Canon 6 - Canon 11 Rule 11.02
Canon 6 - Canon 11 Rule 11.02
Canon 6 - Canon 11 Rule 11.02
#39;s Oath-taking and "d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he
required him to answer the Complaint. deceived me into signing the affidavit of desistance and
[ Adm. Case No. 2505, February 21, 1992 ] the conformity to his explanation and later on the
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in
which was received on 7 June 1982. Said "Explanation" fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to
EVANGELINE LEDA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). resume our marriage and introduced me to his family,
TREBONIAN TABANG, RESPONDENT. Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is
Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him
DECISION "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he with the Supreme Court."
could proceed with his law studies and until after he
PER CURIAM: could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as
our future." He also admitted having indicated that he Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after
respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status he had already taken his Oath stating, among others,
character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, as single since my marriage with the complainant was that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he
one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 not as yet made and declared public." He further averred "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her
January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their
2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply
February 1983. prayed that the Complaint be dismissed. with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among
them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect
Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit or by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be
The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not
Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He
Code[1] as one of exceptional character (Annex "A," that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not
Petition). against Respondent. to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and
until after Respondent had finished his law studies dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me
(began in 1977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1952. even (sic) you go to any court." According to
1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Com- Complainant, although the letter was unsigned,
plainant admits, though, that they had not lived together On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand
as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
1982). disbarment based on the following grounds:
Respondent denies emphatically that he had sent such a
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and "a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to letter contending that it is Complainant who has been
thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
declared that he was "single." He then passed the marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our
marriage institution. In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers
examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking
that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose
his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that
"b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies
Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his
truth he is already married in his application to take the and take the Bar first but for the reason that said
application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's
bar exam. marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of
Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also
the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the
alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became "c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband
aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5). certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;
and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records
marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume shows that Respondent had reconciled with
affidavit before any person authorized by law to that his marriage to Complainant is void. The Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick
administer oaths. He could not have abandoned presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the
Complainant because they had never lived together as marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been
husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a
Examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of duty in connection therewith has been regularly "full-fledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his
the law, he was single. performed. marriage to Complainant.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too
Solicitor General for investigation, report and positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions
recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in
General submitted his Report, with the recommendation deplorable. devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his
that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the
him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the of which he admits having been "legally married" to court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a
various pleadings he had filed before this Court. Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing
Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to
General's Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, instead that it is only the second page where his expect only complete candor and honesty from the
report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the signature appears that he meant to admit and not the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v.
latter recommended the indefinite suspension of averments on the first page which were merely of Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10).
Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled. Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in
in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits the candor required of him not only as a member of the
Upon the facts on record, even without testimonial and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f])
evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack Bar but also as an officer of the Court.
and [g]; 4[b]).
of good moral character sufficiently established. It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having good moral character is not only a condition precedent
Firstly, his declaration in his application for admission been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this
to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a to admission to the practice of law; its continued
case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies
bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30
his signature in the marriage contract. January 1990, 181 SCRA 622). As so aptly put by Mr.
7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to allow essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
suppression of a material fact in connection with his him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such
application for admission to the bar." That false however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified was because it was "not in order from the beginning." entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts
him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58
indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character. Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the Phil. 350 [1933]).
unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C.
faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be
of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code. to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law until further Orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal
record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of
Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall
circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former
in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of We find complainants assertions dubious. She was
financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone clearly in need of financial support from Aquino especially
IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find number and that she had called him there. She also knew that that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We
otherwise. respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent
Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she never who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk
Complainants allegations that she succumbed to refuted respondents allegations that she had met and talked to the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a
respondents sexual advances due to his promises of financial his wife on several occasions, that she lived near his residence, document she knew was related to the support case she
security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences
case against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that his friends, so as not to have known of his marital contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to
complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with status. Considering that she previously had an affair with read it before she signed it.
her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be unnatural
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did
sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with
not fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the
would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of respondent whom she had known for only a short time without
consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even
a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred to
urged her to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the
showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical change [her] life for the better, [30] as alleged in her
money for Alexandras medical and educational support if she
disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of
will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer. [32] If her own
her part.[29] Respondents numerous visits and regular calls to deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence
allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the have complainants bare allegations that cannot be considered issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other
on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount
evidence.[34] Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not
claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement for
enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail
Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on attorneys fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the
is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed
whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check
[35]
being a college graduate or that she knows and understands his duty in accordance with his oath. issued by respondent in favor of complainant
English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for
Complainant further charged respondent of
that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an
misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her
conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was
daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he
without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent. for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she
allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount
did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a
The question remains as to whether his act of of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in
huge sum of money.
preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We We find the circumstances rather suspicious but
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this
rule in the negative. evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party
matter but simply ordered respondent to return the amount
in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere
of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of
in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all We note that there is no clear evidence as to how the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity
available options to her. The law encourages the amicable much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainants of the assertions through the question and
claim for support. The parties are in agreement that answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence,
settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes
complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, a more
which might otherwise be filed in court. [33] Moreover, there is
complainant insists that she should have received more as in-depth investigation is called for to
no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of
there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that ascertain in whose favor the
complainants daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As
respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially
complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but
settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel only P38,000.00 more and complainant said he could have it substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to
when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is and he assumed it was for his attorneys fees. remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence
bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as solely on this aspect.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single
Aquinos counsel in the settlement of the case.Again, we only evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks
We also are unable to grant complainants prayer for Respondents misconduct is of considerable We note that from the very beginning of this case,
respondent to be made liable for the cost of her childs DNA gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out herein respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion
test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years
earmarked for the purpose. immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such
marriage,[40] abandoned his family to cohabit with his severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating
Neither shall we entertain complainants claim for paramour,[41] cohabited with a married woman,[42] lured an circumstances in his favor. [48] Considering further that this is
moral damages and attorneys fees. Suffice it to state that an innocent woman into marriage,[43] or was found to be a his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would
administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is womanizer.[44] The instant case can be easily differentiated suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of
distinct from a civil or a criminal action. [36] It is an from the foregoing cases. the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing of funds of the client.
remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty.
Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on
such.Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the suspension, would accomplish the end desired. [45] In Zaguirre
him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a
public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view v. Castillo,[46] respondent was found to have sired a child with
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought
with more severely.
and honest administration of justice by requiring that those understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous
who exercise this important function shall be competent, nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client
honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts and mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report
and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of
clients may repose confidence.[37] As such, it involves no amoral attitude, the Court suspended him
this Decision.
private interest and affords no redress for private grievance. indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,[47] where
[38]
The complainant or the person who called the attention of respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but
the court to the lawyers alleged misconduct is in no sense a there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a
all good citizens may have in the proper administration of magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of
[39]
justice. case. respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers,
the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to
are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by
all courts in the country. Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
xxx xxx xxx We must admit that this Court is not free
To all these beggings, supplications, from commission of any abuses, but who
words of humility, appeals for charity, would correct such abuses considering
generosity, fairness, understanding, We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER.
that yours is a court of last resort. A
sympathy and above all in the highest We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR.
strong public opinion must be generated
interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get We attack the decision of this Court, not
so as to curtail these abuses.
from this COURT? One word, DENIED, the members. ... We were provoked. We
with all its hardiness and insensibility. were compelled by force of necessity.
We were angry but we waited for the xxx xxx xxx
That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple finality of the decision. We waited until
word, it is plain callousness towards our this Court has performed its duties. We The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize
particular case. never interfered nor obstruct in the in paintings that can be found in all
performance of their duties. But in the courts and government offices. We have
end, after seeing that the Constitution added only two more symbols, that it is
xxx xxx xxx
has placed finality on your judgment also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense
against our client and sensing that you that no members of this Court has ever
Now that your respondent has the guts to heard our cries for charity, generosity,
have not performed your duties with
tell the members of the Court that fairness, understanding sympathy and
"circumspection, carefulness, confidence
notwithstanding the violation of the for justice; dumb in the sense, that
and wisdom", your Respondent rise to
Constitution, you remained unpunished, inspite of our beggings, supplications,
claim his God given right to speak the
this Court in the reverse order of natural and pleadings to give us reasons why
our appeal has been DENIED, not one exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand the Court in concluding that a particular
word was spoken or given ... We refer to critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been case at a particular time makes review
no human defect or ailment in the above generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari. undesirable.
statement. We only describe the.
impersonal state of things and nothing Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et
more. a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court,
unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon,
xxx xxx xxx by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the
Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution
As we have stated, we have lost our faith Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
and confidence in the members of this which present questions whose resolutions will have Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
Court and for which reason we offered to immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. In connection with identical short
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio resolutions, the same question has been
lost today may be regained tomorrow. As Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566: raised before; and we held that these
the offer was intended as our self- "resolutions" are not "decisions" within
imposed sacrifice, then we alone may A variety of considerations underlie the above constitutional requirement.
decide as to when we must end our self- denials of the writ, and as to the same They merely hold that the petition for
sacrifice. If we have to choose between petition different reasons may read review should not be entertained in view
forcing ourselves to have faith and different justices to the same result ... . of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules
confidence in the members of the Court of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have
but disregard our Constitution and to Since there are these conflicting, and, to all this time so understood it. It should be
uphold the Constitution and be the uninformed, even confusing reasons remembered that a petition to review the
condemned by the members of this for denying petitions for certiorari, it has decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
Court, there is no choice, we must been suggested from time to time that matter of right, but of sound judicial
uphold the latter. the Court indicate its reasons for denial. discretion; and so there is no need to
Practical considerations preclude. In fully explain the court's denial. For one
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff order that the Court may be enabled to thing, the facts and the law are already
which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect discharge its indispensable duties, mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances. Congress has placed the control of the opinion.
