Little Black Book of Operations Tradecraft
Little Black Book of Operations Tradecraft
Little Black Book of Operations Tradecraft
Parabellum Concepts
2
Contents
CIA Secret Weapons Systems – Page 3
Logistics of a Black Bag Job – Page 9
NSA Employee Manual – Page 12
A Study of Assassination – Page 29
Surveillance Recognition – Page 42
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"How could you publish the "OSS Sabotage and Demolition Manual,"
I asked Peter Lund, editor and publisher of Paladin Press, "if your
organization, at the least, was not dealing with former OSS agents?
And what about "How to Kill?"
"I don't talk to journalists," Lund said.
"You're called the Paladin Press. You must publish books. Can
I order them?"
"No."
"Why not? You're a publisher, aren't you?"
"We're afraid our publications might fall into the wrong hands."
"What are the right hands?" I asked.
"I don't talk to journalists."
"Have you ever heard of Desert Publications?" I asked.
"A fine outfit," Lund said. "If they recommend you, I'll send
you our material."
"That's my problem," I said. "They don't seem to have a phone
number."
"Well, they're a good group."
"Listen," I said, "wasn't your group, and Desert Publications
besides, involved in CIA mercenary activity in Africa?"
"I don't know anything about that."
"Were you in the Special Forces?"
"July 1967 to July 1968 in Vietnam."
"Were you CIA?"
"I was MACV [Military Armed Forces Command Vietnam]."
"You weren't affiliated with CIA?"
"I didn't say that."
"What do you say?"
"We did joint operations with CIA on the Phoenix Program."
"Wasn't that a murder operation?"
"No. It was snatching people."
The Phoenix Program was designed for a job that the CIA
euphemistically described as "eliminating the Viet Cong
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these tense situations, and each member of the team must be able to control
himself mentally, physically, and emotionally, and have confidence that the
others can do likewise.
B. The surveillance team will follow the subject and any members of the
residence. Depending upon the persons to be followed, no less than two
surveillance agents should be used per person, unless school children are
involved, in which case one agent per child will suffice. In the case of
very young children, it is sometimes advisable to have two agents so as to
avoid the appearance of being a child molester.
C. Once all members of the residence have been surveilled away from the
residence or accounted for in another location, and there are no apparent
obstacles, then the plan is ready for a trial run.
D. When the "ball players" are ready to begin the "game," those agents
designated to telephone the residence of any neighbors in a position to
observe the front should place their calls at a precise moment as
instructed by the "outside man."
E. The "outside man" or "lookout" will call the "inside team" into position
and will alert the various surveillance agents that the "ball players" are
approaching the field. The inside team on the trial run will consist of the
lock picker and one radio person.
Radio transmissions can be received by anyone with the proper equipment,
such as a 200-channel scanning radio, or other similar portable equipment
with a retail price of around $300, so communications must be innocuous.
F. The "pickup man" will deliver the inside team to the front door or to
the most suitable location to avoid attention; this could be the front
door, back door, a nearby alley, or a parking garage. The inside team is
dropped off and the "pickup man" departs the immediate area to stand by for
further instructions through the outside person or lookout.
G. The "inside team" approaches and examines the entrance for obvious alarm
systems. If no alarms are noted, the inside team will make the
surreptitious entry into the residence or office. The radio person of the
inside team will immediately announce to the outside person that "the
players are on the field."
H.The trial run will consist of an immediate search of all rooms for
friends, relatives, housekeepers, or anyone associated with the subject to
be sure the "field" is clear. The inside team will announce to the outside
person some description of the events taking place inside. For example, if
a quick observation reveals no information available for future bag jobs,
the inside person may announce that the game is being called for lack of
11
NSA
Employee Manual
SECURITY GUIDELINES
This handbook is designed to introduce you to some of the basic security principles
and procedures with which all NSA employees must comply. It highlights some of your
security responsibilities, and provides guidelines for answering questions you may be
asked concerning your association with this Agency. Although you will be busy during
the forthcoming weeks learning your job, meeting co-workers, and becoming accustomed
to a new work environment, you are urged to become familiar with the security
information contained in this handbook. Please note that a listing of telephone numbers is
provided at the end of this handbook should you have any questions or concerns.
