NGO field security

by Randolph Martin
•
In an environment of increased exposure, deteri- Erosion of neutrality: As civilian pop-
ulation displacement has become

oration in the rules of war and loss of perceived increasingly the purpose rather than
a by-product of war, so too have the

neutrality, the community of NGOs operating in aid agencies that come to their assis-
tance lost their aura of neutrality.

complex emergencies is facing significantly • NGO competition and culture:

Competition between aid agencies can
increased risks to staff safety and security. increase pressure to ‘get there first’
and work the closest to the lines of

H
umanitarian crises are increas- work of a number of our colleagues in confrontation. Moreover, the culture of
ing in number, duration and the NGO community. Our land-mine NGO workers is too often ill-disposed
their impact on civil society. security protocols draw heavily on the to the discipline necessary for proper
In the first half of the 1990s, 70 states excellent work of CARE in this area; the security protocols. This both reflects
were involved in 93 wars. More than half information exchanged by the NGO par- and perpetuates the lack of develop-
of these conflicts lasted over five years, ticipants in InterAction’s Security Task ment of professional standards and
forty per cent lasted over 10 years, and Force and subsequent training pro- ‘best practices’ in the field of security.
wholly one quarter have lasted over 20 gramme have been a major source of
years1. At the same time, civilians are ideas and inspiration; and the ‘Security Safety versus security
increasingly the targets of conflict rather Triangle’ concept which is the founda-
than simply hapless victims: civilian tion piece of IRC’s security protocols - For our purposes here, the term ‘safety’
casualties of war have increased from 10 and this paper - was conceived by relates to protection from illness and
per cent at the turn of the century, to 50 Koenraad Van Brabant at the Overseas accidents, whereas ‘security’ relates to
per cent in the second world war to over Development Institute, and developed protection from acts of violence and
75 per cent in contemporary conflicts. further by the InterAction Security Task crime. While the security of NGO staff,
Since 1980, the number of refugees has Force. As such, this paper does not seek assets and programmes necessarily
increased from 2.4 million to 14.4 to provide original thought, but rather to requires the investment of considerable
million2, while IDPs have increased from add flesh to the important work that has time and resources, it is important not
22 million to 38 million3. The magnitude already been done. to lose sight of the fact that the greatest
and duration of crises have left benefi- risks to the well-being of NGO staff arise
ciary groups reliant on international Why are humanitarian aid not from security threats, but from safety
assistance for extended periods of time. workers at risk? issues. Safety threats such as vehicle
It has also been suggested that the shift accidents, malaria, water-borne disease,
from wars between national armies to Although there is very little by way of HIV and other health threats continue to
wars between militia and guerrilla study or documentation, it is clear that be by far the largest causes of casualties
groups has contributed to the loss of the there has been an increase in the num- among relief workers.
rules of conduct of war. Finally, as civilians ber and degree of threats to humanitari-
are increasingly the targets of war, those an aid workers in recent years. There are The impact of mandate and
who come to their assistance - the NGOs any number of reasons for this. mission on security
- are less likely to be perceived as impar-
tial and neutral. • Increase in the number and duration An NGO’s exposure to security threats is
of conflicts directly related to its mandate and mis-
While few statistics are available, there is • Absence of rules of conduct : sion, mandate being the overall purpose
an abundance of anecdotal evidence Conflicts are increasingly fought by of the organisation and mission its reason
clearly indicating that aid workers are smaller and less disciplined forces, for operating in a particular situation.
increasingly victims of hostage taking, often struggling over the control of For example, an organisation whose man-
assassination, mine explosions and robbery resources, rather than ideology or date involves evangelism will obviously be
in addition to the ongoing exposure to legitimacy. Conflicts are increasingly at higher risk in some environments than
vehicular and health threats. intrastate rather than international, a secular organisation. Similarly, human
meaning that the combatants and the rights and ‘solidarity’ organisations may
The International Rescue Committee outside world are less likely to view be at higher risk than service-providing
(IRC) faces its share of this groundswell the conflict as subject to external organisations. An organisation whose
in security challenges and has scrambled scrutiny. mission in a given country is life-saving
to develop policies and protocols which • Impunity: Aid agencies are perceived medical services must be prepared to
will maximise the security of its staff as ‘soft’ targets which can be withstand higher levels of risk than an
assigned to insecure environments. We attacked with impunity due to their organisation involved in economic devel-
have been fortunate to be able to draw lack of communal or diplomatic links opment. It is important for NGO leader-
upon the excellent reflective and practical with the combatants. ship to weigh their mandate and local

