People v. Astorga PDF
People v. Astorga PDF
People v. Astorga PDF
SYNOPSIS
Appellant herein was charged with violation of Article 267, Paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code for kidnapping a minor. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial on the merits ensued. Thereafter, he was convicted by the trial court and was
sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. This appeal was filed directly with the Supreme Court in
view of the penalty imposed. In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and the legal characterization of the acts imputed to him.
According to the Supreme Court, the appellant should be convicted only of grave
coercion, not kidnapping. Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew
cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There
was no "lock up." Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code. The felony committed in this case is grave coercion under
Article 286 of the same code, the elements of which were sufficiently proved by the
prosecution. Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was convicted of grave coercion and was sentenced
to six months of arresto mayor.
SYLLABUS
8. ID.; ID.; CONVICTION; WHEN PROPER. — The information, dated March 24,
1992, filed against Astorga contains sufficient allegations constituting grave coercion, the
elements of which were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Hence, a conviction for said
crime is appropriate under Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
"Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof - When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the offenses as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included
in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J : p
Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence
does not adequately prove this element, the accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping.
In the present case, the prosecution merely proved that appellant forcibly dragged the
victim toward a place only he knew. There being no actual detention or confinement, the
appellant may be convicted only of grave coercion. Lex Lib
The Case
The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of Arnulfo
Astorga challenging the March 31, 1993 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum,
Davao convicting him of kidnapping.
In an Information 2 dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8243,
Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly assisted by his counsel, 3
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision 4 reads as follows: 5
This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the penalty imposed. 6
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision of the trial court, as
follows: 7
Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle was used.
The daughter and nephew of her aunt Bebeth were quarreling [sic] about the
possession of a flashlight until the glass got lost. Accused or 'Boy' Astorga, went
near and asked her daughter Jane what happened. Glenda or Bebeth grabbed
her baby and went home.
Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and
accused immediately grabbed and hold [sic] her hand. Accused placed his hand
on her shoulder and covered his [sic] mouth.
Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991 when she was
brought by the accused allegedly to buy candy. Some stores were closed; others
were opened. Accused never went inside the store to buy candy. Instead she [sic]
held and dragged Yvonne until they went inside the compound of Maco
Elementary School. They were walking inside the perimeter fence, [while the
accused was] holding closely the child. Later, there being no person around the
gate, accused brought her out to the highway and walked towards the direction of
Tagum.
Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio
Binuangan, Maco. She asked him where they were going and accused answered
that they were going home. She told him that they were already on the opposite
direction because her grandparent's house is at Binuangan, while their route was
going towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an opposite direction. notwithstanding the
assertion of Yvonne that they were on the wrong direction. accused placed his
hands on her shoulder and dragged her. She cried and protested that she must
go home. Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to walk she
continued crying.
Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in
chasing, asked the accused where they were bound. He answered towards
Binuangan. The group noticed something suspicious because their destination
was already towards Tagum which is an opposite direction to Binuangan.
When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan, one of
those who chased knew the family. He got from the accused Yvonne who showed
some resistance. Nevertheless, the group brought her home at Binuangan.
Likewise, accused was also brought by them to Yvonne's home. The house of
accused and Yvonne were five (5) meters away. Accused wanted to talk to the
parents of the victim, but he was driven by her aunt and adviced [sic] to leave
otherwise he will be stabbed by Yvonne's father. He left and never talked with the
family."
The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the Appellant's Brief, 8 dated
December 10, 1993:
Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner testified that
at around 1:00 P.M. of December 29, 1991, he arrived at Maco from Tagum. Upon
arrival his two friends, Vicvic and Anding were already at his home. They decided
to drink, hence they proceeded to Adecor Cottage and drank two gallons of Tuba.
At around 2:00 P.M., they were at the market place and drink beer grande. At 5:00
P.M. on the same day, the three proceeded near the municipal hall and with some
persons, they again continued their drinking spree taking up Red Horse wine'.
(Decision, p. 3).