INTRODUCTION
In joining NSA you have been given an opportunity to participate in the activities of
one of the most important intelligence organizations of the United States Government. At
the same time, you have also assumed a trust which carries with it a most important
individual responsibility—the safeguarding of sensitive information vital to the security
of our nation. While it is impossible to estimate in actual dollars and cents the value of
the work being conducted by this Agency, the information to which you will have access
at NSA is without question critically important to the defense of the United States. Since
this information may be useful only if it is kept secret, it requires a very special measure
of protection. The specific nature of this protection is set forth in various Agency security
regulations and directives. The total NSA Security Program, however, extends beyond
these regulations. It is based upon the concept that security begins as a state of mind. The
program is designed to develop an appreciation of the need to protect information vital to
the national defense, and to foster the development of a level of awareness which will
make security more than routine compliance with regulations. At times, security practices
and procedures cause personal inconvenience. They take time and effort and on occasion
may make it necessary for you to voluntarily forego some of your usual personal
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prerogatives. But your compensation for the inconvenience is the knowledge that the
work you are accomplishing at NSA, within a framework of sound security practices,
contributes significantly to the defense and continued security of the United States of
America. I extend to you my very best wishes as you enter upon your chosen career or
assignment with NSA.
Philip T. Pease
Director of Security
ANONYMITY
Perhaps one of the first security practices with which new NSA personnel should
become acquainted is the practice of anonymity. In an open society such as ours, this
practice is necessary because information which is generally available to the public is
available also to hostile intelligence. Therefore, the Agency mission is best accomplished
apart from public attention. Basically, anonymity means that NSA personnel are
encouraged not to draw attention to themselves nor to their association with this Agency.
NSA personnel are also cautioned neither to confirm nor deny any specific questions
about NSA activities directed to them by individuals not affiliated with the Agency.
The ramifications of the practice of anonymity are rather far reaching, and its success
depends on the cooperation of all Agency personnel. Described below you will find some
examples of situations that you may encounter concerning your employment and how
you should cope with them. Beyond the situations cited, your judgement and discretion
will become the deciding factors in how you respond to questions about your
employment.
GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
CLASSIFICATION
Originators of correspondence, communications, equipment, or documents within the
Agency are responsible for ensuring that the proper classification, downgrading
information and, when appropriate, proper caveat notations are assigned to such material.
(This includes any handwritten notes which contain classified information). The three
levels of classification are Confidential, Secret and Top Secret. The NSA Classification
Manual should be used as guidance in determining proper classification. If after review of
this document you need assistance, contact the Classification Advisory Officer (CAO)
assigned to your organization, or the Information Policy Division (Q43).
NEED-TO-KNOW
Classified information is disseminated only on a strict “need-to-know” basis. The
“need-to know” policy means that classified information will be disseminated only to
those individuals who, in addition to possessing a proper clearance, have a requirement to
know this information in order to perform their official duties (need-to-know). No person
is entitled to classified information solely by virtue of office, position, rank, or security
clearance.
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All NSA personnel have the responsibility to assert the “need-to-know” policy as
part of their responsibility to protect sensitive information. Determination of “need-
toknow”
is a supervisory responsibility. This means that if there is any doubt in your mind
as to an individual’s “need-to-know,” you should always check with your supervisor
before releasing any classified material under your control.
