Wiring Voting AI V33 en PDF
Wiring Voting AI V33 en PDF
Wiring Voting AI V33 en PDF
Siemens
SIMATIC Safety Integrated for process automation Industry
Online
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/24690377 Support
Warranty and liability
Note The Application Examples are not binding and do not claim to be complete regarding the
circuits shown, equipping and any eventuality. The Application Examples do not represent
customer-specific solutions. They are only intended to provide support for typical
applications. You are responsible for ensuring that the described products are used
correctly. These Application Examples do not relieve you of the responsibility to use safe
practices in application, installation, operation and maintenance. When using these
Application Examples, you recognize that we cannot be made liable for any
damage/claims beyond the liability clause described. We reserve the right to make
changes to these Application Examples at any time without prior notice. If there are any
deviations between the recommendations provided in these Application Examples and
other Siemens publications – e.g. Catalogs – the contents of the other documents have
priority.
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the examples, information, programs, engineering and performance data etc.,
described in this Application Example shall be excluded. Such an exclusion shall
not apply in the case of mandatory liability, e.g. under the German Product Liability
Act ("Produkthaftungsgesetz"), in case of intent, gross negligence, or injury of life,
body or health, guarantee for the quality of a product, fraudulent concealment of a
deficiency or breach of a condition which goes to the root of the contract
("wesentliche Vertragspflichten"). The damages for a breach of a substantial
contractual obligation are, however, limited to the foreseeable damage, typical for
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the type of contract, except in the event of intent or gross negligence or injury to
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proof to your detriment.
Any form of duplication or distribution of these Application Examples or excerpts
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Table of Contents
Warranty and liability ................................................................................................... 2
1 Automation functions ........................................................................................ 6
1.1 Functionality of the functional example ................................................ 6
1.2 Presented architectures ....................................................................... 8
1.3 Properties for the fail-safe analog input module .................................. 9
2 Hardware configuration and wiring of one sensor (1oo1) and one F-
AI (1oo1) ........................................................................................................... 12
2.1 PFD calculation .................................................................................. 13
2.2 Wiring ................................................................................................. 13
2.2.1 Conventional wiring ............................................................................ 13
2.2.2 Wiring using an MTA (Marshalled Termination Assembly) ................ 17
2.3 Parameters for hardware configuration .............................................. 18
2.4 Configuring the logic ........................................................................... 21
2.4.1 Configuring with Safety Matrix ........................................................... 21
2.4.2 Configuring with CFCs ....................................................................... 24
Logic without channel fault evaluation (1oo1) .................................... 24
Logic with channel fault evaluation .................................................... 25
3 Hardware configuration and wiring of one sensor (1oo1) with
redundant F-AI (2oo2) ..................................................................................... 26
3.1 PFD calculation .................................................................................. 27
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1 Automation functions
1.1 Functionality of the functional example
Task
Several analog signals in a system are to be monitored in a safety-oriented
manner. Depending on the importance and risk of failure, there are several ways to
wire and evaluate the signals. For instance, the evaluation can be performed in the
analog input module and/or in the user program.
Fig. 1-1 illustrates an example of a plant unit, in which the valves (BV-100A and
BV-100B) require fail-safe closing, depending
on pressure,
the filling level and
the temperature.
2 Temperature TT-200A
Transmitters
Failsafe Analog Input Safety BV-100A BV-100B
Signals
TT-200B Logic
1 oo2 Voting in the
CPU
LSH-100A
3 Level Switches
Failsafe Discrete
Input Signals LSH-100B
2 oo3 Voting in the
CPU
LSH-100C
This functional example shows various possibilities of wiring and evaluating safety-
related signals.
Solution
Fig. 1-2 illustrates a plausible plant unit layout, in which different connection and
evaluation architectures of the analog signals are used.
2oo3
PT-100B F-AI
0
TT-200B
1 F-DO BV-100A
0
PT-100C F-AI
TT-200 Voting Logic BV-100 Voting Logic 1
0
F_CH_AI F_CH_DO
1oo2 OR
F-DO
0
LSH-100A F-DI
LSH-100 Voting Logic BV-100B
0
F_CH_DI 1
2oo3
LSH-100B F-DI
0
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LSH-100C F-DI
0
Note The fail-safe analog input module SM 336; F-AI 6 x 0/4 ... 20 mA HART with
order number 6ES7 336-4GE00-0AB0 is used in all functional examples. This is
hereafter referred to as F-AI.
Two sensors (1oo2) and redundant F-AI (2oo2) with evaluation in the user
program
Typical application when a single sensor does not have the required safety integrity
level and the data of both sensors must be visible in the automation system. This
architecture can be configured as redundant F-AI (2oo2) for increased availability
(explained in Chapter 7).
Three sensors (2oo3) with evaluation in the user program
Typical application when several sensors are required in order to achieve the
required safety integrity level and there is a desire for increased availability
(explained in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9).
Use of inputs
You can use the inputs as follows:
Each of the 6 channels for current measurement
– 0 to 20 mA (without HART utilization)
– 4 bis 20 mA (with/without HART utilization)
– Functional range of HART communication: 1.17 to typ. 35 mA
Fig. 1-5: SM 336 connection and basic circuit diagram; F-AI 6 x 0/4...mA HART
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Recommendation
You are strongly advised to use the short-circuit proof internal sensor supply of the
module. This internal sensor supply is monitored and its status is indicated by the
Fx LED (see picture: Front view of SM 336 front view; F-AI 6 x 0/4 ... 20 mA HART).
Note The I/O module in this architecture is certified for the safety integrity level SIL3.
However, to be SIL-compliant, the entire safety function – including the field
devices – must be assessed according to IEC 61508/IEC 61511.
In the 1oo1 basic architecture, one sensor is wired to one F-AI channel
(in Fig. 2-1 on Channel 0).
F-AI
Ch 0..5
Sensor 1
0
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CPU
1oo1
Voting
F_CH_AI Logic
2.2 Wiring
2.2.1 Conventional wiring
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In the 1oo1 evaluation scheme, the sensor can be supplied with voltage as follows:
internally through the F-AI or
via an external voltage source
Wiring examples
1
The formula was taken from IEC61508, IEC 61511 and VDI 2180 sheet 4
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
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4-Wire
Current
Transmitter
CAUTION The F-AI cannot detect an under-voltage in the transmitter. Therefore, you
should use transmitters with under-voltage detection.
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
recommended
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CAUTION The F-AI cannot detect an under-voltage in the transmitter. Therefore, you
should use transmitter with under-voltage detection.
4-Wire
Current
Transmitter
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recommended
The required parameters for operating the F-AI are set in the object properties of
the F-AI added (see Fig. 2-8).
The parameters are summarized in Table 2-2.
Note The hardware parameters and configuration window may differ from those in this
section due to the version of the module and hardware configuration pack. You
can find further information in the module's documentation.
Once the hardware has been configured, you can deploy the SIMATIC Safety
Matrix Engineering Tool (for further relevant information, see \5\ in the "Links and
Literature" chapter).
Fig. 2-9 illustrates how a cause for monitoring an input TAG is configured in the
Safety Matrix. The following settings must be used:
Input Type: Analog
1 input
Function type: Normal (1oo1 evaluation)
Enter the signal name in Tag 1 (e.g. F_TAG1001_X) or press the "I/O" button
to select the symbol from the symbol table.
