Federacion de Maestr v. Junta de Relaciones, 410 F.3d 17, 1st Cir. (2005)
Federacion de Maestr v. Junta de Relaciones, 410 F.3d 17, 1st Cir. (2005)
Federacion de Maestr v. Junta de Relaciones, 410 F.3d 17, 1st Cir. (2005)
3d 17
Rico Court of Appeals and then to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court. After losing
the preemption argument in the Puerto Rico courts, the Federacin filed an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board in the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The district court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the Federacin's claim because
resolving that claim would require the court to review the decision of the
Puerto Rico courts that the Board had jurisdiction over the labor dispute, in
contravention of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Consequently, the district court
dismissed the complaint. We affirm, and explain how Exxon Mobil affects
some of our prior Rooker-Feldman cases.
I.
3
The relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed. In 1990, the
Federacin Puertorriquea de Trabajadores, a labor union, filed an unfair labor
practices charge before the Board against the appellant Federacin de Maestros
de Puerto Rico.1 In 1995, the Board issued a grievance (administrative
complaint) against the Federacin. The Federacin then moved to dismiss the
grievance on the grounds that the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")
had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.2 It contended that Puerto Rico labor
law was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151-169,
because the Federacin's activities affected interstate commerce.3
After unsuccessfully requesting that the Board reconsider its decision, the
Federacin filed an interlocutory appeal to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court.
That court referred the appeal to the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals. In 1997, the
Court of Appeals, in a lengthy opinion and resolution, concluded that the
Federacin's activities did not affect interstate commerce, affirmed the Board's
jurisdictional decision, and remanded for further proceedings.
The Federacin moved for reconsideration, which was denied after some delay.
It then petitioned the Puerto Rico Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which,
too, was denied. The Federacin twice requested reconsideration of the denial
of certiorari, and both requests were denied.
In March 2003, the Federacin filed a complaint against the Board in federal
district court, requesting declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the Board
to terminate its proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. The Board moved to
dismiss the federal complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) on the basis that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review a decision of the
Puerto Rico Court of Appeals. The district court granted the motion, and the
Federacin timely appealed.
II.
9
Where no evidentiary hearing has been held, we review de novo the district
court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Wang v. N.H. Bd. of
Registration in Med., 55 F.3d 698, 700 n. 3 (1st Cir.1995). "[W]e construe the
Complaint liberally and treat all well-pleaded facts as true, according the
plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences." Murphy v. United States, 45
F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir.1995).
10
11
However, the Federacin argues that the Puerto Rico court's decision was
interlocutory, and that Rooker-Feldman therefore does not apply. This
argument draws some support from certain of our pre-Exxon Mobil precedents.
In order to understand this argument, and why we now ultimately reject it, we
must first describe the roots of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the somewhat
uncertain path that our jurisprudence has taken, and finally the clarification
provided by Exxon Mobil.4
The jurisdictional statute providing for Supreme Court review of state court
judgments states that "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari" when certain federal questions are
presented. 28 U.S.C. 1257;5 see also id. 1258 (same for Puerto Rico
Supreme Court).6 Rooker held that Congress, by the terms of that statute,
granted the United States Supreme Court, and only the United States Supreme
Court, jurisdiction over appeals from state courts:
13
14
263 U.S. at 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149 (internal citation omitted). In other words,
Rooker is based on a negative inference: because Congress only provided for
review of state court judgments by the Supreme Court, Congress therefore
intended to preclude lower federal courts from exercising such review. Feldman
repeated this reasoning: "[A] United States District Court has no authority to
review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such
judgments may be had only in this Court." 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303.