PREPUBLICATION REVIEW
All NSA personnel (employees, military assignees, and contractors) must submit for
review any planned articles, books, speeches, resumes, or public statements that may
contain classified, classifiable, NSA-derived, or unclassified protected information, e.g.,
information relating to the organization, mission, functions, or activities of NSA. Your
obligation to protect this sensitive information is a lifetime one. Even when you resign,
retire, or otherwise end your affiliation with NSA, you must submit this type of material
for prepublication review. For additional details, contact the Information Policy Division
(Q43) for an explanation of prepublication review procedures.
vast amounts of information leave our facilities daily in the minds of NSA personnel, and
this is where our greatest vulnerability lies. Experience has indicated that because of the
vital information we work with at NSA, Agency personnel may become potential targets
for hostile intelligence efforts. Special safeguards are therefore necessary to protect our
personnel. Accordingly, the Agency has an extensive personnel security program which
establishes internal policies and guidelines governing employee conduct and activities.
These policies cover a variety of topics, all of which are designed to protect both you and
the sensitive information you will gain through your work at NSA.
and continuing to the extent that they are characterized by ties of kinship, obligation, or
affection.
If at any time you feel that a “casual” association is in any way suspicious, you
should report this to your Staff Security Officer immediately. Whenever any doubt exists
as to whether or not a situation should be reported or made a matter of record, you should
decided in favor of reporting it. In this way, the situation can be evaluated on its own
merits, and you can be advised as to your future course of action.
EMBASSY VISITS
Since a significant percentage of all espionage activity is known to be conducted
through foreign embassies, consulates, etc., Agency policy discourages visits to
embassies, consulates or other official establishments of a foreign government. Each
case, however, must be judged on the circumstances involved. Therefore, if you plan to
visit a foreign embassy for any reason (even to obtain a visa), you must consult with, and
obtain the prior approval of, your immediate supervisor and the Security Awareness
Division (M56).
for noting the countries to be visited, mode of travel, and dates of departure and return.
Your immediate supervisor must sign this form to indicate whether or not your proposed
travel poses a risk to the sensitive information, activities, or projects of which you may
have knowledge due to your current assignment.
After your supervisor’s assessment is made, this form should be forwarded to the
Security Awareness Director (M56). Your itinerary will then be reviewed in light of the
existing situation in the country or countries to be visited, and a decision for approval or
disapproval will be based on this assessment. The purpose of this policy is to limit the
risk of travel to areas of the world where a threat may exist to you and to your knowledge
of classified Agency activities.
In this context, travel to communist-controlled and other hazardous activity areas is
prohibited. A listing of these hazardous activity areas is prohibited. A listing of these
hazardous activity areas can be found in Annex A of NSA/CSS Regulation No. 30-31,
“Security Requirements for Foreign Travel” (12 June 1987). From time to time, travel
may also be prohibited to certain areas where the threat from hostile intelligence services,
terrorism, criminal activity or insurgency poses an unacceptable risk to Agency
employees and to the sensitive information they possess. Advance travel deposits made
without prior agency approval of the proposed travel may result in financial losses by the
employee should the travel be disapproved, so it is important to obtain approval prior to
committing yourself financially. Questions regarding which areas of the world currently
pose a threat should be directed to the Security Awareness Division (M56).
Unofficial foreign travel to Canada, the Bahamas, Bermuda, and Mexico does not
require prior approval, however, this travel must still be reported using Form K2579.
Travel to these areas may be reported after the fact.
While you do not have to report your foreign travel once you have ended your
affiliation with the Agency, you should be aware that the risk incurred in travelling to
certain areas, from a personal safety and/or counterintelligence standpoint, remains high.
The requirement to protect the classified information to which you have had access is a
lifetime obligation.
MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS
Within the United States there are numerous organizations with memberships ranging
from a few to tens of thousands. While you may certainly participate in the activities of
any reputable organization, membership in any international club or professional
organization/activity with foreign members should be reported through your Staff
Security Officer to the Clearance Division (M55). In most cases there are no security
concerns or threats to our employees or affiliates. However, the Office of Security needs
the opportunity to research the organization and to assess any possible risk to you and the
information to which you have access.