As shown in Fig. 2-10, there are additional analog parameters that must be
configured for the cause:
Required parameters:
– Limit type: MAX or MIN
– Limit value
Optional parameters:
– Pre-alarm
– Hysteresis
– Units:
If the input TAG goes below or above the limit, the cause activates and triggers the
corresponding effect(s).
You can also activate additional options (e.g. time delay and bypass option),
depending on the process application.
As an alternative to using the Safety Matrix Tool, you can also implement the CPU
logic for reading the input signal by means of the STEP 7 CFC Editor.
There are two ways to implement the CFC logic:
Without channel fault evaluation
With channel fault evaluation
Note Depending on the parameter assignment of the "SUBS_ON" block input, the
F_CH_AI block outputs the substitute value or the last valid process value set at
the "SUBS_V" input in the event of a channel fault at the "V" output.
In the configuration shown (SUBS_ON = 0 on the F-channel driver), the last valid
value is used in case of error. It is not possible to predict whether this value is
above or below the limit.
Fig. 2-13 illustrates a sample logic created in the CFC Editor for reading a single
input signal that takes a channel fault into account. Please note that this example
starts from a MAX limit and that the output of the evaluation logic is switched off
to reach the safe state (Normal State = 1, Safe State = 0).
Note The I/O modules in this architecture are certified for achieving the safety integrity
level of SIL3. However, to be SIL-compliant, the entire safety function – including
the field devices – must be assessed according to IEC
61508/IEC 61511.
F-AI
Ch 0..5
0
CPU
1oo1
Voting
F_CH_AI Logic
Sensor 1
F-AI
Ch 0..5
The following table shows you when the safety function can be triggered by a
corresponding logic.
Note The redundancy of the I/O modules does not increase the safety integrity level.
3.2 Wiring
3.2.1 Conventional wiring
An example for the 1oo1 evaluation scheme with redundant F-AI can be found in
Fig. 3-2 and in Fig. 3-3. The sensor is wired to Channel 0 (terminals 3, 4, 5) of both F-AIs.
2
The formula was taken from IEC61508, IEC 61511 and VDI 2180 sheet 4
Special feature
The short-circuit between sensor supply voltage Vsn and Mn+ is controlled.
It is possible to detect undervoltage from the transmitter by reading back the
sensor supply in the F-AI.
It is necessary to include the external elements in the application-specific
safety consideration, i.e.: the external elements required for implementing the
redundancy (e.g. Zener diodes) must be included in the safety consideration).
Fig. 3-2: A 2-wire transmitter, internal sensor supply with module redundancy
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
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Fig. 3-3: A 4-wire transmitter, internal sensor supply with module redundancy
4-Wire
Current
Transmitter
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
recommended
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Fig. 3-5 A 4-wire transmitter, external sensor supply with module redundancy
4-Wire
Current
Transmitter
recommended
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The two F-AIs must be configured as a redundant pair in the HW Config. The F-AI
redundancy settings can be accessed through the object properties of one of the F-AIs.
For the sake of the hardware configuration example in Fig. 3-7, the redundancy
settings are made on the F-AI located in the ET 200M rack with the PROFIBUS
address 3. The interface of the redundancy settings is shown in Fig. 3-8 and the
settings are summarized in Table 3-2.
Note The hardware parameters and configuration window may differ from those in this
section due to the version of the module and hardware configuration pack. You
can find further information in the module's documentation.
If the redundancy settings have been made, the other hardware parameters can be
set in one of the redundant F-AIs. The settings are automatically applied to the
redundant module.
After the sensor has been added to the hardware configuration, the evaluation
logic for the signal can be implemented in the user program. One method is to use
the SIMATIC Safety Matrix Engineering Tool (for further relevant information, see
\5\ in the "Links and Literature" chapter).
The actual evaluation logic for monitoring a single sensor with redundant F-AI is
the same as that described in the Section 2.4.1 (Configuring with Safety Matrix).
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As an alternative to using the Safety Matrix Tool, you can also implement the CPU
logic for reading the input signal by means of the STEP 7 CFC Editor.
There are two ways to implement the CFC logic:
Without channel fault evaluation
With channel fault evaluation
Note Depending on the parameter assignment of the "SUBS_ON" block input, the
F_CH_AI block outputs the substitute value or the last valid process value set at
the "SUBS_V" input in the event of a channel fault at the "V" output.
In the logic shown (SUBS_ON = 0 on the F-channel driver), the last valid value
of both F-AI modules is used in case of error. It is not possible to predict whether
this value is above or below the limit.
Note When redundant F-AIs are used, activate the discrepancy evaluation on
F_CH_AI by setting the input "DISC_ON" to 1, "DISC_TIM" with a delay time,
and "DELTA" to a max. deviation. Interconnect the "DISCF" output to a message
block to alert the operator when there is a deviation between the redundant
signals.
Fig. 2-13 illustrates a sample logic created in the CFC Editor for reading an input
signal of the redundant F-AI that takes a channel fault into account. Please note
that this example starts from a MAX limit and that the output of the evaluation logic
is switched off to reach the safe state (Normal State = 1, Safe State = 0).
Note When redundant F-AIs are used, activate the discrepancy evaluation on
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Note The I/O modules in this architecture are certified for the safety integrity level
SIL3. However, to be SIL-compliant, the entire safety function – including the
field devices – must be assessed according to IEC 61508/IEC 61511.
In the 1oo2 architecture with evaluation in the F-AI, two sensors are wired to one
F-AI. A block diagram is displayed in Fig. 4-1.
When the 1oo2 evaluation is activated for a channel pair (0/3, 1/4, 2/5), the F-AI
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performs a discrepancy analysis between the two input signals. One of the process
values (MIN/MAX) is forwarded to the CPU depending on the parameter assignment.
The system uses the address of the channel with the lowest number. In Fig. 4-1,
the first sensor on Channel 0 is wired to the F-AI. The second sensor must then be
wired to Channel 3.
Sensor 2
3
3
The formula was taken from IEC61508, IEC 61511 and VDI 2180 sheet 4, see Appendix
4.2 Wiring
4.2.1 Conventional wiring
In the 1oo2 evaluation scheme, the F-AI or an external voltage source can supply
the sensors with voltage.
Fig. 4-2 illustrates a wiring example for 2-wire transmitters.
The first sensor in the figure is wired to channel 0 (terminals 3 and 4) and the
second sensor is wired to channel 3 (terminals 12 and 13).
Fig. 4-2: 1oo2 evaluation in the F-AI: 2-channel, 2-wire transmitter, internal supply
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
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2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
4-Wire
Current
Transmitter
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4-Wire
Current
Transmitter
Fig. 4-4 illustrates a wiring example for 2-wire transmitters with external power supply
and Fig. 4-5 illustrates a wiring example for 4-wire transmitters with external power
supply.
The first sensor in both diagrams is wired to channel 0 (terminals 4 and 5) and the
second sensor to channel 3 (terminals 13 and 14). It is recommended to connect the
M potentials together.