Court's business, in effect, within the
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition Court's discretion. During the last three By the way, this mode of disposal has —
for review. We are quite aware of the terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, as intended — helped the Court in
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. alleviating its heavy docket; it was
rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been For the same three terms the Court patterned after the practice of the U.S.
asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given petitions calling for discretionary review. review are often merely ordered
this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the If the Court is to do its work it would not "dismissed".
abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the be feasible to give reasons, however
facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls brief, for refusing to take these cases. We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on
his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a The tune that would be required is petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have
terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for
petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and already indicated different reasons not compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this
ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do infrequently move different members of Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is
axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr,
this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate,
give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which running of the period of appeal, the movant must not exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would
recites: only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous
(which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the and scandalous outbursts.
Review of Court of Appeals' decision time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not).
discretionary.—A review is not a matter This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty.
of right but of sound judicial discretion, & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra: Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know
and will be granted only when there are that it is natural for a lawyer to express his
special and important reasons therefor. The written notice referred to evidently is dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely
The following, while neither controlling prescribed for motions in general by Rule believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers
nor fully measuring the court's discretion, 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their
indicate the character of reasons which which provides that such notice shall disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the
will be considered: state the time, and place of hearing and manner in which they are handed down.
shall be served upon all the Parties
(a) When the Court of Appeals has concerned at least three days in Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon
decided a question of substance, not advance. And according to Section 6 of and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is
theretofore determined by the Supreme the same Rule no motion shall be acted not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
Court, nor has decided it in a way upon by the court without proof of such judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a
probably not in accord with law or with notice. Indeed it has been held that in lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the
the applicable decisions of the Supreme such a case the motion is nothing but a criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then
Court; useless piece of paper (Philippine the court's actuations are thrown open to public
National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions,"
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public
departed from the accepted and usual Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa property, and the press and the people have the
course of judicial proceedings, or so far v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
sanctioned such departure by the lower and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other
court, as to call for the exercise of the 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the public servants, must answer for their official actions
power of supervision. movant sets the time and place of before the chancery of public opinion."
hearing the Court would have no way to
determine whether that party agrees to The likely danger of confusing the fury of human
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found,
or objects to the motion, and if he reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and
upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and
objects, to hear him on his objection, honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of
records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly
since the Rules themselves do not fix justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to
considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the
any period within which he may file his inflict punishment on those who assail their
law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
reply or opposition. actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case
straying away from the "accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines as this where those who Sit as members of an entire
etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to
supervisory power. blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer
remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as
citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected opportunities for observing and forming a respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a
not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his correct judgment. They are in constant lawyer to disciplinary action.
duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of attendance on the courts. ... To say that
courts and judges. 11 an attorney can only act or speak on this For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
subject under liability to be called to obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should account and to be deprived of his ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places
and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For profession and livelihood, by the judge or upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
like the executive and the legislative branches, the judges whom he may consider it his duty exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, to attack and expose, is a position too behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom monstrous to be conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the
it is expected to serve. entertained. ... . courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him
"to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal
as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
properly respectful terms and through legitimate consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
that for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, of its supreme importance."
which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
An attorney does not surrender, in citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665). As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
assuming the important place accorded
to him in the administration of justice, his Above all others, the members of the bar ... the obligation which attorneys
right as a citizen to criticize the decisions have the beat Opportunity to become impliedly assume, if they do not by
of the courts in a fair and respectful conversant with the character and express declaration take upon
manner, and the independence of the efficiency of our judges. No class is less themselves, when they are admitted to
bar, as well as of the judiciary, has likely to abuse the privilege, as no other the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to
always been encouraged by the courts. class has as great an interest in the the Constitution and laws, but to maintain
(In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) . preservation of an able and upright at all times the respect due to courts of
bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law justice and judicial officers. This
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216) obligation is not discharged by merely
part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution observing the rules of courteous
of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles demeanor in open court, but includes
written for law journals he dissects with detachment the of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the abstaining out of court from all insulting
doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays best position to give advice and who might consider it language and offensive conduct toward
bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so judges personally for their judicial acts.
doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be
Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641: profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196) The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to
the courts is essential to the orderly administration of
No class of the community ought to be But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights,
allowed freer scope in the expansion or shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are
publication of opinions as to the capacity, decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair enjoined to rein up their tempers.
impartiality or integrity of judges than criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of
members of the bar. They have the best courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
The counsel in any case may or may not that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn We are aware that there is a line of
be an abler or more learned lawyer than and disrepute the administration of justice demands authorities which place no limit to the
the judge, and it may tax his patience condemnation and the application of appropriate criticism members of the bar may make
and temper to submit to rulings which he penalties," adding that: regarding the capacity, impartiality, or
regards as incorrect, but discipline and integrity of the courts, even though it
self-respect are as necessary to the It would be contrary to, every democratic extends to the deliberate publication by
orderly administration of justice as they theory to hold that a judge or a court is the attorney capable of correct reasoning
are to the effectiveness of an army. The beyond bona fide comments and of baseless insinuations against the
decisions of the judge must be obeyed, criticisms which do not exceed the intelligence and integrity of the highest
because he is the tribunal appointed to bounds of decency and truth or which courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116
decide, and the bar should at all times be are not aimed at. the destruction of N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann
the foremost in rendering respectful public confidence in the judicial system Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95
submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481) as such. However, when the likely Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first
impairment of the administration of case mentioned it was observed, for
We concede that a lawyer may think justice the direct product of false and instance:
highly of his intellectual endowment That scandalous accusations then the rule is
is his privilege. And he may suffer otherwise. "It may be (although we
frustration at what he feels is others' lack do not so decide) that a
of it. That is his misfortune. Some such 2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was libelous publication by an
frame of mind, however, should not be suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet attorney, directed against
allowed to harden into a belief that he entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a a judicial officer, could be
may attack a court's decision in words municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of so vile and of such a
calculated to jettison the time-honored being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on nature as to justify the
aphorism that courts are the temples of appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of disbarment of its author."
right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They
the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Yet the false charges made by an
26, 1967) Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The attorney in that case were of graver
court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much character than those made by the
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do. respondent here. But, in our view, the
his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a better rule is that which requires of those
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an The entire publication evidences a desire who are permitted to enjoy the privilege
attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or on the part Of the accused to belittle and of practicing law the strictest observance
in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in besmirch the court and to bring it into at all times of the principles of truth,
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute disrepute with the general public. honesty and fairness, especially in their
the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to criticism of the courts, to the end that the
disciplinary action. 3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court public confidence in the due
of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an administration of justice be upheld, and
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who the dignity and usefulness of the courts
examination of relevant parallel precedents. at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used 4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123
sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had
in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. money." Said the court: been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set
Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a
threatening letter and gave the press the story of a 5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court
proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption said:
letter began: and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court
were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. there is a growing habit in the profession
Petersen is cleared up so that my name The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, of criticising the motives and integrity of
is protected from the libel, lies, and and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. judicial officers in the discharge of their
perjury committed in the cases involved, The Court said: duties, and thereby reflecting on the
I shall be compelled to resort to such administration of justice and creating the
drastic action as the law allows and the A calumny of that character, if believed, impression that judicial action is
case warrants. would tend to weaken the authority of the influenced by corrupt or improper
court against whose members it was motives. Every attorney of this court, as
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not made, bring its judgments into contempt, well as every other citizen, has the right
intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," undermine its influence as an unbiased and it is his duty, to submit charges to
and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and arbiter of the people's right, and interfere the authorities in whom is vested the
not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of with the administration of justice. ... power to remove judicial officers for any
men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme conduct or act of a judicial officer that
Court of Illinois declared: Because a man is a member of the bar tends to show a violation of his duties, or
the court will not, under the guise of would justify an inference that he is false
... Judges are not exempt from just disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of to his trust, or has improperly
criticism, and whenever there is proper any part of that freedom of speech which administered the duties devolved upon
ground for serious complaint against a he possesses as a citizen. The acts and him; and such charges to the tribunal, if
judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer decisions of the courts of this state, in based upon reasonable inferences, will
to submit his grievances to the proper cases that have reached final be encouraged, and the person making
authorities, but the public interest and the determination, are not exempt from fair them
administration of the law demand that the and honest comment and criticism. It is protected. ... While we recognize the
courts should have the confidence and only when an attorney transcends the inherent right of an attorney in a case
respect of the people. Unjust criticism, limits of legitimate criticism that he will be decided against him, or the right of the
insulting language, and offensive held responsible for an abuse of his Public generally, to criticise the decisions
conduct toward the judges personally by liberty of speech. We well understand of the courts, or the reasons announced
attorneys, who are officers of the court, that an independent bar, as well as for them, the habit of criticising the
which tend to bring the courts and the independent court, is always a vigilant motives of judicial officers in the
law into disrepute and to destroy public defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 performance of their official duties, when
confidence in their integrity, cannot be Atl. 723. 725. the proceeding is not against the officers
permitted. The letter written to the judge whose acts or motives are criticised,
was plainly an attempt to intimidate and 6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was tends to subvert the confidence of the
influence him in the discharge of judicial suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate community in the courts of justice and in
functions, and the bringing of the court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the administration of justice; and when
unauthorized suit, together with the write- the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, such charges are made by officers of the
up in the Sunday papers, was intended the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct courts, who are bound by their duty to
and calculated to bring the court into justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that protect the administration of justice, the
disrepute with the public. he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and attorney making such charges is guilty of
asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this law itself, as well as to the ethics of the "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt
statement: profession. ... deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of
I accepted the decision in this case, The right of free speech and free the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of
however, with patience, barring possible discussion as to judicial determination is attorneys.