B. Our Pre-Exxon Mobil Cases
15
16
The close nexus between the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Supreme Court
review prompts an obvious question: what if the Supreme Court could not have
reviewed the particular state court decision at issue? Our pre-Exxon Mobil
cases suggested that Rooker-Feldman would not apply in this context. See Cruz
v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 21 n. 5 (1st Cir.2000) (stating, in dictum, that "denying
jurisdiction based on a state court judgment that is not eligible for review by the
United States Supreme Court simply would not follow from the jurisdictional
statute that invigorated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the first place");7 Hill
v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir.1999) (because "Rooker-Feldman
is keyed to 1257," it therefore requires a judgment reviewable by the
18
Our pre-Exxon Mobil case law also recognized, albeit not uniformly, an
alternative conception of "final judgment." The law of claim and issue
preclusion (also known as res judicata and collateral estoppel) provides a
notion of "final judgment" that is related to, but distinct from, finality for
purposes of Supreme Court review.8 We have suggested, in some of our cases,
that "[o]nly a state court adjudication that itself has preclusive effect can bring
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine into play." Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21 n. 5; see also
Badillo-Santiago v. Naveira-Merly, 378 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2004) ("RookerFeldman applies to state or territorial court judgments to which the federal
courts would accord preclusive effect, and the federal courts `can ascribe no
greater preclusive force to a state court judgment than would the courts of that
state.'") (quoting Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21; internal citation omitted); PrezGuzmn v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 238 n. 5 (1st Cir.2003) (same), cert. denied,
541 U.S. 960, 124 S.Ct. 1724, 158 L.Ed.2d 401 (2004).9
19
Yet we have also stated, in apparent contradiction to the above cases, that
Rooker-Feldman does not require a decision to have state law preclusive effect.
See Maym-Melndez v. lvarez-Ramrez, 364 F.3d 27, 32-33 (1st Cir.)
(Rooker-Feldman is "broader and blunter" than res judicata, and does not
impose res judicata's technical requirements, "[s]o, despite the disapproval of
scholars, federal courts regularly use Rooker-Feldman to rebuff collateral
attacks on prior state court judgments without purporting to apply the technical
preclusion rules of res judicata"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 110, 160
L.Ed.2d 120 (2004); Mandel v. Town of Orleans, 326 F.3d 267, 271 (1st
Cir.2003) ("Rooker-Feldman applies whether or not the federal and state causes
of action are technically the same for purposes of claim preclusion, or whether
all of the familiar conditions for issue preclusion are met.") (citation omitted);
Sheehan v. Marr, 207 F.3d 35, 40 n. 5 (1st Cir.2000) (noting that "res judicata
... and Rooker-Feldman are separate doctrines, [although] they have a `close
affinity' to one another," and quoting Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d
981, 983 n. 1 (8th Cir.1995), for the proposition that "Rooker-Feldman is
broader than claim and issue preclusion because it does not depend on a final
These tests of state court judgment finality in our application of the RookerFeldman doctrine have now been superseded by the explanation of that doctrine
in Exxon Mobil. We briefly summarize that case for context.
21
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation sued Exxon Mobil in Delaware state court
for a declaratory judgment that it did not owe Exxon Mobil any money from a
contractual agreement; Exxon Mobil counterclaimed for the money.
Meanwhile, Exxon Mobil filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court as
an "insurance policy" in case it lost the state court lawsuit. The state case went
to judgment first, and the jury found for Exxon Mobil, awarding it a large
verdict on its counterclaim. Saudi Basic appealed the judgment to the Delaware
Supreme Court. See 125 S.Ct. at 1524-25.
22
Meanwhile, the federal action proceeded. Exxon Mobil's claims in federal court
were essentially identical to its defenses and counterclaims in state court. On an
interlocutory appeal related to foreign sovereign immunity, the Third Circuit
sua sponte concluded that Exxon Mobil's claims were identical to claims
actually litigated in state court, and ordered the claim dismissed pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 1525-26.
23
24
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine ... is confined to cases of the kind from which
the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant
preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal
courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions.
25
Id. at 1521-22. The Court specifically limited the doctrine to cases in the
procedural posture of Rooker and Feldman themselves:
26
Rooker and Feldman exhibit the limited circumstances in which this Court's
appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, 28 U.S.C. 1257, precludes a
United States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an
28
III.