Fig. 4-4: 1oo2 evaluation in the F-AI: 2-channel, 2-wire transmitter with external supply
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
recommended
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2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
Fig. 4-5: 1oo2 evaluation in the F-AI: 2-channel, 4-wire transmitter with external supply
4-Wire
Current
Transmitter
recommended
4-Wire
Current
Transmitter
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The required parameters for operating the F-AI are set in the object properties of
the F-AI added (see Fig. 4-8).
The parameters are summarized in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2: 1oo2 evaluation in the F-AI Parameters for the hardware configuration
Parameter Description / Recommendations Desired setting
or permissible
value range
F-parameters
F_destination_address PROFIsafe address of the 1-1022 or
F-signal module (setting via DIP switch). 0000000001...
1111111110
F_monitoring Monitoring time for safety-related 0...65535ms
time communication between the CPU and the Default 2500ms
(ms) F-AI.
Remark: A worksheet is available on the
Siemens Support website to help users
calculate
F-monitoring times (see \10\ in the "Links
and Literature" chapter).
Note The hardware parameters and configuration window may differ from those in this
section due to the version of the module and hardware configuration pack. You
can find further information in the module's documentation.
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After the 1oo2 evaluation is configured in the F-AI, the CPU logic for reading a
single sensor can be implemented. As pointed out earlier, a 1oo1 evaluation
occurs in the user program after the F-AI handles the 1oo2 signal selection and
provides only one analog sensor signal to the CPU logic. One implementation
method is to use the SIMATIC Safety Matrix Engineering Tool (for further relevant
information, see \5\ in the "Links and Literature" chapter).
Fig. 4-9 illustrates how a cause for monitoring an input TAG is configured in the
Matrix. The following settings must be used:
Input Type: Analog
1 input
Function type: Normal (1oo1 evaluation)
Enter the signal name in Tag 1 (e.g. F_TAG1001_X) or press the "I/O" button
to select the symbol from the symbol table.
The cause is configured with the "Normal" function type.
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As shown in Fig. 4-10, there are additional analog parameters that must be
configured for the cause:
Required parameters:
– Limit type: MAX or MIN
– Limit value
Optional parameters:
– Pre-alarm
– Hysteresis
– Units:
If the input TAG goes below or above the limit, the cause activates and triggers the
corresponding effect(s).
You can also activate additional options (e.g. time delay and bypass option),
depending on the process application.
One configuration option highlighted in Fig. 4-11 is the disconnection in case of a
channel fault. If this option is activated, a channel fault at one of the sensor inputs
is evaluated as a trigger signal. Depending on the number of signals and the
function type, the cause can activate and trigger the corresponding effect(s).
As an alternative to using the Safety Matrix Tool, you can implement the CPU logic
for reading the input signal by means of the STEP 7 CFC Editor. The evaluation
logic can be generated in the CFC editor after the two sensor signals have been
added to the hardware configuration and the F-AI performs the 1oo2 evaluation.
There are two ways to implement the CFC logic:
Without channel fault evaluation
With channel fault evaluation
Fig. 4-12 illustrates a sample logic for reading a single input signal in the CFC
Editor, which does not take a channel fault into account. Please note that this
example starts from a MAX limit and that the output of the evaluation logic is
switched off to reach the safe state (Normal State = 1, Safe State = 0).
Note Depending on the parameter assignment of the "SUBS_ON" block input, the
F_CH_AI block outputs the substitute value or the last valid process value set at
the "SUBS_V" input in the event of a channel fault at the "V" output.
In the logic shown (SUBS_ON = 0 on the F-channel driver), the last valid value is
used in case of error. It is not possible to predict whether this value is above or
below the limit.
Note The I/O modules in this architecture are certified for achieving the safety integrity
level of SIL3. However, to be SIL-compliant, the entire safety function – including
the field devices – must be assessed according to IEC 61508/IEC 61511.
In this architecture, two sensors are wired to a redundant F-AI pair. A block
diagram can be found in Fig. 5-1.
The first sensor in the diagram is wired to channel 0 and the second sensor is
wired to channel 3 of both modules. The modules are configured as redundant
modules in HW Config. Each F-AI performs a 1oo2 evaluation of the two sensors.
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Only one analog F-channel driver is required. The F-channel driver chooses from
the incoming analog signals.
Sensor 2 CPU
3
Voting
F_CH_AI Logic
F-AI
Ch 0..5
0
Evalution
1002
The hardware configuration according to Fig. 5-1 is suitable for achieving SIL3.
The following table shows you when the safety function can be triggered by a
corresponding logic.
Note The redundancy of the I/O modules does not increase the safety integrity level.
The PFD value for this wiring and evaluation architecture is calculated using this
formula:
4
The formula was taken from IEC61508, IEC 61511 and VDI 2180 sheet 4, see Appendix
5.2 Wiring
5.2.1 Conventional wiring
An example for the 1oo2 evaluation scheme with evaluation in the F-AI and
redundant F-AI is illustrated in Fig. 5-2.
The first sensor is wired to channel 0 (terminals 3, 4, 5) and the second sensor is
wired to channel 3 (terminals 12, 13, 14) of both F-AIs.
Please note that this architecture also requires two Zener diodes for each sensor.
The first Zener diode has an avalanche voltage of 6.2 V and the second one has
an avalanche voltage of 5.6 V. Another two diodes are also used for decoupling the
voltage supply. The diodes and Zener diodes are needed in case an F-AI is out of
service (e.g. module failure, routine maintenance, etc.).
Fig. 5-2: 1oo2 evaluation in the redundant F-AI , 2-channel, 2-wire transmitter, internal
supply
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2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
The two F-AIs must be configured as a redundant pair in the HW Config. Each of
the F-AI redundancy settings can be accessed through the object properties of the
F-AIs.
For the sake of the hardware configuration example in Fig. 5-4, the redundancy
settings are made with PROFIBUS address 3 using the F-AI in the ET 200M.
The interface of the redundancy settings is shown in Fig. 5-5 and the settings are
summarized in Table 5-2.
Note The parameter names and configuration window may differ from those in this
section due to the version of the module and hardware configuration pack. You
can find further information in the module's documentation.
After adjusting the redundancy settings, the remaining hardware parameters for the
redundant F-AI can be set as described at the end of section 4.3. The settings are
applied automatically to the redundant partner.
After the 1oo2 evaluation is configured in the F-AI, the CPU logic for reading a
single sensor can be implemented. One implementation method is to use the
SIMATIC Safety Matrix Engineering Tool (for further relevant information, see \5\ in
the "Links and Literature" chapter).
The actual evaluation logic for the 1oo2 evaluation scheme with redundant F-AI is
the same as that described in the Section 4.4.1 (Configuring with Safety Matrix).
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As an alternative to using the Safety Matrix Tool, you can implement the CPU logic for
reading the input signal by means of the STEP 7 CFC Editor. The evaluation logic can
be generated in the CFC Editor after the F-AI performs the 1oo2 evaluation.
There are two ways to implement the CFC logic:
Without channel fault evaluation
With channel fault evaluation
Note Depending on the parameter assignment of the "SUBS_ON" block input, the
F_CH_AI block outputs the substitute value or the last valid process value set at
the "SUBS_V" input in the event of a channel fault at the "V" output.
In the logic shown (SUBS_ON = 0 on the F-channel driver), the last valid value is
used in case of error. It is not possible to predict whether this value is above or
below the limit.
