: Violeta is not
the offspring and hence, not the legal heir FC, Art 169 The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child born after 300 days following the termination of the marriage shall be Esperanza’s
brothers and sisters allege that proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
Violeta was merely a ward (ampun-ampunan), and neither a natural child nor legally adopted
so she is not a legitimate heir entitled to own * State of Limbo, wherein the child is statusless
Calasiao Bihon Factory FC, Art 170 When to bring the action to impugn the legitimacy of
the child: Evidence by Proofs by Petitioner Respondents WITHIN: I. NO CONCEALMENT
1. absence of any 1. birth record stating 1 year from knowledge of birth or recording in the
civil register - if husband, orrecord his heirs reside in the same place hospital any of that she
is the where the birth took place regarding legitimate child of 2 years Not the same place but
within the Philippines Esperanza’s giving Proceso and 3 years Abroad birth Esperanza 2. of
action of Violeta’s 2. testimony or knowledge II. CONCEALED OR UNKNOWN TO
HUSBAND OR HEIRS: period for fillingabsence shall be counted from discoveryof Proceso
that she is his child of the birth of the child OR of the fact of registration of said birth birth
certificate in *Legitimacy of a child must be attacked in a direct action, not collaterally. Why
did the law impose a time limit to impugn legitimacy of the child? Because it is in the best
interest of the child to avoid putting his/her status in a state of uncertainty for a long time.
*Ma’am Beth gave a sample situation, when to start computing 2 Jan 1988 birthday 3 Feb
1988 fact of registration 4 Feb 1989 discovery of birth -- This is vague to me. -_What does it
mean to be “unknown”? the child is registered as the child of other persons 5. 3. Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital certificate from the Civil Registry of the absence of Violeta’s birth record
certificate of Principal that Proceso and Esperanza are registered only as guardians and not
parents testimony of the cousin of Violeta’s biological mother 3. testimony of Benita
Lastimosa (alleged bio mother) that she is not her child marriage contract where Esperanza
was the mother Deed of Sale when Violeta was still a minor and represented by her mother
Esperanza Deed of Absolute Sale where Proceso represented her as father 4. 5. 4. 6. ISSUES:
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
115 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 1. 2. WON TC and CA finding that Violeta is
not born of Esperanza Cabatbat is concluding on SC WON complaint is an action to impugn
legitimacy and Art 263 CC (action to impugn legitimacy) can be applied 1. 2. WON a change
in the record of birth in a civil registry, which affects the civil status of the person, may be
granted in summary proceedings WON Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper
action to impugn the legitimacy of the child, or change filiation HELD: 1. YES. The factual
findings of the courts are entitled to great respect. Moreover, the absence of a record of birth
of petitioner Violeta in the Office of the CivReg General puts a cloud on the genuiness of her
birth record. The records of the hospital show that only one woman by the name of Benita
Lastimosa gave birth to an illegitimate child on the date of Violeta’ birth. 2. NO. Because
this is an action to claim inheritance of the respondents as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that Violeta is an illegitimate child, but that she is not a
child at all. CHUA KENG GIAP v IAC & CHUA LIAN KING (1988) 166 SCRA 451
Petitioner insists that he is the son of deceased Sy Kao. As such, he filed a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the latter. Private respondent moved to dismiss, due to lack of
action as well as petitioner’s capacity to file such a case. It has been declared before that
petitioner is not the son of Chua Bing guan and Sy Kao. The latter flatly and unequivocally
declared that she was not petitioner’s mother. Therefore he had no lawful interest in the
estate of Sy Kao. ISSUE: WON Sy Kao is the mother of the petitioner HELD: No. Who
better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than
anyone else, it was her who could say that petitioner was not begotten of her womb.
REPUBLIC v LABRADOR (1999) 305 SCRA 438 A child’s birth certificate lists her name
as Sarah Zita Cañon Erasmo, and her parents Rosemarie Cañon married to Degoberto
Erasmo. On March 1998, her aunt Gladys petitioned the RTC Cebu to change Sarah’s
surname to Cañon, dropping Erasmo, and the first name of her mother to Maria Rosario since
her parents were not married. Gladys said Sarah’s mother, her sister, lived abroad with her
foreigner husband. The RTC granted the petition based on Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The solicitor-general appealed. ISSUES: HELD: No, only clerical mistakes can be made and
significant changes may only be granted in direct, adversarial action. The change sought will
result not only in the substantial correction in the child’s record of birth but also in the child’s
status thereby affecting her rights which cannot be done in a summary action. Although
“Maria Rosario” is the real name of the mother, Sa
rah will become an illegitimate child by virtue of the change. Also, adversarial proceedings
are required in such allegations. Rule 108 may only be used to correct or change clerical or
innocuous errors. Also, Sarah and her purported parents should have been parties to the
proceedings. There is also no sufficient legal explanation why the Gladys, without
appointment as guardian, was the petitioner. Effects: • Sarah’s successional and other rights
may change • Illegitimacy may bring social stigma and embarrass Sarah • Rights of her
parents over her and over each other will be affected • A change of name will affect mother
and creditors TAN v TROCIO (1990) 191 SCRA 764 School owner and directress, Felicidad
Barañan Tan filed an administrative complaint seeking disbarment of Atty. Galileo Trcio for
immorality and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. She alleged that Trocio, who is the legal
counsel of the school overpowered her inside the office and against her will, succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of her. And as a result, she begot a son whom she named Jewel
Tan. She further alleged that he used to support Jewel but subsequently lost interest and
stopped. She claimed she filed the complaint only after 8 years from the incident because
Trocio threatened her with the deportation of her alien husband and due to the fact that she
was married and has eight children. Trocio files his answer stating that he was indeed a
counsel of the school as well as of Tan and her family but denies he sexually assaulted her.
He adds that the principal was a in a revenge trip when he declined her request to commit a
“breach of trust”. ISSUE: WON Trocio had sexually assaulted Tan as a consequence of
which the latter begot a child by him PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 116 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 (and is
thus a ground for Trocio’s disbarment for immoral conduct) HELD: No. Disbarment
complaint dismissed for insufficiency of basis of the allegations. The alleged threat to deport
her husband could not hold because she admitted having lost contact with her husband when
he learned of the respondent’s transgression that very same evening. The fear had thus
become inexistent. She also maintained her transactions with Tan as if nothing had happened.
Such actions can be construed as condonation of his alleged immoral act. Physical likeness
and unusual closeness between Trocio and Jewel is not conclusive proof of paternity, much
less violation of Tan’s person and honor. Jewel was born during the wedlock of Tan and her
husband as such, the presumption of legitimacy prevails. *What’s the big deal about naming
the son Jewel? For all we know, the name is pronounced as “Joel.” *Why is there an
expected reaction from sexuallyabused woman? Different people have different ways of
reacting! *If she aborts it, she’s wrong. If she learns to love it, she wasn’t raped. There’s no
option!!! PEOPLE v TUMIMPAD (1994) 235 SCRA 483 Moreno L. Tumimpad and
Constable Ruel C. Prieto are charged with the crime of rape of Sandra Salcedo, a 15 years
old, had a mind of a five year old child. The accused are two of the four security men
assigned to the victim’s father. Sandra first complained of constipation but after medical aid
was sought, her condition did not improve. However, upon seeing Tumimpad coming out
from the kitchen she told her mother “Mama, patayin mo ‘yan, bastos”. The mother became
suspicious so she brought Sandra to the hospital where they found out that she was pregnant.
Nine months later, Sandra gave birtb to a baby boy who was named Jacob. Sandra was able
to pick the pictures of Tumimpad and Prieto and in the police line-up she pointed to the
accused. The accused moved that a blood test be conducted on the offended party, her child
Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test showed that Jacob has a type ‘O” blood,
Sandra type “B”, Prieto type “A” and Tumimpad type “O”. RTC convicted Tumimpad but
acquitted Prieto. The acquittal of Prieto was on reasonable doubt stating that he has a
different type of blood with the child Jacob. ISSUE: WON it was impossible for Tumimpad
to have committed the crime of rape because most of the time he and his co-accused were
together with Col. Salcedo. HELD: No. It was proven that they were not always with Col.
Salcedo. There were instances that they would even play with Sandra. Based on this it is not
physically impossible for the accused to have access to Sandra. Tumimpad argued that his
conviction was erroneously based on the medical finding that he and the victim have the
same blood type “O”. In Jao vs. Court of Appeals it was held that Paternity – Science has
demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child and the alleged
father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child.
But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. BENITEZ-BADUA v CA
(1994) 229 SCRA 468 Vicente Benitez & Isabel Chipongian owned various properties. On
April 25, 1982 Isabel died & her estate was settled extra-judicially. ON Nov. 13, 1989
Vicente died intestate. Private respondents, Victoria Benitez-Lirio (Vicente’s sister) &
Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente’s nephew) filed a case in the RTC, praying for the issuance
of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of Aguilar. They allege that Vicente is
survived by no other heirs or relatives. That the spouses were w/o issue & without
descendants whatsoever and that Marissa Benitez Badua who was raised and cared for by the
spouses was not related to them by blood nor legally adopted, & therefore not an heir. On
Nov. 2, 1990 Marissa opposed the petition stating that she was the sole heir of Vicente. If
Marissa was really a biological and legitimate daughter, there would be no need for TC
received evidence regarding the matter: • Marissa tried to prove she was the legitimate child
of the spouses, presenting documentary evidence: o Her certificate of live birth o Baptismal
certificate o Income tax returns & information sheet for membership w/ GSIS of Vicente,
naming her his daughter o School records o She also testified that they raised her as their
legit daughter • Private respondents presented testimonial evidence that the spouses failed to
have a child & that Isabel was referred to Dr. Manahan (an ob-gyne) for treatment TC ruled
in favor of Marissa, relying on Art 166 and Art 170 FC. CA however reversed their decision
stating that Marissa is not the biological child of the spouses and therefore not a legal heir.
The CA also held that the TC erred in applying Art 166 and Art 170 FC ISSUES: 1. WON
Art 164, 166, 170 & 171 FC is applicable to the case, as the petitioner contends. PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 117 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 2. WON Marissa is the biological child of the spouses and
therefore a legal heir. HELD: No. The following DO NOT contemplate a situation like the
instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a certain couple. These
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his
wife. The CA correctly refused to apply these articles to the case. Since this case doesn’t
contend that Marissa is not the child of Vicente by Isabel; but that she wasn’t born to the
spouses. Cabatbat-Lim v IAC is appropriate to the case. The totality of contrary evidence
presented by the respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of petitioner’s birth
certificate. LUMAIN DE APARICHO v PARAGUYA (1987) 150 SCRA 279 Trinidad
Montilde had a love affair with Reverend Father Felipe Lumain, a priest, and in the process
she conceived. When she was 4 months pregnant, in order to conceal her disgrace from the
public, she decided to marry one Anastacio Mamburao. Father Lumain himself solemnized
their marriage in March 1924. However, the couple never lived together as husband and wife.
Trinidad gave birth to daughter Consolacion Lumain in Sept, 192 days or 6 mos after the
marriage. Father Lumain eventually died but he left a last will & testament wherein he
acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of
all his property rights and interests. This was duly probated in CFI and on appeal was
affirmed by the CA. After reaching age of majority, daughter Consolacion filed an action in
CFI against one Hipolito Paraguya for the recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to
have inherited from her father, the priest. Hipolito Paraguya was declared owner of portions
A, B, H, F and G and all its improvements. The land in question is portion G. Hipolito assails
also that Consolacion is not a natural child of the late Fr Lumain. TC: Bearing in mind the
date of the birth of the plaintiff, it is evident that her mother Trinidad was still single at the
time she was conceived. It is a legal presumption that plaintiff is the daughter of the spouses
Anastacio and Trinidad. However, this was disputable and Trinidad successfully overcame it.
Consolacion is therefore the natural child of Father Lumain and she is entitled to claim the
disputed property, she having been instituted in the will as universal heir. ISSUE: WON
Consolacion is the natural child of Lumain and if so, WON she is entitled to the possession
of Portion G HELD: SC finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of appellee
Consolacion. As Father Lumain, who died w/o any compulsory heir, Consolacion is therefore
his lawful heir as duly instituted in his will. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose
by will all of his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
Portion G and its improvement declared to be owned by Consolacion. No award of moral
damages to be given to Hipolito for Consolacion was acting in her belief that she was legal
heir of the land. Judgment affirmed. B. Proof of Filiation 1. How to prove filiation FC, Art
172 The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of (PRIMARY EVIDENCE
FOR VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION) 1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgm 2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a p parent
concerned In the absence of which: (SECONDARY EVIDENCE FOR INVOLUNTARY
RECOG) 1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimat 2. Any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws * Defense against Art 166 (grounds
for impugning) It is the husband or his heirs who must present proofs to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy. * Necessary for Art 169 (“statusless”) – The Family Code gives
children their status from the moment of their birth. But such status may be questioned or in
the case of a child born after 300 days following the termination of the marriage of the
mother, the law does not give him any status so that the child or someone in his behalf will
have to prove his status for him. * Secondary evidence not admissible if primary exists! My
question: In this case, can a man voluntarily recognize the child to be his illegitimate child at
the opposition of the biological mother? RECORD OF BIRTH The books making up the
civil register and all the documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and
shall be prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts therein If the alleged father did not
intervene in the making of the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or
doctor or registrar is void. The father’s signature is necessary. *Ma’am Beth says that the
rule requiring father’s signature on the birth certificate to prove participation is ridiculous
since there is no blank or provided space for the father to sign. The only PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 118 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 chance a father can sign on the birth certificate is if he is the
informant. ADMISSION IN A DOCUMENT A public document is one which is 1) issued by
a public office and 2) private document that is notarized A typewritten document containing
an admission of the legitimate filiation is not admissible, as the signature therein may be
super-imposed and may not be the true signature of the parent Also, for handwritten
documents, the intent to recognize the child must be sufficiently apparent. OPEN AND
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD E.g.
bearing the father’s surname, treatment by the parents and of the family of the child as
legitimate, constant attendance to the child’s support and education and giving the child the
reputation of being the child of his parents BASIS: the admission of the parents themselves
and the concurrence therein of the family and of the society Continuous = uninterrupted and
consistent o Tolentino: idea of possesory status of some duration o Sempio-Diy: no required
particular length of time o Pangalangan: distinguished from “continually” which allows for
interruption as long as it is in a regular basis, continuously may be translated to “walang
humpay” Maybe enjoyed by a child conceived but not yet born OTHER MEANS
ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT AND SPECIAL LAWS A. Baptismal certificate:
is a presumptive evidence only, especially when people often have different names in their
birth certificate and baptismal B. Judicial admission C. Family bible where child’s name is
entered: As explained by Ma’am Beth, this is given importance because a Bible is presumed
to have been there for generations and is handed down to children. As the family grows, the
names of the children are added in the list. This is biased to Catholics though. D. Common
reputation respecting pedigree. E. Admission by silence F. Testimonies of witnesses G. Other
kinds of proofs admissible under Rule 130 of RRC RRC, Rule 130 Declaration against
interest Act or declaration about pedigree Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
Common reputation Entries in official records Testimony or deposition at a former
proceeding Opinion of expert witness Opinion of ordinary witnesses CC, Art 220 In case of
doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of t toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage property during marriage, the authority of parents over their
children family in case of unlawful aggression. ****For cases under Proof of Filiation, focus
on the pieces of evidence established in each case CONSTANTINO v MENDEZ (1992) 209
SCRA 18 Amelia Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support of her child
Michael, and damages against Ivan Mendez, a married man. Mendez denied having sexual
intercourse with Constantino. HELD: Filiation was not proven by clear and convincing
evidence. The burden of proof to establish the allegation is on Constantino. Constantino’s
testimony as to when she had intercourse with Mendez is contradicted by evidence. The date
was crucial to determine whether Michael was conceived during the time Amelia and Ivan
were having sexual relations. There was also no clear and convincing proof that Amelia did
not have any sexual encounter with other men. MENDOZA v MELIA (1966) 17 SCRA 788
Father versus son’s common law wife and her son Paciano Pareja owned lot No. 3390-B in
Sorsogon. He donated it to his son Gavino in 1939. Gavino during that time had been living
with his common-law spouse Catalina Mendoza, and their only son Rodolfo who was born in
1935. Gavino disappeared in 1943 and had not been heard of since. Paciano Pareja sold the
disputed property to Temistocles Mella in 1948 who then told herein petitioners to vacate the
said land in 1952. With the notice remaining unheeded, Mella filed and action in 1955.
Petitioners claim ownership of said land, claiming Rodolfo as the rightful successor being the
son of Gavino, and for having adverse possession of the land for 10 years. Trial and appellate
courts ruled for Mella, hence this challenge by Catalina and Rodolfo. As to the issue of
possession, petitioners invoke Art. 390 of Civil Code but the respondent argued that this was
never raised in the trial court nor the appellate court thus could not be considered at the SC.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
119 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - With the issue of Rodolfo as successor, he
showed a coy of his birth certificate. implied trust. His mother gave him a little money to
complete the purchase price. ISSUES & HELD: 1. WON Felisa Lim is entitled to the
inheritance. NO - Felisa Lim alleges that she was recognized by Susana Lim during 1943
which means that it was during the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1889. Sec. 131 of CC of
1889 requires that the recognition of a natural child be made in the record of birth, in a will,
or in some other public document. - Public documents are those authenticated by a notary or
by a competent public official, with formalities required by law. The two classes of public
documents are: o Executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries
(MARRIAGE CONTRACTS WOULD FALL UNDER THIS CATEGORY) o Those issued
by competent public officials by reason of their office - Marriage contract presented by Felisa
does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the CC of 1889.
There was no intervention of a notary. - The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the
contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two
witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by signature or
mark by the said contracting parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage. 2. WON Uy is entitled to the inheritance. NO - The title is in the
name of Susana Lim, and oral testimony cannot overcome the fact that the sale was made to
Susana Lim and title issued in her favor - Implied trust arises where a person purchases land
with his own money and takes conveyance thereof in the name of another. The property is
held on a resulting trust in favor of the one furnishing the consideration for the transfer unless
a different intention or understanding appears. - Uy raised the theory of implied trust in favor
of her husband for the first time in her motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate
court and evidence regarding the purchase by her husband is altogether unconvincing.
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO BAÑAS v HEIRS OF BIBIANO BAÑAS (1985) 134 SCRA 260
Raymundo was the child of Dolores Castillo and an unknown father. Upon Raymundo’s
death, his heirs filed for partition of recovery of hereditary share against the heirs of Bibiano,
claiming that Raymundo was a recognized natural son of Bibiano. ISSUE: WON Rodolfo
can be considered acknowledged natural child by virtue of his birth certificate as evidence.
HELD: No. The appellate court deemed the birth certificate insufficient because it did not
have the signatures of the parents, it being only a certified copy of the registry. The court
ruled that in the absence of such signatures, there was no clear proof that the parent
recognizes the child. LIM v CA (1975) 65 SCRA 160 - In 1962, Felisa Lim brought suit
against Francisco Miguel Romualdez Uy Chen Hong for the declaration of nullity of the
affidavit Uy executed in which he adjudicated to himself (120 square meters located in
Tayabas), as the only son and heir of Susana Lim. - Uy and Lim fights over the inheritance of
Susana Lim’s property, to the exclusion of each other - Lim claims that she is the natural
daughter of Susana. Her evidence are as follows: o baptismal certificate which stated the her
mother was Susana o marriage contract wherein Susana gave consent to the marriage of
Felisa - On the other hand, Uy claims that he is the only son and heir of Susana. His
evidence: o application form for alien registration which stated that his mother was Susana o
order of the BOI cancelling his alien registration, by derivation from his Filipina mother o his
identification certificate which describes him as the son of Susana. - RTC: In 1967, Felisa
Lim was held as the daughter and only heir of Susana Lim to which Uy filed a motion for
reconsideration and new trial but the court denied it. - CA: Upon Uy’s appeal, CA ruled that
neither Felisa Lim nor Uy is entitled to the inheritance because: o neither of them been
recognized by Susana Lim as her child by any means provided for by law o neither of them
been declared in a judicial proceeding to be the child of Susana Lim - They both assailed the
decision of the CA - Lim says that Susana’s consent to her marriage constitutes recognition
as natural daughter and was even executed in a public document in the form of her marriage
contract (Sec 131 of CC of 1889 says that “be made in the record of birth, in a will or some
other public document” - Guadalupe Uy contended that her husband purchased the property
in question with his own money prior to his mother’s death and took conveyance and title.
There was an existence of PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 120 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 Faustina
♥ Bibiano Pedro ♥ Dolores Trinidad, niece of Faustina ♥ Raymund o
PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE C S O A U Y R T S Handwritten note alledgedly written by
Bibiano to the 18 yo Raymundo with a complimentary ending “su padre” School records,
report cards, school receipts for matriculation all signed and paid by Bibiano Typewritten
letters to Atty. Faustino alleging his personal circumstance; as well as typewritten
autobiography asserting that his father is a surgeon Bibiano Bañas CC 278 provides for
“authentic handwriting” which is a private document thus acknowledgement of the child in
such instrument should not be incidental but explicit. The complimentary ending might be
due to the close relations Raymundo enjoyed with his uncle/guardian Bibiano; there is no
clear expression of acknowledgement of filiation. Paternal solicitude ≠ paternity Bibiano
signed these documents as guardian of Raymundo while he is growing up since the latter
spent for his education because Pedro (the real father) is unable to support him; thus it is
natural that Bibiano signs as the guardian even more so that Raymundo spent most his
lifetime in Bibiano and Fautina’s care This typewritten evidence taken into account the
contradicting testimony of Raymundo’s wife Trinidad casts doubt to the authenticity of these
“personal accounts” of Raymundo MARIATEGUI v CA (1992) 205 SCRA 675 Lupo
Mariategui during his lifetime contracted three marriages with three different women and
sired three sets of children. First: with Eusebia Montellano, 4 kids Baldomera: died, survived
by kids surnamed Espina Maria del Rosario Urbana Ireneo: died, left a son, Ruperto Second:
with Flaviana Montellano, one daughter, Cresciana Third: with Felipa Velasco, 3 kids:
Jacinto, Julian, Paulina He died intestate and the children from his 1st and 2nd marriages
excluded the children from the 3rd marriage in the extra-judicial partition of Lupo’s
properties. ISSUES: 1. WON prescription barred private respondents’ right to demand
partition of Lupo’s estate. 2. WON the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for
recognition, were What is the nature◊able to prove their successional rights of over the
estate. of the complaint filed by the private respondents. HELD: The children from the third
marriage continuously possessed the status of legitimate children. Filiation of legitimate
children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil registrar, a final
judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. 1)
WON prescription barred private respondents’ right to demand partition of Lupo’s estate.
Since they are legit kids and heirs of Lupo, the time limitation prescribed in Art 258 for filing
an action for recognition is inapplicable. Prescription doesn’t run against private respondents
w/ respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit
prescription is invoked, haven’t expressly or impliedly repudiated the coownership.
Prescription of an action for partition doesn’t lie except when the co-ownership is properly
repudiated by the co-owner. A co-owner can’t acquire by prescription the share of the other
co-owner absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners. Also, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible & can’t be barred by laches. It
is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership & for segregation & conveyance of a
certain property. No valid repudiation was made by the petitioners. Assuming the petitioner’s
registration of the subject lot was an act of repudiation of coownership, prescription hasn’t
set in when private RESPONDENT’S EVIDENCE A sworn affidavit duly notarized and
executed by Bibiano Banas declaring that Raymundo Banas is his brother, Pedro’s son A
sworn JOINT affidavit duly notarized and executed by Raymundo and Pedro Banas
correcting an error made on the marriage certificate of the former changing the father of
Raymundo from “Bibiano” to “Pedro” C O U R T S A Y S A public instrument explicitly
stating Pedro is the father of Raymundo is strong evidence that he does not acknowledge or
have the intention thereof that the latter is his son If Raymundo really believed that he is
indeed the son of Bibiano he could not have consented to executing such declaration;
Trinidad’s contention of the document was contradictory and therefore set aside. *Ma’am
Beth does not buy the interpretation of “Your Father” as a reference term for an uncle.
UYGUANGCO v CA – See Illegitimate Filiation PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |
Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 121 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law
B2012 respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition. The registration didn’t
operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. SC stated that “prescription, as a mode of
terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation w/c subject
to certain conditions: 1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership 2) such an act of repudiation
is clearly made known to the other co-owners 3) the evidence thereon is clear & conclusive
4) he has been in possession thru open, continuous, exclusive & notorious possession of the
prop for a period required by law Inasmuch as petitioners registered the prop in their names
in fraud of their co-heirs, prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time
private respondents discovered the petitioner’s act of defraudation. And this action was
commenced 2 months after learning petitioners had registered in their names the lots
involved to the prejudice of private respondents. 2) WON the private respondents, were able
to prove their successional rights over the estate. YES FC has to apply since it is effective
already. And under Art 172, filiation of legit kids may be established by the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open & continuous possession of
the status of a legit kid. Evidence proves the private respondents legit filiation. Jacinto’s birth
cert was presented. Though Julian and Paulina didn’t present evidence required by Art 172,
they continuously enjoyed the status as kids of Lupo in the same manner as Jacinto. And for
a considerable length of time & despite the death of their mom, they lived with Lupo until his
death. ACEBEDO v ARQUERO (2003) 399 SCRA 10 - Edwin Acebedo charged Eddie
Arquero for immorality in an administrative complaint. He alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader
Acebedo and respondent unlawfully cohabited as husband and wife as a result of which a
girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two. Attached was the birth certificate of
the girl indicating her parents to be Arquero and Dedjoe. He also presented a copy of their
marriage contract. Arquero vehemently denied the charge of immorality, claiming that it is
“just a mere harassment and a product of complainant’s hatred and extreme jealousy to his
wife.” He presented a sworn statement wherein Edwin Acebedo (complainant) acknowledged
paternity of a child born out of wedlock, which documents, respondent claims, support his
contention that the complaint filed against him is but a malicious scheme concocted by
complainant to harass him. He also said that the complainant was cohabiting with another
woman. - - MTC recommended that the complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce
adequate evidence to show that respondent is guilty of the charge Memorandum by the
Office of the Court Administrator disagreeing with the recommendation of the Investigating
Judge that the case should be dismissed, recommends that respondent be held guilty of
immorality and that he be suspended from office for a period of one (1) year without pay.
ISSUE: WON Arquero can be suspended due to immorality. RATIO: Yes. The entry of
respondent’s name as father in the baptismal certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero cannot be
used to prove her filiation and, therefore, cannot be availed of to imply that respondent
maintained illicit relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A baptismal certificate merely attests
to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the
administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the statements therein
as to the parentage of the child baptized. Arquero admitted that he had an illicit relationship
with the wife of the complainant - Arquero justified his pursuing a relationship with
complainant’s wife with the spouses having previously entered into a settlement with respect
to their marriage which was embodied in a “Kasunduan”. This justification fails because
Arquero, being an employee of the judiciary, knows that the Kasunduan has no force and
effect because Article 1 of the FC provides: marriage is “an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation.” It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by
