Jayatilleke - Early Buddhist Theories of Knowledge PDF
Jayatilleke - Early Buddhist Theories of Knowledge PDF
Jayatilleke - Early Buddhist Theories of Knowledge PDF
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
BY
K. N. JAYATILLEKE
B.A.(Ceylon), M.A.(Cantab), Ph.D.(London)
Sometime Research Student in Moral Science, University of Cambridge
Nuffield Fellow in the Humanities, 1960-1
London
FIRST PUBLISHED IN I 9 6 3
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of
private study, research, criticism, or review, as per
mitted under the Copyright Act, i<)56, no portion
may be reproduced by any process without written
permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the
publisher
1963
DEDICATION
FOREWORD
<5
Foreword
epistemology and that the principal lines of its development showed parallels
with those of Western philosophy, including rationalism and empiricism.
Even though valid objections may be adduced to the theory of 'parallel
development', there are at present few doubts about the 'high standard'.
Among other things, it is a fact that the consistent investigation of logical
fallacies and contradictions, on the basis of exact canons of reason, form an
essential part of nearly all the systems, orthodox and heterodox. And, in the
Words of Faddegon, already in early Vaisesika we find a purely theoretical
attitude of mind and not 'that craze for liberation' which dominates nearly
all forms of Indian thought . . . Rather, it is the theoretical desire for a
correct classification and system of definition. The variety of opinion,
mentioned above, is to a large extent induced by the problems of Indian,
i.e. Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit, philosophical language whichas shown in
a number of recent publicationsis itself correlated to the terminology and
categories of the highly developed Indian science of grammar. Especially,
the correct interpretation of the intricate technical terminology presents
many difficulties. In many cases, the same terms have different connotations,
or altogether different meanings, within different contexts and, historically,
at the successive periods of their application. Indeed, already in ancient
India, both the grammarians and the philosophers were concerned with the
problems of meaning and important works were written on this subject.
Long before this happened in the West, 'semantics' became a fundamental
part of the Indian philosophical discipline. Thus, in addition to a careful
historical consideration of the semantic theories, only a meticulous textual
analysis, on an extensive comparative basis, can produce valid interpretations
of Indian philosophical ideas in European languages which are both compre
hensible and 'intrinsic'. Moreover, to give adequate meaningful renderings
of the difficult texts, even a thorough grounding in modern philosophical
analysis is nowadays an indispensable prerequisite.
A further problem which has engaged the attention of scholars is the exact
position which early Buddhism occupied in the development of Indian
thought, the more so as it was regarded by some of them as a 'foreign body'
in Indian philosophy. Moreover, they were of the opinion that the purely
philosophical quality of the Pali canon was surprisingly deficient. Again,
Stcherbatsky stated that the Pali-school of Buddhologists entirely overlooked
the system of philosophy which is present on every page of the Pali canon.
In his opinion, Buddhist authors played a leading part in the development
of Indian epistemology. This is certainly established for the later school of
Dignga and Dharmakirti and their followers. Stcherbatsky's views are
largely confirmed by the present work which is primarily concerned with
the earlier period. Dr Jayatilleke, who had the privilege of being admitted
to Wittgenstein's classes, is that rare combination of accomplished philolo
gist, historian and methodic philosopher. His book goes far beyond the
Foreword
PREFACE
10
Preface
Our findings about the Early Buddhist theory of knowledge are based
primarily on the source material afforded by the Pali Canon, studied historic
cally and philosophically in the light of the contemporary, earlier and latet
literary evidence bearing on the subject. The literary, linguistic, ideological^
sociological and historical evidence still points to the high antiquity and
authenticity of the Pali Canon1, although what we learn from it aboul
Early Buddhism may have to be supplemented and, perhaps, even modified
at times in the light of what we can glean from the other literary traditionsof Buddhism2. We may refer here to the recent opinion of a student of
religion, Dr Robert H. Thouless, who says that 'it seems more likely that
Hinayna was Buddhism as originally taught and the Mahyna was a,
product of development and conventionalisation'3.
The present work seeks to evaluate the thought of the Pali Canon from a
new point of view and in the light of new material. In it an attempt is made
to uncover the epistemological foundations of Pali Canonical thought. One
of the main problems of epistemology is that of the means whereby our
knowledge is derived. In this work the questions pertaining to the means of
knowledge known to, criticized in and accepted by the Buddhism of the|
Pali Canon are fully discussed. A comprehensive survey of the historical
background (Chs. I, II and III) was indispensable for this purpose partly^
because this throws considerable light on the Buddhist theory of knowledge
and also because part of the material for the study of this background is to
be found in the Canon itself.
i
Apart from the inquiry into the means of knowledge, a number of
questions relating to the problem of knowledge have been dealt with. Thus,
we have endeavoured to show the kind of logic adopted by the Buddhists
in contradistinction to that of the Jains (Ch. VII). While Wittgenstein's 4
imaginary tribes played hypothetical language games showing the various
possibilities in the use of language, we find here actual instances in which
different systems of logic were employed in order to cope with certain
conceptual situations. We have also investigated the role of analysis, the
theories of meaning and truth and the problem of the limits of knowledge.!
as they appear in the Canon.
1
v. Dialogues of the Buddha, Part i, Tr. T. W. Rhys Davids, SBB., Vol. II,
London, 1956, pp. ix-xx; cp. M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature,
Tr. S. Ketkar and H. Kohn, University of Calcutta, 1933, p. 18.
j
2
E. Lamotte grants a primitive core of remarkably uniform material common
to the Pali Nikyas and the gamas, v. Histoire du bouddhisme indien, Vol. I,
Louvain, 1958, p. 171. For a sceptical view, v. J. Brough, The Gndhri Dharmapada, London, 1962, pp. 31 ff.
3
"Christianity and Buddhism" in Milla wa-Milta, No. 2, November 1962, p. 3.
4
The author had the privilege of being admitted to Wittgenstein's classes
held in his rooms at Whewell's Court, Trinity College, Cambridge, in the years
1945-47-
Preface
11
K. N. JAYATILLEKE
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
PREFACE
ABBREVIATIONS
19
VEDIC
21-68
MATERIALISM
69-IO8
14
Contents
the realist school or schools (95-118). No evidence
from the Nikyas for the existence of Arthasstra Lokyata (Machiavellian Materialism) (119). The
Materialist criticism of the argument from authority
(120-121). The kind of reasoning employed by the
Materialist (122-129). The empiricist criticism of
metaphysical concepts (130-133). The use of the
modus tollendo tollens (134-135). Experiments devised
to test an hypothesis (136-139). The Materialist
critique of the claim to intuitive knowledge on the
part of the Mystics (140-142).
III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND III
NON-VEDIC II SCEPTICS, XjTviKAS
AND JAINS
IO9-168
169-204
Contents
IS
205-276
277-332
Contents
i6
333
369
Contents
Buddhism is another view (627). Both views are
unsupported by the historical and textual evidence
(629-639). The authority of omniscience not claimed
for the statements of the Buddha until the very latest
stratum of the Pali Canon (640-649). Buddhism not a
revelation (fi$d). The nature and role of belief or faith
(saddh) and its relation to knowledge; provisional
belief for the purposes of verification not incompatible
with rejection of authority (651-673). Another con
ception of faith (674-678). The nature and role of
reason in the Pali Canon (679). Buddhism not a ration
alism in the sense of being an a priori system of
metaphysics (680-685). Reason has definite but limited
function (686-687). Reason in the criticism of other
doctrines and the use of the modus tollendo tollens
(688-701). The anticipation of two theorems of the
propositional calculusthe rules of Implication and
Contraposition (702-710). Refutation (niggaha) in
the Kathvatthu (711).
IX. THE MEANS AND L I M I T S OF K N O W L E D G E
Contents
i8
477-481
482
BIBLIOGRAPHY
483-494
INDEX
495-519
ABBREVIATIONS
A
A^ #
Anguttara Nikya
Anguttara Nikya
Atthakath, i.e.
Manorathaprani
A.A.S.
nanda srama Series
ABORI. Annals of the Bhandarkar Research In
stitute
Ait. Ar. Aitareya ranyaka
Ait, Br.
Aitareya Brhmana
AO.
Acta Orientalia
Ar.
ranyaka
Ard. Mag. Ardha Mgadhi
AV.
Atharvaveda
BEFEO. Bulletin de l'ficole
Franchise d'ExtremeOrient
BHS.
Buddhist Hybrid
Sanskrit
Br.
Brhmana
Brh.
Brhadranyaka
Upanisad
Ch.
Chndogya Upanisad
Corny.
Commentary
CPD.
Critical Pali Diction
ary
C.S.
Caraka Samhit
D.
Digha Nikya
DA.
Digha Nikya Attha
kath, i.e. Sumangalavilsini
Dh.
Dhammapada
DhS.
Dhammasangani
E>PPN.
Dictionary of Pali
Proper Names
iiRE.
Encyclopaedia of
Religion and Ethics
G S
- *
The Book of the
Gradual Sayings, v.
Anguttara Nikya
History of Indian
Philosophy
HOS.
Harvard Oriental
Series
IHQ.
Indian Historical
Quarterly
Indian Philosophy
IP.
Itivuttaka
It.
Jtaka
J.
Journal Asiatique
JA.
Journal of the
JAOS.
American Oriental
Society
JPTS.
Journal of the Pali
Text Society
JRAS.
Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Society
Katha.
Katha Upanisad
Kausitaki Upanisad
Kaus.
Kaus. Br. Kausitaki Brhmana
Khuddakaptha
Khp.
K.S.
The Book of the
Kindred Sayings, v.
Samyutta Nikya
Kvu.
Kathvatthu
KvuA.
Kathvatthuppakaranatthakath
M.
Majjhima Nikya
MA.
Majjhima Nikya
Atthakath, i.e,
Papancasdani
Manu.
Manusmrti
Mait.
Maitri Upanisad
M.L.S.
Middle Length
Sayings, v. Majjhima
Nikya
M.S.
Mimms Stra
Mund.
Mundaka Upanisad
Nd.I.
Mahniddesa
HIP.
20
Nd.II.
N.B.
N.S.
Abbreviations
Cullaniddesa
Nyya Bhsya
Nyya Stra (SBH.
Edition)
NS.
v. N.S.
O.U.P.
Oxford University
Press
P.
Pali
PAS.
Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society
PIPC.
Proceedings of the
Indian Philosophical
Congress
Prasna.
Prasna Upanisad
PTS.
Pali Text Society
PU.
The Principal Upanisads, Ed. S.
Radhakrishnan
Pug. Pan. Puggalapannatti
PvA.
Petavatthu Atthakath, i.e. Paramatthadipani
Rm.
Rmyana
RV.
Rgveda
S.
Samyutta Nikya
SA.
Samyutta Nikya
Atthakath, i.e.
Sratthappaksini
Sam.
Samavynga Stra
B.
Satapatha Brh
mana
SBB.
Sacred Books of the
Buddhists
SBE.
Sacred Books of the
East
SBH.
S.Br.
SDS.
S.K.
Skr.
S.P.S.
Sn.
SnA.
S.
Svet.
Tait.
Tait. Br.
Th. I
Th. II
Toev.
U.C.R.
Ud.
UdA.
Vbh.
VbhA.
Vin.
v.s.
Y.B.
Y.S.
Suttanipta
Suttanipta Atthaka
th, i.e. Paramatthajotik II
Strakrtnga
Svetsvatara Upani
sad
Taittiriya Upanisad
Taittiriya Brhmana
Theragth
Therigath
Toevoegselen op't
Woordenboek van
Childers, H. Kern
University of Ceylon
Review
Udna
Udna Atthakath,
i.e. Paramatthadipani
Vibhanga
Vibhanga Atthakath,
i.e. Sammohavinodani
Vinaya
Vaisesika Stras
Yogabhsya
Yogastras
CHAPTER I
22
v. infra, 147, 158) and the epistemological and logical theories peculiar
to Materialism, Ajfvikism, Jainism and Buddhism.
(3) When a metaphysical theory is fairly well developed, there is a
tendency to inquire into the grounds of its truth. Similarly, where there
are a number of conflicting theories about a particular problem, it
would be natural to ask which of them was true. Both these queries
lead to an investigation of the nature of truth and knowledge, which
may give rise to logical and epistemological doctrines. This seems to
have been the general pattern according to which interest was first
stimulated and advances made in the solution of the problem of
knowledge both in India as well as in Greece.
(4) In this survey of the Vedic period we shall be concerned with what
the Vedic (Brhmanic and Upanisadic) thinkers assumed or thought
were the means of knowledge and in the origin and nature of reasoning
as we find it in this literature. Both these questions shall be considered
in the light of their bearing on the thought of the Pali Canon.
(5) The Rgveda does not betray any awareness of the nature of
problems of knowledge. If we accept the naturalistic explanation, the
Rgvedic gods were probably fashioned on the analogy of ourselves
by positing wills behind the dynamic forces of nature but there is no
indication whatsoever that the thinkers were consciously employing
an argument from analogy. The mechanical and organic views of
creation1 seem to have been similarly arrived at, although here the
analogies with some observable facts of nature are more evident at
least to the reader. The tendency on the part of the mind to look for
simpler explanations in place of the more complex is perhaps respon
sible for the emergence of monotheistic and monistic tendencies2 in
the last phase of Rgvedic thought.
(6) Interest is almost invariably focused on the outer world and it is
rarely that we meet with a thinker in an introspective mood though
we find an instance of a person who asks himself in a sceptical tone:
'I do not clearly know what I am like here; bewildered and bound with
a mind, I wander' (na vi jnmi yadivedm asmi ninyah3 samnaddho
1
2
Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, I, pp. 99 ff.
Op. cit., pp. 89 fT.
W e have followed the commentators in translating this term; Mdhava takes
it to mean 'concealed' (antarhitah, v. fn. 2) and Syana following him says, 'the
term "ninyah" denotes what is concealed (and means here that) he is concealed,
i.e. has a bewildered mind (antarhitanmaitat antarhito mdhacittah).'
3
The Historical
Background
24
(7) The very few stanzas which strike a sceptical note deserve 39
special mention.1 Here for the first time there is an expression of
doubt about the possibility of knowing certain things and a dim
awareness that some sort of evidence was necessary before we cat)
afford to make factual assertions. What evidence is there for th$
existence of Indra unless someone has seen him? One stanza in a hymn
says, 'One and another say, "there is no Indra". Who hath beheld him?
Whom then shall we honour?' 2 Who again can be sure about the fact
or nature of creation when no one has beheld the spectacle, 'Who has
seen that the Boneless One bears the Bony, when he is first born?
Where is the breath, the blood and the soul of the earth? Who would
approach the wise man to ask this?' (Ko dadarsa prathamam jyamnam, asthanvantam yad anasth vibharti, bhmya asur asrgtm kva
svit, ko vidvmsam upagt prastum etat. RV. 1.164.4). It will be noticed
that the author of this statement is the same as the person who felt 1
uncertain about himself (v. supra, 6). Now Prasad has questioned the
propriety of concluding that these questions suggest an attitude of 1
scepticism and says that 'either they are simply meant to introduce a
discussion, or at the most they indicate a confession of ignorance on the
part of the individual, who puts them' (pp. cit., p. 24). Prasad is quite
right in pointing out that this hymn contains the subject matter of a
brahmodya (v. infra, 46) at which questions of this type were asked,
but if we examine the nature of this question itself, it will be seen that
it cannot be explained away as a confession of ignorance on the part of
the author. The question expresses the puzzlement of one who cannot
understand (in a philosophical sense) how a Boneless Being can pro
duce a Bony offspringan apparent contradiction. Quite apart from
the contradictory nature of this statement, what evidence was there to
believe in it. People doubted the existence of Indra because they could
not see him and the Nasadiya hymn poses the problem, 'the gods are
posterior to this creation: if so, who knows whence it evolved?'
(arvg dev'sya visarjanentha ko veda yata babhva, RV. 10.129.6).
Surely it is in this same sceptical spirit that it is asked, ko dadarsa . . . ?
(who has seen . . . ?), meaning thereby 'who could have seen this
spectacle for us to know that it did really happen?'. The fact that the
author of this hymn doubts his own nature and confesses in all humility
1
25
'He the first origin of this creation, whether he formed it all or did not form it,
Whose eye controls this world in highest heaven, he verily knows it, or perhaps
he knows not*.
Op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 368.
4
Cp. Prasad, '. . . compare Sayana's interpretation of the verse which agrees
with that of mine* (pp. cit., p. 27, fn. 1).
5
Yata updnabhttparamtmana iyam visrstir vividh girinadlsamudrdirpena vicitr srstir babhvjta so'pi kila yadi v dadhe dhrayati yadi v na
dhrayati evan ca ko nmnyo dhartum aknuyt yadi dhrayedisvara eva dhrayennnya iti, op. cit., Vol. 6, p. 410.
26
In the light of this comment Syana's translation of the first two lines
would be as follows:
'That (Highest Self) from whom this creation arose,
Either sustains it or does not sustain it.'
The comment on the next two lines is as follows: 'The Highest Lord
who is such a person does indeed ("indeed" in the sense of "as is well
known") know, i.e. understands: if he does not know, i.e. does not
understand, who else indeed would know: the sense is that the omni
scient Lord alone would know about this creation and no other'.1
This implies the following translation of the last two lines:
'He who is the Lord in the highest heaven;
He verily knows, if (anyone else) does not know*.
Syana's translation of the first two lines is unobjectionable from the
point of view of grammar and syntax though his contention is that
the second line means, 'the (Highest Self) alone sustains it and no one
else', which is not apparent from even his literal rendering of the
sentence. But his translation of the fourth line is clearly at variance
with grammar, for he alters the subject of the verb Veda' of the second
sentence from 'sah' to 'ka anyah' (understood) without any support
from the original. If we have misunderstood Syana in attributing to
him such an unwarranted periphrasis, he is at least translating this line
as 'he verily knows or does not know' and interpreting it to mean 'it
is only he who knows and no one else', although it is evident that this
sentence cannot mean this either in a literal or a figurative sense. Now
Prasad, speaking of the second and fourth lines of this verse, observes,
'These two clauses do not express doubt or ignorance, but mean and
that quite in accordance with idiom that it is only He who bore it, and
no body else and it is He who knows it and no body else respectively'
{op, cit., p. 27, fn. 1), but he does not translate the verse or explain
how the only possible literal translation can idiomatically mean what
he and Syana try to make it mean. It is evident that Syana is really
trying to explain the verse away rather than to interpret what it
strictly meant since he could not countenance the claim that the sacred
scriptures contained statements sceptical about the knowledge or
power of the deity but we cannot be led by these considerations.
1
Idro yah paramesvarah so anga afigeti prasiddhau so'pi nma veda jnti,
yadi v na veda na jnti ko nma anyo janiyt sarvajna isvara eva tarn srstim
jniyt nnya ityarthah, op. cit.9 Vol. 6, p. 471.
27
I
sat, 1
being
yadi v
na veda, 7
or he does
not know
I
asat, 1
non-being
We are leaving out the possibility that the question is meaningless in the
Positivisms sense of the term.
28
(10) Despite the (to us) dogmatic presentation of his own theory^
the sceptical conclusion, after taking account of almost all the possibly
answers to this question, nearly approaches scepticism with regard toi
the possibility of knowledge in respect of the problem of the origin',
of the world. This scepticism which is based on the consideration that
'since the gods came after the creation (srsti-, lit, emission, emanation)
no one knows how the world began' (arvg devsya visarjanentha
ko veda yata babhva, 6) because no one was there to behold the
spectacle (cp. ko. dadarsa . . . ?, supra, 7), is soon forgotten in the
orthodox tradition. However, it leaves its mark in (or is rediscovered
by?) Buddhism, where Brahma, reputed to be 'the creator', (sajita,
D. 1.18 < srj-i-t(5) = Skr. srast: cp. katt, nimmt, loc. cit.) is
said to be ignorant of his own origin (loc. cit., v. infra, 645). Moreover, it is said that 'it is not possible to conceive of the beginning of
the world: a first cause (lit. prior end) cannot be known'. 1
(11) The desire for simple and single principles of explanation, which
seems to have led to the emergence of the monotheistic and monistic
concepts in the final stratum of Rgvedic thought seems to have worked
its way into the undercurrent of speculation found in the Atharvaveda
and the Brhmanas, where the few philosophical hymns try to comprehend the entirety of the universe under some single concept such
as Time (Kla),2 Eros (Kama),3 Creative Power (Brahman),4 Life
Principle (Prna) 5 or an Ontological Framework (Skambha).6
(12) The same tendency is found in the Brhmanas. For although here
thought is subservient to the practical ends of the sacrifice, the universe, conceived on the analogy of the sacrifice, is regarded as a unity.
The unity is, however, not evident on the surface and is made up of
hidden bonds and relations lying concealed beneath the plural universe.7 'What is evident (pratyaksam) to men is concealed (paroksam)
to the gods, and what is concealed to men is evident to the gods' (yad
vai manusynm pratyaksam tad devnm paroksam atha yan manus1
29
ynm paroksam tad devnm pratyaksam, Tndyamahbrhmana,
22.10.3). In the Rgveda there was a primitive conception of causality
underlying the idea of rta which seems to have denoted the 'course of
things' or the observable physical order of the world before it acquired
a moral and theological connotation. But in the Brhmanas, which
value 'what lies beyond the sphere of the senses' (paroksa-),1 the
conception of a causal order gives way to that of a magical order.2
(13) It is in the Brhmanas that we find developed what became for
orthodoxy the supreme source of knowledgethe revealed scriptural
text. As Ranade and Belvalkar say, 'the Brhmanas came to invest the
mantras with the character of divine revelation. They are at times
spoken of as eternally self-subsistent and coeval with God-headif
not actually prior to Him. At other timesand especially in the newer
Brhmana texts {underlining mine)they are described as creations of
Prajpati, the head of the whole pantheon'.3 The hymns are said to be
seen, learned or found generally by some special insight on the part
of the seers and not made or composed by them.4
(14) The reasoning in the Brhmanas is analogical and centres
round the symbolism of the sacrifice. The analogies are remote. A
fanciful etymology, a myth, legend or a vague similarity is sufficient
to establish a connection between two things.5 An explanation to be
satisfactory has to be made in terms of a sacrificial analogy. Examples
of typically Brhmanic reasoning may be found at SB. 11.4.1.1215,
which describes the debate between Uddlaka Aruni and Svaidyana
Gautama. The following are two arguments found there: (1) Atha
jWapuro'nuvkyak prayj bhavanti, tasmd imh praj'dantak
jyante, i.e. and since the fore-offerings are without preliminary
formulae, therefore creatures are born here without teeth, 11.4.1.12,
(2) atha jyWjyahavisah prayj bhavanti tasmt kumrasya retah
siktanna sambhavaty udakamivaiva bhavaty udakam iva hyjyam, i.e.
1
The expression paroksapriy hi devh, i.e. the gods love what is not evident,
is common in the Brhmanas; v. op. cit., p. 63.
2
Oldenberg, Religion des Veda, pp. 315 ff., 321 ff.; Keith, HOS., Vol. 32,
pp. 379 ff.; Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Band I, pp. 41 ff.
References to magic are found in the Rgveda and the Yajurveda as well, v. H.
Lders, Varuna, Band II, Gttingen 1959? PP- 59~45> Die magische Kraft des
B.ta in den vedischen Mythen.
3
Op. cit., p. 56.
4
Keith, H O S . , Vol. 32, p. 482.
5
v. Ranade and Belvalkar, op. cit., p. 63.
30
and since the fore-offerings have ghee for their offering material, a
boy's seed is not productive but is like water since ghee is like water,
This sounds utter balderdash, but just as much as a biological reason
would be given today as to why a 'boy's seed is not productive',
nothing short of a 'sacrificial' reason would have satisfied a Brhmanic thinker. Anything to be understood had to be explained on a
sacrificial analogy and discovering these analogies (bandhut) was as
much an art as the reasoning itself. The reasoning in the above argu
ment may be exhibited as follows since much is taken for granted in
the arguments:
i. Ghee fore-offerings are not productive (since ghee is like water
v. udakam iva hyjyamand water is not productive in a biological
sense)
2. Ghee fore-offerings are like the boy's seed (since both are at the
beginning, ghee fore-offerings at the beginning of the sacrifice and
the boy at the beginning of life)
3. Therefore, the boy's seed is not productive.
The form of this argument from analogy would be as follows:
1. A has the characteristic/?
2. A is like B
3. Therefore, B has the characteristic/?.
The remotest connection, natural or magical, between two things is
sufficient for the Brhmanas to draw the analogy that 'A is like B' on
the basis of which inferences are made.
(15) There is rarely any admission of the need for or possibility of
doubt and investigation (mimms)1 is always carried out with the
conviction that the correct interpretation of the revealed texts opens
the door to all knowledge but there is mention of vicikits, or the
doubt that premotes inquiry.2 Vicikits or 'doubt' is in fact one of the
recognized states of mind. The Sathapatha Brhmana says, 'wish,
conception, doubt, faith, lack of faith, determination, lack of deter
mination, shame, thought, fearall this is mind' (kmah samkalpo
vicikits sraddhsraddh dhrtiradhrtirhrirddhirbbhir ity etat sarvam
mana eva . . . , 14.4.3.9); thus, Tratardana . . . questions about his
doubt' (Pratardanah vicikitsam papraccha, Kaus. Br. 26.5). Of specific
1
v. Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas, HOS., Vol. 32, p. 483.
Ibid.
The Historical
Background
3*
32
the thinkers bring a fresh mind to bear on the problems they seek to
solve.
(19) The tendency especially on the part of Indian scholars to regard
the Upanisads as presenting a single systematic and coherent philosophy on the basis of the interpretations and expositions of either
Sankara, Rmnuja, Madhva or others has much obscured the independence and originality of the speculations of many thinkers of the
Upanisadic tradition. Such an attitude fails to take account of the fact
that although the Upanisadic thinkers owed allegiance to the Vedic
tradition, they were free to theorize on matters and topics that fell
outside the scope ofthat tradition. They not only belonged to separate
schools but were often separated and isolated geographically. Besides,
many generations would have lapsed between one outstanding teacher
and another. We find evidence of conflicting theories, of the criticism
and replacement of one theory by another and the influence of earlier
views on later thinkers, who build on them. All this would not have
been possible if there was a single uniform philosophy called the
vednta, which is unfolded on every page of the Upanisadic texts.
(20) If we examine the Upanisadic texts, considering the theories
found in separate sections or ideological units separately, we would
find that the thinkers of the Upanisads can be classified into two different categories. Firstly, there are those who found and propound
their views by indulging in metaphysical speculation and rational
argument not without a basis in experience, despite the earlier mythology weighing heavily on their minds. Secondly, there are those
who profess their theories as an expression and interpretation of what
they claim to have themselves experienced by the practice of yoga,
although in the form in which they are presented they are dressed in a
good deal of metaphysical clothing. The former set of thinkers are
usually met with in the Early Upanisads while the latter are generally
represented in the Middle and Late Upanisads, but no absolute division
is possible since the rational metaphysicians are found in some of the
Middle and Late Upanisads (e.g. Prasna) while references to yoga
philosophy and practice are not entirely absent in the Early Upanisads.
(21) The difference between these two types of thinkers, namely the
rational metaphysicians who found their theories on a priori and
empirical reasoning and the contemplative intuitionists who claim to
acquire special insights into the nature of reality by following certain
techniques of mind control and culture, would be clearer if we take
The Historical
Background
33
samples of their theories and statements and examine the epistemological bases of their thought. Let us first consider some of the meta
physical theories and see on what kind of thinking and reasoning they
are based.
(22) Let us take the philosophy of Uddlaka. His philosophy has
been treated separately1 by both Barua2 as well as Ruben.3 Ruben
examines his ontology and calls it a 'hylozoistische Monismus',4 and
refers to Uddlaka as 'der lteste Materialist'5 and as a 'Realist'.6 Barua
starts with his theory of knowledge and is inclined to call him an
Empiricist. Since we are interested only in this aspect of his thought
we may examine Barua's appraisal of it. He says; ' . . . Uddlaka
propounded an empirical theory of knowledge. Henceforth let no
one speak, he asserts, of anything but that which is heard, perceived
or cognized. He seems repeatedly to point out:The only right
method of scientific investigation into the nature of reality is that of
inference by way of induction' (op. cit., p. 138). Later Barua seems to
qualify Uddlaka's claims to be a pure empiricist: 'According to his
own showing the senses furnish us with sufficient indications from
which the knowing mind can easily infer the nature and relations of
things in themselves'.7
(23) Now the statement that Barua attributes to Uddlaka, namely
'henceforth let no one speak of anything but that which is heard,
perceived or cognized' does not seem to bear the meaning that Barua
gives to it, when we consider its literal translation in the context in
which it appears. Uddlaka propounds the elements of his philosophy
and then says, 'Verily, it was just this that the great householders and
great students of sacred knowledge knew when they said of old, "no
one will now mention to us what we have not heard, what we have not
perceived, what we have not thought" ' (etaddha sma vai tad vidvarnsa
huh purve mahsl mahasrotriyh na no 'dya kascana asrutam,
amatam, avijntam udharisyati ti, Ch. 6.4.5). This statement does not
1
34
seem to convey anything more than that anyone who has grasped the
theory set forth by Uddlaka knows all there is to be known and
therefore no one can teach him, i.e. make him hear, think or under
stand anything new. It is a dogmatic assertion claiming finality for his
philosophy. It does not mean, 'henceforth let no one speak . . .' but
'today (adya) no one (na kascana) will speak (udharisyati) . . .' and
no epistemological significance can be attached to it.
(24) Whether Uddlaka is an empiricist or not can only be deter
mined by examining the epistemic origin of his theory and when we do
so, he appears to be basically a rationalist, who makes considerable
use of empirical premises to illustrate his theory and serve as a basis
for his metaphysical insights.
(25) Uddlaka for the first time in the history of Indian thought
expressly suggests a proof of the reality of Being (sat) instead of
merely assuming it, when he asserts, 'some say that . . . from nonBeing Being was produced. But, verily, my dear, whence could this
be? . . . how could Being be produced from Non-Being'? (taddhaika
huh . . . asatah saj jyata. Kutas tu khalu, saumya, evam syt . . .
katham asatah saj jyeta, Ch. 6.2.1, 2).
(26) Having proved the reality of being by pure reasoning, Uddlaka
had to explain how the world could have a plurality of things, if
Being (sat) alone were real. If Being was the only reality, plurality
is mere appearance. The different shapes and names that things have,
cannot be real, for Being is the one and only substance that exists. This
is illustrated by some empirical examples. When we see an object of
clay, we know that its shape and name can be changed but its sub
stance cannot be changed for 'the modification is merely a verbal
distinction, a name, the reality is just clay' (vcrambhanam vikro
nmadheyam mrttikety eva satyam, 6.1.4).
^27) It is not only the present plurality that has to be accounted for
but the origin of this plurality. Here Uddlaka uncritically accepts the
earlier mythological notions and says that Being wishes to multiply and
procreate and produces heat (6.2.3). Heat (tejas) produces water
(apas) and water food (annam) (6.2.3,4). Empirical evidence is adduced
in favour of this causal sequence,1 where it is pointed out that when we
1
Note that heat, water and food are in the relationship of root and sprout;
*. . . with food for a sprout look for water as the root. With water as a sprout
look for heat as the root'. . . annena sungenpo mlam anvicceha, abdhih . . .
sungena tejo mlam anviccha, 6.8.4).
The Historical
Background
35
an<
tnat
36
37
38
Nature,
39
40
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
The Historical
Background
4i
42
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
2
Vol. 8, p. 128.
Ibid.
H. N. Rndle, Indian Logic in the Early Schools, Oxford University Press,
1930, p. 14; cp. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, pp. 27 ff.
3
The Historical
Background
43
propositions, the problem of universals may perhaps be ultimatelytraced to 'ceremonial deliberation' and a significant portion of this
was contributed by the Grammarians (Vaiykaranas) but the first
awareness of the validity and invalidity of reasoning seems to have
arisen out of the debate as much in India as in Greece. On the other
hand, Rndle seems to imagine that the only forms of valid reasoning
must be syllogistic and it was probably this which led him to ignore
the foreshadowings of some of the theorems of the propositional
calculus in the Kathvatthu (v. infra, 703-710).
(46) The debate in the Indian context seems to have its historical
origins in the Vedic institution of the brahmodya1 (or brahmavadya).
A brief glance at the history of the brahmodya seems profitable in so
far as it gives a picture of the origin and development of the debate.
The earliest brahmodyas are riddles or religious charades which are
to be found in the Rgveda (1.164, 8.29) or the Atharvaveda (9.9, 10).
They frequently occur in the Brhmanas.2 Their general form is that
of question and answer though sometimes the answers are cryptic or
the questions presupposed.3 When the sacrifice became the reigning
institution in Brhmanic society, the brahmodya was a minor diversion
within it. Bloomfield calls it in this context 'a charade to enliven the
mechanical and technical progress of the sacrifice by impressive
intellectual pyrotechnics'.4 Keith says, 'it is a feature of the Vedic
sacrifice that at certain points are found Brahmodyas, discussions about
the Brahman, the holy power in the universe. Such theosophical
riddles are specially common at the horse sacrifice'.5 The following is
an example of such a brahmodya as related in the SB. (13.5.2.11 ff.):
11. They hold a Brahmodya in the Sadas . . .
12. HotrWho walketh singly? Adhvaryuthe sun.
1
v. Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas, HOS., Vol. 32, pp. 344, 345,
435; A. Ludwig, Der Rigveda oder die Heiligen Hymnen der Brahmana, Band III,
Prag, 1878, pp. 390 ff.; Bloomfield, Religion of the Veda, pp. 216 ff.; Bloomfield,
'The Marriage of Sarany, Tvastar's Daughter', JAOS., Vol. 15, pp. 172 ff.;
M. Haug 'Vedische Rthselfragen und Rthselsprche', Transactions of the
Munich Academy, 1875, PP- 7 ff This last reference is quoted from Bloomfield,
JAOS., Vol. 15, fn. 4-, and I have not been able to find this article in the libraries
of London and Cambridge.
2
These references are given in the article of Bloomfield, JAOS., Vol. 15,
p . 172.
3
4
5
44
The Historical
Background
45
well, such as 'Being cannot come out of Non-Being' (v. supra, 25).
Both these forms of reasoning were made use of to construct meta
physical theories. Vkovkya- at this stage of its development may have
signified a general study of this kind of reasoning as well as of topics,
which would help to make one a good debater.
(49) The debate at this stage seems to have been carried over from the
sacrifice to the public assembly and become an institution important
in itself and not a minor feature of a sacrificial session. Svetaketu
runeya goes for the purpose of debating to the assembly of the
Paficlas, which is called panclnam parisadam (Brh. 6.2.1) and panclnam samitim (Ch. 5.3.1). Sometimes the brahmins would go to the
courts of kings to hold such debates. Yjfiavalkya goes to king Janaka
of Videha 'desirous of cattle' (the prize of the debate) and subtle
questions (pasn icchan anvantn, Brh. 4.1.1), and holds controversy
with him. So does Blki come to Ajtasatru (Kaus. 4.1) and debate
with him. It was these assemblies of the brahmins and the ksatriyas
which came to be known as the brhmana-paris and the khattiyaparis respectively in the Pli Nikyas (v. infra, 349).
(50) But the debate on the sacrificial ground also seems to have con
tinued without a break, though it was no longer a formal brahmodya
but a heated contest. There is a description of such a debate at a
sacrifice at Brh. 3.1-9, which Janaka attends and where he offers a
prize to the victor (i.e. to the wisest brahmin, brahmistha). In the
Mahbhrata, it is said describing the proceedings of a sacrifice that
'as the sacrifice progressed eloquent reasoners (vgmino hetuvdinah)
put forward many theories based on reasoning (hetuvdn) with the
intention of defeating each other'.1 It is probably these brahmins who
called the 'brahmins addicted to the debate' (brhman vdasil) at
Sn. 382 (v. infra, 375). It is also probably to them that the Mahniddesa
refers by the term hetuvd (Nd. I.294) though the term need not be
restricted to the brahmins.2
(51) We found that the term vkovkya- was used in the Brhmanas
to denote a branch of study and observed that at a certain stage in its
development, it probably meant 'the study of the nature of discussion
1
46
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
The Historical
Background
41
have signified logic, since this science was developed many centuries
later as an outcome of the technical art of philosophical discussion'
(loc. cit.). He suggests for it 'the general meaning of dialogue and
metaphorically ability and smartness in debating' (loc. cit.) or 'the
cleverness of arguing in dialogue' (op. cit., p. 53). W e would agree
with Faddegon that vkovkyam could not have meant 'the elements
of reasoning' at SB. 11.5.7.5 but the case is different with its latest use at
Ch. 7.2.1, etc., after the institution of the brahmodya, as we have seen
(v. supra, 46-50) underwent many changes. As for Faddegon's other
argument discrediting almost the entirety of Sankara's interpretations
of this passage on the grounds that they are anachronisms, we would
like to point out that Sankara's exposition on the whole is corroborated
by what the Pli Nikyas attribute to the brahmins as the arts and
sciences studied by them. In fact, this independently supports the
Chndogya list itself by showing that it does not contain later inter
polations. It shows that the catalogue of sciences in the Chndogya
as well as Sankara's comments on the whole are to be trusted as giving
a fair sample of Brhmanic learning at least at the time of the Pli
Nikyas. W e may do this in the form of a table giving the Chndogya
catalogue, Sankara's comment, the word in the Pli Nikyas which is
the equivalent either of the Chndogya catalogue or Sankara's com
ment. W e have indicated in brackets the equivalents found only in a
Pli Corny.:
Chndogya list
1. tharvanam
caturtham
2. itihsapurnam
pancamam
3. vednm vedam
Sankara's
comment
bhratapancamnam
vykaranam
4. pitryam
sraddh-kalpau
5. rsi
6. daivam
7. nidhim
ganitam
utptajfinam
mahakldinidhiSstram
tarkasstram
8.
vkovkyam
Pli equivalent
thabbanam, Sn. 927
itihsapaficamnam
D . 1.88
veyykarana-,
D . 1.88 '
saddhe, D . I.97:
ketubha-, Sn. 1020
ganan, D . I . n
utptam, D . 1.8, v. 1
lokyatam=(vitandavaaa-sattnam,
D A . I.247) '
48
Chandogya list
9. ekyanam
Sankara's comment
nitisstram
Pali equivalent
(nitisattham, DA.
1-93)
sivavijj?, D. I.9
tevijj, Sn. 594
niruktam
rgyajuhsmkhya11.
syavidy
bhtavijj, D. 1.8
12. bhtavidy
bhtatantram
khattavijj, D. I.9
13. ksatravidy
dhanurvedam
nakkhattam, Sn. 927
14. naksatravidy
jyotisam
ahivijj, D. 1.8
15. sarpa (vidy)
grudam
16. devajanavidy
gandhayukti-nrtya- naccam gitam
vditam, D. 1.6
gita-vdya-silpa(54) We do not propose to scrutinize this list item by item, as it
would divert us from our present problem. But if we examine this list
as a whole, it would be noticed that five of the Pali items (1, 2, 12, 13,
14) are identical in word and meaning with the Chandogya list, while
one of them (15) is identical in meaning and one (10) doubtful. Of the
rest, no less than six Pali items (3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 16) are more or less
identical in language and sense with the comments of Sankara. This
lends authenticity to Sankara's comments in that it shows that these
sciences were cultivated by the brahmins at least during the time the
Pli Nikyas were composed, if not earlier and Sankara could therefore
not have been making arbitrary comments particularly with regard to
items 4, 5, 6, 11, 16, which have been questioned by Faddegon. All
this implies that when Sankara was commenting on vkovkya- as
tarkasstra- there is no reason to think that he was trying to find a place
for tarkasstra in this list, but that he was probably recording a genuine
tradition, particularly when we observe that the Buddhists have credited
the brahmins with making a study of what they in their poor opinion
of them have called the vitanda-sattha or the 'art of casuistry'.
The fact that when Pali commentaries came to be written Lokyataexclusively meant Materialism is perhaps an added reason why the
comment vitanda-sattha, quite independently of the corroboration from
Brhmanic sources is to be considered as preserving a genuine tradition.
devavidy
brahmavidy
10.
(55) The etymology of the word lokyata- however, does not even
remotely suggest any connection with logic or casuistry. On the other
hand, all the explanations of the etymology of the term by scholars1
1
The Historical
Background
49
2
SBB., Vol. II, pp. 166-72.
Op. cit., p . 166.
E.g. Chattopadhyaya uncritically quotes Prof. Rhys Davids to show that
the early brahmins studied lokyata- in the sense of Materialism (v. op. cit.,
p. 32) and says, 'Evidences like these perhaps indicate that we are in need of
revising our notion of the Brhmana, particularly of the Brhmana of Buddhist
India' (op. cit., p . 33). CA Sketch of Indian Materialism', P I P C , 1925, p. 40.
4
'A Sketch of Indian Materialism', P I P C , 1925, p . 40.
3
50
Lokayatika- is not even mentioned in the Volume of Indexes (A. VI) of the
Anguttara Nikya.
2
Evam ettha sabbam atthi, sabbam ekattan ti im dve pi sassata-ditthiyo, SA.,
11,76.
3
Sabbam natthi, sabbam puthuttan ti im dve uccheda-ditthiyo, ibid,
51
vkovkya- (v. supra, 47), which was originally a dialogue and later a
debate (dialectics) in which one tried to outstrip the other by argu
ments, designed to disprove one's opponent's thesis and prove his
own. The other main deduction that we can make from the above
passage is based on the commentarial identification of the second and
the fourth views as those of the Materialists. This suggestion is con
firmed by the fact that there is evidence of the existence at this time
of these two schools of Materialists referred to, the pluralist school
(or schools, v. infra, 115) and the nihilist pragmatic school, which we
have argued was the school to which Dighanakha belonged (v. infra,
334) and which adumbrates the later philosophy of Jayarsi (v. infra,
116). The fact that Lokyata is the term which later comes into cur
rency as a general term for these Materialist schools of thought also
supports this identification. If this is so, then the later use of the term
Lokyata to denote exclusively the Materialist doctrines is a one-sided
application and development of a term, which had a wider coverage
earlier, denoting as we see not only the Materialist doctrines but their
anti-theses, the Eternalist doctrines as well. In fact, it may be noted
that according to this passage the oldest lokyata is not the Materialist
doctrine but the eternalist doctrine.
(60) In the Anguttara context too, 'two lokyata brahmins' (dve
lokyatik brhman), loc. cit., meet the Buddha to discuss the problem
of the extent of the cosmos (loka-). They say that Prana Kassapa and
Nigantha Ntaputta are 'directly opposed to each other' (annamafinam
vipaccanikavdnam, M. I.429) in regard to the views that they hold
about the extent of the universe, one holding that 'the universe is
finite' (antavantam lokam, loc. cit.) and the other that 'the universe is
infinite' (anantam lokam, loc. cit.). It is possible that these two theses
constituted a pair of lokyata-doctrines, in which case loka- is here
used in the sense of the 'cosmos' (v. infra, 65), and lokyata would
mean 'what relates to the cosmos' or the problems of the nature and
extent of the cosmos, studied as debating topics and based on reasoning.
(61) The Lahkvatra Stra1 also records an encounter between the
Buddha and a lokyatik brahmin. This gives a long list of lokyatadoctrines and although it is less reliable than the Nikya passages with
regard to what it tells us about Brhmanical doctrines, we can never
theless glean some information. This passage too has been ignored by
scholars in discussing the meaning of lokyata- and Suzuki has
1
52
The Historical
Background
53
54
The Historical
Background
55
56
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
ar^ya-samyoga-ncz/zarvcz-samavaya-visaradah,1
Sabhparva, 5.2-3.
This verse may very well reflect a time when the Nyya or logical
studies were accepted by orthodoxy and admitted into the rank of
Vedic studies but in the light of the above evidence from the Buddhist
Nikyas, confirmed and corroborated by the Brhmanic literature, we
have to presuppose that there was a period when the study of lokyata
or the 'elements of metaphysics and reasoning' formed a part of Vedic
studies. However, a time seems to have come when some of the lok
yata-theses propounded in the process, were seen to oppose or under
mine the fundamental doctrines of the Vedic tradition and it no longer
seemed desirable for orthodoxy to allow brahmins the free exercise of
reason and speculation. Thus the rule was laid down that 'the brahmin
who despises the roots (of Vedic tradition) because of his dependence
on the science of reasoning (hetu-sdstra-) should be cast out by the
good (brahmins) as a nihilist, who scorns the Vedas' (yo'vamanyeta
1
'The supreme sage who was revered by the gods, knew the Vedas and
Upanisads, the histories and Purnas, was a specialist in ancient rituals, was
versed in logic, the truths of justice and the six branches (of learning) and had an
expert knowledge of the (concepts of) monism, conjunction, pluralism and
inherence.*
The Historical
Background
57
te mle hetusstrsrayd dvijah sa sdhubhir bahiskryo nstiko
vedanindakah: Manusmrti I I . n ) . At this time Lokyata- as a branch
of study would have been taboo to the brahmin orthodoxy and the
word lokyata survived to denote those very doctrines, which were
opposed to Vedic teachings but which were once nurtured within the
orthodox fold itself.
(66) This sense of lokyata- appears to be preserved in the Arthasstra,
where it is said to form part of anviksiki or 'philosophy', comprising
both metaphysics and logic: smkhyam yogo lokyatam anviksiki...
hetubhir anviksamn anviksiki lokasyopakaroti,1 i.e. Smkhya, Yoga
and Lokyata (constitute) philosophy . . . by investigating with
reasons it serves the world; the Corny, (modern) explains lokyata
here as 'the science of reasoning as taught by Brahma and Grgya*
(nyya-sstram Brahmagrgyoktam, Vol. I, p. 27). Anviksiki was
rendered by Jacobi as 'philosophic'.2 But Hacker in an article entitled
'Anviksiki'3 has questioned this translation on the ground that since
anviksiki according to Kautilya's own comment means 'examining by
reasons' and this is practised in all the sciences the term does not
exclusively mean 'philosophy'. Yet he too admits that 'anviksiki or
reasoning' is 'habitually applied to systems of philosophy because these
cultivate argument and logical thinking' (op. cit., p. 82) and his main
objection is that these terms are 'never synonymous with philosophy'
{Joe. cit.). It does not therefore disprove our contention that lokyata
in its earliest use meant the study of metaphysical topics along with
the reasoning involved, with the idea of gaining success in debate.
(67) The ways of knowing recognized at this time are, as Keith has
shown,4 stated in the Taittiriya ranyaka as pratyaksa (perception),
anumna (inference), smrti (scripture) and aitihya (tradition). Keith
1
58
thinks that this represents 'a late popular view',1 but the use of the
word smrti- to denote 'scripture' rather than the late word 'sruti',
the absence of the use of the word pramna and the general context of
the passage does not favour Keith's view.
(68) When we analyse the language of the Early Upanisads we find
the use of three or four verbal forms juxtaposed to signify the ways of
knowing accepted at the time. Thus at Ch. 7.24.1, 'pasyati . . . srnoti
. . . vijnti', seems to sum up the different ways of knowing things.
The root drs- is used in the Early Upanisads predominantly to denote
the 'seeing' of visual objects with the eye (caksus rupni pasyati, Brh.
3.2.5). In this sense it is found very frequently either singly2 or in
lists where visual sensing or perception is contrasted with other forms
of sensing or sensory perception.3 These lists do not however mention
all the five senses. Brh. 2.4.14 mentions smelling (jighrati), seeing and
hearing, while Brh. 4.5.15 refers to seeing, smelling, tasting (rasayati)
and hearing and Brh. 4.3.31 and 4.4.2 add touching (sprsati) to the
list, making five in all. When the verbal forms of -v/drs- are used
without mention of the other forms of sensing or sensory perception,
it seems to denote not just visual sensing or perception but perception
in general. Thus, seeing (drstih) is used to denote perception in general
where it is defined that seeing in this instance consists in perceiving
the warmth of the body by touch (Ch. 3.13.8). The fact that the forms
of y'drs- were used predominantly to denote visual perception is
undoubtedly due to the simple fact that perhaps the largest number of
our perceptions are visual perceptions so that the word for visual
perception is gradually extended to denote perception in general.
(69) Yet auditory perception was precluded from being denoted by
\/drs- since the verbal forms of -y/sru had to be used side by side in
contexts, where ways of knowing were referred to, because of the
tremendous importance traditionally attached to hearing at this time.
This importance is due undoubtedly to the respect and reverence in
which the sacred scriptures were held and these scriptures could not
be seen4 but had to be learnt by hearing them from one's teacher. The
veneration in which hearing and learning from teachers was held is
clearly seen from one of the earliest references in the Upanisads. It is
1
59
said that the eye is one's human wealth for one finds it with the eye,
but that the ear is his 'divine wealth' (srotram daivam) for he hears it
with his ear (Brh. 1.4.17). Here the divine wealth referred to is un
doubtedly the sacred scriptures and the use of the epithet 'divine' to
describe what is heard as opposed to what is seen is indicative of the
authority attached to the former. It is important, however, to notice
that even in the Early Upanisads when it came to a matter of deciding
between the evidence of seeing and the testimony of report or hearing
about matters of fact in the everyday world, the decision was made in
favour of sight against hearing as being the more reliable. It is said:
'Truth is sight. Therefore if two persons come disputing, one saying
"I saw" and the other "I heard" they should trust the one who says
"I saw" (caksur vai satyam,... tasmd yad idnim dvau vivadamnau
eytm aham adarsam, aham asrausam iti. Ya evam bryt, aham
adarsam iti tasm eva sraddadhyma, Brh. 5.14.4)/ We find this idea
persisting later in the Maitri Upanisad, where it is said that 'here the
evidence is what is observed (by the senses)' (atra drstam nma pratyayam, 6.10). This is possibly the reason why the Taittiriya ranyaka
distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge obtained from hearing,
namely what is authoritatively heard and remembered (smrti), that is
the sacred scriptures and what is learnt from report or tradition
(aitihya) with regard to other matters, a distinction which led to the
necessity to separate divinely revealed scripture (sruti) from fallible
human tradition (smrti).
(70) In addition to perception or hearing (or learning) there is mention
of thinking (\^rmt); vi + Vf; ni -f V^hy) as a means of know
ledge at this time. The verbal forms used cover the rational reflective
sources of knowledge, which the Taittiriya ranyaka appears to indi
cate by the word anumna, i.e. reasoning, or inference. The thinking
process is sometimes described by the single word vijnti but at
other times a distinction appears to be drawn between the two cognitive
processes of mental conceiving and rational understanding, a dis
tinction which is not very clear. We may list the references to ways of
knowledge as reflected in the language of this period as follows:
Text
seeing or
hearing or
perceiving learning
Brh. 2.45> drastavyah srotavyah
4-5-6
mentally
conceiving
mantavyah
rationally
understanding
nididhysitavyah
6o
Text
seeing or
perceiving
Brh. 3.4.2 pasyeh
Ch. 3.13.8 drstih
Ch. 6.1.3
Ch. 7.25.2 pasyan
Ch. 7.26.1 pasyatah
hearing or
learning
srnuyh
srutih
srutam
mentally
conceiving
manvithh
rationally
understanding
vijniyh
matam
manvnah
manvnasya
vijntam
vijnan
vijnatah
61
are the same as the concepts occurring in the Upanisadic list. Likewise,
in the Suttanipta we find that the forms, 'dittha-, suta-, muta-' often
used to denote the corresponding ways of knowing in the Upanisads
(v. Sn. 793, 798> 8o2> 8l3> 9 01 )(73) While perception, scripture, and reasoning were regarded as the
usual ways of knowing in this period, we find that the verbal forms
from -v/drs- acquire a new meaning (other than that of sense-percep
tion) in the Middle and Late Upanisads. The tman now has to be
directly seen but this cannot be done by means of perception1 (v.
prptum sakyo na caksus, i.e. one cannot attain it with the eye,
Katha, 2.3.12 cp. Katha, 2.3.9, n a caksus pasyati kascanainam, i.e.
no one sees it with the eye). Nor can it be had from the sacred
scriptures (nyam tm pravacanena labhyo, i.e. this soul is not to be
attained by means of scriptural instruction, Katha, 1.2.23). 'Manifold
instruction' is of no avail (na bahun srutena, Katha 1.2.23 Mund.
3.2.3). The mention of manifold instruction (srutena) as distinguished
from scripture (pravacanena) is probably a reference to the diverse
metaphysical theories about the tman in the Early Upanisads. 'Nor
is this apprehension attainable by reasoning9 (nais tarkena matir
paney, Katha, 1.2.9). The tman is 'not to be reasoned about'
(atarkyah, Mait. 6.17, cp. Katha, 1.2.8, aniyn hy atarkyam anupramnt, i.e. for it is inconceivable being subtler than the subtle): it
'cannot be had by the intellect9 (labhyo na medhay, Katha, 1.2.23 =
Mund. 3.2.3). The traditional ways of knowing hitherto accepted are
discarded as far as the knowledge of the tman goes and 'seeing'
acquires the new connotation of extrasensory perception. Thus the
tman which is hidden within all things and does not shine forth is
seen {drsyate) by the subtle seers by their subtle awakened intuition
(drsyate tvagryay buddhy suksmay suksmadarsibhih, Katha,
1.3.12). One sees (pasyate) while in meditative rapture (dhyyamnah)
by the purification of knowledge (jnna-prasdena) and not by any
of the sense-organs (Mund. 3.1.8). As the Svetsvatara puts it, one
would see (pasyet) God hidden as it were by practising the drill of
meditation (dhyna) (1.4). Here was a new way of knowing, un
recognized in the earlier tradition, acquired by means of meditation
(dhyna = P. jhna) though the vision or revelation itself was said
1
Cp. 'He is not grasped by the eye . . . nor by the other sense-organs9 (na
caksus grhyate . . . nnyair devaih, Katha, 3.1.8).
62
to be due to the grace of tman or God.1 Thus by the time of the Middle
or Late Upanisads the following ways of knowing appear to have been
recognized, viz. (i) normal perception, (2) extrasensory perception,
(3) scriptural or traditional authority and (4) reason.
(74) The word that is most frequently or almost invariably used to
denote the knowledge derived from this means of extrasensory
perception is jhna. Thus it is said that the tman is obtained 'by right
knowledge' (samyag-jfinena, Mund. 3.15) or by the 'peace of know
ledge' (jnna-prasdena, Mund. 3.1.8) and those who obtain it are
'satisfied with their knowledge' (jfina-trpth, Mund. 3.2.5). This
tman or God as 'knower' is jfiah (Svet. 6.2, 16, 17) and knowing God
or having the right knowledge is denoted by verbal forms of Vjn
(jntv, Katha 1.2.16; 17; 2.3.8; Svet. 1.11,2.16, 3.10; jntum, Katha
1.2.21). But the word jfina is not entirely confined to this usage for
at Katha 2.3.10 it is used in the plural to mean the 'knowledge of the
five senses' (yad pancvatisthante jnnni manas saha, when the
five sense knowledges together with the mind cease). Likewise other
cognitive verbs are at times employed to denote the above sense but
their occurrence is sporadic and very rare: e.g. matv (Katha 1.2.22),
matih (Katha 1.2.9), viditv (Katha 2.1.2), viduh (Katha 2.3.9),
vidym (Katha 2.3.18) and veda (Svet. 3.8).
(75) Although the contemplatives claimed a direct experience of
reality totally different in character from any kind of metaphysical
insight, it must be said that their description of these experiences is
not without interpretation and is bound up with a good deal of meta
physics and theology. A knowledge of the Vedas was in theory no
more necessary than it was in the earlier metaphysical phase.2 But
tradition could not be entirely done away with and particularly at a
1
There is a doubt whether dhtuh prasdt ought to be translated as 'through
the grace of the Creator', since Sankara interprets the phrase as 'dhtusamprasdt', i.e. through the tranquillity of the senses, an interpretation which is sup
ported by usage in this stratum of thought as Hume has shown (pp. cit.} p. 350,
fn. 1). But this does not alter the fact that it is to be conceived as a revelation as
well, since it is expressly stated that the tman reveals himself (Katha 1.2.23;
Mund 3.2.3.).
2
In this phase it said, for instance, that Janaka has no metaphysical knowledge
of what happens to him after death although he has 'mastered the Vedas' (adhitavedah, Brh. 4.2.1); Svetaketu runeya returns proud and conceited 'after studying
all the Vedas* (sarvn vedn adhitya (Ch. 6.1.2) but without knowing the nature
of reality (Joe. cit.).
