THOMAS BEGNAEN, Petitioner, v.

SPOUSES LEO CALIGTAN AND

ELMACALIGTAN, Respondents
Facts: petitioner Thomas Begnaen (Begnaen) filed a Complaint with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction against respondents Spouses Leo and Elma Caligtan (Sps. Caligtan) for "Land Dispute
and Enforcement of Rights" before the Regional Hearing Office (RHO) of the NCIP at La
Trinidad, Benguet.7 The RHO thereafter issued an Order8 dismissing the complaint based on
respondents' argument that the case should have gone to the council of elders and not through the
Barangay Lupon, as mandated by the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA).

However, instead of abiding by the Order of the RHO, Begnaen filed against the Sps. Caligtan a
Complaint for Forcible Entry with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction10
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bauko-Sabangan, Mt. Province. The MCTC
dismissed the ejectment complaint in favor of respondents. In a Decision17 dated 11 March
2008, the RTC reversed and set aside the Resolution and Order of the MCTC, saying that it was
the latter court that had jurisdiction over the case for forcible entry
Issue:Which court has jurisdiction over the case
Ruling: While admittedly forcible entry cases are cognizable by the regular courts pursuant to
Section 1, rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Court and B.P. Big. 129; nonetheless, with the passage of
the IPRA Law (R.A. 8371), it is our considered view that the regular courts are divested of
their jurisdiction when the parties involved therein are the ICCs/IPs and the property in
question is an ancestral land.
R.A. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, particularly Sections 65 and 66
thereof, provide:
SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices, — When disputes involve
ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.
SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall
have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided,
however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the
attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification
shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
Before proceeding to the pivotal issue of which tribunal shall properly take cognizance of the
dispute between the parties, We first address the NCIP's jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject property.

It is undisputed that the parties are members of ICCs/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).

In point is the Resolution of the MCTC, which states in part:

On the date set, the parties and their respective lawyers appeared. Instead of immediately hearing
the aforesaid prayer, the court, considering that the parties are natives of this place (Mountain
Province) who belong to the so called groups of Indigenous Peoples/Indigenous Cultural
Communities of our country, and that the land subject of this case is also located within this
same province, asked the following questions to the parties, to wit:
1. Do they admit that they belong to and are members of the Indigenous Peoples/Indigenous
Cultural Communities?
xxxx

To these questions, both parties replied in the affirmative: that indeed, they belong to and are
members of the so called group of Indigenous Peoples/Indigenous Cultural
Communities xxx.27
In affirming the MCTC, the CA likewise declared:
Undeniably, both parties herein admitted that they are members of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities, particularly the Kankanaey Tribe of Mt. Province xxx.28(Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing discussions, We find that jurisdiction remains vested in the NCIP-RHO as
the first agency to take cognizance over the case, to the exclusion of the MCTC. We likewise
declare petitioner-appellant estopped from belatedly impugning the jurisdiction of the NCIP-
RHO after initiating a Complaint before it and receiving an adverse ruling.

ROGELIO ROSARIO, RUDY ROSARIO, MARY ANN GUTIERREZ, SYLVIA

CASTILLO, LOURDES JOSE, LORENA ESTEPA, VIRGINIA ESTEPA AND
REMEDIOS SABADO, Petitioners, v. RIZALITO F. ALBA,
Facts: Respondent is the son and only surviving legal heir of Luz while the petitioners are fellow
heirs to the estate of Urbano and Vicenta. As found by the courts below, the petitioners
introduced residential dwellings and other improvements on the subject properties even before
the death of Luz. After Luz died, the respondent sent out written notices to vacate upon the
petitioners; the last one was sent as a registered mail on November 9, 2007, and was duly
received by the petitioners on November 12 and 14, 2007.10 Because of the petitioners' refusal to
leave, the respondent instituted the action for ejectment
Issue: Whether the action filed by the respondent will prosper
Ruling: Ejectment or accion interdictal takes on two forms: forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
In Spouses Del Rosario v. Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc.,27 the Court explained:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any
land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer,
one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, thepossession is illegal
from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possessionde facto. In unlawful
detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination
of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action,
the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination
of the defendant's right to continue in possession.28 (Emphasis and italics ours and underscoring
in the original)

The complaint cannot be considered as one for forcible entry. While the respondent averred that
the petitioners' entry in the subject properties was made without the knowledge and consent of
the respondent or his predecessor-in-interest which said allegation may amount to an averment of
the employment of stealth,29 there is, however, no showing that the action was filed within one
year from the questioned entry
Neither can the Court consider the complaint as one for unlawful detainer.