In addition to exercising prudence in your choice of organizational affiliations, you
should endeavor to avoid participation in public activities of a conspicuously
controversial nature because such activities could focus undesirable attention upon you
and the Agency. NSA employees may, however, participate in bona fide public affairs
such as local politics, so long as such activities do not violate the provisions of the
statutes and regulations which govern the political activities of all federal employees.
Additional information may be obtained from your Personnel Representative.
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authorized badge. To enter most NSA facilities your badge must be inserted into an
Access Control Terminal at a building entrance and you must enter your Personal
Identification Number (PIN) on the terminal keyboard. In the absence of an Access
Control Terminal, or when passing an internal security checkpoint, the badge should be
held up for viewing by a Security Protective Officer. The badge must be displayed at all
times while the individual remains within any NSA installation.
NSA Badges must be clipped to a beaded neck chain. If necessary for the safety of
those working in the area of electrical equipment or machinery, rubber tubing may be
used to insulate the badge chain. For those Agency personnel working in proximity to
other machinery or equipment, the clip may be used to attach the badge to the wearer’s
clothing, but it must also remain attached to the chain.
After you leave an NSA installation, remove your badge from public view, thus
avoiding publicizing your NSA affiliation. Your badge should be kept in a safe place
which is convenient enough to ensure that you will be reminded to bring it with you to
work. A good rule of thumb is to afford your badge the same protection you give your
wallet or your credit cards. DO NOT write your Personal Identification Number on your
badge. If you plan to be away from the Agency for a period of more than 30 days, your
badge should be left at the main Visitor Control Center which services your facility.
Should you lose your badge, you must report the facts and circumstances
immediately to the Security Operations Center (SOC) (963-3371s/688-6911b) so that
your badge PIN can be deactivated in the Access Control Terminals. In the event that you
forget your badge when reporting for duty, you may obtain a “non-retention” Temporary
Badge at the main Visitor Control Center which serves your facility after a co-worker
personally identifies your and your clearance has been verified.
Your badge is to be used as identification only within NSA facilities or other
government installations where the NSA badge is recognized. Your badge should never
be used outside of the NSA or other government facilities for the purpose of personal
identification. You should obtain a Department of Defense identification card from the
Civilian Welfare Fund (CWF) if you need to identify yourself as a government employee
when applying for “government discounts” offered at various commercial establishments.
Your badge color indicates your particular affiliation with NSA and your level of
clearance. Listed below are explanations of the badge colors you are most likely to see:
Green (*) Fully cleared NSA employees and
certain military assignees.
Orange (*) (or Gold) Fully cleared representative
of other government agencies.
Black (*) Fully cleared contractors or consultants.
Blue Employees who are cleared to the SECRET
level while awaiting completion of their processing
for full (TS/SI) clearance. These Limited Interim
Clearance (LIC) employees are restricted to certain
activities while inside a secure area.
Red Clearance level is not specified, so assume the
holder is uncleared.
* - Fully cleared status means that the person has been cleared to the Top Secret (TS)
level and indoctrinated for Special Intelligence (SI).
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All badges with solid color backgrounds (permanent badges) are kept by individuals
until their NSA employment or assignment ends. Striped badges (“non-retention” badges)
are generally issued to visitors and are returned to the Security Protective Officer upon
departure from an NSA facility.
AREA CONTROL
Within NSA installations there are generally two types of areas, Administrative and
Secure. An Administrative Area is one in which storage of classified information is not
authorized, and in which discussions of a classified nature are forbidden. This type of
area would include the corridors, restrooms, cafeterias, visitor control areas, credit union,
barber shop, and drugstore. Since uncleared, non-NSA personnel are often present in
these areas, all Agency personnel must ensure that no classified information is discussed
in an Administrative Area.
Classified information being transported within Agency facilities must be placed
within envelopes, folders, briefcases, etc. to ensure that its contents or classification
markings are not disclosed to unauthorized persons, or that materials are not
inadvertently dropped enroute.