law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties. RA 6713, otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual
than in the judiciary. Arguero’s act of having illicit relations with the complainant’s wife is a
disgraceful and immoral conduct. Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified as a
grave offense which calls for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
122 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal
is imposed for the second offense. Since it is his first offense, his suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day is in order. HERRERA v ALBA (2005) 460 SCRA 197 Armi Alba
instituted an action for support, damages and compulsory recognition against Rosendo
Herrera on behalf of her 13 year old son Rosendo Alba. Respondent requested for DNA
testing to determine her son’s paternal relation to Herrera, which RTC granted. Herrera
appealed assailing that compulsory DNA testing violates his constitutional right against self-
incrimination CA: right against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial compulsion and
affirmed the order to DNA ISSUE: WON DNA testing is a valid test for paternity in this
jurisdiction HELD: Yes. DNA testing has probative value in this jurisdiction owing to its
growing accuracy in establishing matches between a parent and an offspring. However, it
should take not of the following things: 1. how the samples were collected and handled 2. the
possibility of contamination of samples 3. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples 4.
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests 5.
qualification of the analysts who conducted the test The policy of the FC to liberalize the rule
on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially legitimate children is
without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. FOUR
SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A TRADITIONAL PATERNITY 1. prima
facie case – that the woman had sexual relation with the putative father 2. affirmative defense
– show physical incapability or sexual relations OR sexual relation with other men at the
time of conception 3. presumption of legitimacy 4. physical resemblance between father and
child FC, Art 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by transmitted to the heirs
should the child die during the minor heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute a The action already commenced by the child shall survive notw parties. The right of
a child to claim legitimacy may only be transferred to the heirs under two cases and within 5
years: 1. if the child dies during minority 2. if the child dies in a state of insanity *The effect
of legitimacy claim extends the successional rights 3. Rights of legitimate children FC, Art
174 Legitimate children shall have the right: 1. to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, surname 2. to receive support from their parents, their ascendants in conformity with
the provisions of this Code on Suppo 3. to be entitled to the legitimate and other successional
*Ma’am Beth’s mnemonics: 3s - support, surname, succession *The child’s use of his/her
father’ surname indicates the family to which he/she belongs. Hence, it is mandatory for the
child to do so. REPUBLIC v CA & VICENCIO (1998) 300 SCRA 138 Cynthia Vicencio
was born on 19 January 1971 at the Capitol Medical Center, Quezon City to spouses Pablo
Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. They lived in Meycauayan, Bulacan and
Pablo left the said abode on 10 January 1972 after a quarrel with Fe and from then on was
never seen or heard from. Neither was any support for his family ever received from him. 29
June 1976, Fe Esperanza petitioned for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership which
was granted. On 11 July 1977 Fe petitioned to drop the surname of her estranged husband, it
was approved. On 26 April 1986, Pablo was judicially declared as an absentee. Fe married
Ernesto Yu on 15 April 1986, with then Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos Sr.
solemnizing the ceremony. Cynthia grew up treating Yu as her father and Yu treated her as
his own daughter. Confusion and embarrassment was caused by her use of the surname
Vicencio when his stepfather is surnamed Yu. She was made to use the surname Yu when
she joined two beauty pageants, where the use was with the consent of her stepfather. –
When 2. Action to claim legitimacy PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 123 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - Cynthia
petitioned for a change in surname, the stepfather openly declared his consent. The Trial
Court decided in her favor and Appellate Court upheld, both saying that granting her request
would be for the best interest of Cynthia SG opposed saying that even if it would ‘improve
her personality,’ there was no valid, proper, and reasonable cause to grant her request. It
would generate complicated problems especially with regards to problems of inheritance
since her status will be affected. They say, Ernesto could have adopted her instead of Cynthia
coming to court with this petition. DE ASIS v CA (1999) 303 SCRA 176 - Vircel Andres,
mother and legal guardian of her son Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for
support and maintenance against the alleged father Manuel de Asis. Manueld denied filiation.
Vircel agreed to compromise that she would not pursue the case if Manuel will withdraw his
counterclaim. After six years, Vircel filed an action for support and maintenance of her son.
HELD: The right to support cannot be the subject of compromise. The action for support
cannot be barred by res judicata. The ratio behind the prohibition against waving the right to
future support is the need to maintain one’s existence. Paternity and filiation (or lack of it)
must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. The agreement entered into by the
petitioner and respondent’s mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and
support, which is in the nature of a compromise, cannot be countenanced. The right to
receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person as per Art 301 CC.
Also, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise as in Art 2035. ** Legitime of a
legitimate child: half of the parents’ estate divided by the number of legitimate children.
ISSUE: WON appellate court erred in affirming trial court’s decision allowing the change of
private respondent’s surname with that of her stepfather. HELD: Yes. A change of name is a
privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the
duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless
weighty reasons are shown. Confusion might arise with regard to private respondent’s
parentage because of her surname. But even more confusion with grave legal consequences
could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-father’s surname, even if she is not
legally adopted by him. A legitimate child must use the surname of his/her father. C.
Illegitimate Children Generally, illegitimate children are those born of parents who are not
united by a valid marriage. Under the CC, there were three main groups of illegitimate
children: 1. Natural children 2. Natural children by legal fiction 3. Spurious children o
adulterous o incestuous o sacrilegious – born of persons who are disqualified to marry by
reason of religious profession o manceres – those born of prostitutes Under our law, there is
no disqualification to marry on the ground of religious profession. And we also have no law
which automatically classifies children of prostitutes as illegitimate. FC abolished all
distinctions between illegitimate children such that there are only two categories of children
today: legitimate and illegitimate. However, an informal distinction between two groups of
illegitimate children was established: PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 124 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 marriage
of her parents nine years after her birth. Around four months after Pablo’s marriage to Ana,
Pablo died so she took possession of Pablo’s 2. estate and its administration, Pablo’s siblings
objected and prayed for the administration and succession rights be 1. Proof of filiation
transferred to them alleging that Pablo died a widower and that the allegation that Alicia was
a legitimated daughter way and on the same FC, Art 175 Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same is without foundation in fact and law. evidence as
legitimate children. (Art 172) The lower court affirmed this conclusion and said that Alicia’s
evidences are insufficient, being The action must be brought within the same period specified
in Art 173 (lifetime of the child, will not be forged and incompetent extinguished by death of
either parties), except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Art There was no
document 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. to show that petitioner had been supported by the deceased in his lifetime. There were
neither receipts of payment Why must the action be brought during the of school fees in the
name of Pablo nor lifetime of the putative parent in Par 2? Since signatures in school cards
and letters to relatives there might still be a question as to whether the or friends naming
Maria Alicia as daughter. child is really the illegitimate child of the alleged The baptismal
certificate and birth certificate do parent or not, the latter must be given an not bear express
acknowledgment of petitioner opportunity to contest the action, and this he or she as a child
of the deceased. can only do if the action is filed during his or her As proof of filiation,
petitioner claimed that she lifetime. was in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a
natural child of the decedent and her Ma’am Beth asks: “How would illegitimate children
mother. know they are illegitimate if they have always been CA affirmed the lower court’s
findings living with the family? The only time they’d learn ratiocinating that it is not unusual
if Pablo looked they do are not entitled to their parent’s estate is upon Maria as if she were
his own daughter when they die. Only Sempio-Diy knows that rule, because he had no child
in his previous mortals don’t!” marriage. 1. those conceived of parents who have no legal
impediment to marry at the time of may be legitimated all other illegitimate children
COMPARED◊the conception WITH THE CC PROVISION ON PROVING
ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION: Art 285 provided for exceptions in the prescription for
recognition of natural children, FC removed this provision in Par 2, Art 175. (Uyguangco v
CA) 1. If the father or the mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his
majority. 2. If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of
which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this
case, the action must be commenced within 4 years from the finding of the document. HOW
TO BRING ACTION TO CLAIM FILIATION 1. File a separate action 2. Intervene in the
settlement of estate of his/her alleged parent LEUTERIO v CA (1991) 197 SCRA 369 Ma.
Alicia Leuterio claims that she is the natural daughter of Pablo Leuterio and Ana
Maglangque, who was the servant of the former. Alicia claims that she was conceived at the
time when her parents were not disqualified to marry each other and that she was legitimated
by the ISSUE: WON Alicia is the legitimated daughter of Pablo and Ana HELD: No. CA
decision was affirmed. The relief of petitioner is that of involuntary recognition which may
be given if there is incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his
paternity. The recognition must be precise, express and solemn. The photographs she
presented likewise did not bear the decedent’s signature. She was also not a legitimated
daughter. UYGUANGCO v CA (1989) 178 SCRA 684 Graciano Uyguangco claims that he
is the illegitimate son of the late Apolinario Uyguangco who died intestate. Graciano admits
having no documents to prove his filiation but claims to be in continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child. He moved to Misamis Oriental where Apolinario supported his
education and even hired him as a storekeeper in their store without objection of the family.
He was allowed to use the surname and shared in the profits of the copra business. ISSUE:
WON he should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who
is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the CC. PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 125 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 HELD: The action to prove illegitimate filiation is barred.
Since Graciano seeks to prove filiation based on Par 2 of Art 172 FC, it should take place
during the lifetime of the parent. His action is barred because of the death of his father. Art
283 CC which gives weight to “continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or his family” has been superseded by Art 175 FC.
RODRIGUEZ v CA (1995) 245 SCRA 150 On Oct. 15, 1986, Clarito Agbulos filed a case
against Bienvenido Rodriguez. He presented his mother as witness to reveal the identity of
his father. Counsel for Rodriguez objected and the Trial Court sustained. Clarito filed a
petition in the SC and the SC referred the case to the CA. That decision is assailed in this
case. Petitioner: Felicitas shouldn’t be allowed to reveal the name of the father as stated in
Art. 280 of the Civil Code: When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately,
he or she shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had the child; neither
shall she state any circumstance whereby the other party may be identified. Respondent:
Fecilitas should be allowed by : 1. Art 283(4) CC: The father is obliged to recognize the child
as his natural child when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is
his father 2. Sec 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court: A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules mother is - In 1983, Luz Fabian filed
a complaint for the compelled recognition of her children as compulsory heirs of the
deceased on the grounds of open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate
children. RTC declared only Antonia as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and entitled
to her share in the estate ISSUE: 1. WON Family Code provisions apply in instant case 2.
WON application of Family Code in this case prejudice or impair vested right of respondent
should FC be given retroactive effect 3. WON trial court lost jurisdiction when FC took
effect. HELD: 1. No. The suit was filed prior to the effectivity of FC, thus CC provisions still
apply. Art 285 CC governs the case and not Art 175 Par 2 FC. 2. YES. If FC prevails over
CC in the choice of which should govern, it would prejudice Antonia’s right which was
vested upon her by virtue of Art. 285, through the abovementioned suit for recognition. 3.
NO. Since CC still governs the case, trial court never lost its original jurisdiction. What is
your understanding of a vested right? It is not defined in Art 256 FC because it should be on
a case to case basis, taking into account all the circumstances and facts. Subsequent change
of law should not affect the available cause of action. JISON v CA (1998) 286 SCRA 495
Monina Jison alleged that she is the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison. Francisco
denied paternity. While married to Lilia Jison, Francisco impregnated the nanny of his eldest
daughter, Esperanza Amolar. The child was born and enjoyed the continuous and implied
recognition as an illegitimate child. Francisco spent for her education until she became a
CPA and eventually worked as Central Bank examiner. It was her father who paid for the
burial expenses for her mother’s death. And it was through filiation with her father that she
previously was able to seek employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City. She was able to
name the members of the Jison household as well as the staff in her father’s office. She also
claimed knowing the 3 children of Francisco and Lilia. The last time she saw her father was
when she sought his blessings to get married. In sum, Monina’s evidence and testimonies
showed that a. she was close with Francisco’s relatives ISSUE: WON the testimony of the
admissible for compulsory recognition. HELD: Yes. Prohibition in A280, against the
identification of the father or mother of a child apply only in voluntary & not in compulsory
recognition. The said laws were repealed by the FC. Art 172 FC states that filiation may be
proved by any evidence and proof that the defendant is his father. ARUEGO v CA (1996)
254 SCRA 711 Jose Aruego while married had an extra-marital relationship with Luz Fabian
in 1959 until his death in March 1982. Allegedly born to this amorous relationship were
Antonia and Evelyn, both surnamed Aruego. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |
Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 126 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law
B2012 b. - she received P15 as monthly allowance from her father coursed through
accountants of his office c. her filiation was known in the Jison office & household d. her
allowance was not recorded in the books but in a separate cash book because it had to be
hidden from Mrs Jison and children e. that she even asked for a Christmas gift from her
godfather, Don Vicente, father of Mrs Jison When Monina wanted to go to Spain, her father
negotiated that in exchange for the expenses, she would sign a document that denies her
being a daughter. HELD: Monina proved her filiation. She has open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child. Her witnesses (she had 11) established her
claims. However, Monina cannot rely on her birth certificate in the Local Registrar where
Francisco is named as her father. Neither can she rely on her baptismal certificate naming
Francisco as her father. There was no showing that Francisco had anything to do with the
filing of said certificates. Moreover, Art 172 provides the various forms of evidence w/c may
be presented. Monina was able to present a “high standard of proof” which was coherent,
logical and natural as compared to Francisco’s evidence which was barren and mostly
denials. As regards the issue that there was opportunity for Monina’s mother to have slept
with other men during the time she conceived Monina, Francisco had the burden of proof
which he failed to deliver. The issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred
inevitably redounds to the victim’s or mother’s word, as against the protestation of the
accused or putative’s father. Although Pansay unfortunately passed away and therefore
cannot testify, this does not mean that Monina could no longer prove her filiation. Since it
was established that Pansay was still employed under Francisco at the time Monina was
conceived, sexual contact between Pansay and him was not at all impossible, especially in
the light of the overwhelming evidence. Francisco is Monina’s father and she was conceived
at the time Pansay worked for him. He recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts
and conduct as was found by CA and such recognition has been consistently shown and
manifested throughout the years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an
uninterrupted manner. Moreover, if Monina were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have
been unnecessary for Francisco to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina
denounce her filiation. Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a
positive provision of law. A denial of her action on ground of laches would clearly be
inequitable and unjust. Petition denied. Challenged CA decision affirmed. ALBERTO v CA
(1994) 232 SCRA 745 Ma. Theresa Alberto claims that she has been in continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of the late Juan Alberto and is entitled to a
share in his estate. The following are the proofs used: 1. Juan & Aurora were sweethearts
prior to Juan’s marriage to Yolanda 2. Juan gave money to Aurora thru Fr. Arcilla, Juan’s
first cousin 3. Juan gave Theresa money for her schooling 4. Juan made known to his friends
& relatives that she was his daughter 5. He made known to personnel of International School
where Theresa was enrolled that she was his daughter 6. Juan’s younger sister, Mrs. Aurita
Solidum, asked Theresa to be sent to her house to meet her dad for the first time when
Theresa was 9. 7. Fr. Arcilla brought Theresa to Juan’s bedside in the hospital when he was
shot & asked guards to give way to her as she was a member of the family. 8. Juan’s step
mom, Saturnina Alberto, introduced Theresa to one of Juan’s daughter (her half-sister). She
was introduced as an elder sister. 9. Aurora testified that her giving birth to Theresa was due
to an indiscretion and that Mrs. Solidum did arrange mtg bet Theresa & Juan 10. Theresa
testified that: a. her dad gave her P500.00 on their first meeting along with two phone
numbers where he could be reached. b. She met him several times after the first meeting and
he gave him money during those times too c. Dad visited her in IS twice. IS is very strict
when it comes to visitors & by allowing Juan to see Theresa, this shows that he was
identified by the school personnel as Theresa’s dad. d. Dad promised to see her in school
during her 14th birthday which didn’t happen because he was gunned down. e. Her uncles
and aunts (bros and sis) of her dad regarded her as their niece & she was introduced as Juan’s
eldest daughter. The children of Juan’s bros and sis likewise recognized her as their cousin.
11. Jose Tablizo testified that there was a strong physical resemblance bet Juan & Theresa &
they wrote similarly too. He further stated that it was known among Juan’s friends (the
Breeze Gang) that Theresa was Juan’s daughter and that Juan proudly showed him Theresa’s
report card w/high grades. 12. Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Juan’s lawyer,
Immigrations Commissioner Edmundo Reyes discussed w/him Juan’s PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 127 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - letter saying that he was not denying that he was Theresa’s dad
and due to his marital status & since he was a public official, he wanted to avoid public
scandal thus support will be given quietly thru Fr. Arcilla. CA reversed decision. It was not
satisfied that Theresa was in continuous possession of status of natural child of deceased.
Bases: 1. Case wherein 2 nurses took care of kids at the expense of alleged dad, that he
kissed kids, called them sons, gave money for their necessities, they called him dad & was
publicly regarded as dad of the children but Court held that they were insufficient basis for a
declaration of paternity. CA finds Theresa’s evidence weaker than this. Dad may have been
convinced of his paternity but they don’t show his intent to place kids in possession of status
of natural children. 2. Theresa’s letter to Jose Tablizo wherein she wrote of how proud she is
of her dad & how she only knew him as a big man & that his friends like Tablizo who knew
him well & she envied them for having that privilege. (see p. 751). CA claims that the letter
gave the impression that Juan distanced himself from Theresa. Yolanda denied that Juan ever
recognized Theresa as his daughter. She presented letters sent by Aurora to Juan & Fr.
Arcilla as proof that Juan refused to recognize Theresa. In one letter Aurora complained that
Juan didn’t give a damn to Theresa & she mentioned that the child was graduating from Prep
School. Letter likewise stated that she waited for the money for support & that she was
grateful for the P300 he sent. 6. Child is often the fruit of first love & is entrenched firmly in
her parents’ hearts. Juan could’ve not resisted manifesting signs of concern & care in so far
as his first born is concerned especially since child has much talent & great promise. It’s
expected that dad would proudly step forward to claim his paternity. Discreetness is
understandable considering the straight-laced mores of the times & the social & political
stature of Juan. But despite that, he openly visited his daughter in school and met with her in
several occasions. Though letter may imply lack of association, it’s understood because their
relationship was far from normal. There’s sufficient proof that Juan acted in such manner as
to show his intent to recognize Theresa as his own & not that he distanced himself from her.
CC Art. 285: Action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of presumed parents except (1) if dad/mom died during child’s minority, in w/c case,
child may file action before the expiration of 4 yrs from attainment of his majority. Theresa
falls w/in this exception since she was only 14 when her dad died. So can file an action
before she reaches 25 (4 years after age of majority w/c was 21 then). So she had until Sept.
18, 1978 to file the action. And she filed the present action on Sept. 15, 1978, 3 days before
the expiration of the 4-year period. HELD: Theresa was able to prove her open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. 1. Letters from Aurora: did not
prove that Juan refused to recognize Theresa, it only proved that Aurora was having a hard
time raising child on her own and she asked for Juan’s assistance. 2. Juan never stopped
Theresa from using his last name. 3. Report card story: being discredited for hearsay but
according to SC this is w/in the exception of the hearsay rule (Sec. 38, Rule 130, ROC). 4.
Relatives of Juan recognized Theresa too. Yolanda could have presented any of these
relatives to negate Theresa’s claims but she failed to do so. 5. Re Theresa’s letter to Tablizo:
What a poignant novel she can now author as she seeks to establish her parental links with
her dad. There must be questions as to why his dad didn’t marry her mom when there were
no legal impediments at the time of her conception. Note that under the different categories
of illegitimate children under the CC, the natural child occupies the highest position since her
parents were not disqualified to marry during her conception. GUY v CA (2006) 502 SCRA
151 Sima Wei died intestate in Makati City on October 1992, leaving 10M worth of real and
personal properties His known heirs are his surviving spouse and Shirley Guy and children
Private respondents (minors Karen and Kamille Wei), represented by their mother Remedios
filed a petition and prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly
settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. Petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the petition of
Remedios on the following grounds: 1. That Sima Lei left no debts and there is therefore no
need to secure letters of administration 2. That private respondents should have established
their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei 3. That private
respondent’s claim had been paid, waived and abandoned or otherwise extinguished by
reason of Remedios’ RELEASE AND WAIVER CLAIM stating that in exchange for the
financial educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabitilities ISSUES: PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 128 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 1. 2. WON the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private
respondents from claiming their successional rights WON private respondents are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation IN RE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES
OF DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA (2006) 480 SCRA 334
Lucio Campo HELD: 1. No. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do
not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. The document does not state
with clarity the purpose for its execution. Parents and guardians may not also repudiate the
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. Not having been judicially authorized,
the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private
respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased. It must also be emphasized
that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Private respondents could not
have possible waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. 2. A ruling in the same would be
premature considering respondents have yet to present evidences to prove their filiation. It is
the duty of the trial court. AGUSTIN v CA (2005) 460 SCRA 315 Arnel Agustin had an
extramarital affair with Fe Prollamante which produced the child named Martin. Arnel
suggested to have the pregnancy aborted which Fe refused. Arnel allegedly took care of all
the medical bills in Martin’s birth and even signed his birth certificate as the father.
However, in the long run, Arnel failed to give sustenance despite his adequate financial
capacity. Fe, afflicted with leukemia, sues Arnel for support. They also moved for DNA
testing to prove their cause of action. ISSUES: 1. WON complaint for support can be
converted to a petition for recognition 2. WON DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a
proceeding for support without violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination HELD: 1. The action does not amount to conversion. Rather, the
DNA was necessity to establish the respondent’s cause of action. Also, even if the order
would effect the establishment of filiation, the integration of the two actions is still lawful
because the resolution of one issue necessary in the determination of the other issue. 2. No.
Right to self-incrimination is considered only in written and verbal compulsion. Felisa
Ramon Osorio Guillerm o Josefa This case involves the partition of the estate of decedent
Guillermo and Josefa Delgado. The two groups contending the right of inheritance are the
heirs of Josefa Delgado (her half and full-blood siblings and their descendants) and the heirs
of Guillermo Delgado (his siblings and their descendants, his illegitimate child and de facto
adopted child). Josefa died before Guillermo, both intestate. The existence of their marriage
is also under question. 1. HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO. Felisa had seven children
fathered by two men, all the births were out of wedlock. In effect the children belong to the
illegitimate line. 2. HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA. He had an illegitimate child named
Guillerma with Amparo Sagarbarria. However, in his petition for adoption of his ampun-
ampunan Guillermina, he declared that he had “no legitimate, legitimated or acknowledge
natural child.” ISSUES: 1. WON Guillermo and Josefa were validly married 2. Who the legal
heirs of the decedents are 1. Their cohabitation of 50 years cannot be doubted. By
presumption of law, there existed valid marriage between them. Marriage contract is not the
only proof of marriage. The baptismal certificate wherein Josefa was referred to as “señorita”
has no legal bearing. Because of the declaration of Luis as the “natural child of Felisa”, it
was established that no marriage took place between Ramon Osorio and her. Given that,
illegitimate siblings, whether half or full blood can reciprocally inherit from each other. Only
the collateral relatives (and their heirs by their right of representation) of Josefa who are alive
at the time of her death are entitled to a share in her estate. Guilllerma’s right to compulsory
recognition prescribed upon the death of her putative father because her open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate Guillermina & Nanie Guillerma (illegitimate child
with Amparo Sagarbarria) Nazario Edilberta Jose Jacoba Gorgonio Luis 2. 3. PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 129 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 child is only a ground for compelling acknowledgement.
The obituary written by Guillermo for Josefa which includes her as his child does not pass as
genuine writing. Same goes for the ampun-ampunan Guillermina. As a result, Guillermo’s
compulsory heirs are his collateral relatives. ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG v DIAZ (2007)
540 SCRA 480 - Jinky sued for the determination of her minor child Joanne’s filiation via
DNA testing for claim of support. Despite her marriage with Hasegawa Katsuo, she
maintained illicit affair with Rogelio Ong. She got impregnated, and Rogelio Ong covered all
the medical bills and baptismal expenses until he cut off the support and said that the child
was not his. During the pendency of the case, Rogelio died. ISSUES: 1. WON the court erred
in not declaring Joanne as the legitimate child of Hasegawa and Jinky 2. WON DNA analysis
is still feasible notwithstanding the death of Rogelio Ong HELD: 1. No. The presumption of
legitimacy of the child is not conclusive and may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
Further, the resolution of the second issue will render the issue moot. 2. Yes. Rogelio’s death
does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Biological samples means any organic material
originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate objects. *This was decided
differently, deviated from the rule that only the husband can raise or impugn the child’s
legitimacy. Mam is in favor of this ruling. 2. Rights of illegitimate children FC, Art 176
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and sh mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expres record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an ad handwritten instrument is made by the
father. PROVIDED, the before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifeti shall
consist one-half of the legitimate child. *As amended by R IN CC: recognition of the father
was required before illegitimate child can
use his surname. IN FC: regardless of recognition, illegitimate child shall use mother’s
surname. RA 9255: reverts to the CC rule which allows illegitimate children to use father’s
surname subject to the father’s recognition. * RA 9255 was authored by Sen. Ramon Revilla
who is known for having at least 85 children of legal age. (Read: the number does not include
minor children.) * The problem with this law is that it takes out of the picture the role of
women. DAVID v CA (1995) 250 SCRA 82 Ramon villar, a married man, had three children
with his secretary Daisie David. Ramon recognized the children as his. Ramon refused to
return Christopher then 6 years old and his youngest child after a trip to Boracay. He also
enrolled him in a school. Daisy filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher.
HELD: Christopher, as an illegitimate child, is under the parental authority of his mother.
That the husband can provide the needs of the son better is not an argument against the
mother’s custody. The fact that Ramon recognized the child may be a ground for him to give
support but not for giving him custody of the child. PEOPLE v NAMAYAN (1995) 246