It has been held in a catena of cases31 that in actions for unlawful detainer, a complaint
sufficiently alleges said cause of action if it states the following elements, to wit: (1) initially, the
possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (4) within one year
from the making of the last demand to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment.

Quite obviously, the first element is meant to present the basis of the lawful possession in the
beginning which is either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that no contract, express or implied existed between the
parties.
In the complaint, the respondent merely alleged that the petitioners, "without the knowledge and
consent of [the respondent] and his late mother," occup[ied] the subject property by building
their respective houses and other improvements thereon.32 Yet, the respondent failed to show
how or why the petitioners' possession can be considered as lawful at its inception (but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess) to sufficiently establish an
unlawful detainer case.
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ARTURO LOO
PO, Respondent.
Facts: In a complaint6 for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 19429, filed before the
MeTC, Fairland alleged that it was the owner of Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar Mansion
II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City. Fairland sent a formal letter7 to Po demanding that he pay
the amount of P220,000.00, representing the rental arrears, and that he vacate the leased premises
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the letter. Despite receipt of the demand letter and the
lapse of the said 15-day period to comply, Po neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent nor
vacated the premises. Thus, on December 12, 2012, Fairland was constrained to file the
complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC. Po had until January 7, 2013 to file his answer
but he failed to do so.
Issue:WHETHER IN AN EJECTMENT CASE WHEREIN NO ANSWER WAS
SEASONABLY FILED, IT IS AN ERROR OF LAW TO BASE JUDGMENT ON
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
Ruling: Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint
within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to
what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and
attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the
applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.
[Emphasis supplied]
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer, the court shall render
judgment, eithermotu proprio or upon plaintiffs motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely file his
answer and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every allegation
stated in the complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be done in this situation26 except to render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.27

Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the rules for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails to answer the complaint within the period
provided, the court has no authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead, the court, motu
proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite proper service of summons. He
also failed to provide a sufficient justification to excuse his lapses. Thus, as no answer was filed,
judgment must be rendered by the court as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint.
WHEREFORE. Respondent Arturo Loo Po is ORDERED TO VACATE Condominium
Unit .

MILAGROS DIAZ, EDUARDO Q. CATACUTAN, DANTE Q. CATACUTAN,

REPRESENTED BY THEIR COMMON ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, FERNANDO Q.
CATACUTAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES GAUDENCIO PUNZALAN AND TERESITA
PUNZALAN, Respondents.
Facts: Petitioners alleged that their mother, Rufina Vda. de Catacutan, who died on November
17, 2005, had acquired a parcel of land in Mapanique, Candaba, Pampanga, consisting of 3,272
square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3169. They contend that respondents
spouses Gaudencio and Teresita Punzalan (Spouses Punzalan) constructed their house on a
portion of said lot without their consent and knowledge. But petitioners allowed them to stay,
thinking that they would vacate once their need for the property arises. However, when they
made a demand, the Spouses Punzalan refused to vacate. Thus; on April 9, 2008, petitioners
wrote the spouses a formal demand letter to vacate. Still, they refused to leave the property.On
August 22, 2008, petitioners filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer.
MCTC: Ruled in favor of the plaintiff
RTC: Affirmed the decision of the MCTC
CA: Reversed the decisions of the lower courts on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
Petitioners insist that their complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer and thus, the
MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction.
Issue:Whether the MCTC has jurisdiction over the case
Ruling: Here, petitioners claim that their cause of action is one for unlawful detainer and not for
forcible entry. The Court disagrees.Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court in
ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.8 A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following: (1) the defendant's initial possession of the property was lawful, either by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon the
plaintiffs notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of
the property; and (4) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year from
the last demand to vacate the property.10