The normal operational work spaces within an NSA facility are designated Secure
Areas. These areas are approved for classified discussions and for the storage of
classified material. Escorts must be provided if it is necessary for uncleared personnel
(repairmen, etc.) to enter Secure Areas, an all personnel within the areas must be made
aware of the presence of uncleared individuals. All unknown, unescorted visitors to
Secure Areas should be immediately challenged by the personnel within the area,
regardless of the visitors’ clearance level (as indicated by their badge color).
The corridor doors of these areas must be locked with a deadbolt and all classified
information in the area must be properly secured after normal working hours or whenever
the area is unoccupied. When storing classified material, the most sensitive material must
be stored in the most secure containers. Deadbolt keys for doors to these areas must be
returned to the key desk at the end of the workday.
For further information regarding Secure Areas, consult the Physical Security
Division (M51) or your staff Security Officer.
PROHIBITED ITEMS
Because of the potential security or safety hazards, certain items are prohibited under
normal circumstances from being brought into or removed from any NSA installation.
These items have been groped into two general classes. Class I prohibited items are those
which constitute a threat to the safety and security of NSA/CSS personnel and facilities.
Items in this category include:
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EXIT INSPECTION
As you depart NSA facilities, you will note another physical security safeguard—the
inspection of the materials you are carrying. This inspection of your materials, conducted
by Security Protective Officers, is designed to preclude the inadvertent removal of
classified material. It is limited to any articles that you are carrying out of the facility and
may include letters, briefcases, newspapers, notebooks, magazines, gym bags, and other
such items. Although this practice may involve some inconvenience, it is conducted in
your best interest, as well as being a sound security practice. The inconvenience can be
considerably reduced if you keep to a minimum the number of personal articles that you
remove from the Agency.
Only under a very limited and official circumstances classified material be removed
from Agency spaces. When deemed necessary, specific authorization is required to
permit an individual to hand carry classified material out of an NSA building to another
Secure Area. Depending on the material and circumstances involved, there are several
ways to accomplish this.
A Courier Badge authorizes the wearer, for official purposes, to transport classified
material, magnetic media, or Class II prohibited items between NSA facilities. These
badges, which are strictly controlled, are made available by the Physical Security
Division (M51) only to those offices which have specific requirements justifying their
use.
An Annual Security Pass may be issued to individuals whose official duties require
that they transport printed classified materials, information storage media, or Class II
prohibited items to secure locations within the local area. Materials carried by an
individual who displays this pass are subject to spot inspection by Security Protective
Officers or other personnel from the Office of Security. It is not permissible to use an
Annual Security Pass for personal convenience to circumvent inspection of your personal
property by perimeter Security Protective Officers.
If you do not have access to a Courier Badge and you have not been issued an
Annual Security Pass, you may obtain a One-Time Security Pass to remove classified
materials/magnetic media or admit or remove prohibited items from an NSA installation.
These passes may be obtained from designated personnel in your work element who have
been given authority to issue them. The issuing official must also contact the Security
Operations Center (SOC) to obtain approval for the admission or removal of a Class I
prohibited item.
When there is an official need to remove government property which is not magnetic
media, or a prohibited or classified item, a One-Time Property Pass is used. This type of
pass (which is not a Security Pass) may be obtained from your element custodial property
officer. A Property Pass is also to be used when an individual is removing personal
property which might be reasonably be mistaken for unclassified Government property.
This pass is surrendered to the Security Protective Officer at the post where the material
is being removed. Use of this pass does not preclude inspection of the item at the
perimeter control point by the Security Protective Officer or Security professionals to
ensure that the pass is being used correctly.
HELPFUL INFORMATION
SECURITY RESOURCES
In the fulfillment of your security responsibilities, you should be aware that there are
many resources available to assist you. If you have any questions or concerns regarding
security at NSA or your individual security responsibilities, your supervisor should be
consulted. Additionally, Staff Security Officers are appointed to the designated Agency
elements to assist these organizations in carrying out their security responsibilities. There
is a Staff Security Officer assigned to each organization; their phone numbers are listed at
the back of this handbook. Staff Security Officers also provide guidance to and monitor
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the activities of Security Coordinators and Advisors (individuals who, in addition to their
operational duties within their respective elements, assist element supervisors or
managers in discharging security responsibilities).