temporary observations more or less of prime importance under our system
vituperative and finally concluded, that, and ideals of government. No right 10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215,
as my clients were foreigners, it might thinking man would concede for a the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should
have been expecting too much to look for moment that the best interest to private be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally
a decision in their favor against a widow citizens, as well as to public officials, adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a
residing here. whether he labors in a judicial capacity or personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
otherwise, would be served by denying of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that: this right of free speech to any individual. integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in
But such right does not have as its the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been
... the expressions above set out, not corollary that members of the bar who attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were
only transcend the bounds of propriety are sworn to act honestly and honorably published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained
and privileged criticism, but are an both with their client and with the courts this paragraph:
unwarranted attack, direct, or by where justice is administered, if
insinuation and innuendo, upon the administered at all, could ever properly You assigned it (the property involved) to
motives and integrity of this court, and serve their client or the public good by one who has no better right to it than the
make out a prima facie case of improper designedly misstating facts or carelessly burglar to his plunder. It seems like
conduct upon the part of a lawyer who asserting the law. Truth and honesty of robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with
holds a license from this court and who is purpose by members of the bar in such the court acting as a fence, or umpire,
under oath to demean himself with all discussion is necessary. The health of a watchful and vigilant that the widow got
good fidelity to the court as well as to his municipality is none the less impaired by no undue
client. a polluted water supply than is the health advantage. ... The point is this: Is a
of the thought of a community toward the proper motive for the decisions
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and discoverable, short of assigning to the
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney
malignant misuse of members of the bar court emasculated intelligence, or a
apologized to the Court.
of the confidence the public, through its constipation of morals and faithlessness
duly established courts, has reposed in to duty? If the state bar association, or a
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, them to deal with the affairs of the private committee chosen from its rank, or the
an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which individual, the protection of whose rights faculty of the University Law School,
he impugned the motives of the court and its members he lends his strength and money to aided by the researches of its hundreds
to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and maintain the judiciary. For such conduct of bright, active students, or if any
for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ on the part of the members of the bar the member of the court, or any other
of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent law itself demands retribution — not the person, can formulate a statement of a
for 30 days, saying that: court. correct motive for the decision, which
shall not require fumigation before it is
The privileges which the law gives to 9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. stated, and quarantine after it is made, it
members of the bar is one most 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending will gratify every right-minded citizen of
subversive of the public good, if the action using in respect to the several judges the terms the state to read it.
conduct of such members does not criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal
measure up to the requirements of the confederates," "colossal and confident insolence,"
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the wholly different principles are applicable rulings of the court in actions which are
suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its thereto. ended, it held that one might be
opinion as follows: summarily punished for assaulting a
The conduct of the accused was in every judicial officer, in that case a
The question remains whether the way discreditable; but so far as he commissioner of the court, for his rulings
accused was guilty of professional exercised the rights of a citizen, in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the
misconduct in sending to the Chief guaranteed by the Constitution and power of any person," said the court, "by
Justice the letter addressed to him. This sanctioned by considerations of public insulting or assaulting the judge because
was done, as we have found, for the very policy, to which reference has been of official acts, if only the assailant
purpose of insulting him and the other made, he was immune, as we hold, from restrains his passion until the judge
justices of this court; and the insult was the penalty here sought to be enforced. leaves the building, to compel the judge
so directed to the Chief Justice To that extent his rights as a citizen were to forfeit either his own self-respect to the
personally because of acts done by him paramount to the obligation which he had regard of the people by tame submission
and his associates in their official assumed as an officer of this court. to the indignity, or else set in his own
capacity. Such a communication, so When, however he proceeded and thus person the evil example of punishing the
made, could never subserve any good assailed the Chief Justice personally, he insult by taking the law in his own
purpose. Its only effect in any case would exercised no right which the court can hands? ... No high-minded, manly man
be to gratify the spite of an angry recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully would hold judicial office under such
attorney and humiliate the officers so violated his obligation to maintain the conditions."
assailed. It would not and could not ever respect due to courts and judicial
enlighten the public in regard to their officers. "This obligation is not That a communication such as this,
judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an discharged by merely observing the rules addressed to the Judge personally,
exercise by the accused of any of courteous demeanor in open court, but constitutes professional delinquency for
constitutional right, or of any privilege it includes abstaining out of court from all which a professional punishment may be
which any reputable attorney, insulting language and offensive conduct imposed, has been directly decided. "An
uninfluenced by passion, could ever toward the judges personally for their attorney who, after being defeated in a
have any occasion or desire to assert. official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. case, wrote a personal letter to the trial
No judicial officer, with due regard to his (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there justice, complaining of his conduct and
position, can resent such an insult appears to be no distinction, as regards reflecting upon his integrity as a justice,
otherwise than by methods sanctioned the principle involved, between the is guilty of misconduct and will be
by law; and for any words, oral or written, indignity of an assault by an attorney disciplined by the court." Matter of
however abusive, vile, or indecent, upon a judge, induced by his official act, Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y.
addressed secretly to the judge alone, he and a personal insult for like cause by Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin
can have no redress in any action triable written or spoken words addressed to the (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City
by a jury. "The sending of a libelous judge in his chambers or at his home or Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared
communication or libelous matter to the elsewhere. Either act constitutes that the accused attorney had addressed
person defamed does not constitute an misconduct wholly different from criticism a sealed letter to a justice of the City
actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. of judicial acts addressed or spoken to Court of New York, in which it was
Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these others. The distinction made is, we think stated, in reference to his decision: "It is
respects the sending by the accused of entirely logical and well sustained by not law; neither is it common sense. The
this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly authority. It was recognized in Ex result is I have been robbed of 80." And it
different from his other acts charged in parte McLeod supra. While the court in was decided that, while such conduct
the accusation, and, as we have said, that case, as has been shown, fully was not a contempt under the state, the
sustained the right of a citizen to criticise matter should be "called to the attention
of the Supreme Court, which has power sustained as to make it our duty to and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute
to discipline the attorney." "If," says the impose such a penalty as may be grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
court, "counsel learned in the law are sufficient lesson to him and a suitable disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
permitted by writings leveled at the warning to others. ... sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
heads of judges, to charge them with prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with 11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
robbery, either as principals or affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
accessories, it will not be long before the publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary
general public may feel that they may judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel
redress their fancied grievances in like had paralyzed him for two years. such as those catalogued in the above-cited
manner, and thus the lot of a judge will jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have
be anything but a happy one, and the 12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an generally been disposed of under the power of courts to
administration of justice will fall into bad attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and punish for contempt which, although resting on different
repute." decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, bases and calculated to attain a different end,
the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of
The recent case of Johnson v. judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the such condemnable practices.
State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair
respect much the same as the case at in his general conduct of a case. A perusal of the more representative of these instances
bar. The accused, an attorney at law, may afford enlightenment.
wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit 13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published
judge, which the latter received by due newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the 1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where
course of mail, at his home, while not court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of counsel branded the denial of his motion for
holding court, and which referred in this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and
insulting terms to the conduct of the disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
judge in a cause wherein the accused disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
had been one of the attorneys. For this it was disbarred. expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding
was held that the attorney was rightly that
disbarred in having "willfully failed to
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney,
maintain respect due to him [the judge]
dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a It is right and plausible that an attorney,
as a judicial officer, and thereby
period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma in defending the cause and rights of his
breached his oath as an attorney." As
Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such client, should do so with all the fervor
recognizing the same principle, and in
gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member and energy of which he is capable, but it
support of its application to the facts of
of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he is not, and never will be so for him to
this case, we cite the following: Ex
expressed an intention to resign from the bar. exercise said right by resorting to
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L.
intimidation or proceeding without the
Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and propriety and respect which the dignity of
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va.
impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is the courts requires. The reason for this is
Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237,
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, that respect for the courts guarantees the
244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351;
made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial stability of their institution. Without such
Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134;
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which guaranty, said institution would be resting
Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and on a very shaky foundation,
legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into
Our conclusion is that the charges
disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity
against the accused have been so far
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its the decision of the Parazo case, which confidence in the honesty and integrity of
opinion, the statements made disclosed was then and still is pending the members of this Court and believe
consideration by this Court upon petition that they cannot expect justice therefrom,
... an inexcusable disrespect of the of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to they might be driven to take the law into
authority of the court and an intentional intimidate the members of this Court with their own hands, and disorder and
contempt of its dignity, because the court the presentation of a bill in the next perhaps chaos might be the result. As a
is thereby charged with no less than Congress, of which he is one of the member of the bar and an officer of the
having proceeded in utter disregard of members, reorganizing the Supreme courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of Court and reducing the number of is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
the untoward consequences, or with Justices from eleven, so as to change authority of this Court, to which he owes
having abused its power and mocked the members of this Court which decided fidelity according to the oath he has
and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente the Parazo case, who according to his taken as such attorney, and not to
J. Francisco's client ... . statement, are incompetent and narrow promote distrust in the administration of
minded, in order to influence the final justice. Respect to the courts guarantees
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the decision of said case by this Court, and the stability of other institutions, which
author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the thus embarrass or obstruct the without such guaranty would be resting
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, administration of justice. But the on a very shaky foundation.
invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a respondent also attacks the honesty and
news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in integrity of this Court for the apparent Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to
i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that purpose of bringing the Justices of this emphasize that
our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted Court into disrepute and degrading the
said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the administration. of justice ... . ... an attorney as an officer of the court is
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of under special obligation to be respectful
its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many To hurl the false charge that this Court in his conduct and communication to the
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during has been for the last years committing courts; he may be removed from office or
these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go deliberately so many blunders and stricken from the roll of attorneys as
much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme injustices, that is to say, that it has been being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17
Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril deciding in favor of Que party knowing L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the that the law and justice is on the part of
impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable the adverse party and not on the one in 3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel whose favor the decision was rendered, Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and in many cases decided during the last where counsel charged this Court with having
glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also years, would tend necessarily to "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to
announced that one of the first measures he would undermine the confidence of the people its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard
introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would in the honesty and integrity of the of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial
have for its object the complete reorganization of the members of this Court, and consequently Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct
Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his to lower ,or degrade the administration of was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the
avowals of good faith and his invocation of the justice by this Court. The Supreme Court Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
guarantee of free speech, this Court declared: of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which
As we look back at the language
But in the above-quoted written the Filipino people may repair to obtain
(heretofore quoted) employed in the
statement which he caused to be relief for their grievances or protection of
motion for reconsideration, implications
published in the press, the respondent their rights when these are trampled
there are which inescapably arrest
does not merely criticize or comment on upon, and if the people lose their
attention. It speaks of one pitfall into
which this Court has repeatedly against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes administer justice in the decision of a
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the pending case. In the second kind of
Court of Industrial Relations comes into conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to contempt, the punitive hand of justice is
question. That pitfall is the tendency of sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied extended to vindicate the courts from any
this Court to rely on its own emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called act or conduct calculated to bring them
pronouncements in disregard of the law upon to account were made only after this Court had into disfavor or to destroy public
on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment. confidence in them. In the first there is no
charge that the decisions of this contempt where there is no action
Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding pending, as there is no decision which
without as much as making any has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For might in any way be influenced by the
reference to and analysis of the pertinent sometime, this was the prevailing view in this newspaper publication. In the second,
statute governing the jurisdiction of the jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, the contempt exists, with or without a
industrial court. The plain import of all however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then pending case, as what is sought to be
these is that this Court is so patently Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the protected is the court itself and its dignity.