The Historical
Background
6y
64
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
'the sage does not say that they are "experts" by virtue of their (meta
physical) beliefs, scriptural learning and intuitional knowledge' (na
ditthiy, na sutiy, na nnena, m u n i . . . kusal vadanti, Sn. 1078).
(77) During the close of this period we find in the Maitri Upanisad
the use of the word pramna (a valid means of knowledge) in a tech
nical sense and a growing realization that our claims to knowledge
must be backed up by their being made on valid grounds. W e talk
about time but how do we know that such a thing called time exists,
This Upanisad suggests that we measure or know time from observing
the movements of the sun across the constellations. It is said: 'Because
of its subtlety this (course of the sun) is the proof 'for only in this way
is time proved (to exist)' (sauksmyatvd etat pramnam anenaiva
pramiyate hi klah, 6.14). This is followed by the significant statement
that 'without a valid means of knowledge there is no apprehension of
objects (lit. of what is to be proved)' (na vin pramnena prameyasyopalabdhih, loc. cit.). T h e importance attached to the study of the
pramnas or the valid means of knowledge (the central problem of
epistemology) in Indian thought may be gauged by the fact that every
school of thought, orthodox or heterodox had its theory of pramnas.
W h e n the Greeks (Strabo) referred to Indian philosophers as the
'prmnik', 1 it is not clear whether this was a reference to all the
Indian philosophers at the time (of whom they were aware of), who
claimed to base their theories on valid means of knowledge or a class
of 'epistemologists', who made a study of the valid means of know
ledge; in any case it shows the importance of pramnas for Indian
thinkers at this time, as confirmed by the reference in the Maitri
Upanisad. There is also a reference to pamnik in the Anguttara
Nikya and since this is not far removed in time from the Maitri
Upanisad and the Greek reference, we may translate the term pamnik
as 'epistemologists' since it fits the context: 'In this matter the epistemologists 2 (?) argue thus; this person and the other have identically
1
They are described as a class of brahmins 'contentious and fond of argument'
called the Pramnai; v. J. W . M'Crindle, Ancient India, p. 76. Cp. The Cambridge
History of India, Vol. I, p. 421, where E. R. Bevan, the author of the article says,
'The people intended were undoubtedly the prmnikas, the followers of the
various philosophical systems, each of which has its own view as to what con
stitutes pramna a "means of right knowledge".'
2
The Corny, has 'those who form judgments with regard to individuals,
judge, i.e. ought to weigh and consider' (puggalesu pamna-gh paminanti,
pametum tuletum arahanti, AA. V.53). The P T S . translation reads, 'those who
measure thus measure . . .' (G.S. V. 98).
65
the same traits, why then is one of them (considered) inferior and the
other superior' (Tatra . . . pamnik paminanti: 'imasspi teVa
dhamm aparasspi teVa dhamm, kasm nesam eko hino eko panito
ti' (A. V.140). The context indicates that pamnik here are a class of
people who judge the truth-value of a statement in the light of evi
dence and is therefore strongly suggestive o the sense we have given
to it.
(78) In the above discussion we have assumed that Upanisadic
thought was known to Buddhism and has had an impact on it. The
problem of the relation between the Upanisads and Buddhism deserves
to be reviewed in respect of three questions, (1) the question as to
whether there was any contact between Buddhism and the Upanisads,
(2) if there was contact at what point (chronological) did it occur,
and (3) the question whether Buddhist thought can be considered as
a continuation of or a reaction against the main trends of Upanisadic
thought. We shall, of course, not attempt to answer any of these
questions here, but it is necessary to state that with regard to the first
question, we assume contra Thomas 1 that there was contact and the
knowledge that Buddhism shows of Upanisadic thought would we
believe justify our assumption. With regard to the second question
we find that while many scholars are inclined to place the rise of
Buddhism close to the period of the Katha Upanisad2 others prefer a
date long after even the Late Upanisads (e.g. Maitri) had been com
pleted.3 We would prefer to date the rise of Buddhism somewhat
before the Maitri Upanisad, which we believe refers to a rising Buddhist
movement.
(79) Hume, while stating that 'the usual date that is thus assigned to
the Upanishads is around 600 BC just prior to the rise of Buddhism',4
1
66
2
Op. cit., pp. 6, 7.
Op. cit., p. 70.
67
68
the Buddhist text speaks of three kosa-s, the Maitri has the concept of
a four-fold kosa- (caturjalam brahmakosam, loc. cit.).
(81) We may conclude from the above that the rise of Buddhism is
not far removed in time from, though it is prior to, the Maitri Upani*
sad.
CHAPTER II
2
History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 230.
Lokyata, p. 45.
A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. Ill, p. 528.
4
Note his materialist conception of the mind (manas), which is formed of the
finest essence of food (anna-) (Ch. 6.6.1).
3
70
The Historical
Background
71
of such arguments as 'beings are like tree-leaves (or trees and leaves),
which when they fall, do not grow up again'.1
(87) If Materialism grew up as a product of the incipient rational
temper of this period, it is not surprising that references to this doc
trine should be found by the time of the Katha Upanisad, which
mentions a class of people who hold 'this is the world, there is no
other'2 and deny survival.3 Later, in the Svetsvatara Upanisad, it had
to be reckoned among the theories current at that time, for here
reference is made to several speculative theories about the nature of
reality and one of them is the 'doctrine of elements' (bhtni, 1.2).
This may be identified either with the Materialist theory in the Buddhist
texts, which upheld the reality of the four elements, viz. earth, water,
fire and wind (ctummahbhta-),4 or the Materialist doctrine men
tioned in the Jain texts, which held that the five elements (pancamahabbhy, S. 2.1.10), viz. earth, water, fire, wind and air were alone
real and that all things were composed of them.
(88) Since we are concerned only with the epistemological theories
propounded and the nature of the arguments adduced in support of
their doctrines by the Materialists contemporary with the rise of
Buddhism, we shall confine ourselves to these aspects of their doctrines.
It is, however, difficult to determine with any degree of exactness what
portion or proportion of these doctrines could have been contemporary
with this period, since most of the informative accounts that we have
of the Materialists are of a later date. We would therefore adopt the
method of stating those doctrines, which we suspect have a bearing,
direct or indirect, on the thought of this period, even when the form
in which they are stated is comparatively late and then endeavour in
the light of the material available from the Early Jain and Buddhist
sources to sift what may be early from the late.
(89) When we consider the epistemological theories of the various
schools of Materialists, we find that with regard to the opinions and
theories held on the problem of the means of knowledge, it is possible
to classify them into three groups, viz. (1) those who upheld the
1
Yath rukkhapannni patitni na puna virhanti, evam satt ti din
takkena v ucchedam ganhanti, D A . I.120.
2
ayam loko nsti para iti mni, 1.2.6.
3
yeyam prete vicikits manusye 'stityeke nyamastiti caike, 1.1.20.
4
Cp. att rpi ctummahbhtiko, D . I.34; ctummahbhtiko* yam puriso,
* L55.
72
The Historical
Background
73
C*
74
even if it is not clear whether they did hold that it was the only means
of knowledge. It is not possible to ascertain whether the metaphysics
of materialism preceded its epistemology or vice versa but there is
undoubtedly an intimate connection between them. Silnka, the ninthcentury 1 commentator on the Strakrtnga, seems to think that the
denial of the unverifiables on the part of the Materialist is based on
their epistemology and results from the acceptance of perception alone
as the only means of knowledge. Speaking of the Materialists he says,
'they argue (pramnayanti) as follows: there is no soul apart from the
(material elements such as) earth, etc., because there is no means of
knowledge to apprehend it and the only means of knowledge is percep
tion and not inference or the rest since with the latter there is no direct
sense-contact with the object and error results; as a result of error and
owing to the presence of obstacles they (i.e. these means of knowledge)
would be of a defective nature and one cannot have confidence in any
of them; it has been said that "one who runs on uneven ground groping
his way about {lit. trusting on his hands, feet, etc.) depending largely
on inference is bound to fall"this is the characteristic of inference,
scripture and the rest (of the means of knowledge) for (with them) one
has to move as it were by groping one's way because there is no direct
contact with objects; therefore, perception is the only means of knowledge
(pratyaksamevaikam pramnam) and by means of it one cannot apprehend
a soul different from the elements and as for the consciousness (caitanyam)
found in their midst, it manifests itself only when the elements
come together in the form of a body like the intoxicating power when
the ingredients are mixed'. 2 This passage tells us why the Materialists
relied only on perception and how their philosophical beliefs depend
on this. Perception is the only valid means of knowledge since the
others are liable to error, as there is no direct sense-contact with the
object in their case; therefore, there cannot be a self-identical soul since
1
75
one cannot perceive it. This shows that their metaphysical beliefs had
an epistemological basis according to this account of Silnka. It may be
seen that from the earliest times the more sceptical minded were
inclined to doubt or deny the existence of what they did not see. Much
of Rgvedic scepticism was based on this principle (v. supra, 7). It
would therefore not be implausible to suggest that the birth of the
Materialist philosophy in India may have taken place when the
principle that what one does not see does not exist, was more or less
systematically worked out.1
(92) Whatever the views held by the Materialists contemporary with
or prior to Early Buddhism, there is every reason to believe that group
(1) taken as a whole denied the validity of inference altogether. This is
evident from the accounts given of the Materialist criticisms of
inference in Santaraksita's Tattvasamgraha (1457-9), Kamalasila's
Panjik (ibid.), Jayanta'sNyyamanjari2 and the Sarvadarsanasamgraha
(Ch. I). In this respect group (2) is in agreement with group (3), which
also criticizes anumna (inference). A fairly adequate account of these
group (1) criticisms of inference have been given by Das Gupta3 and
Jadunath Sinha4 and we do not propose to repeat this here. A brief
account of the group (1) criticisms of inference as taught in the Nyya
school is given by Radhakrishnan and Moore5 although the criticisms
of Jayarsi Bhatta are specifically directed against the conceptions of
inference found both in the schools of the Nyya as well as the Budd
hists (y. infra, 105, 106). Of these accounts, Jayarsi's criticisms are the
most specific and elaborate while the simplest and the most general
account appears to be that given in the Sarvadarsanasamgraha. The
gist of the argument here is that inference cannot be shown to be a
valid mode of knowledge unless it can be proved that there are good
grounds for knowing the truth of universal propositions (vypti) as
well as their necessity. Now universal propositions or universals cannot
be known by perception, for perception whether external or internal
(i.e. introspection) is of particulars, with which we are acquainted
through sense-experience or introspection. They cannot be claimed to
be known through inference for this would lead to infinite regress. It
cannot be testimony for this is either a form of inference or implies
1
Cp. those who did not believe in gods or sacrifices in the Rgveda (RV. 8,
70.7, 71.8; 10.38.3); these contexts mention the 'godless man' (adevah).
2
Ed. Pandit S. S. Nryana Sukla, Benares, 1936, pp. 108, 109; v. anumnaprmnyksepah.
3
HIP. Vol. Ill, 533 ff- * H I R > V o L T> 2 3 5 ff- 5 P- ciu> PP- 236-46.
j6
1482-3, p. 41; v. Das Gupta, op. cit.y Vol. Ill, p. 536, fn. 2.
Tucci has shown that Purandara was a 'Crvka-mate granthakra* (an
author of a book on Materialism); v. 'A Sketch of Indian Materialism*, P I P C ,
1925, p. 36.
2
The Historical
Background
11
78
bhyodarSanagamy'pi na vyptir avakalpate sahasraso'pi taddrste vyabhicarvadhrant bhyo drstv ca dhmo'gnisahacntigamyatm anagnau tu sa
nstiti na bhyodarsandgatih, Nyyamafijari, p. 109.
2
A Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I, Part III, Section XIV. Cp. p. 169. 'If
we define a cause to be an object precedent and contiguous to one another and
where all the objects resembling the former are placed in a like relation of priority
and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter; we may easily conceive
that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of
existence should be attended with such an object/
3
Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, pp. 44 ff.
4
Basham speaks of 'the positivism of Ajita' {pp. cit., p. 271) but he does not
clarify his usage. Warder (v. infra, 97) uses the term of group (3) but as we have
shown this is quite unjustifiable.
The Historical
Background
79
unseen (adrsta), etc.' The fact that Vdideva Sri and Gunaratna are
Jains and the other reference was in a Buddhist work shows that at
least the Buddhist and Jain tradition was well aware of the existence of
this school. When we consider this in the light of what we know of the
Materialists from the Early Buddhist and Jain sources it seems probable
that these early Materialists or at least one school among them believed
in the validity of both perception and inference while giving priority
to perception and restricting inference within the limits of the verifiable.
(95) The third group of Materialists, as classified according to their
epistemological theories, is represented by Jayarsi Bhatta's Tattvo
paplavasimha, which is the only extant authentic text of the Materialists
(lokyata). Although this work was published in 1940, very few
scholars seem to have taken note of it. Ruben ^I954),2 Jadunath Sinha
(1956)3 and Sharma (i960) 4 make no reference to it in discussing the
philosophy of the Materialists and Chattopdhyya (1959), who
professes to make a specialized study of lokyata-,5 begins his book by
lamenting the lack of any treatise of this school.
(96) The Tattvopaplavasimha refers to another work of the same
school, the Laksanasra (p. 20) or the 'Essence of Definition (?)',
which may be his own work since after criticizing two of the charac
teristics of perception (avyabhicri, vyavasytmakam) according to
the Nyya definition (N.S. 1.1.4) he refers the reader to the above
work for the criticism of the other characteristic (avyapadesyam). As
the editors have pointed out (pp. iii, iv), the reference in Sri Harsa's
Khandanakhandakhdya to a school of the Lokyatas, which like the
Mdhyamika school of Buddhism and the school of Sankara is said
to have denied the validity of all means of knowledge (pramnas) is
most probably a reference to this school.
1
P. 306, hi sabdo'tra visesanrtho vartate, visesah punas Crvkairlokaytrnirvahanapravanam dhmdyanumnam isyate kvacana, na punah svargdrstdiprasdhakam alaukikam anumnam iti.
2
Op. cit.j however, he has more recently written an article on this subject
entitled, 'ber den Tattvopaplavasimha des Jayarsi Bhatta eine Agnostizistische
Erkenntniskritik , appearing in, 'Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Sd-und
Ostasiens und Archiv fr indische Philosophie, Band IF, 1958, pp. 140-53.
3
Op. cit.
* C. D . Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, London, i960.
5
Op. cit., p. 6, '. . . in the ocean of uncertainty concerning the lost Lokayata
the only piece of definite information is that we are left with no original work
on it\
8o
(97) The interest of this school for us lies in the fact that it seems to
throw some light on a school of thought mentioned in the Nikyas,
which represented a standpoint of absolute nihilism or logical scepti
cism in rejecting all views but which at the same time has been called
an 'annihilationist' (ucchedavda-) or Materialist school (v. infra, 335).
It also appears to explain a certain usage (v. infra, 116) of a phrase
attributed to the early Materialists which would otherwise be inexplic
able. Warder has seen in this branch of Lokyata philosophers 'not
materialists but positivists according to modern ideas' (op. cit.y p. 52)
and says that 'we may perhaps connect Jayarsi Bhatta's theory with
Sanjaya Belatthiputta in the Smannaphala Sutta, which, however, is
stated as merely agnostic or sceptic without positivist content' (ibid.,
p. 53). He calls Jayarsi Bhatta 'a positivist' (ibid.) and this branch of
Lokyata as 'the positivist branch' (ibid.) which rejected perception
whereas the 'ordinary Lokyata as described in the Tattvasamgraha
and elsewhere allows perception as the only means of cognition' (ibid.).
He adds that this 'positivist trend may have been a later development
in the Lokyata-Crvka school rather than an early rival branch of
Brhaspatya' (ibid.). The editors of this text have also expressed the
view that this work 'carries to its logical end the sceptical tendency of
the Crvka school' (p. i) and have raised the question as to whether
the author of this work is a mere sophist who has no views of his own,
although they themselves do not think so (p. xiii).
(98) We may state at the outset that we do not agree with Warder's
assessment of this philosophy as positivism and our objection is not
that he is, as he says at the end of his paper, applying 'modern philoso
phical terms' to 'ancient doctrines' (v. op. cit., p. 62). Nor can we see
much of a connection between this philosophy and the views expressed
by the sceptic Sanjaya. And since this early school of absolute nihilists
or logical sceptics, who have also been called materialists, seems to
contain the basic concepts of this philosophy we are more inclined to
entertain the possibility that the germinal ideas or the roots of this
school go back to the period of the Pli Nikyas and that this school
was possibly an early rival branch of the other school which at that time
accepted at least the validity of perception if not of inference as well.
(99) Since this work has been untranslated1 and largely ignored since
its publication it seems desirable to give a brief account of its nature
1
Except for a brief extract of the criticism of anumna in the Nyya school,
given in Radhakrishnan and Moore (op. cit., pp. 236-46).
The Historical
Background
81
and contents before we form any conclusions about it. The work
claims to be, as the editors have shown (pp. xi, xii) a text of the
Lokyata school. The author quotes Brhaspati who is sometimes
mentioned by name with great respect (pp. 45, 88) and is once called
the Strakra- (p. 79). In the second paragraph of his work he cites
the proposition 'earth, water, fire, air are the real elements (tattvni);
by their combination (arise) the body, the senses, objects and con
sciousness'1 which Gunaratna in his Tarkarahasyadipik quotes2 as the
statement of Vcaspati (=Brhaspati). He also quotes with approval
the sayings 'the worldly path should be followed . . . fools and the
wise are alike in the eyes of the world' 3 which he attributes to the
wisest of men (paramrthavidbhih).
(100) And now begins the problem. He speaks of the tattvas (four
elements) of the Lokyata, but shows that we have no grounds for
affirming that they are real. He uses an epistemological argument:
'We can talk of a means of knowledge (mna) only if it is valid
(sallaksananibandhanam mnavyavasthnam, lit. the determination of
a means of knowledge depends on its having the characteristic of
existence) and the proof of the (existence of the) objects of knowledge
(meyasthitih) depends on the means of knowledge but if there is no
means of knowledge (tadabhve) how can we speak of the real existence
of both (objects as well as means of knowledge)'.4 This is not claimed
to be a disproof of Brhaspati's proposition (quoted above) for it is
said that in asserting that earth, etc., were tattvas he was indirectly
referring to (pratibimbanrtham, lit. reflecting) the fact that if even
what is widely accepted as real does not bear critical examination
(vicryamnni na vyatisthante), then what of other things (kim
punar anyni). But this is surely a departure from the materialist thesis,
for how can a person who does not believe in the objective existence
1
82
The Historical
Background
83
84
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
85
impression that the author thought that if perception, which was
universally accepted and that even by some of the Materialist schools,
was demolished, it goes without saying that no means of knowledge
could be valid.
(106) His technique of argument is throughout the same and his
criticisms are almost invariably directed against some specific theory.
We may illustrate this by taking a few passages. In criticizing the
Buddhist theory of perception, he takes up the definition of perception
in the Nyyabindu (1.4), viz. 'perception is free of construction
(kalpan' podham) and is incorrigible (abhrantam)'.1 He argues as
follows: 'One should not say this since the sense of "free" (apoh)
in the phrase "free of construction'' is not to be found. Then is kalpan
itself to be excluded (apohy)? What is kalpan? Is the consciousness
that arises with qualifications of quality, motion, species, etc., kalpan,
or is kalpan the consciousness that produces memory or is it of the
nature of memory, or does it arise from memory, or is it a reflection
of the contact with speech, or is it the apprehension of speech, or is it
of an unclear nature, or has it the nature of apprehending unreal objects,
or is it itself unreal or is it the seeing of objects accompanied by
inference (trirpllinga-2 gato'rthadrs), or is it a reflection of objects
past or future?'3
1
86
The Historical
Background
87
88
to the results of observation. More recently, the term has been used of
the philosophy of the Logical Positivists1 (the Vienna Circle, Witt
genstein of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ayer of Language,
Truth and Logic) who while rejecting metaphysics have broken away
from the narrow empiricism and psychological atomism of positivists
like Mach and Hume and have endeavoured to base their positivism on
logical foundations.2 The term is also sometimes loosely employed to
refer to the modern Analytical Philosophers, who are really the succes
sors of Russell and Moore. None of these positivisits have attempted
to disprove the validity of perception and inference by metaphysical
arguments as Jayarsi does. On the contrary, they have been anxious
to preserve the validity of perception and inference as recognized
methods of knowing in the natural sciences, although they have tried
to rid these concepts of speculative assumptions and linguistic con
fusions. The only point of comparison that we can see is that like
Jayarsi the modern positivist will also say that there are no ultimate
'tattvas' in a metaphysical sense, but the latter would not try to deny
or disprove their existence and would merely hold that assertions
about such super-sensuous realities are strictly meaningless. We cannot
therefore agree with Warder's description of Jayarsi's school as
'positivists according to modern ideas'.
( i n ) The anxiety on the part of the positivist to save science and
eliminate metaphysics led him to formulate the Verification Principle,
the acceptance of which almost became some time ago the hallmark of
a positivist. When we observe that the second group of Materialists
(group (2)) did almost the same for similar reasons in trying to dis
tinguish between empirical or verifiable inference and unverifiable or
metaphysical inference (supra, 94), it is this school which best deserves
to be called the positivist school in Indian thought.
(112) Nor can we see the connection that Warder sees between
Jayarsi's theory and the thought of Safijaya. The most we can say is
that if Jayarasi's denial of knowledge led him to scepticism rather than
to nihilism, as it ought to have, then we may have argued that it was
possibly similar to the grounds on which Safijaya accepted scepticism,
though we have no evidence whatsoever as regards the basis of the
latter's Scepticism. All that we do know was that Safijaya was a Sceptic,
1
v. Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, Ch. IV. Warnock uses the term
'positivism of the Logical Positivist (v. pp. 56, 58, 60).
2
v. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, pp. 136 ff.
89
90
theory that 'nothing exists' was either one of or was closely associated
with the Materialist theories at the time of the Pli Nikyas.
,
(115) If so, what could these two lokyata-materialist1 views, one
holding that 'nothing exists' and the other that 'everything is a
plurality', be? We may identify the second with that school of
Materialists who upheld the reality of the elements, which is represented by Ajita Kesakambali in the Nikyas who speaks of the existence
of at least the four elements, earth, water, fire and air (D. I.55) and
which appears to be similar to if not identical with the first school of
materialists2 propounding a theory called 'the-soul-is-the-same-as-thebody' theory (tajjivataccharira-) in the Strakrtnga (2.1.9=2.1.19,
SBE., Vol. 45, p. 342). According to Silnka's interpretation (y.
supra, 85) there is another school of Materialists mentioned in the
Strakrtnga at 2.1.10 (=2.1.21, 22, SBE., ibid.) which speaks of five
elements, including ether (ksa). If Silnka's identification is correct,
this latter theory clearly brings out the plurality and the reality of
elements, which are described as uncreated (animmiy, akad), eternal
(ssat) and independent substances (animmavit, no kittim, avafijh).
If the identity of the pluralist school with one of these schools is
correct, then the other lokyata theory, which denied the reality of all
things looks very much similar to the absolute nihilism of Jayarsi.
(116) Haribhadra in his Saddarsanasamuccaya speaks of the lokyatas3
(lokyath) being of the opinion that 'this world extends only as far as
what is amenable to sense-perception'.4 From this one may argue that
'lokyata-' means 'what pertains to this world' or the 'philosophy of
this-worldliness or materialism' as Chattopadhyaya has done.5 We
cannot agree that this was the original meaning of the word (v. supra,
65, 66) but there is no reason to doubt that at least one of the schools
of the Materialists believed in the reality of this world and it is signifi
cant that the Materialist theory referred to in the Katha Upanisad
(1.2.6) speaks of the existence of this world and the denial of the next,
ayam loko, nsti para iti, which is translated by Hume as 'This is the
world! There is no other!' (op. cit., p. 346) and by Radhakrishnan as
1
91
92
93
which recommends the utterance even of untruths for the sake of
political expediency but appears to be his own personal view. The
context is ethical and one can hardly draw epistemological or philoso
phical conclusions from it, especially since Vassakara's statement is
compatible with any philosophical standpoint, idealist, phenomenalist
or realist. The fact that Vassakra as an important Magadhan official
may have studied the Arthasstra and the Arthasstra gives a naive
realistic account of the world has, in our opinion, little to do with the
view expressed here.
(120) Whatever differences existed among the Materialists on epis
temological matters they seem to have all agreed in criticizing the
authority of the Vedas and the argument from authority. This probably
goes back to the earliest times. In fact, the original stimulus in the
genesis of the Materialist philosophy may have been provided by the
dissatisfaction with the Vedic tradition at a time when those who
would not still break with tradition found they could no longer agree
with the old traditional knowledge and sought to replace acceptance
of tradition and revelation with metaphysical inquiry. The statement
attributed to the Materialists in the Sarvadarsanasamgraha that 'the
impostors, who call themselves Vedic pundits are mutually destructive,
as the authority of the jnnaknda (section on knowledge) is over
thrown by those who maintain the authority of the karmaknda
(section on ritual), while those, who maintain the authority of the
jnnaknda reject that of the karmaknda', * may have a history that
goes back to the earliest phase of Materialism, though this particular
criticism itself would not have been possible at least before the termina
tion of the Early Upanisadic period for it was probably at this time
that the original Vedas as well the traditional lore including the
Upanisads (r. Brh. 2.4.10, 4.5.11) are said to have been breathed forth
by the Supreme Being.
(121) According to the Sarvadarsanasamgraha, the Materialists criti
cized the sruti or the revelational tradition as a valid means of know
ledge on the grounds that the Veda is 'invalidated by the defects of
falsity, contradiction and repetition' (anrtavyghtapunaruktadosairdsitatay, p. 4). When therefore the Nyya Stra very much earlier
says that '(according to some the Veda) is unreliable since it has the
defects of falsity, contradiction and repetition' (tadapramnyamanrtavyghtapunaruktadosebhyah, 2.1.58) using identical language it is
1
The Sarvadarsanasamgrahah,
94
sammditthi
natthikavdo, M. I.403
akiriyavdo, M. I.406
ahetuvdo, M. L408
atthikavdo, M. I.404
kiriyavdo, M. I.407
hetuvdo, M. I.409
The Historical
Background
95
96
(125) Now, it is said that 'the second kind of person is one who asserts
the existence of the five great elements' (docce purisaje pancamahabbhtietti, S. 2.1.10). This would appear to be a second school of
Materialists, asserting the reality of the five elements including ksa
(kse paficame mahabbhte, loc. cit.) if not for a qualification made
towards the middle of this passage and the fact that we were led from
the context to expect a different kind of philosophy. The Ardhamgadhi text reads as follows: pudhavi ege mahabbhte, ducce maha
bbhte . . . iccete pancamahabbhy animmiy . . . satant ssat
ayacchatth, puna ege evam hu- sato natthi vinso asato natthi
sambhavo (loc. cit.). The presence of the word yacchattha- seems to
mean that the person who held the reality of the five elements also
believed in the reality of the atrnan as a sixth element, in which case
this is not a Materialist philosophy at all and the passage may be
translated as follows: 'Earth is the first element, water the second
element thus these five elements are uncreated . . . independent and
eternal with tman as the sixth (element); further, some say that,
"there is no destruction of that which is and no origination of that
which is not". Jacobi translates differently following Silnka1 taking
"puna ege evam hu" with the previous sentence as follows: 'Earth
is the first element, water the second element. . . These five elements
are not created . . . are independent of directing cause or everything
else, they are eternal. Some say, however, that there is a self besides the
five elements. What is, does not perish; from nothing, nothing comes'
(SBE., Vol. 45, p. 343). This translation is permissible though it devi
ates from the form in which the text is printed, but it does not solve the
problem for it means that this passage is introducing not one but two
theories, one a Materialist theory and the other a Realist theory which
asserts the substantial existence of the soul as well. Silnka, as we pointed
out (v. supra, 85), interprets the two theories as the Lokyata (lokyatamata-) and the Snkhya respectively. He distinguishes this lokyata
from the former which he calls Tajjivatacchariravda2 following the
Strakrtnga though however he still considers this a species of
lokyata.3
1
Tadevambhtni pancamahabhtnytmasastni punareke evamhuh, op. cit.,
Vol. II, fol. 18 on S. 2.1.10.
2
Ayafica prathamo purusastajjlvatacchariravdl, op. cit., Vol. II, fol. 17 on
S. 2.1.9.
3
v. T e caivamvidhastajjivatacchariravdino lokyatikh, op. cit., Vol. II, fol.
16 on S. 2.1.9.
97
Hume makes good use of this premiss or principle (as he calls it) in a different
connection, v. op. cit., p. 35. What consists of parts is distinguishable into them
and what is distinguishable is separable. Cp. p. 32.
2
v. J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, London, 1943? PP- 69, 95> *973
Silnka mentions a school of Materialists who believed in ksa as the fifth
element even when he is commenting on the first school as follows: kesficillokyatiknmksasypi bhtattvenbhyupagamdbhtapancako'panyso na dosyeti, since some Materialists consider ether as an element the reference to five
elements is not wrong, op. cit., Vol. II, fol. 16 on S. 2.1.9.
D
98
Early
Buddhist
Theory
of
Knowledge
99
of the Vedic scriptures (v. supra, 121) but the claims to extrasensory
perception or higher intuition (abhinn) on the part of some of the
religious teachers of their times. This seems to be the significance of
Ajita's remark that * there are no well behaved recluses and brahmins
of good conduct, who can claim to know the existence of this world as
well as the next by realizing this themselves with their higher intuition'
(natthi loke samanabrhman sammaggat sammpatipann ye
iman ca lokam parafi ca lokam sayam abhinn sacchikatv pavedenti, loc. cit.).
(130) That empiricism was the keynote of their arguments is evident,
when we examine the few arguments of the first school of the Material
ists recorded in the Strakrtnga. One of the arguments is that you
cannot observe a soul separate from the body and therefore there is no
soul apart from the body. The inference is directly drawn from obser
vation and is inductive: 'As a man draws a sword from the scabbard
(kosi asim abhinivvattitta) and shows it saying, "this is the sword and
that is the scabbard" (ayam . . . asi ayam kosi), so nobody can draw
(the soul from the body) and show (it saying), "friend, this is the soul
and that is the body" (ayam . . . y iyam sariram). As a man draws a
fibre from the stalk of munja grass (rnuhi isiyam) and shows it saying,
"this is the stalk and that is the fibre" (ayam... munje iyam isiyam).. .\*
We have underlined these examples given to illustrate the fact that the
argument may have been suggested by what their opponents who held
that 'the soul was different from the body' 2 were claiming. For, in the
Katha Upanisad (2.3.17) it is stated that 'one should draw up from
one's own body the inner-tman (antartman) like a fibre from a stalk
of munja grass'3 (antartm . . . tarn svccharirt pravrhen munjdd
ivesikam). This was possibly the subjective experience of a Yogin. The
Buddhists while not committing themselves on this question as to
whether the body was identical with the soul or was different from it
since it is one of 'the things on which no definite view was expressed'
1
Se jahnmae kei purise kosi asim abhinivvattittnam uvadamsejj ayamso
asi ayam kosi, evam eva natthi kei purise abhinivvattittnam uvadamsettro,
ayamso y iyam sarirarn. Se jahnmae kei purise mufij isiyam abhinivvattitta
nam uvadamsejj, ayamso munje iyam isiyam . . . S. 2.1.9, Vol. 2, fol. 11.
2
anno jlvo annam sariram, ibid. Cp. afinam jivam annarn sariram, Ud. 67,
where it is a theory put forward and debated by some recluses and brahmins.
3
Radhakrishnan has mistranslated the phrase mufijdivesikam as 'the wind
from the reed' (PU., p. 647).
ioo
v. infra, 528-535.
The Historical
Background
IOI
102
Early
Buddhist
Theory
of
Knowledge
103
Vgarthvivasamprktau, i.e. united like the word and its object, Raghuvamsa,
2
v. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 309 fT.
3
aham sthlah krso'smi ti smndhikaranyatah, dehah sthaulydiyogc ca sa
evtm na cparah, Sarvadarsanasamgraha, by Syana-Mdhava, Ed. V. S.
Abhyankara, Second Edition, Poona, 1951, p. 7.
4
Mamadeho'yam ityuktih sambhaved aupacriki, op. cit., p. 7.
5
Mama sariram iti vyavahro rhoh sira itydivad aupacrikah, op. cit., p. 6.
6
Stebbing, op. cit., p. 105.
7
This is popularly known as reductio ad absurdum.
I.I.
104
In Indian logic this would fall under tarka (v. Nyya Stra, 1.1.40) i.e.
indirect proof or confutation. Here again the evidence is from the
Sarvadarsanasamgraha but the subject-matter appears to be early. The
arguments are sometimes stated in the form of rhetorical questions but
they can be easily converted into propositional form. We may illustrate
this by stating the arguments in propositional form and comparing
them with the actual form in which they are stated. Most of the argu
ments are against the validity of the sacrifice:
(i) If 'beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the srddha
here' (p), then 'food given below should gratify those standing on the
housetop' 1 (q), but q is observably false and absurd, implying the
falsity of p. The implicate (i.e. q) is however stated in the form of the
rhetorical question, 'then why not give the food below . . .'.
(ii) If 'the srddha produces gratification to those who are dead'1
(p), then '(offerings in their home should) produce gratification to
travellers' (q). But q is observably false and absurd. Here the implicate
is stated in the form of the proposition 'here, too, in the case of
travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the
journey'. 1 This is really an implicate of the implicate but the logic of
the argument remains the same.
(135) There is a similar argument implying the falsity of the belief in
survival:
(iii) If 'he who departs from the body goes to another world' (p)
then 'he would come back for love of his kindred' ! (q). But p is observ
ably false implying the falsity of p.
(136) This last (i.e. iii) is among the propositions which Pysi puts
to the test by devising experiments to test its validity instead of being
merely satisfied with anecdotal or common-sense observations. Pysi,
who also appears to belong to the Positivist branch of the Materialists,
deserves to be mentioned separately since he adopts the Materialist
philosophy of life on the basis of empirical arguments and experimental
evidence.2 The dialogue between Pysi and Kassapa, which is re
corded in the Pysi Sutta (D. II.316 ff.) is said to have taken place
some time after the death of the Buddha.3 It shows that at least by this
1
Cowell's Translation, SDS., p. 10. W e have not quoted the Sanskrit text
here since it does not affect the form of the argument.
2
v. Ruben, op. cit., p. 109; Payasi machte noch ein anderes knigliches
Experiment.
3
v. Prof. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, SBB., Vol. III, p. 347.
105
io
The Historical
Background
107
io8
that when the mind is clear and cleansed, it acquires certain extrasensory
faculties whereby it is possible to have a vision of one's past births
(pubbenivsnussatifina-, D. I.82) as well as the 'decease and survival
of beings' (satte cavamne upapajjamne, D. I.82-3). If these Material
ists acquired these 'extrasensory faculties' which ostensibly gave
alleged evidence of survival, why is it that they believed in the annihila
tion of the soul at death? Did they like some moderns hold that these
mystic states and the visions had in them, though real as experiences
were nevertheless hallucinatory, delusive and non-veridical. The com
mentary seems to offer an explanation though it does not appear to be
satisfactory. It says that 'there were two types of Materialists (lit.
annihilationists), those who have attained jhna (lbhi) and those who
have not (albhi). Those who have attained it observe the decease (of
beings) but not their survival (cutim disv upapattirn apassanto-) with
the clairvoyant vision of the worthy ones; he who is thus successful in
observing only the decease but not the survival of beings accepts the
annihilationist theory'.1 The explanation is logically sound but it does
not appear very plausible. It would be more likely that this school of
Materialists asserted the possibility of attaining these mystical states
but denied any claims regarding the validity of extrasensory perception
in that they were private experiences which gave us no objective
information.
1
Tattha dve jan ucchedaditthim ganhanti lbhi ca albhi ca. Lbhi arahato
dibbena cakkhun cutim disv upapattirn apassanto, yo v cutimattam eva datthum
sakkoti na upapattirn so ucchedaditthim ganhti, DA. 1.120.
CHAPTER
III
I io
The Historical
Background
III
112
moral injuries', whereas the context would have made it clear, had he
translated the whole passage that bahutaradosa- here means 'the
multitude of (intellectual) confusions' or the 'magnitude of mistakes
(arising from claims to knowledge)'. We may render this passage as
follows: 'For they (i.e. the Sceptics) say that those who claim know
ledge (jnninah) cannot be stating actual facts since their statements are
mutually contradictory, for even with regard to the category of the
soul, some assert that the soul is omnipresent (sarvagatam) and others
that it is not omnipresent (asarvagatarri)^ some (say) it is of the size of
a digit {ahgustaparvamtrarri) others that it is of the size of a kernel ofa
grain of millet (symkatandulamtram) some say it both has form and
is formless (mrtamamrtatri), some that it resides in the heart
(hrdayamadhyavartinarri) and (others) that it is located in the forehead
(laltavyavasthitam), etc.in respect of every category there is no
uniformity in their assertions; there is no one with an outstanding
intellect whose statements may be regarded as authoritative; even if
such a person existed, he cannot be discovered by one with a limited
vision according to the maxim that "one who is not omniscient does
not know everything" for it is said "how can one desiring to know
that a certain person is omniscient at a certain time do so if he is devoid
of that person's intellect, his knowledge and his consciousness";
owing to the absence of the knowledge of the means, it cannot properly
be accomplished; it cannot be accomplished because of the mutual
dependence (of the two); for it is said "without a super-knowledge
(visistaparijnna-) the knowledge of the means is not attained
and as a result there is no attainment of the super-knowledge
of the object"; knowledge cannot completely comprehend the nature
of the object of knowledge, for it is said, "whatever is apprehended
should have the parts, near, middle and outer but here only the near
part is apprehended and not the others since it is determined by it
(i.e. the nature of the object)"; as for exhausting the atom (paramnuparyavasnat?) with the (knowledge of) the near portion, considering
the unrepresented parts out of the three parts, it is not possible to
apprehend the atom by those with a limited vision owing to the excel
lence of its nature; therefore, since there is no omniscient person and
since one who is not omniscient cannot comprehend the nature of an
object as it is constituted, since all the theorists (sarvavdinm) have
conceived of the nature of the categories in a mutually contradictory
manner and those who have claimed super-knowledge (uttaraparijnninm) are at fault (pramdavatm) Scepticism is best owing to the
The Historical
Background
113
114
Early
Buddhist
Theory
of
Knowledge
The Historical
Background
"5
omniscience on the part of religious teachers (v. infra, 311), the Sceptics
would likewise have done so. The sayings which state that with a
limited knowledge no one can know that any person is omniscient,
e.g. 'nsarvajnah sarvajiiarn jnti'; 'sarvajno' sviti hyetattatkle
pi bubhutsubhih tajjnnajneyavijnnarahitair gamyate katham' are
also quoted elsewhere 1 and may possibly have been old sayings of the
Sceptics. Another saying bearing on this topic specifically attributed
to the Sceptics and criticized, reads as follows: 'All teachings are like
the utterances of barbarians since they have no (epistemic) basis'
(chinnamlatvt mlecchnubhsanavat sarvam upadesdikam, op. eh.,
Vol. I, fol. 35 on S. 1.1.2.17). This was possibly directed mainly
against those who claimed to speak with authority on the presumption
of their omniscience. O n the basis of these sayings we may perhaps
surmise that they argued that since the human intellect was limited no
one could claim to know everything with such a limited intellect. They
may have even extended this argument to arrive at their Scepticism.
None of the metaphysical theories claiming to be true, which are the
products of such a limited intellect, can be known to be true, since they
are mutually contradictory. Now, no new theory can also be true since
it is bound to contradict one or more of the existing theories. Therefore
nothing can be known to be true. Thus the contradictions of meta
physics and the impossibility of omniscience may have led them to
accept Scepticism. One thing we need not doubt and that is that these
Sceptics more than any other thinkers of their age appear to have been
struck by the fact that the conflicting theories not of one tradition but
of all schools seemed to cancel each other out. And in this respect the
Sceptics were really the children of the age in which they lived.
(151 A) That the period immediately preceding the rise of Buddhism
was one in which there was an interminable variety of views on matters
pertaining to metaphysics, morality and religion is clear from the
references to them in the Buddhist and Jain texts. The Brahmajla
Sutta ( D . 1.12-38) refers to fifty-eight schools of thought other than
the four schools or types of Sceptics referred to. It is not improbable
that some of these are only possible schools not current at the time
(y. supra, 141) but there are good grounds to think that many of them
were actually existing schools in view of the independent literary
sources which refer to them. Similarly, the Strakrtnga mentions three
hundred and sixty-three schools. This list is artificially made up mainly
1
116
but not solely on the basis of the categories of Jainism itself1 but there
would be little reason to deny the existence of the four main schools
of Kriyvda, Akriyvda, Ajnnikavda and Vainayikavda and
probably several subgroups among them. A brief account of the doc
trines of some of these schools is given in several contexts of the
Strakrtnga (j.1.1.8-18, 1.2.1-28, 1.6.27, 1.12.2-11, 2.1.14-30, 2.2.79)
and these accounts do not appear to be in the least artificial.
(152) When we consider this historical background, it is only to be ex
pected that the Sceptics should appear at this time. In the Strakrtnga,
they are called the 'annniy' (Skr. ajfinikh), i.e. the 'ignorant
ones' or 'sceptics' or 'those who deny knowledge' (v. supra, 147),
translated as 'agnostics' by Jacobi (SBE., Vol. 45, pp. 241, 315). They
are mentioned in a few places (S. 1.1.2.17, 1.6.27, 1.21.1-2, 2.2.79)
and are considered one of the four important schools of thought. But
the information given about them in the texts themselves is meagre. It
is said that 'the speculations (vmiams) of the Sceptics do not land
them in ignorance (as they ought to); when they cannot instruct
themselves in the truth (param), how can they instruct others'
(annniynam vimams annne na viniyacchai, appano ya param
nlam, kuto annnusasim), S. 1.1.2.17). Jacobi translates annne na
viniyacchai, as 'cannot lead to knowledge' {op. cit., p. 241) but this is
not supported by the text or the commentary. Even if we translate, na
vi-niyacchai (Skr. na vi-niyacchati) as 'cannot lead to', annne (Skr.
1
Silnka makes up the list of 363 'schools' as follows (v. op. cit., Vol. I, fol.
212, 3 ) :
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Kriyvdins
Akriyvadins
Ajnnikas
Vainayikas
180
84
67
32
363
Total
(i) The 180 Kriyvdins are as follows: the variables arethe nine categories
of Jainism such as jiva-, etc., the two principles of svatah and paratah, the two
attributes of nitya- and anitya-, the five concepts of kla,- svabhva-, niyati-,
isvara- and tman-. This gives 9 X 2 X 2 X 5 = 1 8 0 .
(ii) The variables arethe 7 categories of jiva-, etc., taken negatively, the
two principles of svatah and paratah, the six concepts (note the difference of these
concepts from those enumerated in (i)), viz. kla-, yadrcch-, niyati-, svabhva-,
isvara-, tma-. This gives 7 X 2 X 6 = 8 4 .
(iii) For Ajfianikas, v. infra, 157.
(iv) The variables are the four duties (of manas-, vk-, kya-, and dna-)
towards seven types of people; 7 X 4 = 2 8 .
117
118
of their teacher and thus repeat the other's words like a barbarian with
out understanding the real meaning'.1 This idea seems to be borrowed
from the Sceptics. The fact that Silnka himself does not as a Jain believe
that one cannot know another's mind is clear from his criticism of this
sceptical view. He says it is false (asat), because the Sceptics themselves
cannot believe this. For they put forward views such as 'scepticism is
best' (ajnnameva sreyah, v. supra, 147) intended to instruct others,
He quotes in his favour a non-sceptical view which says that 'the inner
mind of another can be apprehended by his external features, gestures,
movements, gait, speech and the changes in his eyes and face'.2
(154) Here again, we do not know on what grounds the Sceptic held
the view that one cannot know another's mind but it is evident that
this theory itself could have led him to scepticism. If one cannot know
another's mind, communication is impossible and knowledge no longer
becomes objective. We may profitably compare this view with that of
the Greek sophist, who believed in the incommunicability of what we
claim to know. In Gorgias' book 3 on 'Nature or the Non-existent', he
sets forth three propositions, viz. (1) that nothing exists, (2) that if
anything exists it cannot be known, and (3) that if it can be known, the
knowledge cannot be communicated. The Ajnnikas seem to have
agreed with propositions (2) and (3) but not (1) since quite con
sistently with their scepticism they could not categorically hold that
'nothing exists' but only that 'nothing could be known to exist'. This
is the same as proposition (2), thus granting the possibility of existence.
Now Gorgias proves proposition (2) by showing that knowledge is
identical with sense-perception and that since sense-impressions differ
with different people, no two people can have the same sense-impres
sions with regard to an object. Therefore knowledge, which must
necessarily be objective, is not possible because of this subjectivity.
For the same reason this knowledge being identical with sensation,
cannot be communicated. The Indian Sceptics may possibly have
reasoned on similar lines, though one cannot be quite certain about
this, due to the lack of any definite evidence. The argument against the
possibility of complete knowledge (v. supra, 148) seems to give a faint
1
Evam paracetovrttlnm duranvayatvdupadesturapi yathvasthitavivaksay
grahansambhavnniscayrthamajnn mlecchavadaparoktam anubhsanta eva,
op. cit,, Vol. I, fol. 35 on S. 1.1.2.16.
2
krairirigitairgaty cestay bhsitena ca netravaktravikraisca grhyate
'ntargatam manah, op. eh., Vol. I, fol. 35 on S. 1.1.2.17.
3
W . T, Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 116-7.
The Historical
Background
119
indication of this. Here it was said that whatever we apprehend has the
three parts, near (arvk-), middle (madhya-), and outer (para-) and
that we in fact apprehend only the near part (tasyrvgbhgasyevopalabdhih, loc. cit.). N o w this is certainly true of visual perception and in a
sense of sense-perception in general. W e see only the near side (the
side facing us) of objects, so that what each person sees of the object
would be different according to the individual perspective. So if we are
arvg-darsinah (a term which is frequently used in the sayings of
Sceptics) or 'near-side-seers', our knowledge at least of physical
objects, being dependent on our individual perspectives, would be
subjective since these perspectives would be different with different
individuals. In the absence of objectivity, there is no knowledge at all
and the private experiences or impressions of the different individuals
would be incommunicable. Whether the early Sceptics would have
employed such reasoning or not it is difficult to say but they certainly
seem to have held that one could not know another's mind and this
seems to have been one of the grounds of their Scepticism.
(155) As we have seen, Silnka's account stresses the intellectual basis
of their scepticism rather than the pragmatic or moral reasons for it,
but the fact that they were also present is evident from some of his
observations about the Sceptics. According to Silnka 'the Sceptics . . .
conceive that even if there was knowledge it is useless (nisphalam)
since it has many disadvantages (bahudosavat)' (Ajnniknm . . .
jnnam tu sadapi nisphalam bahudosavaccetyevamabhyupagamavatm,
op. cit., Vol. I, fol. 215). This shows that they not only considered
knowledge to be impossible but that it was useless. In enumerating the
sixty-seven 'types' of Sceptics, Silnka puts the question of the
Sceptic in two forms, viz. ' W h o knows that the soul exists? Of what
use is this knowledge? W h o knows that the soul does not exist? O f
what use is this knowledge? e t c ' (san jivah ko vetti? kirn v tena
jnnena? asan jivah ko vetti? kirn v tena jnnena? op. cit., Vol. I,
fol. 36 on S. 1.1.2.20; also Vol. I, fol. 212). T h e second of these forms
is clearly meant to imply that they adopted Scepticism on pragmatic
considerations as well.
(156) Silnka does not shed any more light on what the Sceptics
considered as the defects or disadvantages (dosa-) of knowledge but
as we shall see the accounts in the Pli Nikyas pay a good deal of
attention to this aspect of their scepticism. But since we shall be dealing
with each school of Sceptics mentioned in the Brahmajla Sutta
I20
separately, we may briefly state here what the Sceptics seem to have
considered to be the defects or disadvantages of knowledge. The sense
in which the term dosa- is used by Silanka in elucidating the views of
the Sceptics is not very clear. In the passage in which knowledge was
condemned ((v. supra, 148) as giving rise to a multitude of dosa(bahutaradosasambhavt), it was apparent from the context that the
word meant 'intellectual confusions' and not 'moral injuries' as sugges
ted by Barua (v. supra, 148), who was probably influenced by the picture
of the Sceptic as drawn in the Buddhist texts. The other uses (e.g. 'the
greater the knowledge the greater the dosa', yath yath ca jnntisayas
tath tath ca dostireka-, op. ciu, Vol. I, fol. 35 on S. 1.1.2.17)
were less clear and dosa- could here have meant (ambiguously) 'moral
disadvantages'. In the Brahmajla Sutta, however, we find that the
first two schools of Sceptics held that there were undesirable psycho
logical and moral consequences of claiming knowledge under condi
tions, when it was impossible to know the facts for certain. According
to the first school (v. infra, 159), we have a liking or bias for (chando,
rgo) a proposition and a dislike or a bias against its contradictory
(doso, patigho), when we come to accept it as true without valid
grounds. Since this is grounded on one's prejudices for and against,
the proposition itself is said to be false and its acceptance wrong or
mistaken (mus). Now, uttering a falsehood or doing a wrong thing
is a source of remorse (vighto) and is a moral danger (antaryo).
According to the second school (v. infra, 166), the bias for or against
is an entanglement (updnam) which is again a moral danger
(antaryo). The third school (v. infra, 167) seems to have been
impressed by the psychologically and morally disastrous consequences
of debating their theories, on the part of those who claimed to know
and believe in them. We must not forget that during this period not
only were there a variety of theories but a good many of them were
being hotly debated (v. infra, Ch. V), resulting in one party having to
undergo the miseries of defeat. Sometimes these debates seem to have
given rise to bickering and quarrels among the contending parties.
This third school of Sceptics, if not the first and second as well, seem
to have concluded that all this self-imposed unhappiness was due to
baseless claims to knowledge and that Scepticism was superior to
making such claims. It is probable that these were among the defects
or disadvantages (dosa-) of knowledge spoken of in some of Silnka's
quotations from the Sceptics. If so it would be seen that there were
both pragmatic as well as intellectual grounds for their scepticism.
121
(157) As we have mentioned {v. supra, 151) Silnka speaks of sixtyseven 'types' of Sceptics in order to make up the figure three hundred
and sixty-three, the number of schools of thought, mentioned in the
Strakrtnga. But they are neither schools nor types and the list is
artificially made up mainly but not solely out of the concepts of Jainism
itself. He takes the nine categories (navapadrtha-) of Jainism, each
according to the seven forms of predication (saptabhangakh). This
gives sixty three (i.e. 9X7) forms of sceptical questions, which are
considered to represent sixty three 'types' of Sceptics asking these
questions. The last four 'types' are more interesting and possibly
represent a kind of question, which the Sceptics themselves asked.
They are as follows:
(i) Sati bhvotpattih ko vetti? Who knows whether there is an
arising of psychological states ?
(ii) Asati bhvotpattih ko vetti? Who knows whether there is no
arising of psychological states?
(iii) Sadasati bhvotpattih ko vetti? Who knows whether there is
and is no arising of psychological states ?
(iv) Avaktavyo bhvotpattih ko vetti? Who knows whether the
arising of psychological states is impredicable? Silnka comments
that the 'other three possibilities of predication do not apply in the
case of the arising of psychological states'1. The question of 'the
arising of consciousness' (saniiuppda-) is one on which there
seems to have been a good deal of speculation during the period
of the Pli Nikyas and four different theories on this subject
are mentioned in the Potthapda Sutta (D. 1.180). This could have
easily provoked these sceptical questions, but what is interesting is the
fourfold mode of predication adopted. It is possible that Silnka did
this merely to complete the figure of sixty-seven and his explanation
that this subject does not admit of the other forms of predication is too
puerile to be taken seriously. But it is also not unlikely that the Sceptics
in fact adopted a fourfold scheme of predication as we have suggested
(v. infra, 184) in discussing the evidence from the Pli texts.
(158) The Pli term used to refer to the Sceptics, namely, Amarvikkhepiky seems to be a nickname and has probably been correctly
translated as 'eel-wrigglers' (Prof. Rhys Davids, SBB., Vol. II,
pp. 37 ff.). It is however a word whose meaning is obscure and the
1
Uttaram bhangatrayam . . . bhvotpattau na sambhavatiti, op. cit.y Vol. I,
fol. 213.
122
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
123
say thus, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny the denials
{lit. I do not say, "no, no")'. 1
(160) This description as it stands obviously admits of more than one
interpretation. On a very literal interpretation of it, it need not repre
sent the point of view of a Sceptic at all, unless we mean by a Sceptic
a person who suspends his judgment on the truth or falsity of a
proposition, in the absence of adequate evidence or grounds for believ
ing in its truth or falsity. If this class of thinkers merely refused to
assert that something was positively good or evil, unless they had
objective grounds for doing so, without being misled by subjective
bias due to their likes and dislikes, they would not be Sceptics but
critical thinkers recommending the outlook of science or intelligent
commonsense. The only difference from scientific scepticism, which
advocates the suspension of judgment in the absence of good evidence
or valid grounds for asserting the truth or falsity of a proposition,
would be that these thinkers did not merely consider that it was
intellectually unsatisfactory not to suspend judgment under such
circumstances, but that it was a moral danger (antaryo) as well not
to do so.
(161) Such an evaluation, however, is prima facie improbable. For if
they suspended judgment only until knowledge was possible without
ruling out the possibility of knowledge altogether, they would not
have been known to their opponents as having persistently refused to
commit themselves by asserting or denying all the logically possible
alternatives at least in respect of ethical propositions. It is, therefore,
very probable that they not merely denied knowledge of ethical pro
positions but claimed that such propositions were, in principle,
unknowable, and that if we held that such propositions were either
true or false, as the case may be, we would be guided by our prejudices.
1
Idha . . . ekacco samano v brhmano v idam kusalan ti yathbhtam na
ppajnti, idam akusalan ti yathbhtam nappajnti. Tassa evam hoti: Aham
kho idam kusalan ti yathbhtam nappajnmi, idam akusalanti yathbhtam
nappajnmi. Ahan c'eva kho pana idam kusalan ti yathbhtam appajnanto,
idam akusalan ti yathbhtam appajnanto idam kusalan ti v vykareyyam,
idam akusalan ti v vykareyyam, tattha me assa chando v rgo v doso v
patigho v tarn mam'assa mus. Yam mam'assa mus so mam'assa
vighto. Yo mam'assa vighto so mam'assaa ntaryo ti. Iti so musvdabhay
musvdaparijegucch n'ev'idam kusalan ti vykaroti na pana idam akusalan ti
vykaroti, tattha tattha panham puttho samno vcvikkhepam pajjati amarvikkhepam: Evam pi me no. Tath ti pi me no. Annatha ti pi me no. No ti pi me
no. No no ti pi me no ti. D . I.24-5.
124
*25
SBE., Vol. 45, p. 385). As Jacobi points out, in the commentary on the
Uttardhyayana Stra (18.23), it is said that the Sceptics (Ajnnavdinah) 'contend that knowledge is not necessary for salvation but
tapas'1 is, and Jacobi commenting on this says that 'this seems identical
with the karmapatha'.1
(164) The sacrificial brahmins of the Brhmanas proper, who continued
in the Upanisadic period recommending the path of action (karmamrga-), were undoubtedly against the claims to metaphysical and
intuitive knowledge on the part of the Upanisadic thinkers. However,
there is no reason to think that they were sceptics or agnostics in the
matter of knowledge. They certainly claimed the veracity of certain
ethical propositions. The modified theory of the path of action (karmamrga- or karmapatha-) to be found in the Is Upanisad and later in the
Bhagavadgit is less averse to knowledge. The Is, while condemning
those who delight in knowledge as being in greater darkness than
those who are ignorant,2 nevertheless speaks of some kind of know
ledge with which immortality is obtained (vidyaymrtam asnute, op.
cit., 11). Barua calls the thinkers of the Kena Upanisad, viz. the Keniyas, 'sceptics' (op. cit., pp. 261, 319). However, they were properly
agnostics, who denied the possibility of conceptual or sensory know
ledge of reality3 while not denying that reality 'was known by an
awakening' (pratibodhaviditam4). Likewise, faith (sraddh) in the
Upanisads was never divorced from knowledge and there is no
evidence of a faith movement in the Upanisads, which decried know
ledge. It is those who have both knowledge and faith5 who attain
immortality. Moreover, faith (sraddh) is said to accompany both tapas
and knowledge.6
(165) It is not intrinsically impossible that there were a set of thinkers
in the Vedic tradition who, because they believed in the efficacy of
1
126
The Historical
Background
127
128
129
seems to be clear from this that there was much in common between
these three schools or types of Sceptics and that they valued mental
stability if not the cultivation of some sort of ideal state of mind.