Within the Office of Security, the Physical Security Division (M51) will offer you
assistance in matters such as access control, security passes, clearance verification,
combination locks, keys, identification badges, technical security, and the Security
Protective Force. The Security Awareness Division (M56) provides security guidance
and briefings regarding unofficial foreign travel, couriers, special access, TDY/PCS, and
amateur radio activities. The Industrial and Field Security Division (M52) is available to
provide security guidance concerning NSA contractor and field site matters.
The Security Operations Center (SOC) is operated by two Security Duty Officers
(SDOs), 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The SDO, representing the Office of Security,
provides a complete range of security services to include direct communications with fire
and rescue personnel for all Agency area facilities. The SDO is available to handle any
physical or personnel problems that may arise, and if necessary, can direct your to the
appropriate security office that can assist you. After normal business hours, weekends,
and holidays, the SOC is the focal point for all security matters for all Agency personnel
and facilities (to include Agency field sites and contractors). The SOC is located in Room
2A0120, OPS 2A building and the phone numbers are 688-6911(b), 963-3371(s).
However, keep in mind that you may contact any individual or any division within
the Office of Security directly. Do not hesitate to report any information which may
affect the security of the Agency’s mission, information, facilities or personnel.
SECURITY-RELATED SERVICES
In addition to Office of Security resources, there are a number of professional,
security related services available for assistance in answering your questions or providing
the services which you require.
The Installations and Logistics Organization (L) maintains the system for the
collection and destruction of classified waste, and is also responsible for the movement
and scheduling of material via NSA couriers and the Defense Courier Service (DCS).
Additionally, L monitors the proper addressing, marking, and packaging of classified
material being transmitted outside of NSA; maintains records pertaining to receipt and
transmission of controlled mail; and issues property passes for the removal of
unclassified property.
The NSA Office of Medical Services (M7) has a staff of physicians, clinical
psychologists and an alcoholism counselor. All are well trained to help individuals help
themselves in dealing with their problems. Counseling services, with referrals to private
mental health professionals when appropriate, are all available to NSA personnel.
Appointments can be obtained by contacting M7 directly. When an individual refers
himself/herself, the information discussed in the counseling sessions is regarded as
privileged medical information and is retained exclusively in M7 unless it pertains to the
national security.
Counseling interviews are conducted by the Office of Civilian Personnel (M3) with
any civilian employee regarding both on and off-the-job problems. M3 is also available to
assist all personnel with the personal problems seriously affecting themselves or
members of their families. In cases of serious physical or emotional illness, injury,
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GUIDE TO SECURITY
M51 PHYSICAL SECURITY 963-6651s/688-8293b (FMHQ)
968-8101s/859-6411b (FANX)
CONFIRM and badges Prohibited Items
(963-6611s/688-7411b)
Locks, keys, safes and alarms SOC (963-3371s/688-6911b)
Security/vehicle passes NSA facility protection and compliance
Visitor Control
Inspections
Red/blue seal areas New Construction
Pass Clearances (963-4780s/688-6759b)
A 2A0852B 963-4650/688-7044
B 3W099 963-4559/688-7141
D/Q/J/N/U 2B8066G 963-4496/688-6614
E/M D3B17 968-8050/859-6669
G 9A195 963-5033/688-7902
K 2B5136 963-1978/688-5052
L SAB4 977-7230/688-6194
P 2W091 963-5302/688-7303
R B6B710 968-4073/859-4736
S/V/Y/C/X C2A55 972-2144/688-7549
T 2B5040 963-4543/688-7364
W 1C181 963-5970/688-7061
A STUDY OF ASSASSINATION
DEFINITION
It is here used to describe the planned killing of a person who is not under the legal
jurisdiction of the killer, who is not physically in the hands of the killer, who has been
selected by a resistance organization for death, and who has been sele cted by a resistance
organization for death, and whose death provides positive advantages to that
organization.