inept that in determining the jurisdiction holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Courts would lose their utility if public
of the industrial court, it has committed Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A confidence in them is destroyed.
error and continuously repeated that complete disengagement from the settled rule was later
error to the point of perpetuation. It to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the
pictures this Court as one which refuses where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in circumstance that his statements and actuations now
to hew to the line drawn by the law on contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that under consideration were made only after the judgment
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as
quoted statements is that the manner after the question of the validity of the said much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been
pronouncements of this Court on the examinations had been resolved and the case closed. perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
jurisdiction of the industrial court are not Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by
entitled to respect. Those statements Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect More than this, however, consideration of whether or not
detract much from the dignity of and that them may still be contempt by publication even after he could be held liable for contempt for such post
respect due this Court. They bring into a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial.
question the capability of the members in Alarcon: By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967,
— and some former members of this we have confronted the situation here presented solely
Court to render justice. The second A publication which tends to impede, in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional
paragraph quoted yields a tone of obstruct, embarrass or influence the identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an
sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so courts in administering justice in a officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary
called" the "rule against splitting of pending suit or proceeding, constitutes power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
jurisdiction." criminal contempt which is 'summarily safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to
punishable by courts. A publication which preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in tends to degrade the courts and to unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this
other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not destroy public confidence in them or that inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court
now be reviewed in detail. which tends to bring them in any way into is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of
disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
Of course, a common denominator underlies the contempt, and is equally punishable by profession, by removing or suspending a member whose
aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious courts. What is sought, in the first kind of misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So contempt, to be shielded against the entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective influence of newspaper comments, is the to the office of an attorney.
mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only all-important duty of the courts to
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By behavior and the exercise of a just and The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's
constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, sound judicial discretion. 24 petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself.
amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to The vicious language used and the scurrilous
the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible
corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve
the practice of law those who have proved themselves incidental power. It has been elevated to an express any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney,
unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus — mandate by the Rules of Court. 25 attract public attention to himself and, more important of
all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and
The power to discipline attorneys, who Our authority and duty in the premises being destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the
are officers of the court, is an inherent unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character
and incidental power in courts of record, of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. and texture presents no redeeming feature, and
and one which is essential to an orderly Almacen here in question are properly the object of completely negates any pretense of passionate
discharge of judicial functions. To deny disciplinary sanctions. commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
its existence is equivalent to a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of
declaration that the conduct of attorneys the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of
towards courts and clients is not subject of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go
course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
to restraint. Such a view is without unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law
support in any respectable authority, and powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer,
cannot be tolerated. Any court having the unavoidable.
however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
right to admit attorneys to practice and in language, he actually availed of the said move as a
this state that power is vested in this vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of
court-has the inherent right, in the integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults immunity from criticism. Like any other Government
exercise of a sound judicial discretion to all calculated to drive home his contempt for and entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should
exclude them from practice. 23 disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must
client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice categorically denounces the justice administered by this function as the court of last resort. And more than this,
of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous
confidence and respect. So much so that — unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and to obloquy, and requires detachment and
its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the disinterestedness, real qualities approached only
... whenever it is made to appear to the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of
court that an attorney is no longer worthy while at the same time branding its members as the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and
of the trust and confidence of the public "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his must be informed -by perspective and infused by
and of the courts, it becomes, not only announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the philosophy. 26
the right, but the duty, of the court which people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers
made him one of its officers, and gave of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the
him the privilege of ministering within its startle the public, stir up public indignation and exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty.
bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court
it is almost universally held that both the explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled
admission and disbarment of attorneys Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and up into one in this instance. This is an utter
are judicial acts, and that one is admitted reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the
to the bar and exercises his functions as Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role
an attorney, not as a matter of right, but its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of therein.
as a privilege conditioned on his own administering justice and unworthy to impose
disciplinary sanctions upon him.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled
proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence
and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because,
is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally even without the comforting support of precedent, it is
its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a
is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there even if it be conceded that the members collectively are person from the practice of law, there is no reason why
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and
initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass
primary objective, and the real question for power because public policy demands that they., acting of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the determine for himself how long or how short that
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of suspension shall last. For, at any time after the
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is suspension becomes effective he may prove to this
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view absolutely inexistent. Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the law.
proper and honest administration of justice by purging Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of
the profession of members who by their misconduct the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining these may range from mere suspension to total removal suspended from the practice of law until further orders,
to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the the suspension to take effect immediately.
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course,
prosecutor. primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary
which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be for their information and guidance.
degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and
against the individual members thereof. But in the the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an maintained.
entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment FIRST DIVISION
constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would
the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real sense, accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may
if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only [A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]
not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of
be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive
as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and
and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave that in every effervescence of candor there is ample SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
hazard should the administration of justice be threatened room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
fraternity. manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.
leave us no way of determining how long that
RESOLUTION included in the present complaint for ejectment
was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of
SYLLABUS this representation called up this representation
PLANA, J.: at his house and crying over the phone, claiming
that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. — immediately, this representation like any good
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the husband would do in the defense of his wife
observe and maintain the respect due to the suspension of respondent from the practice of immediately went to the school and confronted
courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all law for the use of insulting language in the Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for
offensive personality and to advance no fact course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party virtual law library representation and if yes, right then and there l
or witness unless required by the justice of the would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library
cause with which he is charged. The Canons of As the material facts are not in dispute, we have
Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to deemed the case submitted for resolution on the Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to
avoid all personalities between counsel. basis of the pleadings of the parties. observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE Complainant was the counsel for the defendants offensive personality and to advance no fact
LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR; (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
PENALTY. — Whether directed at the person of Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before or witness unless required by the justice of the
complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court,
the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of
offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to
right to interrupt complainant which such cutting complainant was formally offering his evidence, avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon
remark while the latter was addressing the court. he heard respondent say "bobo." When 17.)
In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only complainant turned toward respondent, he saw
to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the the latter looking at him (complainant) Whether directed at the person of complainant or
use of intemperate language, respondent failed menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the his manner of offering evidence, the remark
to measure up to the norm of conduct required of presence of many people, complainant was "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and
a member of the legal profession, which all the unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt
more deserves reproach because this is not the court proceedings had to be suspended. complainant which such cutting remark while the
first time that respondent has employed offensive latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he
language in the course of judicial proceedings. He While admitting the utterance, respondent denied exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow
has previously been admonished to refrain from having directed the same at the complainant, lawyer but also to the court. By the use of
engaging in offensive personalities and warned to claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", intemperate language, respondent failed to
be more circumspect in the preparation of his referring to "the manner complainant was trying measure up to the norm of conduct required of a
pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded for to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive member of the legal profession, which all the
his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper matters into the record" while in the process of more deserves reproach because this is not the
decorum and restraint and warned that a making an offer of evidence. The statement of first time that respondent has employed offensive
repetition of the offense will be dealt with more Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent language in the course of judicial proceedings. He
severely. was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph has previously been admonished to refrain from
engaging in offensive personalities and warned to
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was be more circumspect in the preparation of his
pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of
Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines for entering an appearance at such a late date. He itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which
SUPREME COURT forthwith came with a recital of the circumstances under pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from
Manila which he had agreed to have his services retained by normal judicial processes. It detracts heavily from the
the respondents Tiburcio, et al. faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts
EN BANC of justice, generating as it does in the minds of the
He alleged that sometime during the first week of litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that
G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970 October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his something more can be done toward overturning a final
own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other judicial mandate.
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR respondents, went to him to engage his professional
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. CLEMENTE services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L- In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano grossly
M. SORIANO IN L-24114, People's Homesite and 24114), and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon. remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious
Housing Corporation and University of the Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their finger into the vortex of the case. He was wanting in the
Philippines, conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed reasonable care which every member of the Bar must
vs. Atty. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case
HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ELPIDIO TIBURCIO, cases, thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for already litigated or under litigation.
MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL. hearing by this Court on October 27, 1969, while the
present case was still pending and the date of hearing Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar,
thereof was yet undetermined. In addition to Marcelino a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the
RESOLUTION
Tiburcio's representations, Atty. Soriano allegedly relied counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be
upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty. had, then he should, at the very least, give notice to
Antonio J. Dalangpan — that indeed these two cases such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. 2 Atty.
were pending in this Court. And so Atty. Soriano Soriano's entry of appearance in the present case as
prepared a letter-contract dated October 8, 1969, by "chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effect
CASTRO, J.: virtue of which he agreed to render professional services sought to preempt the former counsel, Atty. Nemesio
in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of Diaz, of the premier control over the case. Although at
By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or the hearing of the present incident he averred that he
this Court on October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a less) involved in the two cases. It was on the same date, exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. Diaz to no
member of the Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954, October 8, 1969, that he then caused the preparation of avail, we are far from being convinced that he really did
entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114, his written appearance in the present case. so. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court
PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief did he make mention of such efforts on his part. His
counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere
Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would have been contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land would find no after thoughts.
innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one justification if Atty. Soriano were to render his
year and eight months after the decision in this case professional services solely in the Varsity Hills case, for Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has joined one
became final. Wittingly or unwittingly, therefore, Atty. in this latter case, the records of which we are in a Atty. Bonifacio T. Doria as counsel for the respondents in
Soriano was in effect asking this Court to exhume this position to take judicial notice, an area of only about 19 the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court.
case from the archives. We thus considered it needful hectares is involved, 1 the bulk of the property claimed Atty. Doria, who was counsel of record in that case even
that he explain in full and in writing his unprecedented, if by the respondents having been litigated in the present prior to October 10, 1969, certainly knew the status of
not altogether bizzare behavior. case. the present case since the scope of our decision in the
latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case.