4 April 1999, 4 FORCED MIGRATION review

mission as it relates to the local environ- • The NGO’s activities are perceived as • Communications equipment
ment. IRC’s mandate is refugee assis- impartial. • Reliable vehicles and maintenance
tance. In countries where refugees are • The NGO’s staff and presence are facility
perceived as threatening or are a perse- culturally and politically sensitive. • Perimeter security devices including
cuted group within the host country, IRC • The NGO’s programme reflects local walls, barbed wire and alarm systems
may be seen as aiding and abetting an priorities. • Flak jackets and helmets
enemy. Where IRC’s mission is life saving, • The NGO has developed good work- • Use (or non-use) of the NGO emblem
we must be prepared to withstand a ing relationships with local govern- (or other symbols)
higher level of threat than in countries mental authorities, including the
where our mission is, for example, self- police and military where appropriate. Operational policies & procedures: the
reliance or reconstruction projects. • The NGO’s programmes reflect basic institutional mechanisms which
development concepts and a willing- enhance security, such as:
The Security Triangle: ness to invest the time and effort to • Clear and equitable national staff per-
Acceptance-Protection-Deterrence involve the community in every facet sonnel policies - including grievance
of project assessment, planning, procedures - which are communicated
Unfortunately, security is often concep- implementation and evaluation. to staff and implemented consistently.
tualised in terms of military or police Incidents involving disgruntled staff
models which appear (albeit superficially) are one of the largest causes of security
to emphasise equipment and tactics. infractions for NGOs.
While there is much that we can learn Acceptance • Clear financial policies and proce-
from these models, NGO security is far dures including division of responsi-
more complex. Fancy communications bility in accounting, and prudent cash
gear, logistics capabilities and com- transfer procedures
pound security have their place, but are • Clear vehicle operations policies and
only a small part of what constitutes Protection Deterrence
strict discipline regarding vehicle
security for aid workers. operations
• Curfews and no-go zones where
At IRC, each field office must adapt a Acceptance is the cornerstone of securi- appropriate
local security protocol which includes ty for NGOs with a development man- • Development of and/or participation
each of the three elements of the security date, but is often challenged under the in a ‘warden system’ or communications
triangle: acceptance, protection and timeframes and political circumstances pyramid for conveying emergency
deterrence. An effective local security in which NGO relief efforts take place. In messages
protocol must balance all three ele- war-time relief operations, acceptance by • Communications protocol, training
ments. A strong acceptance strategy the beneficiary community may seem to and disciplined radio usage
with supportive protection and deter- be grossly overshadowed by the hostility • Security orientation for incoming staff
rence elements is ideal. However, where of one or more of the combatants. For and routine security briefings for staff
local conditions limit the effectiveness example, Bosnian acceptance of NGO including personal security training
of the acceptance strategies, it is neces- operations in Sarajevo was overshad- • Convoy operations protocol
sary to build stronger protection and owed by Serb hostility, making it neces- • Visitor screening protocol
deterrence capabilities. sary for NGOs to build strong protection • Clear and consistent discipline for
and deterrence strategies. infractions of security policy, including
1. Acceptance - softening the threat the inclusion of security compliance
In emergency operations, the pressure to in routine performance reviews
This is when the community in which an get programmes moving may limit the
NGO is working accepts and supports ability of staff to thoroughly involve the Coordinated operations: the activities
the NGO’s presence, and out of that local community. However, it is imperative which NGOs are able to carry out
acceptance grows security.4 Lest ‘accep- that NGOs do not let a limited vision of together, thereby creating a ‘strength
tance’ appear too utopian, note that mission obscure this critical element in in numbers’ strategy, such as:
acceptance strategies include the security the security triangle and core element in • Active membership in NGO
which may be provided by local law quality programming: the community’s coordinating bodies
enforcement authorities. Some of the involvement. • Active relationship and coordination
elements of acceptance are: with the United Nations
• The belligerent parties/combatants or • Collaborative convoy operations
the official or de facto authorities in 2. Protection - hardening the target • Integrated communications
the NGO’s area of work give their • Collaborative monitoring, community
consent to the NGO’s activities. This is the element that many people policing, etc
• The community has a stake in the most readily associate with security,
programme and participates actively. though it is by no means the most Some elements of protection are important
• The community has been involved in important element in the triangle. in all situations, even in stable settings
the assessment and design of the Elements of ‘protection’ are presented where acceptance is the primary strategy.
programme. under three main headings: Good communications, sound policy
• The community is involved in the structures and inter-agency coordination
evaluation of the programme. Protection devices: the materials and are always the mark of quality opera-
• The NGO’s mission is transparent and equipment needed to provide adequate tions. Protection strategies need to be
broadly communicated. security, such as: enhanced if conditions deteriorate and