At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. Yvonne
approached him and asked him money to buy candy. He told her that they will
buy. They were not able to buy because the two stores where they went were
already closed. (TSN, pp. 12 and 13, March 24, 1993). He took her for a stroll for
his drunkeness [sic] to subside. They walked inside the school premises which
was about 20 meters away from the second store. They went out of the school
compound going towards Lupon-lupon because due to his drunkneness [sic], he
thought it was the way towards their house. (Ibid, pp. 14-15) They reached Lupon-
lupon bridge, crossed it twice thinking that it was the bridge near the municipal
hall. After reaching Purok, they met several persons, he was asked were (sic)
they were heading, and he answered to Tagumpay, but he was told that the [sic]
way was already going to Tagum. He requested those persons to guide them to
Tagumpay. They asked him who was the child he was carrying. He answered
that it was Traya's child. (Ibid, pp. 16-17). He was carrying the child because he
was already crying as she already wanted to go home. The group of persons,
men and women, guided them. Yvonne was being held by the women. They
arrived at Yvonne's house. He talked to the auntie of the child and told her that he
would converse with her but he was advised to go away because the father of
Yvonne might hack him So he went home. (Ibid, pp. 18-19)"
The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following discussion: 9
"Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he took Yvonne
to buy candy, he strolled with her so that his drunkenness be subsided.
All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she categorically
declared that she did not smell liquor on the accused.
He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they noticed his
actions suspicious bringing with him a child, he walked fast dragging Yvonne.
When he noticed that the group of youngsters were chasing him, he carried
Yvonne and ran until they covered a distance of half a kilometer in chasing them,
until they had overtaken him.
Accused, naivety [sic] that because of his intoxication, he got lost and was
not able to proceed with Yvonne to Binuangan was a shallow afterthought.
It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already going at
opposite direction from home. Instead they were heeding towards Tagum.
Accused did not change course.
Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her liberty and
was by force prevented to go home to her parents.
On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from accused to buy
candy. She also denied as testified by defense witness Arbeth Nalcot that she
went to the house of the accused on 29 December 1991 or on any other dates to
ask money from Astorga for candy.
Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his off tangent
and incredible theory of drunkardness. His alleged being lost in the direction of
Binuangan in spite of Yvonne's insistence and that of the person they met that he
was on the wrong way considering that there are no criss crossing roads except
the highway, is preposterous.
The Issues
"I
II
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that Yvonne
Traya was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty.
III
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that
appellant had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya."
In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the
legal characterization of the acts imputed to him.
Appellant contends that the testimonies witnesses are not worthy of credence
because they were inconsistent and improbable. He cites the following:
"Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the accused told
Yvonne that they will buy candy. She sensed that the accused was drunk. (TSN,
pp. 10-11, March 10. 1993) These testimonies were contradicted by Yvonne
Traya when she declared, that Glenda Chavez had already went [sic] inside their
house when [the] accused told her that they will buy candy (TSN. pp. 10 March
16, 1993). She testified that she did not smell liquor on the accused. (Decision,
pp. 3-4).
Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the accused at
a distance of 2 fathoms and they [sic] him about 15 to 20 meters (TSN, p. 35,
March 10, 1993). Arnel Fabila, on the other hand, testified that they overtook the
accused after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11,
1993).
Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast carrying her
because she was heavy. (TSN, p. 19, March 16, 1993). However, Arnel Fabila
declared that they were able to overtake the accused only after chasing him at a
distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993) meaning accused was
running fast." 11
The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at that time allegedly
contradicted Yvonne's statement that the accused did not smell of liquor. This, does not
detract from the credibility of either witness. Yvonne, then an eight-year-old child, 13 and
her Aunt Glenda, then twenty-seven years old, 14 do not have the same experiences or
level of maturity; hence, their perceptions of events differ. More important, whether the
accused was drunk or not is an insignificant detail that does not substantially affect the
testimonies of these witnesses.
Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses' estimate of the distance covered by the
men who chased appellant does not render their testimonies incredible. 15 Quite the
contrary, such discrepancy shows their candor and sincerity, demonstrating that their
testimonies were unrehearsed. 16 Yvonne testified that when appellant noticed the group of
men following them, he carried her and ran. Yvonne's testimony is in accord with that of
Arnel Fabila — a member of the group who chased appellant — that they were able to
overtake appellant after chasing him half a kilometer. 17
"a) that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused casually
moved around the school premises, as if they were strolling; That when they were
already in the highway, they were also walking openly and casually until they
were met by a group of youngster[s].
Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecution's witnesses, corroborated the fact that
the two were walking casually along the highway when he first saw them;
b) That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged victim will
not be seen or noticed by the people travelling or those persons residing along
the highway if it was true that the accused was dragging her and she was
continuously crying from her residence up to a distance of more than one
kilometer;
c) That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at a very
slow pace; a distance of barely a kilometer for a period of more than two hours;
d) That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking different
kinds of intoxicating liquors from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., causing him to be
confused on which way they should take in going home. c dtai
e) That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters who;
allegedly rescued the child, nor was immediately brought to the municipal hall
which was just near the house of the victim for the filing of the necessary charge;
this [sic] actuations only confirm the fact that the accused merely sought their help
in guiding them home, and
f) That it took more than one week for the complainant and her parents
to file the case at the Fiscal's Office."
We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied by the one-week
delay in the filing of the complaint. It has been held that delay or vacillation in making a
criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of, a witness where such
delay is satisfactorily explained. 19 In the present case, one week was reasonable,
considering that the victim was a resident of Binuangan and that the case was filed in
Tagum, Davao.
Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or bring him to the municipal
hall, because they deemed it more urgent at the time to rescue Yvonne and to bring her
home, which they actually did. 20 There is no settled rule on how a group of young men
should react upon seeing a young girl snatched by an older man. Verily, violence is not the
only normal reaction of young men who see a girl being forcibly taken.
Appellant's claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and walking casually
does not negate the fact that Yvonne was deprived of her will. As noted by the trial court,
appellant used physical force and psychological means in restraining her. 21 Despite her
young age, Yvonne was able to clearly recount the events that transpired on that fateful
night.
Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people travelling or living along
the highway should have noticed appellant and Yvonne. The fact is that a group of men
actually noticed and ultimately chased them.
All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long settled rule that the
trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses should be accorded great respect on
appeal. 22
Petitioner contends that "[t]here was no evidence presented to prove why the
accused should kidnap Yvonne Traya." He submits that "the prosecution had failed to prove
[any] motive to support the alleged kidnapping incident, thus, making the theory of the
defense more credible and believable." 23
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one essential element of
kidnapping — the fact of detention or the deprivation of liberty. The solicitor general
counters that deprivation of liberty is not limited to imprisoning or placing the victim in an
enclosure. Citing People vs. Crisostomo, 25 he argues:
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, 27 the elements of kidnapping are as
follows:
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days;
or
The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms
"lockup" (encerrar ) rather than "kidnap" (secuestrar or raptar ). Lockup is included in the
broader term of "detention," which refers not only to the placing of a person in an enclosure
which he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of liberty which does not
necessarily involve locking up. 28 Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally
approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of
conflict with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative
Code. 29
A When Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was already bringing her
child and bringing with her candle. And Arnulfo Astorga told me that we
will buy candy, sir.
A And while I was not answering the question he immediately grabbed me.
Q And after that, after he held your hand. what did he do next?
Q What school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is name of the school?
A Yes, sir.
Q Exactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy Astorga bring you?
A Yes, sir.
A We were going around and when he saw that there was no person in the
gate we passed at that gate.
A I asked him where we were going and he told me that we are going home
and I told him that this is not the way to our house, and we did not pass this
way. (Witness gesturing a certain direction).
Q And so when you said that is not the way, because our house is towards
Binuangan . . .
By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do you know to what
direction is going to Lupon-lupon, to what place is Lupon-lupon going to?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A Going to my place.
Q Do you know the place where it was going? What is that place?
A To Binuangan.