His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which Clearly, therefore, when Atty. Soriano accepted the two
dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause has long been sealed and terminated by a final cases for the respondents, especially the Varsity
why disciplinary action should not be taken against him judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in Hills case, he had not bothered at all to communicate
with Atty. Doria, as is the befitting thing to do when a Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal
lawyer associates with another in a pending cause. 3 He record of Atty. Clemente M. Soriano on file in the Bar
did not bother either to comprehend the substance of Division of this Court.
the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case,
something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade.
Had he been less precipitate in his actions, he would
have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in
the present case. Further still, if it were true, as claimed
by Atty. Soriano at the hearing of this incident, that his
clients complained to him about having been left out in
the cold by their former lawyer, then that circumstance of
itself should have indicated to him the imperative need
for verification of the true status of the present case. Atty.
Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty.
Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court
— which assurance Atty. Dalangpan, at the hearing of
this incident, categorically denied having given. What
Atty. Soriano should have done, in keeping with the
reasonable vigilance exacted of members of the legal
profession, was to pay a verification visit to the records
section of this Court, which is easily and quickly
accessible by car or public conveyance from his office
(May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila). If this office were
situated in the province and he did not have the time to
come to the Supreme Court building in Manila, he could
have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by
registered mail or by telegram.
SO ORDERED.
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation
December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00
of his contract with the company. He wrote: a month. Among other things, he said:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and " ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I
notifying you of my intent to terminate the hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa &
company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty the housing loan without my authority and against my will.
and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view
THIRD DIVISION made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated
bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds
rights and interests." between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997] real facts from me."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail
and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in
evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, some detail what he took to be the anomalous
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the actuations of Sophia Alawi.
ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea
Court, Marawi City, respondent. that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the
our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and
DECISION state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons
hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his
NARVASA, C.J.: housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his
said onerous and manipulated contract against my
interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18,
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal
agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance
contract."
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice- salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped
in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales
friends. which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. agent."b
Instead at the right hand corner above the description of
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC
the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had
was executed for the purchase on installments by wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop
been typed.
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996,"
above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-
and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of **
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage (his) payments."c
Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village,
Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial,"
she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
"Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-
Alauya of: officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that
"a scion of a Royal Family **."[4] what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced
and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. [11] He
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones, was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's
[5]
Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the assurance that she would show the completed
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and complaint in order that he might comment thereon. [6] He document to him later for correction, but she had since
established reputation;" stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups"
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia he still does not know where the property -- subject of
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa
**;" and his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan & Co. -- is situated; [12]He says Alawi somehow got his
contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular his salary. return it the next day, she did not do so until after several
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. months. He also claims that in connection with his
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature
of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who on such pertinent documents as those regarding the
She deplored Alauya's references to her as had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
"unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had [13]
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his been deducted from his salary. [7] He declared that there
imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Averring in fine that his acts in question were done
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the
evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious,
with Alauya had been regular and completely saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent
disciplined (sic) ** " were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, and demonstrable.
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2)
the complaint. Conformably with established usage that letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April
notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding respondent himself, and attached to the comment as
Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier
Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he
this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, mailed the letters with the use of the money he had
given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2] June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9] himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to The Court referred the case to the Office of the
require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the
assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court recommendation.[14]
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his that "the conduct and behavior of every official and "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or
aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous employee of an agency involved in the administration of advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study
"undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had characterized by, among others, strict propriety and have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
written inter alia that: decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
public for the judiciary."[18] standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by practice law in this jurisdiction.
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with
gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect Alauya says he does not wish to use the title,
confidence;"
for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his
believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators.
unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
interests;" convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not
Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with warrant his use of the title of attorney.
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; use of the franking privilege, the record contains no
or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the everyone his due, and observe honesty and good WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is
contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **." downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of
and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these of conduct more stringent than for most other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with
statements, he was merely acting in defense of his government workers. As a man of the law, he may not more severely.
rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial SO ORDERED.
"mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, person and the rights of others at all times, and that his
a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. every act and word should be characterized by
[15] prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
Public Officials and Employees (RA conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting
a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney,"
public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that this Court has already had occasion to declare that
"(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been
policy, public order, public safety and public admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN likewise issued.6 Two alias writs dated May 8, 20087 and
B. BRAGAS, Respondents April 16, 20138were later on issued, directing the sheriff
to collect the sum of ₱4,012,166.43, representing the
DECISION judgment award plus interest and attorney's fees.
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff,
petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent more particularly award of moral
Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying his Petition for damages is contrary to law; and
Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to
issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of First d. Defendant has valid, legal and
Instance of Bulacan. justiciable defenses.2
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows: The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin
Bautista, an associate of the same law firm. The
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court
was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for
resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a
Domingo Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However
complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against the same was denied and the decision became final on
petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower
(Branch VIII), docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Court, presided by respondent Judge for execution. 3
Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo
W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private
Associates. 1 respondent with the lower Court which was granted by
respondent Judge. 4
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the
pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice, On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L.
petitioner was treated as in default and private Santos 11, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment
respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who
parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member
Republic of the Philippines court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion of the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights
SUPREME COURT for Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking had not been adequately protected and his properties
Manila the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon
case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting without due process of law. 5
SECOND DIVISION aside of the decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration
was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977 the law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of
and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". . a clear
assigning the following alleged errors, to wit: case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for
defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the
grounds relied upon ". . . could have been ventilated in
the appeal before the Court of Appeals ... " 6
LAWYER'S OATH
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing 2. Ordering defendants individually to pay the
considerations, it is hereby respectfully prayed sum of P350.00 Philippine Currency, per month
that judgment be rendered in accordance with by way of monthly rental commencing from May
plaintiff's prayer in their Complaint in the above- 16, 1990, and thereafter until they shall have
entitled case. SO ORDERED. vacated the premises of the plaintiff;
He further alleges that Branch 18 of the Regional 3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, in its Order of 19 severally the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine
January 1993 in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 2 - a currency, on account of plaintiff's attorney's fees
petition for certiorari filed by the defendants in (retainer) and P500.00, Philippine Currency, for
Civil Case No. 90-1706 - had already opined that every hearing/trial attended by said attorney
the said decision is void upon its face because it: before this Honorable Court; and
-versus-
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
Complainant,
-versus-
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
-versus-
x------------------------------------------------
--x
ATTY. LEON L. ASA and ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS,
Complainants, DECISION
-versus-
done the same with his own visitors.[11] In any event, they as CBD Case No. 03-1108, for gross violation of lawyers oath
claim that the assailed factual narration was material and and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Castillo also filed an administrative
relevant to Castillos question why Asa was given the lions
complaint[15] against Asa before the IBP, charging him with
share of attorneys fees when he had not rendered any known
embezzlement, dishonesty, betrayal of trust, grave abuse of
material service which redounded to the benefit of
Castillo alleged that: (1) Oliveros assisted Cassiday in confidence and violation of the lawyers oath and the Code of
the Nonan children.
embezzling US $950,000 representing the share adjudicated to Professional Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD
Moreover, the Castillos declared that the deposit of the Nonan heirs; (2) in conspiracy with Dr. Laurel and a Case No. 03-1109.
the Nonan funds at the UCPB was not attended with malice or certain Atty. Douglas Cushnie, Oliveros resorted to forum
bad faith, nor was it intended to benefit them as the funds shopping to undermine and defeat the jurisdiction of the Castillo alleged that (1) Asa, Cassiday and Dr. Laurel
could only be withdrawn by Dr. Laurel who had exclusive Philippine court in the guardianship proceedings; (3) Oliveros, scandalously mismanaged the estate of the Nonan heirs, the
access to all the information pertaining to the interest and along with Asa, Dr. Laurel and Cassiday, perpetuated other bulk of which they indiscriminately pocketed;
benefits accruing thereto. acts of fraud in the guardianship proceedings; and (2) Asaand Oliveros filed a groundless administrative
(4) Oliveros, together with Asa, deliberately and maliciously complaint against him and Ginger Anne to compel him to
withdraw his claim for attorneys fees against Dr. Laurel and
his bid to replace the latter as guardian of the Nonan heirs; (3) As regards the $24,500 that he allegedly secretly Dollar Account No. 8-250-00047-3 in RCBC. Dr. Laurel,
despite an Agreement[16] dated February 16, 2000 between him pocketed, Asa explained that several days prior to April 18, however, withdrew $160,000.00 the following day from
and Asa that the latter would receive only 25% of whatever he 2000, Dr. Laurel and Atty. Cassiday fixed the attorneys fees of RCBC and placed it in his own Dollar Time Deposit Account
(Castillo) would receive as attorneys fees, Asa secretly both Castillo and Asa at $100,000 each, based on the amount for which $500.00 was spent for the purpose. A
pocketed the amounts of $24,500 and $160,500 from the to be paid by the four heirs or $25,000 per heir. When the first Certification[20] to this effect, issued by
guardianship case on April 18, 2000; (4) Asa refused to heir Merceditas Feliciano (Merceditas) paid $1,150,000 on RCBC Ortigas Business Center Manager Dolores L. Del Valle,
account for and turn over the amount of $130,000 in attorneys April 18, 2000, he deposited $24,500 of this amount in his and was appended to AsasAnswer.