EMPLOYMENT
should be confined to an absolute minimum of persons. Ideally, only one person will be
involved. No report may be made, but usually the act will be pr operly covered by normal
news services, whose output is available to all concerned.
JUSTIFICATION
Murder is not morally justifiable. Self-defense may be argued if the victim has
knowledge which may destroy the resistance organization if divulged. Assassination of
persons responsible for atrocities or reprisals may be regarded as just puni shment.
Killing a political leader whose burgeoning career is a clear and present danger to the
cause of freedom may be held necessary.
But assassination can seldom be employed with a clear conscience. Persons who are
morally squeamish should not attempt it.
CLASSIFICATIONS
The techniques employed will vary according to whether the subject is unaware of his
danger, aware but unguarded, or guarded. They will also be affected by whether or not
the assassin is to be killed with the subject hereafter, assassinations in which the subject
is unaware will be termed "simple"; those where the subject is aware but unguarded will
be termed "chase"; those where the victim is guarded will be termed "guarded."
If the assassin is to die with the subject, the act will be called "lost." If the assassin is to
escape, the adjective will be "safe." It should be noted that no compromises should exist
here. The assassin must not fall alive into enemy hands.
A further type division is caused by the need to conceal the fact that the subject was
actually the victim of assassination, rather than an accident or natural causes. If such
concealment is desirable the operation will be called "secret" ;; if concealment is
immaterial, the act will be called "open"; while if the assassination requires publicity to
be effective it will be termed "terroristic."
Following these definitions, the assassination of Julius Caesar was safe, simple, and
terroristic, while that of Huey Long was lost, guarded and open. Obviously, successful
secret assassinations are not recorded as assassination at all. [Illeg] o f Thailand and
Augustus Caesar may have been the victims of safe, guarded and secret assassination.
Chase assassinations usually involve clandestine agents or members of criminal
organizations.
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THE ASSASSIN
In safe assassinations, the assassin needs the usual qualities of a clandestine agent. He
should be determined, courageous, intelligent, resourceful, and physically active. If
special equipment is to be used, such as firearms or drugs, it is clear that he must have
outstanding skill with such equipment.
Except in terroristic assassinations, it is desirable that the assassin be transient in the area.
He should have an absolute minimum of contact with the rest of the organization and his
instructions should be given orally by one person only. His safe evacuation after the act is
absolutely essential, but here again contact should be as limited as possible. It is
preferable that the person issuing instructions also conduct any withdrawal or covering
action which may be necessary.
In lost assassination, the assassin must be a fanatic of some sort. Politics, religion, and
revenge are about the only feasible motives. Since a fanatic is unstable psychologically,
he must be handled with extreme care. He must not know the iden tities of the other
members of the organization, for although it is intended that he die in the act, something
may go wrong. While the Assassin of Trotsky has never revealed any significant
information, it was unsound to depend on this when the act was p lanned.
PLANNING
When the decision to assassinate has been reached, the tactics of the operation must be
planned, based upon an estimate of the situation similar to that used in military
operations. The preliminary estimate will reveal gaps in information and possibly indicate
a need for special equipment which must be procured or constructed. When all necessary
data has been collected, an effective tactical plan can be prepared. All planning must be
mental; no papers should ever contain evidence of the oper ation.
TECHNIQUES
The essential point of assassination is the death of the subject. A human being may be
killed in many ways but sureness is often overlooked by those who may be emotionally
unstrung by the seriousness of this act they intend to commit. The spe cific technique
32
employed will depend upon a large number of variables, but should be constant in one
point: Death must be absolutely certain. The attempt on Hitler's life failed because the
conspiracy did not give this matter proper attention.
