CIVIL LAW by Dean Albano
CIVIL LAW by Dean Albano
CIVIL LAW by Dean Albano
CIVIL LAW
Dean Ed Vincent S. Albano
1.
***
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and
(6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
1.
c.
3. ***
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country. (11a)
1.
4.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
1.
b.
e.
5. *
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided
it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.
(29a)
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive
at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb.
However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven
months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours
after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
1.
6. ***
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites
are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and
a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
(53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of
the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a,
55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity
of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards
not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38,
may contract marriage. (54a)
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious
sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered
with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the
written authority granted by his church or religious sect and
provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the
solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in
Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is
e.
f.
7. ****
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of
a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
9. **
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements
may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the
marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and
136.
Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial
separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient
cause. (190a)
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an
absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has
been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or
failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided
for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the
marriage settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated
in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the
presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial
separation of property. (191a)
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the
court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their
common properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse,
shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The
court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons
1.
b.
11. **
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code
on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
13.
**
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and
the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house
where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is
situated. (223a)
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of
its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head
of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living
in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for
legal support. (226a)
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of
ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home. (238a)
Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. (n)
1.
14. *
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such
a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual
intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation,
or undue influence. (255a)
1.
b.
d.
16. ***
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in
the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
(287a)
1.
the petitioner."
Section 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname.
The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in
any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce.
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known
by that by that first name or nickname in the community: or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
1.
Correction of Status
1.
Tamargo v.
FELICIANO, J.]
CA
[G.R.
No.
85044.
June
3,
1992.|
that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. This
principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed
negligence" x x x where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others
with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or
logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of
parents their parental authority which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. Article
221 of the Family Code has x x x insisted upon the requisite
that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the
actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the
ensuing damage
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child
living with its parents commits a tortious act, the parents
were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural
duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and
control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction
in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority.
No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents x x x could have arisen since [the minor]
was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.
b.
e.
g.
Silva vs. CA [G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997 | VITUG, J.:]
i.
l.
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of
the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act
complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of
the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the
commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal
separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of
legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription.
m.
22. ***
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
b.
24.
***
Article 415.
The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to
the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the
land or form an integral part of an immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a
way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or
ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the owner of the
immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach
them permanently to the tenements;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by
the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding
places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or
preserves them with the intention to have them permanently
attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals
in these places are included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms
part of the bed, and waters either running or stagnant;
(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by
their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or
coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights
over immovable property. (334a)
1.
Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that
"[d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are intended
by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a
river, lake, or coast" are considered immovable property.
Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by
destination, being in the nature of machinery and other
implements intended by the owner for an industry or work
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land
and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or
work
Davao Sawmills vs Castillo
b.
***
Article 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally
or through another, plantings, constructions or works with the
materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad
faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The
owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them only in
case he can do so without injury to the work constructed, or without
the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if
the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may
remove them in any event, with a right to be indemnified for
damages. (360a)
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige
the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if
the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof. (361a)
Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land
of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity. (362)
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith
with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in
the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may
have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
Article 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is
intended, without altering the form or substance of the property
leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the
lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should
the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove
the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment
upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled
to any reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects,
provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor
does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the
lease is extinguished. (n)
1.
Rosales vs Castelltort
Under Art. 448, the landowner can choose between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its
value is considerably more than that of the structures, in
which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.
If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the
lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that
accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.
Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to
exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the
building to remove it from the land.
Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character
except in the case and from the moment facts exist which
show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the
thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases or is
legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are
made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by
suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.
b.
Nuguid v CA
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to
appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the
proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the
possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a
builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all
Article 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the
others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though
benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding
of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial
to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.
(397a)
Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.
In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall
be governed by the provisions of this Title.
28.
Article 533. The possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of
the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.
One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed never to have
possessed the same. (440)
Article 534. On who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the
consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is not
shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; but the effects of
possession in good faith shall not benefit him except from the date of
death of the decedent. (442)
Article 1138. In the computation of time necessary for prescription
the following rules shall be observed:
(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for
prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or
predecessor in interest;
(2) It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the
possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in possession
during the intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary;
(3) The first day shall be excluded and the last day included. (1960a)
29. **
Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good
Ledesma v CA
It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable or
(b) has been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the
same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it
in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto for under the
first sentence of Article 559, such manner of acquisition is
equivalent to a title. There are three (3) requisites to make
possession of movable property equivalent to title, namely: (a)
the possession should be in good faith; (b) the owner
voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the
possession is in the concept of owner.
Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been
unlawfully deprived of it cannot be said to have voluntarily
parted with the possession thereof. This is the justification for
the exceptions found under the second sentence of Article 559
of the Civil Code.
b.
EDCA v Santos
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired
ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer
to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid
for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and
did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to
the books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase
"unlawfully deprived" were to be interpreted in the manner
suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's
title who buys a movable property from him would have to
surrender it to another person claiming to be the original
owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor.
The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag, so
to speak, and would be compelled to return the thing bought
by him in good faith without even the right to reimbursement
of the amount he had paid for it.
c.
Aznar v Yapdiangco
The lower court was correct in applying Article 559 of the
Civil Code to the case at bar, for under it, the rule is to the
effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only
from the finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons
who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief
or robber. The said article establishes two exceptions to the
general rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when the owner (1)
has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof.
In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as
against the owner, who may recover it without paying any
indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public
sale.
Under Article 559 of the new Civil Code, a person illegally
deprived of any movable may recover it from the person in
possession of the same and the only defense the latter may
have is if he has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, in
which case, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor. In the present case,
plaintiff has been illegally deprived of his car through the
ingenious scheme of defendant B to enable the latter to
dispose of it as if he were the owner thereof. Plaintiff,
therefore, can still recover possession of the car even if it is in
the possession of a third party who had acquired it in good
faith from defendant B. The maxim that "no man can transfer
to another a better title than he had himself" obtains in the
civil as well as in the common law.
30. ***
Article 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention
clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by
the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title
creating the usufruct;
Moralidad v Pernes
We disagree with the CAs conclusion of law on the matter.
The term or period of the usufruct originally specified
provides only one of the bases for the right of a usufructuary
to hold and retain possession of the thing given in usufruct.
There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct
shall be considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the
Civil Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:
The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986
constitutes the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of,
the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone of
my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail
the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not
inimical to the purpose thereof" (Emphasis supplied). What
may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may
be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner
made it abundantly clear "that anybody of my kins who wishes
to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an
atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid
bickering with one another." That the maintenance of a
peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin
constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of
the usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding
Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my
kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned
may exercise the freedom to look for his own." In fine, the
occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere
of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious
Abellana v CA
Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is
continuous and apparent and may be acquired by prescription
under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a
footpath or road may be apparent but it isnot a continuous
easement because its use is at intervals and depends upon the
acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts
his feet over somebody else's land (4 Manresa 597; Haffman
vs. Shoemaker, 71 SE 198, both cited on p. 454, Vol. 2, 6th
Ed., Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines). Hence, a right of
way is not acquirable by prescription (Cuaycong, et al, vs
Benedicto, et al., 37 Phil. 781; Ronquillo, et al. vs. Roco, et al.,
103 Phil. 84; Ayala de Roxas vs. Case, 8 Phil. 197).
c.
d.
Cristobal v CA
To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the
preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity
has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate
and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.[9] The burden of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
e.
S????????? vs CA WIDTH
f.
Ramos v Gatchalian
The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit. We find
no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that
the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate
outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian
Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a
road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos
Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan
for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still
undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when
he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him
within the ambit of the legal requisite. We agree with the
appellate court's observation that the petitioner should have,
first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez
Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot
4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said
subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the
Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To allow the
petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue
inspite of a road right of way provided by the petitioner's
subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue
allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming
from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what
jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years
regarding an easement of a right of way, that "mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as
its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must
be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."
g.
* Periods
A???? vs D????
Void Title; Imprescriptible
33.
34.
Finders Keepers;
DONATIONS
35.
Article 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person
disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it.
Article 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of
the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall
be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession.
(620)
Article 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take
effect during the lifetime of the donor, though the property shall not
be delivered till after the donor's death, this shall be a donation inter
vivos. The fruits of the property from the time of the acceptance of
the donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor provides
otherwise.
36.
***
Article 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee. (623)
Article 737. The donor's capacity shall be determined as of the time
of the making of the donation. (n)
1.
37.
***
Article 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in
writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or
of the document representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand
pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing.
Otherwise, the donation shall be void. (632a)
Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be
valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must
satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall
be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted
in both instruments. (633)
Article 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they
may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for
their validity are present. However, when the law requires that a
contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or
enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable. In such cases, the right
of the parties stated in the following article cannot be exercised.
(1278a)
Article 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or
through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose,
or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise, the donation shall
be void. (630)
Article 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the
donor and of the donee. (n)
1.
Republic vs S?????
b.
Lagazo vs CA
In the words of the esteemed Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, 14
"Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is
essential. The donation, following the theory of cognition
(Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment
the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee."