(171) Apart from the few hints that we get about these Sceptics from
Buddhist and Jain sources, we have not been able to trace any positive
reference to them elsewhere in Indian thought. But the account given
of the scepticism of Pyrrho, who is said to have been influenced by
Indian thought, * bears a remarkable similarity to the point of view
of these Sceptics. The quotation preserved by Aristocles from one of
Timon's prose works and which is supposed to represent the views of
Timon's teacher, Pyrrho, reads as follows: 'He himself (Pyrrho) has
left nothing in writing but his disciple Timon says that the man who is
to be happy must look to these three things: (1) what is the nature of
things, (2) what attitude should we take to them, and (3) what those
who take this attitude will gain by it. He says that he declared that
things were in an equal degree indifferent and unstable and incapable
of being tested. For this reason neither our senses nor our opinions are
true or false. So we must not put our trust in them but be free from
beliefs and inclinations and unshaken, saying of each thing in turn that
it no more is than it is not or that it both is and is not or that it neither
is nor is not. And those who take this attitude, Timon says will first
gain speechlessness (abasia) and then imperturbability (ara/xx^a)'. 2
(172) One difference that we seem to observe on the surface is that
Pyrrho's scepticism appears to be all-embracing while the scepticism
of the three schools outlined above seems to have been more or less
confined to moral propositions. But this appearance is deceptive. With
regard to all three of these schools, it is stated, that they gave sceptical
answers 'when questioned on each and every matter' (tattha tattha
panham puttho, D.I., pp. 24, 25, 26). The reason for high-lighting
the ethical examples was probably due to the Buddhists themselves
being mainly concerned with this aspect of their teachings just as much
as the account given by Silnka of the different 'types' of Sceptics
(v. supra, 157) gave one the impression that the Sceptics were mainly
interested in the concepts and categories of Jainism.
(173) If we compare the doctrines of the above three schools of
Sceptics with the account given above of the scepticism of Pyrrho, it
1
130
would be interesting to observe that both hold that (1) there were no
beliefs or opinions which were true or false and therefore (2) we should
give no positive answer to any of the logical alternatives. It would also
be seen that (3) the four logical alternatives mentioned in Timon's
account (i.e. is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not) are
identical with that of Sanjaya, the Buddhists and perhaps also of the
three schools of Sceptics as we have shown below (y. infra, 184).
Lastly (4) the value of the sceptical attitude is said by Pyrrho to lie in
the fact that it promotes speechlessness (aphasia) and mental imperturbability (ataraxia), which seem to be the states of mind regarded as
ideal by the above schools of Sceptics since they held that anything
that caused mental instability was a hindrance. Because of Pyrrho's
love of quietism, Burnet1 thinks that Pyrrho is more of a quietist than
a sceptic and is inclined to regard him as being nearer the Buddhist
ideal: 'We see that those who knew Pyrrho well described him as a
sort of Buddhist arhat and that is doubtless how we should regard him.
He is not so much a sceptic as an ascetic and a quietist'. But when we
see that Pyrrho's scepticism as well as his quietism are shared by the
above schools of Sceptics, it would be more appropriate to regard him
as having a closer kinship with them rather than with the Buddhists,
who were opposed to their scepticism.
(174) Barua compares the school of Pyrrho with that of Sanjaya (pp.
cit., p. 32) but as indicated below (y. infra, 180) it is not said of the
school of Sanjaya, unlike in the case of the previous three schools, that
it held non-scepticism to be a source of vexation or a hindrance. We
therefore have no evidence that the school of Sanjaya valued mental
equanimity. In the circumstances we would have to hold that Pyrrhonean scepticism would be nearer the three schools mentioned above
than the school of Sanjaya, which in our opinion does not seem to have .
valued mental quietude at all.
(175) The fourth school of Sceptics is described in language identical
with that used to define the philosophy of Sanjaya so that we may
presume that Sanjaya was one of the foremost representatives if not
the leader of this school. Sanjaya is described along with the other five
teachers, who were contemporaries of the Buddha as being a wellknown (nto), celebrated (yasass) teacher and a leader of a sect
(titthakaro) who was held in high esteem by the common folk (sdhusammato bahujanassa); he is also said to have a following (sangh
1
The Historical
Background
131
1
132
(177) Professor Basham, dissenting from Barua's view that the passage
mentioned above represents a doctrine that was held in good faith by a
school of Pyrrhonists, thinks that the passage is 'probably satirical, a
tilt at agnostic teachers who were unwilling to give a definite answer to
any metaphysical question put to them' (op. cit., p. 17). He adds that
'its agnosticism was never a part of the jivika creed, and it may be
omitted from further consideration' (loc. cit.).
(178) This seems to be unclear. For it may be asked whether (1) there
was at least one school of Sceptics, (2) Sanjaya was a Sceptic, and (3) if
Sanjaya was a Sceptic, he was an jivika. If (2) and (3) are denied there
is a contradiction inasmuch as elsewhere Professor Basham ascribes
the 'sceptical philosophy' outlined in the Sandaka Sutta to Sanjaya
(pp. cit., p. 19). Moreover, he states (y. infra, 195) that 'the Sandaka
Sutta seems to embrace all six of the heretical teachers . . . in the
category of jivikas' (pp. cit., p. 96). From this it may be inferred that
he considers 'agnosticism' or 'scepticism' (v. op. cit., p. 19both words
are used indiscriminately) as part of the jivika creed(s) in Barua's
second sense of the term jivika,1 with which Basham agrees.2
Nevertheless, at the beginning of his work he states the very opposite.
Moreover, Professor Basham omits to discuss Silnka's statement to
the effect that 'the jivikas and others, who are followers of Gosla's
doctrines are a product of ajnnavda' (supra, 147), whatever ajnnavda may mean here.
(179) We are not anxious to prove that scepticism is part of the
jivika doctrines or not, though we would like to be clear about the
use of the term jivika, so as to avoid confusion (v. infra, 196). But if
Prof. Basham is saying that there was no school (or schools) of Sceptics,
but only 'agnostic teachers' who were sceptics only with regard to
metaphysical questions, it is necessary to urge that, as we have shown
above, the independent evidence and testimony of both the Buddhist
as well as the Jain texts seem to point in the opposite direction. But
opaptik? N'atthi satt opaptik? Atthi ca natthi ca satt opaptik? N'ev'atthi
na natthi satt opaptik. Atthi sukatadukkatnam kammnam phalam vipko?
Natthi sukatadukkatnam kammnam phalam vipko ? Atthi ca natthi ca sukata
dukkatnam kammnam phalam vipko? N'ev'atthi na n'atthi sukatadukkatnam
kammnam phalam vipko? Hoti Tathgato parammaran? Na hoti Tathgato
parammaran? Hoti ca na hoti ca Tathgato parammaran? N'eva hoti na na hoti
Tathgato parammaran? . . . D . I.27.
1
jivikawhat it means', A B O R L , Vol. 8, 1927, p. 183.
2
Op. cit., pp. 96, 97. 'We have seen that the second usage is very common in
early Buddhist literature* (p. 98).
The Historical
Background
133
134
all questions put to him. But if we examine the actual list of proposi
tions mentioned (and here a whole list is given unlike in the case of the
previous schools), it would be seen that they pertain to metaphysics
(the next world, survival, transcendent existence) and morals (the
consequences of good and evil). It is therefore not improbable that his
scepticism was directed only to those questions, the answers to which
were unverifiable and therefore unknowable or as Jacobi says 'trans
cendent or beyond human experience' (op. cit., p. xxvii). In this respect
the philosophy of Sanjaya may be compared with that of the positivist
branch of the Lokyata (i.e. group (2), v. supra, 89, 94), the difference
being that these positivists seem to have denied the truth of these
propositions or suggested that they do not make sense1 while Sanjaya
seems to grant the possibility of their truth, though denying that we
have any means of knowing this. If so Sanjaya seems to have examined
the truth-value of propositions in the light of relevant evidence. His
philosophy, therefore, is as Ui sums it up 'a scepticism on the one hand
and a primitive step of criticism of knowledge on the other hand, like
the sophists2 in the Greek philosophy'.3
(182) Another fact to be noted in the account given of Sanjaya's
philosophy is that the propositions are arranged in a four-fold order
of expression and the logical alternatives are not confined to simple
assertions and denials. For instance, we find not only the expressions
'there is (atthi) a next world' and 'there is no (natthi) next world' but
also the forms 'there is and is not (atthi ca natthi ca) a next world' and
'there neither is nor is there no (n'ev'atthi na n'atthi) next world'. This
four-fold mode of expression, as we have shown later (y. infra, 581)
appears to have been adopted in the Pli Nikyas alongside the usual
two-fold mode. Keith gives the credit to Sanjaya for initiating this
new four-fold logic: 'he seems as an agnostic to have been the first to
formulate the four possibilities of existence, non-existence, both and
neither.. .' 4
(183) This is certainly a possibility that cannot be ruled out. His very
scepticism may have led him to include the modes of expression 'both
is and is not' and 'neither is nor is not', both of which are expres
sions sometimes used in common speech in addition to the ordinary
1
The closest that the early Materialists came to saying this is their statement
recorded in the Sutrakrtnga (v. supra, Ch. II, p. 46), viz. 'it is those who say
that the (soul) does not exist or is not evident, who would be making the right
2
statement about it*.
v. infra, 326.
3
4
The Vaisesika Philosophy, p. 23.
Buddhist Philosophy, p. 303.
The Historical
Background
135
assertions and denials, so as to make his scepticism and his scruples for
truth appear more comprehensive. O n the other hand there are two
other alternatives worth considering, which appear to be more plaus
ible than the one suggested.
(184) One of the alternatives is that the four-fold schema was not the
innovation of Sanjaya but was held in common by all the schools of
the Sceptics; in such a case Buddhism would have either borrowed this
classification from the Sceptics or shared it with them. The other
alternative is that the innovation was on the part of the Buddhists and
that the Sceptics themselves including Sanjaya were not concerned
with such problems.
(185) Let us consider the first alternative. W e have already seen how
Silnka arranged the only example he seems to have taken from the
Sceptics themselves in a four-fold schema (v. supra, 157). He may have
done this merely to complete his figure of sixty seven 'categories' of
Sceptics: but the fact that the example he took was not based on Jain
concepts and his own admission that this particular example did not
admit of more than a four-fold order of predications are possibly
pointers to the fact that he was borrowing not only the example but
the four-fold formula itself from the Sceptics. The adoption of such
different Schemas was perhaps characteristic of this period and was
probably necessitated by the variety of doctrines, which had to be
considered apart (v. infra, 573). D r Basham has some evidence to show
that the jivikas under Makkhali Gosla and the schismatic Jain sect
of the Trairsikas adopted a scheme of classifying propositions into
three logical 'heaps' (rsi) or categories (v. infra, 217-20). N o w there
is no known school of Indian thinkers apart from the Buddhist (barring
Sanjaya who is known only through the references in Buddhist litera
ture) who adopted a four-fold schema, but the five-fold formula of
denial, which according to the accounts given, is common to all the
schools of Sceptics, seems to be based on the acceptance of a four-fold
form of predication. Let us examine this formula:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
DA. 1.115-6.
136
-(p)
3. (p.notp)
4. (notp)
5. (not(p.notp))
It will be seen from the above that 2, 4, 3 and 5 (in this order) are the
denials of the usual four propositional types in the order in which we
stated them. The identifications of the commentator has some basis in
the wording. He has seen that there was a double 'na' (two 'nots') in 5
(no no ti p i . . . ) and identified it as a denial of a proposition of the form
na eva . . . na (na) . . . Where he saw a single 'na' in 4 {no ti pi . . .)
he identified it as a denial of a proposition of the form 'na . . . ' . He then
identified 2 (tath pi . . .) as the denial of a simple assertion. In 4
(annath pi . . .) he saw a slight variation of 2 and identified it as a
denial of a partial assertion. But what is most unsatisfactory is the
1
This is called takki-vdam, i.e. the thesis of the sophist (vitandavdin) since
he rejects or argues against both thesis as well as anti-thesis; he neither asserts
p nor not-p.
2
W e are not using the negation sign (~p) or the form 'not p* since 'notp* is
not the contradictory of p (v. infra, 575).
137
identification of 1. What does Buddhaghosa mean by an aniymitavikkhepo? He can only mean the rejection of any one of the logical
alternatives (which he has exhausted in 2, 4, 3 and 5) without specifica
tion, but the language (evampi me no) hardly suggests this.
(187) According to the second explanation, proposition (1) is the
denial of an assertion e.g. if asked whether this is good, he denies it.
Proposition (2) is the denial of a simple negation, e.g. if asked whether
this is not good, denies it. Proposition (3) is a denial that what you are
stating is different from both (1) and (2), e.g. if asked whether his
position is different from both (1) and (2) (ubhayato afinath), denies
it. Proposition (4) is a denial that you are stating a point of view
different from the above, e.g. if asked whether his thesis (laddhi) is
different from the three earlier points of view (tividhen'pi na hoti),
denies it. Proposition (5) is a denial of the denials, e.g. if asked whether
his thesis is to deny everything (no no te laddhi ti) he denies it. Thus
he does not take his stand (na titthati) on any of the logical alternatives
(ekasmim pi pakkhe). We may represent this explanation using sym
bols as explained above, as follows:
i- - ( p )
2. (notp)
3. - ( - ( 1 , 2))
4- - ( - ( 1 , 2, 3))
5- ~ ( J ? 2> 3> 4)
We have used the numerals as well, as equivalent to the formula that
follows for otherwise the notation would appear too complicated and
the point of adopting it would be lost. Thus, 3 means that 'you deny
that your thesis is different from both your previous denial of the
assertion and the denial of the negation'. The purpose of the com
mentator in both his explanations has been to show that the Sceptic
does not take his stand on any of the logical alternatives. But this
second explanation is less satisfactory than the first, since the explana
tions of propositions 3 and 4 appear to be very arbitrary and hardly
related to the language used.
(188) We would like to suggest a third alternative explanation, which
has the merit of being the simplest and the one having the closest
affinities to the language used. Buddhaghosa's second explanation
made the suggestion that the last proposition (no no ti pi me no) is a
denial of the rejection of all the possible logical alternatives. This
appears to be plausible since the statement literally means 'I do not
E*
138
say " n o , n o " \ If so the others constitute the rejection of the usual
four-fold logical alternatives. W e may take them in the usual order
and when we do so it would be noticed that on the whole they corre
spond with the language used. W e may state this explanation in
symbolic form, as follows:
i2.
3.
4.
5.
-(p)
(notp)
-(p.notp)
(not(p.notp))
(1, 2, 3, 4)
139
p.notp
Not(p.notp)
(193) We may compare this with the standpoints of the Jains, which
we may state as follows, confining ourselves to the first four possi
bilities only for the sake of the comparison:
1.
2.
3.
4.
p.notp
(p. is inexpressible)
sydasti
synnsti
sydastinsti
sydavaktavyah
(194) It would now appear as if, far from being poles apart, it is
difficult to distinguish the two points of view. The difference is no
doubt there for, by say, sydasti, the Jains do not mean that 'p may be
the case' in the sceptical sense but that 'p is in fact the case from a
certain point of view (naya)' (v. infra, 236-8). Instead of one develop
ing in opposition to the other as Jacobi has suggested the two seem to
have a common origin, though they part company at a certain point.
When both were faced with the problem of diverse theories (which
140
The Historical
Background
141
142
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
143
natthi sambhavo (v, supra, 85), the only difference being that what is
conceived to be Being is not Vhat is' but 'what will be' and what is
Non-being is not Vhat is not' but 'that which is not to be'. Now Being
cannot be destroyed nor Non-Being come to be. Therefore Vhat will
be' cannot be destroyed, i.e. cannot be otherwise and 'that which is not
to be' cannot come into being, i.e. will not be. The apparent self-evi
dence of the proposition that Vhat will be cannot be otherwise' is
based on the misconception that the future event which actually comes
to pass in the course of time, 'exists' or has Being. Once this is accepted,
the determinist conclusion follows; the same argument can be used to
show that the past could not have been different from what in fact it
was. So everything, past, present and future is unalterable and fixed.
It is probably this very argument of the niyativdin, which provoked
the Buddha to draw attention to the past, present and future usages of
the verb 'to be' (ahosi, atthi, bhavissati) and enjoin the desirability of
keeping 'these three linguistic conventions' (tayo'me niruttipath)
apart without confusing them, so that one may see that one cannot
argue that 'what will be' (bhavissati) has existence (atthi) for the future
that has not come into being and manifested itself has to be reckoned
as 'what will be' (bhavissati) and cannot be reckoned as 'what is'
(atthi)1. It is significant that it is said at the end of this section that even
'the ahetuvdins, the akiriyavdins and the natthikavdins cannot
afford to condemn or reject these three linguistic conventions for
otherwise they would be liable to censure'.2 Here the akiriyavdin is a
reference to Prana Kassapa, whose doctrine is called akiriyam at
D. I.53, while a doctrine stated in identical language is called akiriyavda- at M. 1.404-5 (v. supra, 121). He seems to have been an outright
niyativdin as his later reputation3 shows. Ahetuvdin on the other
hand is probably a reference to Makkhali Gosla, but his doctrine is
called samsra-suddhi (salvation by transmigration) at D. I.53 though
at M. II.408, the same stated in identical language minus the cosmology
is called ahetuvda-. His ahetuvda- is evident from his language in
1
144
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
The Historical
Background
145
146
147
follows: 'In this world, grief does not arise for a man even though he
delights in evil courses, while for another person who does good, it
does'.1 It is thus concluded that there is no causal connection between
evil and grief or good and happiness.
(204) The argument against the causal connection said to hold
between human exertion and its fruits is again shown to be false by
appeal to observation based on the two principles. If there was a causal
connection then we should have the following sequences:
Presence of human exertion
Presence of its fruits
Absence of
Absence of
But what we observe is as follows:
Presence of human exertion
Absence of fruits
(Purusa-kre sati)
(phal'prptih)
Absence of human exertion
Presence of fruits
(Vypr'bhave)
(visistaphal'vptih)
Thus it is argued that 'nothing is achieved by human effort'.2 If we
examine this argument we find that it is based on the assumption that
'equal effort (samne purusakre sati) must be followed by equal
results',3 which is based on the principle that variations in the cause are
correlated with variations in the effect. This is explicitly stated in the
argument that 'Time is not a causal factor, for since Time is uniform,
its effects in the world could not be multiform. There are variations in
the effect only when there are variations in the cause (Krana-bhede hi
krya-bhedo bhavati, n'bhede)'.4 This is similar to Mill's 'Fifth
Canon',5 an extension of the two original principles.
(205) These subtleties probably developed later, but there is some
reason to believe that the basic argument based on the belief in the
1
Atr'aikasy sadanusthnaratasy 'pi na dukkham utpadyate, parasya tu
sadanusthyino tad bhavati, Silnka, op. cit.} Vol. II, fol. 26, on S. 2.1.12;
quoted by Basham, op. cit., p. 234, fn. 3.
2
Yadi purusakrakrtam sukhdyanubhyeta tatah sevakavanikkarsakdmm
samne purusakre sati phalaprptivaisadrsyam phal'praptisca na bhavet.
Kasya cittu sevdivypar'bhve 'pi visistaphal'vptir drsyata iti. Ato na purusakrt kincid sadyate. Silnka, op. eh., Vol. I, fol. 30 on S. 1.1.2.2.
3
The phrase, samne purusakre sati, implies samna-phalaprptih as the
expected consequence.
4
N'pi klah kart, tasy'aikarpatvj jagati phalavaicitry 'nupapatteh.
Kranabhede hi kryabhedo bhavati, n'bhede, Silnka, loc. cit.
5
'Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another varies in
some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is
connected with it through some fact of causation', op. cit., p. 263.
148
149
may draw the conclusion that A is not a causal factor; so is not-A not
a causal factor for the absence of A has made no difference to the result.
So both those who claim that kiriya (the act) is a cause or that akiriya
(the non-act) is a cause are equally wrong as regards the causethis is
in fact supported by Jacobi's second translation, though it is not
supported by the actual wording of the argument. Although this
negative conclusionthat belief in kiriya or akiriya cannot be the
causeseems to be implied, the actual conclusion that is drawn is a
positive one, namely that niyati must be the causal factor. But this is
an assumption, since niyati is a metaphysical factor, which is unobservable and cannot be discovered experimentally. Yet what is most
significant is that the niyativdin seems to have been convinced in some
sense of the fact of causation and made use of the causal argument,
based on a belief in the principles of causal determination to show that
his opponent was wrong. The problem is whether these concepts were
borrowed from another school or were intrinsic to his own system.
(207) According to the argument of the niyativdin as stated by
Gunaratna {v. supra, 202), the niyativdin believed in a 'fixed pattern
of causes and effects' (krya-kranavyavasth) but we saw at the same
time that Prana, the niyativdin, was called an upholder of the
'doctrine of causelessness'l (ahetuvda-). The reason for these con
tradictory evaluations would be clear if we can comprehend the niya
tivdin's concept of causation. He denied whatever was held as the
causes of events natural or metaphysical, by his opponents (e.g.
purusakra-, karma-, kla-, Isvara-). This would have made him appear
in the eyes of his opponents as one who denied all causes, internal or
external, of events. But all his criticisms imply a belief in causation,
which in the ultimate analysis turns out to be a belief in niyati conceived
as the first and the efficient cause of all phenomena. Nature to him was
a single rigidly deterministic system, in which no individual or separate
causal lines2 or processes were discoverable or distinguishable. All
events and processes were caused but caused by the all-embracing
metaphysical principle of niyati. For such a rigid determinist individual
causal processes could not be conceived in isolation from the entire
system. This would have appeared to be the very denial of causation
as understood by some of their opponents and it is difficult to believe
1
v. supra, 199. The term may also have been employed in the Nikya period
to denote yadrcch-vda or 'Indeterminism' (sangati) and Makkhali was
probably an ahetukavdin in both these senses.
2
On the use of the term 'causal lines', v. Russell, Human Knowledge, p. 333 #
150
Krana-vd can also mean 'those who debated about the first cause'; cp.
Kim kranam? Brahma?, Svet. 1.1.
2
v. Basham, op. cit., p. 231, where the full text and the translation is given.
151
niyativdin did argue against his opponents and that his opponents
were these same protagonists as mentioned by Silnka. Silnka states
the fact that the niyativdin argued against those who claimed that the
effort of the person (purusakra-), Time (kla-), God (Isvara-),
Intrinsic Nature (svabhva-) and Karma were respectively the causes
of 'pleasurable and painful experience' (sukhadukkha-). The Svetsvarara Upanisad mentions that one of the questions debated by the
brahmavdins is as follows: adhisthith kena sukhetaresu vartmahe,
where Sankara explains sukhetaresu as sukhadukkhesu1 and the sentence
may be translated as 'governed by whom (or what) do we live in
pleasure and pain'. Now, it is recorded in the Pli Nikyas not only
that this was one of the topics that was hotly debated at the time
(v. infra, 395) but that the parties to these debates were these same
theorists. The opponents of the niyativdin according to Silnka are
the following:
1. Yzdi purusakrakrtam sukhadukkhdyanubhyeta... v. Basham,
op. cit., p. 230, fn. 1.
2. N'pi klah kart . . . ibid,, p. 231, fn. 1.
3. Isvarakamk^\ sukhadukkhe na bhavatah . . . ibid., fn. 2.
4. Svabhvasy api sukhadukkhdikartrtva . . . ibid., p. 232, fn. 1.
5. Karmamh, sukhadukkham prati kartrtvam . . ., ibid., fn. 2.
Now it would be noted that four of these theories are specifically
mentioned in connection with this very problem in the Devadaha
Sutta (M. II.222). We may state them under the numbers correspond
ing to Silanka's list:
1.
3.
4.
5.
(212) We may conclude from what we have said above that some of
the Ajivikas were rationalists who not only constructed their theories
by reasoning but also defended them against their opponents by
1
Adhisthit niyamith kena sukhetaresu sukhaduhkhesu vartmahe, nanda
srama Series, No. 17, p. 18 on Svet. 1.1.
2
This is probably the same as purisa-parakkama-, A. IV. 190, which is a
synonym of purisa-thma- and purisa-viriya-.
3
bhva-=sabhva-, v. Basham, op. cit., p. 226.
4
Cp. the theory of purtana-karma-krtam, mentioned by Gunaratna, op. cit.,
p. 20.
152
153
154
have had their own traditional scriptures: 'the Trairsikas, who follow
the doctrine of Gosla, and who have twenty-one stras, arranged
according to the order of the Trairsika stras in the Prvas\ Now, the
Suttanipta makes a reference to 'the Vedas of the Samanas as well as
those of the brahmins'.1 Since the Samanas were classified in the
Suttanipta as the jivikas and the Niganthas (v. infra, 375), it is likely
that these collections of scriptures of the jivikas are among the
'Vedas of the Samanas' referred to. It shows that at least some of the
jivikas had a sacred scripture as early as the period of the Pali
Nikyas, a fact which is confirmed by the quotations or adaptations
from them, found in the early Buddhist and Jain texts.2
(217) The reference to the 'followers of Gosla' (Goslamat'nusrino), elsewhere called the jivikas, as the Trairsikas in the above
statement of Silnka, is significant and points to the contribution made
by them to epistemology and logic. While the Sceptics and the
Buddhists evolved or adopted a four-fold logic, the jivikas who were
the followers of Makkhali Gosla appear to have classified propositions
into three mutually exclusive categories and had a theory of three-fold
standpoints (naya-). Haribhadra in his Vrtti on the Nandi-Stra
identifies the Trairsikas with the jivikas: Trairsiksc jivik
ev'ocyante.3 As Basham has shown4 Abhayadeva states in the com
mentary to the Samavaynga-Stra that 'these jivikas were called
Trairsikas'.5 On the basis of Silnka's statements Hoernle6 had
identified these Trairsikas with the schismatic Jain sect of Trairsikas,
which came into existence over five centuries after Mahvira, but we
agree with Dr Basham's contention7 that the two have to be dis
tinguished.
(218) Dr Basham says that 'the distinctive characteristic of the
jivika system of epistemology . . . was the division of propositions
into three categories' {op. cit., p. 274); but in fact there is another
distinctive feature, namely the adoption of three standpoints (nayas)
instead of the seven (or the two?) of Jainism. The passage quoted by
1
The Historical
Background
155
Basham from the Nandi commentary, fol. 113 (v. op, cit., p. 274, fn. 5)
does not in fact appear in the edition of the commentary, that we have
used (i.e. Nandi Stra, with the comms. of Jinadsa and Haribhadra,
ed. Vijayadna Sri, Indore, 1931). In this edition, there are two
passages more or less identical, which explain these aspects of the
epistemology and logic of the jivikas: one is by Jinadsa Gani in his
Crni appearing on fol. n o and the other is in the Vrtti by Haribhadra
in another form of Prakrit appearing on fols. 113, 114. The difference
is merely dialectical, e.g. the Crni has 'te c'eva jivik tersiy
bhanit', etc., while the Vrtti reads, 'te c'eva Ajiviy tersiy bhaniy'.
These passages differ in a significant respect (v. infra) from the passage
cited by Basham.
(219) We may take the Sanskrit version in Abhayadeva's commentary
on the Samavaynga-Stra, which reads as follows: 'These jivikas
are called Trairsikas. Why? The reason is that they entertain (icchanti)
everything to be of a triple nature, viz. soul, non-soul, soul and nonsoul; world, non-world, world and non-world; being, non-being,
being and non-being, etc. Even in (api) considering standpoints they
entertain a three-fold standpoint such as the substantial, the modal and
the dual'.1 Thus according to Abhayadeva, they are called Trairsikas
for two reasons, in having a three-fold mode of predication and a
three-fold set of standpoints.
(220) The Prakrit versions are almost identically similar to this, the
only difference being that instead of sarvam trytmakam icchanti they
have, savvam jagam trytmakam icchanti, which makes no material
difference. But the passage quoted by Basham has significant variations.
It defines Trairsikh in an additional sentence as follows: Tatas tribhi
rsibhiscarantiti Trairsikh, i.e. thus, since they work with three
heaps they are (called) Trairsikas. Since this definition occurs
immediately after mentioning their three-fold standpoints (naya), the
'heaps' (rsi) seem to refer to the different types of predication as well
as the standpoints. The notable difference in this passage is that it speaks
of the three nayas as 'dravy'stikam paryystikam ubhaystikan ca',
whereas Abhayadeva has (v. fn. supra) 'dravyrthikah paryyrthikah
1
Ta eva c'jiviks Trairasik bhanith. Kasmd?ucyate, yasmtte sarvam
trytmakam icchanti yath jivo'ajivo jivjivah, loko'loko loklokah, sad asat
sadasat ityevam adi, nayacintym api te trividham nayam icchanti tadyath
dravyrthikah paryyrthikah ubhayrthikah, Samavyngastram, with
Abhayadeva's commentary, Ed. Nginadsa Nemachanda, 1938, fol. 120 on
Sam. 147.
156
ubhayrthikah' corresponding to the Prakrit 'davvatthiko pajjavatthiko ubhayatthiko ya' (Nandi Stra) (fol. n o ) . Are we to regard
the latter as preserving a more faithful tradition, since the two funda
mental nayas of the Jains are called the dravyrthikanayaand
paryyrthikanaydi-l and the Prakrit versions of the Nandi commen
taries agree with the Sanskrit version of the Samavaynga com
mentary?
(221) According to D r Basham, 'the jivikas . . . seem to have
accepted the basic principle of Jaina epistemology, without going to
the over-refined extreme of sapta-bhangi, as in the orthodox Jaina
sydvda and Nayavda
{pp. cit., p. 275). This implies that the
jivikas were aware of the seven-fold formulae of the Jains and sim
plified them. But judged by the fact that the three-fold schema of
predication is simpler than the four-fold schema of the Sceptics and
Buddhists and the corresponding seven-fold schema of the Jains, it
would appear to be earlier than both the Buddhist and the Jain
Schemas, with which the jivikas could not have been acquainted
when they evolved theirs.
(222) In fact, it can be shown that in the earliest Buddhist and Jain
texts the very doctrine of the Trairsikas, which seems to have
necessitated the three-fold schema, is mentioned, thus making it highly
probable that it was at least earlier than the Jain schema. For while the
earliest stratum of the Pali Nikyas knows of the four-fold schema,
one of the earliest books of the Jain Canon, the Strakrtnga, which
makes an independent reference to this Trairsika doctrine, does not
mention the seven-fold schema, although it is aware of the basic
principle of sydvda (v. infra, 233).
(223) The Brahmajla Sutta mentions a class of religious teachers,
who were semi-eternalists (samana-brhman . . . ekacca-sassatik
ekacca-asassatik, D . 1.19), who hold that the world and the soul were
partly eternal and partly not (ekaccam sassatam ekaccam asassatam
attnan ca lokan ca pannapenti, loc. cit.). It is probably this same theory
that is elsewhere referred to as the view that holds that the soul and
the world are both eternal and not eternal (sassato ca asassato ca att
ca loko ca, M. II.233, Ud. 69). Four varieties of these semi-eternalists
are mentioned in the Sutta, of which the second believes in the existence
of an ethereal group of Khidd-padosika gods (santi . . . Khiddpadosik nma dev, loc. cit.). N o w it is said that those who over1
157
indulge in sporting in this Heaven lose their memory, fall from this
state and are reborn on earth (tamh ky cavitv itthattham gacchati,
loc. cit.). Such a person leaves the household life (anagriyam pabbajati), practises meditation and attains a jhnic state (tappam anvya . . .
ceto-samdhim phusati, loc, cit.), whereby he sees this past life of his
and realizes that in that world there are beings who do not over
indulge, and who are eternal (ye . . . na ativelam hassa-khidd-ratidhamma-sampann viharanti . . . te . . . na cavanti, nicc dhuv
sassat aviparinmadhamm sassati-samam tath'eva thassanti, loc. cit.)y
while the others are liable to fall. The account given of this school may
perhaps have undergone some distortion, but we can gather from what
is stated that according to this school, there are three types of beings:
1. the eternal beings (sassat) who live for ever in that state (sassatisamam tath'eva thassanti, loc. cit.).
2. the temporal beings who live in this world.
3. the partly eternal and partly temporal beings (ekaccam sassatam
ekaccam asassatam) who fall from the eternal state and perhaps
go back again after a life of restraint and meditation.
(224) W e can see here more than the rudiments of the doctrine of
mandala-moksa or cyclic salvation (y. Basham, op. cit., 257-61). T h e
eternal beings would correspond to the cempotakars of the Civannacittiyr, while those who fall would be the mantalars (y. op. cit.,
p. 260), the main difference being that a different reason is given here
as to why the mantalars return from that state. Now, D r Basham
says that this doctrine of cyclic salvation 'appears to have emerged
some time after the death of Gosla' (y. op. cit.y p. 259). He does not
explain why it was necessary to await the death of Gosla for the doc
trine to emerge, but he has seen that it is mentioned as early as the
Sutrakrtnga. However, it is not correct to say that 'it is first men
tioned in the Sutrakrtnga' {loc. cit.). W e may quote the original
version in the Sutrakrtnga since the identity in language with the Pali
version is significant:
Suddhe apvae y iham egesim hiyam
Puno kidd-padosenam so tattha avarajjhai
Iha samvude muni je pacch hoi apvae
Viyadambu jah bhujjo nirayam sarayam tah.
S . 1.1.3.11-2.
1
We have used capital H for 'Heaven' here to denote that in the opinion of
this school it was an eternal state.
158
Op. cit., Vol. I, fol. 45 on S. 1.1.3.11.2. Svassanapjam upalabhy'nyassana-parbhavam c'opalabhya . . . pramodah safijyate, svassananyakkradarsanc ca dvesah.
The Historical
Background
*59
was not so important for the early jivika. 1 But unless it was one of
the cardinal doctrines both the Jains as well as the Buddhists would
not have stated it in summarizing their views.
(227) This Trairsika doctrine which found it necessary to posit three
kinds of souls and perhaps three kinds of worlds corresponding to
them as well as three kinds of being, appears therefore to be quite early.
The evidence points to its having its origin in a sect of Ajivikas (in the
loose sense) independently of Gosla, though it may have accepted
Gosla's leadership or merged with the followers of Gosla later on.
It is to this doctrine that Basham traces the necessity for the Trairsika
to posit a third possibility: 'The jivika postulate of a third possibility,
neither being nor non-being, must have formed a convenient logical
basis for the unusual doctrine that some souls were compelled to return
even from nirvana. These would be classified in the third category,
sadasatemancipated from samsra and yet not emancipated' (op. cit.,
p. 275). W e agree with this conclusion though not in the form in which
Dr Basham states it, since the third possibility is not 'neither being
nor non-being' but 'both being and non-being' (sadasat), which has
to be distinguished from the former since the distinction was drawn in
the time of the Pli Nikyas. The thesis of this school is, as we said,
stated in the Pli Nikyas as 'sassato ca asassato ca and ca loko ca
which would probably have been equivalent to 'sanasanjlvasca lokasca9
in the terminology of the Trairsika. This, it may be observed, is not a
logical proposition which is contradictory as would appear from its
form (since it seems to violate the Law of Excluded Middle) but an
empirical proposition which is contingent (v. infra, 579). Thus, for this
school the three logical alternatives would be: (1) p, (2) notp, (3)
p.notp and not the usual two (i.p, 2.not-p) according to the Aristo
telian schema.
(228) W e are on less certain ground with regard to its doctrine of
nayas in respect of its antiquity and significance. D r Basham assumes
that it is a simpler version of the seven-fold nayas of Jainism (op. cit.>
p. 275). But there is another possibility.
One has to compare these three nayas considering the terminology
with the two fundamental nayas of Jainism:
1
v. his remark, 'This doctrine is not elsewhere mentioned in the Pli or Jaina
Prakrit texts, and seems not to have loomed large in the minds of the earlier
Ajivikas' (op. cit., p. 259).
i6o
Ajivika
i. Dravyrthika(Substantial)
2. Paryyrthika(Modal)
3. Ubhayrthika(Dual)
Jainism
Dravyrthika- (3) naigama-,
samgraha-,
vyavahra-.
Paryyrthika- (4) rjustra-,
sabda-,
samabhirdha-,
evambhta-.
It will be seen that the Ajivika is more complex if we consider the fact
that Jainism has nothing corresponding to the ubhayrthikanaya-, but
on the other hand the Ajivika has not subdivided (as far as our
knowledge goes) the first two nayas. The fact that the first two nayas
are held in common, points to a common origin, though later the
Jains made further elaborations of these while the jivikas added the
third.
(229) One suspects a close connection between the three forms of
predication and the three nayas. Are we to say that each of the forms
of predication was possible only from one of the nayas, viz.
(1) Sataccording to the dravyrthikanaya(2) Asataccording to the paryyrthikanaya(3) Sadasataccording to the ubhayrthikanayae.g.
(1) A chariot exists as a substance, i.e. from a substantial point of view.
(2) A chariot does not exist as a collection of attributes, i.e. from the
modal point of view (cp. the chariot simile in the Nikyas (S. 1.134)
and the Milinda Panha, 27).
(3) A chariot does and does not exist as a substance and as a collection
of attributes, i.e. from the substantial-cum-modal or dual points
of view.
(230) We find this usage substantiated in the Jain Canonical texts,
which sometimes speak of something having the characteristic q from
one standpoint, the characteristic not-q from another and the character
istics q and not-q from both standpoints. The Trairsika usage was,
therefore, probably not different from this. It also shows that though
the Jains did not actually posit a separate dual standpoint they made
161
102
163
164
165
(239) The attitude of mind that favoured this kind of relativism was
also suspicious of the possibility of the truth lying in extreme points
of view. We already found this in the compromise solutions of
Mahvira who uses the expressions 'both . . . and' (sydastinsti) like
the Trairsikas with their sadasat to express the fact that two opposing
points of view are both right and wrong and that their falsity consists
in taking each extreme point of view to be the sole truth. At times
Mahvira expressly states the truth is not to be found in extremes. It is
said: 'He should not believe that (this world) is without beginning or
without end, eternal or not eternal, according to the argumentation (of
the heretics). From these alternatives you cannot arrive at truth; from
these alternatives you are led to error' (Jacobi's Translation, SBE.,
Vol. 45, pp. 405, 406). The text reads: andiyam parinny anavadaggeti v guno, ssayamassae v iti ditthim na dhrae, eehim dohim
thnehim vavahro na vijjai. eehim dohimthnehim anyram tu jnae
(S. 2.5.2, 3). This point of view is in a sense a corollary of Jain
relativism but, as would be seen, it plays a central role in Buddhism
(v. infra9 607-9).
(240) When we examine the Jain stras we find classifications of
various types of knowledge. These formal classifications may be late
and belong to the post-Buddhistic era but there is little reason to doubt
that the kinds of knowledge referred to were known in the preBuddhistic phase of Jain thought. Thus in the Sthnnga and the
Nandi Stras, as pointed out by Vidybhsana (op. ciu, p. 161, fn. 5),
jnna, which is the general term for knowledge is classified as follows:
Jnna
Aparoksa
Kevala
Paroksa
Akevala
I
Abhinibodha
(Mati)
Sruti
Avadhi
Manahparyya
(241) We find here a classification that is peculiarly Jain, based as it is
on the metaphysics of Jainism. Only extrasensory perception is
denoted by aparoksa or direct knowledge, while normal perception
166
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
167
likely that the main elements of the theory and the different kinds of
knowledge mentioned were known at a time at least coeval if not prior
to Early Buddhism. If we consider the ways of knowing recorded in
the Jain scriptures as shown above, without the valuation or interpreta
tion given to them in accordance with Jain metaphysics we would have
to say that the following means of knowledge are acknowledged in
them namely, (1) perception, sensory and para-normal, (2) inference,
(3) scripture or tradition. Paranormal or extrasensory perception
would include (i) absolute knowledge or omniscience (kevala), (ii)
clairvoyance and clairaudience (avadhi), and (iii) telepathy (manahparyya). The Stras, however, regard upam or comparison (analogy)
as a means of knowledge different from inference. We have seen that
the word pramna was used in the sense of a 'means of knowledge' in
the above quotation from the Uttardhyayana Stra (v. supra, 237),
but since the word appears to have come into currency in its technical
sense during the time of Early Buddhism or at least not very much
later (v. supra, 77), we cannot say how early or late its use in the Jain
scriptures is. The earlier Jain word for a means of knowledge appears
to have been not pramna but hetu. We may see this in the classification
of hetu-s in the sense of pramnas in the Bhagavati and Sthnnga
Stras as shown by Vidybhsana (op. cit., p. 162): athav heil cauvvihe
pannatte tarn jah, paccakkhe anumne uvame game, i.e. the means of
knowledge have been declared to be four-fold, viz. perception, infer
ence, analogy and tradition. This is confirmed by the definition of the
term in the Caraka Samhit, which as we have shown appears to have
preserved an earlier logical terminology current at the time of the Pali
Nikyas (v. infra, 323). This definition reads as follows: Hetur
nmopalabdhikranam tatpratyaksam anumnam aitihyam aupamyam
ity ebhir hetubhir yad upalabhyate tat tattvam (3.8.6.25), i.e. Hetu
stands for the means of apprehension, viz. perception, inference,
tradition and analogy; what is apprehended by means of these hetu-s
is truth. We may note that of the hetu-s pratyaksa- and anumnacorrespond to paccakkhe and anumne of the Jain list, while aitihyam
corresponds to game and aupamyam to uvame (Skr. upam). It is
difficult, however, to say whether the Jains were the first to use the
word in this sense. The Materialists are often called the 'haitukas',1
probably because they used epistemological arguments or arguments
based on hetu- in the sense of 'means of knowledge' to prove their
1
S^l-^)*
168
theories or disprove their opponents (v. supra, 91). They may very
well have been the first to use the term in this sense. The fact that the
Jains did not use the term exclusively in the epistemological sense is
clear from the rest of the quotation of Vidybhsana from the Bhagavati and the Sthnnga Stra, where heil is used in the sense of 'reason'
in a formula bearing a close resemblance to the general causal formula
appearing in the Pli Nikyas (v. infra, 771): athav he cauvvihe
pannatte tarn jah, atthi tarn atthi so he, atthi tarn natthi so he, natthi
tarn atthi so he, natthi tarn natthi so he, i.e. the reasons (he) are
declared to be four-fold, the reason why something exists because
something else exists, the reason why something exists because some
thing else does not exist, the reason why something does not exist
because something else exists, the reason why something does not exist
because something else does not exist. As the examples given by
Vidybhsana would show (loc. cit.), they are four kinds of possible
correlations between causally connected events or things. Thus, if
x (fire) and y (smoke) are causally connected we can say that x is
present because y is present, y being the reason (hetu) why we say
that x is present. We may represent the four instances thus:
1. It is (atthi tarn)
because (he)
2.
4.
that
that
that
that
is (atthi)
is not (natthi)
is (atthi)
is not (natthi)
CHAPTER IV
170
171
172
The Attitude
to
Authority
171
the Vedic scriptures and stands for the testimony of experts. Vedic
statements are included only as a special case of such testimony and
are authoritative because God is all-knowing and presumably trust
worthy (N.S. 2.1.68), the existence of God being independently
proved by a metaphysical analogical argument (smnyatodrsta).
(255) The testimony of people who may be of any class, 'rsis? ryas
or mlecchas'1 relate to empirical facts (drstrtha) while that of the
Vedas relates to non-empirical facts (adrstrtha). Even if the early
Nyya was atheistic,2 it is not likely that the Vedas were rejected
altogether for it seems to have been argued that the human authors of
the Vedas, namely the rsis, were ptas or reliable persons whose state
ments even with regard to non-empirical facts may be accepted
(N.B. 1.1.8, 2.1.68). But what is significant is that the Mimms claim
to an absolute authoritativeness of the Vedas is criticized (N.S. 2.2.1340) and that its authority is considered derivative from the general
authority of reliable testimony, in this school which specialized in the
study of logic. The Vaisesika school, which became closely attached
to the Nyya, not only criticizes the absolute claim to authority of
the Vedas (V.S. 2.2.21-37, 6.1.1. ff.) but does not treat sabda as a
separate pramna at all. It nevertheless subsumes both tradition
(aitihya) as well as verbal testimony (sabda) under inference3 and
treats scriptural statements as sabda or testimony acceptable on the
reliability of the seers. We thus see logicians of the Nyya school
treating the scriptural statements of the Vedas as a sub-class of verbal
testimony and the metaphysicians of the Vaisesika school treating
them as a sub-class of inferential propositions. This attitude to the
Vedas seems to bear some affinity to that of our second group of
Vedic thinkers (v. supra, 244).
(256) The other schools represent a point of view midway between
that of the Mimms and the Nyya-Vaisesika. The Snkhya as a
metaphysical system accepts reliable assertions (ptavacana) as an
independent source of knowledge (S.K. 4). Unlike the Naiyyikas, it
admits its non-personal authorship (S.P.S. 5.46) and independent
1
174
175
176
177
Cp. rco yajmsi smni nirame yajnasiddhaye . . . sdhys tair ayajan devn
ityevani anususruma, Harivamsa, 1.1.3 840; v* Srimn Mahbhratam Harivamsaparvan, Ed. E. Kinjawadekar, Poona, 1936, p. 6.
178
The Attitude
to
Authority
179
180
It is clear from the general context that brahmacariya- here means the practice
of the ceremonial religion and not 'celibacy', cp. the Tait. Upanisad 1.911,
where the importance of offspring (praj), begetting (prajananah) and procreation
(prajtih) and also the necessity of 'not cutting off the line of progeny* (prajtantum m vyavacchetsih) is stressed.
181
182
The Buddha is here not primarily concerned with criticizing the authority of
the Vedic tradition but the claims made about the nature of Brahma and the way
of fellowship with him.
183
tradition, not even the original seers have had a direct knowledge or
vision of Brahma. They have not claimed to have 'seen Brahma face
to face' (Brahma sakkhidittho, D. I.238) and they did not say, 'we
know this, we see this (namely) where, in which direction and in
which place Brahma is' (mayam etam jnama mayam etam passma
yattha va brahm yena va brahm yahim va brahm ti, D. I.239).
(275) Radhakrishnan concludes from examining this Sutta that the
'Buddha does not like the idea of basing the reality of Brahman on
Vedic authority, for when once we admit the evidence of revelation
there is no end to it' (IP. I. p. 467). This conclusion appears to be
strictly unwarranted by the context, which makes it clear that the
Buddha is merely denying that the knowledge of /or about Brahm
in the Vedic tradition is not based on a direct vision or revelation of
Brahm at all, whatever the views the Buddha may have had on the
validity of revelation itself. The Buddha does not prima facie appear to
be averse to the 'idea of basing the reality of Brahman on Vedic
authority* provided a valid claim to a real, personal knowledge of
Brahm was made by at least one of the teachers, on whom this tradi
tion was based. The criticism made here is that the Vedic tradition as
such is not, and cannot claim to be, a revelation. It is not a denial of
the possibility of revelation altogether, though of course, the admission
of such a possibility would be incompatible with the non-theistic
character of Buddhism.
(276) We have already referred to the direct criticism of the Canki
Sutta (r. supra, 263) where the Buddha criticizes the claims of the
brahmins to the absolute and exclusive authority and validity of
scripture (mantapadam) on the grounds that none of the seers claimed
direct personal knowledge of its truth. This is in fact an express denial
that the Vedic seers or their successors were experts whose testimony
could be trusted in regard to what they said, by virtue of the fact that
they themselves did not claim expert personal knowledge of the validity
of what they asserted. This denial of any special insight to the seers
was tantamount to a denial that they were competent persons (pta-)
whose testimony could be accepted.
(277) That the brahmins whom the Buddha converses with, are not
the most orthodox brahmins of the Vedic tradition, has been the
contention of Thomas 1 partly following Oldenberg.2 We, on the
1
2
28
3 #
184
185
186
187
tradition is partially true or has some truth in it, and is partially false
and has some falsity in it as well. On this interpretation all traditions
and reports would have some truth in them. It seems even to tally
with the explanation as to why a religion based on anussava is criticized
only as being 'unsatisfactory' (anasssikam) and not a 'false religion'
(abrahmacariyakam) since there is an element of truth in it.
(283) But this explanation does not seem to be probable since it
contradicts what was already said in the Canki Sutta (v. supra, 278)
where it was pointed out that even the profoundest tradition (revela
tion or report) may turn out to be entirely false. The statement can
be interpreted to mean either '(a tradition) is (partly) true and (partly)
false' or '(a tradition) is (sometimes) true and (sometimes) false'.
The first of these two interpretations is not different in meaning from
the above. The second is to be preferred since it confirms what was
already said in the Canki Sutta. On this interpretation a revelation,
tradition or report though Veil-remembered' may be false and though
'ill-remembered' may be true since there are four alternative possi
bilities.
1. sussatam tath
2. sussatam annath
3. dussatamtath
4. dussatam afinath
188
189
beliefs which formed part of the right philosophy of life (sammditthi) as defined at M. III.72.1
(286) Even the Buddhist criticism of the institution of the sacrifice
is not on the same level with that of the Materialists. The Materialists
saw nothing but deception and fraud in the brahmanical conception
of the sacrifice and would eschew the word yajna from their vocabu
lary altogether. The Buddhists while condemning the elaborate
brahman sacrifices of the time as wasteful and immoral in that they
involved a waste of effort and of valuable resources as well as the
killing of animals (D. 1.141), was not averse to the simple sacrificial
offerings of the earliest brahmins who killed no animals for the
occasion (Sn. 245) and made their offerings in good faith (dhammena).
It was probably such sacrifices where there was no slaughter of
animals that the Arahants could approach (nirrambham yannam
upasankamanti arahanto, i.e. the Arahants attend sacrifices in which
there is no slaughter, A. 11.43, S. I.76). We find Buddhism interpreting
yanna at its best to be the highest religious life as advocated in
Buddhism (Katamo yanno . . . mahapphalataro ca mahnisamsataro
ca . . . ? D. I.i47ff.) just as much as the Upanisads attempt to re
interpret yajna as the religious life (atha yad yajna ity caksate
brahmacaryam eva tat, i.e. now what people call the sacrifice is just
this religious life, Ch. 8.5.1). The significant difference, apart from the
difference in the conception of the religious life, is that the Upanisads
as part of the Vedic tradition generally did not directly attack yajna
and are careful even when advocating ahims to make the single
exception of the sacrifice (ahimsan sarvabhtnyanyatra tirthebhyah,
i.e. showing compassion to all creatures except at the sacrificial
grounds, Ch. 8.15.1). The reason for this exception is obvious. To
deny the sacrifice was to deny the authority of the injunctive assertions
of the Veda and to deny the sacred authority of the Vedic tradition
itself. This the Buddha did but the Upanisads never dared to do;
however much of their speculations may have been at variance with
orthodoxy.
(287) Just as much as the Materialists show the Veda to be contra
dictory the Buddhist texts too tend to show up the contradictions of
the Brahmanical literature, placing the statements in the mouths of the
1
'There is (value in) alms, sacrifice and prayer, there is consequence and result
of good and evil actions, etc.* (atthi dinnam, atthi yittam, atthi hutam, atthi
sukatadukkatnam kammnam phalam vipko . . .)
19
191
stated the evidence which seemed to indicate how in the Brhmanic
and Early Upanisadic tradition, Vedic knowledge was deemed to be
derived directly from a divine omniscient being, namely Prajpati
or Brahma. At the same time there seems to have arisen about this
time the belief that the original seers had a special intuitive knowledge
of the Vedic dharma. This is apparent from Yska's statement:
skstkrtadharmnah rsayo babhvuh, i.e. the seers had a direct
personal knowledge of dharma, Nirukta, 1.20. It is this notion which
the Nyya utilizes to define the competency of the seers when it bases
Vedic authority on the testimony of experts (pth): kirn punar
ptnm prmnyam, skstkrtadharmat bhtaday yathbhtrthachikypayis iti,1 i.e. wherein lies the validity of experts(it lies in)
the fact that they have a direct knowledge of dharma, compassion for
beings and a desire to speak the truth. It seems to have been this very
notion which was the main target of the criticism of the Buddhists who
granted the honesty and trustworthiness of the seers but denied any
special knowledge to them.
(290) It is very likely that in the pre-Buddhistic and pre-Materialistic
phase of the Vedic tradition there was no clearly formulated theory of
the basis of Vedic authority although belief in Vedic authority was
undoubtedly present and it is natural that clear-cut theories should
begin to emerge only after this authority was questioned, as it was, by
the heterodox schools. Judging from the material, the pauruseya
theory would seem to have had strong potentialities at this time. But
it is retained only by a school or schools, which may be considered
the least orthodox and the least concerned about knowledge based on
authority because of its preoccupation with logic and its emphasis on
reason. There seems to be more than one reason for this but one of the
factors, why the pauruseya-theory was not generally favoured, may be
the criticisms of this theory on the part of the Buddhists.
(291) The Prva-Mfmms which represents the views of the most
orthodox brahmins who pre-eminently valued Vedic dharma gives
up the pauruseya-theory altogether (M.S. 1.8.27) and bases the
authority of the Vedas on the novel theory of the eternity of words
(M.S. 1.7 ff.) and the very absence of a personal author. The theory
that the truth or falsity of Vedic injunctions cannot be verified by any
1
Vtsyyana, Nyyabhsyam, Ananda Asrama Series No. 91, p. 145 on N.S.
2.1.68 (2.1.69, SBH. Edition).
192
193
quite emphatically stated that the hymns were composed by them. The
original seers (pubbak isayo) are constantly described as 'the makers
and the utterers of the hymns' (mantnam kattro mantnam pavattro, D. 1.242, M. II. 169) even though it is seemingly admitted that
they practised tapas (isayo pubbak . . . tapassino, Sn. 284). With the
emergence of the conception of the eternity of the Vedas, it could not
possibly have been held that the seers composed them, for even if they
were de facto composing them, they were giving utterance to some
thing that was eternal (v. the argument that a word is the same even
if it is uttered several times or by several persons, M.S. 1.6.19.20).
The brahmin interlocutors concur with the Buddha in regard to the
criticisms made. This is undoubtedly due partly to the fact that what is
reported is not a live discussion with real brahmin opponents but a
Buddhist version of it. But it is of significance that, as Muir has
shown, after a careful sifting of the evidence that 'the Vedic rsis
themselves . . . do not seem to have had any idea, either of their
hymns being uncreated or derived from the eternal Brahma or of
their being infallible' (op. cit., Ill, p. 283). The Vedic seers claim to
make (^/kr), compose (-\Aaks), produce (\/jan) (op, cit., p. 232 fr.)
and we may add utter (avadannrtni . . . RV. 1.179.2; cp. P. pavattro) the hymns but do not claim to see them, although Radhakrishnan
says with no historical justification 'that the rsi of the Vedic hymns
calls himself not so much the composer of the hymns as the seer of
them' (IP. I. p. 128). Even the Vedic Anukramani-s speak of the rsis
as the authors of the hymns (yasya vkyam sa rsih) as Muir (op. cit.,
p. 85), following Colebrooke1 had already pointed out. It is only
later that it is urged that they 'see the Veda by means of an extra
sensory perception' (atmdriyrthadrastrah rsayah . . . , Vedrthapraksa on Taittiriya Samhit, quoted ibid.). The Buddhist criticisms
therefore appear to be realistic in so far as they were made in the
light of the objective facts as they saw them.
(294) As we saw above, the term anussavik (Traditionalists) was not
exclusively used in reference to the teachers of the Vedic tradition,
although when it came to a matter of criticizing a specific tradition it
was more often than not the Vedic tradition that was being assailed.