Note When redundant F-AIs are used, activate the discrepancy evaluation on
F_CH_AI by setting the input "DISC_ON" to 1, "DISC_TIM" with a delay time,
and "DELTA" to a max. deviation. Interconnect the "DISCF" output to a message
block to alert the operator when there is a deviation between the redundant
signals.
Fig. 5-7 illustrates a sample logic created in the CFC Editor for reading an input
signal that takes a channel fault into account. Please note that this example starts
from a MAX limit and that the output of the evaluation logic is switched off to reach
the safe state (Normal State = 1, Safe State = 0).
Note When redundant F-AIs are used, activate the discrepancy evaluation on
F_CH_AI by setting the input "DISC_ON" to 1, "DISC_TIM" with a delay time,
and "DELTA" to a max. deviation. Interconnect the "DISCF" output to a message
block to alert the operator when there is a deviation between the redundant
signals.
Note This architecture can achieve the safety integrity level SIL3. However, to be SIL-
compliant, the entire safety function – including the field devices – must be
assessed according to IEC 61508/IEC 61511.
For this scheme, one can choose between two design variants, which differ in their
PFD and availability.
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The hardware configuration according to Fig. 6-1 is suitable for achieving SIL3.
The following table shows you when the safety function can be triggered by a
corresponding logic.
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CPU
F_CH_AI 1oo2
Voting
Logic
F-AI
Ch 0..5
Sensor 2
0
The hardware configuration according to Figure 4-2 is suitable for achieving SIL3.
5
The formula was taken from IEC61508, IEC 61511 and VDI 2180 sheet 4, see Appendix
The following table shows you when the safety function can be triggered by a
corresponding logic.
formula:
With:
6
The formula was taken from IEC61508, IEC 61511 and VDI 2180 sheet 4, see Appendix
6.3 Wiring
6.3.1 Conventional wiring
In the 1oo2 evaluation scheme, the sensors can be powered from the F-AI or an
external voltage source.
The following diagrams show the wiring for 2-wire and 4-wire transmitters powered
from the F-AI or an external voltage source.
The transmitters in the following diagrams are wired to two channels of an
F-AI. The first sensor is wired to channel 0 (terminals 3, 4, 5 - jumper to 1M) and
the second sensor to channel 3 (terminals 12, 13, 14 - jumper to 1M).
The F-AI is supplied with power via 1L+/1M (terminals 1 and 2), and the sensors
via Vs0... Vs5 (terminal 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18), depending on the channel, or from an
external voltage source.
Fig. 6-3: 1oo2 evaluation in the user program, 2-wire transmitter, 2-channel connection,
internal supply
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2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
Fig. 6-4: 1oo2 evaluation in the user program, 4-wire transmitter, 2-channel connection,
internal supply
SM336;
AI 6x 0/4...20mA HART
L+ 1
1L+
M 2
1M
Vs0 3
CH0 M0+ 4 4-Wire
+
M0- 5
Current
- Transmitter
Vs1 6
CH1 M1+ 7
M1- 8
Vs2 9
CH2 M2+ 10
+ 4-Wire
Current
M2- 11 - Transmitter
Vs3 12
CH3 M3+ 13
M3- 14
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Vs4 15
CH4 M4+ 16
M4- 17
Vs5 18
CH5 M5+ 19
M5- 20
The
Fig. 6-5 shows an example where an external voltage source with 2-wire
transmitters is used:
Fig. 6-5: 1oo2 evaluation in the user program, 2-wire transmitter, 2-channel connection,
external supply
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
recommended
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2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
The Fig. 6-6 illustrates an external voltage source with a 4-wire transmitter.
Fig. 6-6: 1oo2 evaluation in the user program, 4-wire transmitter, 2-channel connection,
external supply
4-Wire
Current
Transmitter
recommended
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4-Wire
Current
Transmitter
The required parameters for operating the F-AI are set in the object properties of
the F-AI added (see Fig. 6-9 and Fig. 6-10).
Table 6-3: 1oo2 evaluation in the user program. Hardware configuration parameters
Parameter Description / Recommendations Desired setting
or permissible
value range
F-parameters
F_destination_address PROFIsafe address of the 1-1022 or
F-signal module (setting via DIP switch). 0000000001...
1111111110
F_monitoring Monitoring time for safety-related 0...65535ms
time communication between the CPU and the Default 2500ms
(ms) F-AI.
Remark: A worksheet is available on the
Siemens Support website to help users
calculate
F-monitoring times (see \10\ in the "Links
and Literature" chapter).
Module parameters
Diagnostic interrupt A diagnostic interrupt is triggered by various Release / lock
error events that can be detected by the
module. These events are then reported to
the CPU.
Remark:
If the diagnostic interrupt is released at the
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Note The hardware parameters and configuration window may differ from those in this
section due to the version of the module and hardware configuration pack. You
can find further information in the module's documentation.
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After the sensor signals have been added to the hardware configuration, the 1oo2
evaluation logic can be implemented in the user program. One option is to use the
SIMATIC Safety Matrix Engineering Tool (for further relevant information, see \5\ in
the "Links and Literature" chapter).
Fig. 6-11 illustrates how a cause for the 1oo2 evaluation of the sensor signals is
configured in the matrix. The following settings must be used:
Input Type: Analog
2 inputs
Function type: OR (1oo2)
Tag 1 and Tag 2 must be entered and should correspond to the symbolic I/O
name of the encoder (e.g. F_TAG1001_X and F_TAG1002_X). The input can
be added by selecting the signal from the symbol table. To do this, use the
"I/O" button.
The cause is configured with the OR (1oo2) function type. If at least one encoder is
released for triggering, the cause activates and triggers the corresponding effect(s).
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Fig. 6-11: 1oo2 evaluation in the user program (Safety Matrix – Configure)
As shown in Fig. 6-12, there are additional analog parameters that must be
configured for the cause:
Required parameters:
– Limit type: MAX or MIN
– Limit value
Optional parameters:
– Pre-alarm
– Hysteresis
– Delta
– Units:
Fig. 6-12: 1oo2 evaluation in the user program (Safety Matrix – Analog parameter)
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Additional attributes are available (e.g. time delay and bypass option), depending
on the process application.
One configuration option highlighted in Fig. 6-13 is the shutdown behavior in case
of a channel fault. If this option is activated, a channel fault will act as a violation of
the limit on a sensor input. in the case of OR (1oo2), if there is a channel error and
the option is enabled, the cause activates and triggers the corresponding effect(s).
Fig. 6-13: 1oo2 evaluation in the user program (Safety Matrix – Options)
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As an alternative to using the Safety Matrix Tool, you can implement the 1oo2
evaluation logic for the input signals by means of the STEP 7 CFC Editor. After the
sensor signals have been added to the hardware configuration, the 1oo2
evaluation logic can be implemented with the CFC Editor.
There are two ways to implement the CFC logic:
Without channel fault evaluation
With channel fault evaluation
Please note that by using the appropriate logic blocks, you can also implement a
2oo2 evaluation in the user program.
Fig. 6-14 illustrates an example logic created in the CFC Editor for 1oo2 evaluation that
does not take channel faults into account.
Please note that this example starts from a MAX limit and that the output of the evaluation
logic is switched off to reach the safe state (Normal State = 1, Safe State = 0).
