Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011)
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011)
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011)
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
Syllabus
whether monetary claims can ever be certified under the Rule be
cause, at a minimum, claims for individualized relief, like backpay,
are excluded. Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single, indivisible
remedy would provide relief to each class member. The Rules his
tory and structure indicate that individualized monetary claims be
long instead in Rule 23(b)(3), with its procedural protections of pre
dominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out.
Pp. 2023.
(b) Respondents nonetheless argue that their backpay claims
were appropriately certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because those claims
do not predominate over their injunctive and declaratory relief re
quests. That interpretation has no basis in the Rules text and does
obvious violence to the Rules structural features. The mere pre
dominance of a proper (b)(2) injunctive claim does nothing to justify
eliminating Rule 23(b)(3)s procedural protections, and creates incen
tives for class representatives to place at risk potentially valid mone
tary relief claims. Moreover, a district court would have to reevalu
ate the roster of class members continuously to excise those who
leave their employment and become ineligible for classwide injunc
tive or declaratory relief. By contrast, in a properly certified (b)(3)
class action for backpay, it would be irrelevant whether the plaintiffs
are still employed at Wal-Mart. It follows that backpay claims
should not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). Pp. 2326.
(c) It is unnecessary to decide whether there are any forms of in
cidental monetary relief that are consistent with the above interpre
tation of Rule 23(b)(2) and the Due Process Clause because respon
dents backpay claims are not incidental to their requested
injunction. Wal-Mart is entitled to individualized determinations of
each employees eligibility for backpay. Once a plaintiff establishes a
pattern or practice of discrimination, a district court must usually
conduct additional proceedings . . . to determine the scope of indi
vidual relief. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 361. The
company can then raise individual affirmative defenses and demon
strate that its action was lawful. Id., at 362. The Ninth Circuit erred
in trying to replace such proceedings with Trial by Formula. Because
Rule 23 cannot be interpreted to abridge, enlarge or modify any sub
stantive right, 28 U. S. C. 2072(b), a class cannot be certified on the
premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory de
fenses to individual claims. Pp. 2627.
603 F. 3d 571, reversed.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to Parts I and III.
No. 10277
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breaks added).
Second, the proposed class must satisfy at least one of the
three requirements listed in Rule 23(b). Respondents rely
on Rule 23(b)(2), which applies when the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole.2
Invoking these provisions, respondents moved the Dis
trict Court to certify a plaintiff class consisting of [a]ll
women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store
at any time since December 26, 1998, who have been or
may be subjected to Wal-Marts challenged pay and man
agement track promotions policies and practices. 222
F. R. D., at 141142 (quoting Plaintiff s Motion for Class
Certification in case No. 3:01cv02252CRB (ND Cal.),
Doc. 99, p. 37). As evidence that there were indeed ques
tions of law or fact common to all the women of Wal-Mart,
as Rule 23(a)(2) requires, respondents relied chiefly on
three forms of proof: statistical evidence about pay and
promotion disparities between men and women at the
company, anecdotal reports of discrimination from about
120 of Wal-Marts female employees, and the testimony of
a sociologist, Dr. William Bielby, who conducted a social
4 To
enable that result, the Court of Appeals trimmed the (b)(2) class
in two ways: First, it remanded that part of the certification order
which included respondents punitive-damages claim in the (b)(2) class,
so that the District Court might consider whether that might cause the
monetary relief to predominate. 603 F. 3d, at 621. Second, it accepted
in part Wal-Marts argument that since class members whom it no
longer employed had no standing to seek injunctive or declaratory
relief, as to them monetary claims must predominate. It excluded from
the certified class those putative class members who were no longer
Wal-Mart employees at the time Plaintiffs complaint was filed, id., at
623 (emphasis added).
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8 Bielbys conclusions in this case have elicited criticism from the very
scholars on whose conclusions he relies for his social-framework analy
sis. See Monahan, Walker, & Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender
Discrimination: The Ascendance of Social Frameworks, 94 Va.
L. Rev. 1715, 1747 (2008) ([Bielbys] research into conditions and be
havior at Wal-Mart did not meet the standards expected of social
scientific research into stereotyping and discrimination); id., at 1745,
1747 ([A] social framework necessarily contains only general state
ments about reliable patterns of relations among variables . . . and goes
no further. . . . Dr. Bielby claimed to present a social framework, but he
testified about social facts specific to Wal-Mart); id., at 17471748
(Dr. Bielbys report provides no verifiable method for measuring and
testing any of the variables that were crucial to his conclusions and
reflects nothing more than Dr. Bielbys expert judgment about how
general stereotyping research applied to all managers across all of WalMarts stores nationwide for the multi-year class period).
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9 The
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10 For
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5(g)(2)(A)).
C
In Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F. 3d 402, 415
(CA5 1998), the Fifth Circuit held that a (b)(2) class would
permit the certification of monetary relief that is inciden
tal to requested injunctive or declaratory relief, which it
defined as damages that flow directly from liability to
the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the
injunctive or declaratory relief. In that courts view, such
incidental damage should not require additional hearings
to resolve the disparate merits of each individuals case; it
should neither introduce new substantial legal or factual
issues, nor entail complex individualized determinations.
Ibid. We need not decide in this case whether there are
any forms of incidental monetary relief that are consis
tent with the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) we have
announced and that comply with the Due Process Clause.
Respondents do not argue that they can satisfy this stan
dard, and in any event they cannot.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuits view, Wal-Mart is enti
tled to individualized determinations of each employees
eligibility for backpay. Title VII includes a detailed reme
dial scheme. If a plaintiff prevails in showing that an
employer has discriminated against him in violation of the
statute, the court may enjoin the respondent from en
gaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, [including]
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
backpay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate. 2000e5(g)(1). But if the employer
can show that it took an adverse employment action
against an employee for any reason other than discrimina
tion, the court cannot order the hiring, reinstatement, or
promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment
to him of any backpay. 2000e5(g)(2)(A).
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Opinion of GINSBURG, J.
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Opinion of GINSBURG, J.
3 The Court suggests Rule 23(a)(2) must mean more than it says. See
ante, at 810. If the word questions were taken literally, the majority
asserts, plaintiffs could pass the Rule 23(a)(2) bar by [r]eciting . . .
questions like Do all of us plaintiffs indeed work for Wal-Mart? Ante,
at 9. Sensibly read, however, the word questions means disputed
issues, not any utterance crafted in the grammatical form of a question.
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9 Cf.
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