This shows that despite the presence of other traditions the Vedic
tradition was the most influential and all attention is focused on
questioning its authority. Two of the other terms used in the criticism
1
194
of the various forms of traditional authority, namely paramparand pitakasampad- are also actually used in close association with the
Vedic tradition (brhmannam purnam mantapadam itihaitihaparamparya pitakasampadya, M. II. 169; anussavena itihaitihaparamparya dhammam deseti, M. I.5201). The word paramparmeans a 'series or a succession' {s.v. PTS. Dictionary) and the Buddha
compares the generations of Vedic teachers to a string of blind men
(andhaveni)2 clinging to one behind the other in succession (paramparsatt, D. 1.239, M. II. 170). Parampar can also denote the
'unbroken succession of the teaching' rather than of the teachers, an
interpretation which would fit in better with the meaning of itihaitihaparamparya (i.e. according to the successively handed down
teaching) which would be equivalent to Skr. aitihyapramparyay
(v. Vrtti on Pnini 5.4.23, upadesapramparye aitihyam, Bhtlinck,
Pnini's acht Bcher Grammatischer Regeln, Band I, p. 342). There is,
however, no basic difference in the two meanings and paramparas denoting the 'unbroken succession of the teaching or teachers' is
undoubtedly one of the important factors which counted for the
authoritativeness of the tradition as is always recognized (cp. sampradyvicchede sati . . . i.e. in the absence of a break in the tradition,
S.D.S., p. 127).
(295) Though parampar thus occurs in connection with the Vedic
tradition, the fact that it is used in distinction to that of anussava as a
means of knowledge, quite apart from the meaning of the word itself
which has no intrinsic connection with the Vedas, is a sufficient indi
cation that what is criticized at A. 1.189 and A. II. 191 (m anussavena,
m paramparya . ..) is the acceptance of a tradition in general on the
grounds that it has been successively handed down or the belief in a
teacher on the grounds that he belongs to a successive line of teachers,
handing down a tradition (cp. Corny., paramparkathya m ganhittha,
do not accept on the grounds of a traditional teaching, AA. II.305).
In this connection it is important to remember that Buddhism refers
1
Here there is no verbal mention of the Vedic tradition but as we have shown
by an analysis of this context, it is the Vedic tradition that the author of the text
had primarily in mind.
2
There is some confusion as to whether the second word of this compound
is v e n i = string or venu=bamboo. Andhavenpamam ( D . I.239) or andhavenpamam (v.l). can be decompounded as either veni+upamam or venu+iipamam
but the v. 1. andhavenumafine (M. II, 170, fn. 3) can only be v e n u = b a m b o o ,
successionSkr. vamsah, used of the line of teachers at Brh. 2.6.1; 4.6.1; 6.5.1.
195
196
which is not based on itiha, knowing which in this life itself . . . '
(kittayissmi dhammam ditthe dhamme anitiham yam viditv . . . Sn.
1053) one would transcend the world.
(298) In contrast to this is the use of itihaitiha always in reference to
the Vedic religion (Sn. 1084, M. 1.520,11.169, S. I * ^ ) - At Sn. 1053,
a brahmin student tells the Buddha that what was taught him 'outside
the religion of Gotama' (huram Gotamassan) was of the form ' "so
it has been" "so it will be", all of which is based on itiha and all of
which increases speculation' (iccsi iti bhavissati sabbam tarn itihitiham sabbam tarn takkavaddhanam). The contrast is between the
means of knowledge in the Buddha's religion and the means of
knowledge in the Brahmanical religion. The Buddha's religion is
personally verifiable in this life (sacchikato sayam, Th. I.331; ditthe
dhamme viditv, Sn. 1053) and is not based on itiha while the Brah
manical religion is presumably not so, is based on itiha and is specu
lative.
(299) What is itiha? From the above analysis it would appear that it
included the speculative material in the Brhmanic religion pertaining
to the religious life. Now we saw above that the Tait. Ar. distinguished
between two kinds of material in tradition namely scripture (smrti)
and traditional instruction (aitihya) (v. supra, 67). The very use of
smrti rather than sruti to denote the main textual tradition is perhaps
an indication of the antiquity of this usage1 and shows that \ / s m r a n d
y/itw were indiscriminately employed in reference to scripture at
this time. (Note a similar confusion in the Pali textsdussatam =
du-smrtam and sussatam = su-smrtam of anussavik = anu-srav-ika-,
\/sru at M. I.520.) That part of the tradition which was not classifiable
under smrti seems to have been listed under aitihya. Now aitihya is
an abstract noun, formed from itiha- according to Panini's rule 5.4.2
(ananta-vasatha-itiha-bhesajannyah) and the fact that he thought the
function of the word was worth explaining is perhaps an index to the
antiquity of the conception of aitihya, which is defined in the Vrtti
as 'ityesa niptasamudye upadesapramparye aitihyam' (v. supra, 294).
So aitihya is the basis for the belief in the validity of 'traditional
instruction' which may have comprehended all the ancillary sciences
of the Vedas including the legendary lore and the speculative theories
of the Brahmanical tradition. When the Suttanipta (Sn. 1053) spoke
1
Mishra, History of Indian Philosophy, I, p. 88, translates smrti as 'memory*
but it is unlikely that memory was distinguished from pratyaksa at this time.
197
198
v. Carakasamhit, 3.8.6.31-34.
v. aitihyam anumnafi ca pratyaksamapi cgamam, Rm. 5.87.23 (reference
as given in the St Petersburg Dictionary, s.v. aitihyam); also in the Mahbhrata,
v. Prasad, History of Indian Epistemology, p. 84.
2
199
200
201
202
not have the reputation of being a good preacher with the same
audience (A. II. 13 8).
(308) We have now discussed the several forms of knowledge based
on authority mentioned in the list given in the Anguttara Nikya.
With the exception of anussava, which came in for detailed criticism
as the form of authoritative knowledge par excellence, no reasons are
given here or elsewhere as to why the other forms of knowledge based
on authority were unsatisfactory or unacceptable. Perhaps we have
to assume that the same reasons for which anussava was unsatisfactory
apply to the rest, namely, that such assertions may turn out to be true
or false and therefore there is no guarantee that they are true on the
grounds on which they are accepted. Another reason is suggested by
the Niddesa when it is said that the knowledge based on the various
forms of authority and reasoning (V. supra, 259; infra, 314) is not
'personally realized and directly verified by oneself (smam sayam
abhinntam attapaccakkhadhammam, loc. cit.). Thus even if a belief
based on authority is true, it is not the same as knowledge as defined
and accepted in Buddhism and therefore it is not to be regarded as
knowledge (v. infra, 714, 783).
(309) The Anguttara Nikya list, which we have discussed cannot
also be assumed to be exhaustive. We have already noticed that it
appeared to omit itihitiha- unless (1) this was considered to be identical
with itikir, or (2) the list from itikir to ditthinijjhnakkhanti con
stituted an analysis of the categories within itihitiha as the Niddesa
definition would seem to imply. There is a general antagonism to the
acceptance of knowledge based on any kind of authority in the Pali
Nikyas, especially external non-Buddhist sources of knowledge and
this finds expression occasionally against other forms than those we
have discussed. Thus when Saccaka in debate with the Buddha invokes
the opinion of the majority (mahati janat, M. I.230) in favour of the
truth of a belief that he holds, he is quietly rebuked with the remark that
the belief of the majority has nothing to do with the truth of the thesis
in question (kim hi te . . . mahati janat karissati, ingha tvam sakam
yeva vdam nibbethehi, i.e. what has the opinion of the majority to do
here . . . try to extricate your own thesis, M. I.230).
(310) Another form which the criticism of the acceptance of authority
has taken in Buddhism is perhaps the denial of omniscience. One of the
religions criticized as unsatisfactory is that which is claimed to be based
on the omniscience of the teacher. The claim to omniscience is defined
The Attitude
to
Authority
203
204
him, he meets a fierce elephant, horse or bull, has to ask for the names
of people, of villages or hamlets or to find his way. The text is aware that
these criticisms can be met by the rejoinder (and this was probably
the case) that all these eventualities were inevitable but foreseen (cp.
sunnam me agram pavisitabbam ahosi, tena pvisim . . . i.e. I had to
enter an empty house, therefore I entered, M. I.519). One of the re
ligions thus criticized is undoubtedly Jainism; we are often told that
the Nigantha Ntaputta claimed omniscience (M. II.31, A. III.74) and
this, we know, was 'one of the fundamental dogmas of the Jainas'
(v. Jacobi, Jaina Stras, Part II, SBE., Vol. 15, p. xvi). But as we have
shown there were other claimants to omniscience at this time (v. supra,
196) and the above criticism is levelled against a type of religion rather
than a specific one. What could have been the reason (hetu) that the
author of the text (M. 1.127) was thinking of when he denied the
possibility of omniscience in the above sense but left the possibility
open for someone to be omniscient in the tautological sense of having
the potentiality of knowing anything but not knowing everything all
at once (sakideva) ? We can understand why the continuity of omni
science in all the states of the individual is not considered possible
no one would think that one can have knowledge when one is asleep
(sutta-). But why is this further qualification made that one cannot
know everything all at once? Buddhism makes much of the principle
that the infinite cannot be grasped by a finite measure. It is said that
'there is no measure of the person who has attained the goal (i.e.
Nirvana)' (attham gatassa na pamnam atthi, Sn. 1076). A calculator
(ganaka), accountant (muddik) or 'statistician' (sankhyaka) cannot
measure the amount of the grains of sand in the Ganges or the water
of the ocean, presumably considered infinite (S. IV.376). If omniscience
was reckoned to consist in knowing an infinite set of propositions all at
once, then this was not possible for a finite mind. And, perhaps, no
objection was seen in principle to the possibility of a finite mind
knowing any finite set of such propositions at any particular time. In
any case a claim to omniscience in any sense was not to be accepted
without examining the validity of such a claim, at least, negatively by
the simple tests of common sense.
(312) We have dealt here with the Buddhist criticism of the argument
from authority as found in traditions which Buddhism criticizes. We
are still left with the problem of the role of authority within Buddhism,
which we have considered in a later chapter (y. Ch. VIII).
CHAPTER V
(3) kra-parivitakkena
(4) ditthi-nijjhna-kkhantiy
2o6
The later uses recorded exclusively denote the sense of 'cause' (Svet. 5.12;
6.5, 16, 17; Mait. 6.30).
2
'Altindishe Antizipationen der Aussagenlogik, Studien zur indischen Logik
IF in Extrait du Bulletin de VAcademie Polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres,
Cracovic 1933, p- 93
207
(317) Scholars have often referred to the takki as 'sophists' even using
the word 'sceptics' interchangeably with it (v. infra, 319). It was
probably Oldenberg who set the tone for using the word 'sophist' in
this loose sense. He speaks of a 'species of Indian sophistic' (eine Art
indischer Sophistik1) and compares it with the Greek sophistic move
ments, as though the two were exactly parallel developments: 'Certain
phenomena which developed themselves in the busy bustle of the
ascetic and philosophizing circles, may be described as a species of
Indian sophistic; wherever a Socrates appears, sophists cannot fail to
follow. The conditions under which this sophistic arose were quite
similar to those which gave birth to their Greek counterpart... there
followed Gorgiases and Protagorases and a whole host of ingenious,
species, somewhat frivolous virtuosi, dealers in dialectic and rhetoric.
In exactly the same way there came after the earnest thinkers of the
masculine classical period of Brahmanical speculation a younger
generation of dialecticians.'2 When he goes on to enumerate these
'dialecticians' he seems to include almost all those thinkers mentioned
in the Pali Canon, who did not belong to the Vedic tradition, leaving
out the Jains. The list is as follows, though we have to infer on the
basis of his remarks whom probably Oldenberg had in mind when his
references are not quite specific:
(a) ' . . . the professed controversialists with an overweening
materialist or sceptical air, who were not deficient in either the readi
ness or the vitality to show up all sides of the ideas of their great
predecessors, to modify them, to turn them into their opposites' (op.
cit.y p. 69). Is this a reference to the amarvikkhepik (Sceptics) who
looked at all sides of a question without committing themselves to any
point of view, though they were certainly not Materialists ?
(b) Those who discussed about the 'eternity or transitoriness . . .
infiniteness or finiteness of the world' (Joe. cit.). This seems to be a
reference to the diverse schools of religions which held these mutually
opposed views referred to at Ud. 66-70, etc., although the list is far
from complete.
(c) Then spring up the beginnings of a logical scepticism, the two
doctrines, of which the fundamental propositions run, 'everything
appears to me true' and 'everything appears to me untrue" (loc. cit.).
This appears to be a reference not to 'the two doctrines', but to the
1
J
959> P- 792
Buddha, Tr. W . Hoey, London, 1882, pp. 68-9.
2o8
209
2
History of Indian Logic, p. 227.
Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 13.
Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 94 ff.
2io
The Attitude
to
Reason
ill
they did not wish to make positive assertions, for it is when something
is posited or a positive assertion is made (pratijnte) that the others
could then question them whereas if there were no truths that they
could uphold, they were quite immune to the attacks of able con
troversialists owing to their very scepticism.
(323) Incidentally, we have already noticed two logical terms pre
served in the Caraka Samhit in older senses attested by the Jain or the
Buddhist texts. One was 'hetu' in the sense of 'pramna' (y. supra, 315)
and the other is anuyoga. Keith has expressed the view that the
variations in the meanings of logical terms in the Caraka Samhit
from that of the Nyya Stra were due to the ignorance of the
author of Caraka Samhit of the standard terminology.1 This is an
unwarranted assumption for if this terminology is independently
supported by the usages of the Buddhist or Jain texts, it shows not that
the author of the Caraka Samhit was ignorant of the meanings of these
terms, but that these terms are from an earlier logical tradition not
made use of by the author of the Nyyastra, though the latter may
have been aware of them and consciously rejected them.
(324) If, thus, the third school of sceptics clearly shunned debate
altogether, the picture they present would be the very opposite of that
of the Greek sceptic, who welcomed debate in order to prove the
worth of his scepticism by disproving each and every thesis that came
in his way. There is also no reason to think, as we have said, that the
first two schools of Sceptics were in principle different from the third
in this respect. The fact that the first school was said to be 'afraid of
falsehood' (musvdabhay, D. 1.25) showed that they had certain
scruples for truth and they would therefore not try to denounce every
theory that was put forward in debate merely because they did not
believe in it. Besides these first three schools regarded the moral
consequences of non-scepticism, for different reasons, to be a source
of worry or vexation (vighta-) and since they may have realized that
Vexation could result from debate' (vivde sati vighto, M. I.499) xt ls
unlikely that they would have debated their scepticism at all. There is,
however, one respect in which the outlook of these three schools of
Scepticism may be compared with that of Protagoras, though not of
1
'Nor can any stress be laid on the variations from the Nyya school; an
unscientific exposition of this kind need reflect nothing more than the lack of
knowledge of its author and sheds no light on the early history of the school',
op, cit.3 p. 13.
212
the later Greek Sceptics. We have shown that despite their moral
scepticism at the intellectual level, they probably subscribed to the
traditionally or conventionally accepted moral and religious practices.
Now it is said that Protagoras in spite of his disbelief in objective
truth 'was led to a defence of law and convention and traditional
morality. While as we saw, he did not know whether the gods existed,
he was sure they ought to be worshipped'.1 The significant difference
however was that the Indian Sceptic even regarded non-scepticism as a
moral danger.
(325) We have tried to show that if takki means 'sophist' then at least
the three schools of Sceptics we spoke of above were not sophists and
much of the confusion in calling them sophists seems to have sprung
from the assumption that since the Greek sceptics were sophists, the
Indian sceptics were probably the same.
(326) The case is, however, different with the school of Sanjaya who,
we suggested, did engage in debate in defence of his scepticism
(y. supra, 180). Among the propositions which he refused to declare
were either true or false, was, hoti Tathgato parammaran (the
Tathgata exists after death) and its other three alternatives (D. I.27).
These are among the very propositions the truth of which was said
to have been hotly debated by various religious theorists at this time
(v. Ud. 67). Could Sanjaya have been criticizing one of these theses
at one time and an opposing thesis at another? Did he do so because
he felt that the arguments against each of these alternatives were
equally strong, though he did not discard the possibility that any one
of them could be true? Or did he merely criticize these theories to
display his dialectical skill, regardless of the cause of truth because he
felt that truth was impossible in these matters? The context seems to
favour on the whole the former interpretation. On both interpretations
Sanjaya would have been using takka (tarka) merely to disprove his
opponent's thesisthe sense in which the word is used in the Nyya
Stra (v. supra, 316). But if the latter interpretation was true he would
come close to being the Indian counterpart of the Greek scepticsophist, with the difference that while the Greek scepticism was all
embracing in scope Safijaya's was probably limited to the range of
transcendent propositions. Apart from the tentative character of this
identification there is no reason to think that Sanjaya represented a
1
The Attitude
to
Reason
213
214
5
and among whom at least one school (the second) is said to have
regarded non-scepticism as an updna (involvement) of which they
were afraid and with which they were disgusted (cp. z//?</<z/za-bhay
#/?<z^z/za-parijegucch, D. I.26 and anupdnya santike, M. L498).
That the Buddhist attitude to the amarvikkhepik was on the whole a
favourable one is also apparent from the place they receive in the
Sandaka Sutta (M. 1.520, 521), where the religion of these Sceptics
was classified as one of the four unsatisfactory but not totally false
religions. It also tends to confirm our supposition that the Sceptics,
despite their intellectual scepticism had a conception of the moral and
religious life.
(333) We said that 2(a) seems to be the theory that Dighanakha
himself held. Now, according to the commentary not only is Dighan
akha said to be a Materialist (uccheda-vdo lit. annihilationist, but
synonymous with 'Materialist' at this time) but 'sabbarn me na
khamati' is interpreted differently. 'Sabbarn' is said to be 'all rebirths
and conceptions, which do not please him' (sabb me uppattiyo . . .
patisandhiyo na khamanti, MA. III. 204). Miss Horner disagreeing with
this comment, says that 'Gotama, however, takes "all" in its literal
sense' (M.L.S. II. 176, fn. 6) but does not clarify what this literal sense
was. She translates 'sabbam me na khamati' as 'all is not pleasing to me'
{loc. cit.) but if we interpret 'all5 here to mean just 'everything in the
universe' or even as 'sense-data and thoughts' according to the defini
tion of sabba- at S. IV. 15, it is difficult to see the reason for conflict and
debate between three people who held the views 'everything pleases
me', 'nothing pleases me' and 'some things please me'. The context
makes it evident that ditthi (views) form the content of sabbam for
when Dighanakha says 'sabbam me na khamati', the Buddha asks
'es pi te ditthi na khamati' {loc. cit.) and it is replied 'es me . . . ditthi
khameyya' {loc. cit.). From this we may presume that sabbam here
means 'all (ditthi-s)'. The fact that the radical form of khamati is
closely associated in usage with ditthi (e.g. ditthi-nij)h.na-kkhanti,
S. II.iis; IV.139; A. I.189; II.191; M. II.170) lends support to our
view. We may therefore translate the statement, sabbam me na khamati,
as we have done, as 'I approve of or agree with no (view)' and it is
evident that Oldenberg himself took it in this sense, for otherwise he
would not have seen here the 'beginnings of a logical scepticism'.
(334) It is a problem as to which school of thought Dighanakha
belonged. As a nihilist who disagreed with and denied every thesis that
2i 6
was put forward by his opponents in debate, Dighanakha, the paribbjaka,1 (Dighanakho paribbjako M. I.497) may have belonged to
Sanjaya's school of paribbjakas, the only school of debating sceptics.
The only historical connection that we can see, is that Dighanakha
was a nephew of Sriputta (DPPN., s.v. Dighanakha) and Sriputta
is presumed to have been an adherent of Sanjaya before he joined the
Buddha. But this does not explain how tradition came to associate him
with the Materialists and identify him as a member of that group.
This commentarial identification of him as a Materialist is in fact con
firmed by the text as well. In the course of the dialogue the Buddha
tells Dighanakha that he should regard 'the body which has form,.is
composed of the four primary elements and arises from father and
mother (kyo rpl ctummahbhtiko mtapettika-sambhavo, M.
I.500) as not a soul (anattato samanupassitabbo, loc. cit.J. The wording
is unusual,2 occurs rarely and is identical with the phraseology used
to describe the first school of the Materialists (viz. att rpl ctum
mahbhtiko mtpettikasambhavo, D. I.34). It appears as if the
Buddha was making a specific criticism of the Materialist theory.
There is therefore reason to think that Dighanakha was in fact a
Materialist. As a nihilist Materialist, he may be identified with the
school of nihilist Lokyata, which denied the truth of every thesis
(v. supra, 113). We do not know what kind of arguments they em
ployed but if they were called takki (and we have no evidence that
they were) they would have employed takka for purely destructive
criticism in order to pull down their opponents' theories.
(335) The opposite of Dighanakha's view 'sabbam me khamati' (I
agree with every view) is also said to be held by a school of recluses
and brahmins (eke samanabrhman, loc. eh.). This point of view
resembles, if it is not identical with the anekntavda of the Jains.
According to this theory every view is true from some standpoint
(naya) or other and in general3 no view can be categorically false. The
proposition 'S is P' (sydasti) as well as 'S is not P' (synnsti) can
both be true according to different standpoints (y. infra, 589). This
logic would entail the truth in some sense of all views. The doctrine
of naya is mentioned in some of the early Jain stras (y. supra, 237)
and it is not impossible that it was known, when the Pali Nikyas
1
217
218
Zl<)
(v. SBB., II. p. 167 f.) are similar but it would be noticed that an argu
ment pertaining to the creation of the world is placed on the same
footing as an argument that the crow is white or the crane is black.
We cannot on this evidence argue that there were vitandavadins at
this time, but if we have reason to believe that the art of reason had
been cultivated from the time of the early Upanisads, we have no
reason to disbelieve that vitandavadins or casuists may have existed
both among the Samanas and the brahmins at this time, if there is any
independent evidence for their existence.
(339) We may therefore inquire whether there was a class of people,
who may be called vitandavadins or casuists in as much as they were
primarily interested in displaying their dialectical skill and defeating
their opponents, regardless of the nature of the arguments used.
Saccaka (v. (g), supra, 317) to some extent answers to this description.
He is described as 'one who indulged in debate, a learned controver
sialist, who was held in high esteem by the common people' (bhassappavdako panditavdo sdhu sammato bahujanassa, M. I.227, 237).
There is no reason to doubt that he was one 'who excelled in debate'
(bhassappavdako, s.v. PTS. Dictionary, where it is explained as 'one
who proposes disputation, one who is fond of debate and discussions')
for otherwise his opponents would not have given him the credit for
this. He is said to have held debates (vdena vdam samrabhit, M.
I.250) with the six famous teachers Prana Kassapa, Makhali Gosla,
etc. The list includes Nigantha Ntaputta, although he is described as a
follower of Nigantha (nigantha-putto, M. I.227, 237). It is implied
that he defeated them in debate, Saccaka is made to say that when he
joined them in debate, they evaded in one way or another (anilena
annam paticari, M. I.250), shifted the topic of discussion (bahiddh
katham apanesi, loc. cit.) and showed signs of irritation, anger and
displeasure. These are among the recognized 'occasions for censure'
(nigrahasthna, v. infra, 372) and their mention here implies that
Saccaka was victorious in these debates. Saccaka boasts (or is repre
sented as boasting) about his dialectical skill in magniloquent language.l
This exaggerated picture of his dialectical attainments is however not
justified by his actual performance, at least as reported by his opponents
in the Cla-Saccaka Sutta (M. L.227 ff.) for he falls a victim to a simple
dialectical argument of the Buddha. Even if we call him a casuist
because of his eagerness merely to display his dialectical skill, according
1
220
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
Taittiriya Upanisad
annarasamaya (-atrna)1 (the soul
consisting of the essence of food)
tm prnamayah2 (the soul consisting of organic activities)
tm manomayah (the soul consisting of the mind)
tm vijnnamayah (the soul consisting of cognition)
tm nandamayah (the soul consisting of bliss)
Even the argument that the first tman is composed of the essence of
food since all life that dwells on the earth (prajh . . . yh ks ca
prthivim srith, 2.3.1) depend on food (annd jyante . . . annena
vardhante, loc. cit.) is similar to Saccaka's argument that man has his
body as tman (rpatt) because among other things all organic and
sentient life (bijagmabhtagma, M. I.230) grows to maturity in
dependence on the earth (pathavim nissya, loc. cit.). If this Upanisadic
teaching was not the source of Saccaka's inspiration and he was in fact
a strict adherent of Nigantha's doctrine (v. DPPN., Vol. 2, s.v. Saccaka),
1
Note that rpa (bodily form) is described as 'formed of the four great
elements and thriving on gross food' (ctummahbhtiko kabalihkrhrabhakkho,
D . Li86), i.e. annamaya (formed of food).
%
The sankhra-s include 'in and out breathing' (asssapasss . . . kyasankhro, M. I.301), which is equivalent to prna in the Upanisads (v. Brh. 3.9.26;
Katha, 2.2.5.).
The Attitude
to
Reason
221
then the closest teaching to the one that he propounds would be the
theory of the five asti-kyas (jiva, ksa, dharma, adharma, pudgala)
all of which have a substantial existence, being dravyas,1 although in
that case only two of the astikyas (i.e. jiva and pudgala) would in
any way correspond with his five selves (i.e. with vififina and rpa
respectively).2 Whatever the origin of Saccaka's theory he seems
anxious to defend it and therefore he cannot be called a casuist
(vitandavdi-), who was merely interested in outwitting others in
debate in order to display his dialectical skill.
(340) Another set of thinkers who appear prima facie to be vitandavdins are the recluses and brahmins, whom the third school of
Sceptics (v. supra, 167) feared would engage them in debate. They
were described as 'learned (pandit), subtle (nipun), hairsplitters
(vlavedhirp), who have mastered the doctrines of others (kataparappavd)3 and who go about shattering (vobhindant) with their
intelligence (panngatena) the theories put forward (ditthigatni)' (D.
L26). The fact that they were called 'hairsplitters' who make it their
business to study the theories of others in order to controvert them
strongly suggests that they were a class of vitandavdins primarily
interested in exhibiting their dialectical skill by defeating their
opponents in debate.
(341) There seems to be an eye-witness's account of these 'recluses
and brahmins' (samanabrhman) in action at S.V.73, where Kundaliya
tells the Buddha that he rests in parks (rmanisdi) and frequents
assemblies (parisvacaro) and that it is a habit of his to wander in the
afternoon from park to park and from pleasaunce to pleasaunce where
he sees (passmi) certain recluses and brahmins (eke samana-brhmane)
holding debates (katham kathente), merely for the merit of defending
their own theories (itivdapamokkhnisamsam eva) and of censuring
(their opponents' theories) (uprambhnisamsam).
(342) The only other place in the Nikyas, where the two terms occur
together is in the Alagaddpama Sutta where it is said, te (i.e. ekacce
moghapuris) uprambhnisams c'eva dhammam pariypunanti
1
222
223
224
22
226
Early
Buddhist
Theory
of
Knowledge
questioning him (M. 1.176, II. 122, 123; cp. M. I.396; S. III.6). It is
said that they frame questions in such a manner that 'if they questioned
thus and he answers thus, we shall join issue with him thus and if
questioned thus he answers thus we shall join issue with him thus'
(evafi ce no puttho evam bykarissati, evam pi'ssa mayam vdam
aropessama, evafi ce pi no puttho evam bykarissati, evam pi'ssa mayam
vdam aropessama ti, M. I.176, II. 122). This description seems to
suggest that the favourite questions that they devised were in the form
of dilemmas.1 There are two examples of such dilemmas or 'twopronged questions' (ubhatokotikam panham, M. I.393, S. IV.323),
which are known in Indian logic in general as 'questions with a double
noose' (ubhayatahps, v. Bagchi, Inductive Reasoning, pp. 182, 183).
Both these questions are asked by ksatriyas and they are said to be
instigated by Nigantha Ntaputta. One is by Prince Abhaya (Abhayar
jakumra) and the other by the headman (gmani) Asibandhakaputta.
From the concluding section of the Abhayarjakumra Sutta, it is
evident that this question is to be reckoned among the class of questions
framed and asked by these controversialist learned men (M. I.395, 396)
They are the earliest dilemmas to be recorded in the history of Indian
thought.
(351) The dilemma is 'a form of argument, the purpose of which is
to show that from either of two alternatives, an unwelcome conclusion
follows'.2 This fact is exhibited in the form in which the argument is
stated at M. I.392, 393. The propositions constituting the argument
may be stated as follows:
pbhseyya nu kho . . . Tathgato tarn vcam, y s vc paresam
appiy amanp, i.e. would the Tathgata make statements which
are displeasing and unpleasant to others.
qatha kincarahi . . . puthujjanena nnkaranam, puthujjano pi hi
tarn vcam bhseyya, y s vc paresam appiy amanp, i.e.
then how is he different from the ordinary individual, who also
makes statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others.
r ( = not-p) -na . . . Tathgato tarn vcam bhsati y s vc
paresam appiy amanp, i.e. the Tathgata would not make
Statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others.
1
227
natha kincarahi . . . Devadatto bykato: pyiko Devadatto atekiccho Devadatto, i.e. then why has he pronounced about Devadatta
that he is doomed to h e l l . . . that he is incorrigible?
(352) The argument is stated in a form adapted to the needs of
conversation, but if we restate p, q, r, and n in the indicative mood in
the light of what is meant, the form of the argument is as follows:
If p, then not q; and if r (== not-p), then not-n,
But either p or r ( = not-p)
(Law of Excluded Middle);
Therefore, either not-q or not-n.
(353) It will be seen that this is a complex constructive dilemma
(v. Stebbing, op. cit., p. 108). The Buddha is faced with the prospect
of either admitting that 'he is not different from the ordinary individual
who also makes statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to
others' (not-q) or of admitting that 'he has not pronounced about
Devadatta that he is doomed to hell
that he is incorrigible' (not-n).
The latter admission would be evidently false and the former damaging
to his reputation. In fact we have here a subsidiary argument of the
form modus tollendo ponensi1
Either not-q or not-n (conclusion of the above),
Not (not-n) (since not-n is evidently false),
Therefore not-q.
(354) The Buddha escapes from this dilemma by admitting p in a
qualified sense (na . . . ekamsena, i.e. not categorically, M. 1.393)
which does not imply not-q and is therefore not led to accept not-q.
There is no reason to suppose that the person who framed this question
was aware of the logical form of the arguments as we have represented
them but there is no doubt that the question as stated in this Sutta
embodies a valid dilemma.
(355) Asibandhakaputta's question (S. IV.323 fT.) which has also been
called an 'ubhatokotikam panham' is not so explicitly stated as the one
above. Besides, it contains a conception of consistency which formal
logic does not take account of. This is the sense in which one's actions
may be said to be consistent or inconsistent with the views that one
claims to hold (v. infra, 598 for the definition of this concept of
consistency). In addition, the second prong of the dilemma is not
1
228
stated but merely implied and it is only the fact that it is called a
dilemma (ubhatokotikam panham) that justifies our reconstruction
of it. The statements that constitute the argument are as follows:
p (== B asserts t)Bhagav anekapariyyena kulnam anuddayam
vanned.*
q ( = B acts as if he does not believe t)Bhagav dubbhikkhe . . .
mahat bhikkhusanghena saddhim crikam carati, ucchedya
Bhagav kulnam patipanno.2
We have to assume that the second half of the dilemma is made up
of the following implicative premiss:
If not-p; then r, where not-p = 'B does not assert t' and r = 'B is
not different from an ordinary person'. We may now state the dilemma
as follows:
If p (B asserts t) then not-q (B acts as if he does believe t) and if
not-p (B does not assert t) than r (B is not different from an ordinary
person).
But, either p or not-p (Law of Excluded Middle).
Therefore, either not-q or r.
(356) This again would be a complex constructive dilemma, although
we are less certain of its form owing to the qualifications that had to be
made.
(357) Even if these ksatriyas did cultivate the elements of reasoning,
as appears to be evident from the questions that they have framed,
there is no reason to believe judging from these questions that they
were casuists (vitandavdins) for the questions are about what may
have appeared to intelligent people at this time as the contradictions
of the Buddha. They are quite straightforward and there is no quibbling
in them. In fact, the attitude that the Buddha himself had towards this
intelligentsia provides ample proof that this class of people as a whole
cannot be classified as quibblers and casuists. The Buddha himself
says that he agrees with them on certain matters and disagrees with
them on other matters (y. santi eke samanabrhman pandit nipun
kataparappavd vlavedhirp vobhindant manne caranti pann1
The Exalted One in various ways speaks well of showing compassion to
people.
2
The Exalted One during a famine . . . goes about (for alms) with a large
concourse of monks and (thus) behaves in a way detrimental (to the interests of)
people.
229
230
(359) From our investigations so far we found that with the possible
exception of Sanjaya's school there was little evidence for the existence
of sophists in the Greek sense of the term. It is however not unlikely
that there were quite a few vitandavdins among the dialecticians
(kataparappavd . . . vobhindant caranti) but as we have shown
there is no reason to believe that the majority of them belonged to
this class. There is no evidence in Pali literature that either of these
two classes were called takki, although the word takka (tarka) was
later employed in the Nyyastra to denote an indirect argument used
to disprove one's opponent's thesis.
(360) We are now in a position to consider classes (b), (d), (e) and ( f)
of our list (v. supra, 317). All of them represent definite theories
about the nature of man, his destiny or the universe and some of them
were attributed to well-known teachers at this time. All these theories
mentioned by Oldenberg constitute only a sample of the many theories,
which on the evidence of the texts can be shown to have been debated
during this period. It can be shown that some of these theories were
constructed by takka and presumably all of them were defended by
takka against the attacks of their opponents. The word is clearly
employed to denote the kind of reasoning on which these debated
theories were being defended or criticized in the course of discussion.
It is said in the context of the debate that 'people say the two things
"true" and "false" employing takka on views' (takkan ca ditthisu
pakappayitv 'saccam, mus' ti dvayadhammam hu, Sn. 886). In the
light of the evidence that we have, these debaters have to be distin
guished on the whole from the sophists, casuists (vitandavdi) and
dialecticians, discussed above. There is no sense in calling these
theorists sophists for they were not sceptic-sophists in the Greek
sense of the term, nor were they vitandavdins for despite their
anxiety to score a victory in debate, there is little doubt that they
cherished the truth of their own theories. Whether and to what extent
they used, consciously or unconsciously, fallacious forms of reasoning
231
232
233
234
the language used in the debate and meagre as it is, it gives us a glimpse
of what took place. We may pick out those statements that seem to have
a bearing on the kind of reasoning that was employed in these debates,
viz.
(i) Sahitam me, asahitam te, i.e. the text is on my side, there is no
text on your side.
(2) Pure vacaniyam pacch avaca, i.e. you state later what ought to
be stated earlier.
(3) Pacch vacaniyam pure avaca, i.e. you state earlier what ought
to be stated later.
(4) ropito te vdo, niggahito 'si, i.e. you put forward the thesis,
(now) you are censured.
(366) These statements tend to make it very probable that there was a
conception of valid and invalid reasoning at this time.
(367) We have differed in our translation of, sahitam me, from Prof.
Rhys Davids who renders it as 'I am speaking to the point' and from
the Corny, which explains the phrase as 'my language is apt (silittham),
meaningful (atthayuttam) and accompanied by reasons (kranayuttam)' (DA. I.91). This commentarial explanation cannot, however, be
entirely set aside as it may be preserving a genuine tradition. Our
language would be meaningful and substantial if it lacks the defects
of speech (vkyadosa), of which the C.S. enumerates five types1
(3.8.6.46) namely (1) saying too little (nynam), which occurs when
there is an omission of the reason (hetu), the example (udharana-)
the application (upanaya) and the conclusion (nigamana), (ii) saying
too much (dhikyam) consisting of irrelevancy or repetition, (iii)
meaninglessness (anarthakam), where there is a mere collection of
words, (iv) incoherence (aprthakam), where there is a disparateness
of categories (parasparena ayujyamnrthakam, loc. cit.) and, lastly,
(v) contradiction (viruddha), consisting of opposition to the example
(drstnta), established tenet (siddhnta), or context (samaya). The
concepts are too elaborate and developed to belong to the period of the
Pali Nikyas. The technical uses of udharana ( harana), upanaya
and nigamana ( = niggamana) are not earlier than the Kathvatthu,2
which is one of the latest books of the Pali Canon.3 But the two basic
1
35
236
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
The Attitude
to
Reason
37
jivam anfiam sanram' to which was opposed the theory 'tarn jivam
tarn sariram', i.e. the 'soul is identical with the body' (Ud. 67, v. infra,
379, 384, 387). tm nityah, 'the soul is eternal' is the same as sassato
att (M. II.233) t o which was opposed the theory asassato att (M.
II.233). Sdhyasama is defined in the N.S. as 'that which is indistin
guishable from what has to be proved, since it has to be proved' 1
(1.2.8). The C.S. knows of two kinds of petitio principii, namely the
samsayasama and varnyasama. Samsayasama is said to occur Vhen
that which is the cause of doubt is regarded as dispelling the doubt', 2
and varnyasama 'when the reason is not different from the subject'.3
We cannot assume that all these various forms of the fallacy of petitio
principii were known during the time of the composition of the Pali
Nikyas, but we are merely making the minimum inference that
statement (3) seems to betray some awareness of the fallacy of petitio
principii, however this might have been understood at the time.
(371) Statement (4) contains one of the key terms of the debate
(niggahltdsi), which was used when there arose an 'occasion for
censure' (nigrahasthanam), which according to the N.S. occurred
when 'there was misunderstanding or lack of understanding'4 on the
part of one's opponent. The N.S. enumerates no less than twenty-four
such occasions for censure (5.2.1). The C.S. also gives a strict definition
of the term although it does not enumerate the different occasions for
censure as such. According to the C.S. it results in defeat (parjayaprptih) and occurs 'when the disputant either fails to understand
what the audience understands, when repeated thrice or when one
censures that which is not censurable or refrains from censuring that
which is censurable'.5
(372) One of the nigrahasthnas is fallacies (hetvbhsh) (N.S.
5.2.1) and there is no reason to suspect that the fallacies indicated by
statements (2) and (3) were not regarded as such. There is no direct
mention of individual nigrahasthanas in the Pli Nikyas but a few
indirect references are made to them. Where the Buddha engages the
1
238
Early Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
239
240
241
titthiy ( = saman?)
jivik
brhman
Niganth
242
well, as for example at Ud. 66-9, where there is a reference to nntitthiy samanabrhman paribbjaka,1 who are said to be 'debating
and making verbal thrusts at each other* (vivdpann annamannam
mukhasattihi vitudant viharanti, Ud. 67).
(367) The evidence that we have adduced shows that there were
theories backed by reasoning, which were being debated at this time,
both by the brahmins as well as the samanas. When therefore the Pali
Nikyas give lists of such theories, which are said to be debated, we
need not doubt their authenticity. Since the word takka was employed
to denote the kind of reasoning that was employed in these debates,
takki may very well have meant the 'reasoners' or debaters who
participated in these debates.
(377) One of the earliest lists of topics said to be vigorously debated
by 'many and various heretical teachers, recluses, brahmins and
paribbjakas' (sambahul nntitthiy samanabrhman paribbjaka,
Ud. 66) contains the ten theses on which the Buddha refused to express
an opinion, namely the avykatas. Each of these theses is said to be held
by a school of recluses and brahmins (santi eke samanabrhman
evamvdino evam-ditthino, loc. cit.) who were at loggerheads with
each other in maintaining the truth of its own thesis (vivdpann . . .
vitudant viharanti, ediso dhammo, n'ediso dhammo, n'ediso dhammo
ediso dhammo, loc, cit.). At M. I.426 where this same list of ten is
mentioned, it is introduced as follows: yn'imni ditthigatni Bhagavat avykatni thapitni patikkhittni. This is translated by Miss
Horner as 'those (speculative) views that are not explained, set aside
and ignored by the Lord' (M.L.S. II.97). Here thapitni can certainly
mean 'set aside' and we do not disagree with this translation, but it is
also possible that thapita-, here means 'established' (s.v. PTS. Diction
ary) in the sense of 'proved or demonstrated' and the sentence may
then be translated as 'all these theories which have not been explained
by the Buddha and which are demonstrated and rejected (by various
schools)'. We suggest this as a possibility for two reasons. Firstly, we
find that neither thapita- nor patikkhitta- find a place in a list of
synonyms, meaning 'put aside' used in reference to these very theories.
Thus, at A. 11.41, where it is said that these ten views were put aside
by the Buddha, the language used is as follows: sabbni 'ssa tni
nunnni honti cattni vantni muttni pahinni patinissatthni. The
1
*43
same sentence occurs again in the same Nikya with the addition of
panunnni after honti (V.31: this is a v.l. even at II.41) but both
thapitni and patikkhittni are conspicuous by their absence, which is
very unusual for the normal Pali idiom. Secondly, we find that
sthpan (from ^/ sth) is a technical term, used in the sense of
formally demonstrating the truth of a theory in the C.S. and is defined
as 'the proof of the proposition by means of reasons, examples, ap
plications and conclusions' (tasya eva pratijny hetubhir drstntopanayanigamaih sthpan, 3.8.6.23), It is also significant that the pro
position taken to illustrate the process of sthpan is nityah purusah,
i.e. 'the soul is eternal' and which is the same as the proposition
'sassato att' given in a longer list of propositions said to be debated
at this time (v. Ud. 69).
(378) It is worth trying to identify the schools which put forward each
of these theses to see what kind of arguments were adduced in support
of them. The theses are as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
244
that there was no observable soul, apart from the body and only
the observable exists (v. supra, 91). The Materialists also probably
held (8), and perhaps (3) and (2) as well.
(380) (8) is interpreted to mean in the Corny, that 'the soul does not
exist after death'; hoti tathgato ti disu, satto tathgato ti adhippeto,
i.e. in the statements, hoti tathgato, etc., by tathgata- is meant the
'soul', DA. 1.118; cp. tathgato ti att, the tathgata is the 'soul',
UdA. 340. But the contemporary evidence of the Nikyas themselves
shows beyond doubt that the word 'tathgato' was used to denote
the 'perfect person' or the 'saint' as understood in each religion. It is
said that religious teachers used to 'declare about the state of survival
of their best and highest disciples, who had attained the highest attain
ment, after they were dead and gone'* (yo pi'ssa svako uttamapuriso
paramapuriso paramapattipatto tarn pi svakam abbhatitam kalakatam
upapattisu vykaroti, S. IV.398) and elsewhere we find that the phrase,
uttamapuriso paramapuriso paramappattipatto used as a synonym of
tathgato, viz. yo pi so avuso tathgato uttamapuriso paramapuriso
paramapattipatto tarn tathgatam imesu catusu thnesu pafinapayamno panfiapeti: hoti tathgato param maran ti v. Na hoti . . . , S.
IV. 3 80. The Materialist would, of course, not have a conception of
the perfect person, but he would have certainly denied the truth of this
statement even in this sense.2
(381) The epistemological arguments of the Materialists may have
been extended to show that the world was finite in space (3) and time (2)
but we have no definite evidence that they did so. Since the observable
world is finite in space and time, they may have argued that the world
was in fact finite in space and time and we find Dhammapla com
menting on thesis (2) identifying it as the view of the Materialists
(asassato ti satta pi ucchedavd dassit, i.e. (by the thesis), 'the world
is not eternal' was indicated the seven Materialist schools, UdA. 344).
(382) Thesis (3) was certainly put forward by the school of Finitists,
mentioned in the Brahmajla Sutta of the Buddhists and the Sthnriga Stra of the Jains. In the latter work, eight classes of Akiriyavdins are mentioned, of whom the third is called mitavdl (Finitists).
1
Ajita, the Materialist, is included among the religious leaders who make these
pronouncements, but this is obviously a mistake which would have occurred in
the course of the oral transmission of the texts.
2
Cp. 'the fool and the wise man are utterly annihilated at the destruction of the
body and does not exist after death* (bale ca pandite ca kyassa bhed ucchijjanti
na honti param maran, D . I.55).
245
nstytm pratyaksdipramnvisayatvt . . . tadabhvn na punyappalaksanam karma, tadabhvn na paraloko npi moksa iti, Sthnnga Stra, Vol. II,
fol. 426.
2
Buddhaghosa says that 'reasoners are of four types' (catubbidho takki,
DA. Li06) and enumerates the anussutika- as the first.
246
(y. supra, 242) he would have denied this altogether, since there was no
possibility of such knowledge being erroneous. We do not know what
reasoning Prana employed in debating this theory if he did so,
although we know that the jivikas, who used reason, also claimed
yogic perception (v. supra, 212-15).
(384) Thesis (6) is again identifiable with more than one school. It
would have been a tenet of the school of Pakudha (v. infra, 428) who
maintained the integral existence of a soul, distinct from the body,
probably on the basis of a priori reasoning (v. infra, 428). It was un
doubtedly held also in the first three 'schools' of Eternalists mentioned
in the Brahmajla Sutta (D. 1.13-16), which maintained 'the eternity
of the soul and the world' (sassatan attnan ca lokah ca, loc. cit.).
Since these three 'schools' differed only in regard to the difference in
the degree of their claims to retrocognition (v. pubbenivsam anussarati, D. 1.13 ff.) we may treat them as one school. The argument
seems to have been that since pre-existence, as perceived by jhna or
yoga (v. tappamanvya . . . anuyogamanvya . . . ceto samdhim
phusati, loc. cit.), was a fact, it was necessary to posit the existence of
an eternal soul to account for it. Buddhaghosa describes this argument
as follows: 'Remembering two or three (previous) births, if he argues
"I myself existed in such and such a place in the past, therefore the
soul is eternal", then he is one who reasons on the basis of remember
ing his past births' (dve tisso jtiyo saritv 'aham eva pubbe asukasmim nma ahosim, tasm sassato att' ti takkayanto Jatissaratafckt
nma, DA. 1.107). In arguing that the soul was eternal they probably
inferred that the soul was different from the body, which was evidently
not eternal.
(385) It is possible to identify this school with some degree of proba
bility with one of the Upanisadic schools of thought. In the Sutrakrtnga, where the Materialists (Tajjivatacchariravadins) criticized the
thesis that the 'soul is different from the body' (anno jivo annam
sarlram, 2.1.9, op. cit., Vol. II, fol. 11 = P. annam jivam annam
sarlram), they argued that their opponents could not point to the
soul as a separate entity from the body, just as one may remove 'a
fibre from a munja stalk' (munjo isiyam, loc. cit.) and show it separ
ately. Now this example, as we have shown {v. supra, 130), is found
in the Katha Upanisad and known in the Pli Nikyas. The use of this
simile signifies the practice of jhna or yoga since it was said that 'one
should draw out (the tman) from one's own body, like an arrow-shaft
247
from a reed'. In fact it is even specifically stated that 'the soul shines
not forth but is seen by subtle seers with superior and subtle awakened
intellect' (tm na praksate, drsyate tvagryay buddhy sksmay
sksmadarsibhih, Katha 1.3.12) in a context which enjoins the practice
of yoga (pp. cit., 1.3.13). Now in this Upanisad, it is stated that 'the
tman is constant and eternal . . . and is not slain when the body is
slain' (nityah sasvatd yam . . . na hanyate hanyamne sarlre, 1.2.18).
According to the Upanisad the tman is claimed to be seen by these
yogis as distinct from the body as a result of the practice of yoga,
against which the Materialists argued (v. supra, 131) that this could not
be objectively demonstrated. This is a somewhat different argument
from the one stated in the Brahmajla Sutta but both these schools
seem to be very similar in their outlook.
(386) Even the schools of the Semi-eternalists mentioned in the
Brahmajla Sutta (D. 1.17-22) in so far as they believed in the integrity
of the soul, may be deemed to have subscribed to the theory that 'the
soul was different from the body'. The fourth school is said to have
argued (v. takki, D. I.21) that 'the soul as consciousness, mind, or
intelligence is eternal' (cittam ti v mano ti v vinnnan ti v ayam
att nicco dhuvo sassato, loc. cit.) while the soul consisting of the senseorgans is not eternal (cakkhun ti sotan t i , . . ayam att asassato). This
implies that consciousness regarded as the soul is eternal and different
from the body. The theory results from metaphysical arguments based
on empirical premisses (v. infra, 430).
(387) The Caraka Samhit too records an argument of the same type
of a school which held the thesis that 'the soul is different from the
body'. It reads as follows: 'Since when the eternal soul is present in
the body, the signs of life are cognizable and (they) are not cognizable
at the departure (of the soul), the eternal soul is different from the
body' (yath nityamtmani sarirasthe jivalingnyupalabhyante tasya
cpagamnnopalabhyante tasmd anyah sarird tm nityasc9eti9
3.8.6.52). It is difficult to identify the school which put forward this
argument but one may compare the phrase tm nityah in this passage
with attnicco in the Pali version in the previous paragraph. This
argument is also a metaphysical (causal) argument based on empirical
premisses; when the soul is present, the signs of life are present and
when the soul is absent, the signs of life are absent. Therefore the soul
is the cause of the signs of life and not the body, which must be
1
248
249
We find it in the Jain Stras (saw natthi vinaso, v. supra, 126) and we
find the Buddha accusing the Materialists of asserting the 'destruction
of an existent being' (saw sattassa . . . vinsam, D. I.34). It is possible
that this same premiss was made use of to argue that the perfect person
who had the quality of 'existence* (sat) could not cease to be and there
fore lived eternally in this state.
(390) Thesis (9) was held by the Trairsika jivikas, who posited the
state of sadasat (being and non-being) primarily for this reason,
though it is difficult to see how this theory was defended (v. supra,
227).
v. supra, 44.
250
of existence nor does not, since a living person who exists (hoti) is
said to be 'possessed of consciousness' (savinfinaka, A. 1.132) and a
dead body which has ceased to exist is called 'devoid of consciousness'
(apetavinnna, Dh. 41); and (ii) the mystic impersonalism of the
Middle and Late Upanisads. The Svetsvatara Upanisad speaks of 'a
third stage after death which is a product of meditation' (tasybhidhnd trtiyam dehabhede, 1.11), presumably a stage which is describable as neither existence nor non-existence and in the late Mndkya this 'double na' form of expression is used to describe a 'fourth
stage' (caturtham), which is described as 'neither cognition nor noncognition' (na prjnam nprajnam, 7) and is said to be strictly 'in
describable' (avyapadesyam, loc. cit.). We do not, however, know on
what grounds these theories were defended, if they were debated.
(393) Lastly, thesis (4) is probably that of the Jains. The theory is
ascribed to Nigantha Ntaputta, who, it is said, claims omniscience
and says that 'with his infinite intelligence he has a direct knowledge of
a world that is infinite' (aham anantena nnena anantam lokam jnam
passam viharmi, A. IV.429). We have changed the reading in the
PTS. text from, antavantena nnena antavantam lokam, to, anantena
nnena anantam lokam, on the basis of the variae lecdones. The reason
for doing so is that as the translator Hare has observed,1 if both
Prana Kassapa and Nigantha Ntaputta, who are mentioned here, are
said to be omniscient, then their knowledge (nna-) must be infinite.
As for loka-, it is obvious from the fact that both are said to be 'in
direct contradiction with each other' (afinamannam ujuvipaccanikavdnam, loc. cit.) that one held that the world is finite and the
other that it was infinite. The variant readings offer both possibilities
for each, but we have ascribed to Prana the view that the world is
finite and therefore it is necessary to emend the reading from anta
vantam to anantam in the case of Nigantha Ntaputta. The Jain texts
are not very helpful in solving this problem for, according to the Jain
theory, space is classified as 'mundane' (lokksa) and 'supramundane'
(alokksa).2 If the former was intended by loka- in the Buddhist
context, then it is finite since it is contained within alokkSa, but the
latter is infinite (ananta-) and is said to be 'perceivable by omniscience*
(sarvajfiadrstigocara).3 In the Brahmajla Sutta, this theory is said to
1
2
Ibid.
The Attitude
to
Reason
251
52
(395) In addition to the above ten theses, which are said to be debated
by rival groups 'deeply attached to their respective theories which
they cherish' (nnditthi-nissaya-nissit, Ud. 67), there is another list
of sixteen theories in this same context, which are said to be similarly
debated. They may be classified under four groups according to the
topics discussed:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
253
254
255
(401) This shows that the Buddhist texts were aware of the concept
of the timeless, since the concept of what 'consumes time' is the same
as 'that in which time is consumed (lit. cooked)' (yasmin tu pacyate
klah). It is therefore possible that it was this theory that was alluded
to by III (d). The only problem is that in such a case it is difficult to see
how sukhadukkha- the 'experience of pleasure and pain' could be
timeless! A possible explanation is that the author of this passage in
cluded this in order to preserve the symmetry of his classifications.
(402) A more plausible hypothesis would be to identify III (d) with an
Ajivika doctrine which denied the reality of time altogether and
seems to have been a product of a priori reasoning. According to this
theory time was illusory in a static universe in which there was no
multiplicity or motion. It is the doctrine of avicalita-nityatvam (lit.
motionless permanence), which Basham mistakenly believed was a
later development of the Ajivika school (op. cit., p. 236) since he failed
to see the evidence for the existence of this doctrine in both the
Buddhist as well as the Jain texts. The version of the doctrine given
in the Strakrtnga misled even Silnka, who erroneously identified
it with the Snyavda school of Buddhism and this in turn misled
Jacobi (v. infra). The Strakrtnga (1.12, 6, 7) associates the doctrine
with a school of akiriyavdins and states it as follows: 'Te evam
akkhanti abujjhamn virva-rvni akiriyavi . . . nicco uei na
atthameti, na candim vaddhati hyati v salil na sandanti na vanti
vy vanjho niyato kasine hu loe', i.e. those Akiriyavdins, who have
no understanding propose diverse (theories) . . . the sun does not
rise or set, the moon does not wax or wane, rivers do not flow and
winds do not blow; the whole world is deemed (niyato = niscitah,
Corny.) to be unreal (vanjho = Skr. vandhyah, lit. void). This is a
doctrine which denies the reality of multiplicity and motion and
asserts that the world of appearance is unreal. Now Jacobi translating
the above passage says in a footnote quoting Silnka that 'this is the
opinion of the Snyavdins' (SBE., Vol. 45, p. 317, fn. 1) meaning by
the Snyavdins the Buddhist school of Snyavda and in his Intro
duction (op. cit., p. xxv) Jacobi himself considers this identification as
correct. Now, in the first place, Jacobi's footnote is misleading and
inaccurate, since Silnka identifies this theory with both the Buddhists
as well as the Materialists. Commenting on te evam akkhanti, he says
'te CrvkaBauddhdayo 'kriyvdino evam caksate', i.e. those
Materialists, Buddhists and others, who are akriyvdins say so, op. cit.>
256
The Attitude
to
Reason
*57
Upanisads. He says: 'Referring obviously to the Mundakas, the
Gautamakas, the Katyyanas and others Sudharman adds: They
declare that the sun does not rise there (in the Brahma-world), nor
does it s e t . . . ' (op. cit.9 p. 197). By adding the words 'in the Brahmaworld' in his translation, unsupported by the original, he has distorted
its meaning since the original says that the sun does not rise, etc., in
this world (implied by the examples given). If the Brahma-wo rid was
meant by the passage, it is surely absurd to say according to this
passage that the Brahma-world was 'barren' (vafijho). Barua is evi
dently thinking of the stanza which occurs at Katha 2.2.15 ~ Mund.
2.2.11 = Svet. 6.14; viz. na tatra sryo bhti na candratrakam n'em
vidyuto bhnti kuto'yam agnih, i.e. the sun shines not there, nor the
moon nor stars, these lightnings shine not, much less this fire. Now the
counterpart of this Upanisadic verse is found in the Udna as Barua
himself was the first to point out (pp. cit., p. 424) and reads as follows:
na tattha sukk jotanti dicco nappaksatiy na tattha candim bhti
tamo tattha na vijjati, Ud. 9. It appears from the context that this is a
description of the Buddhist state of Nibbna. Since Barua was ignorant
of the Pali parallel to the Strakrtnga passage, he failed to observe
that his identification, dependent on the slender basis of the mere
similarity of a sentence, did not hold water, since the Buddhists could
not have been criticizing their own views, which would be the case if
Barua's identification was correct. We cannot therefore agree with
Barua's attempt to see in this passage this particular Upanisadic
doctrine.