29
Exxon Mobil tells us when a state court judgment is sufficiently final for
operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: when "the state proceedings [have]
ended." 125 S.Ct. at 1526. If federal litigation is initiated before state
proceedings have ended, then even if the federal plaintiff expects to lose in
state court and hopes to win in federal court the litigation is parallel, and the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. See id. at
1526-28. On the other hand, if federal litigation is initiated after state
proceedings have ended, and the plaintiff implicitly or explicitly "seek[s]
review and rejection of [the state] judgment," id. at 1526, then a federal suit
seeking an opposite result is an impermissible attempt to appeal the state
judgment to the lower federal courts, and, under Rooker-Feldman, the federal
courts lack jurisdiction.
30
As noted above, our prior tests of finality involved appealability under 1257
and/or state law preclusive effect. Under Exxon Mobil, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine applies when the losing party in state court files suit in federal court
"after the state proceedings ended." We now explore what it means for state
proceedings to have "ended," and explain how this test differs from the tests we
had set forth before Exxon Mobil.
31
32
First, when the highest state court in which review is available has affirmed the
judgment below and nothing is left to be resolved, then without a doubt the
state proceedings have "ended." In this situation, the state court judgment would
constitute a "[f]inal judgment[ ] or decree[ ] rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had" under 1257, it would carry preclusive
effect in virtually every state, andmost relevant here it would qualify
under Exxon Mobil's "ended" test.
33
Second, if the state action has reached a point where neither party seeks further
action, then the state proceedings have also "ended." For example, if a lower
state court issues a judgment and the losing party allows the time for appeal to
expire, then the state proceedings have ended. In this situation, the judgment
would carry preclusive effect in virtually every state. It would usually not,
however, be an appealable "[f]inal judgment[ ] or decree[ ] rendered by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had" under 1257.
Neverthelessand this is what mattersit qualifies under Exxon Mobil's
"ended" test.10
34
Third, if the state court proceedings have finally resolved all the federal
questions in the litigation, but state law or purely factual questions (whether
great or small) remain to be litigated, then the state proceedings have "ended"
within the meaning of Rooker-Feldman on the federal questions at issue. We
infer this meaning from a footnote in Exxon Mobil that provides an example of
a federal suit that would be subject to Rooker-Feldman even though the state
court litigation was still ongoing.
35
36
In ASARCO, the plaintiffs sought state court declaratory and injunctive relief
against an Arizona mineral leasing statute on the grounds of, inter alia, federal
preemption. See 490 U.S. at 610, 109 S.Ct. 2037. The trial court upheld the
statute, but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, and "remanded the case to the
trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment for [plaintiffs], to enter
a judgment declaring [the state law] invalid, and to consider what further relief,
if any, might be appropriate." Id. The defendants petitioned for certiorari, which
the United States Supreme Court granted. Id. at 610, 109 S.Ct. 2037.
37
The plaintiffs, with the United States as amicus, contended that the Court
lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. They raised two distinct jurisdictional
arguments: that the state court judgment was not a "final judgment" under
1257 because matters of relief remained to be litigated, and that the case was
nonjusticiable because, although the plaintiffs had standing to file the suit under
state law, they did not have standing under Article III. See id. at 611-12, 109
S.Ct. 2037.
38
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. It held that 1257 jurisdiction
was available under the doctrine of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975),11 and that, even though the
plaintiffs would not have been able to file the suit in federal court initially, the
defendants nevertheless had standing to bring the appeal. See ASARCO, 490
U.S. at 612, 617-19, 109 S.Ct. 2037.
39
The Court also rejected the United States's suggestion that the defendants had
to seek relief through a federal declaratory judgment action. Id. at 620, 109
S.Ct. 2037. The Court observed that such an action would require the federal
court "to readjudicate the very same issues that were determined in the statecourt proceedings below," and "in essence[ ] would be an attempt to obtain
direct review of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in the lower federal
courts" in violation of Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 622-23, 109 S.Ct. 2037.