Q And so when you . . . what did he do next when you said that is not the
place going to your house?
Q What about you, what did you do when he was dragging you?
Q Did you say any word to him when you were crying?
A He told me that we will be going home, and told me not to make any noise
because if I will make any noise we will be lost on our way.
A The man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and Boy Astorga
answered, to Binuangan, but the man continued to say that this way is
going to Tagum and not to Binuangan any more.
A I further said that we will already leave, and we will be the ones to go to
Binuangan, and after that, Boy Astorga put me down because he urinated.
So, at that instance, I ran, but, after he urinated, he already took hold of me
not to run any more because there is a ghost.
Q When you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you when he urinated,
where did you run?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q While you were being dragged did you make any plea to him?
A He said that we will go home but I know [sic] that place we are [sic]
heading to is [sic] not a way to our home but it is [sic] the opposite.
A He continued walking and I also continued crying and I told him that I want
to go home and he told me that we are heading towards home, but I told
him that the way we are going to is not the way to our house.
A Yes, sir.
A He continued running and he stopped several vehicles but they did not
stop, so, we just continued walking.
A He moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back and he saw that
persons were already chasing him and after that he carried me and ran."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on
the move. They went to Maco Elementary School and strolled on the school grounds. When
nobody was at the Luponlupon bridge, appellant took the victim to the highway leading to
Tagum, Davao. At that time, Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to go
home to Binuangan, but appellant ignored her pleas and continued walking her toward the
wrong direction. Later on, the group of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant
Astorga carried the victim and ran, but Fabila's group chased and caught up with them.
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the
victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping. 31 Appellant's apparent intention was to
take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not
materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not
show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her.
Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an
actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup".
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the
same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion
is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce
intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the
person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words,
that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
32 When appellant forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home
to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going home,
and we cannot find any. llc d
The present case should be distinguished from People vs. Rosemarie de la Cruz . 33
Here, Appellant Astorga tricked Yvonne to go with him by telling her that they were going to
buy candy. When Yvonne recognized the deception, she demanded that she be brought
home, but appellant refused and instead dragged her toward the opposite direction against
her will. While it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga intended to detain or "lock up"
Yvonne, there is no question that he forced her to go with him against her will. In
Rosemarie de la Cruz , Victim Whiazel voluntarily went with accused. Furthermore, the
accused in that case failed to consummate the crime of kidnapping because of the timely
intervention of the victim's neighbor. Thus, the Court held in that case: 34
"In a prosecution for kidnapping the intent of the accused to deprive the
victim of the latter's liberty in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable
proof (People vs. Puno 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by the trial court, and
maintained by the People, as consummating the crime of kidnapping in this case
are those when accused-appellant held the victim's hand and refused to let go
when the victim asked to go over to her neighbor, who by then already saw what
was happening. This happened for only a very brief span of time and the
evidentiary record shows that there were a good number of people present at that
time, that a guard was stationed at the gate, and that there was at least a teacher
nearby. The child could have just as easily shouted for help. While it does not
take much to scare the wits out of a small child like Whiazel, under the attendant
circumstances, we cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of her
liberty. It must further be noted that up to that brief moment when Cecilia saw
them, and the child asked to be let go, the victim had gone with accused-
appellant voluntarily. Without any further act reinforcing the inference that the
victim may have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance of her minority,
the Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the case at bar was consummated.
While it is a well entrenched rule that factual findings of trial courts, especially
when they concern the appreciation of testimony of witnesses, are accorded great
respect, by exception, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts, as, we perceive in the case at bar, the Court may choose to substitute its
own findings (People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992])."
The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga contains sufficient
allegations constituting grave coercion, the elements of which were sufficiently proved by
the prosecution. Hence, a conviction for said crime is appropriate under Section 4, Rule
120 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991, the penalty imposed by
law for grave coercion was arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos. 35
The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply here because the maximum penalty does
not exceed one year. 36 However, appellant has been imprisoned for more than six (6)
months. He has more than served the penalty imposable for such an offense. 37
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
6.The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the Court on January 16,
1996 of the letter of the Bureau of Corrections dated January 11, 1996 confirming the
confinement of the appellant at the New Bilibid Prisons.