(405) If we compare the Jain and the Buddhist versions we observe
that according to the former account the world is unreal or void
(vafijha) and according to the latter account everything is firm
(esikatthyitthit). Now, these two epithets occur together in the
description of the doctrine of Pakudha Kaccyana, viz. vafijha
ktatth esikatthyitthit, a phrase which recurs in the description of
the soul (att) and the world (loko) in each of the eternalist theories
(D. L14, 15, 16). At the same time it may be noticed that, as Basham
has observed, the doctrine of immobility was part of Pakudha
Kaccyana's theory.1 This was the reason why he surmised that the
'new doctrine of Avicalita-nityatvam' was 'imported into the jivika
1
He speaks of Pakudha's 'Parmenidean doctrine of immobility , (op. cit.} p. 17)
and says that he 'maintained that elementary categories were as firm as mountains,
neither moving . . .' (op. cit., p. 236).
I
258
259
26o
261
to the Pli Nikyas, but the argument from evil against the possibility
of a creator (v. infra, 698), which is an extension of the argument
from design, showing that if God exists evil must be part of the
design, may have been intended to counter an argument of the above
sort.
(414) Proposition IV (c) is explained in the Corny, as the theory that
holds that both God as well as oneself are causal factors in the genesis
of the experiences of pleasure and pain: 'It is the belief of some that
God, etc., in creating the soul and the world do not create entirely of
their own accord but take into consideration the good and evil of
each being (considered as) a co-operative cause and thus the soul and
the world is self-caused and caused by another' (yasm attnan ca
lokan ca nimminant Issardayo na kevalam sayam eva nimminanti,
atha kho tesam tesam sattnam dhamm'dhammnam sahakrikranam
labhitv'va tasm sayam kato ca parakato ca att ca loko c ti ekaccnam laddhi, UdA. 345). We find traces of this theory in the Svetsvatara Upanisad although Isvara here is in general the one primary
and sole cause of all things. While God remains the creator, each
person assumes various forms according to his deeds (karmnugny
anukramena dehi sthnesu rpny abhi samprapadyate, 5.11). Thus
karma- is also a causal factor in addition to Isvara.
(415) It is necessary to understand what is meant by adhiccasamuppannam in proposition IV (d), if we are to identify any of the schools
which put forward this thesis. As we have shown (v. infra, 763) it
seemed to have been originally coined to denote the concept of
yadrcch which means 'chance' or 'fortuitous circumstance* in sense
equivalent to sangati or 'what happens to come together'. Thus, it
denoted a casual occurrence as opposed to a causal occurrence. But
before long it seemed to have been extended to denote any noncausal occurrence, which was non-causal in the sense of being opposed
to a causal occurrence (paticca-samuppanna-) as understood in
Buddhism. In this latter sense it was apparently equated with ahetuappaccay (A. 1.173). Thus, in this sense it came to denote both the
niyativda-, which is a Strict Determinism as well as yadrcch-vda-,
which is its opposite or Indeterminism. While the usage within the
Nikyas supports this explanation, it also has the sanction of the com
mentator Dhammapla who says: 'Adhiccasamuppanna- means
*'arisen by chance"; it is called the theory of fortuitous origination as
262
(events) arise without any cause. Therefore (tena) even the ahetukavda- is to be included in it' (adhicca-samuppano ti yadicchya samuppanno, kena ci kranena vin uppanno ti adhiccasamuppannavdo
dassito. Tena ahetukavdo pi sangahito hoti, UdA. 345). We have
discussed some o these theories and the kind of reasoning they
employed in the second chapter (v. supra, 198-210).
(416) We have discussed above the theories which were said to have
been actually debated at this time. We may observe that they represent
a wider variety of schools than envisaged by classes (b), (d), (e) and
(f) of our list {v. supray 317). We have been able to identify many, of
the schools in which these theories were held, but it would have been
noticed that the kinds of reasoning employed by these theorists were
many and various. It is necessary to distinguish between (a) the kind
of consideration which led to the construction of the theory from (b)
the reasons employed in the defence of the theory against their
opponents' criticisms. In so far as reason played a part in (a), we may
observe that some theories (v. supra, 379, 387, 389, 408, 413, 415)
were the product of pure reasoning, while in the case of others reason
ing played only a minor role. These latter are classifiable into those in
which reasoning is employed on the alleged data of extrasensory
perception (v. supra, 383, 384, 393) and those in which reasoning is
based on premisses derived from report (v. supra, 382). In fact,
Buddhaghosa's list of different kinds oV reasoners (takki) proves useful
in classifying the above theorists. This is what he says: * There are
four types of reasoners, one who reasons on a premiss based on
tradition (or report), one who reasons on a premiss based on retro- .
cognition, one who reasons on a premiss based on jhnic experience
and the pure reasoner. In this connection, he who hears such a state
ment as "there was a king named Vessantara" and argues on the basis
of it that "if Vessantara is identical with the Exalted One, then the
soul is eternal" and accepts this theory is one who reasons on a premiss
based on tradition (anussutiko). One who remembers one or two
(prior) births and argues that since it was he who existed in the past
in such and such a place, therefore the soul is eternal, is one who
reasons on a premiss based on retrocognition (jatissara-takki). He
who, because of his jhnic experience, argues that since his soul is
happy in the present, it must have been so in the past and it will be so
in the future and accepts the theory (that the soul is eternal) is an in
tuitionist reasoner (labhi takkiko). But a pure reasoner (suddhatakkiko)
263
264
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
discussed on a level with the svak 'the disciples of the Buddha' and
that the attitude to the takki in the Sandaka Sutta (v. M. I.520) is a
comparatively favourable one, since they are classified not among the
upholders of false religions but of religions which are unsatisfactory
or unconsoling. In the light of the above evidence it seems reasonable
to suggest, as against Vidyabhusana and Keith, et al.9 that takkik is
used here to mean 'reasoners' or 'debaters' in general and not for a
narrow class of quibblers or sophists.
(419) Whatever the meaning of takkika- in the above context, the
term takki is quite clearly used of a 'rationalist' in the sense of a 'pure
reasoner' (suddha-takkika) who constructed a metaphysical theory on
the basis of reasoning. In this sense takki and vimamsi (investigator,
speculator) go together. There are four such theories mentioned in the
Brahmajla Sutta, as being the product of such rational speculation.
We may examine them to see the kind of reasoning on which they are
based.
(420) The first is described as follows: 'Herein a certain recluse or
brahmin is a reasoner and speculator. By the exercise of reason and
speculative inquiry, he arrives at the following self-evident (con
clusion): the soul and the world are eternal, independent, steadfast as
mountain peaks and as firm as pillarsthese beings transmigrate and
fare on, die and are reborn and exist for ever and for ever.' *
(421) Oldenberg saw in this passage the Snkhya dualism of the
eternal purusa and prakrti and noting the fact that purusa is called
ktastha in Snkhya held that this was an inexact description of
Snkhya. Thomas, half-heartedly following Oldenberg, says, adverting
to the inaccuracy of the description that this passage (along with
another of the same type) 'speak(s) of doctrines that were rejected even
without being understood'.2 Since Snkhya applies the epithet ktastha
only to the purusa3 it is admitted that this is not an exact account of the
essentials of Snkhya thought. We would conclude from this as against
Oldenberg and Thomas that this is not a reference to Snkhya philo
sophy at all.
1
Idha . . . ekacco samano v brhmano v takki hoti vimamsi. So takkapariyhatam vimamsnucaritam sayam-patibhnam evam ha: Sassato att ca
loko ca vanjho ktattho esikatthyitthito, te ca satt sandhvanti samsaranti
cavanti upapajjanti, atthi tveva sassati-saman ti, D . 1.16.
2
3
History of Buddhist Thought, p. 77.
Ibid.
265
266
267
which posits the existence of more substances and categories than are
envisaged in the above theory. It is therefore difficult to say whether
this was a proto-Vaisesika theory or the nucleus from which the later
Vaisesika theory emerged, but it is necessary to observe that the
similarity seems to extend to another important feature of the two
philosophies. The Caraka Samhit, which as we have seen, appears to
have preserved an earlier logical terminology than that of the Nyya
tradition (y. supra, 323), seems also to have preserved an earlier
definition of two central concepts in the philosophy of Vaisesika,
smnya- and visesa-:1
sarvad sarvabhvnm smnyam vrddhikranam
hrsahetur visesasca pravrttir ubhayasya tu,
i.e. smnya is the cause of the increase and visesa the cause of decline
of all events at all times and there is a continuity of both. This is
certainly different from the meanings of 'universals' and 'particularity'
attached to these concepts in orthodox Vaisesika and shows at least
what changes this philosophy underwent before assuming its present
shape. Now Keith had noticed a correspondence between the six
elements of Pakudha Kaccyana and the six factors of Empedocles,2
which means that sukha- (pleasure) and dukkha- (pain) are comparable
to Empedocles' principles of Harmony and Strife. Whether they played
a similar role in the philosophy of Pakudha Kaccyana, it is difficult
to say in the absence of positive evidence, but the fact that they were
not mentioned in the Strakrtnga account nor in some of the later
Ajivika accounts3 which were aware of them, possibly indicates that
they played a different role in his theory from that of the other
elements, perhaps, analogous to the role of smnya and visesa in the
proto-Vaisesika philosophy, as found in the Caraka Samhit.
(428) The philosophy of Pakudha Kaccyana seems to be a perfect
product of a priori reasoning and we have already shown the steps of
this reasoning in discussing the genesis of this philosophy, without
the concept of the soul (v. supra, 126). The presence of the concept
of the soul makes no difference to the argument and we need not
repeat this here. It is important to reiterate that two premisses seem to
have been accepted as self-evident, (i) that what is distinguishable has
1
v. 1.1.43; Prasad, History of Indian Epistemology, p. 123, where the reference
is wrongly given as Sarlra, I.43, whereas the verse occurs in Strasthna, 1.43.
2
Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas, HOS., Vol. 32, p. 611.
3
Basham, op. cit., p. 91
268
The Attitude
to
Reason
269
270
Pali version. Unfortunately, we are not given the reasoning behind this
view, which is often the case with Upanisadic theories. Buddhaghosa's
analogy of the bird (compared to the soul) and the tree is found in the
Upanisads (Prasna 4.7; Svet. 4.6) but not in the context that he
suggests. The argument based on observation that the person can exist
without the sense-organs but not without prna or the life-breath
(identified with the 'intelligential self in the Kausitaki Upanisad1) is
often mentioned (Brh. 1.3.1-7, 1.7-13) but in these contexts, manas
(mind) is treated as one of the sense-organs. We have not been suc
cessful in tracing the argument in pre-Buddhistic thought. The
argument possibly was that sense-organs being material were des
tructible while the mind being immaterial was indestructible and that
what was indestructible was immortal, but this is pure surmise.
(432) The next thesis based on reasoning and speculation and intro
duced in identical language as the first reads as follows: 'This world is
neither finite nor infinite. Those recluses and brahmins who say that
the world is finite and spherical are wrong. Those recluses and brah
mins who say the world is infinite and without limit are also wrong.
And so are the recluses and brahmins who say that the world is both
finite and infinite'.2 The Corny, is unhelpful and it is difficult to see
what the reasoning of this school could have been. We would tenta
tively suggest that it could be the view of the school which held the
doctrine of avicalitanityatvam (y. supra, 402-8) and which, probably on
the basis of a priori arguments, proved the unreality of multiplicity,
motion and of the world. According to this theory if the world was
unreal (vanjha), then space was unreal and therefore the spatial
epithets 'finite' or 'infinite' could not be predicated of it. So the world
is 'neither finite nor infinite' and the three other logical alternatives
based on the conception that space was real are proved to be false.
(433) The next rational thesis is: 'The soul and the world are noncausal in origin' (adhicca-samuppanno att ca loko ca, D. I.29). Prof.
Rhys Davids translates the phrase as 'fortuitous in origin' but as we
1
This is the main theme of this Upanisad; v. . . . prno'smi prajfitm, 3.2,
'I am the breathing spirit, the intelligential self (Hume, The Thirteen Principal
Upanishads, p. 321).
2
N'evyam loko antav na pannanto. Ye te samana-brhman evam hamsu:
'Antav ayam loko parivatumo' ti tesam mus. Ye pi te samana-brhman evam
hamsu: 'Ananto ayam loko apariyanto' ti tesam pi mus. Ye pi te samanabrhman evam hamsu: 'Antav ca ayam loko ananto c 'ti tesam pi mus . . .
D . I.23, 24.
271
have shown (v. supra, 4 5; v. infra, 763) whatever the original etymo
logical meaning of the word, we find that in usage it referred to either
(a) a purely Deterministic theory or (b) a purely Indeterministic
theory. If it was the former, it could be identified with the niyativdin's thesis, which as we have shown (v. supra, 199) was a product
of a priori reasoning; the Corny, explains adhiccasamuppanna- as 'noncausal in origin' (akrana-samuppannam, DA. Li 18) and this may very
well imply the niyativda-, which has been called the ahetuka-vda (the
non-causal theory, v. supra, 415) in the Nikyas.
(434) The above four theories are the only four which are stated in
the Nikyas to be exclusively the product of takka- (cp. takkapariyhatam) and according to the Corny, those who constructed these
theories would have to be classified as suddha-takkik or 'pure
reasoners'. There are, however, a few theories mentioned in the
Pancattaya Sutta of the Majjhima Nikya, which according to the
commentary are a product of various kinds of reasoning (v. supra, 416)
including pure reasoning. Thus the theory that 'the soul and the world
were extremely happy' (ekanta-sukhi att ca loko ca, M. II.233) in our
pre-existent state1 is said to be a theory that can have one of three
epistemic origins: 'This theory may arise as that of the mystic (who
reasons on the data of his experiences), the person who remembers his
past births (and reasons on this basis) and the (pure) reasoner. In the
case of the mystic, the theory arises as a result of his recalling by means
of his retrocognitive knowledge his (past) life in a ksatriya family as
extremely happy; similarly in the case of the person remembering his
prior births, who experiences happiness in this life and recalls that his
soul was in the same state in the previous seven lives. In the case of the
(pure) reasoner, it arises as a result of his experiencing happiness in this
life and arguing that he was identically the same in the past'.2
(435) We are now in a position to see that the term takka- meant in
the Pli Nikyas either (i) the kind of reasoning with which the
theories, which were debated at this time, were defended or criticized,
even if they may not have been in origin products of reasoning at all, or
1
Note that this theory is a pubbantnuditthi, 'a theory relating to the prior
end (i.e. pre-existence)', M. I.233.
2
Ayam ditthi lbhi-jtissara-takkinam vasena uppajjati: lbhino hi pubbenivsafinena khattiyakule ekantasukham eva attano jtim anussarantassa evam
ditthi uppajjati, tath jtissarassa paccuppannam sukham anubhavato atitsu
sattasu jtisu tadisam eva attabhvam anussarantassa, takkissa pana idha sukhasamangino ante p'ham evam eva ahosin ti takkerieva uppajjati, MA. IV.24,
272
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
(ii) the kind of reasoning with which the speculative, rational meta
physical theories were constructed and which the commentator has
called 'pure reasoning'. We found that these latter appear to have been
constructed on the basis of a priori reasoning, but the instances were
too few and their identity too uncertain for us to be quite sure about
this. So when it was enjoined that 'one should not accept (a theory)
on the grounds of takka-' (m takka-hetu, v. supra, 314), it meant that
'reasoning' of the type (i) or (ii) should not be considered as giving
knowledge of the truth of these theories.
(436) This is further clarified in the Sandaka Sutta, where it is said
that one of the four types of religions which are said to be unsatis
factory but not necessarily false is that based on 'reason and specula
tion'. It says: 'Herein... a certain teacher is a reasoner and investigator;
he teaches a doctrine which is self-evident and is a product of reasoning
and the pursuit of speculation. But in the case of a person who reasons
and speculates, his reasoning may be good or bad, true or false'.1 In
this passage too we have the same problem that we met with in the
passage referring to the anussavik- {v. supra, 282). The text reads:
takkissa . . . satthuno . . . sutakkitam pi hoti duttakkitam pi hoti,
tath pi hoti annath pi hoti, which is translated by Miss Horner as,
'If a teacher is a reasoner . . . part is well-reasoned and part is badly
reasoned and is both right and wrong' (M.L.S. II.200). For the same
reasons, which we urged against a similar translation of the previous
passage (v. supra, 282, 283), we would prefer to translate this (literally)
as 'It is (sometimes) well-reasoned and (sometimes) ill-reasoned by a
teacher who is a reasoner and it is (sometimes) true and (sometimes)
false'. This would give the four possibilities:
1.
2.
3.
4.
273
274
*75
276
says: 'It is impossible that one should have a perfect and clear personal
knowledge of these (theories) apart from believing in them out of
faith, likes, authority, consideration of some reasons (kra-parivitakka-) or conviction based on reflecting on them (ditthi-nijjhnakkhanti). In the absence of a perfect and clear personal knowledge,
even if these recluses and brahmins acquire a partial knowledge {lit,
clarify only a part of their knowledge) of them, it would be an en
tanglement (updna-) of theirs' (. . . tesam vata anfiatr'eva saddhya
afinatra ruciy afinatra anussav afinatra kraparivitakk annatra
ditthinijjhnakkhantiy paccattam yeva nnam bhavissati parisuddham
pariyodtan ti n'etam thnam vijjati. Paccattam kho pana fine asati
parisuddhe pariyodte, yad api te bhonto samanabrhman tattha
nnabhgamattam eva pariyodapenti, tad api tesam bhavatam samanabrhmannam updnam akkhyati, M. L234).
(442) It will be seen that one cannot hope to have perfect knowledge
(nna) of a proposition or theory by the consideration of some reasons
for it (kra-parivitakka-) or by the conviction that dawns by merely
reflecting on it (ditthi-nijjhna-kkhanti). Belief on the basis of these
two kinds of rational reflection, is placed on the same footing on
epistemological grounds as faith (saddh), authority (anussava-) or
purely subjective considerations like likes or dislikes (ruci). We have
already observed that in the Canki Sutta it was said that these five
grounds of acceptance of a theory or proposition (viz. saddh, ruci,
anussava-, kraparivitakk-, ditthinijjhnakkhanti-) were said to have
a 'twofold result in this life itself (ditthe'va dhamme dvidh vipk,
M. Li70, v. supra, 278, 279) namely of turning out to be either true or
false for 'even that which is well reflected upon (suparivitakkitam,
M. L171) or well thought out (sunijjhyitam, loc. cit.) is liable tobe
baseless, unfounded and false, while that which is not well reflected
upon or not well thought may turn out to be true, factual and not false*
(api ca . . . suparivitakkitam yeva hoti . . . sunijjhyitam yeva hoti,
tan ca hoti rittam tuccham mus; no ce pi suparivitakkitam hoti, no ce
pi sunijjhyitam hoti, tan ca hoti bhtam tuccham anannath, loc. cit.).
The moral was that 'an intelligent person safeguarding the truth should
come absolutely to the conclusion that p is true and not-p false*
(vinnun purisena nlam ettha ekamsena nitttham gantum: idam eva
saccam, mogham afinan ti, loc. cit.) on any of the above grounds.
CHAPTER VI
278
279
it is not possible to say whether they are true or false, without clearing
up ambiguities and making certain qualifications and the Buddha is an
analyst in so far as he analyses such propositions and makes the
requisite qualifications without asserting that they are categorically
true or false.
(448) This is similar to though not identical with the Jain point of view,
which advocates the attitude of non-absolutism or anekntavda with
regard to the truth-value of propositions. Propositions according to
Jainism are true or false only in respect of certain standpoints or
nayas (v. supra, 228) and not in any absolute or categorical sense. This
means that certain qualifications have to be made or the naya (stand
point) in respect of which the proposition is asserted has to be specified
before we can ascertain its truth or falsity.
(449) While in the case of Jainism no proposition could in theory be
asserted to be categorically true or false, irrespective of the standpoint
from which it was made, in Buddhism such categorical assertions
were considered possible in the case of some propositions. But the
fact that the Buddha did not make a categorical assertion as to the
truth-value of some propositions (e.g. the avyakata-s or unanswered
questions),1 the truth of which was being hotly debated at this time
(y. supra, 378) seemed to have earned him the reputation in certain
circles of being one who did not make any categorical assertions at
all. The wandering ascetic Potthapda says 'we do not know of any
categorical doctrine preached by the recluse Gotama' (na kho pana
mayam kind samanassa Gotamassa ekamsikam dhammam desitam jnma, D. I.189) supporting this statement of his, by referring to the fact
that the Buddha has not categorically declared that any of the avykatatheses were either true or false. The Buddha in reply says, T have
taught and laid down doctrines (of which it is possible to make)
categorical (assertions) and I have taught and laid down doctrines (of
which it is not possible to make) categorical (assertions)' (ekamsik
p i . . . may dhamm desit pannatt, anekamsik p i . . . may dhamm
desit pannatt, D. I.191). The former are illustrated by the example
of the four noble truths 2 and the latter by the avykata-theses.3
1
We are using this word to denote the ten unanswered questions considered
as propositions in the indicative form (v. supra, 378).
2
Katame . . . ekamsik dhamm desit . . .? 'Idam dukkhan ti, etc.', D . I.191.
3
Katame . . . anekamsik dhamm desit . . .? 'Sassato loko* ti v . . ., etc.,
loc. cit.
280
Analysis
and
Meaning
281
282
(454) It is possible that the earliest division was into (1) ekamsavykaranlya-pafiha- and (2) anekamsa-vyakara-niyapanha- corre
sponding to the two kinds of statements (ekamsik dhamm and
anekamsik dhamm) mentioned at D. 1.191. Later, the latter class
would have been subdivided into the (a) vibhajja-vykaranlya- and
the (b) thapaniya-, corresponding to the two classes of statements
that were not ekamsika- (v. supra, 450). Patipucch-vykaraniya is,
in fact, a sub-class of vibhajja-vyakaranlya, as will be seen below.
(455) Although this classification of questions is found in the Nikyas,
nowhere in the Pali Canon is there an attempt to explain and illustrate
what is meant by these four kinds of questions. We have to seek these
explanations in the Corny, to the Anguttara Nikya (AA. II.308, 309),
the Milindapanha (pp. 144, 145), the Abhidharmakosa,1 the Sphutrthbhidharmakosavykhy2 and Poussin's account of the Abhidhar
makosa commentaries.3
(456) The Mahvyutpatti (83, p. 29) records the four kinds of ex
planations (of questions) in the order in which they are stated in the
Anguttara verse (v. supra, 453) and the prose passage at A. 1.197
(v. supra, 452): ekamsa-vykaranam, vibhajya-, pariprcch-, sthpaniyavyakaranam. The only innovation it makes is to add vykaranam
after sthpamya- whereas the Pali account (A. II.46) merely says
thapaniya-, while mentioning vykarana- along with the other three
types. We cannot deduce from this that thapaniya- 'setting aside' was
not really considered an explanation of the question since there is the
mention of, cattri.... panhavykaranni (loc. cit.).
(457) While the Pali Abhidhamma is strangely silent about these
questions, the Abhidharmakosa records a verse mentioning not only
the four types of questions but four examples illustrating them as well,
viz.
ekmsena vibhgena prcchtah sthpaniyatah
vykrtam maranotpattivisisttmnyatdivat,
loc. cit.
(458) These examples, as will be observed, are different from those
we meet with in the Pali tradition and we cannot assume that the
original division in the Nikyas was intended to be illustrated by
examples of the sort adduced, especially when we find that there was
1
Analysis
and
Meaning
283
2
Vibhs 15.13; v. Poussin, op. cit.} Vol. V, p. 45, fn. 3.
Ibid.
Cp. Jnnaprasthnasstra of Katyyaniputra, Tr. and Ed. S. B. Sstri, Vol. I,
Sntiniketan, 1955, Foreword, 'Of the seven Sarvstivda texts, the Jnnapras
thnasstra is the principal work and the other six which are called pda are only
4
supplements to it.'
Poussin, op. eh., Vol. V, p. 45.
5
6v s n I2
Poussin, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 47- - - 4 and S. II.244 ff.
7
Poussin, op. cit.3 Vol. V, p. 44
3
284
285
286
with one's body, speech or mind one experiences suffering, loc, cit.).
This reply is erroneous probably because the term sancetanikam
kammam (volitional act) is ambiguous and can mean (i) sancetanikam
kusalam kammam (a good volitional act), (ii) sancetanikam akusalam
kammam (an evil volitional act), or (iii) sancetanikam avykatam
kammam (a neutral volitional act) and the reply will differ in each
case. The Mahsanghikas seem to have noticed this instance in the
Nikyas and give it as an example of this kind of question (Poussin,
op, cit., p. 47). The analysis (vibhajya) required in answering this kind
of question consists therefore in clearing up the ambiguities implicit
or even remotely implied in the terms or the form in which the
question is put.
(466) The third kind of question, the patipucchvykaraniya-, appears
in fact to be only a subdivision of the second type, since the necessity
for the counter-question is again due to the ambiguities in the original
question, which in fact can be cleared up by an analytical answer instead
of putting the onus on the questioner by asking him what he means
by this or that term. The Milindapanha in illustrating this type of
question merely gives the example, 'cakkhun sabbam vijnati ti?'
(does one know everything with the eye? loc. cit,) but does not tell
us what the counter-question should be. The counter-question
probably would be a request to clear up the ambiguity of 'sabbam'
by asking, sabbam rpam udhu sabbam saddam . . . ? (Is it every
form or every sound or . . . ?). The question is therefore not logically
different from a question of the second kind since it could be analyti
cally answered as follows: cakkhun sabbam rpam vijnati, api ca na
sabbam saddam vijnati . . ., i.e. one knows every form with the eye
but one does not know any sound
Buddhaghosa gives the example,
'yath cakkhum tath sotam, yath sotam tath cakkhun ti?' (Is the
eye the same as the ear and the ear the same as the eye? loc, cit,)
It is said that one should counter-question the questioner and ask him
in what sense he is using the word 'same'. If he answers that it is 'in
the sense of seeing' (dassanatthena) one's reply should be (no' and if
it is 'in the sense of impermanence' (aniccatthena) one's reply should be
'yes'. It is clear that this ambiguity could have been dealt with, without
the necessity for the counter-question.
(467) The Abhidharmakoakrik gives the example, 'Is man superior
or inferior?' (Poussin, op, cit., p. 44). One should reply this with the
question, 'In relation to whom?' (loc. cit.) and if he says, 'In relation
287
to the gods' (Joe. cit.), he should reply 'he is inferior' (he. cit.), but
if he says, I n relation to the beings of the lower worlds' (etres des
mauvaises destinees, loc. cit.), he should reply, 'he is superior' (Joe.
cit.). Here again the counter-question which is necessitated by the
ambiguity of the terms 'visista-' (superior) and 'hfna' (inferior) may
be cleared up in the very first answer by specifying the senses in which
man is inferior and superior respectively. Bhadanta Rma thought
that this question was of the first type and one could reply it cate
gorically as follows: 'L'homme, en effet, est en raeme temps superior
et inferieur d'apres le point de comparaison' (Poussin, op. cit., p. 45).
But this is a mistake since in specifying, 'd'apres le point de comparison'
one is making an 'analysis'. The Abhidharmikas, as we have already
remarked, do not strictly distinguish this type of question from the
second. It is the same question as the second, which becomes patipucch-vyakaranfya and is intended to confuse and confound the
questioner when he happens to be a deceitful person (satha) (v.
Poussin, op. cit., p. 46).
(468) The Mahsanghikas have the merit of picking on an example
taken directly from the Nikyas. When the Buddha is asked the
question, sann nu kho . . . purisassa att, udhu ann sann anno
att, i.e. is consciousness a person's soul or is consciousness one thing
and the soul another? D. 1.185, he replies with the question, kim pana
tvam . . . attnam paccesi, i.e. what do take to be the soul?, loc. cit.
The Mahsanghikas give this same example.1 In this context perhaps
the counter-question may be justified for one of the words (att, soul)
used by the questioner admitted of such a variety of usages at this
time that no one but the user could have known exactly the sense in
which he was employing the term. But even here it may be noted that
the reply is based on an analysis of the meaning of the term att.
(469) The next kind of question mentioned, the thapanlya-, is in
teresting in so far as it seems to have a modern parallel in the kind of
question which the Positivist dismisses as meaningless and therefore
unanswerable. The Milindapanha (p. 145), the Anguttara Corny.2
(AA. II.309), the Mahsanghikas (Poussin, op. cit., p. 48), and even
1
Poussin, op. cit., p. 47, Poussin has mistakenly given the reference as Dlgha,
i. 195 when it should be D . I.185.
2
Here it is said, tarn jivam tarn sariran ti dini putthena pana, 'avyakatam
etam Bhagavata'ti thapetabbo, i.e. when questioned whether the 'soul is the same
as the body', etc., one should set it aside as unexplained by the Exalted One.
288
bhidharmikas (Poussin, op. cit., p. 47) agree in giving the avykatatheses in question form as examples of this kind of question. The
Mahsanghikas mention fourteen theses by extending the theses,
antav loko and sassato loko, into the four logical alternatives (v.
infra, 571) instead of the two, but curiously enough this extension is
not made in the Pali Canon, which knows of only ten avykatatheses.
(470) There is no doubt that these theses were regarded in the
Nikyas as those doctrines about which no categorical assertion was
made (v. supra, 449). At M. I.426 it was said: yn'imni ditthigatni
Bhagavat abykatni thapitni patikkhittnisassato loko iti pi
asassato loko iti pi . . . , i.e. those metaphysical theories which have
not been explained and which have been set aside and rejected by the
Exalted One (v. supra, 377). This shows that the Nikyas clearly
recognized these questions as those which were to be set aside.
(471) The problem is why these questions were set aside. Buddhaghosa
defines a thapanlya panha as 'a question which ought not to be ex
plained and which ought to be set aside on the ground that it was not
explained by the Exalted One' (avykatam etam Bhagavat ti thapetabbo, eso panho na vattabbo, ayam thapaniyo panho, AA. II.309).
This is not very helpful, for he is virtually saying that these questions
ought to be set aside because they have been set aside by the Buddha.
But the problem really is why the Buddha considered these questions
as * those which ought to be set aside'.
(472) Did these questions have a certain property which made them
unanswerable or were they in principle answerable categorically or
analytically though set aside for a special reason. If the latter was the
case, the questions do not belong to a logically different type whereas
if the former is the case, they would fall into a class of their own. It is
also possible that the questions which were classified as thapanlya
were a mixed lot, of which some were to be set aside for the former
reason and others for the latter.
(473) We have discussed in a later Chapter what consideration lead us
to conclude that these questions were 'to be set aside' (thapanlya) on
pragmatic grounds since belief in any of the possible answers was
considered irrelevant and otiose for our purpose (v. infra, 814). It is
possible to argue that these questions were regarded to be in principle
answerable categorically though dismissed for pragmatic reasons but
it is necessary to note that nowhere is it directly stated that these
289
2 c)0
Analysis
and
Meaning
291
concepts, 'Thus it can come about that we aren't able to rid ourselves
of the implications of our symbolism, which seems to admit of a
question like, "Where does the flame of a candle go to when it's
blown out}" "Where does the light go to?" We have become obsessed
with out symbolism.We may say that we are led into puzzlement
by an analogy which irresistibly drags us on.' 2
(477) It is therefore clear that the author of this Sutta considered this
question as a meaningless one and as falling into a type of questions
which were by their very nature (logical) unanswerable and have there
fore to be 'set aside'. This question is given as an example to illustrate
the nature of the question, Vimuttacitto . . . kuhim upapajjati ti?'
(y. supra, 474) which is also said to be one to which no categorical
reply is possible and since this is in effect intended to be in intent the
same question as, 'hoti Tathgato param maran?' we may presume
that at least these questions were considered to be thapaniya in the
sense that 'they ought to be set aside as unanswerable' as, owing to
the very form in which the quesion is put, it is strictly meaningless
and no meaningful answer in any of the logical alternatives was
therefore possible.
(478) The Abhidharmakosakrik alone gives the following example
to illustrate this kind of question: 'Les skandhas sont-ils la meme
chose que le sattva ou etre-vivant, ou en sont-ils difTerents?' (Poussin,
op, ciu, p. 44). The explanation given clearly classifies it as a meaning
less question, that is a question whose logical character is such, as to
make it impossible of being answered by a categorical reply. It is
said that the term 'etre-vivant' in the question does not refer to any
entity and it is therefore like the question, 'Is the son of a barren
woman white or black?' (loc. cit.). Here the descriptive phrase 'the
son of a barren woman' does not refer to anything since it is logically
impossible for a barren woman to have a son. Hence the question,
which asks for the relationship between an existent thing (the skandhas)
and a non-entity is literally meaningless and has to be set aside. This
example does not occur in the Pali Canon, although it is stated here
that the Tathgata is not to be identified with the skandhas nor
considered separate from them (S. III.111; S. IV.383) and Buddhaghosa identifies Tathgata- with satta- ( = a being) though we think
1
Cp. Ninian Smart, A Dialogue of Religions, London, i960, p. 47, makes CB.
(i.e. Ceylon Buddhist) say in reference to this assertion, 'The assertion has no
clear meaning: a flame neither goes North nor in any other direction . . . \
2
Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford, 1958, p . 108.
292
293
II. 161). The question is put in its four logically alternative forms and
dismissed with the answer 'do not (ask) thus' (m h'evam, loc. cit.).
This means that the question is a thapaniya-panha. The reason given
is that, 'in talking thus one ascribes phenomenal reality1 to what is not
phenomenally real' (iti vadam appapaficam papanceti, loc. cit.). The
realm of sensory and mind experience constitutes the realm of the
phenomenally real (yvat channam phassyatannam gati, tvat
papancassa gati, yvat papancassa gati, tvat channam phassya
tannam gati, loc. cit.) and with the cessation of the former, the latter
ceases to be for oneself (channam . . . asesvirganirodh papancavpasamo, loc. cit.). The objection to the question seems to be that the
question imputes to transcendent reality the characteristics of 'exis
tence', 'non-existence', etc., which have a valid application only within
the realm of experience.2
(481) There are questions mentioned, where all four of the logical
alternatives may be false (v. infra, 585) but these questions are not to
be treated as thapaniya-panha since the questions have been cate
gorically answered. The Nikyas distinguish between the two types
by using the formula 'm h'evam' (do not (say) so) for all the four
alternatives of a thapanlya-, while in the former case the usual nega
tion, 'no h'idam' (it is not so) is used for each of the four alternatives
(y. A. II. 163).
(482) The term vi + -v/khaj- is found in another important sense in
the Pali Canon to denote 'a detailed classification, exposition or
explanation' of a brief statement or title, e.g. ye c'ime bhot Udenena
cattro puggal samkhittena vutt vitthrena avibhatt sdhu me
bhavam Udeno ime cattro puggal vitthrena vibhajatu anukampam
updya, M. II. 161. The brief statement is called an uddesa which has
to be analysed and explained in detail: ko nu kho . . . Bhagavat
samkhittena uddesassa udditthassa vitthrena attham avibhattassa
vitthrena attham vibhajeyya (M. III. 193; cp. 198, 223). Such a detailed
analysis and explanation is called a vibhahga as opposed to its uddesa;
uddesan ca vibhangah ca (M. III. 187, 192). There are a number of
Suttas, which are called vibhahgas in this sense, e.g. Clakamma1
294
95
296
Pitaka,
Second Edition,
297
K*
Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas, HOS., Vol. 32, p. 483.
298
brhmano, Dh. 388). 'Rpa- is that by which one is afflicted with heat,
cold, etc' (ruppati ti tasm rpan ti vuccati, kena ruppati? sitena,
unhena . .., S. III.86), although it is doubtful whether the etymology
of rpa is in any way connected with the verbal root of ruppati, to
be hurt.
(489) The etymology is not always wrong, for there are many
instances in which the correct verbal root is indicated, e.g. when
sann is defined by correctly relating it with the verbal form sanjnti
and by mentioning a few typical instances of sann: sanjnti ti . . 4
tasm sann ti vuccati, kifica sanjnti... nilakam pi sanjnti pitakam.
pi sanjnti... lohitakam p i . . . odtam pi, i.e. it is called sann, because
one recognizes (with it), what does one recognize? One recognizes
what is blue, yellow, red, white, M. I.293. This kind of definition in
extension1 is at times resorted to with greater exactness in the Abhidhammapitaka, though sometimes a definition in intention or even
several such definitions are given along with it.
(490) Thus that rpa which is denoted by the term 'rpyatanam'
(the field of visual phenomena) is defined as follows: * whatever form,
which is dependent on the four great elements, is possessed of hue,
brightness and visual appearance, and causes impressions (such as)
what is blue, yellow, red, white, black . . . long, short, shall, large,
circular, globular, square, hexagonal . . . depth (ninna-thalam) . . .
shade, light, brightness, darkness, mist, cloud . . . the hue and bright
ness of the moon, the sun, the stars . . . , etc. (yam v pana annam pi
atthi rpam . . .), which one has seen (passi), is seeing (passati), will
see (passissati) or would see (passe) with the eye, which is itself
unobservable, though possessed of impressions, is form, the field of
visual phenomena and the sphere of formthis is the field of visual
phenomena' (yam rpam catunnam mahbhtnam updya vannanibh-sanidassanam sappatigham nilam pitakam lohitakam odtam
klakam . . . digham rassam anum thlam vattam parimandalam
caturamsam chalamsam . . . ninna-thalam chy tapo loko andhakro
abbh mahik
canda-mandalassa vanna-nibh suriya-mandalassa
vanna-nibh trakarpnam vanna-nibh . . . yam v panafinam pi
atthi rpam . . . yam . . . cakkhun anidassanena sappatighena passi v
passati v passissati v passe v rpam p'etarn rpyatanam p'etam
rpa-dhtu p'esidam tarn rpam rpyatanam, DhS., 617, p. 139.
1
299
(491) Several ways of defining are combined in this complex definition
of the term rpyatanam. We notice a definition in extension enumer
ating typical instances of different kinds of visual phenomena such
as hues (blue, yellow, etc.), shapes (long, short, square, etc.), depth,
darkness, light, shade and degrees of brightness. Then there is a
definition in intention by stating that they all have the property of
being observable in an actual or hypothetical (v. passe, would see)
sense by the eye. Then again one may possibly discern a definition by
definite description,1 when it is said that it is 'the form which is
dependent on the four great elements, is possessed of hue, brightness
and visual appearance and causes impressions'. Finally there is a
substitution of partly synonymous verbal phrases, e.g. rpam p'etam
. . . rpadhtu p'es, which Johnson calls 'biverbal definition'.2
(492) This is not all. More definitions of rpyatanam follow, all
given in intension and where the characteristics mentioned are, (i) that
on which the eye focuses itself {lit. strikes) in an actual or hypothetical
sense (yam rpam . . . cakkhum patihanni v patihannati v patihafinissati v patihanne v, DhS., 618, p. 140), (ii) that which would
cause an impression in an actual or hypothetical sense on the eye
(yam
cakkhumhi . . . patihanni, etc., DhS., 619), (iii) that which in
conjunction with the eye gives rise to a visual impression in an actual
or hypothetical sense (yam . . . cakkhum nissya cakkhu-samphasso
uppajji v, etc., DhS., 620), (iv) that which in conjunction with the eye
gives rise to, in an actual or hypothetical sense, feeling, percepts,
volitions and visual cognitions resulting from visual impressions
(yam . . . cakkhum nissya cakkhu-samphassaj vedan . . . sanfi . . .
cetan . . . cakkhuvinnnam uppajji v uppajjati v uppajjissati v
uppajje v, DhS., 620).
(493) We do find many instances of bi-verbal definitions, where there
is a mere substitution of verbal phrases and which as Mrs Rhys
Davids pointed out were 'over-lapping or partially coinciding notions'
(r. supra, 483). As a typical example we quote the definition of jam:
y tesam tesam sattnam tamhi tamhi sattanikye jar jiranat khandiccam pliccam valittacat yuno samhni indriynam paripko, Vbh.,
99. We may compare this with the definition of rpassa jarat: y
rpassa jar jiranat . . . indriynam paripko, DhS., 644, p. 144
where the phrase, 'tesam tesam sattnam tamhi tamhi sattanikye' is
1
300
301
302
knowledge (pafin)
mundane
(lokiya)
(b)
supra-mundane
(lokuttara) Vbh., 322
knowledge (pafin)
actual
(kena ci vifineyy)
(c)
hypothetical
(na kena ci vinneyya) loc. cit.
knowledge (pafin)
cogitative
(savitakka-)
non-cogitative
(avitakka-) Vbh., 323
cint-maya(arising from
thinking)
suta-maya(arising from
testimony)
bhvan-maya(arising from
contemplation,
i.e. jhnic
experience) Vbh., 324
303
knowledge (pafin)
Of the mystic
(sampannassa)
= bhvan-maya-
(na kmvacara)
kmvacara
rpvacara
(na rpvacara)
arpvacara
1
(na arpvacara)
apariypanna, loc. ch,
34
Analysis
and
Meaning
35
306
Analysis
and
Meaning
307
(509) We can see that not all rpa is rupakkhandha- for piyarpa- and
starpa- are rpa-, but not rupakkhandha-. But as the next statement
1
Cp. Wittgenstein, op. eh., p. ioe: ' W e might very well also write every
statement in the form of a question followed by a "Yes"; for instance: 'Is it raining?
Yes!" Would this show that every statement contained a question?'
308
(512) We may eliminate the question (and answer) form and restate
the propositions asserted as follows:
(i) All vedan is vedankkhandho, i.e. All S is P (SaP)
(ii) All vedankkhandho is vedan, i.e. All P is S (PaS)
1
309
Now any textbook on logic would tell us that (ii) is not the converse
of (i) nor (i) the converse of (ii). One is not an immediate inference
from the other but they are independent statements giving us infor
mation about the relative use of the concepts contained in them. To
regard (ii) as the converse of (i) would be to violate the rule of dis
tribution, which states that 'no term may be distributed in an inferred
proposition unless it is distributed in the original proposition'.2 Now
in a universal affirmative proposition (i.e. SaP), the subject is dis
tributed and the predicate is undistributed.3 If we convert it as PaS,
an undistributed term in the original gets distributed and the rule is
violated, resulting in an illegitimate conversion.
(5X3) Now are we going to say that the author of the Yamaka, in the
light of the above evidence, was ignorant of the distribution of terms
and the process of conversion. All this is absurd. The Yamaka does
not consist of a set of logical exercises and is not a textbook on applied
logic at all. The members of the pairs of statements do not stand to
each other in the logical relation of one being an immediate inference
of the other. To conceive them as such is wholly to misunderstand
the purpose of the book, which is not an exercise in logical gymnastics,
but is intended to convey to the reader the exact logical boundaries of
important concepts in the light of their actual technical usage. The
fact that some of these statements may in fact turn out to be the
converse of the other is to be counted as purely accidental and is not
due to any conscious intention on the part of the author to make an
immediate inference from the one statement. As an example of this
type we may state the following:
(i) Dukkham dukkhasaccan ti? Amant, i.e. Is suffering (classifiable
as) the truth of suffering? Yes.
(ii) Dukkhasaccam dukkhan ti? Kyikam dukkham cetasikam dukk
ham thapetv avasesam dukkhasaccam dukkhasaccam na dukk
ham, kyikam dukkham cetasikam dukkham dukkhan c'eva
dukkhasaccan ca, i.e. Is all that (is classifiable as) the truth of
suffering, suffering? Excepting physical and mental suffering the
rest of the truth of suffering is the truth of suffering: physical and
mental suffering (is classifiable) both as suffering and as the truth
of suffering.
Yamaka, 174.
1
2
3io
Analysis
and
Meaning
311
eva akuppam pativijjhati, A. III. 119) and 'to be held in great esteem'
(garu ca bhavamyo ca, A. III. 113) by one's co-religionists. Sriputta,
who is held up as an example unto others1 is said to have mastered
these techniques in a comparatively short time (A. II. 160). One of the
books of the Khuddaka Nikya is called the Patisambhidmagga and
a chapter of the Vibhanga is called the Patisambhidvibhanga
(pp. 293-305). According to the explanation given of the four kinds
of analysis2 atthapatisambhid stands for analysis of meanings 'in
extension', dhammapatisambhid for analysis of reasons, conditions or
causal relations, niruttipatisambhid for analysis of (meanings 'in
intension' as given in) definitions and patibhnasambhid for analysis
of intellect to which things knowable by the foregoing processes are
presented.
(517) Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids tell us that ' "attha" does not
refer to verbal meanings'3 but this is quite unhistorical and incorrect.
The Vibhanga (294) quite clearly says that one of the senses of attha
in the compound attha-patisambhid is 'the meaning of what is
spoken', namely of words and sentences, viz. so tassa tass'eva bhsitassa attham jnti: ayam imassa bhsitassa attho ayam imassa bhsitassa attho ti: ayam vuccati attha-patisambhida, i.e. he comprehends
the meaning of whatever is spoken (such as) 'this is the meaning of
this sentence' 'that is the meaning of that sentence'this is called
the analysis of meaning. The monks apparently learned the dhamma
by heart and then examined the meaning of what they learnt (cp.
sutv dhammam dhreti, dhritnam dhammnam attham upaparikkhati, i.e. hearing the dhamma they bear it in mind and then examine
the meaning of what they have learnt by heart, M. II. 173). This
examination of meaning probably constituted part of attha-patisam
bhida. The clearing of ambiguities by analysis and the giving of
detailed exegeses of short titles learnt (i.e. the two meanings of vi +
<\/bhaj) in all likelihood also constituted attha-patisambhid for in
mentioning the attainment of atthapatisambhid by Sriputta, it is
said that he could 'reveal, analyse and clarify' (vivarmi, vibhajmi
ttnikaromi, A. II. 160) and 'exegetically explain' questions put to him
(v. so mam pafihenaaham veyykaranena, loc. cit.). Attha- is also
1
312
3r3
314
Analysis
and
Meaning
3*5
a triad, each thing presumably having its specific name (nma), form
(rpa) and function (karma) (1.6.1-3); name and form are real
(nmarpa- satyam, loc. ciu). The world was created by Brahma with
each thing being given its own name and form (tarn nmarpbhym
eva vykriyate asau nma, ayam idam rpa iti, 1.4.7). Even if things
perish, the name does not perish 'for the name is eternal' (anantam vai
nma, 3.2.12). As against this, we find the Buddhists pointing to not
only the dialectical variations in language but the changes in nomen
clature that take place with time. Thus it is pointed out that 'the hill
Vebhra had a different name and designation' (Vebhrassa pabbatassa
afin va samann ahosi ann pafinatti, M. 111.68) at different times.
The name of the hill Vepula and the people resident in its environs
differed from age to age (S. II. 190-2).
(525) In the Nikyas we often notice attempts to avoid ambiguity
and vagueness by specifying whether expressions have the same
meaning or not. Thus it is asked 'whether the expressions appamn
cetovimutti, kincafin cetovimutti, sufinat cetovimutti and animitt
cetovimutti have different meanings, the words too being different
or have the same meaning, (despite) the words being different'
(nnatth c'eva nnbyanjan ca, udhu ekatth, byanjanam eva
nnan ti, M. I.297, cp. S. IV.296). The answer is that 'there is a sense
in which the meanings are different as well as the words and a sense
in which the meanings are the same, the words alone being different'.1
This shows that it was not assumed that a difference in language neces
sarily implies a difference in meaning, which judging from what Yaska
says appears to have been the prevailing theory of meaning at the time.
(526) Yska lays down his principle of the meaning of words as
follows: tni cet samnakarmni samna-nirvacanni nnakarmni cen
nn-nirvacanni,2 i.e. (as translated by Sarup3) 'if their meanings are
the same, their etymologies should be the same; if their meanings are
different their etymologies also should be different'. It may be noticed
that the word used for 'meaning' is karmni which literally means
'functions' or 'uses'.4
1
Atthi kho . . . pariyyo yam pariyyam gamma ime dhamm nnatth c'eva
nnbyanjan ca atthi ca kho . . . pariyyo yam pariyyam gamma ime dhamm
ekatth, byanjanam eva nnam, M. I.297.
2
The Nighantu and the Nirukta, ed. L. Sarup, University of Punjab, 1927, p. 48.
3
The Nighantu and the Nirukta, O.U.P., 1920, p. 58.
4
Note Wittgenstein's theory that the meaning of a word is its 'use', The Blue
and Brown Books, p. 67.
316
317
not exist at the present moment. But when we talk of the concept 'Being'
without a time reference, we violate this convention and assume that
the past as well as the future has existence in the sense in which the
present has existence. On the other hand the philosophers of NonBeing, the nihilist Lokayatikas (v. supra, 116) were also guilty of
violating this convention for they deny that even the present has Being
because it passes away. For them the past does not exist, the present
does not exist and the future does not exist, for everything passes
away, while the opposite is true for his opponent. As it is said, 'the
world rests on the two doctrines Being (atthitam) and Non-Being
(natthitam) but he who rightly sees the arising of the world as it
really is, does not hold that there is Non-Being in the world and he
who rightly sees the cessation of things, as it really is, does not hold
that there is Being in the world . . . that 'everything exists' is one
extreme and that 'nothing exists' is the other extreme . . . (Dvayanissito . . . loko yebhuyyena atthitan c'eva natthitan ca. Lokasamudayam . . yathbhtam sammappannya passato y loke natthit
s na hoti, lokanirodham . . . yathbhtam sammappannya passato
y loke atthit s na h o t i . . . sabbam atthi ti kho ayam eko anto,
sabbam natthi ti ayam dutiyo anto, S. II. 17). The importance attached
to not transgressing the boundaries of linguistic convention thus
appears to have been directed against certain metaphysical theories
which resulted from it.
(528) While it was necessary to observe convention in order to avoid
misleading forms of expression, certain conventions could by their
very nature give rise to misunderstanding. So while observing con
vention it is necessary not to be led astray by it. 'The emancipated
person' is said 'to make use of current forms of speech without being
led astray by them' (vimuttacitto . . . yan ca loke vuttam tena voharati
aparmasan1 ti, M. I.500). The Potthapda Sutta gives atta-patilbha
as an example of an expression which may be misleading.
(529) In order to understand the significance of this criticism, it is
necessary to compare the doctrine criticized in the Potthapda Sutta
with its corresponding Upanisadic doctrine. The amz-patilbhas or
'obtainments of selves' are said to be three in number:
(1) Rpi ctummahbhtiko kabalihkrhrabhakkho = olriko attapatilbho, i.e. the obtainment of the gross self, which has form,
is made of the four great elements and feeds on gross food.
1
318
319
is apparently directed against the metaphysical views held with regard
to these selves by some of the Upanisadic thinkers, as for instance
when it is urged at Tait. 2.2.1-5 t n a t a ^ these selves were real or at
Katha 2.3.17, where it is assumed that 'the person . . . ever seated in
the heart of creatures is the (real) inner self, which one should draw
out from one's own body like a shaft from a reed1 (puriso'ntar tm
sad jannm hrdaye sannivistah tarn svc chanrt pravrhen mufijd
ivesikam . . .).
(532) The Buddha uses the term attapatilbha- to describe these
states but does not assume that there is an entity or entities corre
sponding to the word 'atta-' within one's person or body. This is
illustrated by the example of the milk which changes into cream,
yoghurt, curd and butter (khiramh dadhi dadhimha navanitam
navanitamh sappi sappimh sappimando, D. I.201). At the stage
when milk has turned into any of these states it cannot be called by
any other name than the name appropriate to describe each state
(yasmim samaye khiram hoti, n'eva tasmim samaye 'dadhf ti sankham
gacchati . . . loc. cit.). To this extent one cannot overstep convention.
Nor should one assume that each of these names signifies an entity
within the changing process.
(533) The fact that we use the word T constantly to refer to our
selves seems to imply the existence of an ontological subject corre
sponding to the grammatical subject T of the sentences we use. In
many of the Upanisads where the identity between the individual soul
and the ultimate world-ground was being taught there was little
doubt that 'aham' in sentences like, eso aham asmi (this I am) (Ch.
8.11.1) meant the personal ego conceived as a substantial entity and
generally considered to reside within the body (r. supra, 531). Against
this the Materialists argued that the personal pronoun T (also 'my')
in T-sentences referred to the body and not to a mental substance
(v. supra, 133). The Buddhists appeared to have opposed both these
schools of substantialists by contending that there was no permanent
substantial entity that could be observed to correspond to the term or
concept T or 'soul' (cp. n'eso aham asmi, na m'eso att, M. I.40)
and that we should not be misled by the apparent implications of the
use of language. Words like amz-patilabha- are 'expressions, turns of
speech, designations in common use in the world which the Tathgata
1
Note that this very simile is mentioned where these selves are mentioned at
D. I. 77 .
320
makes use of without being led astray by them* (Itim . . . lokasamann lokaniruttiyo lokavohr lokapafinattiyo yhi Tathgato
voharati aparmasan ti, D. I.202). On the basis of this sentence, though
perhaps with little knowledge of its specific context, Ogden and
Richards1 have observed that 'the rejection of misleading forms of
language was carried still further by Buddhist writers in their rejection
of the "sour".
(534) Jaini, referring to this passage in the Potthapda Sutta, gives a
different twist to it both in his comments as well as in the translation
of the passage itself. He says: 'The term pahhatti occurs several times,
in the Suttas, always referring to designations or concepts recognized;
as unreal in themselves nevertheless used in common parlance. In the
Photthapda-sutta,2 for instance, the Buddha, while speaking onj
various speculations on the nature of self, says that a word like attaA
patilabha or expressions like past, present or future or milk, curds, I
butter, ghee, etc., are merely names, expressions, turns of speech,'
designations in common use in the world. The Tathgata, although he
makes use of these is not led astray by them (i.e. knows them as
unreal').3 In the first place, that pahhatti is used in the Suttas (Jaini
does not himself quote any instances) for 'concepts recognized as
unreal in themselves' is incorrect as, for instance, the use of the term
dukkha-pahhatti (S. IV.39) clearly showswe cannot say that accord
ing to the Suttas, dukkha- is unreal! On the other hand in the context
of the Potthapda Sutta, the Buddha quite explicitly approves of the
statement to the effect that the empirical self was real in the past
is real in the present and will be real in the future, viz. 'I did exist
in the past, not that I did not; I will exist in the future, not that I will
not, and / do exist in the present, not that I do not' (Ahos'ham atitam
addhnam nham nhosim, bhavissm'ham angatam addhnam
nham na bhavissmi, atthham etarahi nham natthi ti, D. I.200).
Besides, a careful study of the context will show that it was not the
intention of the author to say that 'milk, curds, butter, ghee, etc/,
are mere words which do not denote anything real (as Jaini says) but
that in the first place we should not overstep convention by calling
what comes to be called (sankham gacchati, D. I.201) 'curds' by the
names 'milk', 'butter', etc., and secondly assume that 'milk' or 'butter'
1
Analysis
and
Meaning
321
2
Ch. 6.1.6.
A History of Western Philosophy, p. 225.
The Blue and Brown Books, p. 66.
4
The reference *D. III.121' in the P T S . Dictionary {s.v. sapptihirakata-) is
erroneous.
L
3
322
Early
Buddhist
Theory
of
Knowledge
(537) There are many problems associated with the meaning of these
terms. Are the characteristics of bhsitam (a statement) described by
the phrases 'apptihirakatam sampajjati' and 'sapptihirakatam sam
pajjati' equivalent to the characteristics 'apptihriya-' and 'sapp
tihriya-' respectively? What is this characteristic or in other words
what do these phrases mean? Lastly, what is the etymology of these
words?
(538) There seems to be a certain measure of unanimity with regard
to the answer to the first question in that scholars seem to refer to the
other usage as being synonymous.1 The PTS. Dictionary even goes
to the extent of confusing the one expression with the other.2
(539) We notice that 'apptihirakata-' and 'sapptihirakata-' occur in
the first book of the Digha Nikya and once in the Majjhima Nikya,
while 'apptihriya' and 'sapptihriya-' do not occur in the first book,
although they are found in the second book and occur in all the Nikyas
in similar though not identical contexts. They seem to have replaced
the more cumbersome earlier expressions with a simple adjectival
phrase (apptihriya-; sapptihriya-).
(540) Scholars are divided as to the answer to the second question.