SCRA 646 The accused Tortillano Namayan raped Margie Pagaygay, 21 years old but is
slightly retarded with a mental age of 3-7 years old. The bulging stomach indicating
pregnancy became evident. Margie says that Namayan raped her on several occasions while
she was fetching water from the artesian well. Namayan denied all allegations purporting that
at the time specified, he was serving time in jail. However, the jail warden admitted that he
cannot confirm WON Namayan was indeed in jail because it was not his responsibility to
look after the prisoners. In fact, some of the detainees are allowed to go out at the discretion
of the guard. ISSUES & RULING: PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 130 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 1. WON
it was physically impossible for Namayan to be the father of the child. NO On July 30, 1991
Margie was found to be 4-5 months pregnant therefore sexual intercourse might have
happened during the period between March 15, 1991 to April 15, 1991. It was proven that
Namayan was seen outside the Municipal Jail during the town fiesta (March 19, 1991).
Namayan was detained in a minimum security prison and it was also stated that some
prisoners were able to go out depending on the discretion of the guard. These facts disprove
the claim of Namayan that it could not have physically possible for him to commit the act.
Also, even if he was released only on April 12, 1991 it would have still been possible for him
to impregnate Margie. 2) WON compulsory acknowledgement and support for the child is a
proper remedy in this case. YES No legal impediment The crime of rape committed by
Namayan carries with it among others the obligation to acknowledge the offspring if the
character of its origin doe not prevent it and to support the same. MOSSESGELD v CA
(1998) 300 SCRA 464 Eleazar Calasan, a married man, signed the birth certificate of his
illegitimate son, Jonathan Mossesgeld CAlsan. The local civil registrar refused to register the
birth certificate of Jonathan using the surname Calasan. HELD: Illegitimate children must
use the surname of their mother regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by
their fathers in the record of birth. The father may however choose to legally adopt the child.
Once adopted, the child may use the father’s surname. REPUBLIC v ABADILLA (1999)
302 SCRA 358 Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino begot two children during their
common law relationship. The children’s birth certificate indicated their surnames as
Abadilla. They filed a petition for correction/cancellation of entries to rectify “Herson” to
“Gerson” and delete the entry in the parents’ marriage date and place. RTC granted the
petition. OSG interposed the RTC decision’s reversible error in not ordering the change of
minors’ surname from “Abadilla” to “Celestino”, as effect of the deletion of the entry on
marriage. HELD: Illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. The surname of
the children in the birth certificates should be changed to Celestino. ** Under RA 9255
(2004) illegitimate children may use their father’s surname if he consents to it. GONZALES
v CA (1998) 298 SCRA 322 Ricardo Abad died intestate. The sisters and brothers of Ricardo
alleged that they are the only heirs of the deceased. Honoria Empaynado (partner for 27
years), Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion alleging that
they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo. There was also another illegitimate
child with Dolores Sancho named Rosemarie Abad. The collateral relatives adduced the
following proofs: o Mapua Institute of Technology enrollment forms which did not state Jose
as dead. o Affidavits of Quiambao & Ramos claiming that they know Jose died in 1971 &
that he was buried at the Loyola Memorial Park. o A doctor who said Ricardo had gonorrhea
so he was sterile. HELD: The Best evidence is Jose’s death certificate which was not
presented. Loyola Memorial Park showed a certain JOSE BAUTISTA LIBUNAO married to
a JOSEFA REYES and not JOSE SANTOS LIBUNAO married to HONORIA
EMPAYNADO. Also, Dr. Arenas’ affidavit is inadmissible for tending to blacken Ricardo’s
reputation. The privilege of secrecy is not abolished because of death. Respondents presented
his ITR where he declared Honoria as his legitimate wife & the 3 as his legitimate
dependents. He also opened bank accounts for them and paid insurance premiums. The
evidence presented proved that the three sisters are the illegitimate children of Ricardo.
Hence, they are entitled to inherit Ricardo’s estate. Art 988 CC provides that “in the absence
of legitimate descendants and ascendants, illegitimate children succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased. REPUBLIC v VICENCIO (1998) 300 SCRA 138 - SUPRA GAN v REYES
(2002) 382 SCRA 357 Bernadette Pondevida wrote Augustus Caezar Gan demanding for
support for the their love child, 3 year old Francheska Joy Pondevida, in order that she may
send the child to school. Gan denied paternity of the chld, prompting Bernadette to institute
in behalf of her daughter a complaint for support. HELD: In all cases involving a child, his
interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in
view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until
the decision of the trial court attains finality. Cases involving child support are final and
immediately executory, even more so, cannot be stayed by an appeal. PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 131 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 TONOG v CA (2002) 376 SCRA 523 Petitioner Dinah Tonog, a
nursing student begot a child with a physician Edgar Daguimol. The child named Gardin
Faith Tonog and the mother resided with the Daguimol’s parents. Then, Dina left for the US
to work and the child was left in the care of paternal grandparents and her father. Daguimol
applied for legal guardianship of the child, which was subsequently granted. Dina instituted
action for remand of custody ISSUE: WON Dina can claim custody of the child on TYP and
Art 176 FC HELD: The custody case is not yet concluded, meaning the court can only rule
on temporary custody. The CA did not err in allowing Edgar to retain in the meantime
parental custody over Gardin. A child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings
and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment. Gardin Faith is already 12 years old, her choice should also
be given weight. However, the decision should not be taken against the fitness of the mother
or the preference or the father. DE GUZMAN v PEREZ (2006) 496 SCRA 474 Petitioner
Roberto and private respondent Shirley became sweethearts while STUDYING LAW in
UST. Their studies were interrupted when Shirley became pregnant and gave birth to Robby.
The two, nonetheless, never got married. Roberto married another woman later on. He never
provided any financial support for Robby except in two instances (1992 & 1993) when he
sent money for the schooling and when he gave P7000.00 for the kid’s hospitalization
expenses. Shirley, at one instance, demanded support for Robby’s education since she was
suffering some financial problems. Roberto did not give anything despite his fabulous
wealth. He managed the De Guzman corporations, has five luxurious cars, owns a house in
Ayala Heights Quezon City and regularly travels abroad with his family. Shirley then filed
criminal complaint for abandonment against Roberto. Respondent’s evidence: Notarized
copy of the Gen Info Sheet of RNCD Development Corporation showed that Roberto owned
P750,000 worth of paid-up corporate shares. The city prosecutor of Lipa found probable
cause to charge petitioner with neglect of child under Art 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Sec
10(a) of RA 7610 Roberto filed a petition for review with the Sec of Justice who then
affirmed City Prosecutor’s resolution Petitioner’s claims: (1) He is financially incapable as
all the alleged properties belong to his father. His share was also in reality his dad’s; (2)
Robby is not a neglected child since his education was provided by Shirley and her relatives
ISSUE: WON a parent who fails/refuses to do his part in providing his child the education
his financial station in life and condition may permit, be charged criminally for neglect of
child under Art 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to RA 7610 HELD: Petitioner acknowledged
Robby as his son. He had not denied that he never contributed for his education except in two
instances. He admitted that the boy’s education was being financed by Shirley and her
relatives. There is also a prima facie evidence that he is financially capable as shown by the
notarized GIS. Roberto’s argument that "neglect attaches only if BOTH parents are guilty of
neglect does not hold. The law is clear. The crime may be committed by ANY parent. The
law intends to punish the neglect of any parent. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate
himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful
compliance with his/her own parental duties. Petitioner, however, cannot be indicted for
violation of PD 603 in relation to RA 7610 as the latter covers only those cases of neglect
under the former which are not covered by the RPC. “Neglect of child” under PD 603 is also
a crime under Art 277 of the RPC. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of 7610
Presumption of innocence is his favor still stands. What has been ascertained is simply the
existence of probable cause for petitioner’s indictment for the charge against him.
Petitioner’s guilt should still be proven beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case. ZEPEDA
v ZEPEDA (1963) 41 Ill App 2d 240 Plaintiff Joseph Dennis Zepeda sued his father for
causing him to be an adulterine bastard. The father induced the mother to have sexual
relations with him with the promise of marriage despite his full knowledge of its
impossibility because he is already married. As a result, the plaintiff suffers the consequences
of being an illegitimate child like social stigma, inability to inherit from paternal ancestors
and deprived of the right to have a normal home. An illegitimate very birth placed him under
a disability. ISSUE: WON the plaintiff has cause of action HELD: Recognition of the
plaintiff’s claim means creation of a new tort: a cause of action for a wrongful life. Courts
must take into consideration the consequences of opening the doors of litigation wider.
Lawmaking, though inherent in the judicial process, should not be indulged in where the
result could be as sweeping as here. The interest of the society is so involved, the action
needed to redress PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009 Page 132 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 the tort could be so far-
reaching, that the policy of the State should be declared by the representatives of the people.
ALBA v CA (2005) 465 SCRA 495 (same parties as in 460 SCRA 197) Rosendo Herrera
seeks to delete his name as a father and his surname from the birth certificate of Armi Alba’s
son Rosendo Alba, Jr. RTC granted the petition and duly notified Armi of the said decision.
However, the decision notice was sent to the wrong address. Armi now avers that Rosendo
deliberately provided the wrong address to prevent her from appealing in the case. That he is
well aware of her present address because they used to live there as common law spouses. As
a result, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction was committed by the court. ISSUE: WON
the RTC grant to correct the entries in Rosendo Alba’s birth certificate should be annulled
HELD: No. The petition for correction of birth certificate is in rem so it does not require the
presence of Armi. Also, no extrinsic fraud occured because although Armi claims that the
address in the birth certificate was erroneously entered by her sister, her signature signifies
her approval in the entries provided. Rosendo Herrera’s payment of the condominium unit
only proves his previous ownership and fails to establish any intimate relations between
them. The photocopied love notes also do not have any probative value and never proven to
be the respondent’s authentic writing. Finally, even if the court annuls the decision, Rosendo
Herrera Jr is still not eligible to retain his surname because RA 9255 provides that an
illegitimate child shall only use his father’s surname if the latter acknowledges his filitiation,
which is not the circumstance in this case. Therefore, Rosendo Herrera must use his mother’s
surname. REPUBLIC v CAPOTE (2007) 514 SCRA 76 Trinidad Capote filed a petition for
the change of name of one Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores, a minor under her
guardianship being that the mother is in abroad. The minor was the illegitimate child of
Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso, born July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and as such used the name of his father despite the absence of marriage
between them The father never gave any support and failed to take up his responsibilities
towards the said minor from his birth. The minor is now fully aware of his position and
likewise prays for the same, since his mother would like to petition him to join her in abroad,
and having a different surname without a father would cause and inconvenience in the
processing of document. RTC granted petition and CA affirm ISSUE: WON the guardian
may rightfully change the minor’s name HELD: Yes. Since private respondent has complied
with the requirements of Rule 103. Art 366 CC states that he should take the surname of the
recognizing parent, who in the present case is the mother. Art 176 FC mandates that
illegitimate children shall use the surname of the mother. Being that the name established
filial relations it is of importance that he change his name to affirm his status. It will erase the
impression that he was recognized by his father. The SOG has likewise misapplied Rule 108
RC, because such action is separate and distinct from the action at hand. This is for the best
interest of the child since it will facilitate the reunion between him and his mother, once she
successfully petitions him. Petitioner’s Contention: Is should be tried as an adversarial
proceeding and not a summary proceeding. *To this the respondent has already complied
with such requirement by posting it in a newspaper of general circulation, no opposing
petitions were put forward. D. Legitimated Children FC, Art 177 Only when conceived and
born outside of the wed conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impe
legitimated. LEGITIMATION remedy by means of which illegitimate children are
considered legitimate, it being supposed that they were born in lawful wedlock.
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN illegitimate children who are considered legitimate because of
the subsequent marriage of their parents In legitimation, the law makes legal what exists by
nature, while in adoption, the law creates by fiction a relation that did not in fact exist by
nature. REQUISITES FOR LEGITIMATION 1. child was conceived AND born out of
wedlock 2. the parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other at the
time of conception CHILDREN WHO CANNOT BE LEGITIMATED 1. adulterous 2.
but◊incestuous 3. of marriages against public policy 4. of bigamous marriages can be
ADOPTED to elevate their status PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 133 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 Why
can’t children of adulterous relationships cannot be legitimated? 1. rational of legitimation
would be destroyed 2. unfair to legitimate children in terms of successional rights 3. problem
of public scandal 4. will destroy the sanctity of marriage 5. very scandalous, especially if the
parents marry years after the birth of the child 6. it is tantamount to tolerating what would
have been a wrong act, it would seem to be more beneficial to the erring spouse Tomasa
married and had a daughter, Maria Luciano. When she was widowed, she took her daughter
with her and lived in the house that Leon Escobar built for them. Leon visited them almost
everyday. He sent his sons Antonio and Fortunato to keep them company at night. When
Tomasa died, Leon took Maria into his home until she married and was taken by her husband
to the province. Leon Escobar died, then Fortunato became ill. Antonio wrote to Maria to
return to Manila to nurse Fortunato, even sending money for passage. When Fortunato died,
Antonio took Maria into a FC, Art 178 Legitimation shall take place by subsequent valid
marriage between parents. The annulment ofhis home, where she lived until Antonio’s death.
voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. Maria claims that she is entitled to inherit
from the estate of Antonio by virtue of her being the CC: legitimation takes place through
subsequent legitimate daughter of Tomasa, who is a marriage (Art 270) provided that the
parents have legitimated sister of Antonio acknowledge the child before or after the marriage
ISSUE: WON Maria Luciano is entitled to inherit from FC: legitimation takes place through
subsequent Antonio marriage as long as the requisites of Art 177 are met. The length of time
between child’s birth and HELD: YES. A child that enjoys continuous possession the
parents’ marriage does not matter. of the status of a natural child is considered legitimated by
the subsequent marriage of the * The status of legitimated children in void ab initio parents.
Maria Luciano’s mother Tomasa was marriages are likewise affected because no marriage
legitimated by the Maria of her parents hence a exists at all. legitimate sister of Antonio. A
legitimate daughter of a legitimated sister is entitled to inherit from her mother’s legitimate
daughter - Maria may inherit FC, Art 179 Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as
legitimate children. from Antonio. FC, Art 180 The effects of legitimation shall retroact to
the time RAMIREZ v birth. of the child’s GMUR (1919) - * To protect not only the child but
also the child’s descendants because it can happen that at the time of the marriage of the
child’s parents, the child already had married and died is survived by children who should
benefit from the legitimation of their deceased parent. 42 Phil 855 Doña Ana Ramirez
Samuel Bischoff Felisa Castro Wertmuller Leona Castro Frederick Dr. descendants. FC, Art
181 The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit
theirErnest von Emil Mory Kauffman FC, Art 182 Legitimation may be impugned only by
those who are prejudiced in theirElena within five years from the time rights, Leontina their
cause of action accrues. Elizabeth Federico Carmen Maria Ernesto Esther DE LOS SANTOS
v LUCIANO (1934) 60 Phil 328 Tomasa Escobar was born to Leon Escobar and Josefa
Esguerra before they were married. After her parents got married, they begot two more
children: Antonio and Fortunato Escobar. All the while, Tomasa lived with the spouses and
their two legitimate children. The children called the spouses “Tatay” and “Nanay”. The
other children called Tomasa “Manang,” which is an appellation given to elder sisters.
Tomasa grew up and lived under the care of the spouses until she married. The spouses
supported her, treated and presented her as their daughter, and was publicly known as such. -
- Samuel, a Swiss, is married to Ana Ramirez without children. He died in 1913 and left a
will which declares that he has no forced heir. He bequeaths all his properties to his wife, to
the exclusion of properties in Switzerland which are adjudicated to his brothers and sisters.
His declaration of absence of force heirs ignores the possibility of his descendants from
Leona. Leona is born to Felisa Castro and an unknown father. However, on the margin of her
original baptismal certificate was an annotation by Fr. Ferrero that Samuel recognized her as
his natural daughter. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,
A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 134 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - - - Leona grew up in
Samuel’s family and brought up as a family member, which effected a tacit admission of
paternity. 1895 Leona ♥ Frederick, a Brit born in HK with whom she had three
children. 1899 Leona goes to Switzerland to recuperate in a sanatorium (did not specify
illness). After sometime, she told Fred that she does not want to be his wife anymore. So in
1904 Fred went to France and obtained a decree of divorce which was granted in 1905.
Leona fell for her doctor Emil. They begot a child in 1900 and married after Leona got
divorced from Fred. Two more daughters issued in the married. 1910 Leona died The heirs of
Leona seeks participation in the estate of their alleged grandfather Samuel. Otto Gmur
(respondent) appeared as guardian of 3 Mory children while Fred appeared for his own
children. Ana insists that Samuel did not recognized Leona. - - Ana’s contention that only
kids born of persons free to marry may possess status of recognized natural child. There
being no evidence to show Felisa Castro’s status at the time Leona was born, she will be
presumed single or widow. Court cannot entertain contrary presumption that Felisa’s guilty
of adultery. As a recognized natural daughter, had she survived her dad, she would have been
his forced heir (CC Art 807 (3) & 939) and entitled to 1/3 of the inheritance (CC Art 842).
No. French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for dissolution of marriage
contracted in the Phil by persons domiciled here especially since such marriage is
indissoluble under Philippine laws. Although the spouses (first marriage) have traveled to
different places, all those stays were limited & thus we can’t say that they have established
their domicile elsewhere. It has been established that court of a country in w/c neither spouse
is domiciled & w/c one/both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining divorce
has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status & a divorce granted by such court is
not entitled to recognition anywhere. Going to one place for the sole purpose of obtaining
divorce w/o intention to remain in that place is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on courts
of that state especially if cause of divorce is not recognized by the laws of the state of that
person’s own domicile. During the time they obtained divorce decree, the Phil law provided
that a valid marriage can only be dissolved by death of one of the parties. The law invoked in
obtaining the divorce allowed divorce where wife has been guilty of adultery/husband guilty
of concubinage. Evidently, this should not be upheld since it is repugnant to the moral
sensibilities of our people & it’s contrary to law. Leontina’s status: The first marriage was
still subsisting when she was born thus she’s an offspring of an adulterous intercourse w/c is
not capable of legitimation (CC Art 119). WON the Mory and the Kaufman children are
entitled to inherit. Frederick’s children are legitimate & entitled to inherit, thus no need to
discuss. The divorce being invalid, the claims of the Mory children should then be rejected.
The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated & acknowledged natural children,
excluding kids of adulterous relations. “Descendants” under CC Art. 941 can’t include
illegitimates born of adulterous relations. No. Rights of forced heirs to their legitime are not
divested by decree admitting a will to probate, regardless of fact that no provision has been
made for them in the will. Decree of probate is conclusive only as regards due execution of
will. Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 2. ISSUES: 1. WON Leona is a recognized natural child
of Samuel 2. WON the divorce between Fred and Leona is valid 3. WON Leontina should be
considered as a legitimate daughter of Fred and Leona (being born before the divorce decree,
hence while their marriage is subsisting) 4. WON the Mory and the Kaufmann children are
entitled to their share in the estate. 5. WON the probate of a will affects the rights of forced
heirs who don’t appear to contest the probate. HELD: 1. Yes. Prior to her first marriage, she
was in an uninterrupted enjoyment of de facto status of natural child & treated as such by
Samuel. Document presented by Fr. Ferrero admissible since he’s the custodian of church
records. Original document not needed since they have shown that diligent search was made
to find it, to no avail. Thus, secondary evidence presented by the priest is sufficient.
Applicable provision: Law 11 of Toro which became Law 1, Title 5, Book 10 of the
Novisima Recopilacion which provides that recognition could be established by proof of acts
on part of the parent unequivocally recognizing the status of his child. This is different from
CC Art 131 provision which provides that acknowledgment must be made in the record of
birth, by will or in other public instrument. Regardless of what provision is applied, it’s
sufficiently shown that Leona was recognized. 3. 4. 5. PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 135 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 753: forced heirs can’t be prejudiced by failure of testator to provide for
them in his will. And even if testator intended to leave everything to his wife, will is
intrinsically invalid if it would cut off the rights of his forced heirs. IN RE JULIAN WANG
(2005) 454 SCRA 155 The mother, Anna Lisa Wang, wants to change her minor child’s
name from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang, in effect dropping his middle
name. The mother explains that the family will be migrating to Singapore where middle
names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name. She fears that
this will cause discrimination and embarrassment to her son as “Carulasan” sounds funny in
Mandarin (they pronounce R as L). There will also be difference in Julian and her sister’s
(Wang Mei Jasmine) name. They might be confused because they have different surnames.
RTC: denied, the reason they purported does not fall within the grounds provided by law
OSG: No proof that change of name is in the best interest of the child; Mere convenience is
not a valid reason for petition for change of name; Singaporean law does not prohibit the use
of middle name; There will be no confusion to parentage because they both use their father’s
surname ISSUE: WON the change of the minor’s name should be allowed HELD: No. SC
adopts the same reason as OSG and added that such change of name would make his
integration into the Singaporean society is not sufficiently establish. Also, petitioner is only a
minor. The matter of change of name should be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority. Cute trivia: Did you know that Pepe is the nickname for Jose
because Joseph is the padre putative (putative/foster father) of Jesus, shorted to P.P. which is
pronounced “pe-pe” PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,
A.Y.ϑ in Spanish? 2008-2009 Page 136 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 XIII.
ADOPTION ADOPTION is a juridical act which creates between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. PURPOSE OF
ADOPTION Originally: mainly for the benefit of the adopter, who are usually people who
had no children, so that they may experience the joys of parenthood Modern view: for the
benefit of the children to be adopted o It has both social and moral purpose: to extend to the
orphan or to the child of the indigent, the incapacitated or the sick, the protection of society
in the person of the adopter o The adopted child remains an heir of his parents by nature
CONSTRUCTION OF ADOPTION LAW: construed so as to encourage the adoption of
unfortunate children by persons who can properly read and educate them CHILD WELFARE
PARAMOUNT: In determining whether adoption shall be allowed, the welfare of the child is
the primary consideration. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Petition for adoption is done
through proceeding in rem. No court may entertain such a petition unless it has jurisdiction
over: the subject matter of the case and over the parties the res, which is the personal status
of the person to be adopted as well as that of the petitioners ADOPTION AND
LEGITIMATION similar in the sense that in both of them the child is given the status of the
child born in lawful wedlock of the parents adopting or legitimizing it Persons affected
Procedure LEGITIMATION Only natural children May take place by extrajudicial act of
parents (marriage) Only by both parents of the child Child receives the same status and rights
as a legitimate child, not only in ADOPTION Strangers (generally) Always by judicial
decree May be made by one parent Creates a relationship only between the child and the
adopting parent, relation to the legitimizing parents, but also in relation to other relatives of
the latter but not with the relatives of the latter WHAT DOES ONLY BY A JUDICIAL
DECREE MEAN? Only an adoption made through the court is valid. The fact of adoption is
never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence Proof
required: judicial decree of adoption o Absence of proof of order of adoption by court cannot
by substituted by oral evidence o Secondary evidence admissible where the records of
adoption were actually lost or destroyed o Pedigree testimony is not admissible Mere
agreement of adoption between the adopters and the biological parents of the child is not
valid Mere fact that the child has lived with the alleged adopter who had treated him like his
own child is not sufficient to establish a valid adoption (Lazatin v Campos) Neither is the
mere registration of the child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed
adopters a valid adoption (simulated birth) A. Pre-adoption and Adoption Procedure There
are no provisions on pre-adoption procedures in FC, it is only introduced in RA 8552
(Domestic Adoption Act of 1998). FC, Art 184 The following persons may not adopt: 1. The
guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of guardianship relations; 2. Any
person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral t 3. An alien, except: a. a former
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by con b. One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of his or her Fil c. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt of the
latter Carried out by whom Benefits GUARDIAN: To prevent a guardian who has misused or
misappropriated the funds or properties of his ward to resort to adopting his ward to avoid an
accounting of such funds or properties and possible criminal prosecution. Guardianship must
be terminated first in accordance with the Rules of Court and the final accounts of the
guardian approved, before said guardian can be allowed to adopt his or her ward. MORAL
TURPITUDE: Adoption demands that the adopter be morally qualified to do so, and a
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
137 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude shows lack of good moral character on the part of the person convicted. The
disqualification is not removed by a pardon given to the offender, since the lack of necessary
moral qualification remains even if criminal liability has been removed. 8. **but if no DVC
was signed (in cases ◊where the child 9. File a petition for was abandoned or left to adoption
Lawyers only strangers) come in at this point i. locate unknown parents (dahil pampagulo
lang *The fact that adopter has legitimate or illegitimate through trimedia (TV, radio sila) or
newspaper) (Sec 5) children is no longer a barrier to adopting. This was 10. Decree of
adoption (Sec ii. after 3 months of no prohibited by CC and removed in PD 603, FC and RA
13) claiming, petition for 8552. 11. Issuance of Travel Declaration of Authority if foreign
Abandonment now adoption FC, Art 187 The following persons may not be adopted
becomes◊(DA) a ward of the 1. A person of legal age, UNLESS, he or she is government A
child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse 2. Declare the child Prior to the adoption,
said person had been consistently legally available treated by the adopter as his or considered
and for her own child during minority adoption 2. An alien with whose government the
Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations 3. A person who has already been
adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded *Preparation of
Home Study Report months to reconsider adjustment period (Sec 12) Recommendation and
consent of DSWD ADOPTION OF ADULTS 1. No need to adopt adults because they are
old enough to take care of themselves. 2. If the only reason someone wishes to adopt and
adult is to share his material advantages with another, he can do so by simply giving the latter
financial assistance and leaving him something in his will. 3. Rational of adoption: to give
poor, orphaned, abandoned little children the advantages of having parents who would love,
support, protect, rear and educate them until they are old enough to take care of themselves.
4. EXCEPTIONS a. If the adult is the parent in nature because this would raise the status of
the illegitimate child b. If in the custody since childhood/minority, there is the presumption
that adopter really wants to adopt the child but only neglected to do so before the latter
reached majority. PROCEDURE FOR ADOPTION ACCORDING TO RA 8552 (Ma’am
Beth tabulated the procedure during lecture) CHILD 1. Biological parent goes to DSWD for:
a. counseling (Sec 4) - importance of providing relevant info on the child, medical history
and family background - possibility of child to be placed for adoption b. signs a Deed of
Voluntary Commitment or DVC** c. give the parent 6 1. 2. 3. 1. Visit to adopter’s home 2.
Will include documents of adopter (locals) a. authenticated birth certificate b. Marriage
contract c. Written consent of children d. Physical and mental evaluations e. NBI/Police
clearances f. financial proofs g. character references h. pictures i. Certificate of attendance to
pre-adoption fora 3. For foreigners (on top of item 2) a. certification of legal capacity to
adopt b. certificate that country will allow entry of and permanent residence of adoptee into
the country c. Certificate of Philippine residents from BID d. Two character references from
non-relatives from home country e. Police clearances from all places where adopter lived
BIOLOGICAL PARENT: Does not provide exception for age. This means that a minor
mother does not need the consent of her parents to give up her child for adoption. Even if the
parents are against the adoption of their grandchild, they cannot prevent the biological parent
from doing so. GRACE PERIOD: This is an innovation of RA 8552. The biological parent is
given the right to reconsider his/her decision to relinquish his/her child within six months
from signing the Deed of Voluntary Commitment - This grace period is what makes it