Note Depending on the parameter assignment of the "SUBS_ON" block input, the
F_CH_AI block outputs the substitute value or the last valid process value set at
the "SUBS_V" input in the event of a channel fault at the "V" output.
In the logic shown (SUBS_ON = 0 on the F-channel driver), the last valid value is
used in case of error. It is not possible to predict whether this value is above or
below the limit.
Fig. 6-15 illustrates an example logic created in the CFC Editor for 1oo2 evaluation
that takes channel faults into account.
Please note that this example starts from a MAX limit and that the output of the
evaluation logic is switched off to reach the safe state (Normal State = 1, Safe
State = 0).
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Note The I/O modules in this architecture are certified for achieving the safety integrity
levels of SIL3. However, to be SIL-compliant, the entire safety function –
including the field devices – must be assessed according to IEC 61508/IEC
61511.
In this architecture, two sensors are wired to a pair of redundant F-AIs. A block
diagram can be found in Fig. 7-1.
In the diagram, the first sensor on Channel 0 is wired to both F-AIs. The second
sensor is wired to Channel 1 of both F-AIs. The F-AIs are configured as redundant
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modules in the HW Config. Only one analog input channel driver block per sensor
is required. The driver block selects a signal from the incoming signals of the
redundant F-AI.
Sensor 1
0
CPU
1
1oo2
F_CH_AI
Voting
Logic
F-AI
Ch 0..5
Sensor 2
1
The hardware configuration according to Fig. 7-1 is suitable for achieving SIL3.
The following table shows you when the safety function can be triggered by a
corresponding logic.
Note The redundancy of the I/O modules does not increase the safety integrity level
7
The formula was taken from IEC61508, IEC 61511 and VDI 2180 sheet 4, see Appendix
7.2 Wiring
7.2.1 Conventional wiring
A simplified example of the 2(1oo2) evaluation scheme with evaluation in the user
program and redundant F-AI is illustrated in Fig. 7-2. The first sensor is wired to
channel 0 (terminals 3, 4, 5) of both F-AIs and the second sensor is wired to
channel 1 (terminals 6, 7, 8) of both F-AIs.
Please note that this architecture also requires two Zener diodes for each sensor.
The first Zener diode has an avalanche voltage of 6.2 V and the second one has a
avalanche voltage of 5.6V. Another two diodes are also used for decoupling the
voltage supply. The diodes and Zener diodes are needed in case one of the F-AIs
is out of service (e.g. module failure, routine maintenance, etc.).
Fig. 7-2: 1oo2 evaluation in the user program, redundant F-AI, 2-wire, 2-channel transmitter,
internal supply
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
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2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
The two F-AIs must be configured as a redundant pair in the HW Config. Each of
the F-AI redundancy settings can be accessed through the object properties of the
F-AIs.
For further information on hardware, see \4\ in the "Links and Literature" chapter.
In Fig. 7-4, the redundancy settings are made with PROFIBUS address 3 using the
F-AI in the ET 200M. The settings are summarized in Table 7-2.
Table 7-2: 2 1oo2 evaluation in the user program – redundant F-AI - Redundancy
parameters
Parameter Description / Recommendations Desired setting or
permissible value
range
Redundancy Shows whether the F-AI is acting as part of a Two (2)
redundant pair or not. modules
Remark:
For redundancy, the parameter must be set
to 2 modules.
Redundant Used for selecting the redundant partner
module module.
Note The parameter names and configuration window may differ from those in this
section due to the version of the module and hardware configuration pack. You
can find further information in the module's documentation.
If the redundancy settings have been made, the other hardware parameters can be
set in one of the redundant F-AIs. The settings are automatically applied to the
redundant module.
After the sensor signals have been added to the hardware configuration, the 1oo2
evaluation logic can be implemented in the user program. One option is to use the
SIMATIC Safety Matrix Engineering Tool (for further relevant information, see \5\ in
the "Links and Literature" chapter).
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The actual evaluation logic of the 2(1oo2) evaluation scheme with evaluation in the
user program and redundant F-AI is identical to the one described in
Section 6.5.1 (Configuring with Safety Matrix).
As an alternative to using the Safety Matrix Tool, you can implement the 1oo2
evaluation logic for the input signals by means of the STEP 7 CFC Editor. After the
sensor signals have been added to the hardware configuration, the 1oo2
evaluation logic can be implemented with the CFC Editor.
There are two ways to implement the CFC logic:
Without channel fault evaluation
With channel fault evaluation
Please note that by using the appropriate
logic blocks, you can also implement a 2oo2 evaluation in the user program.
Fig. 6-14 illustrates an example logic created in the CFC Editor for 1oo2 evaluation
that does not take channel faults into account.
Please note that this example starts from a MAX limit and that the output of the
evaluation logic is switched off to reach the safe state (Normal State = 1, Safe
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State = 0).
Note Depending on the parameter assignment of the "SUBS_ON" block input, the
F_CH_AI block outputs the substitute value or the last valid process value set at
the "SUBS_V" input in the event of a channel fault at the "V" output.
In the logic shown (SUBS_ON = 0 on the F-channel driver), the last valid value is
used in case of error. It is not possible to predict whether this value is above or
below the limit.
the symbol on the F-AI with the lowest address (e.g. F_TAG1001_X to
EW512). Use a limit block (F_LIM_HL or F_LIM_LL) to compare the signal with
the tripping limit value.
Create an F_CH_AI channel driver for the second analog
sensor and connect it to the symbol on the F-AI with the lowest address
(e.g. F_TAG1002_X to EW514). Use a limit block (F_LIM_HL or F_LIM_LL) to
compare the signal with the tripping limit value.
Create an AND operation for the negated output values of the limit blocks
(QHN or QLN).
Note The I/O modules in this architecture are certified for the safety integrity level
SIL3. However, to be SIL-compliant, the entire safety function – including the
field devices – must be assessed according to IEC 61508/IEC 61511.
The 2oo3 base architecture with evaluation in the user program uses three sensors
and three F-AI. A block diagram can be found in Fig. 8-1. In the diagram, each
sensor on Channel 0 is wired to one F-AI. In this example, the F-AI are integrated
into an ET 200M.
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Please note that due to the system flexibility, there could be also other
architectures that differ to the variant described in terms of the availability of the
modules and ET 200M racks, e.g.:
Low availability:
All three sensors are connected to one module.
Similar availability of the modules:
All three sensors are connected to two mutually redundant modules. The two
modules are integrated in the same ET 200M rack.
Higher availability of modules and ET 200M racks:
All three sensors are connected to two mutually redundant modules. The two
modules are integrated in various ET 200M racks (see Chapter 9).
Higher availability of modules and ET 200M racks:
Each sensor is connected to a module. The modules are integrated in various
ET 200M racks.
F-AI
Ch 0..5
Sensor 2 CPU
0
F_CH_AI 2oo3
Voting
Logic
F-AI
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Ch 0..5
Sensor 3
0
The hardware configuration according to Figure 8-1 is suitable for achieving SIL3.
The following table shows you when the safety function can be triggered by a
corresponding logic.
Failed component detected? Tripping of the safety
function possible?
