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    Jane Doe v. Claire Donovan, 747 F.2d 42, 1st Cir. (1984)

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    This document summarizes a court case regarding a juvenile, Jane Doe, who was tried for murder in juvenile court. The jury deliberated for four days but ultimately declared they were deadlocked on the murder charge. The judge declared a mistrial over the defense's objections without inquiring if the jury had reached a verdict on any lesser included offenses. Jane Doe argued this violated her double jeopardy rights. The appeals court denied her motion for an injunction, finding that even if retried only on manslaughter, she would not suffer irreparable harm as the state would lose jurisdiction over her once she turned 18, which was before any potential sentencing. The court assumed manifest necessity justified retrial on manslaughter and that retrial on murder would not result in

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    Jane Doe v. Claire Donovan, 747 F.2d 42, 1st Cir. (1984)

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    This document summarizes a court case regarding a juvenile, Jane Doe, who was tried for murder in juvenile court. The jury deliberated for four days but ultimately declared they were deadlocked on the murder charge. The judge declared a mistrial over the defense's objections without inquiring if the jury had reached a verdict on any lesser included offenses. Jane Doe argued this violated her double jeopardy rights. The appeals court denied her motion for an injunction, finding that even if retried only on manslaughter, she would not suffer irreparable harm as the state would lose jurisdiction over her once she turned 18, which was before any potential sentencing. The court assumed manifest necessity justified retrial on manslaughter and that retrial on murder would not result in

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    Filed: 1984-11-16 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 747 F.2d 42 Docket: 84-1701

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    This document summarizes a court case regarding a juvenile, Jane Doe, who was tried for murder in juvenile court. The jury deliberated for four days but ultimately declared they were deadlocked on the murder charge. The judge declared a mistrial over the defense's objections without inquiring if the jury had reached a verdict on any lesser included offenses. Jane Doe argued this violated her double jeopardy rights. The appeals court denied her motion for an injunction, finding that even if retried only on manslaughter, she would not suffer irreparable harm as the state would lose jurisdiction over her once she turned 18, which was before any potential sentencing. The court assumed manifest necessity justified retrial on manslaughter and that retrial on murder would not result in

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    24 views5 pages

    Jane Doe v. Claire Donovan, 747 F.2d 42, 1st Cir. (1984)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    This document summarizes a court case regarding a juvenile, Jane Doe, who was tried for murder in juvenile court. The jury deliberated for four days but ultimately declared they were deadlocked on the murder charge. The judge declared a mistrial over the defense's objections without inquiring if the jury had reached a verdict on any lesser included offenses. Jane Doe argued this violated her double jeopardy rights. The appeals court denied her motion for an injunction, finding that even if retried only on manslaughter, she would not suffer irreparable harm as the state would lose jurisdiction over her once she turned 18, which was before any potential sentencing. The court assumed manifest necessity justified retrial on manslaughter and that retrial on murder would not result in

    Copyright:

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    of 5

    747 F.

    2d 42

    Jane DOE, Petitioner, Appellant,


    v.
    Claire DONOVAN, et al., Respondents, Appellees.
    No. 84-1701.

    United States Court of Appeals,


    First Circuit.
    Argued Oct. 3, 1984.
    Decided Oct. 30, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 16, 1984.

    Carol Donovan, Boston, Mass., with whom Norman S. Zalkind and


    Zalkind & Sheketoff, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for petitioner,
    appellant.
    Linda G. Katz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boston, Mass., with whom Francis X.
    Bellotti, Atty. Gen., Frederick W. Riley and Barbara A.H. Smith, Asst.
    Attys. Gen., Boston, Mass., were on brief, for respondents, appellees.
    Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, COFFIN and BOWNES, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM.

    Appellant-juvenile Jane Doe seeks to enjoin the Massachusetts juvenile court


    proceedings against her pending decision by the district court on her writ of
    habeas corpus. Appellant claims that retrial on the murder complaint in juvenile
    court subjects her to double jeopardy. The district court denied appellant's
    motions to stay her retrial and to stay that order pending appeal. Appellant filed
    a motion in this court to stay the district court's order and to enjoin proceedings
    in the Boston Juvenile Court. After a hearing before one judge this court
    temporarily stayed the state court proceedings until further order. After an
    expedited hearing before a full panel, we vacate the stay.