impossible to adopt a newly born infant. However, if adoptive parents insist, they can be
given “risk placement” wherein the adopters get custody of the child, subject to the
biological parent’s change of mind within 6 months. MATCHING: The adoptive parents are
allowed for certain preference, for instance, they could specify sex. Females are generally
more adoptible because they are easier to take care of. The PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVE
PARENTS Inquiry Attend adoption home study report (Sec 14)◊forum Application DSWD
makes a case study report issuance of pre-adoption placement authority (PAPA)◊Matching
Placement 4. 5. 6. 7. PERSONS AND FAMILY◊Supervised trial custody for 6 months or
less RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 138 of 170 Karichi E.
Santos | UP Law B2012 - - notion is adopting a boy is like bringing in a male stranger. The
peak season for adoption is during Christmas. Parents prefer younger children because they
have no values yet. They are relatively more convenient to shape and rear in a way the
adoptive parents want to. Not much mannerisms or habits yet. Regarding physical attributes,
Ma’am Beth noticed that the adoptive parents want the child to have a resemblance with the
husband. B. Who may adopt/be adopted FC, Art 183 A person of age, and in possession of
full civil capacity an support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate in keeping w
Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the adoption o In addition, the
adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the p nature of the adopted or is the spouse
of the legitimate parent of the p *The age gap ensures that the relationship between the
adopter and the adoptee will be a parent child relationship (approximate natural filiation) and
that the adopter has sufficient maturity to fulfill the role of a parent to the adopted child.
(Think Daddy Long Legs) ADOPTION OF SEVERAL CHILDREN: A person may legally
adopt two or more children. FC, Art 185 Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
follow 1. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child 2. When one spouse
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the ot * Under CC and PD 603, spouses can adopt
solely. * But what if one spouse seeks to adopt the illegitimate child of the other? FC, Art
186 In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse ado shall be exercised by the
spouses in accordance with this Code. * Consent not required in case of legal separation
because it terminates the common life between the spouses and the reason for requiring the
this◊consent of one spouse for the adoption made by the other no longer exists was made
explicit in RA 8552 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,
A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 139 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 the child’s sickness, he
was entrusted to the Art 183 (who may adopt), Art 184 (who may not adopt), Art 185 (joint
adoption of spouses) and Art petitioners since birth. The natural parents of the 186 (parental
authority) have been amended by Art III Sec 7, RA 8552 minor voluntarily gave their
consent and written conformity to the adoption. The SG opposed the WHO MAY ADOPT
petition on the ground that relatives by blood or by affinity are prohibited from adopting one
another bec I. For Filipino citizens of the incongruous dual relationship that will result. 1. of
legal age 2. full capacity and legal rights TC dismissed the petition, hence this appeal. 3. 4. 5.
good moral character, no conviction for crime involving moral turpitude emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children WON an elder sister may adopt her younger
ISSUE: at least 16 years older than the adoptee UNLESS biological parent of the adoptee or
the spouses of the adoptee’s brother parent II. For aliens HELD: Yes. There is no provision
in the law 1. qualifications for Filipino citizens 2. the country has diplomatic relations with
the Philippinesprohibiting relatives by blood from adopting one 3. 4. 5. 6. another. A. 335
NCC enumerates those persons who has been living in the Philippines for at least 3 years
prior to the filing of application may not adopt, and it has been shown that certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal
petitioners aren’t among those prohibited from capacity to adopt in his/her country adopting.
A. 339 NCC names those who can’t be his/her government allows the adoptee to enter the
country as his/her adopted son/daughter requirements for residency and certification of
qualification is waived forthe followingEdwin isn’t one of those adopted and the minor a. b.
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relativeexcluded 4 within the by law. A. 338
NCC on the other hand allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural seeks to adopt
the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse might be, w/c isn’t the policy of the
law. Adoption statutes, being humane and authority and designed If spouses jointly adopted
or one spouse adopted the illegitimate child of the other, Joint parental salutary, shall be
exercised to provide homes, care and education for by parents. unfortunate kids, should be
construed so as to encourage the adoption of such kids by persons who * Qualifications for
exemption in residency can properly rear and educate them. requirements of RA 8552
(Number 6 in box above) is The fact that adoption in this case will result in a the exemption
to the general rules for adoption by dual relationship between the parties, that the aliens in
Art 184 Par 3. One difference is that RA adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting
8552 allowed for adoption of “relatives by affinity” sister, shouldn’t prevent the adoption.
One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by
adoption is limited to the adopting parents and doesn’t extend to their other relatives, except
as expressly provided by law. Petition for adoption granted. Art III Sec 8, RA 8662
REPUBLIC v CA and BOBILES (1992) 205 SCRA 356 WHO MAY BE ADOPTED Any
person: Private respondent Zenaida Bobiles filed a 1. below 18 years of age who has been
administratively or judicially declared available for adoption then 6 yo and petition to adopt
Jason Condat, 2. legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse who had been
living with her family since he was 3. illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to
improve his/her status to that of legitimacy 4 mos old. 4. a person of legal age IF prior to the
adoption said person has been consistently considered and treated by the The court a quo,
finding the petition to be adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority sufficient in form and
substance, issued and 5. a child whose adoption has been previously rescinded order setting
proceedings for be initiated within 6 6. a child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has
died PROVIDED that nothe petition shallhearing. The order was duly published and posted
with copies months from the time of death of said parent IN RE ADOPTION OF EDWIN
VILLA (1967) aka SANTOS Jr. v REPUBLIC 21 SCRA 299 Spouses Luis Santos Jr a
lawyer and Edipola Villa a nurse, having no child of their own, filed a petition praying that
the minor Edwin Villa, a younger brother of Edipola, be declared their son by adoption. Due
to seasonably served to interested parties. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition.
Subsequently, the RTC granted the petition which was affirmed by the CA. During the
pendency of her petition, the FC took effect which makes mandatory the joint adoption of
spouses. married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
within the 4 father or mother, and a stepchild by the stepdad or consanguinity OR affinity of
the Filipino spouse stepmom. III. Guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of
the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial To say that adoption shouldn’t be allowed
when accountabilities the IV. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:adopter and the adopted are related to each a. if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of theexcept in those cases enumerated Art 338 CC other, other b. if
one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter PROVIDED that the other
spouse has signified is to preclude adoption among relatives no mater his/her consent thereto
how removed or in whatever degree that relationship c. if the spouses are legally separated
from each other c. father or mother, of other illegitimate kids by their - PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 140 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - Petitioner now contends that the petition for adoption should
have been dismissed outright as it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her
husband Dioscoro Bobiles, in violation of Art 185 FC. It argues that FC must be applied
retroactively to the petition of Mrs. Bobiles. And that even if the FC is not applied, the court
still erred by granting adoption to both the spouses instead of Zenaida alone. regarding joint
ISSUE: WON the FC provision adoption of spouses should apply HELD: No. Art 256 FC
provides for the retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof subject to the
qualification that such retroactive application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights. Zenaida had rightfully commenced the petition prior to the effectivity of the FC. Her
right to that action is not subject to subsequent modification of the law. Art 185 FC is
remedial in nature. Technical rules should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings
because it involves the future condition and paramount welfare of the adoptee. Petition for
adoption granted. REPUBLIC v TOLEDANO and SPS. CLOUSE (1994) 233 SCRA 9
Spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse filed a petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn’s 12 yo brother.
Alvin is a natural born American citizen while Evelyn was a former Filipno who became
naturalized American citizen in Guam. Solomon Joseph Alcala and his mother, Nery Alcala
consented to the adoption due to her inability to support the boy’s education. HELD: The
Clouse may not adopt Filipino children. Alvin is not qualified to adopt under FC because he
is not a former Filipino citizen and Solomon is not his relative by consanguinity nor the
legitimate child of his spouse. Evelyn, as a former Filipino citizen, is qualified to adopt but
the FC requires spouses to jointly adopt. Hence, the spouses may not adopt Solomon. **
Under RA 8552 qualified resident aliens may adopt Filipino citizens REPUBLIC v MILLER
(1999) 306 SCRA 183 Claude Miller, formerly a member of the US Air Force assigned at
Clark Air Base, and his wife, Jumrus Miller, both US citizens but residing in Angeles City,
filed before RTC a verified petition to adopt minor Michael Magno Madayag. Poverty and
deep concern for his future prompted Michael’s natural parents to give their irrevocable
consent to the adoption. - RTC granted petition for adoption finding petitioners to possess all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for adoption. Michael was freed from all
obligations of obedience and support with respect to natural parents. He was then declared
child of the Millers by adoption. His surname was to be changed from “Madayag” to
“Miller”. ISSUE: WON the Court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the
prohibition under FC, effective on Aug 3, 1988, when the petition for adoption was filed
before FC, on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
which allowed aliens to adopt. HELD: Yes. The enactment of FC will not impair the right of
alien respondents to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of
filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested
right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to
the will of the holder. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action. Adoption statues, being humane and salutary, hold
the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill the compassionate and noble objectives
of the law. C. Nature of adoption proceedings LAZATIN v CAMPOS (1979) 92 SCRA 250 -
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate and was survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and
his adopted twin daughters Nora L. De Leon (married to Bernardo de Leon) and Irma Lazatin
(married to Francisco Veloso) A month after Mariano Lazatin’s death, Margarita de Asis
commenced an intestate proceeding before the CFI of Pasay. To the said proceeding,
Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne intervened since they claimed to be admitted
illegitimate (not natural) children of Mariano with a woman named Helen Muñoz.
Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another illegitimate (not
natural) child PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009 Page 141 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - - - 2 months after the
intestate proceeding, Margarita de Asis died but left a holographic will (a will written
entirely in the testator’s hand), which provided, among others, for: o a legacy of cash,
jewelry and stocks to Arlene De Leon, a granddaughter o a legacy of support to Rodolfo
Gallardo, a son of her late sister o a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara (petitioner’s
son) During Margarita de Asis’ lifetime, she kept a safety deposit box at the People’s Bank
and Trust Company, which either she or Nora could open. Five days after Margarita’s death,
Nora opened the said box and removed its contents (shares of stock, adoption papers of hers
and her sister’s, jewelry belonging to her and to her mother) Her sole reason for opening the
box was to get the stock certificates and other small items. A bank personnel informed her
that she needed an authority from the court to open the box in view of her mother’s death. So,
she decided to remove everything from it On June 3, 1974, the private respondents filed a
petition to probate the will of Margarita Days after learning that Nora opened the box,
Ramon Sta. Clara filed a motion in the probate court, claiming: o that Margarita had executed
a will subsequent to that submitted for probate o demanded its production o prayed for the
opening of the box Of course, when the court ordered its opening, the box was already
empty. Seven months after Margarita’s death, Renato Lazatin intervened for the first time as
an admitted illegitimate child. Then he also filed a motion to intervene in the estate of
Margarita de Asis, this time as an adopted child on the basis of an affidavit executed by
Benjamin Lazatin, brother of Mariano, stating that Renato was an illegitimate child of
Mariano who has later adopted by him. The affidavit was later modified to state that Renato
was adopted by both Mariano and Margarita Renato’s motion to intervene in the settlement
of the estate of Margarita was denied by the lower court on the ground that the evidence
presented tend to prove that he was a recognized natural child of Mariano, but not a legally
adopted child of Margarita. He never presented a decree of adoption in his favor. Likewise,
Renato’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the court unless he presented some
documentary evidence to prove his adoption Renato Lazatin filed a motion for intervention in
the probate proceedings of the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child. ISSUE: WON
Renato is an adopted child HELD: Renato has not established his status as an adopted child.
Secondary evidence is not admissible unless the existence of the records are proven along
with the contents of the records and its loss. Adoption is a juridical act and the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out otherwise it is a nullity. The fact of adoption is
never presumed, but must be affirmatively proven by the person claiming its existence. - - - -
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
142 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 SANTOS v ARANZANSO (1966) 16 SCRA
344 Paulina, 17 and Aurora, 8 were adopted by spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes.
The two minors were in the custody of the couple since infancy and the whereabouts of their
biological parents are unknown since the outbreak of the war. Crisanto de Mesa, the guardian
ad litem gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina who was over 14 years old then
also put in writing her assent to the proceeding. An adoption decree was eventually granted 8
years later, Juliana died and Simplicio commenced the settlement of her estate declaring that
he and the two adopted daughters, are the surviving heirs Gregoria Aranzanso, an alleged
first cousin of Juliana opposed the settlement estate saying that the marriage between Juliana
and Simplicio is void ab initio for being bigamous. Likewise, the adoption is also null for
want of written consent of their parents. Demetria Ventura, who claims to be another cousin
of Juliana and mother of Paulina filed her opposition in the same tenor as Gregoria’s. ISSUE:
WON the adoption decree is valid. HELD: Yes. Consent by the parents to the adoption is not
an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned their kids, consent by the
guardian ad litem suffices. In adoption proceedings, abandonment imports “any conduct on
the part of the parent w/c evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties & relinquish
all parental claims to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural & legal
obligations of care & support which parents owe to their kids.” Although the adoption court
did not use the term “abandonment” the reasons propounded bear the essential elements of
abandonment. Granting arguendo that the marriage between Juliana and Simplicio is void,
the adopted children are deemed to be adopted by Juliana as a single person. The philosophy
behind adoption statutes is to promote welfare of the child, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote that objective. DSWD v BELEN (1997) 275 SCRA 645
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo, naturalized US citizens, filed a petition to
adopt their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Antonio Belen granted
the petition based on the findings and recommendations of the DSWD that the adopting
parents and the adoptee have developed emotional attachment. When travel clearance was
being sought from DSWD so that the child may join her adopters in the States, it was
discovered that DSWD was not informed about the commencement of the adoption
proceedings nor was it given notice of the petition being granted. HELD: The DSWD has to
be notified of the adoption proceedings. A Home and Child Study Report is mandatory
before adoption is to be finalized. The DSWD is undoubtedly has the necessary competence,
more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper
recommendation. Adoption is a legal advice by which a better future may be accorded an
unfortunate child. Judge censured and social worker reprimanded. D. Consent necessary for
adoption FC, Art 188 The written consent of the following to the adoptio 1. The person to be
adopted, if 10 years or older 2. The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, o 3. The
legitimate and adopted children, 10 years or older, 4. The illegitimate children, 10 years or
older, of the ado latter’s spouse, if any 5. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
ado Art III Sec 9, RA 8662 WHOSE CONSENT IS NECESSARY 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The adoptee
if 10 years of age or over the biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal which
has legal custody of the child the legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, 10 years of age o
the illegitimate sons/daughters, 10 years of age or over of th spouse the spouse, if any, of the
person adopting or to be adopted * PD 603 and CC: The consent of the adoptee was required
only if 14 years of age or over. DUNCAN v CFI (1976) 69 SCRA 298 A 3-day old baby
named Colin Berry Christensen Duncan was given by his unwed mother to Atty. Corazon
Velasquez. She also instructed him to look for a suitable couple to adopt the child. Atty.
Velasquez then gave consent for the Duncan spouses (Robin Francis Radley and Maria Lucy
Christensen) to adopt the child. Husband: British national residing in the country for the last
17 years and wife: American citizen born in and a resident of the Philippines No child of
their own but previously adopted another child ISSUE: WON Atty. Velasquez is the proper
party required by law to give consent the adoption HELD: Yes. She can rightfully give
consent to the adoption. The father’s consent is not necessary because the child is
illegitimate. The mother’s consent is not necessary either because she is PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 143 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 deemed to have abandoned the child and has given the child to
Atty. Velasquez for guardianship. CANG v CLAVANO (1998) 296 SCRA 128 Spouses
Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano (employee at the Philippine Consulate in LA) were
legally separated because the husband’s extramarital affairs. Herbert became naturalized US
citizen and secured a divorce decree there. Clavano’s brother (Ronald Clavano, a wealthy
businessman) and his wife Maria Clara (a flight stewardess) wanted to adopt the three
children (Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony) of the spouses Cang and Clavano. The 14
yo son signed the petition of adoption along with Clavano. The mother justified the adoption
with the following statements: o The brother had been her in taking care of the children o She
will be going to the US and the children would hamper her job-seeking venture abroad o
Husband had long forfeited his parental rights Herbert immediately returned home upon
learning about the adoption proceeding, which he opposes. RTC and CA granted the decree
of adoption ISSUE: WON the consent of the father to the adoption must be sought, given that
he expresses desire to retain parental authority and that he did not abandon his children
HELD: The adoption may not be granted. Cang’s consent as the father is necessary.
Petitioner’s conduct did not manifest relinquishment of parental duties. Despite the fact that
Cang abandoned his children, it was proven that he continued to send support for the family
from the US. It was mere physical estrangement that existed. Cang did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment. LANDINGIN v REPUBLIC (2006) 493 SCRA 415 Maria Taruc
Diwata Landingin Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Manuel Ramos Amelia Ramos - - - then, it
has been the paternal relatives who give support to the children. The mother also rarely
communicates with the children and already has a second family in Italy. Petitioner is a 57
year old widow, naturalized US citizen in Guam with four grown-up children of her own who
have their own respective families and gainfully employed also in Guam. She lives alone in
her house and works as a part-time waitress. Petitioner’s children executed an affidavit of
consent for the adoption proceeding in the US. Elaine, the eldest of the three adoptees
likewise testified regarding their consent to be adopted by their aunt. The DSWD social
worker was able to interview Amelia when she went home to the Philippines. According to
the mother, she is willing to let go of her parental ties with the children since it’s her in-laws
who have been rearing them. RTC granted but CA reversed for absence of consent of the
petitioner’s children and the adoptee’s biological mother. ISSUES: 1. WON the adoption
may proceed absent the mother’s written consent 2. WON the affidavit of consent executed
by the petitioner’s children in Guam not in the presence of a Philippine consular office is
admissible 3. WON the petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees HELD: 1.
No. The petitioner failed to present actual evidence regarding the mother’s consent. It cannot
be said that she intends to abandon them because she continually gives them financial
support no matter how minimal. Also, the eldest daughter admitted that she consults her
regarding serious issues. 2. No. The authenticity of her children’s affidavit was also not
clearly established. 3. No. Her advanced age and instable source of income puts doubt on her
financial capacity to raise the three kids in the US. That her own children are willing the back
her up is untenable because the ability to support must be personal to the adopter.
ADOPTION AND THE RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE FATHERS A Review of New York Law
Unmarried fathers should be given legal rights to their involvement in the lives of their
illegitimate children. The New York legislature has adopted specific statutory guidelines for
identifying unwed fathers who have a constitutionally protected parental right which must be
surrendered or terminated before their child can be adopted. Elaine Elma Eugene - Diwata
Landingin wants to adopt the legitimate children of her deceased brother Manuel. Since his
death, the children have been in the care of their paternal grandmother Maria as their
biological mother left for Italy to work. Since PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS |
Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 144 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law
B2012 1. Fathers with full substantive rights – Unwed fathers who maintained substantial
and continuous or repeated contact with the child have the same rights as unmarried mothers
with respect to their children, and must execute a voluntary surrender before the child can be
adopted. The father has to have a “substantial relationship” with the child, the standards of
which vary according to the age of the child. A. For children under six months old i. openly
lived with the child or the child’s mother for a continuous period of six months prior to the
placement of the child for adoption ii. openly held himself out to be the father of the child for
six months prior to the placement of the child for adoption iii. paid or offered to pay a fair
and reasonable sum according to his means toward the medical expenses in connection with
the mother’s pregnancy or the birth of the child B. For children over six months old i. pays a
reasonable sum according to his means toward the support of the child ii. visit the child
monthly or maintain regular communication with the child or agency that has custody of the
child 2. Fathers with due process rights – For those who do not meet the statutory criteria
which would require their consent to adoption, they can still be entitled to special notice
which gives due process rights with respect to voluntary surrenders and termination of
parental right. This do not include men convicted of first degree rape when the child who is
the subject of the termination was conceived as the result of the rape. i. ii. any person
adjudicated to be the father of the child by any NY court any person adjudicated to be the
father of the child by another state court when a certified copy of the order has been filed
with the NY putative father registry any person who has filed a timely and unrevoked notice
of intent to claim paternity any person who is recorded on the child’s birth certificate as the
child’s father any person who is openly lived with the child or the child’s mother for a
continuous period of six months prior to the placement of the child for adoption any person
who has been identified as the child’s father by the mother in a written, sworn statement any
person who was married to the child’s mother within six months subsequent to the birth of
the child and prior to the execution of a surrender or the initiation of a termination
proceeding viii. any person who has filed an instrument with the putative father registry
acknowledging the paternity of the child 3. Fathers without rights – Those who have not
made efforts to establish a relationship with a non-marital child do not have a right to be
included in a court decision to approve a mother’s surrender, to terminate the mother’s rights
or to approve the adoption of the child 4. Fathers unable to meet the criteria prevented from
visiting or contacting the child because of a court order or other actions taken to protect the
mother from domestic violence incarceration drug addiction father unaware of the child
relative’s action E. Effects of Adoption FC, Art 189 Adoption shall have the following
effects: 1. For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitim reciprocal rights
and obligations arising from the relationship to use the surname of the adopters; 2. The
parental authority of the parents by nature over the ado except that if the adopter i
s the spouse of the parent by adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses 3. The
adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and CC, Art 365 An adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter * RA 8552 allows the adopters to give their adopted child a
name of their choice. This was previously not available in PD603 and FC (Republic v
Hernandez). The rationale for this rule is that the given name will be the only emotional tie
the adoptive parents can have with their adoptee. FC, Art 190 Legal or intestate succession to
the estate of the adopted iii. iv. v. (1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants
and the su adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or intestate suc (2) When
the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate asc shall divide the entire estate, one-
half to be inherited by the parents or (3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate
children of the adopte estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the ille
the adopters. vi. vii. (4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the
entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitima third by the adopters;
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate (6) When only
collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then t apply. PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 145 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Sec. 16) legitimate child – as such, they were
entitled to All legal ties bet. biological parents and adoptee are severed, and the same shall be
vested on the adopter, except if the inherit Teodoro’s share in his parents’ estate by biological
parent is the spouse of the adopter. right of representation LEGITIMACY (Sec. 17) The
lower court decided both cases in favor of The adoptee shall be considered legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter for all intents and purposes, and entitled to all rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate children born to them without discrimination of any
kind. Adoptee is entitled to herein respondents love, guidance, and support. Both decisions
were based on findings evidenced SUCCESSION (Sec.18) by the decree of adoption of Delia
and Edmundo, Adopter and adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without
distinction from legitimate filiation, in legal and and the birth certificate of Doribel intestate
succession. If adoptee and his/her biological parents had left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall In the first case, it was held that the respondents, govern. Teodoro and
Isabel, and that Doribel was a TAMARGO v CA (1992) 209 SCRA 518 Spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt the 10 yo minor Adelberto Bundoc. Before the
petition was granted, Adelberto shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo using an air rifle. The
parents of Tamargo sued Adelberto’s natural parents for damages. The child though was
acquitted for acting without discernment. The Bundocs claim that the Rapisuras should be the
proper parties in this suit since parental authority shifted to the adopting parent from the
moment the petition for adoption was filed. ISSUE: Who between the adoptive parents and
the biological parents should be held liable for the damages incurred by the child? HELD:
Adelberto’s natural parents are liable for the damages. The tortuous act of the minor occurred
prior to the adoption. Adelberto was in his natural parents’ actual custody at the time of the
accident. The effects of adoption on parental authority cannot be given retroactive effect.
SAYSON v CA (1992) 205 SCRA 321 Rafaela ♥ Eleno Mauricio Rosario Basilisa
Remedi Teodoro Teodoro ♥ Isabel Delia (adopted) Edmundo (adopted) Doribel - - -
being legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel, the herein petitioners were excluded from
sharing in the estate of the spouses In the second case, it was held that Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation (of their
father Teodoro) The CA, however, held that Delia and Edmundo are NOT entitled to inherit
from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela, but affirmed the lower court’s decision in all other
respects Petitioners contend that: - Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because
Doribel had already been born when the decree of adoption was issued. Doribel’s birth
disqualified her parents from adopting based on Art 335 CC, which names among those who
cannot adopt those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
natural children by legal fiction. Doribel is not a natural child of Teodoro and Isabel, but of
Edita Abila who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was the
mother of Doribel - - The surviving brother, sisters and mother-in-law of Teodoro filed a
complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Teodoro
and Isabel, but this was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, alleging
successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent’s lawful descendants Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel filed another complaint for the accounting and partition of the estate of
their grandparents (Eleno and Rafaela) against the 4 surviving children, alleging that Delia
and Edmundo were the adopted children of 1. WON Delia and Edmundo were legally
adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel - YES It is too late to challenge the decree of
adoption. It was issued way back in 1967, and therefore has become final and executory
Assuming that the petitioners were the proper parties, they should have seasonably appealed
or assailed the decree of adoption on the basis of Doribel’s birth before or seasonably after
the decree was issued, but they did not Mauricio also claims to have no personal knowledge
of Doribel’s birth A challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as
in petitioners’ action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue -
A presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that
the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven Santos v Aranzanso – An adoption order