Furthermore, "[i]f the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments." 15
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore,
indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and
void.16 The perfection and the validity of a donation are well
explained by former Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino in this wise:
. . Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor
to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it
has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly
notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very
same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not
appear in the same document, it must be made in another.
Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the
intention to accept. But in this case it is necessary that formal
notice thereof be given to the donor, and the fact that due
notice has been given must be noted in both instruments (that
containing the offer to donate and that showing the
acceptance). Then and only then is the donation perfected. If
the instrument of donation has been recorded in the registry
of property, the instrument that shows the acceptance should
also be recorded. Where the deed of donation fails to show
upon him, the obligee may seek rescission and the court shall
decree the same unless there is just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the
court to determine the period of the compliance, there is no
more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission claimed.
Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is
basically a gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental
circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved in
favor of the least transmission of rights and interests.
b.
*
Article 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property.
By future property is understood anything which the donor cannot
dispose of at the time of the donation. (635)
Article 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have a
right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. (n)
Article 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different
donees shall be governed by the provisions concerning the sale of
the same thing to two or more different persons. (n)
c.
78.
1767**
SY VS CA
Article 1767 of the Civil Code states that in a contract of
partnership two or more persons bind themselves to
contribute money, property or industry to a common fund,
with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
Not one of these circumstances is present in this case. No
written agreement exists to prove the partnership between
the parties. Private respondent did not contribute money,
property or industry for the purpose of engaging in the
supposed business. There is no proof that he was receiving
a share in the profits as a matter of course, during the
period when the trucking business was under operation.
Neither is there any proof that he had actively participated
[
1789;1808*
1801 1803**
1804**
1816; 1823 1824*
1828; 1829; 1830***
ORTEGA VS CA
The birth and life of a partnership at will is predicated on
the mutual desire and consent of the partners. The right to
choose with whom a person wishes to associate himself is
the very foundation and essence of that partnership. Its
continued existence is, in turn, dependent on the constancy
of that mutual resolve, along with each partner's capability
to give it, and the absence of a cause for dissolution
provided by the law itself. Verily, any one of the partners
may, at his sole pleasure, dictate a dissolution of the
partnership at will. He must, however, act in good faith, not
that the attendance of bad faith can prevent the dissolution
of the partnership but that it can result in a liability for
damages.
In passing, neither would the presence of a period for its
specific duration or the statement of a particular purpose
for its creation prevent the dissolution of any partnership
by an act or will of a partner. Among partners, mutual
agency arises and the doctrine of delectus personae allows
them to have the power, although not necessarily the right,
to dissolve the partnership. An unjustified dissolution by
the partner can subject him to a possible action for
damages.
The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the
relation of the parties caused by any partner ceasing to be
associated in the carrying on, as might be distinguished
from the winding up of, the business. Upon its dissolution,
the partnership continues and its legal personality is
retained until the complete winding up of its business
culminating in its termination. The liquidation of the assets
of the partnership following its dissolution is governed by
various provisions of the Civil Code; however, an
agreement of the partners, like any other contract, is
1869**
PROF. SERVICES INC VS AGANA
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of
the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of
the physicians associated or accredited by it, including
those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the
Court of Appeals conclusion that it is now estopped
from passing all the blame to the physicians whose
names it proudly paraded in the public directory
leading the public to believe that it vouched for their
skill and competence. Indeed, PSIs act is tantamount
to
holding
out
to
the
public
that Medical City Hospital, through
its
accredited
physicians, offers quality health care services. By
accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the
impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform
medical or surgical services for its patients. As expected,
these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the
services on the reasonable belief that such were being
rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or
servants.
QC CAPITAL MEDICAL CENTER VS NOGALES
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an
exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the
physician is the ostensible agent of the hospital. This
exception is also known as the doctrine of apparent
authority.
[U]nder the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can
be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a
physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of
whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless
the patient knows, or should have known, that the
physician is an independent contractor. The elements of the
86.
1317; 1403 (1); 1881; 1882; 1883; 1898; 1909; 1910; 1911***
BICOL SAVINGS BANK VS CA
The sale proscribed by a special power to mortgage under
Article 1879 is a voluntary and independent contract, and
not an auction sale resulting from extrajudicial foreclosure,
which is precipitated by the default of a mortgagor. Absent
that default, no foreclosure results. The stipulation
granting an authority to extrajudicially foreclose a
mortgage is an ancillary stipulation supported by the same
cause or consideration for the mortgage and forms an
essential or inseparable part of that bilateral agreement.