40
41
The injury of which the [ASARCO] petitioners (the losing parties in state court)
could have complained in the hypothetical federal suit would have been caused
by the state court's invalidation of their mineral leases, and the relief they
would have sought would have been to undo the state court's invalidation of the
statute. The hypothetical suit in ASARCO, therefore, shares the characteristics
of the suits in Rooker and Feldman, i.e., loser in state court invites federal
district court to overturn state-court judgment.
42
43
This scenario prompts the question of how the lower federal courts should
determine whether a state proceeding, still ongoing in some form, has ended
with respect to a particular federal issue. We infer from Exxon Mobil that the
Cox Broadcasting test of finality should be used for this purpose by the
following reasoning. Exxon Mobil confirms that the ASARCO state court
litigation was sufficiently final (i.e., had "ended") for purposes of the RookerFeldman doctrine. See id. And ASARCO concluded that the state court
litigation there was sufficiently final for Supreme Court review because it
satisfied the Cox Broadcasting test. See 490 U.S. at 612, 109 S.Ct. 2037. In
short, Exxon Mobil and ASARCO, read together, suggest that if state court
litigation is sufficiently final for Supreme Court review, then it is sufficiently
final for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
44
IV.
45
Exxon Mobil means that our prior tests of finality (appealability under 1257
and preclusive effect) are no longer applicable for Rooker-Feldman purposes.
Simply put, a state proceeding may meet the "ended" test of Exxon Mobil even
if it fails one or both of those prior tests. Consequently, the applicability of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine no longer turns on whether the state court decision
was "final" or "preclusive." Rather, we examine the posture of the case in the
state court i.e., whether "state proceedings [have] ended," 125 S.Ct. at 1526
and the relief sought in the federal court.
46
47
That is the case here. Exxon Mobil holds that federal courts lack jurisdiction to
review a state court judgment in a federal case initiated "after the state
proceedings ended." 125 S.Ct. at 1526. While such judgments will often qualify
as "final judgments" under 1257 and/or carry state law preclusive effect,
neither 1257 finality nor state law preclusive effect is necessary under the
Exxon Mobil test.
48
49
Similarly, we recognize that Exxon Mobil has effectively abrogated BadilloSantiago, Prez-Guzmn, and Cruz to the extent that they state that RookerFeldman doctrine only applies to state court judgments with preclusive effect.
See Badillo-Santiago, 378 F.3d at 6 ("Rooker-Feldman applies to state or
territorial court judgments to which the federal courts would accord preclusive
effect, and the federal courts `can ascribe no greater preclusive force to a state
court judgment than would the courts of that state.'") (quoting Cruz, 204 F.3d at
21); Prez-Guzmn, 346 F.3d at 238 n. 5 ("`[O]nly a state court adjudication
that itself has preclusive effect can bring the Rooker-Feldman doctrine into
play.'") (quoting Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21 n. 5); Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21 n. 5 ("Only a
state court adjudication that itself has preclusive effect can bring the RookerFeldman doctrine into play."). Under Exxon Mobil, state law preclusive effect is
51
Rather, what matters is that the state court proceedings have ended with regard
to the sole federal issue, namely, whether the Board's jurisdiction is preempted
by the NLRA. That jurisdictional question is separate and independent from the
merits of the dispute. It logically should be, and has been, decided in advance of
a trial on the merits. Moreover, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has declined to
disturb the lower court's decision, thus exhausting the possibility of further
review in the Puerto Rico court system.15
52
We find that this case falls neatly within one of the situations described in Cox
Broadcasting:
53
[W]here the federal issue has been finally decided in the state courts with
further proceedings pending in which the party seeking review [in the Supreme
Court] might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering
unnecessary review of the federal issue by [the Supreme] Court, and where
reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any
further litigation on the relevant cause of action ... if a refusal immediately to
review the state-court decision might seriously erode federal policy, the Court
[has jurisdiction].