Sensor Sensor Sensor F-AI 1 F-AI 2 F-AI 3
1 2 3
Yes No No Yes No No Yes (not required)
No Yes No Yes
No No Yes Yes
No Yes No Yes No No Yes
No Yes No Yes (not required)
No No Yes Yes
No No Yes Yes No No Yes
No Yes No Yes
No No Yes Yes (not required)
X Yes Yes X X X Yes
Yes X Yes
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Yes Yes X
X X X X Yes Yes
Yes X Yes
Yes Yes X
With:
8
The formula was taken from IEC61508, IEC 61511 and VDI 2180 sheet 4, see Appendix
8.2 Wiring
8.2.1 Conventional wiring
In the 2oo3 evaluation scheme, the F-AI or an external voltage source can supply
the sensors with voltage.
Fig. 8-2 illustrates a wiring example for 2-wire transmitters and
Fig. 8-3 illustrates a wiring example for 4-wire transmitters.
In both diagrams, each transmitter on Channel 0 is wired to one F-AI.
Fig. 8-2: 2oo3, evaluation in the user program with 3 F-AIs and 3 transmitters, 2-wire,
internal supply.
Process variable
is acquired with
mechanically 2-Wire 2-Wire 2-Wire
separate sensors. Current Current Current
Transmitter Transmitter Transmitter
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Fig. 8-3: 2oo3 evaluation in the user program with 3 F-AIs and 3 transmitters, 4-wire, internal
supply.
SM336;
AI 6x 0/4...20mA HART
1L+
L+ 1
M
M 2
Vs0 3
Vs1 6
CH1 M1+ 7
SM336;
M1- 8 AI 6x 0/4...20mA HART
L+ 1 1L+
Vs2 9
M 2 M
CH2 M2+ 10
Vs0 3
M5- 20
Vs1 6
CH3 M3+ 13
CH1 M1+ 7
M3- 14
M1- 8
Vs4 15
Vs2 9
CH4 M4+ 16
CH2 M2+ 10
M4- 17
Vs5 18
M2- 11
CH5 M5+ 19
Vs3 12
M5- 20
CH3 M3+ 13
M3- 14
Vs4 15
CH4 M4+ 16
M4- 17
Vs5 18
CH5 M5+ 19
M5- 20
Fig. 8-4 illustrates a wiring example for 2-wire transmitters with one external
voltage source and Fig. 8-5 shows a wiring example for 4-wire transmitters with
one external voltage source.
In both diagrams, each transmitter on Channel 0 is wired to one F-AI.
Fig. 8-4: 2oo3 evaluation in the user program with 3 F-AIs and 3 transmitters, 2-wire,
external supply.
Fig. 8-5: 2oo3 evaluation in the user program with 3 F-AIs and 3 transmitters, 4-wire,
external supply.
SM336;
AI 6x 0/4...20mA HART
1L+
L+ 1
M
M 2
Vs0 3
CH1 M1+ 7
SM336;
M1- 8 AI 6x 0/4...20mA HART
L+ 1 1L+
Vs2 9
M 2 M
CH2 M2+ 10
Vs0 3
M
CH1 M1+ 7
M3- 14
M1- 8
Vs4 15
Vs2 9
CH4 M4+ 16
CH2 M2+ 10
M4- 17
Vs5 18
M2- 11
CH5 M5+ 19
Vs3 12
M5- 20
CH3 M3+ 13
M3- 14
Vs4 15
CH4 M4+ 16
M4- 17
Vs5 18
CH5 M5+ 19
M5- 20
Fig. 8-6 shows an example of a hardware configuration with three F-AIs. In this
example, the ET 200M (IM153-2) contains an F-AI in each of slots 4, 5 and 6. Each
of the three sensor signals is wired to the first channel of an F-AI. For further
information on hardware configuration, see \4\ in the "Links and Literature" chapter.
The required parameters for operating the F-AI are set in the object properties of
the F-AI added (see Fig. 8-7).
The parameters themselves are summarized in Table 8-1.
Note The hardware parameters and configuration window may differ from those in this
section due to the version of the module and hardware configuration pack. You
can find further information in the module's documentation.
After the three sensor signals have been added to the hardware configuration, the
2oo3 evaluation logic can be implemented in the user program. One option is to
use the SIMATIC Safety Matrix Engineering Tool (for further relevant information,
see \5\ in the "Links and Literature" chapter).
Figure 8-8 illustrates how a cause is configured in the Matrix for 2oo3 evaluation.
The following settings must be used:
Input Type: Analog
3 inputs
Function type: Majority Evaluation (2oo3 evaluation)
Tag 1, Tag 2 and Tag 3 must be entered and should correspond to the
symbolic I/O name of the encoder (e.g. F_TAG1001_X, F_TAG1002_X and
F_TAG 1003_X). The input can be added by selecting the signal from the
symbol table. To do this, use the "I/O" button.
The cause is configured with a Majority Evaluation (2oo3 evaluation) function type.
If at least two of the three encoders are released for triggering, the cause activates
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and triggers the corresponding effect(s). Please note that it is also possible to
configure other evaluation architectures – 1oo3 (OR) or 3oo3 (AND) – in the
"Function Type" field.
As shown in Fig. 8-9, there are additional analog parameters that must be set for
the cause:
Required parameters:
– Limit type: MAX or MIN
– Limit value
Optional parameters:
– Pre-alarm
– Hysteresis
– Delta
– Unit of measurement
Exceeding the delta value is reported. It is not considered a shutdown criterion.
Additional attributes are available (e.g. time delay and bypass option), depending
on the process application.
One configuration option highlighted in Fig. 8-10 is the shutdown behavior in case
of a channel fault.
If this option is activated, a channel fault at one of the sensor inputs is evaluated as
a trigger signal. In a Majority Evaluation (2oo3) (if this option is enabled), the cause
is activated and the relevant effect(s) are triggered on the occurrence of two
channel faults, or a channel fault and a channel limit violation.
As an alternative to using the Safety Matrix Tool, you can implement the 2oo3
evaluation logic for the CPU by means of the STEP 7 CFC Editor. After the three
sensor signals have been added to the hardware configuration, the 2oo3
evaluation logic can be made with the CFC Editor.
There are two ways to implement the CFC logic:
Without channel fault evaluation
With channel fault evaluation
Note Depending on the parameter assignment of the "SUBS_ON" block input, the
F_CH_AI block outputs the substitute value or the last valid process value set at
the "SUBS_V" input in the event of a channel fault at the "V" output.
In the logic shown (SUBS_ON = 0 on the F-channel driver), the last valid value
is used in case of error. It is not possible to predict whether this value is above or
below the limit.
Connect the negated outputs of the limit value blocks (QHN or QLN) with the
inputs of an F_2OUT3 block in order to generate the signal for the trigger
command.
Fig. 8-12 shows an example logic for 2oo3 evaluation in the CFC Editor, which
takes channel faults into account. Please note that this example starts from a MAX
limit and that the output of the evaluation logic is switched off to reach the safe
state (Normal State = 1, Safe State = 0).
Note These architectures are able to achieve the safety integrity level SIL3 because
the three signals are evaluated in the user program. However, to be SIL-
compliant, the entire safety function – including the field devices – must be
assessed according to IEC 61508/IEC 61511.
Figure 9-1 illustrates a block diagram with redundant F-AI. This optional 2oo3
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architecture uses three sensors and two redundant F-AIs in two ET 200M racks.
The three sensors in the diagram are wired to channels 0, 1 and 2 of both F-AIs.