The power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that
contemplates exclusively the representation of the
1924; 1875***
SANCHEZ VS MEDICARD
For the purpose of equity, an agent who is not the efficient
procuring cause is nonetheless entitled to his commission,
where said agent, notwithstanding the expiration of his
authority, nonetheless, took diligent steps to bring back
together the parties, such that a sale was finalized
and consummated between them. In order not to
prejudice its personnel, Unilab, through respondent
Ejercito, negotiated with respondent Dr. Montoya of
Medicard, in order to find mutually beneficial ways of
continuing the Health Care Program. The negotiations
resulted in a new contract wherein Unilab shall pay
Medicard the hospitalization expenses actually incurred by
each employees, plus a service fee. Under the "cost plus"
system which replaced the premium scheme, petitioner
was not given a commission. It is clear that since petitioner
refused to reduce his commission, Medicard directly
negotiated with Unilab, thus revoking its agency contract
with petitioner. We hold that such revocation is authorized
by Article 1924 of the Civil Code.
MEDRANO VS CA
The letter of authority must be read as a whole and not in
its truncated parts. Certainly, it was not the intention of
Medrano to expect the respondents to do just that (to
negotiate) when he issued the letter of authority. The clear
intention is to reward the respondents for procuring a
buyer for the property. Before negotiating a sale, a broker
must first and foremost bring in a prospective buyer. It has
been held that a broker earns his pay merely by bringing
the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is
eventually made. The essential feature of a brokers
conventional employment is merely to procure a purchaser
for a property ready, able, and willing to buy at the price
and on the terms mutually agreed upon by the owner and
the purchaser. And it is not a prerequisite to the right to
Distinctions**
2056; 2058; 2059 ***
JN DEV. CORP VS PHIL GUARANTEE
Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself
to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal
debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The
guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must be
indemnified by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot
be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has
exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all
the legal remedies against the debtor. This is what is
otherwise known as the benefit of excussion.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[38]
1956 ***
CB Circular No. 905 as amended by CB Circular 796
NACER VS GALLERY FRAMES
Thus, from the foregoing, in the absence of an express
stipulation as to the rate of interest that would govern the
parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of
any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per
annum - as reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping
Lines and Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations
for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of
the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial
Institutions, before its amendment by BSP-MB Circular No.
799 - but will now be six percent (6%) per annum effective
July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new
rate could only be applied prospectively and not
retroactively. Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per
annum legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013.
Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six percent (6%) per
annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when
applicable.
40
[14]
[15]
[16]
32
33
2085
2087; 2115 ***
CHU VS CA
A pacto
commissorio is
a
provision
for
the automatic appropriation of the pledged or mortgaged
property by the creditor in payment of the loan upon its
maturity. The prohibition against a pacto commissorio is
intended to protect the obligor, pledgor, or mortgagor
2088; 2112 **
2089 ***
YAP VS DY
From the foregoing, it is apparent that what the law
proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion of the
property or a number of the several properties mortgaged
corresponding to the unpaid portion of the debt where
before foreclosure proceedings partial payment was made
by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation.
This also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release
of any portion of the mortgaged property or of one or some
of the several lots mortgaged unless and until the loan
thus, secured has been fully paid, notwithstanding the fact
that there has been a partial fulfillment of the obligation.
Hence, it is provided that the debtor who has paid a part of
the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment
of the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely
satisfied.
That the situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within
the purview of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious
since the aggregate number of the lots which comprise the
collaterals for the mortgage had already been foreclosed
and sold at public auction. There is no partial payment nor
partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak of. The
aforesaid doctrine, which is actually intended for the
protection of the mortgagee, specifically refers to the
release of the mortgage which secures the satisfaction of
the indebtedness and naturally presupposes that the
mortgage
is
existing.
Once
the
mortgage
is
extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof, said
2183 *
AFIALDA VS HISOLE
This opinion, however, appears to have been rendered in a
case where an animal caused injury to a stranger or third
person. It is therefore no authority for a case like the
present where the person injured was the caretaker of the
animal. The distinction is important. For the statute names
the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for
"any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious
reason that the possessor or user has the custody and
control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position
to prevent it from causing damage.
10
DAMAGES
101. Actual and Compensatory *
VICTORY LINER VS GAMMAD
The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the
deceaseds earning capacity should be deleted for lack of
basis. As a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of
earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is selfemployed earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that in the deceaseds line of work no documentary
evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.
[52]
[53]
[54]
[18]
[41]
[42]
[44]
[46]
[47]
SUCCESSION
JURAT
vs.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT:
The case
highlights the fundamental difference between a jurat and an
acknowledgment and based on the distinction, the Court held
that a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary
public is void, even if it was sworn to before a notary public.
3. 808
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him
twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by
the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. (n)
1.
4. 810-811
Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must
be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
(678, 688a)
Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare
that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the
preceding paragraph, and if the court deem it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to. (619a)
1.