54
420 U.S. at 482-83, 95 S.Ct. 1029; see also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,
497 & n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 3172, 77 L.Ed.2d 798 (1983) (accepting jurisdiction over
state court decision that unfair labor practice charge brought in state court was
not within jurisdiction of NLRB); Local No. 438 Constr. & Gen. Laborers'
Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 548-50, 83 S.Ct. 531, 9 L.Ed.2d 514 (1963)
(accepting jurisdiction over state court's injunction against labor union
picketing; issue to be further litigated on the merits was legality of picketing,
which was entirely separate from the union's federal defense, that NLRB's
jurisdiction over labor dispute was exclusive); cf. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 525 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("[S]tate-court decisions
With these issues resolved, this case turns out to be as simple as it first
appeared. The Federacin litigated its federal labor law preemption defense
before the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals. That court found that the Federacin
was not engaged in interstate commerce and that the Board's jurisdiction was
not preempted by federal labor law; the Puerto Rico Supreme Court did not
disturb that judgment. The Federacin's subsequent federal claim seeks a
declaration that the Board's jurisdiction was preempted by federal labor law.
That claim could succeed only if the federal court were to hold that the Puerto
Rico decision was incorrect. As in Rooker and Feldman, here "the losing party
in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended,
complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking
review and rejection of that judgment," Exxon Mobil, 125 S.Ct. at 1526.
Consequently, the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the state court
decision, despite the interlocutory nature of the Puerto Rico courts' decisions.
The district court properly dismissed the complaint.
56
Affirmed.
Notes:
1
The Federacin also asserted defenses under Puerto Rico law, which are not
before us
The Act grants the NLRB jurisdiction over charges of unfair labor practices
"affecting commerce," which means interstate commerceSee 29 U.S.C.
152(6)-(7), 160. That jurisdiction is exclusive and preempts state labor law. See
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45, 79 S.Ct.
773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Therefore, if the Federacin's activities affected
Because the district court and the parties frame the dispute in terms of
theRooker-Feldman doctrine, we do not reach the questions of whether
alternative doctrines such as abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), or refusal to grant declaratory relief under
El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488 (1st Cir.1992), would also have
justified dismissal.
Although the statute itself has changed sinceRooker was decided, the changes
have not been material to the present issue, see supra note 5, and the negative
inference drawn in Rooker applies equally today.
The two concepts of finality serve very different purposes. The purpose of the
final judgment rule of 1257 is to prevent the Supreme Court from considering
a case that hasnot reached final judgment. It applies "vertically" within a single
case's progress up through the appellate hierarchy. By contrast, the purpose of
res judicata (and its federal statutory codification, 28 U.S.C. 1738) is to
prevent federal and sister state trial courts from hearing a case that has reached
final judgment. It applies "horizontally" to parallel litigation or collateral
attacks.
Moreover, whether a state court judgment is final for purposes of 1257 is a
question of federal law, Gotthilf v. Sills, 375 U.S. 79, 80, 84 S.Ct. 187, 11
L.Ed.2d 159 (1963) (per curiam), but whether it is final for purposes of
preclusion is a question of state law, Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517,
1520 (1st Cir.1983).
10
A more subtle version of this scenario is where the lower state court does not
issue ajudgment but merely an interlocutory order (e.g., a discovery order
determining whether certain documents were privileged), and the parties then
voluntarily terminate the litigation. In this case, the state court issue would be
neither appealable under 1257 nor preclusive under the preclusion law of
most states. Nevertheless, the state proceedings have ended, and the RookerFeldman doctrine precludes either party from later challenging the order in
federal court.
11
12
For example, if a lower state court issues a judgment and the losing party
allows the time for appeal to expire, then the state proceedings have ended, but
1257 jurisdiction would ordinarily not be available
13
14
15
16
Again, the relevance ofCox Broadcasting is not that appealability under 1257
is required in order for the proceedings to have "ended" under Exxon Mobil. But
when an interlocutory state court decision is appealable under Cox
Broadcasting, then the "ended" test, as we construe it, will almost always be
satisfied.