The translations proffered are many and various. We wish to put
forward the theory that statements (bhsitam) characterized as 'app
tihirakatam sampajjati' or 'apptihriyam' are in some sense 'lacking
in meaning'. An examination of the contexts of the kinds of statements
which are so described shows that in an important sense they 'do not
make sense' and are 'meaningless' (niratthakam) as explained in one
of the commentaries (MA. III.273, appatihirakatan ti . . . niratthakam
sampajjati). The etymology of the word, however, is obscure but
usage is the surer clue to the meaning of the term than its etymology.
(540A) The meanings suggested are quite a few and may be classified
as follows:
I (a) apptihirakatam bhsitam
(b) sapptihirakatam bhsitam
1. Talk without ground
1. Talk well-grounded
(Prof. Rhys Davids,
(Prof. Rhys Davids,
SBB., II, pp. 257, 259)
SBB., II, p. 262).
1
3*3
4. Unreliable talk
(Horner, loc. eh.)
5. Without wonders
(Woodward, G.S. I.254)
3. Intelligible1
(Neumann, Majjhima
Nikyo, II, p. 318)
4. A thing of saving grace
(Prof. Rhys Davids,
SBB.)
That brings salvation
with it
(Mrs Rhys Davids,
K.S. V.232; v. fn. 2)
6. Incomprehensible1
(Neumann, Majjhima Nikyo,
II, p. 318)
(541) Of the above, Franke's suggestions are based on various con
jectural etymologies of the word, considering the context as well. The
PTS. Dictionary is largely influenced by the belief that the term is
derived from the word P. ptihariya- > P. ptihera- (both attested in
Pali) meaning 'miracle' and regards the idea of 'substantiated' and
1
324
325
326
2
Stebbing, op. cit., p. 149.
Ibid., p. 151.
v. K. N. Jayatilleke, 'Factual Meaning and Verification' in UCR., Vol. 13,
4
pp. 6, 8.
A. C. Ewing, 'Meaninglessness' in Mind, 1937? P- 359*
3
327
country', could we still say that the statement, 'I love the beauty
queen of this country' is meaningless ? Modern Positivists would say
that this statement is not meaningless at all, but according to the
Pli Nikyas, it would seem that the context can render such a state
ment meaningless. From the account given, it is in fact the context
which makes the above statement meaningless. T h e context is one in
which the person who makes this statement confesses that he does not
know whether this beauty queen whom he professes to love was 'a
ksatriya, a brahmin, a vaisya or sdra' (khattiyi v brhmani v
vessi v suddi v, D . I.241), does not know 'what family or personal
name she had' (evam nm evam gott ti v, loc. cit.), does not know
'whether she was tall, short, dark, brunette or golden in colour or in
what village or town or city she dwells' (digh v rass v kli v
sm v manguracchavi v ti, amukasmim gme v nigame v nagare
v ti, loc. cit.). In other words he claims to like and love a person whom
he has not 'seen or known' (najnsi mpassasi, loc. cit.).
(549) According to this account it would appear that X's statement
'I love Y' is meaningless since (i) one is not sure whether there is an
instance of Y, and (ii) even if there is, it does not make sense for X
to say that he loves Y unless he has some acquaintance direct or
indirect with Y, such that he could specify at least one of the charac
teristics of Y. (ii) alone can give meaning to the use of the word 'love'
which (in this context) must have a person as object and its use
would otherwise be lacking in meaning. In other words, there is no
verifiable content to the statement from the point of view of X who
is making it.
(550) The similarity as well as the difference of this example from
that of an argument that the Materialists used against the concept of
the 'soul' (v. supra, 131) is worth noting. The Materialists argued that
we could not speak of the existence of the soul unless we could specify
whether the soul was 'long or small, globular, circular or triangular . . .
black, blue . . . of sweet smell or of bad s m e l l . . . was bitter or pungent
. . . hard or soft, etc.9 Since their opponents did not attach a verifiable
content to the concept of soul (tman), one could not talk of its
existence. Here in the Nikyas it is considered meaningless to make a
statement unless the speaker could attach a verifiable content to each
of its terms. In the Strakrtnga account it is not specifically said that
a statement containing the word 'soul' is meaningless, since it is an
empty concept with no verifiable content but the Pli Nikyas seem
328
329
Tyham evam vadmi: Api pana tumhe . . . ekam v rattim ekam v divasam
upaddham v rattim upaddham v diviasam ekantasukhim attnam sanjnth ti
(Joe. cit.), i.e. I ask them whether they have experienced extreme happiness within
themselves for one night or day or even for half a night or day and they reply
that they have not.
2
Tyham evam vadmi: Api pana tumhe . . . ekantasukham lokam jnam
passam viharath ti? Iti putth no ti vadanti, loc. cit.
3
Api pana tumhe . . . y t devat ekantasukkham lokam uppann tsam
bhsamnnam Saddam suntha . . . Iti putth no ti vadanti, loc. cit.
4
Api pana tumhe jntha: 'Ayam maggo ayam patipad ekantasukhassa
lokassa sacchikiriyy' ti? Iti putth no ti vadanti, loc. cit.
L*
33
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
331
332
CHAPTER VII
334
S. IV.208. 299.
Op. cit., p. 49; v. Kvu. 159.
335
Barua is speaking of are presumably the law of Identity (see below, 1),
the law of Contradiction (see below, 2), the law of Excluded Middle
(see below, 3) and 'the law of Double Negation'1 (see below, 4). In the
first place Barua's 'A is neither B nor not~B' is not the principle of
Double Negation as understood in Western logic, where it is defined
as equivalent to 'A is not not-A'. 2 'A is neither B nor not-B' appears
in fact to be a violation of the principle of Excluded Middle, which
states that 'A is either B or not-B'. Secondly, a study of the four forms
of predication, as they stand, is sufficient to show that they are not
laws of thought. The four forms of predication are:
1. S is P, e.g. atthi paro loko (there is a next world).
2. S is not P, e.g. natthi paro loko (there is no next world).
3. S is and is not P, e.g. atthi ca natthi ca paro loko (there is and is
no next world).
4. S neither is nor is not P, e.g. n'ev'atthi na natthi paro loko (there
neither is nor is there no next world).
(564) It will be seen that (1) is not the law of Identity but a simple
affirmative categorical assertion; (2) is not the law of Contradiction
but a negative assertion or denial, it being a problem as to whether it
is the contradictory or merely the contrary of (1); (3) and (4) are
assertions not recognized in Aristotelian logic although statements of
this form sometimes occur in everyday parlance even in Western
languages.3 Considered as laws of thought or in the light of their
conformity to them (3) violates (i.e. is the negation of) the law of
Contradiction and (4) violates the law of Excluded Middle. Judged by
their form in the light of Aristotelian logic (3) and (4) are necessarily
(logically) false propositions. No wonder Poussin said 'we are helpless!'
(565) Now what do these propositions really mean? We have already
attempted to answer this question in an article entitled 'Some Problems
of Translation and Interpretation II', 4 and we do not propose to repeat
this here. We intend merely to summarize briefly the gist of what we
have said and make some added observations.
(566) Since then there have been a few articles written around this
subject but in none of them is there a serious attempt to clarify the
problems involved. The first is that of P. T. Raju writing in the
1
2
Barua, ibid.
Stebbing, op. cit., p. 191.
v. Article by C. Lewy on 'Calculuses of Logic and Arithmetic' in Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 20, pp. 36> 374
UCR., Vol. 8, pp. 45-55, 19503
336
Logic and
Truth
337
attempt to reverse the principle of four-cornered negation, so that one
may have a four (or more)fold principle of affirmation, results
naturally and logically in the seven-fold system of predication' (op.
eh., p. 128). Despite these obvious defects in Bahm's article, he does
make a significant contribution towards solving the riddle (logical) of
the four-fold assertions when he says, 'To affirm "is", "is not", "both
is and is not" and "neither is nor is not" jointly when "is" and "is
not" are interpreted as contradictories and "neither is nor is not" as
involving1 an excluded middle is to assert contradictorily. But if on
the other hand, "is" and "is not" (or "a" and "non-a") are interpreted
as opposites rather than as contradictories and "neither is nor is not"
(or "neither a nor non-a") is interpreted not as involving an excluded
middle but as presupposing that there is something which is neither
the one nor the other (its opposite), then no contradiction is involved'
(op. cit.y p. 128). According to this theory we do not fall into logical
difficulties if we treat not-P (in the four assertions) as the contrary and
not the contradictory of P. This is in principle the solution that we
had offered in our own treatment of the subject and we shall further
examine this solution below.
(568) The latest article to appear on this subject is by Shosun
Miyamoto, entitled 'The Logic of Relativity as the Common Ground
for the Development of the Middle Way' 2 Miyamoto takes (2) to (5) of
the five-fold assertions (v. supra, 185) which he attributes to Sanjaya
(but which in fact are either shared by all the Sceptics or were exclusively
Buddhist, v. supra, 184-90) and says that four of them are equivalent
to (I) to (IV) 3 of the four-fold formula, viz.
The four-fold
formula
1
2
3
II
III
IV
=
=
Sanjaya's statements
1. I do not think of them in such a manner (evam pi
me no).
2. I do not think of them as being identical (tath ti
pi me no).
3. I do not think of them as being different (annatha
ti pi me no).
4. I do not think of denying them (no ti pi me no).
5. I do not think ofnot denying them (no no ti pi me no).
(op. cit., p. 75).
338
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Buddhist schema
==
I
=
II
=
HI
IV
339
340
Here (I) states that the world has the characteristic 'finite' in all
respects; this is clear from the further qualification, parivatumo,
'bounded all round'. II states that the world has the opposite or the
contrary characteristic of being 'infinite' in all respects (y. apariyanto).
1
'If not, is A neither B nor not-B (in other words is A a chimaera)', v. supra,
497.
2
'The fourth Law . . . is applicable to . . . the conception of something which
is really nothing . . .', op. cit.} p. 49.
Logic and
Truth
341
Now III does not state that the world is both finite in all respects (I) and
infinite in all respects (II). This would be self-contradictory, if we mean
by loka- the same thing in both cases. It states that the world is both
finite in some respect and infinite in another respect. For it is said that
those who hold this theory 'conceive the world to be finite in one
dimension and infinite in another' (uddham adho antasafmi lokasmim
viharati tiriyam anantasanni, (D. I.23). IV is said to be the point of
view of a 'reasoner' (takki, loc. cit.\ according to whom the epithets
'finite' and 'infinite' cannot be predicated of the world and hence it is
said that he disagrees with I, II, and III (loc. cit.). This too, it may be
noted, is not a contradictory statement but a different point of view
quite distinct from I, II and III. It resembles the point of view of Kant
who showed in his 'Critique of Pure Reason' that one could on the
one hand argue that 'the world was finite (in space and time)' and also
that 'the world was infinite'. However, since the conclusions contradict
each other we are faced with an antinomy, the truth being that spatial
(and temporal) attributes (e.g. finite, infinite) are subjective.1 It will be
noticed that according to this four-fold logic, a person who denies that
'the world is finite' and asserts the contradictory, namely that 'it is not
the case that the world is finite' may be one who holds II, III, or IV.
The Aristotelian logic of two alternatives tends to obscure these finer
distinctions while the above logic of four alternatives tends to high
light them, showing them as separate logical alternatives.
(575) It is, however, necessary for the purpose of this four-fold logic
to interpret II, as Bahm pointed out (v. supra, 567), as the contrary or
opposite and not as the contradictory of (I). For example, if we take
the epithet sukhl- (experiencing pleasure, happy), we can have the
assertion, I, so sukhl, 'he is happy'. Since 'na sukhl' is the contradictory
and 'dukkhi' (unhappy) the contrary of sukhl-, i.e. II would be 'so
dukkhi'. Ill would be 'so sukhi ca dukkhi ca' and IV 'so n'eva sukhl
na dukkhi'. Ill and IV are here not self-contradictory statements.
Ill describes the person, who experiences both pleasurable as well as
painful sensations and IV the person whose experiences have a neutral
hedonic tone, being neither pleasurable nor painful. We find in fact the
following four-fold predication about the hedonic experiences of the
1
Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Tr. by N. K. Smith, London, 1933;
for the proofs that the world is finite and that it is infinite, v. pp. 396-402; space
is an a priori form of intuition, not reality, pp. 7 1 #> 77> 80-91, 123, 163, 244,
399-400, 440, 449.
34 2
soul, which are mutually exclusive and together exhaustive of all the
possibilities:
I Ekanta-sukhi att hoti, i.e. the soul is extremely happy.
II Ekanta-dukkhi att hoti, i.e. the soul is extremely unhappy.
III Sukha-dukkhl att hoti, i.e. the soul (has mixed feelings of)
happiness and unhappiness.
IV Adukkhamasukhi att hoti, i.e. the soul has no (feelings of)
happiness or unhappiness.
D.I.31.
(576) We may cite numerous examples of this type from the Canon
To take an example which is often repeated:
I Puggalo attantapo . . ., i.e. the person, who torments himself
(e.g. the ascetic).
II Puggalo parantapo . . ., i.e. the person, who torments others
(e.g. the hunter).
III Puggalo attantapo parantapo ca . . ., i.e. the person who tor
ments himself as well as others (e.g. the king who initiates
and participates in a sacrifice causing the destruction of life
with much discomfiture to himself).
IV Puggalo n'evattantapo na parantapo . . ., i.e. the person who
neither torments himself nor others (e.g. the arhant).
M. 1.341 fi.; Pug. Pan. 55 ff.
One of the reasons for adopting this logic seems to be the fact that this
four-fold schema gave a better and finer classification of the empirical
data (thus preventing much ambiguity in utterances) than that offered
by the strictly dichotomous division.
(577) While the majority of the four forms of predication are explicable
on the above basis, taking (II) as the contrary and not the contradictory
of (I), there are some instances where we are faced with an apparent
difficulty. This is where (II) appears by virtue of its form, to be the
contradictory of (I):
e.g. I
II
III
IV
343
.
^
f
<
[_
II so dukkhi (contrary)
111111111 so sukhadukkhi
TTT
IV so adukkhamasukhl
f
II so arpi (contrary)
_ _
.
TTr
< 111
so rupi ca arupi ca
,
_._
T^7
(^ IV so n eva rupi narupi
The difference is not noticeable but nevertheless has to be maintained
in the following, since the contradictory of (I) is ambiguous and could
mean II, III or IV.
(579) The fact that propositions of the form, 'S is P' and 'S is not P'
are not always mutually contradictory in actual usage is clear from the
fact that together they do not always exhaust the possibilities as they
344
Logic and
Truth
345
p
not-p
T
F
F
T
T
T
F
F
Of the four possibilities (3) and (4) are excluded by the Laws (NonContradiction and Excluded Middle) of the system and we are left with
(1) and (2) as the logical alternatives or the alternative possibilities.
Likewise, in a four-fold logic or a logic of four alternatives, we are left
with only four possibilities, the others being ruled out by the Laws
(Non-Contradiction and Exclusion) governing the system. If we draw
up a truth-table it will be seen that out of sixteen truth-possibilities,
only four (v. 1-4, below) alternatives are permissible:
1
I.
II.
III.
IV.
p
notp (contrary)
both p and notp
neither p nor notp
(T)
F
F
F
F
(T)
F
F
F
F
(T)
F
F
F
F
(T)
5 6 7
etc., up to 16
T F T
T F T
T F T
T F F
(583) Let us take an example from the Nikyas that confirms this.
Supposing I say ' / know what has been seen, heard, sensed, thought,
attained, sought and reflected upon by the class of recluses and
brahmins, then it would be false for me to say, / do not know what has
been seen, heard . . . it would likewise be false for me to say, I know and
1
346
do not know what has been seen, heard . . . and false for me to say, /
neither know nor do not know what has been seen, heard . . . ' . Now this
is a literal translation of a passage appearing at A. II.25, viz. yam . . ,
sassamana-brhmaniy pajya . . . dittham sutam mutam vinnatam
pattam pariyesitam anuvicaritam manas tarn ahamjnmi... Yam . . .
dittham sutam . . . tarn aham na1 jnml ti vadeyyam tarn mama assa
mus, tarn ahamjnmi na ca jnml ti vadeyyam tamp'assa tadisam
eva, tarn aham nevajnmi na najanmi ti vadeyyam tarn mama assa
kali. This example illustrates the fact that when one alternative was
taken as true, it was assumed that every one of the other alternatives
were false. In this case when (I) is true, it is said that each of the
alternatives (II), (III) and (IV) were false.
(584) When the four alternatives happened to be those of a thapaniya
panha or a meaningless question all four alternatives were rejected
rather than negated because the question in each of the alternatives was
not considered to be a proper question (kallo panho). Thus we have
the four alternatives:
I. Channam phassyatannam asesavirganirodh atth'annam
kind ti?
i.e. is there anything else after complete detachment from and
cessation of the six spheres of experience?
II. . . . natth'annam kind ti?
III. . . . atthi ca n'atthi c'annam kind ti?
IV. . . . n'ev'atthi no n'atth'annam kind ti?
The replies to each of these questions is of the form 'ma h'evam', i.e.
do not say so (A. II. 161). The response to the other avykata-questions
is also similar since these questions are 'not answered but set aside'
(avykatni thapitni, M. I.426; v. supra, 481). In other words these
questions were not negated but rejected. Raju (v. supra, $66) and Bahm
(v. supra, 567) have therefore misdescribed their nature as far as the
Pali Canonical position is concerned by calling this doctrine that of
'four-cornered negation' when it ought properly to be called Tourcornered rejection5.
(585) In fact, it is all the more necessary to distinguish the fourcornered rejection from four-cornered negation, which is also rarely
1
347
met with in the Nikyas. Consider the answers to the following four
alternative forms of a question:
I. Kin nu kho . . vijjya antakaro hot! ti? Is it the case that one
attains the goal by means of knowledge?
II. Kin nu kho . . . caranena antakaro hot! ti? Is it the case that
one attains the goal by means of conduct?
III. Kin nu kho . . . vijjcaranena antakaro hot! ti? Is it the case that
one attains the goal by means of both knowledge and conduct?
IV. Kin nu kho . . . annatra vijjcaranena antakaro hot! ti? Is it the
case that one attains the goal without knowledge and conduct?
Taking II as the contrary of (I), the question is in the form of the four
logical alternatives. The answer to each of these four alternatives is of
the form 'na h'idam', i.e. it is not so (note the difference from the
above), the reason being that while 'knowledge' and 'conduct' are
necessary conditions for final salvation they are not sufficient condi
tions. This denial of all the four logical alternatives is in apparent
violation of the Law of Exclusion (v. supra, 582), but this is not a
peculiarity of this logic, since we meet with this paradoxical situation
even with Aristotelian logic, e.g. when a non-smoker is confronted
with the question 'have you given up smoking?'
(586) It is necessary to distinguish the above four-fold logic from the
logic of the Jain sydvda, which is radically different from it. We
shall refer to the seven forms of predication of Jainism by the Indian
numerals 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and the four logical alternatives by the
Roman numerals I, II, III and IV. Now it was the contention of Raju,
Bahm and Miyamoto (v. supra, 566, 567, 569) that 4 (sydavaktavya-)
was the same as IV (S is neither P nor notP), while Bahm and Miya
moto further identified (v. supra, 567, 569) 1, 2, 3 of Jainism with I, II,
III of Buddhism respectively. This is mistaken and is due to a failure
to understand the logic of each system, as a result of which they seem
to have been misled by mere superficial similarities. It appears on the
face of it that we could identify 1, 2, 3, 4 with I, II, III, IV respectively:
Jain
1. syd asti (may be, it is)
2. syd nsti (maybe , it is not)
3. syd asti nsti (may be, it is
and it is not)
4. syd avaktavyam (may be, it is
unpredicable)
Buddhist
I. atthi (it is)
II. natthi (it is not)
III. atthi ca natthi ca (it is and
it is not)
IV. n'ev'atthi na ca natthi (it
neither is nor is not)
348
p (syd asti)
not-p (syn nsti)
1
T
F
F
T
T
T
F
F
v. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 303; cp. Raju, op. cit., p. 700.
349
(589) It will be noticed that (3) and (4) are not ruled out, since p may
be true from one standpoint and not-p from another; similarly p may
be false from one standpoint while not-p is also false from another
standpoint. It is necessary to remember that Jain logic admits of falsity
(naybhsa). This happens when the particular assertion is not possible
from the standpoint from which it is made. For instance, if I assert
that a thing (which exists) does not exist (syd nsti) from the point of
view of its own form (svarpa), substance (svadravya), place (svaksetra) and time (svakla), the statement would be false. So in drawing
up our truth-table to represent the possibilities according to Jain logic,
it is necessary to take account of another variable (in addition to the
truth-value), namely the standpoint (naya). Let us for the sake of
simplicity, take two alternative forms of predication (syd asti and syd
nsti) and two standpoints, x and y. This gives sixteen truth-possibilities
in all, since there would be four possibilities for each of the four
possibilities in the above table, viz.:
1
Tx Tx Ty Ty Fx Fx Fy Fy
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Tx Tx Ty Ty Fx Fx Fy Fy
p (syd asti)
Tx Fy Tx Fy
Ty Fx Fx Ty
350
(591) This shows the radical difference between the logic of sydvdb
and of the catuskoti, i.e. the Buddhist logic of 'four alternatives'. The
former represents seven forms of predication, which supplement each
other, each of which may be true simultaneously with the others from
its own standpoint. The latter represents four alternatives of which (as
understood in the Canon) * only one could be true. In this respect, this
logic resembles the Aristotelian, except for the fact that the latter is a
two-valued logic of two alternatives while the former is a two-valued
logic of four alternatives. Until recently it was believed in the Western
world that Aristotelian logic was the only logic and that it reflected the
structure of reality but, with the discovery of many-valued logics by
Lucasiewicz and Lobochevsky, this view is no longer universally held.
This means that our choice of a logical system is to some extent
arbitrary and dependent on the needs and nature of our discussion.
The Buddhist four-fold logic is in this respect no more true or false
than the Aristotelian and its merits should be judged by its adequacy
for the purposes for which it is used. It is not at all necessary to feel
helpless before it (as Poussin did!), if its nature and significance is
understood.
(592) Before we leave this topic, we may make some observations on
an article by Robinson,2 in which he makes a few comments on the
catuskoti He calls this the Tetralemma (pp. cit., p. 301), but since we
have treated the four alternatives as propositional functions, following
Schayer,3 and since they are basic to a whole system of logic, we prefer
to call this 'the four-fold logic'; we do not call Aristotelian logic 'the
dilemma' because it is a logic of two alternatives. We agree with
Robinson when he says that 'the four members' (i.e. the four alterna
tives) are 'in a relation of exclusive disjunction' ('one of but not more
than one of "a", "b", "c", "d" is true') (Joe. cit.); this we have actually
shown to be the case (v. supra, 583). We cannot agree with his
observation that 'the tetralemma resembles the four Aristotelian forms
in some ways. Both sets comprise propositions constructed from two
1
Ngrjuna's position is different but this is beyond the scope of our study.
Richard H. Robinson, 'Some Logical Aspects of Ngrjuna's System' in,
Philosophy East and West, Vol. 6, No. 4, January 1957, pp. 291-308.
3
'Altindische Antizipationen der Aussagenlogik' in Studien zur indischen
Logik, Extrait du Bulletin de l'Academie Polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres
cracovic 1933, p. 93; Schayer represents the four alternatives as p, ^ p , (p.'"^/p),
( ^ / p . ^ 0 P ) ) - W e are, however not treating 'p* as the contradictory of ' p ' and
hence we have written 'notp' instead (v. supra, 186).
2
351
terms and the constants (functors) 'all', 'some', and 'not' \op. cit.,
p. 303). If we do so, we treat (I) as an universal affirmative proposition,
which it is not (at least always) (v. supra, 574). For similar reasons, the
explanation of II as corresponding to an Aristotelian E-type proposi
tion, of III as 'the conjunction of I and O forms' (Joe. cit.) and IV as the
'conjunction of E and A forms' (loc. cit.) is unsatisfactory. His proposal
to interpret the fourth alternative as: 'No x is A and no x is not A'
(pp. cit., p. 302), which is true 'when x is null' (loc. cit.) is contradicted
by usage in the Pli Nikyas (v. supra, 576, IV).
(593) Let us examine the conception of truth as we find it in the
Nikyas. There is no direct inquiry into the nature of truth (in the
epistemological sense) in them, but the value placed on truth (in the
wider sense) was so great that some observations about the nature of
truth (in the above sense) were, perhaps, inevitable.
(594) In the Abhayarjakumra Sutta, we find statements classified
according to their truth-value, utility (or disutility) and pleasantness
(or unpleasantness). The intention of the classification is to tell us
what kinds of propositions the Buddha asserts. If propositions could
be true (bhtam, taccham) or false (abhtam, ataccham), useful
(atthasamhitam) or useless (anatthasamhitam), pleasant (paresam piy
manp) or unpleasant (paresam appiy amanp), we get eight
possibilities in all as follows:
True
useful
useless
5)
False
55
5?
useful
useless
??
pleasant
unpleasant
pleasant
unpleasant
pleasant
unpleasant
pleasant
unpleasant
The text reads as follows: 'The Tathgata does not assert a statement
which he knows to be untrue, false, useless, disagreeable and unpleas
ant to others (i.e 8). He does not assert a statement which he knows
to be true, factual, useless, disagreeable and unpleasant to others (i.e. 4).
He would assert at the proper time a statement which he knows to be
true, factual, useful, disagreeable and unpleasant to others (i.e. 2). He
would not assert a statement which he knows to be untrue, false, use
less, agreeable and pleasant to others (i.e. 7). He would not assert a
352
353
fact there is a next world, if one thinks that there is no next world, that
would be a false conception. When in fact there is a next world, one
asserts the statement that there is no next world, that would be a false
statement' (Santam yeva kho pana param lokam; natthi paro loko
ti'ssa ditthi hoti, s'ssa hoti micchditthi. Santam yeva kho pana param
lokam: natthi paro loko ti sankappeti, svssa hoti micchsankappo.
Santam yeva kho pana param lokam: natthi paro loko ti vcam
bhsati, s'ssa hoti micchvc, M. I.402). Thus, while false proposi
tions entertained as beliefs or conceptions or expressed as statements
are considered false, when they do not correspond with or deny facts,
true beliefs, conceptions or statements are said to be those which
reflect or correspond with fact. The words used for true beliefs, con
ceptions or statements are sammditthi, sammsankappo and sammvc respectively, which literally mean 'right belief, etc.', but here
'right' (samm) being the opposite of 'micch' (false) is synonymous
with 'true': 'When in fact there is a next world, the belief occurs to me
that there is a next world, that would be a true belief.. .' (Santam yeva
kho pana param lokam: atthi paro loko ti'ssa ditthi hoti, s'ssa hoti
samm ditthi, M. L403).
(597) Though truth is defined in terms of correspondence with fact,
consistency or coherence is also considered a criterion of truth. We
have already cited an example from the Nikyas, where it is clearly
shown that, when two statements contradict each other, it cannot be
the case that both statements are true for 'if p is true, not-p is false and
if not-p is true, p is false' (v. supra, 562). In the Suttanipta referring
to numerous theses put forward by various theorists the question is
asked 'Claiming to be experts, why do (they) put forward diverse
theoriesare truths many and various
?' (kasm nu saccni vadanti
nn . . . kusal vadn: saccni su tni bahni nn . . . Sn. 885) and
answered: 'Truths, indeed, are not many and various' (na h'eva
saccni bahni nn... Sn. 886). It is in this context that the statement
is made that 'truth is one without a second' (ekam hi saccam na
dutiyam atthi, Sn. 884). The Buddha in arguing with his opponents
appeals to this principle of consistency by showing that their theories
are false because they are contradicting themselves. Thus, in the debate
with Saccaka, the Buddha says at a certain stage in the discussion,
referring to his opponent's statements that 'his later statement is not
compatible with the former nor the former with the later' (na kho te
sandhiyati purimena v pacchimam, pacchimena v purimam, M. I.232).
M
354
Here the consistency called for is the coherence with the various
statements and implications of a theory.
(598) But it is important to note that there is another sense of con
sistency recognized in the Nikyas. This is the consistency between
the behaviour of a person and his statements. In this sense, it is claimed
that the Buddha 'practised what he preached and preached what he
practised' (yathvdi tathkri, yathkri tathvdi, It. 122). One does
not normally speak of this kind of consistency as logical consistency;
but when Toynbee says that 'the Buddha was an illogical evangelist''/
and speaks of his 'sublime inconsistency' (op. cit., p. 64) or 'sublimely
illogical practice' (op. cit., p. 73) he is using 'illogical' in this novel
sense. W e have tried to state more precisely what is meant by 'illogical'
here 2 and have found two senses, (1) when A asserts p and acts as if
he believes p is false, and (2) where A asserts p and p is false (where p
is a statement descriptive of A's behaviour, which is directly relevant
to the truth-value of p).
(599) Despite this emphasis on consistency, which runs through the
Nikyas, we find an early reference to the concept of pacceka-sacca,
i.e. individual (private) or partial truth (?). Prima facie this notion
appears to run counter to the conception of truth as being consistent.
This concept first appears in the Suttanipta in reference to the diverse
theories put forward by controversialist debaters. It is said that 'these
individuals dogmatically cling to (lit. are immersed in) individual (or
partial?) truths' (pacceka-saccesu puth nivitth, Sn. 824). T h e term
is also used to denote the avykata-theories, which as we have shown
were also debated (v. supra, 378). These theories are called 'the several
paccekasaccas of the several recluses and brahmins' (puthusamanabrhmannam puthupaccekasaccni, A. II.41; V.29). N o w paccekaliterlly means 'each one' (s.v. P T S . Dictionary) or 'individual' and
the BHS. Dictionary suggests 'individual (alleged) truths' for pratyekasatya (s.v.). What could be the significance of the use of this term?
Could we interpret this to mean that each of these theories had an
element of truth and were in fact 'partial truths'. This is very strongly
suggested by the parable of the blind men and the elephant (Ud. 68).
A number of men born blind (jaccandh) are assembled by the king
who instructs that they be shown (dassesi), i.e. made to touch an
1
Logic and
Truth
355
elephant. They touch various parts of the elephant such as the forehead,
ears, tusks, etc. They are then asked to describe the elephant and each
reports mistaking the part for the whole that the elephant was like that
portion of the elephant which was felt by him. There are ten conflicting
accounts in all corresponding in description to the ten parts touched
and these are compared to the ten avykata-theses put forward by the
various recluses and brahmins. If we interpret the parable literally one
would have to say that their theses too mistakenly describe the part for
the whole and in so far as they constitute descriptions of their partial
experience, they have an element of truth but are deluded in ascribing
to the whole of reality what is true only of the part or in other words
what is partially true. Since it were these very avykata-theses that
were called pacceka-saccas it would appear to be not without justifica
tion to translate this word as 'partial truths'. One may in fact even
suggest, though with little historical justification, that these theses were
'indeterminate' (avykata-) in the sense of being neither true nor false1
analogous to the sense in which avykata- is used to denote what is
'neutral' in moral contexts where 'what is indeterminate (avykata-)
are acts which are neither good nor evil . . .' (ye ca dhamm kiriy
n'eva kusal na akusal . . . ime dhamma avykata, DhS., 583, p. 124).
If such an interpretation is to be justified, we would have to say that
these avykata-theses were a product of partial descriptions of reality,
their error consisting in regarding these partial accounts as descriptions
of the whole of reality. They would be the misdescribed experiences of
different thinkers like the blind men's accounts of the elephant. In fact,
it is almost suggested in the Brahmajla Sutta that not merely the
avykata-theses but all the sixty two philosophical theories 'result
from impressions' (phassapaccay, D. I.42, 43; cp. te vata annatra
phass patisamvedissanti ti n'etam thnam vijjati, i.e. it is impossible
that they would entertain (these theories) without the impressions they
had, D. I.43, 44)i.e. perceptive, sensory and extrasensory and
cognitive experienceand that these theories were presumably only
partial accounts of reality.
(600) But this conception of truth is not developed in the Nikyas and
if we hold the above account of pacceka-sacca as a 'partial truth' we
1
This is in fact a sense in which 'indeterminate' is used in logic, e.g. '. . . if a
three-valued logic is proposed in which the law of the excluded middle is replaced
by the trichotomy every proposition is either true or false or indeterminate . . .'
A. Pap, Semantics and Necessary Truth, Yale University Press, New Haven,
1958, p. 169.
35^
Logic and
Truth
357
test to be used is "What effect will this teaching produce on my life" P'1
Poussin too calls Early Buddhism 'pragmatic': 'nous avons defini
Pancienne dogmatique comme une doctrine essentiellement "pragmatique" . . . ' 2
(603) This pragmatism of Buddhism is also strongly suggested by the
parable of the arrow (M. I.429) and the parable of the raft (M. 1.134).
The parable of the arrow occurs in reference to the avykata-theses
and the gist of it is that a man struck with a poisoned arrow should be
concerned with removing the arrow and getting well rather than be
interested in purely theoretical questions (about the nature of the
arrow, who shot it, etc.), which have no practical utility. The moral is
that man should only be interested in truths which have a practical
bearing on his life. In the same context it was said that the avykataquestions were not answered because 'it was not useful, not related to
the fundamentals of religion, and not conducive to revulsion, dispassion, cessation, peace, higher knowledge, realization and Nirvana'
(na h'etam atthasamhitam n'dibrahmacariyakam, na nibbidya na
virgya na nirodhya na upasamya na abhinnya na sambodhya na
nibbnya samvattati, M. I.431). The parable of the raft has the same
motive and is intended to indicate the utilitarian character of the
teachings or the 'truth' of Buddhism. The truths are useful for salvation
but even they should not be clung to however useful they may have
been. It is said: 'I preach you a dhamma comparable to a raft for the
sake of crossing over and not for the sake of clinging to it . . .'
(Kullpamam vo . . . dhammam desissmi nittharanatthya no gahanatthya... M. 1.134). A person intending to cross a river and get to the
other bank, where it is safe and secure makes a raft and with its help
safely reaches the other bank but however useful the raft may have been
(bahukro me ayam kullo, loc. cit.), he would throw it aside3 and go
his way without carrying it on his shoulders; so it is said that 'those
who realize the dhamma to be like a raft should discard the dhamma as
well, not to speak of what is not dhamma' (kullpamam vo jnantehi dhamm pi vo pahtabb, pag'eva adhamm, M. I.135). We cannot
1
358
Early
Buddhist
Theory
of
Knowledge
interpret this to mean that the dhamma is true only by virtue of its
utility and that it ceases to be true when it ceases to be useful. What is
meant is that unlike the answers to the avykata-questions (which
were 'not useful' (na atthasamhitam, v. infra, 811) for salvation, the
dhamma was useful for salvation and its value (though not its truthvalue) lay in its utility. It ceases to have value, though it does not cease
to be true, when one has achieved one's purpose with its help by attain
ing salvation.
(604) We may conclude from this that the truths of Buddhism were
also considered to be useful (atthasamhitam) for each person until one
attains salvation. This is confirmed by what is stated in the passage
quoted above (y. supra, 594) where it was said that the Buddha speaks
only what is true and useful, whether pleasant or unpleasant. We may
sum this up by saying that the truths of Buddhism were considered to
be pragmatic in the Buddhist sense of the term, but it does not mean
that Early Buddhism believes in a pragmatist theory of truth.
(605) According to the pragmatist theory of truth 'a belief is true if it
is useful and false, if it is not, or more widely . . . a belief is true if
"it works'". 1 Now in the passage quoted above (v. supra, 594), the
possibility was granted that there could be statements which were true
but useless. This means that a statement could be useless without being
false, thus showing that utility (atthasamhitam) was not considered to
be a definition or an infallible criterion of truth. But on the other hand,
it is curious that the list of possibilities mentioned in the passage are
only six and as we have shown (v. supra, 594) there is a failure to
mention statements which are both false as well as useful (pleasant or
unpleasant). It is difficult to say whether this omission was accidental
or intentional, for we have to depend on an argumentum e silentio. If it
was intentional, we would have to say that it was not reckoned one of
the possibilities either because it was considered self-contradictory to
say of a statement that it was false but useful2 or because such state
ments did not in fact exist. This (i.e. both these latter alternatives) seem
likely not because of any pragmatist theory of truth but because of the
peculiarly Buddhist use of the term 'useless' (na atthasamhitam). Here
attha- (s.v. PTS. Dictionary) is not just 'what is advantageous' in the
1
359
broad utilitarian sense of the term, but what is morally good in the
sense of being useful for the attainment of the goal of Nirvana. Since
falsehood or the assertion of a statement which is false (musvda) was
considered a moral evil, it would have been held to be logically or
causally impossible for what is false, i.e. what is morally evil to result
in what was useful in the sense of being morally advantageous or good
(atthasamhitam).
(606) While truth is not defined in terms of utility it seems to have been
held that the claims of a belief to be true were to be tested in the light
of personally verifiable consequences. Mrs Rhys Davids says that
according to the Klma Sutta 'the one test to be used is "what effect
will this teaching produce on my life" ' (v. supra, 602). What the Sutta
states is that 'you should reject those beliefs (as false) when you your
self realize that when they are accepted and lived up to they conduce to
lack of welfare and unhappiness' (yad . . . tumhe attan va jneyyatha
. . . ime dhamm samatt samdinn ahitya dukkhya samvattantiatha . . . tumhe pajaheyytha, A. II. 191). As we have shown in the
light of other evidence (v. infra, 797) verifiability in the light of
experience, sensory and extrasensory, is considered a characteristic of
truth but what is thus claimed to be true is held to be true only by virtue
of its 'correspondence with fact' (yathbhutam). Thus, verifiability is
a test of truth but does not itself constitute truth.
(607) Many of the important truths in Buddhism are considered to lie
midway between two extreme points of view. Extreme realism, which
says that 'everything exists' (sabbam atthi ti) is one extreme (eko anto)
and extreme nihilism which asserts that 'nothing exists' (sabbam natthi
ti) is the other extreme (dutiyo anto)the truth lies in the middle
(S. II.76). Similar anti-theses which are false are the doctrines of
eternalism (sassataditthi) and annihilationism (ucchedaditthi) (S. II.20,
III.98), the Materialist conception that the body and the soul are
identical (tarn jivam tarn sariram, S. II.60) and the dualist conception
that they are different (annam jivam annam sariram, loc. cit.), the Deter
minist thesis (sabbam pubbekatahetu, A. 1.173) and the Indeterminist
thesis (sabbam ahetuappaccay, loc. cit.), that we are entirely personally
responsible for our unhappiness (so karoti so patisamvediyati, S. II.20)
and that we are not at all responsible for our unhappiness (anno karoti
anno patisamvediyati, he. cit.), extreme hedonism (kmasukhalliknuyogo, S. IV.330, V.421) and extreme asceticism (attakilamathnuyogo,
loc. cit.). In all these instances it is said that the Buddha 'without falling
360
into these two extremes preaches the dhamma in the middle (ete ubho
ante anupagamma majjhena . . . dhammam deseti). Thus the mean
between two extreme views is held to be true. The 'middle way*
(majjhim patipad) which is a mean both in the matter of belief1 as
well as of conduct is said to 'make for knowledge . . . and bring about
intuition and realization' (nna-karani. . . abhinnya sambodhya . . .
samvattati, M. 1.15).
(608) Logically, there is no reason why the truth should lie in the
middle rather than in one of the two extremes though most people
would be inclined to think that a moderate view, which takes count of
the elements of truth in all the extreme views with regard to a particular
matter, is more likely to be true than any of the extreme views. The
problem, however, is whether it was dogmatically assumed that the
truth must lie in the middle or on the other hand whether it was con
sidered that the truth in the above instances happened to lie between
two extremes. The second appears to be the more plausible alternative
in the light of the facts. When the Buddha held that neither the paths
of over-indulgence nor of extreme asceticism makes for spiritual
progress and happiness, this is considered to be a finding based on his
experiences and experiments {v. infra, 794-7). Likewise the truth of
the other syntheses or the middle views is claimed to be established
independently.
(609) This attempt to reconcile opposing theses was not an entirely
new venture in the history of Indian thought. We first met with it in
Nsadiya hymn, which tries to effect a synthesis between mutually
contradictory theories (v. supra, 9). Even the idea of the fruitful mean
appears to be foreshadowed in the Aitareya ranyaka, where it is said
that one should not be over-generous or miserly but avoiding both
extremes should give at the proper time: \ . . if a man says om (yes) to
everything then that which he gives away is wanting to him here. If
he says om (yes) to everything then he would empty himself and would
not be capable of any enjoyments . . . If a man says "no" to everything
then his reputation would become evil and that would ruin him even
here. Therefore let a man give at the proper time, not at the wrong
time. Thus he unites the true and the untrue and from the union oj these
two he grows and becomes greater and greater' (Ait. Ar. 2.3.6.11-13;
1
Cp. Sthiramati, Madhyntavibhgatik, ed. S. Yamaguchi, Nagoya, 1934,
v. Antadvayavarjane pratipattih (the principle of the avoidance of the two
361
v. SBE., Vol. i, pp. 230-1). We find here the idea of synthesis and the
fruitful mean which makes for growth and development (v. supra, 607)
and which may have suggested the idea of the mean in Buddhism,
though, of course, the mean in Buddhism is not a synthesis between
truth and untruth.
(610) The doctrine of the two kinds of knowledge, the higher and the
lower, which made its appearance in the Middle and Late Upanisads
(v. supra, 75) and the theory of standpoints adopted by the Trairsika
jivikas (v. supra, 228, 229) and the Jains (v. supra, 228) has its
counterpart in Buddhism in the doctrine of the two kinds of truth,
conventional-truth (sammuti-sacca) and absolute truth (paramatthasacca). There is, however, no clear-cut distinction between these two
kinds of truth in the Pali Canon. What we do find is a distinction
between two types of Suttas (Discourses) which seems to have provided
a basis for the later emergence of the doctrine of the two kinds of truth
in medieval times; but even this latter theory, which appears in the
commentaries, must be distinguished from the doctrine as understood
by modern orthodoxy.1
(611) The two kinds of Suttas are the nitattha- (Vnh t o infer+attha=
meaning) or 'those of direct meaning' and the neyyattha- or 'those of
indirect meaning'.2 In one place in the Anguttara Nikya the importance
of distinguishing between these two types of Suttas is stressed and it is
said that those who confuse the two misrepresent the Buddha: 'There
are these two who misrepresent the Tathgata. Which two? He who
represents a Sutta of indirect meaning as a Sutta of direct meaning and
he who represents a Sutta of direct meaning as a Sutta of indirect
meaning'.3 On the basis of this Edgerton has remarked that Tn Pali
neither is ipso facto preferred to the other; one errs only in interpreting
one as if it were the other' (BHS. Dictionary, s.v. nitartha-). On the
other hand Edgerton says that 'in BHS. a nitartha t e x t . . . is recom
mended as a guide in preference to one that is neyrtha' (be. cit.).
This is certainly so.4 But even in the Pali the very fact that one is called
1
v. Ledi Sadaw, 'Some Points in Buddhist Doctrine' in JPTS., 1914, pp. 115163; cp. Nyanatiloka, A Guide Through the Abhidhamma Pitaka, p. 2.
2
v. Poussin, L'Abhidharmakosa, Vol. IX, p. 247; St Schayer, 'Pre-Canonical
Buddhism' in Archiv Orientalni, Vol. 7, 1935, p. 121, has 'texts with literal mean
ing' for nitattha- and 'of symbolical (meaning)' for neyyattha-.
3
Dve'me Tathgatam abbhcikkhanti. Katame dve? Yo ca neyyattham
suttantam nitattho suttanto ti dipeti; yo ca nitattham suttantam neyyattho
suttanto ti dipeti, A. I.60.
* v. Poussin, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 246, fn. 2.
M*
362
a nitattha Sutta, whose meaning is plain and direct and the other a
neyyattha- in the sense that its meaning should be inferred in the light
of the former, gives the former a definite precedence over the latter.
(612) No examples are given in the Canon of the two kinds of Suttas,
referred to, and we have to seek this information in the commentaries.
The commentary on the above passage tries to illustrate the difference:
'A Sutta of the form "there is one individual, O monks", "there are
two individuals, O monks", "there are three individuals, O monks"
. . . , etc., is a Sutta of indirect meaning. Here although the perfectly
Enlightened One speaks of "there is one person, O monks", etc., its
sense has to be inferred since there is no individual in the absolute sense
{paramatthato). But a person because of his folly may take this as a
Sutta of direct meaning and would argue that the Tathgata would not
have said "there is one individual, O monks", etc., unless a person
existed in the absolute sense. Accepting the fact that since he has said
so there must be a person in the absolute sense, he represents a Sutta
of indirect meaning as a Sutta of direct meaning. One should speak of
a Sutta of direct meaning (as of the form), "this is impermanent^
sorrowful and devoid of substance (soul)". Here the sense is that what
is permanent is at the same time sorrowful and lacking in substance.
But because of his folly, this person takes this as a Sutta of indirect
meaning and extracts its sense saying, "there is something which is
eternal, happy and is the soul" and thus represents a Sutta of direct
meaning as a Sutta of indirect meaning'.1
(613) This explanation seems to trace the distinction between these
two kinds of discourse to the statement of the Buddha that there were
'expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world
which the Tathgata makes use of without being led astray by them'
v. supra, 533). For according to this statement, the Buddha is con
strained to use language which has misleading implications and we have
1
Ekapuggalo bhikkhave, dve'me bhikkhave puggal, tayo'me bhikkhave
puggal . . . ti evarpo suttanto neyyattho nma. Ettha hi kincpi sammsambuddhena ekapuggalo bhikkhave ti di vuttam, paramatthato pana puggalo nma
natthi ti evam assa attho netabbo va hoti. Ayam pana attano blataya nitattho
ayam suttanto: paramatthato hi puggale asati, na Tathgato ekapuggalo bhikkhave
ti dini vadeyya. Yasm pana tena vuttam, tasm paramatthato atthi puggalo ti
ganhanto tarn neyyattham suttantam nitattho suttanto ti dipeti. Nitatthan ti
aniccam dukkham anatt ti evam kathitattham. Ettha hi aniccam eva dukkham
eva anatt yev ti attho. Ayam pana attano blataya neyyattho ayam suttanto
attham assa harissami ti niccam nma atthi, sukham nma atthi, att nama atthi
ti ganhanto nitattham suttantam neyyattho suttanto ti dipeti nma, AA. II. 118.
363
364
Early Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
i.e. 'The Perfectly Enlightened One, the best of teachers, spoke two
truths, viz. conventional and absoluteone does not come across a
third; a conventional statement is true because of convention and an
absolute statement is true as (disclosing) the true characteristics of
things'.
(616) This step is not taken in the Pali Canon, where probably the
impact of the statement of the Suttanipta that 'truth was one without
a second' (ekam hi saccam na dutiyam atthi, v. supra, 597) was strongly
felt. This statement seems in fact to have had a wide currency for as
Poussin points out we meet with the question in the Vibhs, 'si les
verites sont quatre, pourquoi Bhagavat dit-il qu'il y a une verite?'1
Even in the Bodhisattvabhmi, where truth (satya-) is classified under
one to ten divisions, the first is that 'truth is one in the sense of being
non-contradictory' (avitathrthena tvad ekam eva satyam na dvitiyam) 2 although the second says that 'truth is two-fold as samvrti and
paramrtha (dvividham satyam samvrtisatyam paramrthasatyaii
ca). The saying that there is one truth but not a second contradicts
this later saying (v. supra, 615) that there are two truths but not a
third.
(617) But although the commentaries speak of these two kinds of
truth, it is necessary to note that they do not imply that what is true
in the one sense, is false in the other or even that the one kind of truth
was superior to the other, notwithstanding the use of the term
'paramattha' (absolute) to denote one of them. The Corny, to the
Anguttara says, 'the Exalted One preaches the conventional teaching
to those who are capable of listening to this conventional teaching and
penetrating the meaning, discarding ignorance and acquiring eminence.
But to those who are capable of listening to his absolute teaching and
penetrating the truth, discarding ignorance and attaining distinction,
he preaches the absolute truth. There is this simile on this matter. Just
as if there were a teacher, who explains the meaning of the Three Vedas
and is versed in the regional languages; to those who would understand
the meaning if he spoke in the Tamil language, he explains it in the
Tamil language and to another who would understand (if he spoke in)
1
'Documents D'Abhidharma Les Deux, les Quatre, les Trois Verites, Extraits
de la Vibhs et du Kosa de Samghabhadra , in Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques,
Vol. 5, Bruxelles, 1937? P- 161.
2
Ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1930-6, p. 292.
365
1
3 66
Early
Buddhist
Theory
of
Knowledge
367
368
bhaveti ti? Na h'evam . . . , loc. cit.)y we have to presume that this kind
of knowledge is absolute knowledge (paramatthafina) and comes
within the realm of absolute truth (paramatthasacca), although neither
of these words are used. This surmise is confirmed by the fact that the
theories pertaining to the content of paramrtha-satya in the BHS. and
the Chinese texts all revolve round the Four Noble Truths. Poussin
has listed no less than five theories on this subject.1 The first is that
c
les deux dernieres verites . . . sont paramrthasatya9 (pp. eh., p. 163),
the second that 'seul le mrgasatya est paramrthasatya . . .' (loc. cit.\
the third that 'seul le principe: "Toutes choses sont vides et sans-soi"
est paramrthasatya (pp. eh., p. 164) and the fourth which is the view
of P'ing-kia to the effect that 'les quatre verites sont samvrti et
paramrtha (loc. eh.). Poussin says that 'la Vibhs ignore une
cinquieme opinion: que la troisieme verite . . . seule est paramrtha*
(op. eh., p. 165), but if our above deduction is correct, we would have
to add a sixth opinion (of the Theravdins), namely that all four truths
constitute the content of paramrtha-satya only. This is the closest that
the Pali Canon comes to distinguishing two aspects of truthbut the
distinction here unlike in the Corny, and the article of Sadaw is a
distinction of subject-matter and not a distinction of two kinds of truth
in real or apparent contradiction with each other.
1
CHAPTER V I I I
370
2
Buddha, Tr. Hoey, London, 1882, p. 53.
Buddhism, pp. 83-4.
4
Op. cit., p. 85.
Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 360.
5
v. E. J. Thomas, 'Buddhism in Modern Times' in UCR., Vol. 9, p. 216.
6
I.e. Mrs Rhys Davids, before she changed her views radically about the
nature of the doctrines of Early Buddhism.
7
v. Buddhist Psychology, p. 21; Compendium of Philosophy, p. 278. cp. Prof.
Rhys Davids' view that there is much subtle irony in the discourses of the Buddha,
SBB., Vol. II, pp. 33, 160, 163; cp. Poussin, JA., 1902, Vol. II, p. 250.
8
Buddhist Philosophy, p. 14.
9
J. G, Jennings, The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha, Oxford University
Press, London, 1947? pp. xxii-xxvii, xxxvi-lv.
3
371
(628) This latter view is clearly in contradiction with the texts and
we have to accept these statements in the texts, which speak of rebirth
and karma, as genuine on methodological grounds, unless there are
very strong considerations against such acceptance. That the concept
of personal responsibility appears at first sight to be incompatible with
the doctrine of anatt (soullessness) is no good ground for rejecting
these doctrines since these texts themselves are conscious of this
problem and do not think that there is a discrepancy. It is said that
'a certain monk entertained the thought that since body, feelings,
ideas, dispositions, and consciousness is without self, what self, can
deeds not done by a self, affect' (annatarassa bhikkhuno evam cetaso
parivitakko udapdi: Iti kira, bho, rpam . . . vedan . . . sann . . .
sankhr . . . vinnnam anatt anattakatni kammni kam attnam
phusissati ti, M. III. 19). This is the same as saying that if there is no
self, there can be no personal identity and no personal responsibility
but this is dismissed as an unwarranted corollary of or as going
beyond the teaching of the Buddha (cp. satthu-ssanam atidhvitabbam
manneyya, loc. cit.). The paen of joy said to have been uttered by the
Buddha on attaining enlightenment stresses the fact of freedom from
'repeated birth' (jtipunappunam, Dh. 154). The conception of
salvation from1 is intimately connected in Buddhism with the belief in
rebirth. It is therefore an integral part of Early Buddhist belief and
much of Buddhism would be unintelligible without it.
(629) But this need not commit us to the view that rebirth (and
karma) are uncritically or dogmatically accepted from the earlier or
prevalent religious tradition. The only evidence adduced by those who
put forward or suggest this view, is that rebirth is almost universally
accepted in the Indian religious tradition. Since Buddhism too sub
scribes to this view, it is argued that Buddhism dogmatically accepted
this theory from the prevalent tradition. From this it follows that the
Buddha himself was violating the very injunction he was making,
when he asked people not to accept a doctrine merely because it was
found in a tradition, etc. (v. supra, 260).
(630) With all deference to scholarship, we wish to submit that this
conclusion arises from both an unhistorical as well as an uncritical
survey of the material. In fact, that a belief is found in a stratum A
and in a chronologically successive stratum B, provides no conclusive
evidence that the thinkers of stratum B uncritically and dogmatically
1
372
373
were probably known to the Buddhist texts. We may add to this list.
We meet with the early pantheistic theory that 'the karma of he who
reveres the soul as the world does not perish and out of this soul he
creates whatever he likes (after death)' (sa ya tmnam eva lokam
upste na hsya karma ksiyate asmdd hy eva tmano yad yat kmayate
tat tat srjate, Brh. 1.4.15). Since his karma does not get exhausted,
he would presumably live in this state for ever. This same theory of
personal immortality is mentioned in the Nikyas as the theory which
states that 'the soul is my world, after death I shall be permanent,
stable, eternal, not subject to change and I shall remain in that con
dition eternally' (so loko so atty so pecca bhavissmi nicco dhuvo
sassato aviparinmadhammo sassatisamam tath'eva thassmi ti . . . ,
M. I.135, 136). Another such theory holds that the person who is
made of mind (manomayo'yam purusah, Brh. 5.6.1) after departing
from this world goes to the wind, the sun, the moon and to the world
that is without heat, without cold and lives there eternallya theory
which we have identified with one of the rational eternalist theories
referred to in Buddhism (v. supra, 431). As we said, the Brhmanic
theories persist in a slightly different dress. Thus, the belief that we
attain the company of the sun is found at Ch. 3.17.6, 7 and this is the
theory which appears in the Kausitaki Brhmana and is noted in the
Nikyas (v. infra, 820). In the Taittiriya Upanisad there is a theory
that the person after death changes his states from one to another:
' . . . asml lokt pretya etam annamayam tmnam upasankrmati...
prnamayam . . . manomayam . . . vijnnamayam . . . nandamayam'
(i.e. after departing from this world proceeds to the (state of the)
self consisting of food . . . consisting of the life-principle . . . consisting
of mind . . . consisting of understanding . . . consisting of bliss, 3.10.5).
Now these 'selves', as we have shown, partly correspond to the 'selves'
mentioned in the Potthapda Sutta (v. supra, 529) and here the first is
said to be rpi, i.e. 'has form'1 and the last arpl,2 i.e. 'has no form'.
It is likely that it was this theory of survival that was thought of when
it was held in the Brahmajla Sutta that 'the soul has form and does
not have form (after death)' (att rpi ca arpl ca . . . , D. I.31).
(634) The first clear reference to the theory of rebirth or the return to
earth to become man or animal is found at Brh. 6.2.15-16, Ch. 5.10.1-8
and Kaus. 1.2. It is only in the Katha Upanisad that for the first time
1
2
374
Early
Buddhist
Theory
of
Knowledge
yj
yjC*
377
378
of 'libre examen'; still more it considers critical inquiry as the one key
to the comprehension of truth . . .' (loc. cit.). 'Buddhism is a faith
and a creed, a respectful and close adhesion to the word of the one
Omniscient' (op. cit., p. 34). He adds, 'innumerable are the documents
which establish this point' (loc. cit.) but not a single reference is given
to the Pali Canon where it is said or implied that the Buddha was
omniscient. He does not make it clear whether on his view the Buddha
both claimed omniscience and/or was acclaimed omniscient by his
disciples, though he holds that the latter is true: 'according to his
disciples the Buddha alone knows everything . ..' (loc. cit.).