12.People vs. De Leon, 248 SCRA 609, 619, September 23, 1995; People vs. Buka, 205
SCRA 567, 583, January 30, 1992.
15.People vs. Nicolas, 241 SCRA 67, 74, February 1, 1995 citing People vs. Payumo, G.R. No.
81761, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 64; People vs. Irenea, 164 SCRA 121; August 5, 1988;
People vs. Cariño, 165 SCRA 664, September 26, 1988; People vs. De Gracia, 18
SCRA 197, September 29, 1966; People vs. Muñoz, 166 SCRA 730, July 29, 1988;
SCRA 197, September 29, 1966; People vs. Muñoz, 166 SCRA 730, July 29, 1988;
Cordial vs. People, 166 SCRA 17, September 27, 1988.
16.People vs. Padilla, 242 SCRA 629, 642, March 23, 1995 citing People vs. Lase, 219 SCRA
584 [1993]; People vs. Jumamoy , 221 SCRA 333, April 7, 1993; People vs. Ducay , 225
SCRA 1, August 2, 1993; People vs. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 407, 411, August 7, 1990;
People vs. Gadiana, 195 SCRA 211, March 13, 1991; People vs. Madriaga, 211 SCRA
698, 712, July 23, 1992; People vs. Custodio, 197 SCRA 538, May 27, 1991; People vs.
Cabato, 160 SCRA 98, 107, April 15, 1988; People vs. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401, 416,
March 30, 1988.
19.People vs. Dabon, 216 SCRA 656, 667, December 16, 1992; People vs. Banayo, 195
SCRA 543, March 22, 1991; People vs. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571, February 6, 1991;
People vs. Santiago, 197 SCRA 556, May 28, 1991; People vs. Canciller , 206 SCRA
827, 831, March 4, 1992; People vs. Baysa, 172 SCRA 706, April 25, 1989.
22.People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191, 201, January 18, 1995; People vs. Dolar , et al ., 231
SCRA 414, 422-423, March 24, 1994; People vs. De Guzman, 216 SCRA 754, 759-760,
December 21, 1992.
24.People vs. Sta. Agata, 244 SCRA 677, 684, June 1, 1995 citing People vs. Cayetano, 223
SCRA 770; People vs. Magpayo, 226 SCRA 13; People vs. Joya, 227 SCRA 9.
27.Prior to its amendment by Section 8, RA No. 7659, effective December 31, 1993. The crime
happened in 1991.
28.Aquino, The Revised Penal Code , 1988 ed., Vol. III, pp. 1-2 citing Groizard and Cuello
Calon.
29.Aquino, The Revised Penal Code , 1988 ed., Vol. I, pp. 3-4, citing People vs. Manaba, 58
Phil. 665; People vs. Mesias, 65 Phil. 267; People vs. Yabut, 58 Phil. 479; People vs.
Balubar , 60 Phil. 698; People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172; Cadiz, 1 ACR and other cases;
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code , Criminal Law , Twelfth Edition, 1981, Book One, pp.
17-18.
31.People vs. Godoy , 250 SCRA 676, 728, December 6, 1995; People vs. Cua, 232 SCRA
507, 516, May 25, 1994; People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85, 93-94; February 17, 1993;
United States vs. Ancheta, 1 Phil. 165 (1902); United States vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 163
(1902); People vs. Remalate, 92 Phil. 48 (1952); People vs. Guerrero, 103 Phil. 1136
(1958); People vs. Ong, et al ., 62 SCRA 174, January 30, 1975; People vs. Ty Sui
Wong, et al ., 83 SCRA 125, May 12, 1978; People vs. Jimenez, et al ., 105 SCRA 721,
July 24, 1981.
35.Article 286 was amended by R.A. No. 7890 on February 20, 1995.
36.Section 2 of Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225).
1.When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any
crime; and
2.When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to
surrender voluntarily.