    Appellant was tried in the Boston Juvenile Court as a delinquent on complaints


    alleging murder and illegal possession of a firearm on June 24 and June 27,

    1983. The jury was instructed on murder in the first degree, murder in the
    second degree, manslaughter and illegal possession of a firearm, and was
    handed four corresponding verdict slips. Toward the end of the third day of
    deliberations, the jury responded affirmatively when asked if they could reach
    a verdict on the murder complaint. They were then excused for the day. At
    approximately noon on the fourth day of deliberations the jury indicated that it
    was deadlocked on the complaint which charged murder and the jurors stated
    so in open court. The jury did reach a verdict on the firearm charge.
    3

    The court indicated to counsel at sidebar that it intended to declare a mistrial on


    the murder charge and accept the verdict on the firearm complaint. Defense
    counsel requested that the court inquire of the jury whether it had been able to
    reach verdicts on each of the lesser offenses included in the murder charge. The
    judge denied defense counsel's request and declared a mistrial on the murder
    complaint.

    Appellant argues that her constitutional right against double jeopardy was
    violated when the trial court prematurely declared a mistrial. The court acted
    without first inquiring of the jury whether it had been able to reach a verdict on
    any of the included offenses. Appellant claims that this inquiry was necessary
    to establish manifest necessity to declare a mistrial over counsel's objections,
    and that failure to inquire was a constitutional violation. Appellant argues that
    retrial is barred on the entire murder complaint, and in the alternative, that she
    may be retried only on the manslaughter charge. Appellant buttresses her
    conclusion with the fact that during deliberations the foreman of the jury
    apparently signed verdict slips on the counts of murder in the first and second
    degree reporting the appellant not guilty on those charges.

    The Commonwealth contends that the double jeopardy clause did not require
    the trial court either to inquire whether the jurors had reached a partial verdict
    on the murder complaint, or to accept a partial verdict. It also asserts that
    appellant is not entitled to entry of verdicts of acquittal on any part of the
    murder complaint because the jury did not announce such a verdict in open
    court.

    Discussion
    6

    We are proscribed by Younger v. Harris from interfering with pending state


    criminal prosecutions in the absence of exceptional circumstances
    demonstrating great and immediate irreparable injury. 401 U.S. 37, 46, 91 S.Ct.
    746, 751, 27 L.Ed.2d 669. While it is acknowledged that a colorable double
    jeopardy claim may constitute the threat of injury necessary to fall within the

    exception to the Younger abstention principle, see Willhauk v. Flanagan, 448


    U.S. 1323, 1325, 101 S.Ct. 10, 11, 65 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1980) (Brennan, J. sitting
    as Circuit Justice on Application for Stay), we find that appellant has failed to
    show irreparable harm sufficient to warrant our intervention in this case.
    7

    In the usual case, the double jeopardy clause guarantees not only against double
    punishments, but also against twice being subjected to the ordeal of a trial.
    Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2041, 52 L.Ed.2d
    651 (1977). Consequently, the mere possibility of retrial prior to a
    determination of the federal constitutional claim would constitute irreparable
    harm justifying federal court intervention in state criminal proceedings.
    However, we do not have that usual case before us because in any event
    appellant will have to stand trial.

    We reach this conclusion because in all likelihood appellant will be retried on


    at least the count of manslaughter. When asked by the court, the jury stated that
    they were deadlocked on the murder complaint. Therefore even without
    additional questioning as to partial verdicts, it is logical to conclude that at a
    minimum the jury was deadlocked on the least included offense of
    manslaughter.1 Stone v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 31 Cal.3d 503,
    646 P.2d 809 (1983).

    Appellant argues that even if the jury was deadlocked on the manslaughter
    count, the court prematurely declared a mistrial because a mistrial may be
    declared over objection only after "a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion
    leads [the court] to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be
    served by a continuation of the proceedings." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
    470, 485, 91 S.Ct. 547, 557, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). See also Brady v. Samaha,
    667 F.2d 224, 228-29 (1st Cir.1981); United States v. Hotz, 620 F.2d 5 (1st
    Cir.1980). Appellant asserts that manifest necessity to declare a mistrial was
    lacking here because the court failed to inquire of the jury whether it was able
    to reach a partial verdict or whether it needed assistance. In addition, appellant
    faults the court for its failure to give the Tuey-Rodriguez charge,
    Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 364 Mass. 87, 100-01, 300 N.E.2d 192 (1973),
    urging the jurors to make further efforts to reach an agreement. Appellant notes
    that the jurors had deliberated at most two and one half hours since the
    foreman's declaration the previous day that the jury could reach an agreement.