On the other hand, in an action for forcible entry, the following requisites are essential for the
MTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case.: (1) the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession
of the property; (2) the plaintiff was deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth; and (3) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the date of actual
entry on the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one (1)-year period is counted
from the time the plaintiff-owner or legal possessor learned of the deprivation of the physical
possession of the property. It is not necessary, however, for the complaint to expressly use the
exact language of the law. For as long as it is shown that^the dispossession took place under said
conditions, it is considered as sufficient compliance with the requirements.11

Contrary to petitioners' contention that none of the means to effectuate forcible entry was alleged
in the complaint, the Court finds that the allegations actually make up a case of forcible entry.
They claimed in their Complaint12 that the Spouses Punzalan constructed their dwelling house on
a portion of petitioners' lot, without the latter's prior consent and knowledge. This clearly falls
under stealth, which is defined as any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain
entrance into, or to remain within residence of another without permission.13 Here, the evidence
clearly reveal that the spouses' possession was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated,
considering that they started to occupy the subject lot and thereafter built a house on the same
without the permission and consent of petitioners. The spouses' entry into the land was,
therefore, effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners. Consequently, it is
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry
The Court held that the MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer..
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated February 17, 2012, and its Resolution dated July 25, 2012 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 112959, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SPOUSES ROMEO T. JAVIER AND ADORINA F. JAVIER, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES

EVANGELINE PINEDA DE GUZMAN AND VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, ARNEL
PINEDA, EDGAR PINEDA, HENRY PINEDA AND REGINO RAMOS, Respondents.
Facts: On April 8, 2005, petitioners filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cabanatuan
City (MTCC), a Complaint against respondents for Ejectment, pertinent portions of which
contain the following allegations:

Plaintiffs are the absolute owners of a parcel of land at Bakod Bayan, Cabanatuan City with an
area of 740 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113559, a copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "A" to "A-1";

Plaintiffs were in prior physical possession of the entire property;

 On December 13, 2004, the above-named defendants unlawfully entered a portion of said land
and arrogated unto themselves ownership thereof by enclosing the same with concrete hollow
blocks (chb) fence as shown by a copy of picture herewith attached.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged in their Answer that the area they fenced in had always
been in their possession as it was within the boundary of the lot they had been occupying. The
MTCC issued its Decision dated March 15, 2007, dismissing the complaint on the ground that
the case involved a boundary dispute, thus, a plenary action within the competence of the
Regional Trial Court is the proper remedy.
RTC: The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs-appellants
Aggrieved by the foregoing judgment, herein respondents elevated the case to the CA. In a
Decision dated September 24, 2008, the CA, in turn, reversed and set aside the RTC Decision
and reinstated the MTCC Decision.
Issue: whether the action filed by petitioners qualify as one for forcible entry based on the
allegations in the complaint
Ruling:
The MTCC and the CA are correct that the meat of the controversy between herein parties is the
actual boundaries or the metes and bounds of their respective lots. On this matter, Manalang v.
Bacani5 is quite instructive:

x x x a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an

ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is,
whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiffs property. A
boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration
or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The
defendant's possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the
expiration or termination of his right of possession.In forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the
plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 24, 2008, and its Resolution dated January 7, 2009, are hereby AFFIRMED.
HEIRS OF JOHNNY AOAS, REPRESENTED BY BETTY
PUCAY, Petitioners, v. JULIET AS-IL,Respondent.
Facts: As-il filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages against the Heirs of Aoas before the
MTC, claiming absolute ownership and possessory rights over the 42 square meter portion of a
parcel of land. She alleged that since time immemorial, she, by her predecessors and successors-
in-interest, had been in actual, open, physical, and notorious possession of the subject property;
that sometime in January 2005, she discovered that the Heirs of Aoas, by stealth and strategy,
initiated the preparatory digging, clearing and construction of a house and enclosing the subject
land, thus, depriving and dispossessing her of the same; and that when confronted, they asserted
ownership of the same property.
Issue: whether an ejectment case under Rule 70 is a proper remedy to resolve this controversy.
Ruling: Settled is the rule that a boundary dispute, as in this case, can only be resolved in the
context of an accion reivindicatoria, and not in an ejectment case. In Manalang v. Bacani, the
Court held that boundary dispute cannot be resolved in ejectment proceedings as it involves
different issues, to wit: The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is,
whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiffs property. A boundary
dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under
which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his
right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant's possession
was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of
his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very
beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior
possession de facto.