FORCED MIGRATION review April 1999, 4 5

 acceptance strategies become less effective, Military deterrence: This is the least Liberia, Somalia and Afghanistan are
but should never be viewed as an alter- common form of deterrent strategy, usu- among those countries where car theft
native to strong community support. ally appearing in conjunction with peace- has meant not only a loss of property
keeping missions when NGOs formally but a security risk to staff. Learning that
3. Deterrence - posing a counter coordinate activities with external inter- one of the enticements to theft of NGO
threat national military forces. We have wit- property in these settings has been the
nessed this in northern Iraq, in Somalia knowledge that NGOs will not retaliate
Most NGOs are not large enough, nor an and in Bosnia. In each case, NGOs have through vendetta, IRC has limited the
appropriately suited actor, to pose a worked closely with international military risk by renting vehicles from the local
credible counter threat on their own. coalitions who have provided a military community instead of purchasing new
The focus of deterrence strategies is the security umbrella under which NGOs vehicles. An indirect benefit of this
relationships which we are able to build have been able to implement humanitarian approach is that more funds go into the
with larger regional or international assistance programmes. Needless-to-say, local economy, assuaging an issue which
institutions: military deterrent strategies are less often embitters local communities. This
than ideal and should only be pursued acceptance strategy focusing on a local
Diplomatic deterrence: This is the when the other elements of the security community may be of limited use when
product of an NGO’s relationship to larger triangle are clearly insufficient. travelling between distant locations. In
international actors who can exert diplo- these situations, protection strategies
matic pressure on our behalf, influencing Threat assessment and response such as sound vehicle protocols govern-
local authorities and actors who either ing routes taken, times of travel, com-
pose security threats themselves or who Threat assessment should accompany munications en route, use of convoys,
are well placed to promote the security any initial programme assessment, and etc, become much more important.
interests of the NGOs, but are not ade- be carried on continually during pro- Deterrence strategies also play a role; in
quately doing so. This is a very important gramme operations. Like programme Afghanistan, IRC coordinated with sever-
element in the security strategy in any assessments, security threat assess- al other NGOs to suspend assistance to a
country of operations. Elements include: ments should include a wide variety of particular district until the community
• The quality of our relationship with inputs from the United Nations, the returned several stolen vehicles.
key diplomatic missions embassies and national government,
• The quality of our relationship with through to other NGOs, local govern- Official harassment is typical in situa-
the United Nations ment and community leaders and finally tions where an NGO is assisting a group
• The quality of our participation in individuals in the community. In the persecuted by the host government, or
NGO coordinating bodies which are simplest terms, it is a matter of identify- where NGOs are operating across lines
capable of presenting a unified front ing what security threats are of the high- of confrontation. Bribery is not a good
est probability and greatest consequence strategy here, as it only exacerbates the
Guards: The use of guards is a common to an NGO’s operations and prioritising problem for all concerned over time.
deterrent strategy at NGO facilities resources to these threats accordingly. Acceptance strategies can work under
around the world. Oddly, there are very these circumstances. During the war in
few instances where NGOs have devel- Bosnia, IRC faced great difficulties bring-
oped strong professional guidelines for The security triangle in practice ing assistance into Serb-surrounded
this very common deterrent force. Sarajevo. Opening primary health care
Uniforms, basic training, incident There is an appropriate place for each programmes and a winter heating pro-
debriefing and provision of basic equip- point of the security triangle under any gramme in Republika Srpska greatly
ment (ranging from a night stick and type of security threat, from land-mines enhanced IRC’s ability to negotiate pas-
flashlight to VHF radios) are among the to burglary, even though the emphasis sage, while not compromising our man-
cornerstones. Coordinated inter-agency may shift between acceptance, protec- date in the region. Similarly, singling out
monitoring greatly strengthens the effect tion and deterrence. refugee or returnee groups from a larger
of guards. community which might also be in des-
perate need can also undermine security.
IRC health programmes in northern
Sudan have sought to provide assistance
in a balanced way to Northerners as well
as Southerners. Similarly, our ongoing
programmes for Serb refugees in
Yugoslavia may provide a degree of
acceptance for IRC in post-conflict
Kosovo or for current operations in
Montenegro. Protection strategies can
also mitigate against official harassment.
Training of staff in methods of conflict
diffusion is helpful. Staff need to be well
oriented in the agency’s mandate and
mission and be able to represent the
NGO in a mature and non-threatening
ICRC/Till Mayer

way. Finally, the deterrence strategies

Kabul, Afghanistan

6 April 1999, 4 FORCED MIGRATION review

 Security training:
centre on the relationship between the
NGO and the larger political actors who
may be able to cajole a hostile govern-
ment when all else fails.