implies the finding of the necessary facts, and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it
2. WON Doribel is a legitimate child - YES Doribel’s birth certificate is one of the
prescribed means of recognition under both Art 265 CC and Art 172 FC. Although it is only
prima facie PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-
2009 Page 146 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - - - evidence of filiation, which
may be refuted by evidence, such evidence is lacking in this case Mauricio’s testimony that
he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila is suspect as it comes from an
interested party Abila’s affidavit denying her earlier statement in the petition for the
guardianship of Doribel is hearsay. It was also never offered in evidence in the lower courts.
Even without Abila’s affidavit, the birth certificate must be upheld. It was held in Legaspi v
CA that the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of
strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity Doribel’s legitimacy cannot be
questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting. It should be questioned in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party It cannot be questioned by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose Isabel Johnston filed a petition to
adopt a 2 yo minornamed Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana from
Hospicio de San Jose as she is in a childless marriage with Raymond Arthur Johnston. The
petition was granted and the child was given Isabel’s maiden surname, Valdez. Isabel filed a
motion to change the child’s surname to ValdezJohnston, Isabel’s married name. HELD:
Isabel’s husband did not concur in the adoption. Hence, the child should use Isabel’s maiden
name or it may lead to confusion. REPUBLIC v WONG (1992) 209 SCRA 189 Maximo
Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala Sr and Segundina Alcala. When they were 2
and 9 yo respectively, he and his sister were legally adopted by Hoon Wong and Concepcion
Ty Wong (naturalized Filipinos who are childless after 15 yrs of marriage. When he turned
22, Maximo wants to revert to his natural parents’ real name saying that the Chinese surname
of his adoptive parents embarrassed and isolate him in his Muslim community. Likewise, it
hampers the progress of his business (furniture store). The adoptive mom does not mind his
action and even assured that he will still be entitled to inherit from them despite the name
change. RTC granted the petition for change of name SG resists because change of name is
an act of ingratitude to his adoptive parents who cared for him. ISSUE: WON the reasons
submitted by Maximo are valid, sufficient & proper to warrant the granting of the petition.
HELD: Yes. It was proven that the surname was detrimental to Maximo’s business.
Likewise, the change of Maximo’s surname was not done to defraud anyone. Use of the
adoptive parents’ surname is not the main objective of adoption but merely one of its effects.
FC echoes the same statutory right of an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter.
Thus, the use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a
right. SC said that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals & entities for
the purpose of identification & a change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons adduced & the consequences that will likely
follow; it is a privilege w/c may be granted upon showing of a proper or reasonable cause or
compelling reason. While it is true under the law that an adopted child must bear the name of
the adopter, the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than
the object of adoption proceedings. 3. WON Delia, Edmundo and Doribel are entitled to
inherit from Teodoro and Isabel - YES Doribel, as the legitimate daughter, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased
couple, in conformity with Art 979, which states that legitimate children, which includes
adopted children, succeed their parents The underlying philosophy of the article is that a
person’s love descends first to his children, and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents
and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives It is also supposed that one of a person’s
purposes in acquiring property is to leave them eventually his children as a token of his love
for them and as a provision for their continued care after his death 4. WON Delia and
Edmundo are entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela - NO The grandparents were total
strangers to Delia and Edmundo, as adopted children An adopted child is deemed to be a
legitimate child, and thus has the same rights as legitimate child. HOWEVER, these rights do
not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between
only the adopting parents and the adopted child, and does not extend to the blood relatives of
either party. * The adopted children are entitled to Teodoro’s estate. Legally adopted children
have the right to inherit from the adoptive parents. However, the adopted children may not
represent their adoptive parent. Adoption creates a relationship only between the adoptive
parents and the adopted. It does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. JOHNSTON
v REPUBLIC (1963) 7 SCRA 1040 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 147 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
REPUBLIC v CA and CARANTO ( ) 255 SCRA 99 Midael had been living with Jaime since
he was 7 years old. When Jaime married Zenaida on 19 January 1986, Midael stayed under
their care and custody. - Spouses Jaime and Zenaida Caranto filed for the adoption of 15 yo
minor Midael C. Mazon on 2 September 1988. Aside from the decree of adoption, they also
prayed for the change in the given name birth certificate entry from Midael to Michael. OSG
opposed the petition insofar as it also sought to change ‘Midael’ to ‘Michael’ in an adoption
proceeding. RTC dismissed OSG and rendered judgment on 30 May 1989 granting Caranto
spouses’ petition. OSG appealed to CA, CA upheld RTC on 23 January 1992; hence, this
petition. ISSUES: WON RTC acquired jurisdiction on petition for adoption WON RTC and
CA erred in granting change of given name from Midael to Michael HELD: YES. Petitioner
contends that since the name appearing in the requisite notice by publication did not state the
true name of the child. Court ruled that the case at bar was an obvious clerical error in the
given name of the child, and does not confuse any identities. NO. The change of given name
is without force and effect. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court does not only refer to errors
concerning civil status, but even to names as well as enumerated in item (o) of § 2 of Rule
108. The local civil registrar must have been made party to the proceeding. The notice by
publication also failed to include the matter on the change of name, depriving the local civil
registrar of notice and opportunity to be heard. REPUBLIC v HERNANDEZ (1996) 253
SCRA 509 Spouses Van and Regina Munson adopted an infant who bears the name Kevin
Earl Bartolome Moran in his birth certificate. When they had him baptized, they gave him
the name Aaron Joseph, the name by which the child is known to the family, relatives and
friends. The spouses then instituted a joinder of the petition for adoption and the petition for
a change of name. The petitioner opposed the said action saying that there is no legal basis
for the change of the adoptee’s given name. RTC ruled in favor changing the name of the
child ratiocinating that “as adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may feely select the
first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is
fixed by law.” - Further, the respondents submit that change of name may be given liberal
construction since the object of strict implementation is to prevent fraudulent acts, while an
infant has not exercised any of its rights. ISSUES: 1. WON joinder of petition for adoption
and petition for a change of name is allowed by the law 2. WON there is lawful ground for
the adoptee’s change of name HELD: 1. No. In order for two petitions may be joined in one
proceeding, the causes of action must: (a) not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties and (b) arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the
parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character. There is no
conceptual unity between petition for adoption and petition for change of name. The two
actions are different and unrelated from each other, and therefore, two special proceedings
which cannot be joined as having one cause of action. They must be instituted separately. 2.
No. The change of surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the
adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. The birth certificate,
as it appears in the civil register, contains the official name. It does not matter if the mother,
with all intention to abandon it later, named the child for the sake of naming it. If they really
want to change the name, they institute another action under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
F. Rescission FC, Art 191 If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the a any
person authorized by the court or proper government instrume prescribed for loss or
suspension of parental authority. If the adopte judicial rescission of the adoption on the same
grounds prescribed for d FC, Art 192 The adopters may petition the court for the judicial
rescis 1. If the adopted has committed any act constituting a ground for d 2. When the
adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters dur acts has definitely repudiated the
adoption ** Under CC, PD 603 and FC, both the adopted child and the adopter can ask for
the judicial rescission. However, RA 8552 only allows rescission by the adoptee. PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 148 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 expenses of judicial adoption o simply register adopted
child in heir names any person who causes fictitious registration GROUNDS FOR
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION of birth of child under name/s of person/s not 1. Repeated
physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) his/her biological parent/s punishable by
prison mayor medium plus 2. attempt on the life of the adoptee 3. sexual assault or violence
P50k fine 4. abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations includes
physician/nurse/hospital personnel who cooperated in execution of crime, The only remedy
available to the adopter is Art 919 CC which is disinheritance. similar penalties apply plus
permanent disqualification Ma’am Beth says: “The cost of adoption *Art 919 CC – causes
for disinheritance decree is just as much as normal delivery! 1. conviction of an attempt
against the life of Well, at least, that’s my rate.” the testator, his or her spouses, descendants
or ascendants 2. having accused the testator of a crime punishable by imprisonment for six
years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless 3. conviction of adultery or
concubinage with the spouse of the testator 4. having induced the testator to make a will or to
change one already made, by fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence 5. refusal
without justifiable cause to support the testator 6. maltreatment of the testator by word or
deed 7. living a dishonorable or disgraceful life 8. conviction of a crime which carrier the
penalty of civil interdiction Art VI Sec 19, RA 8662 EFFECTS OF RESCISSION FC, Art
193 If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial
rescission of the adoption, the court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental
authority of the parents by nature, unless the latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in which
case the court shall appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor. If the
adopted person is physically or mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in the same
proceeding a guardian over his person or property or both. Judicial rescission of the adoption
shall extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the adopters and the adopted
arising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to
use the surnames of the adopters and shall resume his surname prior to the adoption. The
court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries. Art VI
Sec 20, RA 8662 1. Restoration of parental authority to original Reciprocal rights and
obligation between adoptee and adopter extinguished Cancellation of amended birth
certificate Successional right back to before as of date of rescission Vested rights acquired
prior to judicial rescission shall be respected 2. 3. 4. 5. G. Rectification of Simulated Birth
CRIME OF SIMULATION OF BIRTH (Art VII Sec 21, RA 8522) intended to curb or
prevent such acts done by people who want to avoid trouble and PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 149 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 RECTIFICATION OF SIMULATION OF BIRTH (Art VII Sec 22, RA
8522) Three-in-one procedure 1. Correction of Entries in Birth certificate 2. Declaration of
Abandonment 3. Adoption Decree Application for correction of the birth registration shall be
filed within 5 years from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter H. Adoption
decree REYES v SOTERO (2006) 482 SCRA 520 Elena Lising died intestate. Corazon
Chichioco filed a petition for issuance of letter and administration and settlement and estate
as the niece of the decedent with the collateral relatives of the decedent. Chichioco alleged
that the properties of the decedent is with the petitioner Ana Joyce Reyes, her grand niede
and that she be appointed as the administrator of these properties instead. Reyes filed an
opposition to the petition, claiming that she is in fact the adopted child of the decedent and
her husband Serafin delos Santos and that the appointment of administration is unnecessary
since she is the sole heir of Lising. As evidence, she provided the following: o Certification
from the Municipal Registrar of Paniqui, Tralac that on the Record of Court Decrees, Reyes
was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin delos Santos. o Certification of the Clerk of Court
of the RTC-Tarlac City that judgment was rendered on Dec 21, 1968 decreeing her adoption
by the spouses o Judicial form no. 43: the adoption decree which declares her adoption o
Decree of final distribution issued by PVAO: benefits paid to her as “daughter” of Serafin
delos Santos. Chichioco filed an annulment of the adoption decree stating that documents
presented are false and fraudulent; and that petitioner and her mother collaborated to make it
appear that petitioner is adopted by Elena and Serafin. ISSUE: WON the petitioner herein
should prove the validity of her adoption due to irregularities raised by private respondent.
HELD: No. The Court ruled that the documents presented by the petitioner sufficiently
proved that she is legally adopted by Elena and Serafin. It is presumed that these documents
are regularly issued as they are issued under the seal of the issuing offices and signed by the
proper officers. The adoption decree is a public document that is required by law to be
properly registered in the official repository i.e. local civreg as well as the court that rendered
such judgment. Thus these documents are prima facie evidence of the facts therein unless
proven contrary with proof of such alleged irregularity be brought in a separate proceeding
for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree as in Santos v Aranzanso. The private
respondents cannot assail such decree to defeat the petitioners claim that she is the sole heir
of the decedent. Therefore, the petitioner whose adoption is presumed to be valid is the sole
heir of the decedent. I. Inter-country Adoption * Governed by RA 8043 or the Inter-country
Adoption Act WHO MAY BE ADOPTED – Any child: 1. has been voluntarily or
involuntarily committed to the Department as dependent, abandoned, or neglected pursuant
to the provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code may be the subject of Inter-Country
Adoption; 2. Povided that in case of a child who is voluntarily committed, the physical
transfer of said child shall be made not earlier than six (6) months from the date the Deed of
Voluntary Commitment was executed by the child’s biological parent/s. The prohibition
against physical transfer shall not apply to adoption by a relative or children with special
medical conditions. WHO MAY ADOPT Any foreign national or a Filipino citizen
permanently residing abroad who has the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under the Act may file an application if he/she: (a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age;
(b) is at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted at the time of the filing of
the application, unless the applicant is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or is the
spouse of such parent by nature; (c) has the capacity to act and assume all the rights and
responsibilities incident to parental authority under his/her national law; (d) has undergone
appropriate counseling form an accredited counselor in his/her country (e) has not been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (f) is eligible to adopt under his/her national
law (g) can provide the proper care and support and give the necessary moral values and
example to the child and, in the proper case, to all his/her other children; (h) comes from a
country: a. with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations; b. whose government
maintains a foreign adoption agency; and c. whose laws allow adoption; and PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 150 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 (i) files jointly with his/her spouse, if any, who shall have
the same qualifications and none of the disqualifications to adopt as prescribed above. J.
Adoption issues THE PROS AND CONS OF INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT1
Nationalistic reasons against IA 1. International pride – political pressure to upgrade internal
system of social welfare 2. An unacceptable form of international charity 3. Belief that
country and heritage is special and children would be deprived of something valuable if
removed from it 4. Waste of human resources and exploitation by Western neighbors Best
interest of the child 1. Remain in their biological families, or at least in their home countries
a. Deprivation of cultural identity b. Racial discrimination c. Unnecessary separation from
family 2. IA acts as an “escape valve’ for LDC’s and a “conscience-saving” mechanism for
developed countries, it works to the disadvantage of all children in these nations a. limited
response to the needs of children by benefiting only a few, leaving millions of homeless
children in need of assistance b. IA reduces pressure on the nations to improve their child and
family welfare programs 3. IA is dictated by the demands of would-be parents in developed
countries, rather than the needs of the children involved a. incentives for child trafficking and
trading likewise increase b. will result to increase in number of abandoned children, it will
even encourage more mothers who want better life for their children c. western people are
adopting for their own selfish needs, then it is not an altruistic activity 4. IA facilitates child
trafficking *Too lazy to include the rebuttals which is the second part. It’s nice though. You
might want to check it out yourself. 1 Summary by Karichi Santos PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 151 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 XIV. PARENTS AND CHILDREN PARENTAL AUTHORITY
(patria potestas) is defined by Manresa as “the mass of rights and obligations which parents
have in relation to the person and property of their children until their emancipation and even
after this under certain circumstances.” * The preferential right of fathers is for cases that
require immediate decision and are essentially temporary until ◊decided by the court.
CHILDREN’S DUTY 1. observe respect and reverence temporary, only as long ◊permanent,
lifetime of parent and child 2. obey them as they are under parental authority *But in the
Philippines, the best way to show respect and reverence is to obey! A. Parental Authority –
General Provisions FC, Art 212 In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent p
remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental aut another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the chil FC, Art 213 In case of separation of parents,
parental authority shall b Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially
the FC, Art 209 Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property
of their unemancipated children, parent chosen is unfit. parental authority and responsibility
shall include caring for and rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. No child
under 7 yo shall be separated from the mother unless the Cou Years Presumption) FC, Art
210 Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the
cases authorized by law. Parental authority is a purely personal right. It cannot be renounced
except for the following waiver permitted by law: 1. adoption 2. guardianship 3. surrender to
an orphanage or asylum (Art 223-224) Minority does not divest a parent of parental
authority. In fact, there are two kinds of parental authority: 1. parental authority over the
person of the child 2. parental authority over the property of the child PARENTAL
AUTHORITY OVER THE FC, Art 214 In case of   PARENTAL AUTHORITY
OVER THE PROPERTY    PERSON 1. death 2. absence 3. unsuitability of the
parents Substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandp the court,
taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the PD 603, Art 58 Damages by
child are answered by parents CC, Art 2180 The father and, in case of his death or incapaci
caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages
caused by the minors or inca and live in their company. Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades s and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
cu The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to preven When does a parent have parental authority over the person
but not the property? 1. when the parent is a minor 2. when the parent is Child) 1. Custody
A.◊ Parent ◊disinherited by an ascendant (Grandparent Determining the best interest of the
child i. GENDER AND TENDER YEARS PRESUMPTION EX PARTE DEVINE (1981)
FC, Art 211 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In 398 So. 2d 686 case of disagreement, the father’s
decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. - Alice Beth, an
employee at the US Army at Fort Children shall always observe respect and reverence
towards they McMClellan ♥◊their parents and are obliged to obey them as long Christoper,
a school teacher as children are under parental authority. Matthew Patrick and Timothy Clark
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
152 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - - Mr and Mrs Devine were divorced, the
court awarded the children to Mrs Devine, according to the tender years presumption (if both
parents are fit, and children are at their tender years, under 7 years, mother will take care of
them, based on instinctive role of the mother). Mr Devine now challenges the
constitutionality of the tender years presumption and claiming that it is violative of the14th
amendment (equal protection) ISSUE: WON Gina has rights to the child HELD: No. The
provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 7 yo will not apply when the
court finds compelling reasons to do otherwise. In this case, Gina’s situation is not economic
and moral conducing for the child. Conrado is married to another woman, and also, Gina has
another child by another married man. Having a sibling with a different surname will cause
confusion to the child. Angelie Anne was also legally adopted and it dissolves the authority
of the natural parents to the child. Ma’am Beth does not agree with the decision, she says that
3 yo kids will be happy for the playmate. It would not ask “Sino tatay mo?” Moral of the
story: Don’t use different surnames, even if the father acknowledges the child. UNLESS he
gives support, otherwise, it’s useless! Would it favor an adulterous mother if the child was
younger or older? Younger, because the child does not have any opinions yet. All it wants is
milk, diaper and burp. ESPIRITU v CA (1995) 246 SCRA 362 Reynaldo Espiritu and
Teresita Masauding first met at Iligan City in 1976. In 1984, they again met in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania and began to maintain a common law relationship as husband and wife. 2 years
later, Rosalind was born. They then got married in 1987 and later had a son, Reginald. Their
relationship deteriorated and they separated in 1990. Teresita then left the children and
Reynaldo and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children to the Philippines and
left them to her sister. Teresita then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the
petitioners. The trial court denied the writ, but the CA granted the petition, applying Art 363
CC which states that a child below 7 yrs old shall not be separated from the mother. ISSUE:
WON Teresita is fit to be granted custody of the children HELD: No. The prime
consideration is the child’s best interest. TYP provides that if the child is under seven years
of age, the mother is the best custodian. However, the presumption is not absolute and may
be overcome by compelling reasons. When a child is over seven, his or her choice of parent
is paramount. The testimonies of the psychologist and social worker showed that the children
disliked their mother, even loves her yaya more. Their testimonies ISSUE: WON the trial
court’s reliance on tender years presumption deprived the father of his constitutional
entitlement to the equal protection of the law HELD: Yes. The tender years presumption
represents an unconstitutional gender-based classification which discriminates between
fathers and mothers in child custody proceedings solely on the basis of sex. It creates a
presumption of fitness and suitability of one parent without consideration of the actual
capabilities of both parties. It also imposes unnecessary legal burden on the father. (Note:
The burden of proof that the mother is unfit. Thus, the male can only gain custody IF the
female is unfit even if the father is fit. This violates the equal protection clause.) * Remember
Moe v Dinkins, a case about the requirement of parental consent TEST PROXY MOE v
DINKINS Maturity Age DEVINE Fitness Sex/Gender Is there a fit between the test and the
proxy? No, because even if mothers are closer than fathers during infancy, it is not sufficient
ground because as the child matures, the difference between the parental skills of the father
and the mother decreases. CERVANTES v FAJARDO (1989) 169 SCRA 575 Angelie Anne
Cervantes is the product of common-law relationship between Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon. They offered Angelie for adoption to her sister and brother in law, Zenaida Carreon
Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, the petitioners in this case. Gina executed an affidavit of
consent and an appropriate petition for adoption was filed by herein petitioners. The petition
was granted. Petitioners received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid
150,000, or else, they would get back their child. The petitioners refused. Gina took the child
from their yaya at the petitioners’ residence. Petitioners asked for the child but respondent
refused, saying that she had no desire to give up the child in the first place and the affidavit
that she executed wasn’t explained fully to her. The petitioners herein filed a writ of habeas
corpus. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
Page 153 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 were given weight by the court since the
interview and the examination were done for foreign travel and school purposes respectively,
not for the advancement of the litigation case. Also, she refuses to talk to her in the phone
and when they saw each other in court, daughter ignored her mother and did not show any
longing. The mother’s illicit affair with Reynaldo’s coworker seemed to have caused
emotional disturbances to Rosalind. There is also nothing in the records which show that
Reynaldo was unfit. His assignment in the states is just temporary, and he will be coming
back home to the Philippines permanently. CELIS v CAFUIR (1950) 86 Phil 554 When
Ileana Celis gave birth to a boy, Joel, she entrusted him to Soledad Cafuir because of her
father’s displeasure of the disgrace Ileana brought to the family for having illicit relations
with a man whom she is not married with and because of her father’s objection of having her
son stay in the paternal home. Ileana made two documents: 1) entrusting Soledad her child
and only Soledad can adopt the child. 2) appointment of Soledad as the child’s guardian.
Ileana only came to visit the boy every Saturday and provided some milk, food and a little
money. She eventually married co petitioner Agustin Rivera and then decided to get the boy
back, but Soledad refused. Ileana then filed for a writ of habeas corpus. Soledad, in her
defense, claims that the two documents enacted by Ileana renounced her custody of and
patria potestas over her child. ISSUE: WON Ileana had renounced her custody of the child in
favor of Soledad. HELD: No. The first document merely entrusted her son to soledad.
Entrusted cannot convey the idea of permanent renunciation. Also, the clause that says “No
one has the right to claim for adoption except Soledad” merely provides an option for
Soledad, which she didn’t take. The second document, on the other hand, merely designated
Soledad as the guardian of the child. The designation of one as the guardian does not mean
that the guardian will always assume and discharge the duties of the office or position.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH v CA (2007) 527 SCRA 380 - Agnes Gamboa-Hirsh ♥ Franklin
Harvey Hirsch and a daughter was born to them named Simon Noelle - They
were married in Bacolod but the couple cannot agree on where they would establish their
conjugal home, whether in Boracay or in Makati. - They settled in Boracay but Agnes
insisted on going to Makati. She did, and took with her Noelle with no intention of coming
back. Husband petitions for writ of habeas corpus which CA granted and they were given
joint custody ISSUE: WON the CA erred in giving custody to both the parents HELD: Yes.
Art 213 applies because the child is under 7 years old and the mother did not have the
disqualification for possessing custody. SY v CA (2007) GR No. 124518 Mercedes filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus for her two minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah. Her
husband Wilson alleges that she is unfit for custody because she has 1) abandoned their
family, 2) mentally unstable and 3) cannot provide for their children ISSUE: WON Mercedes
can have custody of her children HELD: Yes. Because all of Wilson’s arguments, aside from
being unsubstantiated, had been refuted by Mercedes. She left the conjugal home to work in
Taiwan and earn money to reclaim her children. Her act of praying in the rain is a mere
expression of her faith, which is the same reason for the couple’s separation (religious
differences). ii. PARENTAL UNFITNESS FELDMAN v FELDMAN (1974) 358 NYS 2d
507 Mady Feldman filed for divorce against her husband, Philip, based upon cruel and
inhuman treatment. Pursuant to their separation agreement, she was awarded the custody of
their 2 children. After the divorce, the former wife began dating a married man. In one visit
of the former husband at her former wife’s house, he found a copy of Screw Magazine and
some letters with explicit photographs on the dining room and kitchen tables. The letters
were in response to the ads placed by the former wife and her male companion regarding fun
and games with other couples or groups. The former husband then filed a petition for the
custody of the two children. The trial court found that the wife was living sexually liberated
lifestyle. Based on this, the trial court granted the custody of the two children to the former
husband. ISSUE: WON the mother’s unusual sexual activities makes her unsuitable for
custody because of immorality PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 154 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 HELD:
No. Her peculiar sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody. It was
found that she had supported her children well and has given them a great atmosphere at
home. The unusual practices by the mother did not, in any way, affect the children. There is
no evidence also, that the publications or pictures were ever seen by the children. (Note: the
right of a divorced woman to engage in private sexual activities, which no way affect her
minor children, is within the penumbra of privacy mandated by the Bill of Rights) Also, the
children were well-provided for both emotionally and physically (doing good at school, even
elected as class officers) and that the mother’s home had a “cheerful and happy atmosphere”
(which to Ma’am Beth’s mind was “maaliwalas”. SANTOS v CA (1995) 242 SCRA 407
Leouel and Julia had placed their child into the care of the latter’s parents ever since the child
was born. The grandparents were the ones who provided support for the child, since Leouel
cannot afford to do so. Julia then left for the States to work. The grandparents claim that Julia
has been sending financial support to her son. On September 1990, Leouel abducted the child
from his grandparents. The grandparents then filed for custody of the boy, which the trial
court granted. Leouel appealed, stating that the respondents have failed to show the he is
unfit to be the father and that the substitute parental authority granted to the boy’s
grandparents was inappropriate. The respondents claim that they are financially well-off to
take care of the son, while Leouel is not. They can provide the child with an airconditioned
room since he is asthmatic. Also, Julia has entrusted the boy to them. Leouel’s use of trickery
to abduct the child also is a sign of his unfitness. They likewise claim that they are in the best
position to take care of the child, and this should be the primary consideration of the court.
ISSUE: WON Leouel should be awarded proper custody HELD: Yes. The father, Leouel was
not shown to be an unfit parent. The fact that he kidnapped his son from the latter’s maternal
grandparents does not render him unfit. Also, disqualifying him as custodian because of the
nature of his work would mean depriving all soldiers of their child’s company. Only in cases