F-AI
Ch 0.. 5
Sensor 1
0
Sensor 2
1
Sensor 3 CPU
2
F _ CH _AI
2 oo 3
Voting
Logic
F-AI
Ch 0.. 5
0
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The hardware configuration according to Figure 9-1 is suitable for achieving SIL3.
The following table shows you when the safety function can be triggered by a
corresponding logic.
Note The redundancy of the I/O modules does not increase the safety integrity level.
9
The formula was taken from IEC61508, IEC 61511 and VDI 2180 sheet 4, see Appendix
9.2 Wiring
9.2.1 Conventional wiring
A simplified example of the 2oo3 evaluation scheme with redundant F-AI and
evaluation in the user program is illustrated in Fig. 9-2. The first sensor is wired to
channel 0 (terminals 3, 4, 5) of both F-AIs, the second sensor is wired to channel 1
(terminals 6, 7, 8) and the third sensor to channel 2 (terminals 9, 10, 11) of both
F-AIs. Please note that this architecture also requires two Zener diodes for each
sensor. The first Zener diode has an avalanche voltage of 6.2 V and the second
one has an avalanche voltage of 5.6 V. Another two diodes are also used for
decoupling the voltage supply. The diodes and Zener diodes are needed in case
one of the F-AIs is out of service (e.g. module failure).
Fig. 9-2: 2oo3 evaluation in the user program, redundant F-AI, 3-channel transmitter, 2-wire,
internal supply
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
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2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
2-Wire
Current
Transmitter
Fig. 9-3: 2oo3 evaluation scheme with redundant F-AI and evaluation in the user program -
hardware configuration plan
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The two F-AIs must be configured as a redundant pair in the HW Config. Each of
the F-AI redundancy settings can be accessed through the object properties of the
F-AIs.
For the sake of the hardware configuration example in Fig. 9-4, the redundancy
settings are made with PROFIBUS address 3 using the F-AI in the ET 200M. The
settings are summarized in Table 9-2.
Fig. 9-4: 2oo3 evaluation scheme with redundant F-AI and evaluation in the user program -
Redundancy parameters
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Table 9-2: 2oo3 evaluation scheme with redundant F-AI and evaluation in the user program
Redundancy parameters
Parameter Description / Recommendations Desired setting or
permissible value
range
Redundancy Shows whether the F-AI is acting as part of a Two (2)
redundant pair or not. modules
Remark:
For redundancy, the parameter must be set
to 2 modules.
Redundant Used for selecting the redundant partner
module module.
Note The parameter names and configuration window may differ from those in this
section due to the version of the module and hardware configuration pack. You
can find further information in the module's documentation.
If the redundancy settings have been made, the other hardware parameters can be
set in one of the redundant F-AIs. The settings are automatically applied to the
redundant module.
You can find a description of the hardware parameters at the end of section 0.
After the three sensor signals have been added to the hardware configuration, the
2oo3 evaluation logic can be implemented in the user program. One option is to
use the SIMATIC Safety Matrix Engineering Tool (for further relevant information,
see \5\ in the "Links and Literature" chapter).
The actual evaluation logic for the 2oo3 evaluation scheme with redundant F-AI
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and evaluation in the user program is the same as that described in the Section
8.4.1 (Configuring with Safety Matrix).
As an alternative to using the Safety Matrix Tool, you can implement the 2oo3
evaluation logic for the CPU by means of the STEP 7 CFC Editor. There are two
ways to implement the CFC logic:
Without channel fault evaluation
With channel fault evaluation
The logic for both options corresponds to the solutions described in Chapter 8.4.2.
Note Depending on the parameter assignment of the "SUBS_ON" block input, the
F_CH_AI block outputs the substitute value or the last valid process value set at
the "SUBS_V" input in the event of a channel fault at the "V" output.
In the logic shown (SUBS_ON = 0 on the F-channel driver), the last valid value is
used in case of error. It is not possible to predict whether this value is above or
below the limit.
Note When redundant F-AIs are used, activate the discrepancy evaluation on
F_CH_AI by setting the input "DISC_ON" to 1, "DISC_TIM" with a delay time,
and "DELTA" to a max. deviation. Interconnect the "DISCF" output to a message
block to alert the operator when there is a deviation between the redundant
signals.
inputs of an F_2OUT3 block in order to generate the signal for the trigger command.
Fig. 9-6 shows an example logic for 2oo3 evaluation in the CFC Editor, which takes
channel faults into account. Please note that this example starts from a MAX limit
and that the output of the evaluation logic is switched off to reach the safe state
(Normal State = 1, Safe State = 0).
Note When redundant F-AIs are used, activate the discrepancy evaluation on
F_CH_AI by setting the input "DISC_ON" to 1, "DISC_TIM" with a delay time,
and "DELTA" to a max. deviation. Interconnect the "DISCF" output to a message
block to alert the operator when there is a deviation between the redundant
signals.
(F_LIM_HL or F_LIM_LL) to compare the signal with the tripping limit value.
Create an F_CH_AI F-channel driver for the third analog sensor and connect the
corresponding I/O signal to the block. Use a limit block (F_LIM_HL or F_LIM_LL)
to compare the signal with the tripping limit value.
Implement the evaluation logic by interconnecting the inputs of an F_2OUT3
block with the outputs of the following AND operations:
– The negated output QBAD (F_NOT) of the first channel driver with the
negated value of the first limit module output (QHN or QLN).
– The negated output QBAD (F_NOT) of the second channel driver with the
negated value of the second limit module output (QHN or QLN).
– The negated output QBAD (F_NOT) of the third channel driver with the
negated value of the third limit module output (QHN or QLN).
APPENDIX
You can find the PFD value for the F-CPU in the manual "Safety Engineering in
SIMATIC S7" (see \8\ in the "Links and Literature" chapter) or as a download on
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When calculating the PFDavg for a safety function, an additional PFD value must
be added for the safety-related communication.
Table 10-3
Safety-related Low demand mode After a service life of
communication (average probability of
failure on demand)
< 1E-05* 20 years
*Note for S7-300/400 F-CPUs:
The PFDavg value is valid under the assumption that a maximum of 25 fail-safe
I/Os are involved in a safety function. If more than 25 fail-safe I/Os are used, you
must also add 3.5E-7 fail-safe I/O for this safety function.
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The power feed should be routed to a power feed unit installed as part of the
cabinet system. Please note that each power feed should have an independent
power feed unit. The power feed unit should have a number of terminals with
overcurrent protection. To increase system availability, a circuit breaker should be
used for overcurrent protection. A second power feed (which requires a second
power feed unit in the cabinet) can be used for improved system availability.
The power feed unit should have a connection for each conductor of the infeed:
Cable
Neutral / return conductor and
GND
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The ground connection for the infeed should be marked or color coded so that it
can be recognized as a ground connection. This ground connection must be
connected to the housing with low resistance. The ground connection terminal
should be held in place mechanically to ensure ground protection.
The infeed should have individual distribution terminals for connecting the loads in
the cabinet. The distribution terminals should be grouped, each with a ground
terminal for ground connections. Additional ground connections are required to
ground the rack used for mounting the system components.
The system power supply outputs cabinet-specific 24 V DC for the cabinet loads.
The system power supply should have multiple outputs with terminals for each line.