(644) Some Canonical texts are referred to in the sequel apparently
intended to show that the Buddha claimed omniscience and/or was
acclaimed omniscient. There is a reference to the Kevaddha Sutta,
where the Buddha claimed to know the answer to a question, which
even Brahma was ignorant of (D. I.223). The parable of the elephant
and the blind men (v. supra, 599) is mentioned with the remark,
'human wisdom always falls short in some point. To be saved one must
refer to the Omniscient' (loc. cit.). Lastly, there is a reference to a
passage in the Anguttara Nikya (presumably A. IV. 163 ff.), where
the Buddha is compared to a granary, whence men bring every good
word, followed by the remark that 'they show beyond doubt that
Buddhism is a faith and creed' (loc. cit.). Keith quotes these same
passages to make the same point. l
(645) Now an examination of these passages will show that they do
not establish the fact that the Buddha claimed omniscience or was
believed to be omniscient by his disciples. The point of the Kevaddha
Sutta is to show that Brahma did not know the answer to the question,
'where do these four great elements . . . cease to be?' (kattha nu kho
bhante ime cattro mahbht aparises nirujjhanti, D. I.223). The
Buddha alters the question so as to preserve the naive realistic theory
of the external world, viz. 'where does water, earth, fire and air not
penetrate . . . ? ' (kattha po ca pathavi tejo vyo na gdhati. . . loc. cit.)
and answers it. The fact that he answers it is not intended to imply
that the Buddha was omniscient but only that Brahma was ignorant
as he is elsewhere said to be (cp. avijjgato . . . Brahma, M. L326) of
matters pertaining to the transcendent reality or Nirvana. The Buddha,
where he disclaims omniscience, claims to have three kinds of know
ledge, viz. (1) knowledge of his diverse past births, (2) clairvoyance,
1
379
and (3) the knowledge of the destruction of the 'intoxicants', i.e. the
knowledge of the means to and the fact of Nirvana (v. infra, 801).
Brahma, not having attained Nirvana, lacks the third (i.e. 3). With
regard to (1), Brahma's knowledge is said to be limited;1 the same is
the case with (2), for the Buddha claims to know the existence of
three groups of gods of whom Brahma is ignorant.2 So the Kevaddha
Sutta merely reinforces Buddha's claim to possess a 'three-fold
knowledge'.
(646) The parable of the blind men and the elephant likewise does
not seem to imply the omniscience of the Buddha. It merely tries to
illustrate the fact that the other religious teachers had at best only a
partial vision of reality3 (v. supra, 599). By implication the Buddha
had a total vision of reality, but this is not the same as a claim to
omniscience, for in such a case we would have to say that every meta
physician who makes such a claim is claiming omniscience!
(647) We can again hardly draw the inference that omniscience is
claimed for the Buddha when it is said in the Anguttara Nikya that
'whatever is well-spoken is the word of the Exalted One' (yam
kind subhsitam, sabbam tarn tassa bhagavato vacanam . . . , A.
IV. 164), if we take this statement in the context in which it is made.
This is not a saying attributed to the Buddha, but to a little known
monk Uttara who says this in a mythological context, addressing
Sakra, the king of the gods. In its context, there is a simile accom
panying the utterance: 'If there is a granary in the vicinity of a village
or hamlet and people were to carry grain in pingoes, baskets, in their
robes and hands . . . then if one were to ask the question 'from where
are you carrying this grain', the proper reply would be to say that it
was from this large granary. Even so, whatever is well-spoken is the
word of the Exalted One'. 4 What it means in its context, is that those
1
380
381
that 'he knows everything that has been seen, heard, sensed, thought,
attained, sought and searched by the minds of those who inhabit the
entire world of gods and men'. 1 This is followed by the inquiry as to
the sense in which the Buddha is 'all-seeing' (kenatthena samantacakkhu, op. cit., p. 133). This word (samanta-cakkhu) is used with a
slightly different connotation from that of sabbann and curiously
enough the 'omniscience of the Buddha' comes to be classified as one
of the fourteen kinds of knowledge, which constitute the knowledge
of the Buddha (cp. cuddasa Buddhannni . . . sabbannnutannnam
Buddhannam, loc. cit.). Whatever this may mean, it is clear from this
section that omniscience is claimed for the Buddha by disciples far
removed in time from the Buddha himself. Similarly, the Kathvatthu
urges as a matter of common belief that the Buddha is omniscient
(sabbann) and all-seeing (sabba-dassvi). These two epithets occur
in a list of eight epithets (Tathgato 2 , Jino 3 , Satth 4 , Samm-sambuddho 5 Sabbann Sabbadassvi Dhammassmi 6 Dhammapatisarano,
Kvu. 228) five of which (see footnotes) are found in the Sutta Pitaka
as regular epithets of the Buddha. It may be concluded from the above
that neither did the Buddha claim omniscience nor was omniscience
claimed of the Buddha until the very latest stratum in the Pali Canon
and that is even after most of the books of the Abhidhamma had been
completed.
(650) W e cannot therefore hold that the Buddha claimed authority
for his statements on the grounds that he was omniscient. Nor can
we say that he received his knowledge from an omniscient divine
source as seems to be implied in Poussin's statement that ' B u d d h i s m . . .
was a faith in revealed truths' {op. cit., p. 33). The injunction on the
part of Brahma to the Buddha to preach his religion (v. desassu bhagav dhammam, M. 1.169) does not imply that the Buddha gained his
knowledge from Brahma, especially when we see it said that Brahma
was ignorant of the deeper spiritual truths of Buddhism (v. supra, 645).
Przyluski has also expressed the view that the Early Buddhist scriptures
constitute a revelation. He says: 'In Buddhist thought the notion of
sruti is far more important than generally believed. It explains the
frequently used term of bahusruta,rendered literally in Chinese by
to-wen 'who has heard much'. T h e initial formula of the sutra, evam
1
382
may srutam not only alludes to the sacred texts by nanda, when the
First Council was held, but also indicates that these texts were revealed
and that the whole of them constitute the sruti. And just as srutais opposed to drsta- or sruti- to pratyaksa- the former term applied
as compared to the latter, a knowledge of superior quality. It seems
easier now to understand why Pali ditthi- View, opinion' is so
frequently used deprecatingly with the meaning of 'ill-founded or
false opinion'.1 In a footnote commenting on sruti (op. cit., p. 246,
fn. 2) he says that 'it is true that for Buddhaghosa followed in this
respect by European scholars (Kern, Manual of Buddhism, p. 2,
quoted by Poussin, Opinions, p. 35) evam may srutam means,
sammukh patiggahitam (DA. 1.31)'. But this interpretation he says
is 'a later one' (Joe. cit.). This view is surprising. It goes against
everything that we know from and about the Pali Canon. In the first
place there is no reason to doubt the traditional explanation that
'evam me sutam' means 'thus have I heard', even if we doubt the rest
of the tradition that they were the words of nanda. This phrase
introduces a Sutta, which has been reported by someone who had
learnt it in an oral tradition. It preserves the same non-dogmatic
attitude recommended in the Canki Sutta that when someone has
heard something from a tradition (anussavo) he preserves the truth,
if instead of dogmatically claiming that it was the case he says, 'this
is what I have heard from the tradition' (evam me anussavo, M. 1.171;
v. supra, 278). If the Buddha himself introduced his statements with
the words, 'evam me sutam', we would have reason to believe that he
was giving expression to something that he received from a human or
divine source. Not only does he not say anything of this sort but
claims on the contrary the following: 'I do not say this having heard
it from another recluse or brahmin, but what I myself have seen and
experienced, that I speak' (tarn kho pana aham . . . nnnassa samanassa
va brhmanassa va sutv vadmi, api ca yad eva me smam ntarp. smam
dittham smam viditamtarn evham vadmi ti, It. 59, 60, 74; M.
III. 186). We see here the very opposite of what Przyluski was sug
gesting, namely the superior valuation of dittham (what is seen) over
sutam (what is heard) (cp. supra. 69). Przyluski has also apparently
confused dittham with ditthi (v. infra, 742).
(651) What attitude, then, was expected towards the statements of
the Buddha? Is it the same as the attitude recommended towards all
1
p . 246.
383
384
385
386
Early Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
affection of faith and filial affection. But appreciation and faith are
identical' (punappunam bhajanavasena saddh va bhatti. Pemam
saddh-pemam gehasitapemam ti vattati. Pasdo saddh pasdo v,
248). According to this appraisal saddh is closest in meaning to
pasdawith which it is identified and we find this exemplified in
the usages in the Nikyas. The Jnnaprasthna (1.19) defines sraddh
as 'cetasah prasdah'1 (appreciation of mind) and we find 'cetaso
pasda-' in the Nikyas where we can expect saddh: yato yato
imassa dhammapariyyassa panhya attham upaparikkheyya labheth*
eva attamanatam labhetha cetaso pasadam^ i.e. inasmuch as he examines
with his intellect the meaning of this doctrinal passage he obtains
satisfaction and a mental appreciation (of it), M. I.114. We note here
that cetaso pasda- is 'mental appreciation' or the 'intellectual joy*
resulting from intelligent study and a clarification of one's thoughts.2
Lack of pasda- is likewise correlated with lack of understanding, e.g.
saddhammam avijnato pariplavapasdassa panfi na pariprati, i.e. the
wisdom of a person who does not understand the good doctrine and
whose pasda- is fickle does not increase, Dh. 38. Similarly, aveccappasda- in the Buddha, his Doctrine and his Order (Buddhe . . .
dhamme . . . sanghe aveccappasdena samanngato hoti, M. I.37)
seems to mean 'faith based on understanding' since avecca- seems to
mean 'having understood', e.g. yo ariyasaccni avecca passati, i.e. he
who having understood sees the noble truths, Sn. 229. Here the Corny.
has panfiya ajjhoghetva, 'having comprehended with one's intelli
gence'. The Corny., however, has 'acala-' (unshaken) for the same
word at D. I.217, but this is probably a secondary meaning since
'faith born of understanding' (aveccappasda-) is similar to 'rational
faith' (kravati saddh, M. I.320) which is said to be 'rooted, estab
lished, fixed and irremovable' (mlajt patitthit . . . dalh asamhriy, loc. cit.). We have to presume that avecca- (s.v. PTS. Dic
tionary) is formed from ava + present participle from \/iy 'to go',
meaning 'understand' (cp. avagata- from ava + Vg a m ? * t0 g' = =
understood, s.v. PTS. Dictionary). It is said that failure to investigate
and understand results in lack of pasda-, e.g. ananuvicca apariyoghetv pasdaniye thne appasdam upadamseti, i.e. one shows lack of
faith in a situation in which one ought to have faith as a result of not
1
v. Poussin, L'Abhidharmakosa, II, p. 106, fn. 3; Poussin translates 'cetaso
prasdah' as 'la clarification de la pensee' (op. cit., II, p. 156).
2
Poussin translates 'cetaso prasdah' as 'la clarification de la pensee' (op. cit.y
i i , P . 156).
387
388
Authority
and Reason
Within Buddhism
389
2
M. II.94.
The Theory of Knowledge, p. 26.
M. I.37, IL5I; A. 1.222, II.56, III.2I2, 332, 45I, IV.406, V.183.
4
Cp. Bhagavammlaka no . . . dhamm, i.e. our doctrines originate with the
Exalted One, A. IV.158, 351.
3
39
Authority
and Reason
Within
Buddhism
391
392
Early Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
393
prior to and for the generation of belief (or faith). Elsewhere, doubting
the teacher, the doctrine, the order, the training and being angry with
one's co-religionists (satthari . . . dhamme . . . sanghe . . . sikkhya
kankhati . . . sabrahmacrisu kupito hoti anattamano . . . , M. I.101)
are considered 'five obstacles or hindrances (to moral and spiritual
progress) of the mind' (pafica cetokhil . . . cetaso vinibandh, loc. cit.).
This kind of doubt (vicikicch) is regarded as one of the five impedi
ments (pancanivaran, M. 1.269, 270) and it is said that one should
'clear the mind of this doubt, becoming certain of moral values'
(akathamkathi kusalesu dhammesu vicikicchya cittam parisodheti,
loc. cit.) but this doubt is apparently to be removed not by blind belief
but by the conviction that dawns from a critical study and evaluation.
After the above preliminary examination of the Tathgata it is said
that one would feel that it was worth listening to his teachings (evamvdim . . . satthram arahati svako upasankamitum dhammasavanya,
M. I.319). After that 'he realizes with his own higher knowledge some
of those doctrines and concludes that (they are true) and then reposes
faith in the teacher, believing that the Exalted One was enlightened,
his doctrine well-taught and the Order of good conduct' (tasmim
dhamme abhinnya idh'ekaccam dhammam dhammesu nittham
agamam, satthari pasidim: sammsambuddho bhagav, svkkhto
bhagavat dhammo supatipanno sangho ti, M. I.320). It is said that
'the faith (saddh) of him, which is thus fixed, rooted and established
on these reasons, grounds and features is said to be a rational faith
(kravati saddh), rooted in insight, firm and irremovable by recluse
or brahmin, a god, Mra or Brahma or anyone in the world' (yassa
kassa ci . . . imehi krehi imehi padehi imehi byanjanehi . . . saddh
nivitth hoti mlajt patitthit, ayam vuccati . . . kravati saddh
dassanamlik dalh asamhriy samanena v brhmanena v devena
v Mrena v Brahmun v kenaci v lokasmim, loc. cit.). This rational
faith which is a product of critical examination and partial verification
is apparently contrasted with the 'baseless faith' (amlik saddh, M.
II. 170) which the brahmins have towards the Vedas and which the
Buddha shows, does not bear critical examination {v. supra, 263).
It is strange that no scholar has drawn our attention to this important
distinction.
(667) W e have so far come across saddha (faith, belief) being used for
different stages and types of acceptance of a proposition or doctrine.
The first was that of accepting for the purpose of testing, the stage in
N*
394
395
39^
(670) The faith of the saddhnusri (the one who is led by faith),
who is reckoned the last of those who have some spiritual attainment
(M. L439) is not of the same order as that of the saddh-vimutta
(y. supra, 668) and could not be considered to have reached the stage
of 'rational faith' (kravati saddh, v. supra, 666). This is evident
from the description which says that 'he has a mere faith or affection
for the Tathgata' (Tathgate c'assa saddhmattam hoti pemamattam,
M. I.479). This is a condition which can lapse {v. supra, 652); here the
acceptance is more out of affection (pema), which is considered a
hindrance rather than a help to salvation (v. supra, 657) than out of a
genuine desire for knowledge.
(671) Now faith or belief in the above sense is only considered a
first step towards understanding. It is not even a necessary step for all
and this is probably the reason why it is not included in the noble
eight-fold path. It is said that 'there are two sources for the arising of
the right view of life, viz. the propaganda of others and critical
reflection' (dve . . . paccay sammditthiy uppdya: parato ca ghoso
yoniso ca manasikro, M. I.294). The acceptance of the right view on
the basis of the propaganda of others, presumably of the Buddha and
his disciples, is an acceptance out of saddh, but the fact that we may
adopt it as a result of one's own independent thinking shows that
saddh is not necessary at least for the few. There is no doubt however
that according to the texts the majority need it.
(672) In the lists of virtues or requirements for salvation, in which
saddh occurs, we find that it is always mentioned as the first member,
while understanding (panfi) j s almost always the last, viz.
1. saddh, sila-, suta-, cga-, pann, A. 11.66, III.6, 44, 181, IV.270,
271, 284, 288, M. I.465, II.180, III.99.
2. saddh, viriya-, sati-, samdhi, pann, M. 1.164, III.99.
3. saddh, sila-, cga-, pann, patibhna-, A. V.96.
4. saddho, appbdha-, asatha-, raddhaviriya-, pahhav, M. IL128.
5. saddho, hirim, ottpi-, akodhano, pahhav, S. IV.243.
6. saddh-, hiri-, ottpi-, viriya-, pahha-, A. III.4, 9, 352, V.123.
7. saddho, raddhaviriya-, upatthitasati-, samhito, pahhav, A.
V.329, 333> 3358. saddho, hiri-, ottpi, bahussuta-, raddhaviriya-, upatthitasati-,
pahhav, M. III.23, A. II,2i8, A. IV.23, 38.
397
398
b. 1V.298.
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
Ifp is true
We are happy in the
next life
We are unhappy in the
next life
If not-p is true
We are praised by the
wise in this life
We are condemned by
the wise in this life.
407
right view) than its opposite, without being able to demonstrate that
this was true. This means that reason was of limited value.
(688) The Buddha's attitude to the numerous theories which were
being propagated and defended on rational grounds at this time
(v. supray Ch. V) seems to have been to ignore them. The evidence of
the texts indicates that he refrained from joining issue with these
dialecticians and rational metaphysicians in debate as far as possible,
like some of the Sceptics (v. supra, 169) though he seems to have
accepted the challenge when they came to him with questions for the
purposes of debate (v. supra, 350 f.). The attitude of the Buddha is
probably summed up in his own statement that 'when a debate has
arisen the sage does not enter it' (vdan ca jtam muni no upeti, Sn.
780). It is probably this attitude of shunning debates in public assem
blies on the whole, which earned for the Buddha the rebuke of the
brahmins that 'the recluse Gotama utters a lion's roar, but he utters it
in the empty house and not in the public assemblies' (sihandam kho
samano Go tamo nadati, tan ca kho sufingre nadati no parissu, D.
1.175). Even when people wished to know from the Buddha his views
on or criticisms of others' doctrines, he generally refrains from
expressing any view and is content to teach his own doctrines. When
Subhadda mentions the famous teachers of his time and wants to know
whether 'they all understood, none understood or some understood
and some did not' (sabbe te . . . abbhannamsu, sabbe'va na abbhann
amsu, ekacce abbhannamsu ekacce na abbhannamsu, D. II. 150, 151),
the Buddha says, 'enough, Subhadda, leave these questions aside . . . I
shall teach you the dhamma . . .' (alam, Subhadda, titthat' etam . . .
dhammam te
desissmi, loc. cit.). When two brahmins come to him
and state the contradictory views expressed by Prana Kassapa and
Nigantha Ntaputta on the extent of the cosmos (v. supra, 393) and
wish to know which of them was true, his reply was the same (A.
IV.429). This attitude probably explains why there is very little rational
criticism even of doctrines which Buddhism opposed, in the Pali
Canon.
(689) The Buddha's rejoinder to the brahmin rebuke that his 'lion's
roar' was to be heard only in empty houses was that 'the recluse Gotama
does utter his lion's roar and does so in public assemblies' (sihanadan
ca samano Gotamo nadati parissu ca nadati, D. 1.175). This statement
too may have an element of truth, especially when we find positive
claims that the Buddha 'participated in hundreds of assemblies'
408
409
410
Authority
and Reason
Within
Buddhism
411
false). 'If God designs the life of the entire worldthe glory and the
misery, the good and the evil actsman is but an instrument of his
will and God (alone) is responsible.'1 Elsewhere in the Jtakas, the
argument from evil is used to disprove the truth of Theism by means
of the same modus tollendo tollens: 'If Brahma is lord of the whole
world and creator of the multitude of beings (/?), then why (i) has he
ordained misfortune in the world without making the whole world
happy (not-^), or (ii) for what purpose has he made the world full of
injustice, deceit, falsehood and conceit (not-^), or (iii) the lord of
beings is evil in that he ordained injustice when there could have been
justice' (not-*?).2
(699) The next theory criticized is that 'everything is caused by past
actions' (sabbam pubbekatahetu, J. V.208)a species of Determinism.
'If one experiences happiness and misery as a result of past actions (/?),
a person is paying off the debts of his past sin and being a payer off of
past debts, is not responsible for his evil actions (^).'3 Here again q
is assumed to be evidently false implying the falsity of p.
(700) The Materialist is similarly disposed of. 'If the soul is alive only
in this world and is destroyed at death and the world (consisting of)
the fools and the wise perishes (/>), then the world perishing, one is not
responsible for one's evil actions.'4
(701) Lastly, the Machiavellian philosophy is dismissed. 'Fools
thinking themselves learned say that there is the "rule of might"
(khatta-vidh) in the world (/?); one may destroy mother, father, elder
brother, children and wives, if such a need be there.' 5 Here what is
meant is that if might is right (/?), then one may kill mother, father,
etc., when it is expedient to do so (q). But q is held to be an evidently
false proposition, implying the falsity of/?.
1
Issaro sabbalokassa sace kappeti jivitam iddhivyasanabhvanca kammam
kalynappakam niddesakri puriso issaro tena Hppati.
2
Sace hi so issaro sabbaloke Brahma bahubhtapati pajnam, (i) kim sabbaloke
vidahi alakkhirn sabbalokam na sukhi aksi . . . (ii) mymusvajjamadena c'pi
lokam adhammena kimatth'aksi . . . (iii) adhammiyo bhtapati . . . dhamme sati
yo vidahi adhammam, J. VI.208.
3
Sace pubbekatahetu sukhadukkham nigacchati, pornakam katam ppam
tam eso muccate inam, pornakam inamokkho kuvidha ppena lippati, J. V.208.
4
Idh'eva jivati jivo pecca pecca vinassati, ucchijjati ayam loko ye bal ye ca
pandit, ucchijjamne lokasmim kuvidha ppena lippati, J. V.239.
5
A h u khatta-vidh loke bl panditamnino, mtaram pitaram hanne atha
ettham pi bhtaram haneyya putte ca dre, attho ca tdiso siy, J. V.240.
412
(702) The logical form of the above arguments in the modus tollendo
tollens is not clearly depicted but in the Kathvatthu, we get a con
scious formulation of this form of argument.
(703) Bochenski in criticizing Randle's opinion that the author of the
Kathvatthu had little knowledge of logic1 has quite rightly re
marked: 'Denn es ist in unserem Text klar zu sehen, dass die Dis
kutierenden ganz bewusst bestimmte formallogische Regeln nicht nur
anwenden, sondern fast ausdrcklich formulieren'.2
(704) There is, however, a difference of opinion between Bochenski
and Schayer3 as to what exactly these formal logical rules were. Accord
ing to Schayer the Kathvatthu tells us about 'a few theorems of the
propositional calculus' (einiger Theoreme des Aussagenkalkls, op.
cit., p. 91), namely the definition of Implication (Definition der
Implikation, op. cit., p. 92) and the law of Contraposition, which
Schayer calls the 'law of Transposition' (Gesetz der Transposition,
loc. cit.). He does not say that these formal rules of the propositional
calculus are explicitly formulated but that the author of the Kath
vatthu shows an awareness of them: 'Ich glaube, dass wir die Kenntnis
dieser beiden Gesetze dem Verfasser des Kvu mit grosser Wahr
scheinlichkeit zuschreiben drfen' {loc. cit.). But according to Bochen
ski, Schayer goes too far (so scheint er zu weit zu gehen, op. cit.,
p. 488) when he speaks of 'Antizipationen der Aussagenlogik' in the
Kathvatthu (loc. cit.). For him the relations established are not
relations between propositions but between terms or concepts. So we
are concerned here with rules which correspond somewhat to 'termlogical formulae' (termlogischen Formeln, op. cit., p. 489) and not with
the rules of propositional logic (aussagenlogische Regeln, loc. cit.).
(705) This in fact was the very ground on which Schayer criticized
Aung's original symbolical formulation of the argument in the 'Points
of Controversy' (pp. xlviii ff.) which Bochenski seeks to reinstate:4
'Wie man sieht, entspricht diese Formel dem stoischen modus tollendo
1
413
tollens, das sagt aber Shwe Zang Aung nicht und schafft ausserdem
durch die unntige Einfhrung von Namenvariabein die grund
stzlich falsche Suggestion, als ob es sich um Relationen zwischen den
fier Begriffen A, B, C and D handelte. Tatschlich sind die Elemente,
mit denen die Logik des Kathvatthu operiert, evidenterweise nicht
Namenvariabein, sondern Aussagenvariabein . . . ' (op. cit., p. 91).
(706) We find that the evidence from the Kathvatthu favours
Schayer's exposition rather than that of Bochenski. As Bochenski
himself has shown (v. op. cit., p. 489, 51.021 and 51.031), if we treat
'puggalo upalabbhati saccikatthaparamatthena' (a person is known in a
real and ultimate sense) as a proposition (say, p) and *yo saccikattho
paramattho tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikatthaparamatthena' (a
person is known in a real and ultimate sense in the same way in which a
real and ultimate fact is known) as another proposition (say, q) we can
clearly translate the argument of the Kathvatthu without distortion
of its form as it appears in the original:
Theravdin: Is/> true?1
Puggalavdin: Yes (|- p).
Th.: Is q true?
P.: It is not true2 ( ^ q).
Th.: (1) Acknowledge defeat (jnahi niggaham): if p is true, then q
is true (p 3 q).
(2) The assertion that/? is true (lit. ought to be asserted, vattabbe)
but not q, is false (r^(p-r^,q))(3) If q is not true, xhenp is not true (~q D ~p)(4) is identically the same as (2). 3 Bochenski has rightly omitted
it (loc. cit.) as this repetition is of no logical significance.
Schayer includes it and refers to the 'four assertions' (vier
Festellungen, op. ciu, p. 92) but the Kathvatthu itself speaks
of 'the five assertions (lit. the pentad) in direct order'
(anulomapancakam, loc. cit.), apparently considering the
preamble also as a unit. (4) was probably repeated because
it is the only assertion that ends in 'micch' (false) and would
have appeared to the debater to clinch the issue.
1
414
n..-Yes(h ~p).
P.; Is q not true?
Th.: It is not the case that it is not true: ~(~q).
P.: (1) Acknowledge the rejoinder (jnahi patikammam): if not-/?
is true, then not-^ is true: (r^p D ^<7).
(2) The assertion that not-/? is true but not not-^, is false: ^ ( ^ . . v
(3) If not-^ is not true, then not-/? is not true: ~(~q)
(4) = (a).
D ^ (~/?).
(708) The argument is thus quite clear, when stated in the propositional form, whereas the analysis of the propositions into its terms or
into subject-predicate form not only makes the argument less clear
but tends to obscure the fact that truth or falsity is here predicated of
propositions and not of terms. The Kathvatthu is certainly familiar
with the concept of 'term'* as the section on the 'clarification of terms'
(vacana-sodhanam, Kvu. 25) shows, but it may be seen that when the
Kvu. uses the word micch (false), it is used as the predicate of a
proposition, e.g. (2) above, i.e. micch {p. r^q) where (/?. ~q) has to be
taken as a compound proposition. Besides, the Kvu. is familiar with the
term for a proposition, viz. patinn ( = Skr. pratijn) and is using the
word in this sense in these discussions; cp. etya patinnya h'evam
patijnantnam, Kvu. 2, rendered by Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids as
'you, who have assented to the very proposition . . .' (pp. cit., p. 10).
In addition, there are discussions in which Bochenski's term-logical
analysis breaks down and fails to bring out the fact that it were the
propositions, which are regarded as equivalent:
Th.: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?2
(Propositional analysisp?; term-analysisIs A B ? )
P.: Is the person always (sabbad) known in the sense of a real and
ultimate fact?3
(Propositional analysisq?; term-analysisIs A B, always?)
Here p D q, since q is only a restatement of />, a general proposition
being true 'at all times' (sabbad). But if it is a relation between the
1
Not in the modern sense in which a proposition is composed of terms and
2
relations.
Puggalo upalabbhati saccikatthaparamatthena ti, Kvu. 8.
3
Sabbad puggalo upalabbhati saccikatthaparamatthena, ioc. cit.
Authority
and Reason
Within Buddhism
415
terms A and B, it need not be so, since Socrates may be well today
(A is B) and ill tomorrow (A is not B).
(709) Now Bochenski himself says that it is noteworthy that 51.03
originates from 51.02 by substituting 'A is not B' for 'A is B' and also
by substituting 'A is not C for 'A is C (v. op. cit., p. 489). But surely,
this is because 'A is B' and 'A is C were considered as units or proposi
tions in place of which other propositions (the negative forms) could
be substituted.1 In the circumstances, it is not possible to agree with
Bochenski's contention that in attributing an awareness to the author
of the Kvu. of two of the theorems of the propositional calculus, the
rules of Implication (p D q. = ~(p* ~q) and Contraposition (p D q.
= ~q D ~p\ one is ascribing to Indian thinkers a faculty of abstraction
(Abstractionsfhigkeit, Bochenski, op. cit.y p. 489), which they did
not possess. For one has to rely on the factual evidence in this matter
and not on hypothetical possibilities of what can or cannot exist.
(710) It would not, of course, be correct to say that the author of the
Kvu. formulated these rules since he does not actually equate (1) and
(2) (Implication) nor (1) and (3) (Contraposition), but merely assumes
their identity. And we do not think Schayer goes too far when he says,
'Ebensowenig sagt er expressis verbis, obwohl er dies zweifelsohne im
Sinne hatte, dass die Thesen: p D q, ~ (p. ~q) und r^q j ~p als
quivalent zu betrachten sind'. (Op. cit., p. 92.)
(711) The presence of eight refutations (Kvu. 1-11) has no logical
significance and the use of the word niggaha- (refutation) only up to
the number eight (cp. atthako niggaho, Kvu. 11) is arbitrary, since the
subsequent discussions also constitute refutations (v. jnahi niggaham,
pp. 14 ff.).
1
Note that Bochenski himself says, 'und das knnte die Vermutung nahelegen,
dass es damals schon einige bewusst angewandte aussagenlogische Regeln gab*
(pp. cit., p. 489).
CHAPTER IX
(712) In this final chapter we propose to examine the means and limits
of knowledge as recognized in the Pali Canonical texts.
(713) In Chapter IV, we noticed that when the Buddha classified his
predecessors and contemporaries in respect of the ways of knowledge
emphasized by them as the Traditionalists, the Rationalists and the
'Experientialists' (v. supra, 250), he identified himself as a member
of the last group (v. supra, 249). In his address to the Klmas and to
Bhaddiya Licchavi, where he criticizes six ways of knowing based on
authority (v. supra, 251) and four ways of knowing based on reason
(v. supra, 314) on the ground that beliefs based on authority or reason
may turn out to be true or false (v. supra, 283, 308, 436, 442), he ends
on the note that one should accept a proposition as true only when one
has 'personal knowledge' (attan va jneyytha, A. II. 191) of it, taking
into account the views of the wise (v. supra, 662).
(714) This emphasis on personal and direct knowledge is found
throughout the Nikyas and in trying to determine the ways of know
ing recognized in the Canon, it is necessary to see clearly what was
meant by this kind of knowledge.
(715) The fact that the Buddha claimed to be 'one of those' (tesham
asmi, v. supra, 249) recluses and brahmins, who had a 'personal higher
knowledge' (smam yeva . . . abhinnya, loc. cit.) of a doctrine not
found among 'doctrines traditionally handed down' (pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu, loc. cit.) is clear evidence that the Buddha did not
claim or consider himself to have an unique way of knowing denied to
others. It ranks him in his own estimate as a member of a class of
recluses and brahmins, who claimed to have a personal and a 'higher
knowledge' of doctrines not found in the various traditions. Who
could these 'recluses and brahmins' be, in the light of our knowledge
of the historical background? (V. Chs. I, II, III).
417
(716) We saw that the brahmin thinkers fell into three types on
epistemological groundsthe Traditionalists of the Vedas and
Brhmanas, the Rationalists of the Early Upanisads and the 'Experientialists' of the Middle and Late Upanisads (v. supra, j6, 244). Since
the Buddha dissociates himself from the first two classes (y. supra, 246)
we may presume that he identifies himself among others with the
brahmin thinkers of the Middle and Late Upanisads. From the time of
the Early Upanisads, newly discovered doctrines not found in the
traditional Vedic learning, were being taught. Svetaketu had 'learned
all the Vedas' (sarvn vedn adhitya . . . Ch. 6.1.2) but had to be
instructed by Uddlaka with a doctrine 'whereby what he has not
heard (presumably in the Vedic teaching) is heard' (yensrutam srutam
bhavati, Ch. 6.1.3). Such doctrines as well as the doctrines constituting
the 'higher knowledge' (par vidy) of the Middle and Late Upanisads
(v. supra, 75) have to be reckoned among 'the doctrines not tradition
ally handed down' (ananussutesu dhammesu) referred to in the Pali
passage. The brahmin Rationalists have to be excluded from the class
of thinkers, with whom the Buddha identifies himself, also for the
reason that they did not claim to have a 'higher knowledge' (abhinn)
based on any kind of contemplative or meditative experience (dhyna
=P.jhna, v. supra, 31), unlike the Middle and Late Upanisadic
thinkers.
(717) We have observed that these latter thinkers claimed a kind of
knowledge, which was a matter of directly 'seeing' or intuiting ultimate
reality (y. supra, 73) and which was usually described by the word
jnna (v. supra, 74). In a sense, the emphasis on jhna or knowledge
was common to all the Upanisadic thinkers, since knowledge came to
be valued as the means of salvation at least from the time of the
ranyakas onwards (v. supra, 16). Thenceforth, there was a cleavage
in the Vedic tradition between the karmamrga or 'the way of ritual'
and the jhna-mrga or 'the way of knowledge'. Early Buddhism is
aware of this distinction, for the Suttanipta mentions the yahha-patha
or 'the way of ritual' (yanna-pathe appamatt, Sn. 1045) as against the
nana-patha or 'the way of knowledge' (nana-pathya sikkhe, Sn. 868).
But it is also necessary to emphasize the distinction between the two
ways of knowledge recognized within the Upanisads - the intellectual
or rational knowledge of the Early Upanisads and the intuitive know
ledge of the Middle and Late Upanisads. Of these two, it is the latter
way of knowing that Buddhism values.
o
4i 8
419
na
passeyya).
420
(722) Now Keith seems to have noticed the essential affinity betwee n
the way of knowing of the Middle and Late Upanisads and that of
Early Buddhism; he makes the following observation: 'The view of
intuition as the source of true knowledge, and at the same time a
decisive cause of emancipation from rebirth is characteristic of
Buddhism as of the Upanisads, and explains why in neither do we find
any serious contribution to epistemology. The Buddha, like the sage
of the Upanisad, sees things as they truly are (yathbhtam) by a mystic
potency, which is quite other than reasoning of the discursive type.
The truth of his insight is assured by it alone, for it is obviously in
capable of verification in any empirical manner.'1 He qualifies this
statement when he adds that 'the Canon does not treat intuition
(panfi) as being wholly distinct from, and unconnected with discursive
knowledge . . . it is allied to deliberate and searching mental apprecia
tion (yoniso manasikro)' (pp. cit., p. 90).
(723) While we agree with Keith's comparison between the way of
knowledge accepted in Buddhism and the Upanisads, in the light of
the evidence that we have shown above, we cannot subscribe to his
other remarks. Despite the qualitative similarity between the means
of knowledge in the Middle and Late Upanisads and Buddhism, it is
necessary to note that the latter gives a different orientation to and
evaluation of this means of knowledge. This tends to present this
knowledge in a different light altogether and makes less obvious the
gap between the empirical and the mystical.
(724) In the Upanisads one's knowledge and vision is not, in the final
analysis, due to one's efforts but to the grace or intervention of tman
or God (v. supra, 73). The emergence of this knowledge is conceived
as something inexplicable and mysterious. This character warrants it
being called a kind of mystical knowledge. But in the Buddhist account
the mental concentration (samdhi) which is a product of training and
effort, is a causal factor (upanis) in the production of this knowledge:
'. . . in the absence of right mental concentration and in the case of one
not endowed with right mental concentration, the cause is absent (for
the production of) the knowledge and insight of things as they really
are' (. . . sammsamdhimhi asati sammsamdhivipannassa hatpanisam hoti yathbhtannadassanam, A. III.200). It is a natural and
not a supernatural occurrence: 'It is in the nature of things (dhammat)
that a person in the state of (meditative) concentration knows and sees
1
421
what really is. A person who knows and sees what really is, does not
need to make an effort of will to feel disinterested and renounce. It is
in the nature of things that a person who knows and sees as it really is,
feels disinterested and renounces. One who has felt disinterested and
has renounced does not need an effort of will to realize the knowledge
and insight of emancipation (vimutti-nnadassanam). It is in the nature
of things that one who has felt disinterested and renounced, realizes the
knowledge and insight of emancipation'. {Dhammat es . . . yam
samhito yathbhtam jnti passati. Yathbhtam jnato passato na
cetanya karamyam 'nibbindmi virajjmi' ti. Dhammat es . . . yam
yathbhtam jnam passam nibbindati virajjati. Nibbinnassa . . .
virattassa na cetanya karamyam Vimuttinnadassanam sacchikaromf
ti. Dhammat es . . . yam nibbinno viratto vimuttinnadassanam
sacchikaroti, A. V.3, 313.) Here the 'knowledge and insight' (nnadassana) which is a means to an end and is often called panfi (v. infra,
797) as well as the final 'knowledge and insight of emancipation'
(vimuttinnadassana-), which is the end itself, are considered to be
natural causal occurrences.
(725) This difference in valuation is clearly brought out when we
compare the views of Prana Kassapa and the Buddha on the nature
of knowledge. Both claim to belong to the same class of thinkers on
epistemological grounds. Prana Kassapa is a fina-vdin (V. supra,
720) and so is the Buddha (v. supra, 718). But their theories with regard
to the genesis of knowledge are utterly different. Prana holds that
'there is no cause or condition for the lack of knowledge and insight
. . . or for the presence of knowledge and insight' (natthi hetu natthi
paccayo afinnya adassanya . . . nnya dassanya, S. III. 126), while
the Buddha holds that 'there was a cause and reason' (atthi hetu atthi
paccayo, loc. cit.) for both. This is partly due to the fact that Prana
was a niyati-vdin or a Strict Determinist (v. supra, 199), but even the
Middle and Late Upanisadic thinkers in claiming that the arising of the
final intuition of reality was due to the grace of Atman or God (v.
supra, 73) subscribe to a similar view.
(726) In outlining the causes and conditions for the emergence or
non-emergence of this (kind of) knowledge it is said: 'When one
dwells with one's mind obsessed with and given to passion and one
does not truly know and see the elimination of the passion that has
arisen, it is a cause of one's failure to know and see . . . (likewise) illwill, sloth and torpor, excitement and perplexity, and doubt (are causes
422
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
of one's failure to know and see).' On the other hand, the cultivation
of the seven factors of enlightenment (sattabojjhahga) is said to be a
cause and condition for the arising of knowledge and insight.2
(727) The five factors outlined above as what causes the lack of
knowledge and insight are in fact the same as what is commonly known
in the Pli Nikyas as 'the five impediments' (pancanivarana-, D. I.73).
According to the Buddhist theory, the elimination of these five factors
is said to clear the way for the development of the jhnas or the
meditative states of the mind: 'When these five impediments are
eliminated he looks within himself and gladness arises in him and with
gladness, joy; with his mind overjoyed his mind becomes at ease and
with his body at ease he experiences happiness; being happy his mind
becomes concentrated.'3 Then follows a description of the first up to
the fourth jhnas.4 It is at this stage, on the attainment of the fourth
jhna 'when the mind is concentrated, pure, cleansed, free from
blemishes, purged of adventitious defilements, supple, pliant, steady
and unperturbed' (evam samhite citte parisuddhe pariyodte anangane
vigatpakkilese mudubhte kammaniye thite nejjappatte, D. I.76)
that he is said to 'turn and direct his mind to knowing and seeing'
(nna-dassasya cittam abhiniharati abhininnmeti, loc. eh.). The mind
in this state is said to observe introspectively but directly one's con
sciousness associated with the body. 5 In this same state he turns and
directs his mind to 'psycho-kinetic activity' (iddhi-vidhya, D. I.77),
to 'clair-audience' (dibbya sotadhtuy, D. I.79), to 'telepathic
knowledge' (cetopariya/z^oya^ D. I.79), to the 'retrocognitive
knowledge of past existences' (pubbenivsnussatma^aya, D. 1.81),
to the 'knowledge of the decease and survival of beings' (sattnam
1
423
On this distinction, v. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Ch. II, pp. 25-60.
P T S . Dictionary s.v.; on this term see Mrs Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1914,
pp. 94, 130, 201; Compendium of Philosophy, pp. 40, 41, 102.
2
424
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
425
426
427
428
Upanisad takes the stand that perception was the most reliable means
of knowledge (v. supra, 69), but it was the Materialists who underlined
the importance of perception even to the extent of discarding other
means of knowledge. The Buddhists seem to have been influenced by
the Materialists in their emphasis on perception, although perception
here is both sensory as well as extrasensory. 'Who would believe', it
is said, 'that this earth and the majestic mountain Sineru would be
consumed by fire, except on the evidence of sight' (ko saddht ayan ca
pathavi Sineru ca pabbatarj dayhissanti ti . . . ahhatra ditthapadehi,
A.IV.103).
(738) The Buddhist theory of truth (v. supra, 596) also makes it clear
that truth and therefore knowledge is objective, as telling us the nature
of'things as they are' (yathbhtam). The knowledge of things as they
are consists in knowing 'what exists as "existing" and what does not
exist as "not existing" ' (santam v atthl ti nassati asantam v natthi
ti nassati, A. V.36). 'Knowing things as they are', it is said, 'wherever
they are, is the highest knowledge' (etad anuttariyam . . . nnnam
yadidam tattha tattha yathbhtannam, A. V.37). What is taught by
the Buddha is claimed to be objectively valid: 'Whether the Tathgata
preaches the dhamma to his disciples or does not preach it, the dhamma
remains the same' (desento pi Tathgato svaknam dhammam tdiso
va adesento pi hi dhammo tdiso va, M. L331).
(739) The importance of eliminating subjective bias and of getting
rid of habits of mind that cause people to fall into error is often stressed.
It was the Sceptics who paid the greatest attention to this subject. The
first school of Sceptics said that truth cannot be arrived at and it was
always a subjective factor such as attachment (chando), passion (rgo),
hate (doso), or repulsion (patigho), which makes one accept a pro
position as true (v. supra, 159). We have already seen that the Buddha's
attitude to the debate (v. supra, 688) was similar to that of the Sceptics,
most of whom avoided debate because of the vexation that it caused
(v. supra, 338). We similarly see the influence of the above doctrine of
the Sceptics where it is said that there are 'four ways of falling into
injustice' or untruth (agati-gamanni, A. II. 18), namely out of attach
ment (chanda-), hatred (dosa-), ignorance (moha-), and fear (bhaya-);
the arhat or the 'ideal person' in Buddhism is not misled in any of these
four ways (D. III. 133). The difference from Scepticism is that this does
not result in Buddhism in total scepticism with regard to the possibility
429
43
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
431
Seyyath p i . . . anno v afifiam paccavekkheyya, thito v nisinnam paccavekkheyya, nisinno v nipannam paccavekkheyya, evam eva . . . paccavekkhannimittam suggahitam hoti sumanasikatam spadhritam suppatividdham pafinya
2
. . ., A. III. 27.
v. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 566.
3
Api nu tumhehi dittham v sutam v ayam puriso pntiptam pahya . . . tarn
enam rjno gahetv hananti.
432
433
to the subject found here. He says that 'what is most interesting in the
analysis of mind contained in this literature is its empiricist approach
and the fact that this approach produced results which are strikingly
similar to those produced by modern psychologists using introspective
methods . . . I believe that these are the first speculations putting for
ward a naturalistic view of mind and the closest in the ancient world to
present-day psychological theories'.1 The raison d'etre of this new
theory of perception according to Dr Sarathchandra is that 'Buddhism
having cast aside the current conceptions about the soul, had to advance
an alternative hypothesis to explain such functions of the senses as
seeing, hearing, smelling or tasting which, in the Upanisadic philosophy,
were activities of the Atman residing in the respective sense-organs'
(pp. ciu9 p. 3).
(745) In our opinion, this explanation puts the cart before the horse.
It is not that Buddhism casts aside the concept of the soul and then
evolves a completely new theory of perception altogether but that the
approach of Buddhism results on the one hand in the elimination of
metaphysics and on the other in the retention and development of
some of the empiricist findings in the Upanisadic theories of perception.
Let us illustrate this. The Buddhist account gives a strictly causal
explanation of the origin of sense-cognition without recourse to any
of the Upanisadic metaphysical concepts. Visual cognition, for example,
results from the presence of three conditions (1) an unimpaired internal
sense-organ of sight (ajjhattikam . . . cakkhu aparibhinnam hoti,
M. 1.190), (2) external visible forms entering into the field of vision?
(bhir ca rp ptham gacchanti, loc. cit.), and (3) an appropriate2
act of attention on the part of the mind (tajjo ca samannhro hoti,
loc. cit.). When these conditions are satisfied, it is said that 'there is a
manifestation of this kind of perception' (vinnna-bhgassa ptubhvo
1
Buddhist Psychology of Perception, The Ceylon University Press, Colombo,
1958, Introductory Note, p. viii. This was originally presented as a P h . D . thesis,
viz. The Psychology of Perception in Pali Buddhism with special reference to
the theory of bhavanga, P h . D . (London), 1948.
2
Tajjassa ti tadanurpassa, i.e. tajja- means appropriate to it, M.A. II.229.
Sarathchandra says that 'samannhro* here can refer to either 'an automatic act
of sensory attention* or a 'deliberate act directed by interest* (v. op. cit., p. 21).
He prefers the former and adds that 'the Sanskrit is preserving the original mean
ing of the term* (op. cit., p. 22) but the Slistamba Stra (quoted by him) merely
has *tajja- manasikram pratitya*, i.e. on account of the reflection resulting from
it (v. ed. N . A. Sstri, Adyar, 1950, p. 15; cp. Mdhyamaka Vrtti, ed. Poussin,
P- 567.
434
hoti, loc. cit.). All the above conditions, it is said, must be satisfied for
the production of the above result. If condition (i) is satisfied but not
(2) and (3), or if conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied but not (3), the
result will not take place (v. M. L190, lines 20 to 28). All this is in
accordance with the Buddhist causal theory (v. infra, 766) but never
theless the elements of the above hypothesis are traceable to the
Upanisads and this Dr Sarathchandra (op. cit., pp. 21, 22) does not
seem to have noticed. Taking the ten sensory and motor organs
together the Kausitaki Upanisad points out that 'the material elements
cannot exist without the cognitive elements nor the cognitive elements
without the material elements and from either alone no form would
be possible'.1 Except for the fact that the 'cognitive elements' are here
metaphysically conceived as the agents of the sensory functions, there
is a recognition of the mutual causal dependence of sensible objects
and their respective cognitions. Likewise the importance of attention
for sense-cognition is recognized in the Upanisads where it is said, 'my
mind was elsewhere, I did not see; my mind was elsewhere, I did not
hear, for with the mind does one see and with the mind hear'.2
(746) While we have rendered vinnna- in the above passage (i.e.
M. 1.190) as 'perception' Sarathchandra translates it as 'sensation'
(pp. cit., p. 21) and has a theory about it. He says that vinnna- in these
contexts has been often 'interpreted to mean cognition' (op. cit., p. 4)
but that it meant 'not full cognition, but bare sensation, a sort of
anoetic sentience' (loc. cit.); later he says that 'vinnna in the earliest
texts was almost synonymous with sann' (op. cit., p. 16). This
interpretation is based on the analysis of a single context (M. L i u ,
112) and the alleged confirmation of this sense from the Abhidhamma
(op. cit., pp. 4, 25). Sarathchandra promises to 'analyse the various
meanings of 'vinnna' (op. cit., p. 4) but this promise is not fully kept
(v. op. cit., pp. 16-21) since he has failed to discuss those contexts in
which vinnna- and the verbal forms of vi + Vf have a distinctly
cognitive connotation.
(747) Let us examine some of these contexts. The sense of'knowledge'
for vinnna- is quite clear where it is said that 'the Tathgata should be
examined in order to know (vinnnya, lit. for the knowledge of),
1
435
43 6
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
The Means
and Limits
of Knowledge
437
43 8
*957> P- 373
pncannaip bhikkhusatnarn . . . safthi bhikkh chajabhinn, S. I.191.
The Means
and Limits
of Knowledge
439
ca, ye dre santike ca, D. I.79; M. II.19). This implies not only the
alleged ability to perceive sounds even at a distance without the inter
vention of the physical media of hearing but the claim to be able to
appreciate the sounds of non-human spirits. It is an expansion of
auditory perception (without the medium of the sense-organ) both in
extent as well as in (what may be called) depth. The Buddha is said to
have heard the brahmin Bhrdvja's conversation with the wandering
ascetic Mgandiya at a distance by means of this faculty (M. I.502).
Sunakkhatta confesses to Otthaddha that just three years after follow
ing the training of the Buddha he has the ability (in jhna) of 'seeing
celestial figures . . . though he cannot hear their voices'.1
(753) The other four forms of abhinna, it will be noticed, are called
specific forms of knowledge (fina-). Lindquist has not given the
definition of 'the (paranormal) knowledge of another's mind' (cetopariyanna-) as it appears in the Pali Canon2 and has also failed to see
that two different kinds of telepathy are spoken of in these texts.
Ceto-pariyanna- corresponds to manahparyya-jnna- (Ard. Mag.
manapajjavanna-) in Jainism. According to the earliest account of this
faculty it would appear that by means of it one would know only the
general state of the mind of another. It is said, 'he comprehends with
his mind the mind of other beings and individuals as follows: he knows
that a passionate mind is passionate, (likewise) he knows a dispassionate
mind, a mind full of hatred and free from hatred, ignorant and devoid
of ignorance, attentive and distracted, exalted and unexalted, inferior
and superior, composed and not composed, emancipated and not
emancipated'.3 This is compared to observing one's face in a mirror
(dse) or a pan of water (udakapatte) and noticing whether there is a
mole or not (sakanikam v . . . akanikan ti jneyya, D. I.80). This
description seems to imply that only the general character of another's
mind is known in telepathy. But in the same stratum of thought it is said
that 'one can read the mind, the states of mind, the thoughts and the
trains of thought of other beings and individuals' (... parasattnam para1
Dibbni hi kho rpni passmi piyarpni . . . no ca kho dibbni saddni
2
sunmi, D . 1.152.
Op. cit.} pp. 75-7.
3
So parasattnam parapuggalnam cetas ceto paricca pajntisargam v
cittam sargafi cittan ti pajnti, vitargam v cittam. . ., sadosam v cittam . . .
vitadosam v . . . samoham . . . vitamoham . . . sankhittam . . . vikkhittam . . .
mahaggatam . . . amahaggatam . . . sauttaram . . . anuttaram . . . samhitam . . .
asamhitam . . . vimuttam . . . avimuttam, D . I.80, 81.
44
441
442
443
444
445
of events) it paves the way for the idea of universal causation. We also
noticed that causal arguments which presuppose a concept of causation
were being used at this time particularly by the niyativdins (v. supra,
206) but it is not possible to identify a theory of causation with any of
the non-Buddhist schools during this period.
(762) It is with Buddhism that we, for the first time, meet with a clearcut theory of causation in the history of Indian thought.
(763) Causation as understood in Buddhism stands midway between
the Indeterminism of yadrcchvada and the Strict Determinism of
niyativda. The Buddhists seem to have coined the term adhicca^samuppanna- to denote the concept of yadrcch. These Indeterminists
(adhicca-samuppannik) are said to be of two types on epistemological
grounds, (1) those who base their theory on (jhnic) observation, and
(2) those who base their theory on reasoning (D. I.28,29). The former,
it is said, learn to recollect their past with their retro cognitive vision
'up to the moment of the arising of consciousness but not further'
(sannuppdam anussarati, tato param nanussarati, D. I.28, 29) and
argue as follows: 'I did not exist before, but now not having existed,
have come into existence' (aham hi pubbe nhosim, so'mhi etarahi
ahutv sattatya parinato, loc. ciu). We see from this description the
indeterminism of the theorythe belief that an event takes place with
no relation to its past. The PTS. Dictionary derives the etymology of
the term from Skr. * adhrtya ) P.adhicca (from V^hr, to bear, support)
but it appears more likely that this word was coined on the analogy of
paticca- (in paticca-samuppda-, paticca-samuppanna-) in order to
distinguish this concept from the latter. If so, the term is derived from
adhi+ V H - ( t )y a (gerundive) meaning 'having come on top o f as
compared with prati-f- VH" 00y a meaning 'having come on account
of.
(764) The Buddhist theory likewise differed from Strict Determinism
(niyativda) in holding that 'the effort of the individual' (atta-kra-)
was sometimes a factor in causal processes and this was not strictly
determined. The proof of this was the empirical fact that we feel free
to act and exercise our effort, called our 'initiative' (rabbhadhtu) in
many situations1 (A. III.337,338). At A. I.173-5, three non-causationist
1
Cp. Katham hi nma say am abhikkamanto sayam patikkamanto evam
vakkhati, natthi attakro . . . ti? i.e. How can one walking up and down with
one's own effort say that there is no personal effort . . ., loc. cit.
446
447
loc. cit.), and (3) they must have the benefit of the earth and water. It is
said that conditions (1) and (2) without (3) do not bring about the
result, nor (1) and (3) without (2) but only when all three conditions
are satisfied. The total cause thus consists of several conditions, each
of which has a different relationship to the effect and is, therefore, a
different type of condition. What the Patthna does is to analyse and
define these various conditions.1 Sometimes the relationship between
cause and effect may be one of mutual dependence, in which case we
would prefer not to talk of a cause or effect for there is no priority of
the cause. Thus one of the relationships subsisting between 'the
psychophysical individual' (nmarpa) and his 'consciousness'
(vinnnam) is such that 'the psychophysical individual is dependent
'on the consciousness' (vinnnapaccay nmarpam, D. II.56) and 'the
consciousness is dependent on the psychophysical individuality'
(nmarpapaccay vinnnam, loc. cit.). This relation is defined in the
Patthna as 'the condition of mutual dependence' (anfiamafinapaccaya-)2.
(767) Buddhaghosa commenting on the word samuppada- (in
paticca-samuppda-=causation) says that the word denotes the
presence of a plurality of conditions and their occurrence together (in
bringing about a result): 'Samuppanna- means when arising, it arises
together, i.e. co-ordinately, not singly nor without a cause' (uppajjamno ca saha sam ca uppajjati na ekekato na pi ahetuto ti samuppanno, Vm. 521).
(768) Causation in Early Buddhism is not subjective and is not a
category imposed by the mind on phenomena. Its objectivity is
emphasized: 'Causation is said (to have the characteristics of) objec
tivity, necessity, invariability and conditionally' (tathat avitathat
anannathat idappaccayat ayam vuccati . . . paticcasamuppdo,
S. II.26). The Corny, explains these terms as follows: ' "Objectivity",
etc., are synonyms of what is characteristic of causation. As those
conditions alone, neither more nor less, bring about this or that event,
there is said to be "objectivity"; since there is no failure even for a
moment to produce the events which arise when the conditions come
together, there is said to be "necessity"; since no event different from
(the effect) arises with (the help of) other events or conditions there is
said to be "invariability"; from the condition or group of conditions,
1
an
448
which give rise to such states as decay and death, etc., as stated, there
is said to be ''conditionally".' 1
(769) That a causal sequence or concomitance occurs independently
of us and that all we do is to discover this, is implied in the following
description of causation: 'What is causation? On account of birth
arises decay and death. Whether Tathgatas arise or not, this order
exists namely the fixed nature of phenomena, the regular pattern of
phenomena or conditionality. This the Tathgata discovers and
comprehends; having discovered and comprehended it, he points it
out, teaches it, lays it down, establishes, reveals, analyses, clarifies it
and says 'look!" (Katamo ca paticcasamuppdo ? Jtipaccay . . .
jarmaranam; uppd v Tathgatnam anuppd v Tathgatnam
thit va s dhtu dhammatthitat dhammaniymat idappaccayat.
Tarn Tathgato abhisambujjhati abhisameti; abhisambujjhitv abhisametv cikkhati deseti pannapeti patthapeti vivarati vibhajati uttanikaroti passath ti cha, S. II.25).
(770) This causal cosmic order (y, s . . . dhtu dhammatthitat . . .
idappaccayat, loc. cit.) was known as the dhamma-dhtu, which is
claimed to be thoroughly comprehended (suppatividdh, M. 1.3 96)
by the Buddha. Its causality is denoted by the term 'dhammat' which
literally means 'the nature of things'. Thus it is said, 'it is in the nature
of things (dhammat) that the absence of remorse is present in a virtuous
person. A person who has no (feelings of) remorse need not determine
in his mind that joy should arise in him. It is of the nature of things
(dhammat) that joy arises in a person who lacks remorse. A person who
is joyful need not determine in his mind that delight should arise in
him. It is of the nature of things that delight arises in a joyful person.'2
Here by the term 'the nature of things' (dhammat) are meant the
causal psychological processes. But as we have seen, causality is not
1
Tathat ti dini paccaykrass'eva vevacanni. So tehi tehi paccayehi
anndhikeh'eva tassa tassa dhammassa sambhavato tathat ti. Smaggim
upagatesu paccayesu muhuttam pi tato nibbattnam dhammnam asambhav'bhvato avithat ti, annadhammapaccayehi anna-dhammnuppattito anafifiath
ti. Yath vuttnam etesam jarmarandlnam paccayato v paccayasamhato v
idappaccat ti vutto, SA. II, 41; cp. Vm. 518.