fees which belonged to him (Castillo); and (5) Asa embarked his wifes joint Dollar Account No. 247-702-9275 at the
on a scheme to force him into resigning as counsel for Dr. Philippine National Bank (PNB), OrtigasBranch as his share Finally, Asa declared that Castillos claim for
Laurel to enable them to exercise absolute control over the in the attorneys fees, while he opened a new account in the $130,000 in attorneys fees is baseless and unconscionable, and
guardianship case and appropriate for themselves the attorneys name of Dr. Laurel to which he deposited the amount of that Castillo filed the complaint merely to harass him in
fees allocated for him. $160,500. retaliation for the complaint he and Oliveros priorly filed
In his Answer to the Complaint[17] in CBD Case No. Asa went on to declare that Castillo received his own
03-1109, Asa alleged as follows: It was in fact Castillo who $25,000 plus interest amounting to $25,023.13 representing IV. CBD Case No. 03-1125
reneged on their February 16, 2000 Agreement as the latter full payment of his attorneys fees from Merceditas, as
had earlier bluntly told him that he changed his mind and that evidenced by a Receipt[19] dated May 2, 2000 signed by On August 25, 2003, Asa filed yet another
he would not give him (Asa) any share in the attorneys fees he Castillo. administrative complaint,[21] against Castillo before the
would receive from the guardianship case, Castillo reasoning IBP, for disbarment/suspension, docketed as CBD Case No.
that he was the therein counsel of record and had endorsed the Continuing, Asa declared that of the $160,500 03-1125, charging him with deceit, malpractice, gross
case to the Laurel Law Offices. He thus reported the matter to belonging to Dr. Laurel, $100,000 represented partial payment misconduct in office, immoral conduct, violation of the
Dr. Laurel and informed him that he would likewise not give for his consenting to be the guardian ad litem of lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in
Castillos share in the attorneys fees he [Asa] might receive the Nonanheirs and $60,000 represented reimbursement for light of his baseless, malicious and derogatory allegations in
because [Castillo] has no word of honor.[18] expenses incurred over several years by Dr. Laurel, the total of CBD Case No. 03-1109 which were founded on deceit and
unlawful suit. consolidated cases for lack of merit. THIS COURTS RULING
By Report and Recommendation[22] of February 27, action to this Court. Comment/Opposition, Castillos statement reads:
In the case at bar, Castillo and Ginger Annes choice of The Petitioner-Guardian can best
protect the deposits of the Nonan children if
words manifestly falls short of this criterion. Their disparaging the proceeds of the settlement will be
Castillo and Ginger Anne are thus ADMONISHED to
statements in the pleading referred to above belie their deposited with a solvent and more
exercise greater care and circumspection in the preparation of conservative bank like the RIZAL
proffered good intention and exceed the bounds of civility and COMMERCIAL BANKING
their pleadings and refrain from using offensive or otherwise CORPORATION (RCBC) x x x[37]
propriety.
improper language.
Castillos claim that the statement about Asas services In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum
In support of Asa and Oliveros allegation that Castillo
is relevant and pertinent to the claim for attorneys fees and of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the
employed deceit and falsehood in attempting to change the
was, for all legal intents and purposes, a privileged burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Moreover, an
depositary bank for the funds to be held in trust by Dr. Laurel
communication[34] deserves short shrift. Indulging in offensive administrative case against a lawyer must show the dubious
for the Nonan heirs, they presented the March 2, 2000 RTC
personalities in the course of judicial proceedings constitutes character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof.
Order directing Dr. Laurel and his principal counsel Castillo to
unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if [38]
In the case at bar, Asa and Oliveros failed to present clear
deposit the balance of the proceeds of the settlement with any
the publication thereof is privileged.[35] and preponderant evidence to show that Castillo willfully and
and all of the adjudicated heirs with UCPB and the March 14,
deliberately resorted to deceit and falsehood in filing the
x x x this Court will not be inhibited 2000 RTC Order directing the deposit of the settlement
from exercising its supervisory authority over Motion to have the funds deposited at UCPB.
proceeds with the RCBC.
lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to
that standard expected of them as members of
the Bar.Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged Respecting Castillos June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer
communication absolves beforehand the A perusal of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
lawyer from civil and criminal liability based in the Makati RTC Civil Case No. 01-506, he therein alleged:
dated March 8, 2000 signed by Dr. Laurel, however, fails to
on the statements made in the pleadings. But
like the member of the legislature who enjoys establish any wrongdoing on the part of Castillo in having
On the other hand, retired Justice was No. 15 among the
Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who bar topnotchers. This is not earlier filed by Castillo with the Pasig RTC, Branch 154 in
personally knew the plaintiff, was also to mention his impressive
connection with his claim for attorneys fees in Civil Cases
profuse in extolling his academic credentials and highly (sic) batting
and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer, as average of winning about Nos. 43049 and 56637 which affidavit was subsequently
follows: 80% to 90% of his load
cases and work. He was also withdrawn,[42] however, as it was unsigned and unsubscribed.
Q: Do you know the claimant one of the busy lawyers of
Atty. P.M. Castillo? our office, until he went on
private practice and excelled Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
A: Yes sir, because we were both as one of the more
active Senior Trial lawyers successful and respected provides that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
at the Laurel Law Offices. trial practitioners.
[39]
(Underscoring supplied) the courts. Rule 10.01 of said Canon specifically commands
Q: How could you characterize
and rate the trial that a member of the bar shall not do any falsehood, nor
competency, performance consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
and expertise of Atty. P.M.
To Asa, by the foregoing allegation, Castillo
Castillo? allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 of the
committed clear falsehood for Justice Kalalo had never been a
A: He is highly competent, low same Canon provides that a member of the bar shall not
key, aggressive and very lawyer at any time at the Laurel Law Offices.
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper or
brilliant in the conduct of
trial, as well as, in the assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
formulation of courtroom Castillo explained, however, that he can only say that
strategies. His pleadings are
also very well written, direct he has no control, nor influence on the voluntary and
to the point, convincing, And Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
scholarly and exhaustive. To spontaneous declaration and testimony of Retired Justice
directs that a lawyer must employ such means only as are
be sure, he is one of the
popular trial lawyers of our Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals in his favor during the
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the
firm (The Laurel Law highly adversarial proceedings. [40]
Offices), not only because judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false statement
he came from an exclusive
school, but also because of of fact or law.[43]
his scholastic records Castillos explanation does not impress, however. The
at Ateneo de Manila was
records show that the above-quoted statements attributed by
also impressive. That is why Complete candor or honesty is thus expected from
he was taken in by former Castillo to Justice Kalalo were lifted from an unsigned and
VP Salvador H. Laurel even lawyers, particularly when they appear and plead before the
before the release of the unsubscribed affidavit entitled Question and Answer Format in
1964 bar where he was also courts.[44] They have an obligation to the court as well as to the
No. 2 among the Ateneo bar Lieu of Direct Testimony of Justice
opposing party to make only truthful statements in their
candidates for the year. He [41]
Felipe Kalalo dated January 21, 1993. This affidavit was
guardian ad litem of the Nonan children and
pleadings.[45] The burden cast on the judiciary would be accepting all responsibilities attached to said
position .US$100,000.00
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by
and Dr. Laurel Partial Inventory, Account and Report of
counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task (8) Reimbursement to Salvador H.
Guardian [48]
dated February 13, 2002 filed with the Angeles Laurel for expenses incurred during the last
of verification of allegations submitted could easily be six (6) years for airfare, car rentals, overseas
City RTC, Branch 59 in Sp. Proc. No. 5222 stating that: calls, and representation and other incidental
imagined.[46] expenses while in the various states in the
United States in order to pursue the claim of
3. On April 18, 2000, the Nonan children against
Guardian Ad Litem Salvador H. Laurel and the Hillblom estate .US$60,000.00
In light of the above findings reflecting Castillos
his Principal Foreign Legal Counsel, Atty.
administrative culpability, his charge Benjamin Cassiday III received by way of x x x x[49] (Underscoring supplied),
settlement from one of the duly adjudicated
against Asa and Oliveros of filing groundless disbarment cases heirs of Larry
Lee Hillblom, Mercedita Feliciano, by and
against him and Ginger Anne necessarily fails. through her Guardian Ad Litem, Milagros
Feliciano, the amount of ONE MILLION validate Asas explanation that the amount of $160,500
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND US
belonged to Dr. Laurel but was merely temporarily placed in
As regards Castillos claim that Asa secretly pocketed DOLLARS (US$1,150,000.00) which was
deposited with the Rizal Commercial his (Asas) account.
$24,500 and $160,500, the undated certification issued by Banking Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis
Square Branch, Ortigas Center, Pasig City
RCBC Branch Operation Head Dolores del Valle reading: under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250-
000430-ABA. Routing No. RCBC PH MM in The Partial Inventory, Account and Report of
This is to certify that on April 18, the name of Salvador H. Laurel, in trust
Guardian shows that $12,500 was received by Asa as attorneys
2000, Mr. Leon L. Asa opened a Dollar for Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jeril Nonan, in
Savings Account at our Business Center. A compliance with the Order of this Honorable fees for assisting Dr. Laurel and Castillo from 1996 to 2000.
credit was made to his assigned Dollar Court dated April 26, 2000;
[50]
Savings Account Number 8-250-00047-3 in Confirming such disbursement is a Receipt [51] dated April
the amount of US Dollars: One Hundred 4. Pursuant to the above-stated
Orders of this Honorable Court, the Guardian 18, 2000 signed by Asa. The remaining $12,500 of the
Sixty Thousand Five Hundred
(USD: 160,500.00) as initial transaction. We Ad Litem and Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III $25,000 attorneys fees of Asa per heir (as priorly agreed upon
further certify that on April 19, 2000, there disbursed the following amounts for the
was a debit made for said account in the purposes indicated: by Dr. Laurel and Cassiday) were remitted by Asa to the
amount of US Dollars: One Hundred Sixty
A. ATTORNEYS FEES & OTHER Laurel Law Offices as Official Receipt No. 1766 [52] issued by
Thousand (USD: 160,000.00) and that same
amount was placed in the Dollar Time NECESSARY LEGAL EXPENSES:
the treasurer/cashier of the Laurel Law Offices dated April 19,
Deposit Account of Salvador H. Laurel. Mr.