of death, absence or unsuitability of parents may substitute parental authority be exercised by
the surviving grandparents. B. Role of the child’s preference PIZARRO v CA & VASQUEZ
(1937) 36 OG 449 Maria and Mariano were wed in 1928 and lived together until 1922. they
have two children. Because of Mariano’s infidelity and cruelty, spouses agreed to live
separately. They executed a contract of separation stating that the custody of the children will
be with Maria. One year late, Maria gave birth to Lorenzo. Mariano sues and wins a case for
adultery. However, since both parties had committed adultery after such separation, the court
gave custody to the paternal grandparents. ISSUE: WON a wife accused of adultery was
entitled to separate maintenance. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 155 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 HELD: In
absence of proof of guilt, yes she is entitled to support. The contention here is between the
wife’s affirmation against the husband’s denial of the short-lived marital reunion. Maria said
she had briefly reconciled with her husband during a fiesta in Cavite. He promised to behave
so she was persuaded to live with him again. The presumption of legitimacy continues even
if the husband and wife voluntarily separate and live apart. This presumption is one of the
strongest known in law and cannot be overthrown except by stronger evidence to the
contrary. Considering that the reunion with the wife is not impossible nor improbable.
Mariano also asserted the unchastity of his wife after the birth of Lorenzo, contradicting his
earlier statements and actions. He had found out about Maria’s affair as early as March 1934
but gave her money in September and October 1934. Maria is entitled to prima facie
presumption of innocence of the crime of adultery. A declaration of adultery in this case
affects her standing, as well as her child. Since alleged adultery of Maria has not been
sufficiently established, Lorenzo is presumed to be legitimate because he was born in lawful
wedlock, there having been no divorce relative or absolute. Maria swore that she had left her
husband and the conjugal abode because he had kept a mistress there, and had repeatedly
done her bodily harm. These assertions were not contradicted. Consequently, the defense of
unworthiness having failed, the innocent wife must be given separate maintenance. She
would also be given the custody of her three children, because 1) the contract of separation
stipulated that Gloria and Julita stay with her and 2) it was for the best interest of the
children. GOLDSTEIN v GOLDSTEIN (1975) 115 R.I. 152 Edward Goldstein was awarded
custody of a child, Ann Robin, after a decree by the court. As such, the child and her father
lived in Israel, while the mother, Claire, stayed in the States. The wife then initiated a series
of proceedings to reclaim rights over the child and she finally succeeded in part, when her
husband and child returned to the States and appeared in court. The trial judge found it
advisable to place the child under the mother’s custody pending the hearing. At the hearing,
both were found to be fit. Ann was found to be very intelligent and suffers no emotional
damage. The wife requested for the judge to take notice of the threat of war in Israel, while
the husband argued that the states had more violence and engaged in much more wars. - -
The judge and Ann Robin then talked, and from their conversation, Ann said that she loved
her father more than her mother and that she had no desire to visit with her mother but agreed
if she was allowed to live with her father if she visited her mother for 4 weeks during the
summer. The judge, taking into consideration the child’s best interests, granted custody to the
father. The wife argued that the judge failed to consider all circumstances and allowed the
child’s choice to control his decision. ISSUE: WON the judge’s reliance on the child’s
preference was justifiable HELD: Yes. The factors in awarding custody to one or the other of
the parents were equally balanced as to make it difficult for the judge to decide between
them. That being so, it does not seem that he abused his discretion when he gave great weight
to the child’s preference. LAXAMANA v LAXAMANA (2002) 388 SCRA 296 - Lourdes (a
degree holder in banking and finance) Michael◊♥ Raymond (graduate of LLB, buy and
sell, resto owner and fishpond) and twins Joseph & Vincent ‘ - The family was well off until
the father became drug dependent and violent. This led the wife and her children to abandon
the petitioner After going in and out of the rehab and finally being declared drug-free,
Reymond then filed a petition for habeas corpus for the custody of the 3 children Lourdes
opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of the petitioner and then filed for an
annulment of their marriage Reymond filed in the habeas corpus case a motion seeking
visitation rights over his children. After the parties reached an agreement, the court granted
the visitation rights and ordered the parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological
examination. The results of the psychiatric evaluation were presented to the court. The exam
states that the children were affected psychologically by the father’s drug-related behavior,
and also the psychiatrist found that Reymond is still not completely cured of the drug
addiction. However, the psychiatrist did not detect any evidence that the paternal visits would
be harmful to the children. Based on this, the court granted custody to Lourdes and visitation
rights to Reymond. ISSUE: WON the court properly resolved the issue of custody HELD:
No. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of the children
shall PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
Page 156 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 not be disregarded by mere technicality
in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. While Reymond may have a
history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social
well-being. Although he is not completely cured of his drug dependence, there is no evidence
showing that he is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education and moral
and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15
years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their
choice as to which parent they wanted to live. * Ma’am Beth does not like this decision. Why
would you risk the children staying with someone who has propensity for drug addiction? It’s
only saving grace is that the lower court would only receive evidence. C. Presumption for
primary caretaker This rule is not followed in the Philippines. It’s just included here so that
we’ll know that we have other alternatives to: 1. tender years presumption 2. best interest of
the child 3. child’s preference GARSKA v MCCOY (1981) 278 S.E. 2d 357 Michael Garska,
the appellee and Gwendolyn McCoy, the appellant, met at North Carolina. Michael got Gwen
pregnant and thus, Gwen moved back to her grandparents. During her pregnancy, she
received no support from Michael, but after she gave birth, Michael sent a package of food
and diapers. In the subsequent months, the baby had many complications, and to pay for the
medical bills, Gwen’s grandfather attempted to use his medical insurance provided by the
united mine workers. But he has been informed that they would have to adopt the baby so
they can avail of the said insurance. Gwen then signed a consent in which she agreed that her
baby will be adopted by her grandparents. Michael, upon learning this, visited the baby for
the 1st time and sent money weekly. Gwen’s grandfather then filed a petition for adoption.
Consequently, Michael filed a petition for write of habeas corpus to secure custody of his
son. The court denied the petition for adoption, since the baby had not resided with them for
the requisite 6 months. The court also awarded custody to Michael for reasons that he: is
natural father, was better educated, more intelligent, able to provide better financial support,
among others. ISSUE: WON Michael should be awarded custody HELD: No. the court set
forth the rule regarding the presumption of primary caretaker. The court held that the primary
caretaker is one who performs the following caring and nurturing duties of the parent: 1.
preparing and planning of meals 2. Bathing and grooming and dressing, 3. purchasing,
cleaning and care of clothes, 4. medical care, 5. arranging for social interaction among peers
after school, 6. arranging alternative care, 7. putting child to bed at night, attending to child
in the middle of the night, waking child in the morning, 8. disciplining, 9. educating, and, 10.
teaching elementary skills. Once the primary caretaker is identified, all that need to be
determined is whether the parent is unfit or not. In this case, it is obvious that Gwen is the
primary caretaker. There is no finding which points that Gwen is unfit. In fact, all of the
evidence indicates that she mobilized all of the resources at her command, namely the
solicitous regard of her grandparents, in the interest of this child and that she went to
extraordinary lengths to provide for him adequate medical attention and financial support.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
157 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 D. Flip of the coin (Mnookin article) 2
CRITICISMS AGAINST ALTERNATIVES TYP results to protracted litigation. However, if
we do way with no presumptions, there is the disadvantage of moving into the facts, and
what should be the hierarchy of the facts? Each and every case will be litigated, and we end
up spending money and destroying families when we could have done it by being civil. How
much weight should be given to the child’s choice? When and where should we ask the
child? Any place where there are neither parents nor lawyers like the chambers of the judge.
When do you ask? Not during the trial of course, when the child would be fearful of hurting
the parents. What is the advantage of flipping the coin? It is perfectly random, like the way
they pick people in the draft, who will fight the war. BUT we cannot flip the coin because
application to the government’s capacity to decide on the child’s best interest. It symbolically
ignores the difference between the parties. Also, people lose the opportunity or forum to
vent, to flame which is good for the soul. Conclusion: accept the flaws of whatever
presumption we have. 2. Other rights and duties in exercise of parental authority FC, Art 220
The parents and those exercising parental authority shall wards the following rights and
duties: 1. To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruc provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means; 2. To give them love and affection, advice and
counsel, companionsh 3. To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in
industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and insp 4. To furnish them with
good and wholesome educational materials, with others, protect them from bad company,
and prevent them studies and morals; 5. To represent them in all matters affecting their
interests; 6. To demand from them respect and obedience; 7. To impose discipline on them as
may be required under the circum 8. To perform such other duties as are imposed by law
upon parents 2 Summary by Krissy Conti PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E.
A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 158 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 4.
RIGHTS OF PARENTS 1. 2. To keep them in their company To demand from them respect
and obedience DUTIES OF PARENTS All others! So in effect, parents have more duties
than rights 5. fruits of all the properties of the child whether acquired by lucrative or onerous
title insurance proceeds accruing to the child PURPOSES WHICH THE PARENTS MAY
USE THE FRUITS AND INCOME OF THE CHILD 1. be civilly liable for the injuries and
FC, Art 221 Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall child’s support and
education damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and daily needs of the family as subject to 2. collective under their parental
authority a the appropriate defenses provided by law. social unit FC, Art 222 The courts may
appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the
1. emancipation of child child so requires EXTINGUISHMENT OF PARENT’S
USUFRUCT 2. 3. death of the child loss of parental authority through judicial decree FC, Art
223 The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution
exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child
resides, for an order providingparent to the child’s living 4. consent of the for disciplinary
measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his
choice or appointed by the court, and a summary independently hearing shall be conducted
wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. 5. disinheritance and incapacity to
succeed by reason of unworthiness However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the
petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the • Administration and
usufruct such other circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or
suspension of parental authority or adoptare two measures as it may deem just and proper.
distinct things. There may be FC, Art 224 The measures referred to in the preceding article
may include the commitment of the child for not more than 30 days in entities or institutions
engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government
agency. FC, Art 227 If the parents entrust the management or administration The parent
exercising parental authority shall not interfere with thethe net proceeds whenever committed
but shall provide for The child care of the child of such property shall belong to the owner.
his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the
commitment of the childwould havejust if the adm amount not less than that which the owner
whenever paid and proper. the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus
give in legitime. FC, Art 225 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
guardianship over the property of the unemancipated Who has authority father's decision
shall prevail, unless common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of
disagreement, theover the child’s property? 1. parents unless minor or disinherited by there is
a judicial order to the contrary. administration without usufruct or vice versa. ascendant
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of 2. child exceeds P50,000, the
parent concerned shall be the parental authority required to furnish a bond in such amount as
the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property
or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligationsv ABANILLA general
guardians. SALIENTES prescribed for (2006) A verified petition for approval of the bond
shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child - Marie
Antonette ♥ thereof is situated. resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place
Lorenzo Emmanuel The petition shall be◊where the property or any partLoran docketed as a
summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of
However, Loran cannot the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article
shall be heard and resolved. get along with his in-laws 500 SCRA 128 - The family lives with
the wife’s parents. so he urges his wife to leave and transfer to their The ordinary rules on
guardianship shall be merely suppletory exceptown place. Marieunder substitute parental
authority, or when the child is refuses so Loran leaves alone. Loran was prevented from
seeing his the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary
rules on guardianship shall apply.childn. So he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus for
his 2 yo child. FC, Art 226 The property of the unemancipated child earned or
acquireddismissed his case becauseonerousis resorted CA with his work or industry or by
WHC or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted
exclusivelycases latter's support and education, withheld to in to the where rightful custody is
unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. from a person entitled thereto. The right of the
parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the
child's support and ISSUE: WON a father may be deprived to see his son secondarily to the
collective daily needs of the family. PROPERTY OF THE CHILD 1. child’s earning through
his labor, work or industry 2. property acquired by the child by gratuitous title donated or
inherited 3. property acquired by the child through onerous title HELD: No. Since they have
de facto separation, the custody is yet to be settled so father retains his parental authority
over the child. CABANAS v PILAPIL (1974) 58 SCRA 94 - Florentino Pilapil had a child
(Millian Pilipil) with the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas, married to another man. - The
deceased insured himself assigning the child as the beneficiary and his brother, respondent
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
159 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 herein, Francisco Pilapil as the trustee during
her minority. Upon his deaths, the proceeds were given to the brother. - Mother prays for
appointment as the administrator in her capacity as the natural parent. Uncle resists invoking
the terms of the insurance policy. ISSUE: Who between the mother and the uncle has the
right to administer the child’s property? HELD: The mother. Art 320 and 321 of CC says that
the father, in his absence, the mother is the legal administrator of the property of the child.
There is no ambiguity in the law, so apply it if the facts are not disputed. LIBI v IAC (1992)
214 SCRA 816 - Julie Ann Gotiong (18 yo, 1st year Commerce student at University of San
Carlos, Cebu) and Wendell Libi (18-19) were sweethearts. Julie broke up with Wendell
because he was sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell attempts to reconcile with her but to no
avail. So he resorts to threatening Julie who in turn, sought the help of her best friend Malou
Alfonso in whose house she stayed to avoid her ex-bf. Julie and Wendell died from a single
gunshot inflicted by a revolver licensed in the name of Wendell’s father, Cresencio Libi (the
petitioner). No eyewitness account so the parents of the two parties presented their own
theories. GOTIONG VERSION OF THE STORY: Wendell killed their daughter, the
committed suicide. LIBI VERSION OF THE STORY: Wendell was an informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), so an unknown and antagonized third party
killed him and included Julie to eliminate any witnesses. The Gotiongs filed a civil case
against the Libis to recover damages for their daughter’s death ISSUE: WON the parents of
the Wendell are liable for the damages HELD: Yes. Parents are primary liable for damages
caused by minor children from quasi-delicts and criminal offenses except when they
exercised due diligence. In this case, parents did not exercise due diligence since the son
gained access to the key of the safety deposit box where gun was (mother just kept it in her
bag, to the knowledge of the son) and their ignorance to the nature of his job as evidence by
the picture of him with a gun given to Julie Ann. Also, the Libi’s theory is untenable because
they did not file a case against the alleged malefactor of their son, there were only two bullets
used and no paraffin test was conducted because of the hasty interment. * Ma’am Beth
recognizes the impulse of teen-agers to have a life unknown from their parents. Mahirap
talagang maging magulang, if you don’t know what your child is doing, you’re a bad parent
and if something goes wrong you’re liable for it. If you get involved too much, you’re being
too intrusive and stunts your child’s growth. LINDAIN v CA (1992) 212 SCRA 725 Dolores
Luluquisin, acting as a guardian of her minor children, sold a land registered in the name of
her children to the private respondents Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila for P2000. They
assert that the value can be validly sold without written court approval because the property
was less than P2000. Even if the sale was invalid, the petitioners’ right to redeem has already
prescribed because it is only allowed until four years after reaching age of majority ISSUE:
WON judicial approval was necessary for the sale of minor’s property by the mother HELD:
Yes. Sale of minor children's property executed by the mother is void. Judicial approval is
necessary because the powers and duties as legal administrator are only powers of possession
and management; no power to mortgage, encumber or dispose. Also, the action for
reconveyance of immovable prescribe only after 30 years. PEOPLE v SILVANO (1999) 309
SCRA 362 It is not for the humans to ravish what they produced. Sheryl Silvano, a beautiful
and tall mestiza, 16 yo was raped by her father as a punishment for her coming home late.
She has been raped since she was 13 yo old. And only told her mother and grandmother
about it when she was being compelled to return to their home (she left their home and
stayed at her lola’s house). Father submits many arguments like: he couldn’t have possibly
raped the child because the room was cramped, that his wife just wants to severe marital ties
with him, that if he did rape her it would have woke up her two brothers who are sleeping in
the same room. He was merely teaching her sex education. ISSUE: WON raping is justified
form of punishment HELD: No! Sex with one's own child is per se abhorrent and can never
be justified as a form of parental punishment. It is detrimental to the child’s moral
development and well-being. His arguments are likewise untenable because any noise that
they would have produced is disguised as a form of parental reproach. DEATH ROLL!
SHIELDS v GROSS (1983) 58 NY 2d 338 - Brooke Shields wants to revoke a contract
entered into by her mother when she was just 10 years old. PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 160 of 170 Karichi E. Santos |
UP Law B2012 The contract was for a modeling session wherein she was made to pose nude
in a bath tub. ISSUE: WON a child upon reaching age of majority may disaffirm a contract
entered into by her parent HELD: No. Neither was judicial approval of the contract was
necessary because this was only required of child performers which by statutory definition
excludes child models. The decision balanced two interests, that of: 1. the child: not
pornographic (????) 2. stability of commercial transactions SILVA v CA & GONZALES
(1997) 275 SCRA 60 - Carlitos Silva (a married businessman) cohabited with Suzanne
Gonzales (an actress) and begot two children, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia Because the
wife resumed her acting career (though wife contends that she did not stop) they separated
Mother refuses to allow father the children’s company on weekends and says that he is into g
ambling and womanizing which she fears might affect the values of the children RTC gave
visitation rights to the father Mother remarries a Dutch national and goes to Holland with
kids. CA denies custodial rights to father and asks for self-sacrifice, saying that rotational
custody is harmful to the children, especially if they see that the father has another family. If
he really loves his children, he will give them what is best for them, even if it means he will
not see them. Besides, illegitimate children should be under the parental authority of the
mother. ISSUE: WON the father may be deprived of visitation rights HELD: No. Provisions
on inherent and natural right is regardless of legitimacy. Besides, Art 49 FC may be applied
here (visitation rights of void ab initio marriages). The consequences are merely the product
of the unfounded imagination of the judge. Besides, the RTC gave safeguards to the
visitation rights: “cannot take out children without the mother’s consent”. FC, Art 216 In
default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, th authority over the child in the order
indicated.: 1. surviving grandparent, as provided in Art 214 2. oldest brother or sister, over 21
yo, unless unfit or disqualified 3. child’s actual custodian, over 21 yo, unless unfit or
disqualifie whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property preference
shall be observed. SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY Grandparents, oldest sibling
or court appoint guardian Exercised in case of death, absence or unsuitability of parents
Subsidiarily liable for if damages caused by act or omission under the supervision of people
with special parental authority Law is silent about prohibition of corporal punishment
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY School, administrators and teachers Exercised
concurrently with the exercise of parental authority Principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by act or omission of minor under their custody, supervision or instruction
Cannot inflict corporal punishment on the minor FC, Art 217 In case of foundlings,
abandoned, neglected or abused ch authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial
proceedings to he institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.
ABANDONED CHILD is one who has no parental care of guardianship or whose parents or
guardian have deserted him for at least six months FC, Art 218 The school, its administrators
and teachers, or the individ special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whe or institution.
FC, Art 219 Those given the authority and responsibility under the pre for damages caused
by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated exercising substitute parental authority over
said minor shall be subsid The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragrap proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not
covered by this and the preceding articles shall be g delicts. CC, Art 2180 The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the m minor children who live in their company. B. Substitute
and Special Parental Authority Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitate company. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the perso diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
161 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 PALISOC v BRILLANTES (1971) 41 SCRA
548 While inside the laboratory room of Manila Technological Institute, Dominador Palisoc
and Virgilio Daffon engaged in a brawl which killed the former. Parents of Dominador
claims damages from the school, the teacher and Daffon (who is already of legal age).
ISSUE: WON the school, its administrators, the teacher and Daffon are liable for damages
HELD: President and instructor are jointly and severally liable since incident could have
been prevented if they gave proper supervision. It is not necessary that the student board in
the school for Art 2180 to apply. As long as students are in their custody, they stand in loco
parentis and must exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. AMADORA
v CA (1988) 160 SCRA 315 Just before their highschool graduation, Pablito Daffon shot
Alfredo Amadora which resulted to his death. It was proven that they were only at the school
auditorium to finish their project in Physics. Amadora’s parents claim for damages which
RTC and CA dismissed. ISSUE: Who may be held liable for the damages? HELD: 1) Not the
school nor the administrators: Art 2180 only holds school administrators of trade and art
school liable, but not academic institutions. 2) Not the teacher in charge because it was not
show that he was not required to be there at the time of the incident. 3) Not the school prefect
because it was not proven that the gun used by Daffon was the same gun he had confiscated
and did not report to authorities. However, it was established that Art 2180 applies to all
schools, academic or non-academic. In academic schools, teacher in charge is liable for
student's misconduct. In non-academic schools, the head is liable. Custody is not coterminous
with semester. As long as student is under the control and influence of school and within its
premises in pursuance of legitimate right, obligation or privilege, he is considered under
school custody. * Ma’am Beth thinks Amadora was incorrectly decided DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN PALISOC AND AMADORA PALISOC during school hours, school liable if
impleaded AMADORA not during classhours, what mattered was the purpose ST. MARY’S
ACADEMY v CARPITANOS (2002) 376 SCRA 473 On 13 to 20 February 1995, St. Mary’s
Academy Dipolog conducted enrolment drive for the school year 1995-1996. This included
visiting schools where prospective enrollees are. Among the volunteer students are Sherwin
Carpitanos and James Daniel II. On one day of the campaign, James Daniel II who was then
15 took the wheel from the grandson of Vivencio Villanueva, the owner of the Mitsubishi
jeep, and by reckless driving caused the overturning of the said vehicle which caused injuries
to its passengers and led to the death of Sherwin. Sherwin’s parents sued James Daniel II and
his parents, Vivencio Villanueva, and the school. JD II and Villanueva were absolved while
SMA was held to pay primary liability while James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel were to pay
subsidiarily. SMA appealed and on 29 February 2000, got reduced damages to pay. They
moved to reconsider on the same date, but got denied on 22 May 2000. Hence they filed this
appeal. ISSUE: WON SMA is liable under Art 218 and 219 FC HELD: NO. Even if under
the aforementioned articles, the school, its administrators and teachers, have special parental
authority over minor children (Art 218) and that they will be solidarily liable for any
damages (Art 219), it was erroneously established that their alleged negligence of not
sending a teacher to serve as guardian was the proximate cause of the accident that caused
the death of Sherwin. Rather, it was the reckless driving of James II and the mechanical
failure of the jeep when its steering wheel guide got detached that caused the jeep to lose
control and turn turtle, injuring its passengers and causing the death of herein petitioners’
minor child. The ones liable should be the parents of James Daniel II (JD II being in their
care and custody) and Vivencio Villanueva for his negligence regarding the condition of his
jeep and his grandson’s allowing of James to drive the said vehicle. VANCIL v BELMES
(2001) 358 SCRA 707 Reeder Vancil died as a US Navy Serviceman in 1986. He is survived
by his common-law wife Helen Belmes (herein respondent) and two minor children Valerie
and Vincent. The kids were 6 and 2 years old respectively in 1987. Bonifacia, Reeder’s
mother and a naturalized American citizen, is the petitioner in this case. She seeks
guardianship over the persons and properties of the two minors. RTC appointed her as legal
and judicial in 1987. Helen appealed to the in 1988 CA and won. CA said that parents are the
ipso facto guardian of their minor children without the need of the PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 162 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 - court appointment. The grandmother did not present any reason
to contest Helen’s fitness to hold parental authority. Ten years later or in 1998, Bonifacia
brought the case to SC saying that Helen is morally unfit as guardian because her live-in
partner raped Valerie several times and that her status as an expatriate is not a statutory
requirement for guardianship. FC, Art 231 The court in an action filed for the purpose in a
related ca the person exercising the same: 1. 2. 3. 4. Treats the child with excessive harshness
or cruelty; Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example; Compels the child to beg;
or Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasc The grounds enumerated
above are deemed to include cases which h the person exercising parental authority. ISSUE:
WON the grandmother may be granted guardianship of the two children instead of the
mother. HELD: OF COURSE NOT. As the Court held in Santos, Sr. v CA, parents have the
preferential right to the custody of their children especially if there is continuous parental
authority. Grandparents are only resorted to in case the parent is absent, dead or proved to be
unsuitable. Bonifacia did not present convincing evidence showing that Helen is unfit to be
Vincent’s guardian (Valerie already turned 18 by 1998, ergo guardianship for her is moot).
Also her expatriate status disqualifies as a substitute guardian because 1) she resides in the
US (plus the fact that her libel case here in the Philippines would give her second thoughts on
coming back) and 2) her old age, she will merely delegate guardianship duties to someone
else who may not qualify as a guardian. Besides, Vincent only has 2 years before
emancipation. CA DECISION AFFIRMED. If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the
welfare of the child s parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper und
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental auth same proceeding if the
court finds that the cause therefor has ceased a FC, Art 232 If the person exercising parental
authority has subjected t abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of
such FC, Art 233 The person exercising substitute parental authority shall h the parents. In no
case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engag inflict corporal punishment
upon the child. TERMINATION – permanent SUSPENSION – temporary a. ◊ipso facto if
with civil interdiction (reclusion temporal, perpetua or death) terminated by: i. service of
penalty ii. amnesty or pardon b. judicial decree C. Suspension or Termination of Parental
Authority FC, Art 1. 2. 3. FC, Art 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. FC, Art carries with it the penalty of civil
interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon
ISSUE: WON Pacita may regain her child pardon or amnesty of the offender. CHUA v
CABANGBANG (1969) 27 SCRA 791 CFI dismisses Pacita’s claim for her daughter. She
was a prostitute who had three children by 228 Parental authority terminates permanently:
three men whom she lived with successively Upon the death of the parents; (Chua Ben, Sy
Sia Lay and Victor Tan Villareal). Upon the death of the child; or Betty Chua, 11 yo at the
time of the trial, was Upon emancipation of the child one of her children and is in the custody
of Flora Cabangbang. Cabangbang and Chua had different stories as to 229 Unless
subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates: how Betty’s
custody was acquired. adoption guardianship FLORA: she found the child wrapped in a
bundle abandonment in their front door final judgment divesting parental authority PACITA:
Villareal gave Betty to Flora as a absence or incapacity payment for his debts. She now
claims custody of her child after five years allegedly because she did not know exercising the