    10

    To the extent that discretion to declare a mistrial is vouchsafed to the trial


    court, the court's decision is to be accorded substantial deference. Arizona v.
    Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509, 98 S.Ct. 824, 832, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). The
    court found that the jury was deadlocked after four straight days of careful

    deliberation. Despite the foreman's statement on the third day that a verdict
    could be reached, the fact that the jurors were deadlocked on the fourth day is
    not implausible. To upset the tentative verdict only one juror need have
    changed his or her mind during the night. Moreover, in spite of the fact that
    appellant's counsel did not request the Tuey-Rodriguez charge, the court
    considered giving the charge but chose not to after "examining the 'total picture'
    surrounding the state of jury deliberations."
    11

    While not assessing the merits of appellant's attack based on the declaration of
    a mistrial absent manifest necessity, we do feel it proper, in pursuing our
    analysis of the harm appellant is likely to suffer, to make assumptions as to the
    scenario if a further stay is not ordered. For this purpose only, therefore, in light
    of our expressed reasons, we assume that the more probable scenario is that
    manifest necessity justified a declaration of mistrial as to manslaughter and that
    retrial on this charge can take place.

    12

    Given the opportunity, it appears from its brief and argument that the
    Commonwealth will retry the appellant on the entire murder complaint and not
    just on the manslaughter count. We realize that trial for first degree murder is
    not comparable to a trial for manslaughter. Because of the unique jurisdictional
    posture of this case, however, we believe that appellant will suffer no
    significantly greater harm from a retrial on the murder count even if
    manslaughter is subsequently found to be the only permissible charge. Most
    important in reaching this conclusion is the fact that appellant will turn eighteen
    on May 5, 1985 and at that time the Commonwealth will lose jurisdiction to
    retain custody over her. Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 119, Sec. 72. Only in very
    limited circumstances (when discharge would be "physically dangerous to the
    public because of the person's mental or physical deficiency, disorder or
    abnormality") can the Department of Youth Services hold someone committed
    as a delinquent child past the age of eighteen. Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 120,
    Secs. 16, 17. There is nothing in the record presented by either party to suggest
    that appellant fits within this exception and the Commonwealth has not
    indicated an intention to assert custody over the appellant after she reaches the
    age of eighteen.

    13

    As a result, the Commonwealth will be unable to sentence the appellant,


    whether convicted of murder in the first degree or manslaughter, for a period
    extending beyond May 5. Whatever harm appellant may face as a result of a
    wrongful conviction for a more heinous crime, her physical custody by the state
    will not be affected. Nor will her right to judicial review be impaired.
    Appellant's posture before the court will be identical to any individual
    challenging the constitutionality of her state court conviction.

    14

    Appellant has therefore failed to demonstrate irreparable harm which warrants


    our intervention in the state court proceedings. Accordingly the temporary stay
    granted by this court is vacated and the district court's denial of petitioner's
    motion for stay of the state court delinquency proceedings is

    15

    Affirmed.

    Although we have no need to reach the merits of appellant's broader claim that
    the double jeopardy clause prohibits declaration of a mistrial without first
    inquiring of the jury whether it has reached verdicts on each included offense,
    we acknowledge that it raises serious legal questions. The issue has been
    discussed by the appellate courts of nine states, including as a result of this
    action, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In support of appellant's position,
    see Stone v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 31 Cal.3d 503, 646 P.2d 809
    (1983); State v. Pugliese, 120 N.H. 728, 422 A.2d 1319 (1980); State v.
    Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 566 P.2d 1142 (1977). But see State v. Booker, 306
    N.C. 302, 293 S.E.2d 78 (1982); People v. Hickey, 103 Mich.App. 350, 303
    N.W.2d 19 (1981); People v. Hall, 25 Ill.App.3d 992, 324 N.E.2d 50 (1975);
    Walters v. State, 255 Ark. 904, 503 S.W.2d 895 (1974); State v. Hutter, 145
    Neb. 798, 18 N.W.2d 203 (1945). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
    found against appellant on this issue. A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 392 Mass.
    52, 465 N.E.2d 240 (1984)

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