2
Dhammat es . . . yam sllavato . . . avippatisro uppajjati. Avippatisrissa
. . . na cetanya karanlyam 'pmujjam me uppajjat' ti. Dhammat es . . . yam
avippatisrissa pmujjam uppajjati. Pamuditassa . . . na cetanya karanlyam *piti
me uppajjat' ti. Dhammat es . . . yam pamuditassa piti uppajjati, A.V. 2, 3,
312; cp. for more examples, M. I.324, A. II.21.
The Means
and Limits
of Knowledge
449
450
451
(cp. Maitri, 3.1; Svet. 4.12). As an Empiricist {v. infra, 793) the Buddha
could not posit the existence of a soul. At the same time he could not,
like the Materialists, deny the continuity of the individual after death
and the responsibility of the individual for his actions. The raison d'etre
of the ' Chain of Causation' lies therefore mainly in the fact that it gives
a causal account of the factors operating in maintaining the process of
the individual and thereby of suffering. This is clear from the following
statement: 'In the belief that the person who acts is the same as the
person who experiences . . . he posits Eternalism; in the belief that the
person who acts is not the same as the person who experiences . . . he
posits Materialism. Avoiding both these extremes the Tathgata preaches
the doctrine in the middle. On ignorance depends our volitional acts
\sankhara) 1 ... In this manner there arises this mass of suffering... does
there cease this mass of suffering'.2 Another purpose for which the
'Chain' was employed was to substitute an empirical causal explanation
of the (relative) origin and development of the individual in place of
an explanation in terms of metaphysical first causes or final causes.
Thus, after enumerating the causal process of the genesis and develop
ment of the individual, the Buddha says: 'Would you, O monks,
knowing and seeing thus probe {lit. run behind) the prior end of things
. . . or pursue {lit. run after) the final end of things?' (api nu tumhe
bhikkhave evam jnant evam passant pubbantam v patidhveyytha
. . . aparantam v dhveyytha, M. I.265). In the face of this evidence
it is surprising that many scholars (Kern, Jacobi, Pischel, Schayer)
should have tried to explain this 'Chain' as a 'kosmische Emanationsformel',3 comparing it with the Snkhya series. In fact it is expressly
implied that 'ignorance' (avijj) is not a first cause: 'The first beginning
of ignorance is not known (such that we may say), before this there
was no ignorance, at this point there arose ignorance'... but that ignor
ance is causally conditioned can be known' (purim . . . koti na pannayati avijjya 'ito pubbe avijj nhosi, atha pacch sambhavi' ti . . .
Atha ca pana pafinyati 'idappaccay avijj' ti, A. V.113).
1
452
(775) From the use made of causation in the Nikyas, one could see
that causal empirical explanations were everywhere substituted (e.g.
theories of perception, knowledge, consciousness, etc.), for prevalent
metaphysical theories. What about the theory of causation itself? Was
it metaphysical or empirical ? A comparison with some of the theories
of causation in the Hindu philosophical schools is not without value
for this purpose, in order to see more clearly where the Buddhist
theory stood. W e may list these theories as follows:
1. Saktivada (the theory that the cause is a kind of force)Prva
Mimms.
2. Satkranavda = Vivartavda (the theory that everything has
Being as its cause and is a manifestation of Being)Vednta.
3. Satkryavda (the theory that the effect is contained in the cause)
Snkhya.
4. Asatkryavda = rambhavda (the theory that the effect is not
contained in the cause and is something new)Nyya-Vaisesika.
(776) Of these the Saktivada, which resembles an Activity theory 1 of
causation, is criticized in the BHS. text, the Slistamba Stra. Here it is
said that although the 'element of heat' (tejodhtuh) is a causal factor
in making a seed grow, it does not do this out of its own will: 'It does
not occur to the element of heat, " I shall bring this seed to maturity" '
(tejodhtor api naivam bhavati, 'aham bijam paripcayami' ti, rya
Slistamba Stra, Ed. Sstri, p. 5). This sentiment, it may be noted,
was already expressed in a psychological context in the Nikyas, when
it was said for instance that 'a person who lacks remorse need not
make an act of will (saying), "Let joy arise in me". It is of the nature
of things that joy arises to one who lacks remorse' (avippatisrissa na
cetanya karanlyam 'pmujjam me uppajjatu ti. Dhammat es . . .
yam avippatisrissa pmujjam uppajjati, A. V.2; v. supra, 724). W e
may observe from this that even in psychological causation, a con
scious act of will was not always considered necessary in bringing
about a subsequent psychological state. This constitutes a criticism
of the animistic and activist conception of causation.
(777) Although the Satkryavda, which is an Entailment theory 2
holding that the cause necessarily brings about its effect, which is
contained in it and the Vedntic Satkranavda are not mentioned as
1
2
453
such, we meet with foreshadowings of these two theories in preBuddhistic thought. In the Aitareya ranyaka, where it was said that
Water was the cause and the world the effect (v. supra, 760), we find
the statement, 'whatever there is belonging to the son, belongs to the
father; whatever there is belonging to the father, belongs to the son', 1
meaning by 'father' and 'son' cause and effect respectively. This seems
to imply both that the effect (son) is contained in the cause (father)
and that the cause (father) persists in the effect (son). This resembles
the Satkryavda. Similarly in the thought of Uddlaka we found that
Being (sat) was the ultimate substance, which manifested itself in the
variety of the forms of nature (y. supra, 25); this is analogous to the
Satkranavda. Now it seems to be this kind of belief of theory, which
implies the presence of the effect in the cause or the immanence of the
cause in the effect, that is criticized in the Potthapda Sutta (Digha
Nikya). Here in the causal sequence 'milk, curds, butter, ghee, etc.',
it was pointed out that one should not consider 'milk' to persist in
'curds' or 'curds' to exist in 'milk' in some mysterious manner (v.
supra, 534), this is the kind of claim made in the above two theories.
One may observe that according to the Satkryavda, 'the oil exists
in the sesamum, the statue in the stone, the curd in the millc.1 The
Asatkryavda, the least metaphysical theory, was in fact later con
fused with the causal theory of the Buddhists.3
(778) The Buddhist theory is therefore empirical since it spoke only of
observable causes without any metaphysical pre-suppositions of any
substrata behind them. It closely resembles the Regularity theory4
except for the fact that it speaks of the empirical necessity (avitathat,
v. supra, 768) of the causal sequence or concomitance and does not
seem to hold that all inductive inferences are merely probable (v. supra,
758). At the same time it is necessary to note that the Buddhist theory
of causation was not deterministic (v. supra, 764), since it included
mental decisions among the causal factors and these were not con
sidered to be strictly determined. Thus, it is said that 'a person who
knows and sees things as they are, need not make an effort of will
(saying), "I shall become disinterested"; it is of the nature of things
that a person who knows and sees becomes disinterested'.5 But
1
454
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
455
we have already referred (v. supra, 773) nor with R. E. Hume's remark
that 'neither Buddha nor the Buddhist writings had any interest in
problems of . . . scientific causation'.1 Kern's criticism that in the
'Chain of Causation' 'the difference between post hoc and the propter
hoc is utterly ignored'2 is invalid, since the mention of the two prin
ciples of causal determination shows an awareness of the difference
between coincidental and causal sequences. Thomas' observation that
to say that 'birth is the cause of old age' is 'like calling day the cause of
night'3 is the kind of objection that has been levelled against the
Regularity theory even in its modern form.4
(781) Mrs Rhys Davids has said that 'the only general principle of
thought put forward in Europe which harmonizes with Buddhist
axioms is that "Principle or Law of Sufficient Reason" for which
certain logicians notably Leibniz claimed equal rank with the three
named above, namely that "nothing happens without a reason why it
should be so rather than otherwise". This comes very near to the
idappaccayat (this is conditioned by that) of Buddhist causality'.5
This is a very misleading suggestion for the two have nothing in
common. It is true that according to Leibniz's law of sufficient reason
'nothing happens without a reason',6 but the reason is best known to
God, who creates the best of all possible worlds, in which whatever
happens necessarily contributes towards making it the best. This is
the sufficient reason for all contingent truths and it lies in (the goodness
of) God, who chose out of his free will to create this world in preference
to every other possible world, which was relatively less perfect.7 Since
the knowledge of these reasons involves an infinite analysis of possible
facts, in the light of their contribution to the goodness of possible
worlds (and/or compossibility8), the reasons cannot usually be known
by men.9 This is an attempt to explain things in terms of final causes.10
1
456
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
Russell speaks of two principles of sufficient reason, the general and the
special (The Philosophy of Leibniz, P- 3)> the former applying to possible existents
and the latter to actual existents (pp. 30, 36). He says that the former is 'a form
of the law of causality asserting all possible causes to be desires or appetites'
(p. 30). Even this conception of causality is opposed in Buddhism (v. supra, 776).
1
Buddhism, Williams and Norgate, London, 1912, pp. 105, 106.
3
Taticcasamuppda', ERE., Vol. 9, p. 672.
4
We find this distinction drawn even in Skya or Buddhist Origins, London,
1931, p. 152, where she speaks of 'the abstract statement' and 'the concrete
5
application'.
Skya or Buddhist Origins, pp. 133, 162.
6
Op. cit., p. 143, 'Save for the opening lines, I do not see that these verses,
imputed to Kappina, strengthen my surmise, that in him we have a man chiefly
responsible for Skya becoming, in repute, a religion based on causation'.
7
v. Skya or Buddhist Origins, p. 136, 'Further, the prose rejoinder of Sriputta
is a stereotyped phrase occurring elsewhere in the Pitakas'.
457
agree with her assumptions or what they imply. On the basis of such
a method of purely imaginative reconstruction, there is no limit to the
number of largely speculative theories, which can be claimed to be the
original message of Buddhism. For this reason, such speculations are
of little value for scholarship, since no objective methodological
criteria and rules of interpretation are adhered to.
(783) Inductive inferences in Buddhism are therefore based on a
theory of causation. These inferences are made on the data of per
ception, normal and paranormal. What is considered to constitute
knowledge are direct inferences made on the basis of the data of such
perceptions. All the knowledge that the Buddha and his disciples
claim to have in 'knowing and seeing' (v. supra, 741), except for the
knowledge of Nirvana, appears to be of this nature. For reasons of
space we cannot examine all the doctrines of Buddhism in order to see
whether they could be explained on this basis. Nor is this necessary,
for we are concerned only with the epistemological foundations of the
thought of the Canon. We shall therefore merely illustrate by taking
a few samples, how the doctrines of Buddhism may be considered to be
epidemically derived from direct inferences based on perception,
normal or extrasensory.
(784) Let us first take some examples of direct inferences based on the
data of normal perception:
(1) The statement that 'on account of birth there is decay and death'
(jtipaccay jarmaranam, S. II.25) is an empirical generalization
based on the observation (by perception) that all those who are
'known and seen' to be born eventually grow old and die. From the
observed cases the inductive inference (anvayanna-) is made that all
those who are born, whether in the past or in the future, grow old and
die.
(2) The statement that 'all conditioned things are impermanent*
(sabbe sankhr anicc, M. I.228) is a similar empirical generalization.
Quoting this example, Professor Wijesekera has observed that 'this is
not given as a result of metaphysical inquiry or of any mystical
intuition but as a straightforward judgment to be arrived at by
investigation and analysis. It is founded on unbiased thought and has
a purely empirical basis'.2
1
v. op. clt.y p. 136, 'Further, the verse found in inscriptions on ruins at Benares
and elsewhere occurs nowhere else in the Pitakas'.
2
O. H. de A. Wijesekera, The Three Signata, Kandy, i960, pp. 2, 3.
p*
45 8
(3) When it is asked whether the Buddha holds that the statement
'grief, lamentation, mental agony, sorrow and anxiety arise from and
originate from attachment' (piyajtik . . . sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupys piyappabhavik, M. II. 108), he says 'yes9 (evam
etam, loc. cit.) and adds that 'it should be understood in this way' (tad
amin p'etam . . . pariyyena veditabbam, loc. cit.). He then enumer
ates a series of observed historical instances of people in Svatthi, who
because of their deep attachment to their loved ones, were given to grief
when they died and lost their senses. He also recounts a case where a
person killed his betrothed and committed suicide in the hope of re
uniting with her in the hereafter, when she professed not to love him.1
(4) The statement that 'among human beings there aren't the usual
characteristics, which constitute species' (n'atthi manussesu Ungarn
jtimayam puthu, Sn. 607) or in other words that the human race was
biologically one species, is based on a keen observation of nature.2
It is said that the grasses, trees, worms, moths, ants, four-footed
creatures, serpents, fishes, birds have 'characteristics that constitute
species' (Ungarn jtimayam, Sn. 601-6) and that therefore there are
'different species' (annamann jtiyo, loc. cit.) among them. But this
is not the case with human beings, who do not have such character
istics in respect of their hair, head, ears, colour, etc. (loc. cit.); the
difference among men is said to be only nominal (vokran ca manus
sesu samafinya pavuccati, Sn. 611).
(785) Statements were not only justified on the basis of empirical
evidence but were rejected as false when they conflicted with what was
empirically observed. Thus the statement held by certain recluses and
brahmins to the effect that 'so long as a person is young one is en
dowed with intellectual capacity . . . but this is lost with old age*
(yvad evyam bhavam puriso daharo . . . tvad eva paramapannveyyattiyena samanngato hoti yato . . . ayam . . . vayo anuppatto . . *
atha tamh pannveyyattiy parihyati ti, M. 1.82) is said to be in
correct. In support of this the Buddha points to his own example and
to 'four centenarians (cattro . . . vassasatyuk, loc. cit.) in the Order
who are endowed with the highest intellectual capacity despite their
old age. Likewise, the proposition held to be true by certain recluses
1
Atha kho s itthi smikam etad avoca: . . . ahan ca tarn na icchami ti. Atha
kho so puriso tam itthim dvidh chetv attnam upptesi: ubho pecca bhavissam
ti, M. II. 109, 110.
2
For a detailed account of this argument, v. G. P. Malalasekera and K. N .
Jayatilleke, Buddhism and the Race Question, UNESCO, 1958, pp. 35-7-
459
and brahmins to the effect that 'all those who kill living creatures
experience pain and sorrow in this life itself (yo koci pnam atimpeti,
sabbo so ditth'eva dhamme dukkham domanassam patisamvediyati,
S. IV.343) is said to be false since some people are honoured in this
very life if they kill the king's enemies (loc. cit.).
(786) We find at the same time that many of the doctrines of Buddhism
are claimed to be inductive inferences based on the data of extra
sensory perception. In this respect, extrasensory perception is
treated at the same level as normal perception and it is considered
possible to make both valid and erroneous inferences on this data
(y. infra, 790). It may be asked whether the claims to extrasensory
perception belong to the mythical and miraculous element in the Canon
and whether these claims were actually made by the Buddha and his
disciples. There is reason to believe that these claims were actually
made. There is no doubt that yoga-practices prevailed among the
thinkers of the Middle and Late Upanisads, the Jains, some of the
jivikas and the Buddhists. Claims of this kind were common to all
these schools. They are not considered miraculous but the result of the
natural development of the mind in the Buddhist texts (y. supra, 724)
and have a close connection with the central doctrines of Buddhism
(v. infra, 797). Some of these experiences such as ante-natal retrocognition1 have been claimed by people under deep hypnosis.2 For
others such as telepathy and clairvoyance, it is believed that there is a
certain amount of experimental data which tends to confirm the exis
tence of such faculties.3 We have reason therefore to believe that genuine
claims were made about having these experiences. The other question
is whether these experiences were veridical or delusive. This falls outside
the scope of our study and we do not propose to examine it here.
1
Cp. a similar but less explicit claim attributed to Pythagoras, v. Kirk and
Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 223.
2
v. T h . Flournoy (Professor of Psychology, University of Geneva), Des
Indes la Planete Mars, Geneva, 1899; W . McDougall, An Outline of Abnormal
Psychology, Sixth Edition, London, 1948, p. 510 fT.; cp. Charles A. Cory (Asso
ciate Professor of Philosophy, Washington University), 'A Divided Self in
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Vol. XIV, Boston, 1919-20, pp. 282,283; cp. also
Ian Stevenson, The Evidence for Survival from Claimed Memories of'Former In
carnations, Thamesmouth Printing Co. Ltd., Essex, 1961, and C. J. Ducasse, The
Belief in a Life after Death, Illinois, 1961, p. 241-299.
3
v. J. B. Rhine, New Frontiers of the Mind, Penguin Books, 1950; cp. by the
same author, The Reach of the Mind, London, 1948; also, R. Tischner, Telepathy
and Clairvoyance, London, 1925.
460
The Means
and Limits
of Knowledge
461
Idham . . . ekaccam puggalam evam cetas ceto paricca pajnmi: tath' yam
puggalo patipanno tath ca iriyati tan ca maggam samrlho yath kyassa bhed
param maran duggatim . . . upapajjissati ti; tarn enam passmi aparena samayena
dibbena cakkhun visuddhena atikkantamnusakena... duggatim . . . upapannam
ekantadukkh tipp katuk vedan vediyamnam. Seyyath ' p i . . . angraksu . . .
pr'angrnam vitacciknam vitadhmnam, atha puriso gaccheyya . . . kilanto
. . . ekyanena maggena tarn eva angraksum panidhya, tarn enam cakkhum
puriso disv evam vadeyya: tath'yam bhavam puriso patipanno tath ca iriyati
tan ca maggam samrlho yath imam yeva angraksum gamissati ti; tarn enam
passeyya aparena samayena tassa angraksuy patitam ekantadukkh . . . vedan
vediyamnam, M. I.74.
462
463
are born in a happy state after death, and (iv) that those who assert
(2) (i), (ii) and (iii) are right and the others wrong.
(3) and (4) Two other examples are given to illustrate the other two
possibilities, namely, that of a person who sees a person of good
conduct born in a happy state and in an unhappy state respectively.
(791) In the course of this Sutta, it is pointed out that the Buddha does
not deny the validity of the claims to have observed what they did claim
to observe (M. III.212-15; e.g. Yan ca kho so evam ha: apham
puggalam addasam idha pntiptim adinndyim . . . param maran
. . . sugatim
upapannan tiidam assa anujnmi, i.e. I grant his
claim to have seen an individual who kills and steals, born after death
in a happy state). But he denies the validity of some of the inferences
made on the basis of these experiences. It is shown, for example, that
all four generalizations made from a single instance are mistaken, e.g.
yan ca kho so evam ha: yo kira bho pntipti . . . sabbo so . . .
duggatim . . . uppajjatl ti, idam assa nnujnmi, i.e. I do not approve
of his claim that all those who kill . . . are born in an unhappy state.
This shows a realization of the fact that one cannot make generaliza
tions on the basis of one (or a few) instances.1 But at the same time,
the general rule that good acts tend to make one's future state of
survival happy and vice versa is not denied for the apparent exceptions
(2 and 4) are explained as due to the performance of good or evil
deeds, as the case may be, sometime or another in one's past lives
(cp. pubbe v'ssa tarn katam hoti . . . pacch v, M. III. 214, 215) or
due to a change of heart at the moment of death (maranakle v'ssa
h o t i . . . , loc. cit.).
(792) Not only, therefore, does Buddhism not give a theistic or meta
physical interpretation to these experiences, but considers it necessary
that we draw the right inferences from them in the same sense in
which it was necessary for us to be right about our inferences from
sense-experience.
(793) We have tried to show that perception (normal and paranormal)
and inductive inference are considered the means of knowledge in the
Pli Nikyas. The emphasis that 'knowing' (jnam) must be based on
'seeing' (passam) or direct perceptive experience, makes Buddhism a
form of Empiricism. We have, however, to modify the use of the term
somewhat to mean not only that all our knowledge is derived from
1
44
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
465
466
467
Etam santam etam panitam yadidam sabbasankhrasamatho sabbpadhipatinissaggo tanhakkhayo virago nirodho nibbnan ti. So tattha tthito savnam
khayam ppunti, M. I.436.
4^8
those who say that the Recluse Gotama is omniscient and all-seeing
and professes to have an infinite knowledge and insight, which is
constantly and at all times present to him, when he walks or stands,
sleeps or keeps awakeare not reporting him properly and mis
represent him (as claiming) what is false and untrue'.* Asked how he
should be correctly reported he says: 'in proclaiming that the Recluse
Gotama has a three-fold knowledge, one would report him properly
and not misrepresent him'.2 This three-fold knowledge consists of
(i) unlimited (yvad eva kankhmi, M. I.482) retrocognition,
(2) unlimited clairvoyance, and (3) knowledge of the destruction of the
inflowing impulses (loc. cit.). It will be seen that it was the same know
ledge which the disciples who verified his teaching claimed to have
(v. supra, 727). On the evidence of the Nikyas themselves this is too
narrow a definition of his field of knowledge for it fails to include the
other forms of higher knowledge, such as telepathy, etc. (v. supra, 727),
which both the Buddha and his disciples claimed to have. The probable
reason for this restriction was the fact that it was this three-fold know
ledge that really mattered.
(802) This very statement in which he claims only 'a three-fold
knowledge' would have thus left the door open for speculation as to
what the real extent of his knowledge was. At another place, the
Buddha is credited with the statement: 'those who assert that the
Recluse Gotama denies that there is any recluse or brahmin who was
omniscient or all-seeing, are not stating the truth and are falsely accus
ing me of saying what is not true'. 3 He then says that what he stated
was that 'there is no recluse or brahmin, who would know and
see everything all at once'.4 This means that it is possible for someone
to know everything but not all at once. This is in fact the sense in
which omniscience is ascribed to the Buddha in the Milindapanha
1
Ye te evam hamsu: Samano Gotamo sabbann sabbadassvi, aparisesam
nnadassanam patijnti: carato ca me titthato ca suttassa ca jgarassa ca satatam
samitam nnadassanam paccupatthitan ti, na me te vuttavdino, abbhcikkhanti
ca pana man te asat abhten ti, M. I.482.
2
Tevijjo Samano Gotamo ti . . . bykaramno vuttavdi c'eva me assa na ca
mam abhten abbhcikkheyya, loc. cit.
3
Ye te evam hamsu: Samano Gotamo evam ha: natthi so samano v brhmano v yo sabbann sabbadassvi aparisesam nnadassanam patijnissati; n'etam
thnam vijjatl ti; na me te vuttavdino abbhcikkhanti ca pana mam te asat
abhten ti, M. 11.127.
4
Natthi so samano v brhmano v yo sakid eva sabbafi fiassati sabbam
dakkhiti n'etam thnam vijjatl ti, loc. cit.
The Means
and Limits
of Knowledge
469
(pp. 102 ff.). In the parable of the Simsap leaves, the Buddha takes a
handful of leaves in the Simsap forest and says that what he has taught
is like the leaves in his hand and what he knew but did not teach is like
the leaves in the forest (S. V.437). This means that he claimed to know
much more than he taught but he did not claim omniscience. Nor does
he in the Nikyas deny omniscience in the sense of knowing every
thing but not all at once. Yet it is clear that according to the earliest
accounts in the Nikyas, the Buddha did not claim (an unlimited) precognitive knowledge. In the Psdika Sutta, Digha Nikya, it is said,
'It is possible that other heretical teachers may say "the Recluse
Gotama has a limitless knowledge and vision with regard to the past
but not with regard to the future" . . .V The Buddha goes on to
explain that 'with regard to the past the Tathgata's consciousness
follows in the wake of his memory' (atitam addhnam . . . rabbha
Tathgatassa satnusri vinfinam hoti, loc. cit.). He recalls as much as
he likes (so yvatakam kankhati tvatakam anussarati, loc. cit.).
'With regard to the future the Tathgata has the knowledge resulting
from enlightenment that "this is the final birth
" ' 2 This appears
to be an admission that the Buddha did not claim to have (at least an
unlimitedyprecognitive knowledge of the future. This fits in with his
disbelief in Strict Determinism {v. supra, 764).
(803) While the Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta mentioned that the Tathgata
had a three-fold knowledge, we find it mentioned in one place in the
Anguttara that 'there are six intellectual powers of the Tathgata*
(cha yimni . . . Tathgatassa Tathgatabalni, A. III.417). The six
constitute, in addition to the three-fold knowledge, the following:
(i) 'the Tathgata knows, as it really is, what is possible as possible
and what is imposible as impossible' (. . . Tathgato thnan ca
thnato atthnan ca atthnato yathbhtam pajnti, loc. cit.), (ii) 'the
Tathgata knows as it really is, the effects according to their con
ditions and causes, of the performance of karma in the past, present
and future' (.. . Tathgato atitangatapaccupannnam kammasamdnnam thnaso hetuso vipkam yathbhtam pajnti, loc. cit.)y
and (iii) 'the Tathgata knows, as it really is, the corruption, perfection
and arising from contemplative states of release, concentration and
1
Thnam . . . vijjati yam annatitthiy . . . evam vadeyyum-Atltam kho
addhnam rabbha Samano Gotamo atirakam nnadassanam pannpeti, no ca kho
angatam . . ., D . III. 134.
2
Angatafi ca kho addhnam rabbha Tathgatassa bodhijam finam uppajjati
Ayam antim j t i . . . , loc. cit.
470
attainment' (.. Tathgato jhnavimokkhasamdhisampattinam samkilesam vodnam vutthnam yathbhtam pajnti, loc. eh.).
(804) The knowledge of possibility and impossibility is illustrated at
great length in the Vibhanga (335-8). Some of the impossibilities seem
to be logical, e.g. 'it is impossible for two universal monarchs to be
born simultaneously in the same world' (atthnam etam . . . yam
ekiss lokadhtuy dve rjno cakkavatti uppajjeyyum, Vbh. 336).
Others are causally impossible, e.g. 'it is impossible for a good con
sequence to arise for one whose conduct is evil' (atthnam etam . . .
yam kyaduccaritassa ittho . . . vipko nibbatteyya, Vbh. 337).
(805) 'The ten (intellectual) powers' (dasa . . . balni, M. I.71) of the
Tathgata mentioned in the Nikyas and the Vibhanga (335-44) add
the following four to the above list of six: (i) 'the Tathgata knows, as
it really is, the mode of life leading to all states (of survival)' (Tathgato
sabbatthagminim patipadam yathbhtam pajnti, loc. eh.), (ii) 'the
Tathgata knows, as it really is, the world with its various and diverse
elements' (Tathgato anekadhtunndhtulokam yathbhtam paj
nti, loc. eh.), (iii) 'the Tathgata knows, as it really is, the various
predilections of beings' (Tathgato sattnam nndhimuttikatam
yathbhtam pajnti, loc. eh.), and (iv) 'the Tathgata knows, as it
really is, what goes on in the senses and faculties of other beings and
individuals' (Tathgato parasattnam parapuggalnam indriyaparopariyattam yathbhtam pajnti, loc. eh.). Despite the apparent
progress from three to six and six to ten, it is difficult to say that there
is genuine change in the conception of the intellectual powers of the
Buddha. The seven powers added to the list of three are commonly
attributed to the Buddha throughout the Nikyas and it is difficult to
say that the transition from three to ten represents a change in stratum.
(806) But the position is different, as we pointed out (v. supra, 649)
in the Patisambhidmagga, where we notice that the Buddha is
credited with 'knowing all the future' (sabbam angatam jnti, p. 131)
and is omniscient {v. supra, 649).
(807) We may next turn to the problem of the unanswered (avykatni) questions. The list is enumerated in paragraph 378 (y. supra,
378). Professor Murti has translated avykatni as 'the Inexpressibles':
'The Inexpressibles (avykata, Skt. avykrtavastni) occur in very
many dialogues. They are invariably enumerated as fourteen and
471
472
attitude to these questions, which is also the same as (i). 1 Keith says:
'It is quite legitimate to hold that the Buddha was a genuine agnostic,
that he had studied the various systems of ideas prevalent in his day
without deriving any greater satisfaction from them than any of us
today do from the study of modern systems, and that he had no
reasoned or other conviction on the matter'.2 'He is silent, not merely
because knowledge of these matters does not tend to Nirvana, but
Unanswered questions
Answerable
Co
Did not know the an
swers (Scepticism, Naive
Agnosticism)
(3)
Beyond the grasp of the
intellect; transcends the
limits of knowledge
(Rational Agnosticism)
(4)
Logically
meaningless
(Logical
Positivism)
2
v. SBE., Vol. 45, p. xxviii.
Buddhist Philosophy, p. 63.
4
Op. du, p. 44.
Ibid., p. 45.
The Means
and Limits
of Knowledge
473
474
I.e. 'does the Tathgata exist after death'? (hoti Tathgato param maran,
D . I.27) in accordance with the four possibilities.
2
Tarn jivam tarn sariran ti v . . . ditthiy sati . . . afinm jivam annm sariran
ti v . . . ditthiy sati brahmacariyvso na hoti, S. II.61.
3
Buddhismus, Berlin und Leipzig, 1919, Vol. I, p. 120.
4
5
Op. cit., p. 38.
Ibid., p. 40.
475
476
APPENDIX I
Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfnge des Buddhismus, p. 286.
477
478
Early
Buddhist
Theory
of
Knowledge
Brahman is the most real (sattamam) of the worlds and is the heaven
above the world of the gods, fathers, the living, the world of Agni,
of Vyu, of Indra,2 of Varuna and of men. In the early Upanisads it is
still the highest and the seventh world from the world of men (Brh.
4-3-33)- ^ i s definitely a place to be attained only after death and by
journeying there (Brh. 6.2.15, Ch. 4-I4? 5~6, 5.10.2). The conception of
the Brahmaloka as a state attainable in this life emerges only sporadic
ally in the Early Upanisads, where a special theory is put forward such
as, for instance, when it is suggested that we enter the Brahmaloka in
deep sleep (Ch. 8.3.2). But even in the later Upanisads where Brahman
is clearly a state attainable in this life, the earlier view of the Brahmaloka
was still too strong to be put aside altogether. We see this clearly in
the Mundaka Upanisad, where the earlier idea of the 'meritorious
Brahmaloka won by good works' (punyas sukrto brahma-lokah,
1.2.6) is criticized as an insecure goal {op. cit., 1.2.7) even though those
who attain the imperishable Brahman {op. cit., 2.2.2) are still repre
sented as departing 'through the door of the sun to where the immortal
purusa is' (srya-dvrena . . . yatrmrtah sa purusah, op. cit. 1.2.11)
as at Brh. 6.2.15 a n d Ch. 4.15 5-6, and attaining immortality in the
Brahma-worlds (brahmalokesu) only at the end of time (parntakle,
op. cit., 3.2.6). When therefore it is said in the Buddhist texts that
Sriputta thought 'the brahmins were obsessed with the idea of the
Brahma world' (ime kho brhman brahmalokdhimutt, M. II. 194)
and decides to preach to them 'the path to companionship with
Brahma' (brahmnam sahavyatya maggam, loc. cit.) it is a reference
to a genuine Brahmanical belief and not a fanciful Buddhist conception
as Thomas seems to think, when he says commenting on the Tevijja
Sutta: 'What is expounded here is not the brahmin theory at all but
the possibility of attaining to the Brahma-world as the Buddhists
conceived it to exist, that is by the practice of the Brahma-vihras'
{op. cit., p. 87). According to the Buddhist texts there are five types
of brahmins mentioned in the Vedic literature of which one is said to
be those who follow tradition but develop mett (compassion) (A.
II.225). That the practice of mett leads to the Brahma-world is not a
later Buddhist conception, but one found in the Early Upanisads. In
1
The text has 'saptamam* (the seventh) but this is a mistake as Keith has said
(v. Rgveda Brhmanas Translated, HOS., Vol. 25, p. 457, fn. 3).
2
. . . devalokam pitrlokam jivalokam . . . agnilokam . . . vyulokam . . .
indralokam . . . varunalokam mrtyulokam . . . Brahmano lokam nkam saptamam
loknm . . .
Appendix
479
480
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
Text
Bahvrca Brhmana (lost) but incorporated in the Aitareya and
Kausitaki Brhmanas.
Chndogya Brhmana
Taittiriya Brhmana
Satapatha Brhmana
(821) The above evidence, we believe, should suffice to show that the
brahmanical conceptions criticized in the Tevijja Sutta are not a
1
Appendix
481
800 BC
800-600 BC
(v. Ch. I)
Late Upanisads
(v. Ch. I)
482
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. ORIGINAL SOURCES
484
Bibliography
485
486
Katha Upanisad, v. PU. Ed. and Tr. J. N. Rawson, The Katha Upanisad,
' O.U.P.,1934.
Kausitaki Brhmana Siikhyana Brhmana, Ed .G. R. V. Chy, A.A.S.
No. 65, Rajkot, 1911. Tr. A. B. Keith, Rgveda Brhmanas Translated,
HOS., Vol. 25, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1920.
Kausitaki Upanisad, v. PU.
Kena Upanisad, v. PU.
Lankvatra Stra, Ed. B. Nanjio, Bibliotheca Otaniensis, Vol. I, Kyoto,
1923. Tr. D. T. Suzuki, The Lankvatra Sfga, London, 1932.
Mdhyamakavrtti (Mlamdhyamakakriks), by Ngrjuna, Ed. L.
de la V. Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. 4, St Petersbourg, 1913.
Madhyntavibhgatika, by Sthiramati, Ed. S. Yamaguchi, Nagoya, 1934.
Mahbhratam, Ed. T. R. Krishnacharya and T. R. Vyasacharya, 18 Vols.,
Bombay, 1906-10.
Mahvyutpatti, v. Secondary Authorities A.
Maitri Upanisad, v. PU.
Mndkya Upanisad, v. PU.
Manusmrti, with Corny, of Kullka Bhatta, Ed. Pandit G. S. Nene, Benares,
1935. With Corny, of Medhtithi, Ed. G. Jha, 3 Vols., Calcutta, 1932-9.
Mimms Stras, by Jaimini, Tr. G. Jha, SBH., Vol. 10, Allahabad, 1916.
Tr. Pandit M. L. Sandal, SBH., Vol. 27, Part I, Allahabad, 1923-5.
Mundaka Upanisad, v. PU.
Nighantu and the Nirukta, Text, Ed. L. Samp, University of Panjab, 1927.
Tr. L. Sarup, The Nighantu and the Nirukta, O.U.P., 1921.
Nyyabhsya, v. Nyya Stra.
Nyyabindu, by Dharmottara, Ed. T. I. Stcherbatsky, Bibliotheca Buddhica,
Petrograd, 1918.
Nyyamanjari, by Jayanta Bhatta, Ed. Pandit S. S. N. Sukla, Ksi Sanskrit
Series, Benares, 1936.
Nyya Stra, with Nyyabhsya of Vtsyyana, Ed. D. N. Josi, A.A.S.
No. 91, 1922.
Bibliography
487
Srimnmahbhratam, v. Mahbhratam.
Srimnmahbhratam Harivamsaparvan, v. Harivamsaparvan.
Svet^vatara Upanisad, with Corny, of Sankara, A.A.S. No. 17, 1905.
Taittiriya ranyaka, Ed. B. S. Phadake, Second Edition, 2 Vols., A.A.S.
N o . 36, 1926-7.
Tattvasamgrahapanjik, v. Tattvasamgraha.
Tattvopaplavasimha, by Jayarsi Bhatta, Ed. S. Sanghavi and R. C. Parikh,
Gaekwad Oriental Series No. 87, Baroda, 1940.
Upanisads, Ed. and Tr. S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, London,
1953. Tr. F. Max Mller, The Upanishads, Part I, SBE., Vol. 1, Oxford,
1879. Tr. R. E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, Second
Edition, O.U.P., 1934. Tr. P. Deussen, Sechzig Upanisad's des Vedas
Leipzig, 1921.
488
A. Reference Books
Abhidhnappadipik, Ed. M. Jinavijaya, Ahmedabad, 1923.
Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, Ed. F. Edgerton, New Haven and
London, 1953.
Critical Pali Dictionary, Ed. V. Trenckner, D. Anderson, H. Smith and
H. Hendriksen, Vol. I, Copenhagen, 1924-48.
Concise Oxford Dictionary, Ed. H. W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler, Fourth
Edition revised by E. Mclntosh, Oxford, 1959.
Concordance to the Principal Upanisads, by G. A. Jacob, Bombay, 1891.
Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, Ed. G. P. Malalasekera, 2 Vols., London,
1937-8.
Dictionary of Philosophy, Ed. D. Runes, London, 1945.
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Ed. J. H. Baldwin, 3 Vols., New
York, 1940-9.
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Ed. J. Hastings, 12 Vols., Edinburgh,
1908-26.
Bibliography
489
490
Bibliography
Pischel, R., Leben
Poussin, L. de la
Bouddhisme,
Gand, 1913.
Prasad, J., History
Radhakrishnan, S.
49 *
C. A. Moore.
Radhakrishnan, S., The Principal Upanisads, v. Upanisads. Indian
Philosophy,
492
Bibliography
493
494
Niyamoto, S., 'The Logic of Relativity as the Common Ground for the
Development of the Middle Way' in Buddhism and Culture, Ed. S.
Yamaguchi, Kyoto, i960, pp. 67-88.
Przyluski, J., 'Drstntika, Sautrntika and Sarvstivdin' in IHQ., Vol. 16,
pp. 246-54.
Przyluski, J. and Lamotte, E., 'Bouddhisme et Upanisad' in BEFEO., Vol. 32,
pp. 141-69.
Poussin, L. de la V., 'Dogmatique Bouddhique' in JA. Tome 20, 1902,
pp. 237-306. 'Documents D'Abhidarmales Deux, les Quatres, les
Trois Verites, Extraits de la Vibhs et du Kosa de Samghabhadra' in
Melanges Chinois et Bouddhique, Vol. 5, pp. 159-87. 'Faith and Reason
in Buddhism' in Transactions oftheThird International Congress for the
History of Religions, Vol. II, 1908, pp. 32-43. 'Le Bouddha et les
Abhinn' in Museon, 1931, pp. 335-342. 'On the Authority (Prmnya)
of the Buddhist Agamas' in JRAS., 1902, pp. 363-76.
Radhakrishnan, S., 'The Teaching of Buddha by Speech and by Silence'
in The Hibhert Journal^ Vol. XXXII, pp. 342-356.
Raju, P. T., 'The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy'
in Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 7, pp. 694-713.
Ryle, G., 'Categories' in Logic and Language, Ed. A. G. N. Flew, Second
Series, pp. 65-81.
Rhys Davids, C. A. F., 'Logic' (Buddhist), ERE., Vol. 8, pp. 132-3.
'Paticcasamuppda', ERE., Vol. 9, pp. 672-74.
Robinson, R. H., 'Some Logical Aspects of Ngrjuna's System' in Philosophy
East and West, Vol. 6, pp. 291-308.
Ruben, W., 'ber den Tattvopaplavasimha des Jayarsi Bhatta eine Agnostizistische Erkenntnis kritik' in Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Sudund
Ostasiens und Archivfur indische Philosophie, Band, II, 1958, pp. 14053.
Sadaw, L., 'Some Points in Buddhist Doctrine' in JPTS., 1914, pp. 115-63.
Schayer, St, 'Altindische Anticipationen der Aussagenlogik' in Studien ^ur
indischen Logik II, Extrait du Bulletin de l'Academie Polonaise des
Sciences et des Lettres Cracovic, 1933, pp. 90-96.
Thomas, E. J. 'Buddhism in Modern Times' in UCR., Vol. 9, pp. 215-25.
Tucci, G., 'A Sketch of Indian Materialism' in P I P C , 1925, pp. 34-43.
Warder, A. K., 'Early Buddhism and Other Contemporary Systems' in
BSOAS., Vol. 18, 1956, pp. 43-63.
Wijesekera, O. H. de A., 'A Pali Reference to Brhmana Carana-s' in Adyar
Library Bulletin, Vol. 20. pp. 294-309. 'Upanishadic Terms for Sense
Functions' in UCR., Vol. 2, pp. 14-24. 'Vedic Gandharva and Pali
Gandhabba' in UCR., Vol. 3, pp. 73-95.
INDEX
abhva, negation, 84
ABHAYADEVA, a Jain
142, 154, 155, 164
commentator,
ABHAYARAJAKUMARA, 226
KESAKAMBALI,
materialist,
496
Early
Buddhist
Theory
of
Knowledge
Index
anussutika, one who reasons on the
basis of tradition or revelation, 262;
takka, argument based on tradition
or revelation, 245
anuyoga, interrogation, 210, 211
anvayavyatirekariti, the methods of
agreement and difference, 146
anvayanna, inductive knowledge, 457
anvaye nna, knowledge based on
induction, 367, 442, 443
apannaka, logically certain, 405
apar vidy, lower knowledge, 63,
169
apariypanna,
unbounded
(know
ledge), 303
aprthaka, incoherent, 239
aparoksa, direct, 165, 166
apauruseya, impersonal, 84, 174
apptihriya, meaningless, 321-3, 325,
33!>33 2
apptihirakata, meaningless (of state
ments), 321, 322, 325, 326, 328,
330-2
Apperception, 438
aprptakla, inopportune, 239
A priori, 32, 36,44, 70, 95, 97, 142, 145,
152, 246, 248, 255, 267, 268, 270-2,
3 l6 > 339. 341* 384> 403> 404, 4 3 l ,
456
pta, expert, 183, 191; vacana, authori
tative statement, 173, 201
ptokti, authoritative statement, 84
ptopadesa, testimony of experts, 200,
201
497
498
347
125,
101, 107,
in,
E. R., 64
Index
competence (of a person), 175, 200,
201
415
BRADLEY, F. H., 84
499
130
500
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
398
Co-nascent, 436
Concentration, 296, 423, 440, 469;
attainment of, 423; meditative, 420;
mental, 418, 420, 423, 462, 466;
causal factor in the production of
knowledge and insight, 420
Concepts, 320, 412; inadequacy of,
475
Conception, false, 353, 354
Conceptual epithets, 340
Concomitance, 77, 78; law of, 77/1
Index
Concomitant, 78
Condition(s), 421, 422, 433, 434, 449;
antecedent, 295-7; antecedent causal,
296; by way of decisive support,
296; of mutual dependence, 447;
necessary, 347; plurality of, 447;
resultant, 295-7; sufficient, 347;
twenty-four, 446
Conditionality, 447, 448
Confidence, 384, 388, 389
Confutation, 104
Congruity, 83
Consistency, 334, 353, 354; between
behaviour and statement, 354; con
ception of, 227; logical, 354;
principle of, 353
Constants, 351
Contemplation, 67
Contemplatives, 62, 63, 169
Contiguity, relation of, 78
Contradiction, 24, 84, 86, 93, 334, 337,
368, 370, 377; law of, 140, 217, 335;
principle of, 333, 334
Contradictory, 335, 337, 339, 341-3
407; mutually, 343
Contraposition, law of, 412; rules of,
415
Contrary, 335, 337, 339-43, 34
Controversialist, 207, 211, 219, 225,
354
Convention(s), 313, 319, 320; limits
of, 313, 314; three linguistic, 316,
317; transgression of, 314
Conventional, 363; knowledge, 367;
language, 366; speech, 363-5; state
ment, 364; teaching, 363-5
Conversion, 306, 307, 309; applied
logic of, 306; illegitimate, 309;
valid, 310
Correlation, 460, 461; one-one,
449
Correspondence theory of truth, 353,
359
COWELL, E. B., 72, 93,
5i
104
5<D2
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
191
Knowledge
2 1 9 , 2 2 1 , 223, 225, 2 2 9 , 2 3 0 ,
407
Dialectician, 128, 136, 153, 169, 206-8,
210, 224, 225, 229, 230, 407
dibba-cakk/iu, divine-eye, clairvoyance,
73, 432, 438; sota, -ear, 422,
sotadhtu, clairaudience, 438
dicta theologica, 175
Difference, method of, 146, 148
DlGHANAKHA, 51, 95, 213-17
Index
ekamsavykaraniya, to be answered
categorically, 281, 282
ekamsika, categorical, 280, 282
Elements, cognitive, 434
Elite, 375, 376, 405
Emancipation, conviction of, 467;
knowledge of, 466; through know
ledge, 467; by intellectual know
ledge, 400
53
504
FOUCHER, A., 57
Grammarians, 43, 84
Greece, 21, 22, 42, 43
Greeks, 64, 70
GUERINOT, A., 156,
161
E.
F.
C.,
Index
Insight, 29, 32,153, 183, 188, 277, 296,
380, 393, 418, 419; of emancipation,
421; extraordinary, 403; final and
ultimate, 171; higher, 192, intui
tional, 169; product ofjhna, 418;
metaphysical, 34, 62; into the nature
of things, 437; superhuman, 152;
supernatural, 192; supernormal, 153;
empirically unverifiable, 420
Intelligentsia, 228, 229, 277
Introspectability, 83
Introspection, 75, 436; objectivity in,
430; object of, 431
Introspective, 22, 83; method, 433
Intuition, 21, 61, 360, 377; a priori,
341; source of true knowledge?
420; higher, 99; highest, 174;
mystical, 457; sudden act of, 466;
yogic, 174, 431
Intuitionist, contemplative, 32
Invariability, 447
Investigation, 457; method of scientific,
33, 457
Investigator(s), 229, 230, 272
itihaitiha, what is based on hearsay or
tradition, 194-6, 198
itihttiha, what is based on hearsay or
tradition, 195, 196, 198, 199, 202
itikir, report, hearsay, 175, 195, 198,
199, 202
itikiriy, hearsay, 195
itivdappamokkha, defending one's own
theory, 224; nisams, for the merit
of, 221, 222
55
154, 155
jnna, knowledge, 9, 54, 61, 62, 165,
417 knda, section on, 9 3 ; mrga,
way of, 417
jhnvarana,
knowledge obscuring,
166; varaniya, 419
JNNAVIMALA, a Jain commentator,
142, 155
JOHNSON, W . E., 299
KAPPINA, 456
506
455
keva/a, omniscient,
omniscience, 245
165-7;
jnna,
Index
57
262
LEUCIPPUS, 97
LEWY, C , 335, 344
LOBOCHEVSKY, N . , 3 5 0
458
MALUNKYAPUTTA, 473
205, 2 0 6 , 2 1 0 , 2 4 0 , 3 0 6 , 3 1 0 , 3 3 4 ,
508
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
mlmms, investigation, 30
Mimms, 82, 84,173, 174,178; Prva,
103, 452; school, 84
Mind, 22, 35,108, 421-6,434,437,439,
459; analysis of, 433; four ways of
MCDOUGALL, W., 459/2
knowing another's, 440; selective
MCKENZIE, J., 388
activity of, 436; conscious content
M ' C R I N D L E , J. W., 64ft
of, 464; control and culture of, 32;
Mean, in pre-Buddhistic thought, 360,
created by, 106; emancipation of,
361; in Buddhism, 359-61
399, 467; -fulness, 466; habits of,
Meaning, 103, 313, 328; direct, 361-3;
428, 431; materialist conception of,
indirect, 361, 362; inferred, 363,
35, 69; naturalistic view of, 433;
363; nature of, 312; relation between
telepathic powers of, 460
a word and its, 103; its relation to
truth, 312; of terms, 297; theory of, Miracle, 322, 324, 332; of instruction,
324
315
Meaningful, 235, 290, 291, 331, 332, Miraculous element, 459
MISHRA, U., 161, 196
454; answer, 290; empirically, 344
Meaningless, 27/2, 234, 238, 287, 322, MIYAMOTO, S., 337, 338, 347
325-8, 330-2, 345, 346, 471, 475; MOORE, G. E., 24, 75, 80, 88, io$n
Modal, 155, 160
statement, 321, 326; -ness, 475
Modus tollendo ponens, 2,2,7
medh, intellect, 61
Meditation, 61, 152, 157, 250, 418, 425 Modus tollendo tollens, 103, 409-12
Moral reasons, 124
Meditative states, 422
Memory, 85, 86, 424; Buddha's, 469; Morphology, 343
Motor organs, 3 1 ; ten, 434
paranormal, 475; ofpre-existence, 440
direct perception,
Metaphysical, 22, 69, 77, 150, 451, 456; Mukhyapratyaksa,
166
agent, 402, 450; argument, 88;
assumption, 38; clothing, 32; con mla, root cause, first cause, 55, 443
cepts, 56, 433; factor, 149; inter MURTI, T . R. V., 470, 471, 474
pretation, 463; inquiry, 93, 457; muta, what is thought of? what is
sensed? 60, 61
interest, 142; presuppositions, 453;
Mystic, 40, 106, 271, 426, 431;
speculation, 21, 32; surmise, 402
potency, 420
Metaphysician, 63, 84, 170-3, 379;
Mystical, experience, 40, 4 1 ; state, n o
rational, 169, 205, 407
Index
Mysticism, 402
Myth, 29
Mythical element, 459
Mythological, 34
Mythology, 21, 31, 32, 36
59
5 io
447
Nyya, 56, 57^, 75, 79, 80, 84, 209,
218, 336; view of aitihya, 197, 198;
ptopadesa in, 200 \pauruseya, theory
of, 190, 192; theory of causation,
452; theory of perception, 186, 187;
view of scriptural statements, 173;
tradition, 267; attitude to Vedic
authority, 191; Vaisesika, 190, 452
Objectivity, 447
Observation, 457, 464
Observables, 77
O G D E N , C. K.,
320
okappana-lakkhana,
of trust, 388
the characteristic
257,
258,265-8
pmnika, epistemologist, 64, 65
PANINI, 194, 196, 218, 480
Index
pasda, mental appreciation, faith, 297,
385-8
5"
POKKHARASATI, l 8 l
POUSSIN, L. de la V.,
195, 282-8,
512
Probable, 77
Proof, 64, 8 1 ; indirect, 104; trans
cendent, 77
Prophecy, the belief in, 152
Proposition(s), 103, 104, 122-4, 126,
13 1 , 134-7, 143, 150, 154, 412-5;
analysis of, 414; compound, 236,
414; conditional, 162; contingent,
33, 340, 344; divisibility of, 313;
empirical, 159; ethical, 123, 125;
false, 335; general, 414; indivisi
bility of, 313; inferential, 173;
interrogative, 333; logical, 159;
meaning of, 277; moral, 128, 129;
transcendent, 212; universal, 7 5 - 7 ;
universal affirmative, 309, 351;
verification of the truth of, 416
Propriety, 200, 201
412
Index
Reasoning, 35, 45, 51, 57, 59-61, 76,
151, 153, 169, 170, 209, 235, 245,
270, 272, 431, 445; analogical, 29,
44; a priori, 36, 97, 145, 246, 255,
267, 268, 271, 272, 403; beginnings
of, 42; Brhmanic, 29, 36, 38;
discursive, 420; elements of, 46, 56;
empirical, 32, 36, 98, 268; fallacious,
205, 209, 225; good and bad, 224;
invalid, 234, 239; logical, 268;
logical basis of, 76; metaphysical,
60; pure, 34, 97, 262, 263, 271, 272,
403; science of, 56, 57; study of,
56, 92; syllogistic, 4 3 ; valid, 234,
239; validity and invalidity of, 43,
404
Rebirth, 4 1 , 126, 127, 369-76, 399,
400, 420, 450; rational ethical
argument for, 404; verifiable, 376,
440, 441
Reductio ad absurdum, 103/2
References, four great, 401
Refutations, eight, 415
Regularity theory of causation, 453,
455
.
Rejection,
four-cornered, 346
Rejoinder, four-fold, 414
Relation, 294, 449; of exclusive dis
junction, 350; of contiguity, 78
Relative, 280
Relativism, 163, 165, 217
Relativity, of standpoints, 280
Religion, 115, 142, 158, 175, 176, 180,
187, 188, 196, 202, 204, 207, 215,
244, 248, 357, 370, 381, 384, 394,
399, 403, 471; based on anussava,
185, 187; epistemic basis of, 171;
based on itiha, 195; unsatisfactory,
264, 272
Report, 84, 175-7, 182, 184-7, 199,
262; untrustworthiness of, 186
Retrocognition, 246, 262, 466, 468;
ante-natal, 459; faculty of, 399;
unlimited, 468
Retrocognitive, 422, 445
Revelation, 63, 93, 169, 181-6, 192,
203; Buddhist criticism of, 182, 183,
185; Buddhist attitude to, 185; and
R
5*3
297, 353 ^
sadasat, being and non-being, 159,
160, 165, 249, 254
SADAW, L., 361/2, 365
514
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
314
samgrahanaya,
164
general
standpoint,
Knowledge
130-
324, 325, 33
saptabhangaka, according to the seven
forms (of predication), 121
saptabhangi, of the seven forms (of
predication), 138, 156
SARATCHANDRA, E. R., 293, 432-6
SARUP, L., 23, 312,
315
Index
Schema, Aristotelian, 159; the four
fold, 135, 156, 333, 342, 344; three
fold, 156
Science, 88
Scientist, 372
Scripture, 57, 58, 61, 63, 166, 167, 174,
196, 198, 200, 427; authority of,
186; criticism of validity and
authority of, 183; revealed, 200;
sacred, 26; as a source of knowledge,
169, 174, 197
Self, cognitive, 220, 316; empirical,
320; intelligential, 270
Self-consistent, 406
Self-contradictory, 84, 86, 139, 164,
J88, 334, 33<>, 341, 349, 358, 383
Self-evident, 84, 268, 403
Sensation, 434, 435; bare, 434, 436
Sense, 72, 73, 8 1 ; consciousness, 4 1 ;
data, 215; organs, 83, 434, 439; six
spheres of, 292
Sensory, field, 436; organs, 31, 434
Sentence(s), 313, 343
Sentience, anoetic, 434, 436
SlLANKA, 70, 74, 75, 81/2, 90, 95-8,
IIO-3, I I 6 - 2 I , 127-9, 132, 135, 138,
142, 144, 146, 147", 150, 151, 153,
154, 158, 162, 255, 256, 258
Simile, of the basin of water, 419; of
the man born blind, 72; of the
chariot, 160; of the fire, 289; of
gold-ore, 424; of the granary, 379;
of the tree, 70; of the touchstone,
391
SINHA, Jadunath, 69, 75, 79, 161,
250
siyvya, the theory of conditional
propositions, 162
SLATER, R. H., 476
SMART, Ninian, 291, 37 m
Socratic, 408
Sophism, 209, 225; sceptical, 208
Sophist, 49, 80, 134, 136, 205-9,
212,
118
217, 230, 2 6 3 , 2 6 4 ;
Greek,
515
Sophistic,
Indian,
207;
Greek,
207
Sophistical, 208, 217
Soul, 33, 36, 39, 52, 72, 74, 76, 82-4,
IO6
Io8
II2
516
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
Knowledge
Symbol, 330
Symbolism, 290, 291
Synthesis, 54, 360, 361
Index
THOMAS, E. J., 65, 107, 183,184, 195,
5*7
39,
42,
518
Early
Buddhist
Theory of
MAHAVIRA,
138,
140,
Knowledge
165,
167,
168,
Index
vipaccanikavda,
holding
contrary
view, 51
vipphra-sadda, sound of the vibra
tions (of thoughts), 440
vipulamati, indirect telepathy? 440
viruddha, contradiction, 234, 235
Vision, 403, 420; clairvoyant, 73, 460,
462; knowledge and, 420, 431;
paranormal, 73; retrocognitive, 445
vztand, casuistry, 206, 217, 218, 223,
224
vitanda-sattha, science of casuistry, 46,
48, 50, 218; vadasattha, science of,
46,47, 218; vdin, casuist, 45, 136,
217, 219, 221, 224, 228, 230, 249, 336
vivda, debate, 190, 231
vivartavda, the theory that every
thing is a manifestation of being, 452
vohravacana^ common usage, 366
vygktciy self-contradictory, 188
vyavahra, conventional, 366; nay a,
standpoint, 164
vyavasytmaka, non-erratic, 79
Wager argument, 375, 406
W A R D E R , A. K., 67, 78, 80, 88, 89,
92, 464
WARNOCK, G. J., 78, 88, 300, 305
WEBER, A., 164, 405, 480
5l9
W E L T O N , J., 309
WIJESEKERA,
O.
H.
De
A.,
106,
70,