same of crime 230 Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the
person where to look for theachild. which HELD: No. There was constructive abandonment
and hence she may be deprived of parental authority. She only wants the child back so her
biological father’s support would resume (take not that this is still uncertain) and she was
even willing to withdraw her suit if the Cabangbangs would pay her 150 K. She attests no
genuine motherly longing. In the best PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 163 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 interest of
the child, Flora Cabangbang should retain custody. COMPARED WITH CELIS v CAFUIR,
Celis did not lose communication with her child during the time that Cafuir had custody of
her child. ABIERA v ORIN (1907) 8 Phil 193 Alejandro filed annulment of their wedding
and brought his children to his mother. During the pendency of the annulment proceeding,
Alejandro died as a policeman. ISSUE: WON Maria Cortes may have custody of her
children? HELD: No. she had insufficient means to support the children and the fact that she
had been found guilty of adultery, she has corrupt moral values harmful to the welfare of the
minors. Grandmother retains custody. *Cortes is a very old case and would not be the same if
decided today. In the olden days, females are judged by her womb, all these laws reflect that
she’s just a wife and mother, not a person. Parents Miguel Vicenta Mario Petra Juan Sebastia
n Vicenta, Mario and Petra were brothers and sisters. Vicenta was married to Miguel; Petra
to Juan. When Vicenta died, Miguel, Mario and Juan entered into an agreement covering the
disposition of the properties left by Vicenta; Mario and Juan were representing their children,
who are the heirs of Vicenta. Sebastian, son of Petra and Juan filed a complaint as special
administrator of his deceased father, alleging that Miguel has not complied with the said
contract/agreement. ISSUE: WON Sebastian, being the son of the deceased Juan Abiera has
the right to ask for the compliance with the said obligation HELD: No. The true interested
parties in the obligation contracted by Miguel Orin are the children of Juan Abiera, and not
the latter, for the simple reason that the obligation was executed in their favor and not in
favor of said Abiera. This being the fact, it is evident that the plaintiff in his office as
administrator of the deceased Juan Abiera has no right to ask for the compliance with the said
obligation. As such administrator, he has only the right to institute such actions as correspond
and pertain to the estate which he is administering, and no other action dealing with contracts
and obligations contracted in favor of 3rd persons or others from whom he does not derive
such right, can be brought as such administrator. The right of Juan Abiera to represent his
children as father or guardian of the same, and that he has not transferred nor could he
transfer to the administrator of his estate such right from the mere fact that he was such
administrator. The said right attached to parental authority or guardianship was extinguished
when Juan Abiera died. CORTES v CASTILLO (1921) 41 Phil 466 - Maria Acardio and
Bernardo Maria committed adultery and◊Cortes ♥ Alejandro Herrera was convicted but
Alejandro pardoned her and they reconciled. However, Maria again committed adultery so
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
164 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 CC, Art 361 Juvenile courts will be
established, as far as practicable, in every chartered city or large municipality. D. Rights and
Duties of Children Rights of the child Duties of the child CC, Art 1. 2. 3. 4. Rights of the
parents Duties of the parents CC, Art 362 Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court,
the father, mother or guardian may in a proper case be judicially admonished. * Rights of the
child * Compare with Art 3 of PD 603 356 Every child: is entitled to parental care shall
receive at least elementary education shall be given moral and civil training by the guardians
has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to physical, moral and intellectual
development CC, Art 363 In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child
under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure. CC,
Art 375 In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the
word “Junior” can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall
either: 1. Add a middle name or the mother’s surname 2. Add the Roman numerals II, III and
so on CC, Art 357 Every child shall: 1. obey and honor parents or guardian 2. respect
grandparents, old relatives and persons holding substitute parental authority 3. exert utmost
for education and training 4. cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the good
of the same CC, Art 376 No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority. * Repealed by RA No. 9048 – Correction of clerical or typographical error without
need of judicial order - * Duties of the child * Compare with Art 4 of PD 603 CC, Art 358
Every parent and every person holding substitute parental authority shall see to it that the
rights of the child are respected and his duties complied with, and shall particularly, by
precept and example, imbue the child with high-mindedness, love of country, veneration for
the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life and attachment to the ideal of
permanent world peace. CC, Art 359 The government promotes the full growth of the
faculties of every child. For this purpose, the government will establish, whenever possible:
1. schools in every barrio, municipality and city where the optional religious instruction shall
be taught as a part of the curriculum at the option the parent or guardian 2. puericulture and
similar centers 3. Council for the Protection of Children 4. juvenile courts CC, Art 360 The
Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of children in the
municipality. It shall, among other functions: 1. foster the education of every child in the
municipality 2. encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents 3. protect and assist
abandoned or mistreated children and orphans 4. take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency
5. adopt measures for the health of children 6. promote the opening and maintenance of - Not
allowed if it will sow confusion on paternity and successional rights When father changes his
name, there are no effects on children. However, children may elect to change their names on
a separate petition upon emancipation. The father can also include their minor children in his
petition. Change of name shall have no effect on: family relations, family rights and duties,
legal capacity like civil status or citizenship. Change of name is done in a proceeding in rem.
FC, Art 129 (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon
partition in accordance with Art 51. FC, Art 211 Par 2 Children shall always observe respect
and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are
under parental authority. (17a, PD 603) FC, Art 213 In case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall
take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. *
“Separation” in this article applies both to de facto and legal separation PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 165 of 170 Karichi
E. Santos | UP Law B2012 FC Art 226 The property of unemancipated child earned or
acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child
in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter’s support and education, unless
the title or transfer provides otherwise. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of
the child’s property shall be limited: 1. primarily, child’s support 2. secondarily, collective
daily needs of the family PD 603 Art 3 Rights of the Child. - All children shall be entitled to
the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social
status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors. Every child has the right to: (1) is
endowed with the dignity and worth of a human being from the moment of his conception, as
generally accepted in medical parlance, and has, therefore, the right to be born well. (2) a
wholesome family life that will provide him with love, care and understanding, guidance and
counseling, and moral and material security. Dependent or abandoned child: shall be
provided with the nearest substitute for a home. (3) a well-rounded development of his
personality to the end that he may become a happy, useful and active member of society.
Gifted child shall be given opportunity and encouragement to develop his special talents.
Emotionally disturbed or socially maladjusted child shall be treated with sympathy and
understanding, and shall be entitled to treatment and competent care. Physically or mentally
handicapped child shall be given the treatment, education and care required by his particular
condition. (4) a balanced diet, adequate clothing, sufficient shelter, proper medical attention,
and all the basic physical requirements of a healthy and vigorous life. (5) be brought up in an
atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his
character. (6) an education commensurate with his abilities and to the development of his
skills for the improvement of his capacity for service to himself and to his fellowmen. (7) full
opportunities for safe and wholesome recreation and activities, individual as well as social,
for the wholesome use of his leisure hours. (8) protection against exploitation, improper
influences, hazards, and other conditions or circumstances prejudicial to his physical, mental,
emotional, social and moral development. (9) live in a community and a society that can
offer him an environment free from pernicious influences and conducive to the promotion of
his health and the cultivation of his desirable traits and attributes. (10)the care, assistance,
and protection of the State, particularly when his parents or guardians fail or are unable to
provide him with his fundamental needs for growth, development, and improvement.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page
166 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 PD 603 Art 4 Responsibilities of the Child. -
Every child, regardless of the circumstances of his birth, sex, religion, social status, political
antecedents and other factors shall: (1) Strive to lead an upright and virtuous life in
accordance with the tenets of his religion, the teachings of his elders and mentors, and the
biddings of a clean conscience; (2) Love, respect and obey his parents, and cooperate with
them in the strengthening of the family; (3) Extend to his brothers and sisters his love,
thoughtfulness, and helpfulness, and endeavor with them to keep the family harmonious and
united; (4) Exert his utmost to develop his potentialities for service, particularly by
undergoing a formal education suited to his abilities, in order that he may become an asset to
himself and to society; (5) Respect not only his elders but also the customs and traditions of
our people, the memory of our heroes, the duly constituted authorities, the laws of our
country, and the principles and institutions of democracy; (6) Participate actively in civic
affairs and in the promotion of the general welfare, always bearing in mind that it is the youth
who will eventually be called upon to discharge the responsibility of leadership in shaping
the nation's future; and (7) Help in the observance of individual human rights, the
strengthening of freedom everywhere, the fostering of cooperation among nations in the
pursuit of their common aspirations for programs and prosperity, and the furtherance of
world peace. Conventions on the Rights of the Child Art 1 Definition of a child – A child is
recognized as a person under 18, unless national laws recognize age of majority earlier. Art 2
Non-discrimination – All rights apply to all children without exception. It is the State’s
obligation to protect children from any form of discrimination and to take positive action to
promote their rights. Art 3 Best interest of the child – All actions concerning the child should
take full account of his or her best interest. The State shall provide the child with adequate
care when parents, or others charged with the responsibility, fail to do so. Art 4
Implementation of rights – The State must do all it can to implement the rights contained in
the Convention. Art 5 Parental guidance and the child’s evolving capacities – The State must
respect the rights and responsibilities of parents and the extended family to provide guidance
for the child which is appropriate to her or his evolving capacities. Art 6 Survival and
development – Every child has the inherent right to life and the State has an obligation to
ensure the child’s survival and development. Art 7 Name and nationality – The child has the
right to a name at birth. The child also has the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as
possible, to know his or her parents and be cared for by them. Art 8 Preservation of identity –
The State has an obligation to protect and if necessary, re-establish basic aspects of the
child’s identity. This includes name, nationality and family ties. Art 9 Separation from
parents – The child has a right to live with his or her parents unless this is deemed to be
incompatible with the child’s best interest. The child also hast the right to maintain contact
with both parents if separated from one or both. Art Family unification – Children and their
parents have 10 the right to leave any country and to enter their own for purposes of reunion
or the maintenance of the child-parent relationship. Illicit transfer and non-return – The State
has an obligation to prevent and remedy the kidnapping or retention of children abroad by a
parent or third party. The child’s opinion – The child has the right to express his or her
opinion freely and to have that opinion taken into account in any matter or procedure
affecting the child. Freedom of expression – The child has the right to express his or her
views, obtain information, make ideas or information known, regardless of frontiers.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion – The State shall respect the child’s right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, subject to appropriate parental guidance.
Freedom of association – Children have a right to meet with others, and to join or form
association. Protection of privacy – Children have the right to protection from interference
with privacy, family, home and correspondence and from libel or slander. Access to
appropriate information – The State shall ensure the accessibility to children of information
and material from a diversity of sources, and it shall encourage the mass media to
disseminate information which is of social and cultural benefit to the child, and take steps to
protect him or her from harmful materials. Parental responsibilities – Parents have joint
primary responsibility for raising the child, and the State shall support them in this. The State
shall provide appropriate assistance to parents in childraising. Protection from abuse and
neglect – The State shall protect the child from forms of maltreatment by parents others
responsible for the care of child and establish appropriate social programs for the prevention
of abuse and the treatment of victims. Protection of a child without family – The State is
obliged to provide special protection for a child deprived of family environment and to
ensure that appropriate alternative family care or institutional placement is available in such
causes. Efforts to meet this obligation shall pay due regard to the child’s cultural background.
Adoption – In countries where adoption is recognized and/or allowed, it shall only carried
out in the interests of child, and then only with the authorization of competent authorities and
safeguards for the child. Refugee children – Special protection shall be granted to a refugee
child or to a child seeking refugee status. It is the State’s obligation to cooperate with
competent organizations which provide such protection and assistance. Disabled children – A
disabled child has the right to special care, education and training to help him or her enjoy a
full and decent life in dignity and achieve the greatest degree of self-reliance and social
integration possible. Health and health services – The child has a right to the highest standard
of health and medical care attainable. States shall place special emphasis on the provision of
primary and preventive health care, public health education and the reduction of infant
mortality. They shall encourage international co-operation in this regard and strive to see that
no child is deprived access to effective health services. Periodic review of placement – A
child who is placed Art 11 Art 12 Art 13 Art 14 Art 15 Art 16 Art 17 Art 18 Art 19 Art 20
Art 21 Art 22 Art 23 Art 24 Art PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 167 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 25 Art 26
Art 27 by the State by reasons of care, protection or treatment is entitled to have that
placement evaluated regularly. Social security – The child has the right to benefit from social
security including social insurance. Standard of living – Every child has the right to a
standard living adequate for his or her physical, mental, moral, spiritual, and social
development. Parents have the primary responsibility to ensure that the child has an adequate
standard of living. The State’s duty is to ensure that this responsibility can be fulfilled and is.
State responsibility can include material assistance to parents and their children. Education –
The child has a right to education and the State’s duty is to ensure that primary education is
free and compulsory to encourage different forms of secondary education accessible to every
child and to make higher education available to all on the bases of capacity. School discipline
shall be consisted with the child’s rights and dignity. The State shall engage in international
co-operation to implement this right. Aims of education – Education shall aim at developing
the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to the fullest extent.
Education shall prepare the child for an active adult life in a free society and foster respect
for the child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, and for the
cultural background and values of others. Children of minorities or indigenous populations –
Children of minority communities and indigenous populations have the right to enjoy their
own culture and to practice their own religion and language. Leisure, recreation and cultural
activities. – The child has the right to leisure, play and participation in cultural and artistic
activities. Child labor – The child has the right to be protected from work that threatens his or
her health, education or development. The State shall set minimum ages for employment and
regulate working conditions. Drug abuse – Children have the right to protection from the use
of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and from being involved in the production or distribution.
Sexual exploitation – The State shall protect children from sexual exploitation and abuse,
including prostitution and involvement in pornography. Sale, trafficking and abduction – It is
the State’s obligation to make every effort to prevent the sale, trafficking and abduction of
children. Other forms of exploitation – the child has the right to protection from all forms of
exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child’s welfare covered in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 35. Torture and deprivation of liberty – No child shall be subjected to torture, cruel
treatment or punishment, unlawful arrest or deprivation of liberty. Both capital punishment
and life imprisonment without the possibility of release are prohibited for offenses committed
by persons below 18 years. Any child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults
unless it is considered in the child’s best interests not to do so. A child who is detained shall
have legal and other assistance as well as contact with the family. Armed conflicts – State
parties shall take all 38 feasible measures to ensure that children under 15 years of age have
no direct part in hostilities. No child below 15 shall be recruited into the armed forces. States
shall also ensure the protection and care of children who are affected by armed conflict as
described in relevant international law. Rehabilitative care – The State has an obligation to
ensure that child victims of armed conflicts, torture, neglect, maltreatment or exploitation
receive appropriate treatment for their recovery and social reintegration. Administration of
juvenile justice – A child in conflict with the law has the right to treatment which promotes
the child’s sense of dignity and worth, takes the child’s age into account and aims at his or
her reintegration into society. The child is entitled to basic guarantees as well as legal or
other assistance for his or her defense. Judicial proceedings and institutional placements shall
be avoided wherever possible. Respect for higher standards – Wherever standards set in
applicable national and international law relevant to the rights of the child that are higher
than those in this Convention, the higher standard shall always apply. The State’s obligation
to make the rights contained in this Convention widely known to both adults and children.
Art 39 Art 40 Art 28 Art 41 Art 29 Art 42 Art 30 The Child is Not a Person: Family Law and
other Legal Cultures (Caroline Sawyer)3 Paradigms of the Child 1. Family Law 2. Property
Law 3. Children’s Obligation – Tort and Contract Confusion between the capacity of a
person to be the subject of rights and obligations (legal personality) and the capacity of that
person to take action which produces legal effects (legal capacity) Art 31 Art 32 Art 33 Art
34 Art 35 Art 36 Art 37 E. Parents versus Children – When rights clash STRUNK v
STRUNK (1969) 445 S. W. 2d 145 | CA of Kentucky Tommy (28) and Jerry (27) Strunk are
brothers. Tom is suffering from chronic glomerulus nephritis, a fatal kidney disease, and
requires a kidney transplant. Jerry, an incompetent with the mind of a 6 year old and a speech
defect (severely retarded with IQ of 35), is the only viable donor for the operation. The
mother as a committee secures court consent for the operation. Both the Department of
Mental Health and psychiatrist find Jerry is emotionally dependent on Tom such that his
death would be more detrimental and traumatic for him than the loss of one kidney. Guardian
ad litem questions authority of the State to approve the procedure. Art 3 Summary by Krissy
Conti PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
Page 168 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUE: WON a court of equity may
approve the operation for the incompetent. HELD: YES! The doctrine of substituted
judgment applies which means that where the legal disability of the individual is shown, the
jurisdiction of the court is plenary and potent to afford whatever relief may be necessary to
protect his interests and preserve his estates. Such rule has not only been extended to cover
matters of property but also of personal affairs of the incompetent. It is also important to note
here the questioned ruling of the circuit court. Therein the operation was approved because it
was held to be for the “best interest of the incompetent.” The testimony of the psychiatrist
held that Tommy was indispensable for the welfare of Jerry because he is the only living
sibling Jerry has. For Jerry only those who are able to communicate intimately with him can
help in his mental treatment, and in most cases these are members of his family. Tom is
important to him in that he can identify himself with him. Tom is his model, his tie with his
family thus his life is vital to his improvement at the asylum. Considering that their parents
are in their fifties, it would be in the best interest of Jerry’s welfare if Tommy were to
survive. CONSERVATORSHIP OF VALERIE N. aka Mildred G. v Valerie N. (1985) 707 P.
2d 760 | SC of California Valerie N (29), is inflicted with Down Syndrome and has an IQ of
30. She lives with her mother and her stepfather. The mother instituted a court proceeding for
appointment as conservators and requested for additional powers to sterilize Valerie through
tubal ligation (salpingectomy). According to the mother, sterilization was necessary because
Valerie is sexually aggressive at the sight of men (kiss, hug, climb and sit on their laps).
Though she is not sexually active for being under close watch, she masturbates excessively.
Her mother fears the day when she will no longer be able to look after her daughter. She also
went through unsuccessful behavior modification, tried to ingest contraceptive pills but
rejected it eventually and would not cooperate in pelvic examination for intrauterine device.
Lower court granted conservatorship authority to sterilize the incompetent. but not
exhausted. The mother also did not provide clear and convincing evidence as to the necessity
of irreversible sterilization. That Valerie is capable of pregnancy, that other brands of pills
were administered and that other means of administering contraceptive pill were attempted.
JOHNSON v CALVERT (1993) 851 P. 2d 776 - SUPRA GILLICK v WEST NORFOLK &
WISBECH AREA HEALTH AUTHORITY (1985) 3 All E. R. 402 Victoria Gillick wrote to
area health authority asking for assurance that her daughters aged 13, 12, 10 and 5 will not be
given contraceptive advice and treatment without her consent. The reply to the letter stated
that they cannot give such assurance because the final decision must be for the doctor’s
clinical judgment. Gillick again asked for a declaration from the office that it will not provide
minors under 16 years old with contraceptive advice and treatment without informing the
parents but the health authority was steadfast. They argued for the patient-doctor
confidentiality and that if this principle is abandoned, minors might not seek professional
advice at all. This will lead to consequences such as unwanted pregnancies, STD and high
risk abortions. She contends that permitting minors to disregard their parent’s consent
undermines parental responsibility and family stability. ISSUE: WON doctors can lawfully
give contraceptive advice and treatment to minors without parental consent (the extent of a
parent’s right and duties with respect to the medical treatment of a girl under 16 years old)
HELD: NO. Girls under 16 can give no valid consent to anything in the areas under
consideration which apart from consent would constitute an assault, whether civil or
criminal, and can impose no valid prohibition on a doctor against seeking parental consent.
CURTIS v SCHOOL COMMITTEE (1995) 652 N. E. 2d 580 | SC of Massachussetts Parents
contend the condom availability program in a public school where senior and junior high
school students may obtain condoms for free in the nurse’s office and for 75 cents in the
vending machine in their CR. Condoms are given away with counseling from nurse and
pamphlet about HIV/AIDS and STD, with authorities stressing the importance of abstinence
as the best method to avoid STD. The program did not provide for an “opt out” nor parental
notification wherein parents would be notified of their children’s request for condoms.
ISSUE: WON conservators can give consent to sterilization on behalf of their incompetent
wards HELD: No. Although the repeal of the statutes regarding asexualization of mentally
challenged individuals have been declared unconstitutional for violating their due process
and equal protection rights, conservators still may not be authorize to conduct the procedure
unless all means have been PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A.
Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 169 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUE: 1.
WON the program violates the parents’ constitutionally protected right to familial privacy
and parental liability 2. WON the program infringes into the free exercise clause HELD: 1.
No. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate how condom availability constitutes unconstitutional
interference by the state. There was no coercive burden upon the students: a. Students are
free to decline b. Parents are free to instruct their children not to participate 2. No. They were
unable to demonstrate sufficient facts to support any substantial burden to religious exercise.
They merely alleged that the program contravenes parental teaching on premarital sex: the
not only is it permissible but can be made safe. 3. Parents have no right to tailor public school
policy to meet their individual religious and moral preferences. ROE v DOE (1971) 29 NY
2d 188 | CA of New York Daughter was cut off from support by her father by not obeying his
instructions that she live in a college dormitory while studying in college and instead took up
residence with a female classmate in an offcampus apartment. Her father requested she come
home but instead, the daughter sold her car [a gift from her father] and finished the school
year using the proceeds thereof. Upon returning to New York for the summer, she further
disobeyed her father by choosing to stay with the parents of her female classmate in Long
Island. Daughter in general fares poorly in school and has experimented with drugs.
Furthermore she has had a spotty childhood, her mother died when she was three and her
father has repeatedly married and remarried since then his most recent remarriage in 1970.
With the help of a guardian ad litem, she initiated this action for support. ISSUE: WON
daughter is entitled for support in light of her transgressions against her father. HELD: While
delinquent behavior of a child even if unexplained or persistent does not merit the
termination of the duty of the parent to support, voluntary abandonment by the child of the
parent’s home is tantamount to forfeiture of the claim to support. A father in return for
maintenance and support may establish and impose reasonable regulations on his child.
Courts as much as possible do not interfere with the parent’s prerogative in caring,
controlling and protecting the child except only when there is a clear and obvious display of
abuse or neglect on the part of the parent. The parent was concerned about the temptations
that abound outside of campus hence his insistence that she live in the campus dorm. While
the daughter may be free disagree and choose to not comply, she puts herself at risk of
incurring her father’s wrath and consequently, by abandoning her home she forfeits her right
to support. IN RE EDWARD C. (1981) 178 Cal. Rptr. 694 | CA of California The appeal
instituted by spouses Edmond and Deborah to regain custody of their two sons Edward and
Eric who were previously declared “dependent” children. Edward and Eric were removed
from their parents’ home because they were maltreated and subjected to cruel and inhuman
corporal punishment by their father. The father, supported by the mother, argues that he is
vested with divine and Biblical authority to inflict discipline on his children. Their daughter,
Marlee, was given to her maternal grandmother for adoption after suffering physical abuse in
the hands of her father. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan,
A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 170 of 170 Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012 ISSUE: WON the
dependency of children is a violation of constitutional right of privacy of the family HELD:
NO. The parental doctrine and child’s best interest are usually compatible but when they
clash, the latter is protected by the legal system. The finding on Marlee’s case is admissible
to Eric and Edward. The fact that the sons witnessed the vicious beatings as command of the
Lord may inhibit their healthy emotional development. Until the parents cooperate to
counseling program, reunification of the family will be detrimental to the welfare of the
minors. PRINCE v MASSACHUSSETTS (1944) 321 US 158 | SC of Massachusetts Sarah
Prince, a member of the Jehovah’s Witness is a mother to two sons and the guardian of minor
Betty Simmons One night she went one to distribute Watchtower and Consolation, fulfilling
one of her religious obligations She used to bring along her kids but upon reprimand by
Peskins because it violates the statute law against child labor and employment, she ceased to
take her children with her. However, Betty Simmons insisted to come that particular night.
ISSUE: 1. WON the religious act of selling their magazines violate the statute 2. WON the
presence of parent will exempt them from punishment HELD: 1. Yes. It does not infringe on
the free exercise clause because the burden on the religious activity was merely incidental.
The prohibition applies to all children. 2. No. There was clear and present danger even
though in the company of adults. The State’s authority over children is broader than adults
especially in public activities and employment which has crippling effects on the child. They
reserve the Parents can make martyrs out of themselves but not of their children. 3. Check
 out the dissent. Parents reserve the right to train their children religiously. - However, the
presiding judge went on leave effect June 1. But the new presiding judge issued decision in
favor of the mother on May 31. ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over habeas corpus
petitions. HELD: Yes. RA 8369 did not divest RTC jurisdiction ◊over such cases.
MADRINAN v MADRINAN (2007) 527 SCRA 487 - Felipe ♥ Francisca three sons and a
daughter Romnick, Phillip, Francis Angelo and Krizia Ann The couple had a quarrel so he
took the sons with him to Ligao, Albay and then to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Wife sought the help
of the parents and the parents in law, and even the Lupong Tagapagpamayapa to make peace
with the husband, but to no avail. She alleges that the travel disrupted the education of the
children and deprived them of maternal care. They accused each other that their respective
parents always meddle with their family affairs. Mother is unfit because she is always drunk
and would come home late at night from the beerhouse. She neglected her duties as a mother.
Father, a tricycle driver, drove mother out, and a gambler, drug addict and alcoholic himself.
ISSUE: WON CA has jurisdiction regarding writ of habeas corpus under Sec 5 (b) of RA
8369 HELD: Yes. Concurrent jurisdictions of Family Court, SC and CA so that the decision
will be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Note that he had moved to two different
provinces. F. Summary Procedure REYES-TABUJARA v CA (2006) 495 SCRA 844 - Ivy
Carlos Iñigo The separated and custody battle ensued. Dad◊Joan ♥ Ernesto initially won.
Mother files a consolidated petition for writ of habeas corpus and Anti-VAWC.