Leon Asa left the amount of USD: Five xxxx 2000 shows:
Hundred in his account to serve as the
maintaining balance requirement. Subject (7) Partial payment of the fee of
Dollar Savings Account had closed already,[47] Salvador H. Laurel for consenting to be the
RECEIVED from Atty. Leon L. Asa the sum [56]
of Twelve thousand five hundred US Dollars strategy to spite, insult and provoke him to ostracize him and Personal colloquies between counsels which promote
US$12,500.00 as fifty percent (50%) share of
make him feel unwanted to continue as [Dr. Laurels] lawyer in unseemly wrangling should thus be carefully avoided.[57]
LLO [Laurel Law Offices] in attorneys fees
of US$25,000 of Atty. Asa in SP Proc. 5222 furtherance of their conspiracy to force him into resignation
of RTC Angeles City, Br. 59.
Cash.US$12,500- for them to replace him and have absolute control over the It appears that Castillo had previously been suspended
By: Sgd. guardianship case, the funds of the estate and the attorneys for Six (6) Months by this Court in CBD Case No.
Treasurer/Cashier fees, the same is unsubstantiated, hence, deserves no further 176, Bongalonta v. Castillo,[58] for committing falsehood in
inappropriate, to say the least, for consideration in these breach of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Dr. Laurel eventually gave Castillo $10,000 out of the
administrative proceedings, the same is denied. and is hereby admonished to refrain from using offensive and
$12,500 which Asa remitted to the Laurel Law Offices, as
improper language in her pleadings.
reflected in the Partial Inventory, Account and Report of
A final word. The spectacle of members of the bar
Guardian.[53]
being engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from Atty. Pablito M. Castillo is likewise
edifying. Mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations found GUILTY of breach of Canons 8, as well as Canon 10 of
Respecting Castillos claim that, in violation of the
between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
Code of Professional
profession and will not receive any sympathy from this Court.
Responsibility, Asa and Oliveros embarked on another sinister
G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of One
(1) Year, effective upon receipt of this Decision. ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and
DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners,
vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON.
CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of
respective personal records of Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo and
First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch III).
of Atty. Pablito M. Castillo in the Office of the Bar
EN BANC
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila
semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ
reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then
of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As
alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses
was designed to cause delay, and the active that courts of first instance have no power to restrain and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of
participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the
is patent. 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among
enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction
with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal
proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another
spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he
be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for
execution long overdue. month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963,
basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as recall the controverted writ of execution.
that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property, justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of
why did they not adopt this position from the very start, stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the
or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which
Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for
order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to
They chose, however, to attack the execution in a adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was
piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with
projected execution sale six times. More than eight during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as
years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and judge to issue the following order: stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact,
the same has yet to be satisfied. when the motion was set for hearing on December 21,
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez execution was called this morning for hearing, produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the
spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the counsel for the movant did not appear despite promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the
issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the the fact that he had been duly notified of the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said
execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from motion for hearing. In view thereof the court motion for reconsideration.
courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, assumes that he is waiving his right to present
as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall The above exposition of the circumstances relative to
instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the
from the scene following the rendition of the therefore deemed submitted for resolution. movants that "in none of the various incidents in the
aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners
Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the
controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407."
injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact
connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached
said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of
39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a
simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a
foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
ventured to adopt, such that even before, one remedy "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
had been exhausted, they interposed another until the writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty
case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
member of this Court are persuaded that justice was were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's
practically waylaid. jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy
The movants also contend that even this Court (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are is indisputable.
sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial
the "proper remedy" when we said that. jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have
a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 several counsel in this case but the participation of each
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of However, the recall and the denial of the writs of counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of
execution, the validity and regularity of which are preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed
unchallenged, but the levy made by the not amount to the termination or dismissal of the against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their
respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either
not the recall of the writ, but an independent desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they singular or plural in construction, so that when we said
action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the
the projected sale, in which action the conjugal practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay
nature of the levied stocks should be established instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil
as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its
permanent injunction, in the event of a on the same grounds which she advanced in the former aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is
successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty.
the protracted litigation, the petitioners had November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his
already availed of this remedy in civil cases case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court
7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they same when they instituted the herein petition of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners'
incessantly sought other, and often for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about
simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals
the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) . case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he
1964, with the consent of the parties because of the "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when
pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari. he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292
And because of this statement, they now counter that
the said cases could not be branded as having been before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by
instituted for delay. The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record
was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by
assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in
condemned." 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of
the above-quoted statement must not be considered out
the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel
of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent
already availed of the suggested remedy only in the
and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and motion is the same motion discussed above, which,
sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292
is to be commended; what we do not and cannot curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the
were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil
of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. case 7532.
word incidentally advisedly to show that in their
incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988
denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby modified
in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble vs.
costs assessed against the petitioners. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO
HERRERA, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Let the Court further say that while its business is to KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A.
settle actual controversies and as a matter of general RAYOS, petitioners, vs. HON. PAUL T.
policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC,
foremost, to dispense justice. At the outset, we have Makati, Branch 134, respondent.
made clear that from a technical vantage point,
certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise stated, DECISION
the resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate
MENDOZA, J.:
of technical rules, but if the decision is to have any real
meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we
would have done so; in many cases we have eschewed This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders
the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a dated December 3, 1993 and December 17, 1993 of
barrier upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial
so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners guilty of
counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer
time that we have the final say. We likewise cannot, as imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of
the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the P100.00.
bar, let go unpunished what convinces us as serious The antecedent facts are as follows:
indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered. Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co., brought
suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS
Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain
1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to
deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which
pay to the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, the
the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly
sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages;
fraudulently titled in the name of the defendant LFS
Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant
2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no Jose Poe. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 14048,
disciplinary action may be imposed on him for violation was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by
of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by
respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should and not because, as petitioners alleged, he was
counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking not be cited for contempt of court.[2] personally recruited from the South by Atty. Santos
the inhibition of respondent judge from the consideration and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he
of the case.[1] The motion alleged in pertinent part: In a pleading entitled Opposition to and/or assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started
Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed holding sessions on October 18, 1993; that when all
Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel, Atty. male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner
1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant
Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not Kelly Wicker he failed to pick out the young man who
LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able to maneuver the three (3)
necessarily express his views because he merely signed was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the
successive postponements for the presentation for cross-
the motion in a representative capacity, in other words, filing of the motion for inhibition; that he was not
examination of Mrs. Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August
just lawyering, for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to him vindictive and that he in fact refrained from implementing
1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she was not presented;
that a young man possibly employed by the Court had the execution of his order dated December 3, 1993 to
advised him to have the case reraffled, when the enable petitioners to avail themselves of all possible
2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new
this case was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the remedies; that after holding petitioners in contempt, he
judge both failed to come for a hearing, because their issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting
Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and absence was an indication that Atty. Santos knew who
in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. himself from trying Civil Case No. 14048; that Atty.
the judge may be and when he would appear. Wickers Rayos claim that he was just lawyering and acting as the
who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did sense of disquiet increased when at the next two
not likewise appear while other counsels were present; vehicle or mouthpiece of his client is untenable because
hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos and the his (Atty. Rayos) duties to the court are more important
latters witness, Mrs. Remedios Porcuna, were all than those which he owes to his client; and that by
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge absent, while the other counsels were present.[3] tendering their profuse apologies in their motion for
was personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin
Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory, reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order,
Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time
respondent judge, in an order dated December 3, 1993, petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their accusations
member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom
held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each against him; and that the petitioners have taken
plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796,
to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil Case
and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs
of P100.00. No. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated
feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos
November 18, 1993 they asked that the case be
relief; Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which reraffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati, while in
respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order their petition dated November 29, 1993, which they filed
4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of of December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent with the Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked
His Honor and to give a fighting chance for plaintiffs to prove judge directed petitioners to appear before him that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue hearing the
their case, since this will be the last case to recover the on January 7, 1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their case on the ground that he had a full grasp of the case.
partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit sentence.
himself and set this case for re-raffle; In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge,
In their petition[4] before this Court, Kelly Wicker and petitioners claim that although they wanted a reraffle of
5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that respondent judge the case, it was upon the suggestion of respondent
jurisprudence that in the first instance that a litigant doubts the committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them judge himself that they filed the petition with the Court
partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should for contempt. They argue that when a person, impelled Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the
immediately move for his inhibition. by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful case.
manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his
case, he does not thereby become guilty of contempt. What is involved in this case is an instance of direct
The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker. contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly
In his comment,[5] respondent judge alleges that he containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
Considering the allegations to be malicious,
took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings
derogatory and contemptuous, respondent judge
Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in
ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on
Order No. 154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court another case. The former has been held to be equivalent
to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty.
a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not Rayos was that he had been told by an unidentified
the same within the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules likewise appear while other counsels were present; young man, whom he thought to be employed in the
of Court and, therefore, direct contempt.[6] court, that it seemed the opposing counsel, Atty. Santos,
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge knew who the replacement judge was, because Atty.
It is important to point out this distinction because in Santos did not show up in court on the same days the
was personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin
case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor new judge failed to come. It would, therefore, appear
Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time
may be punished only [a]fter charge in writing has been that the other allegations in the motion that respondent
member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom
filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be judge had been personally recruited by the opposing
plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796,
heard by himself or counsel, whereas in case of direct counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been
and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs
contempt, the respondent may be summarily adjudged eased out were Atty. Rayos and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos
feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos
in contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect is thus understating his part in the preparation of the
relief;
contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct motion for inhibition.
contempt only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs
and MeTCs are appealable.[7] leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility
was beholden to the opposing counsel in the case, Atty. for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just
Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge an instrument of his client. His client came to him for
respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence even if owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati, which professional assistance in the representation of a cause,
petitioners are right about the nature of the case against necessitated easing out the former judge to make room and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there
them by contending that it involves indirect contempt, for such transfer. were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which
they have no ground for complaint since they were he could not overstep.[11] Even a hired gun cannot be
afforded a hearing before they were held guilty of These allegations are derogatory to the integrity
and honor of respondent judge and constitute an excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion.
contempt. What is important to determine now is Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in
this country. They suggest that lawyers, if they are well Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility
discretion in holding petitioners liable for direct for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for
contempt. connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to
their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of inhibition as his client.