SURVIVING
SPOUSE
COULD
NOT
BE
PRETERITED: Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance for she is not in the direct line.
8. 891
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous
title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged
to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (871)
10.
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share
is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a
certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid.
This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which
shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by
law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)
Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part
of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
(n)
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of
EFFECT
OF
NON-PERFORMANCE
OF
CONDITION: The Court has distinguished between a
condition imposed on the perfection of a contract and a
condition imposed merely on the performance of an
obligation. While failure to comply with the first condition
results in the failure of a contract, failure to comply with the
second merely gives the other party the option to either
refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the condition.
1.
1324; 1479
Art. 1324. When the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain
period to accept, the offer may be withdrawn at any time
before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except
when the option is founded upon a consideration, as
something paid or promised. (n)
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a
OPTION
CONTRACT
IS
AN
ONEROUS
CONTRACT: The Court defined consideration as the why of
the contracts, the essential reason which moves the
contracting parties to enter into the contract. The definition
illustrates that the consideration contemplated to support an
option contract need not be monetary. Actual cash need not
be exchanged for the option. However, by the very nature of
an option contract (Art. 1479), the same is an onerous
1356:
14.
1409; 1410 URETA vs. URETA | G.R. No. 165748.
September 14, 2011
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void
from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of
the transaction;
(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;
PRINCIPLES
OF
EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL
sometimes called estoppel in pais are part of our law by Art. 1432
of the Civil Code. Coming under this class is estoppel by silence
o
Estoppel by silence arises where a person, who by force
of circumstances is under a duty to another to speak, refrains
from doing so and thereby leads the other to believe in the
existence of a state of facts in reliance on which he acts to his
prejudice. Silence may support an estoppel whether the failure
to speak is intentional or negligent.
same after it was notified by said bank. Thus, there was a change
in the nature of petitioners title during the subsistence of the lease
that the rule on estoppel against tenants does not apply in this
case. Petitioners reliance on said conclusive presumption must,
therefore, necessarily fail since there was no error on the part of
the CA when it entertained respondents assertion of a title adverse
to petitioner.
Art. 1434. When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or
alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title
thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
*MARTIN vs. REYES
TRUST
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the
legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for
the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The
former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if
the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or
illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied
by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the
child.
**EMILIA O'LACO vs. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT | G.R. No.
58010| March 31, 1993
RESULTING
and
CONSTRUCTIVE:
known to the cestui qui trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is
clear and convincing.
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
***IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE vs. TAEZA | G.R. No.
179597 | February 3, 2014
the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over
the property.
CAEZO vs. ROJAS | G.R. No. 148788| November 23, 2007
CASE AT BAR: An intention to create a trust cannot
be inferred from the petitioners testimony and the attendant facts
and circumstances. The petitioner testified only to the effect that
her agreement with her father was that she will be given a share in
the produce of the property. This allegation, standing alone as it
does, is inadequate to establish the existence of a trust because
profit-sharing per se, does not necessarily translate to a trust
relation. It could also be present in other relations, such as in
deposit.
4.
**Art. 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right
to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. (n)
**Art. 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property. By future
property is understood anything which the donor cannot dispose of at
the time of the donation. (635)
Contract to Sell vs. Contract of Sale
**Art. 1534. An unpaid seller having the right of lien or having
stopped the goods in transitu, may rescind the transfer of title and
resume the ownership in the goods, where he expressly reserved the
right to do so in case the buyer should make default, or where the
buyer has been in default in the payment of the price for an
unreasonable time. The seller shall not thereafter be liable to the
buyer upon the contract of sale, but may recover from the buyer
damages for any loss occasioned by the breach of the contract.
The transfer of title shall not be held to have been rescinded by
an unpaid seller until he has manifested by notice to the buyer or by
some other overt act an intention to rescind. It is not necessary that
such overt act should be communicated to the buyer, but the giving or
failure to give notice to the buyer of the intention to rescind shall be
relevant in any issue involving the question whether the buyer had
been in default for an unreasonable time before the right of rescission
was asserted. (n)
**Art. 1592. In the sale of immovable property, even though it may
have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the time
agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place,
the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as
no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him
either judicially or by a notarial act. After the demand, the court may
not grant him a new term. (1504a)
LAFORTEZA vs. MACHUCA | G.R. No. 137552| June 16, 2000
(2) Where actual delivery has been delayed through the fault of
either the buyer or seller the goods are at the risk of the party in
fault. (n)
RES PERIT DOMINO
***Art. 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue
enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the
lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has
previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new
lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time
established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original
contract shall be revived. (1566a)
SAMELO vs. MANOTOK SERVICES | G.R. No. 170509| June 27,
2012