Conclusion where are we now?

These brief examples suggest rounded
strategies for each threat. There are
clearly advantages and disadvantages to
by Koenraad Van Brabant
any strategy, which must be weighed
within the context of each local environ- In recent years, concern for the security of
ment. In Liberia, for example, the poor
quality of rented cars and their drivers aid personnel working in violent environments
eventually posed a greater risk than car
theft, and the policy was abandoned. has grown rapidly.
Thus, flexibility and local control over

T
security policies are an imperative. here are a number of reasons for by Jonathan Dworken of the US Centre
When developing security policies, field this. Firstly, there is a perception for Naval Analysis (on trends), this
managers should first identify the key of greater insecurity with more author (on a management framework for
risks in the local environment based personnel being injured or killed. security) and the Humanitarian Security
upon probability and consequence. Risks Although trends cannot be accurately and Protection Network (on incident
of high probability and/or high conse- assessed as most agencies do not keep reporting and incident pattern analysis2).
quence should be the primary focus of proper records, it is the perceived inse-
agency attention and resources. curity that prompts action. An important There is also growing interest in security
Secondly, for each of these key risks, the training and a gradual increase in courses
factor in this is the perception that aid
field manager needs to carefully and
workers are now more at risk of being on offer. UN agencies such as UNHCR
creatively consider each of the three
deliberately targeted, either for political and WFP are organising in-house training
strategies - acceptance, protection and
reasons or because they are easy prey on security. UNSECOORD in New York
deterrence - in devising an appropriate
for criminals, and this drastically alters fielded a team to conduct training in
local response.
the perception of risk. Secondly, as media Central and South West Asia. Among the
Security for humanitarian staff opera- attention latches onto dramatic kidnap- NGO training providers are RedR in the
tions is too often viewed in terms of mil- pings and assassinations of aid workers, UK, Bioforce in France, CINFO in
itary models or, worse yet, overlooked agencies are becoming more concerned Switzerland and Kontakt der Kontinenten
as an inevitable and inalterable aspect of about their reputation and their ability to in the Netherlands. Security is integrated
working in humanitarian crises. In fact, recruit. Thirdly, some agencies have been into ICRC’s comprehensive in-house train-
there is a lot that can be done to sued by injured staff or the family mem- ing programme.
enhance security in humanitarian opera- bers of deceased staff; not infrequently, it
tions. However, security in humanitarian turns out that agencies do not have ade- Two important things are still missing.
operations calls for a new paradigm that quate insurance cover. Firstly, we need agreed sector-wide stan-
weighs not only the familiar equipment dards that clarify the minimum require-
and technology of security but also the 1. Responding to risk ments in terms of awareness, knowledge
dynamics of community support, inter- and skill with regard to security issues
agency coordination and diplomatic for aid workers, and similar minimum
Training for security is one response
influence. requirements for organisations sending
among others. In the last three years or
so, there has been a number of aware- personnel to dangerous environments.
Randolph Martin is Senior Director Principle 7 of People in Aid’s Code of
ness raising events. ICRC and ECHO for
for Operations at the International Best Practice for the Management and
example have organised seminars on
Rescue Committee, New York. Support of Aid Personnel3 is a first
security; ECHO has developed a back-
1 Dan Smith with the International Peace Research ground paper for the European attempt, and the US Office for Foreign
Institute, The State of War and Peace Atlas, Myriad Commission; and there has been debate Disasters Assistance (OFDA) now con-
Editions Limited, 1997, p13. tractually requires the agencies it funds
in the US Senate Foreign Affairs
2 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 1995, Oxford Committee. Operational agencies have to refer to the InterAction guidelines on
University Press, p26.
also taken internal measures. These security, but more work is needed.
3 Smith, op cit p26. include the development of ‘guidelines’ Secondly, there is a proliferation of dis-
or ‘security manuals’ for field staff and connected initiatives on both sides of
4 Van Brabant K ‘Cool ground for aid workers. the Atlantic; what is needed is an active,
Towards better security management in aid agencies’, field managers1, and reviews of security
Disasters 22 (2), pp109-125, 1998. measures in a particular setting or of the international network to bring them
larger organisational procedures and together to avoid duplication, identify
their strengths and weaknesses. Some gaps, and to exchange learning on good
agencies have also appointed a full-time practice.
‘security’ person in-house. Worth men-
tioning also is practice-oriented research

FORCED MIGRATION review April 1999, 4 7