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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009
Page 14 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
(2) husband responsible for support
(3) wife responsible for domestic and childcare
services
GRAHAM v GRAHAM (1940) (pronounced as
/grahm/)
33 F. Supp. 936
-

James Sebastian Graham, plaintiff sues his

former wife, Margrethe, defendant, to recover
what he was allegedly entitled by a written
agreement wherein defendant agreed to pay the
plaintiff a certain some of money.
-

The agreement was that the wife asked husband to quit his job so that he can accompany her to his travels, to which he
agreed as long as she will pay him $300 each month. The monthly payment is to be in force until the parties no longer desire
the agreement.
ISSUE: WON the agreement compels the wife to
continue paying her husband the $300
HELD: No, the contract is not valid. Marriage contract specifies that it’s the husband’s duty or obligation to support and live
with his wife, and the wife must contribute her services and society to the husband and follow him in his choice of domicile.
Also, a private agreement between persons married or about to be married whereby they attempt to change the essential
obligations of the marriage contract is contrary to public policy.
BRADWELL v ILLINOIS (1872)
93 US (16 wall) 130
-

Myra Bradwell was denied license to practice law

JUST BECAUSE SHE IS A FEMALE.
-

“That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action and that it belonged to men to make, apply and execute
the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth” Amazing… they were able to talk to God directly.
-

Prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts is unaffected by the 14th amendment
DUNN v PALERMO (1975)
522 S. W. 2d 679
-

Rose Palermo is a Nashville lawyer who married Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She has continued to use and enjoy
her maiden name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for all purposes. Tennessee had a state-wide compulsory Registration
Law. Subsequent to her marriage, she lodged with the Registrar a change of address form listing her name as Palermo.
-

She was advised that she was required to register anew under the surname of her husband, or have her name purged from
the registration list. Upon her refusal to so register,
her name was purged from the registration list.
Hence this action.
ISSUE: WON compulsory/mandatory to change name
upon marriage
HELD: No. Woman upon marriage,may elect to retain her own surname or she may adopt the surname of her husband and
the choice is hers. So long as a person’s name remains constant and consistent, and unless until changed in prescribed
manner, and in absence of any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, state has no legitimate concern as to name used.
*According to Ma’am Beth the legal name of any person is the one written on the birth certificate (CC, Art 370)
IN RE SANTIAGO (1940)
70 Phil 66
-

Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares separated for 9 consecutive years, want to remarry so they sought the aid of Atty.
Roque Santiago
-

He instituted a document that waives whatever right of action one might have against each other but realized mistake after
19 days and cancelled the document
ISSUE: WON the document signed by the spouses legitimately terminated the marital tie between them.
HELD: No. Termination of the marriage cannot be stipulated by the parties. Santiago guilty of malpractice and suspended for
1 year.
SELANOVA v MENDOZA (1975)
64 SCRA 69
-

Respondent Judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of Saturnino
Selanova and Avelina Ceniza.
-

One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had
filed against the other and they waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit
against the other.
-

This document was also acknowledged before

him as “City Judge and Notary Public Ex Officio.”
-

Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross

ignorance of the law.
ISSUE: WON marriage is valid
HELD: Agreement is void because it contravenes the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of CC Art 221. Even before the
enactment of the NCC, this court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage
without judicial

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

Page 15 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
approval “secured beforehand” was void. While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they shall remain crimes, and
a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law and consequently not judicially recognizable. Respondent is
severely censured.
ASSUMPTIONS OF FAMILY LAW (Weitzman article)
1. Marriage is a permanent, indissoluble,
lifetime commitment
2.First marriages (young & no previous
 marriages)
3. Main reason is procreation
4. Strict division of labor
5. White middle-class family (property and
inheritance)
6. Judeo-Christian tradition (monogamy)
B. Requisites of Marriage
1. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES–
intrinsic (Art 2)
A. Legal capacity
a.Sex – (must be between man and woman)
b. Age – 18 and above (Art 5)
c.No impediment which means:
(1) no previous marriage
(2) family relations (not incestuous)
JONES v HALLAHAN (1973)
501 S. W. 2d 588
-
Marjorie Jones and her female partner were not issued a license to marry each other in the state of Kentucky.
-
They contend that the failure of the clerk to issue the marriage license deprived them of three (3) basic constitutional rights,
namely, the right to marry; the right of association; and the right to free exercise of religion.
-
Appellants also contend that the refusal subjects
them to cruel and unusual punishment.
ISSUE:
WON
same
sex
marriage
violates
constitutional rights to marry
HELD: No, it does not violate any constitutionally protected right. Two females cannot marry for marriage has always been
considered as the union of a man and a woman. It appears that appellants are prevented from marrying not by the statute of
Kentucky but rather by their own incapacity of entering into marriage as the term is defined. A license to enter into a status
or a relationship which the parties are incapable of entering is a nullity. Definition of marriage says, “union of a man and a
woman.” Thus, in the court’s opinion, there is not constitutional issue involved, since there is no constitutional sanction which
protects the right of marriage between persons of the same sex.
GOODRIDGE v DEPT OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2003)
440 Mass. 309
-

14 individuals (7 couples) were deprived of marriage license because they were the same sex
-

They are professionals and active in socio-civic activities, there was longevity in the relationship and defendants were
involved (adopted children and parents)
-

They met all facial qualifications, list of impediment was not presented by civil registrar (to prove that same sex marriage is
one of them)
-

LEGISLATIVE RATIO:
1. favorable setting for procreation
2. optimal setting for child rearing
3. conserving scarce state and private financial
resources
ISSUE:
1. WON licensing law treats same sex as
impediment – presented by the plaintiff
2. WON bar of same sex couple is a legitimate exercise of the State’s authority to regulation conduct – Court
 HELD:
-

Marriage is a secular institution. No religious ceremony is required. There are only 3 partners (2 spouses and the State who
defines the entry and exit terms)
-

PURPOSE NOT TAILOR FIT:

1.law does not distinguish children’s family
background so why deprive children the rights when they did not choose to be born/grow up in such a family (coitus v non
coitus, e.g. adoption or assisted), failed to address the changing realities of American society
2. best interest of the child ≠ parent’s sexual
orientation
3. homosexuals are well off and economically
independent, anyway, the same is not
condition/requirement for heterosexual
couples.
-

IMPLICATION OF PROHIBITION: deprivation of protection, benefits, obligations and rights exclusive to married people
same reason why these couples want the benefit of marriage
-

They do not undermine marriage, In fact, they appreciate/ show high esteem for of marriage by asking for it! Statute
declared unconstitutional
SILVERIO v REPUBLIC (2007)
537 SCRA 273
-

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio wants to change his name to Mely and sex entry in his birth certificate from male to female
because of his sex reassignment (transgender).
RTC
granted in 2003
CA
reversed in 2006

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

Page 16 of 170
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
ISSUE: WON he is entitled to the change of name
action
HELD: NO!
1. Names are for purposes of identification: Art 376, CC (no change of name without judicial declaration), RA 9048 (Clerical Error
Law), Rule 103 (change of name) and Rule 108 (Cancellation of Correction of Entries; substantial change)
2. Grounds for Change of Name (Sec 4, RA 9048)
a. Difficult and ridiculous, dishonorable name
b. Habitual and continual use
c. To avoid confusion
3. Petitioner has not shown any reasonable cause and does not show that his name may prejudice him
4. Case is administrative rather than judiciary
5. Change of sex not allowed because civil status is
immutable and inherent
6. No special law yet for sex change, until then sex is determined by the sex at the time of birth as resulted by visual inspection of
medical attendant.
7.Though we get your point and sympathize with
you, it’s not within the province of the Court to amend laws. You’re barking at the wrong tree. Go to the Congress and ask
them to pass a bill for you.
B. Consent freely given in the
presence of solemnizing officer
PEOPLE v SANTIAGO (1927)
51 Phil 68
-
 Felipe Santiago asked his deceased wife’s niece Felicita Masilang, 18, to accompany him on an errand
-

Upon crossing a river and reaching municipality of San Leonardo, Satinago expressed his sexual desire to which girl
declined, but he persisted on with force against her will
-

The two proceeded to accused’s uncle house, Agapito Santiago who called a Protestant minister to conduct a wedding.
After the wedding, Santiago sent home the girl with some money to buy bread.
ISSUE: WON the marriage exempted him from
criminal liability
HELD: No! Taking into consideration Santiago’s
behavior before and after the marriage, there isno
serious intention to marry the girl except for
to avoid criminal liability for the rape case.
- Girl was under duress and therefore, lack of consent (essential requisite) which makes the marriage void
BUCCAT v MANGONON DE BUCAT (1941)
72 Phil 19
-

Godofredo married Luida with the belief that she was a virgin. 89 days after the marriage celebration, Luida gave birth. Her husband
Godofredo herein appellant filed for annulment on the ground that she concealed her non- virginity.
ISSUE: WON marriage is valid
HELD: Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud, that is, when the husband at the time of the marriage knew that
the wife was pregnant, the marriage cannot be annulled. Here, the child was born less than 3 months after the celebration of
marriage. Court refuses to annul the marriage for the reason that the woman was at an advanced stage of pregnancy at the
time of the marriage and such condition must have been patent to the husband.
EIGENMANN v GUERRA (1964)
5 C.A. Rep. 836
-

Eduardo Eigenmann married Maryden Guerra on

1957.
-

Two years later, Eigenmann filed an action to annul his marriage with Guerra on the ground that he was between ages 16-
20 at that time and his mother did not give her consent to the marriage.
ISSUE: WON there was parental consent, the
absence of which could render the marriage void.
HELD: Consent may be given in any form be it written, oral or even by implication. Eigenmann’s mother was present at the
time of the celebration of marriage and did not object thereto, such that consent can be gleaned from such act.
- Eigenmann is also estopped from asserting that he was a minor at the time of the marriage celebration, having represented
himself to be over 25 years of age.
Art 4
-

Absence of any essential or formal – void, except

Art 35(2)
-

Defect in the essential requirement – voidable

(Art 45)
-

Irregularity in the formal requirement – no effect in validity, but the parties responsible will be civilly, criminally or
administratively liable
2. FORMAL REQUISITES – extrinsic
(Art 3)
A. Authority of solemnizing officer
- Who may authorize the marriage (Art 7)
a. incumbent member of judiciary
b. priest, rabbi, imam or minister of any
religious sect
- duly recognized by the religion,
- registered in Civil Registry
- acting within the limit of his authority

- at least one of the spouses is member

of the sect
c. ship captain and airplane chief only in Art 31
d. military commander to which chaplain is
assigned in Art 32
e. consul-general, consul, vice-consul for
Filipinos abroad
*Mayors are authorized by LGC to solemnize
marriage
NAVARRO v DOMAGTOY (1996)
259 SCRA 129
-

Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his court’s
jurisdiction.
-

He has jurisdiction in MCTC of Sta. Monica- Burgos, but the marriage was solemnized in Dapa which does not fall under his
jurisdictional area.
-

Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed this administrative

complaint.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge should be held liable,
and whether this will render the marriage void.
HELD: Marriage may be solemnized by, among
others, any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court’s jurisdiction. Solemnization outside
the judge’s territorial jurisdiction will not
invalidate the marriage. What results is an
irregularity in the formal requisites of a valid
marriage. Respondent judge, by citing Art 8 of the FC
as defense for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, acted in gross ignorance of the law and
was therefore held administratively liable –
suspension of 6 months.
- Irregularity in formal requisite – no effect in
marriage validity
ARAÑES v OCCIANO (2002)
380 SCRA 402
-

Petitioner Mercedita Arañes charged respondent judge Salvador Occiano for gross ignorance of the law. Occiano
solemnized the marriage between herein petitioner and the late Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license
and outside his territorial jurisdiction.
-

Couple lived together as husband and wife until the death of Orobia. But then since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s
right to inherit the vast property left by Orobia was not recognized. Respondent explained that he solemnized the marriage
out of human compassion and because the parties promised to present their license the afternoon after the wedding.
ISSUE: WON the respondent judge administratively
liable.
HELD: Yes. He was faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license and for exceeding his territorial
jurisdiction. He was fined P5000 and was given a stern warning by the SC that
repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt more severely. The absence of a marriage license made the
marriage void. And even if the plaintiff retracted her complaint, that’s not how it is done. Withdrawal of complaint
≠ exoneration
B. Valid marriage license except
for marriages of exceptional
character
Art 9 ML obtained in habitual residence of one of
the parties
Art 10 Requirements of Filipino marriages abroad settled in the consular office which will take over the duties of local civil registry
Art 11 Two separate application for one marriage
license which shall specify the following:
1. full name
2. place of birth
3. age and date of birth
4. civil status
5. if previously married, how, when, where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled
6. present residence and citizenship
7. degree of relationship of the contracting
parties
8. full name, residence and citizenship of the
father
9. full name, residence and citizenship of the
mother
10. full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian, person having charge, in case orphaned
Art 12 Proof of age
a. original or certified copy of birth
certificate
b.original or certified copy of baptismal
certif
c. residence certificate witnessed by 2
witnesses preferably next of kin
Proof of age dispensed with if:
a. parents appear personally
b.local civil registrar convinced by mere
looking (read: mukhang matanda na)
c. previously married
Art 13 If previous marriages, not birthcert is
required but:
a.death certificate of deceased spouse
 if no death certificate is available,
affidavit about circumstance and civil
status
b. judicial
decree
of
absolute
divorce/judicial
decree
of
annulment/declaration of nullity
c. declaration of presumptive death
Art 14 if 18-21, then parental consent
Art 15 if 21-25, then parental advice
Art 16 if anyone is required with parental consent or advice, both shall undergo marriage counseling. Failure to attach certificate of