The system supply should be isolated from all other ground references – as well as
any load supplied with system power.
System power can be supplied via a discrete power supply connected to the infeed
(described in Section 11.1.1). The power supply is usually integrated per rack.
The power supply supplies the controllers and I/O modules with 24 V DC. The
power supply for the communication modules, as well as the communication itself
pass over the backplane bus modules. When using isolated modules, the
backplane current and communication from the field I/O are galvanically
isolated. This isolation has two benefits:
Isolation of control level and field level
Protection of the control level from noise and overvoltages
Larger systems can use the system power supply for the field level and a dedicated
rack power supply for the control level. This is advantageous if the field devices
require more power than what is provided by the SIMATIC standard power
supplies. In such cases, the design should support redundant power supplies.
Redundant power supply architectures increase system reliability in online repairs
11.2 Grounding
11.2.1 Objective
ground connection, there should be only one path leading from that point to the
grounding point.
The linear grounding method is limited when using distributed process control systems.
A distributed system is a system in which components are distributed locally in a plant.
In this type of architecture, the linear grounding method can be efficiently applied to
system components called units (functions) (or isolation islands). A unit can be defined
as follows:
Galvanic isolation of other units
Physical separation of other units (functions), so that electrical disturbances
are diverted locally
In systems with units, each part uses a local, linear ground bar to reduce lightning
and electronic noise.
11.2.2 Implementation
The grounding recommendations given in this section are specific to cabinets with
power supplies that supply system components with 24 V DC. The grounding rules
are simplified by placing the system supply in the individual cabinets. If the energy
is shared between the cabinets, the equipment should be in the immediate vicinity
to keep a single grounding reference point and maintain connections. A system
with a centralized power supply should be located within a lightning protection zone
(usually within a building or construction). For all systems outside a common
lightning protection zone, isolation techniques should be used to reduce the
susceptibility to interference. Typical isolation barriers include local power supplies,
optical communication for data highways, and potential-isolated signal transmission
techniques (e.g. relay contacts, etc.).
Grounding
The cabinet design should keep the energy supply separate from other access
openings. The electric current should be connected to a single distribution unit
within the cabinet. As part of the power feed unit, there should be a connection
point for the cabinet grounding. This connection should include the necessary
conductors for the proper operation of the protection device and for operator
protection. The GND connection of the cabinet should be marked or color-coded. If
multiple current sources are used (e.g. for redundancy), you have to use
independent power feed units, and each current source should have its own
cabinet ground connection.
Shield terminations
Field wiring shield terminations should be standard for I/O modules. The physical
terminations for shielding should be provided at the termination location of the field
signal wires, referred to as a shield collection. The shield collection should be
isolated from mounting plates or rail assemblies within cabinets. Shield collections
must accommodate a ground connection. The ground connection connects a
shield collection to the local equal potential ground bar (LEPG).
To complete the shield installation, the LEPG bar must be connected to a ground
reference. The ground is preferably connected to a grounding system, which is also
used for grounding the neutral conductors of the power supply system. Most
industrial plants support a centralized grounding point for connecting "locally"
diverted grounding systems. The connection to ground reference should be as
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follows:
Low impedance (0.5 ohms or less)
As short a physical path as possible
Separate and independent from the safety ground connections required for
operator protection
Please note that the grounding of shields at one location provides protection from
low frequency noise encountered in industrial environments. Care should be taken
to ensure no other connections to ground occur for shields.
DC grounding
Power supplies are typically installed in the cabinets to supply the operating
voltage of 24 V DC. The power supplies have no connection to ground or power
feeds. Depending on the user requirements, the system works in either an
ungrounded mode (floating) or connected to a user-specified reference point.
System setup
S7-400 F/FH systems (including controllers and I/O modules) can work in
grounded or ungrounded mode. To accommodate both operating modes, the
system design includes a jumper that creates a reference potential to ground
connection.
When the jumper is removed, the reference potential is disconnected
from the housing ground.
Depending on the product, the bridge is either part of the hardware module
(see Figure 11-1) or of the system backplane (see Figure 11-2).
Figure 11-1: Installation location of the bridge with IM-153 (ET 200M interface module)
Lage
Jumper der Brücke
location on S7- Entfernen Sie die to
Remove jumper Brücke
eliminate
beiIM-153
300 and IM-153 Modulen
modules für erdfreien Aufbau
frame connection
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Galvanic connection
Reference point
Connection Connection
Anschluss
Connection to rackder
for
DC groundingder
Masse S7-400
Lastspannung
modules
Properties
MTAs are characterized by the following properties:
Redundant 24 V DC power supply with LED display
Screw-type terminals for direct (1:1) connection of field devices, sensors and actuators
Fuse with LED indicator for each I/O channel
Pre-assembled cables to connect the MTA with the I/O module
With 50/25-pole D-sub connector on the MTA side
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The F-AI MTA and the F-AI module are connected to each other over a
pre-assembled connecting cable. The custom length cable is shown below in
Fig. 12-2.
Fig. 12-4 illustrates an example of how to wire a 4-wire transmitter (with external
power supply) to the F-AI MTA.
Fig. 12-5 illustrates an example of how to wire a 2-wire transmitter to the F-AI MTA.
Fig. 12-5: two-wire transmitter
You can find further information under \3\ in the "Links and Literature" chapter.
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13 Glossary
The following table shows the abbreviations used in the document.
Table 13-1 Glossary
Abbreviation Meaning
MooN M-out-of-N channel system
MooND M-out-of-N channel system, extended diagnostics
1oo1 Architecture type: 1 channel system, loss of safety if a channel is faulty.
(1-out-of-1)
1oo1D Architecture type: 1 channel system, loss of safety if a channel is faulty;
extended diagnostics
1oo2 Architecture type: 2 channel system, safety maintained if a channel is
faulty.
1oo2D Architecture type: 2 channel system, safety maintained if a channel is
faulty; extended diagnostics.
β CCF factor - The relationship between the probability of occurrence of a
CCF and the probability of any fault. β is dependent on the system
components, typical values for β are in the range of 1 % and 5 %.
CCF Common Cause Failure – These are errors that affect two or more
separate channels or components in a system. A CCF causes the
system to fail
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14 Links andLiterature
Table 14-1
Topic
\1\ Siemens Industry Online Support
http://support.industry.siemens.com
\2\ Link to this entry
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/24690377
\3\ ET 200M Marshalled Termination Assemblies Remote I/O Modules
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/22091986
\4\ SIMATIC Configuring Hardware and Communication Connections STEP 7 V5.5
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/45531110
\5\ SIMATIC Industrial Software Safety Matrix
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/100675874
\6\ SIMATIC Automation System S7-300 ET 200M Distributed I/O Device Fail-safe
signal modules
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/19026151
\7\ Automation System S7-400 Hardware and Installation
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/1117849
\8\ SIMATIC Industrial Software Safety Engineering in SIMATIC S7
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/12490443
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15 Change documentation
Table 15-1
Version Date Modifications
V1.0 04/2007 First version
V2.0 12/2007 New hardware and software considered, supplemented by
MTA
V2.1 05/2009 Update
V3.0 08/2015 Complete revision
V3.1 08/2017 Update
V3.2 09/2017 Update
V3.3 12/2017 Improved wording and expansion