We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to
power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, that of his client. The Code of Professional
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only precisely in the interest of an efficient administration of Responsibility enjoins him to observe and maintain the
occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to]
respect without which the administration of justice will Constitution.[10] This is a matter of record which could insist on similar conduct by others [12] and not [to]
fail.[8] The contempt power ought not to be utilized for the have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to strike back claims, he deliberated for two months whether or not to or have materiality to the case.[13]
at a party for showing less than full respect for the file the offending motion for inhibition as his client
dignity of the court.[9] allegedly asked him to do. After the respondent judge had favorably responded
to petitioners profuse apologies and indicated that he
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence,
on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge he merely did what he had been bidden to do by his petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their
Arcangels finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. client of whom he was merely a mouthpiece. He was just instant petition which prayed in part that Respondent
A reading of the allegations in petitioners motion for lawyering and he cannot be gagged, even if the Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former
inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof: allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where
prepared and filed were false since it was his client who more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike
2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case verified the same. in Davao City. If nothing else, this personal attack on the
was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the Acting judge only serves to confirm the contumacious attitude,
Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that
a flouting or arrogant belligerence first evident in the Philippines chose him as one of the most
petitioners motion for inhibition belying their outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court
protestations of good faith. Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and that he is a
1963 graduate of the U.P. College of Law.
Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v.
Masaquel:[14] In Ceniza v. Sebastian,[15] which likewise involved a
motion for inhibition which described the judge corrupt,
Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even the Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt,
members of the Supreme Court, were asked to inhibit removed the jail sentence of 10 days imposed by the
themselves from trying, or from participating in the trial court for the reason that
consideration of a case, but scarcely were the movants
punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which they Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist
based their motions for disqualification are not among those the conclusion, considering the background of this occurrence
provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was
imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to not duly mindful of the exacting standard [of] preservation of
disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of grievance
and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is
of court. the view of the Court that under the circumstances the fine
Republic of the Philippines
imposed should be increased to P500.00.
SUPREME COURT
It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies Manila
to this case. The same justification also holds true in this case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is SECOND DIVISION
with the rule that the power to cite for contempt must be MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of imprisonment
exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P G.R. No. L-42032 January 9, 1976
we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be 100.00 to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.
dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the IN THE MATTER OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE
court. In the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is SO ORDERED.
BODY OF MANUEL DE GRACIA ON A WRIT OF
greater reason for doing so considering that the HABEAS CORPUS. MANUEL DE GRACIA, petitioner,
particularly offending allegations in the motion for vs.
inhibition do not appear to have come from him but were THE WARDEN, MUNICIPAL JAIL, Makati, Rizal; THE
additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is PROVINCIAL WARDEN, PROVINCIAL JAIL, Pasig,
advanced in years (80) and in failing health (suffering Rizal; HON. REYNALDO P. HONRADO, Judge of the
from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXV, Pasig,
Wicker may have indeed been the recipient of such a Rizal; and MARCIANO P. STA. ANA, Assistant
remark although he could not point a court employee Provincial Fiscal, Pasig, Rizal, respondents.
who was the source of the same. At least he had the
grace to admit his mistake both as to the source and
truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge Arcangel
was also willing to waive the imposition of the jail
FERNANDO, J.:
sentence on petitioners until he came upon petitioners
description of him in the instant petition as a judge who
cannot make the grade in the RTC of Makati, where It is settled law-that habeas corpus is the appropriate
complex cases are being filed. In response to this, he remedy for release from confinement of a person who
cited the fact that the Integrated Bar of has served his sentence. 1 It i s on such a doctrine that
reliance is placed by petitioner Manuel de Gracia in this On December 8, 1975, this Court issued the following filing of a new information for homicide upon the
application for the issuance of such a writ. It is resolution: "The Court [issued] the writ of habeas corpus authority of this Honorable Court's ruling in People v.
undisputed that while the information against petitioner returnable to this Court on Friday, December 12, 1975 Manolong, and It is similar cases. 8
charged him with the commission of frustrated homicide and required the respondents to make a [return] of the
to which he pleaded not guilty, it was later amended to writ not later than the aforesaid date. The Court further As no return of the writ had been filed on the date set for
one of serious physical injuries. It is to such lesser Resolved: (a) to set this case for hearing on Monday, hearing by respondent wardens, a resolution of the
offense that on September 10, 1971, he entered a plea December 15, 1975 at 10:30 a.m.; and (b) to [grant] the following tenor was adopted by this Court: "When this
of guilty. On the very same day, respondent Judge motion of petitioner to litigate as pauper in this case was called for hearing this morning, Atty. Salvador
Reynaldo P. Honrado imposed upon him the penalty of case." 6 On the date set for hearing, respondent Judge N. Beltran appeared for the petitioner while Assistant
four months and one day of arrests mayor without Reynaldo P. Honrado filed his return, worded as follows: Provincial 'Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and Major o
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. That "1. That the petitioner Manuel de Gracia has already Maristela appeared for the respondents. Thereafter, the
period of confinement he had duly served by November been ordered released by this court per order dated Court Resolved (a) to require Assistant Provincial Fiscal
10, 1975, considering that he had been under detention December 11, 1975, in view of the fact that Trial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. to file a [return] of the writ for
since July 18, 1975. 2 This notwithstanding, the petition Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. has not as of this time filed the the respondent wardens not later than 10:30 a.m. of
alleged that he was not set free, the reason being that amended information for Homicide after the death of Wednesday, December 17, 1975; and (b) to [reset] the
on November 19, 1975, the last day of the prison term Florante Valenzuela, the offended party in this case, hearing of this case on the aforesaid date and time. 9 It
imposed upon him, "respondent Assistant Provincial notwithstanding his motion entitled 'Motion to Order the should be stated likewise that Major Edgardo Maristela
Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana filed with the respondent Warden to hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia dated assured the Court that petitioner had been release What
Judge, in the very same case where your petitioner was November 19, 1975, ...; 2. That in view of the release was declared orally by him was thereafter set forth in
convicted and for which he served sentence, Criminal from custody of Manuel de Gracia, the present petition writing in accordance with his return dated December
Case No. 15289, a 'Motion to Order the Warden to Hold for habeas corpus has become moot and 16, 1975: II That on Sept. 18, 1975, the Office of the
the Release of Manuel de Gracia (your petitioner)' academic. ..." 7 Fiscal of Rizal, did likewise. The return Provincial Warden received a commitment order issued
alleging as a ground that the 'father of the victim, stated: "1. That the Respondent Marciano P. Sta. Ana, by Judge Reynaldo Honrado, dated 16 September 1975,
Gilberts Valenzuela, informed the movant (respondent Jr., the Assistant Provincial petitioner is not in his ...; IV. That by virtue 6f that commitment order which the
Asst. Fiscal, not the People of the Philippines), that the custody or power although, as alleged in the petition, it petitioner was sentenced to suffer the penalty of from
victim in the above-entitled case died and for this reason was upon his motion that the respondent Judge issued four (4) months and one (1) day, he was transferred to
the undersigned will file an amended information. 3 Then the Order ... ordering the warden to hold the release of Makati Municipal Jail, on Sept. 18, 1975, to service his
came this paragraph in the petition: "That on the the accused (herein petitioner). 2. That the reason for his prison term thereat pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
following day, November 20, 1975, the respondent said motion ... is, as stated therein, that he was informed 29 as said prisoner is classified as Municipal prisoner; V
Judge, despite the clear and incontrovertible fact that he of the death of the victim and he was going to file an That the petitioner was brought back and confined again
had no jurisdiction to act on said motion because the amended information. 3. That because of the necessity to the Rizal Provincial Jail on Dec. 3, 1975, by virtue of
case had long been terminated and his decision therein for immediate action so as to avoid the accused being Remittance order issued by Judge Pedro Revilla,
had already been executed, and, further, even assuming released so that he could be held to answer for a crime Executive Judge CFI Rizal dated Dec. 3, 1975, ...; VI.
that the respondent Judge could still act in the case, he of homicide, and in the honest belief at that time that the That on December 12, 1975, the Office of the Provincial
could not and should not act on the Fiscal's motion proper remedy was the filing of an amended information Warden of Rizal received an Order from the Court of
because the same was not set for hearing and no copy for homicide, the undersigned filed the motion on said First Instance of Rizal presided by Honorable Judge
thereof was furnished to your petitioner whose very ground. The information concerning the death of the Reynaldo Honrado, directing him to release Manuel de
liberty was being sought to be deprived, still [he] victim was given to the undersigned by the victim's Gracia, the petitioner in this case; VII. That by virtue of
persisted in acting upon the Fiscal's motion and granted father only on November 19, 1975, the last day of odd order ... and the Order of Release, ... the
the same 'in the interest of justice,' not at all minding that confinement of the accused. However, after being able undersigned respondent released on said date the
your petitioner, while maybe a convict in the eyes of the to study the applicable rule and jurisprudence, the petitioner as evidenced by certificate of discharge from
respondent Judge, is still entitled to due process of law undersigned concluded that the proper remedy is not prison and that is the reason why he cannot produce the
and to some justice; ...." 4 There was a motion for amendment of the information because judgment had body of said person before this Honorable Court; VIII
reconsideration, but it was fruitless. 5 Hence this petition. already been rendered on the first information, but the That he was not able to make the return of the writ
immediately on the ground that he was at that time
confined in the hospital, and he was d only on December
13, 1975." 10 There was likewise a return of the writ on
such a date on behalf of respondent Cresencio T.
Pimentel, Municipal Warden of Makati, Rizal. It was
therein declared: "1. That the petitioner was not in his
custody when he received copy of the petition as the
petitioner was transferred to 'the Rizal Provincial Jail on
December 3, 1975, as he was going to be charged with
the crime of homicide and 'therefore, his confinement
has to be in the Rizal Provincial Jail and that by virtue of
said transfer, respondent Municipal Warden could not
produce the body of the 'petitioner before this-
Honorable Court."11