1. Manual.
It is possible to kill a man with the bare hands, but very few are skillful enough to do it
well. Even a highly trained Judo expert will hesitate to risk killing by hand unless he has
absolutely no alternative. However, the simplest local tools a re often much the most
efficient means of assassination. A hammer, axe, wrench, screw driver, fire poker,
kitchen knife, lamp stand, or anything hard, heavy and handy will suffice. A length of
rope or wire or a belt will do if the assassin is strong and agile. All such improvised
weapons have the important advantage of availability and apparent innocence. The
obviously lethal machine gun failed to kill Trotsky where an item of sporting goods
succeeded.
In all safe cases where the assassin may be subject to search, either before or after the act,
specialized weapons should not be used. Even in the lost case, the assassin may
accidentally be searched before the act and should not carry an incrimin ating device if
any sort of lethal weapon can be improvised at or near the site. If the assassin normally
carries weapons because of the nature of his job, it may still be desirable to improvise and
implement at the scene to avoid disclosure of his ident ity.
2. Accidents.
For secret assassination, either simple or chase, the contrived accident is the most
effective technique. When successfully executed, it causes little excitement and is only
casually investigated.
The most efficient accident, in simple assassination, is a fall of 75 feet or more onto a
hard surface. Elevator shafts, stair wells, unscreened windows and bridges will serve.
Bridge falls into water are not reliable. In simple cases a private meeting with the subject
may be arranged at a properly-cased location. The act may be executed by sudden,
vigorous [excised] of the ankles, tipping the subject over the edge. If the assassin
immediately sets up an outcry, playing the "horrified wit ness", no alibi or surreptitious
withdrawal is necessary. In chase cases it will usually be necessary to stun or drug the
subject before dropping him. Care is required to insure that no wound or condition not
attributable to the fall is discernible after death.
33
Falls into the sea or swiftly flowing rivers may suffice if the subject cannot swim. It will
be more reliable if the assassin can arrange to attempt rescue, as he can thus be sure of
the subject's death and at the same time establish a workable al ibi.
If the subject's personal habits make it feasible, alcohol may be used [2 words excised] to
prepare him for a contrived accident of any kind.
Falls before trains or subway cars are usually effective, but require exact timing and can
seldom be free from unexpected observation.
Arson can cause accidental death if the subject is drugged and left in a burning building.
Reliability is not satisfactory unless the building is isolated and highly combustible.
3. Drugs.
In all types of assassination except terroristic, drugs can be very effective. If the assassin
is trained as a doctor or nurse and the subject is under medical care, this is an easy and
rare method. An overdose of morphine administered as a sedat ive will cause death
without disturbance and is difficult to detect. The size of the dose will depend upon
whether the subject has been using narcotics regularly. If not, two grains will suffice.
If the subject drinks heavily, morphine or a similar narcotic can be injected at the passing
out stage, and the cause of death will often be held to be acute alcoholism.
Specific poisons, such as arsenic or strychine, are effective but their possession or
procurement is incriminating, and accurate dosage is problematical. Poison was used
unsuccessfully in the assassination of Rasputin and Kolohan, though the latte r case is
more accurately described as a murder.
4. Edge Weapons
Any locally obtained edge device may be successfully employed. A certain minimum of
anatomical knowledge is needed for reliability.
34
Puncture wounds of the body cavity may not be reliable unless the heart is reached. The
heart is protected by the rib cage and is not always easy to locate.
Abdominal wounds were once nearly always mortal, but modern medical treatment has
made this no longer true.
Absolute reliability is obtained by severing the spinal cord in the cervical region. This
can be done with the point of a knife or a light blow of an axe or hatchet.
Another reliable method is the severing of both jugular and carotid blood vessels on both
sides of the windpipe.
If the subject has been rendered unconscious by other wounds or drugs, either of the
above methods can be used to insure death.
5. Blunt Weapons
As with edge weapons, blunt weapons require some anatomical knowledge for effective
use. Their main advantage is their universal availability. A hammer may be picked up
almost anywhere in the world. Baseball and [illeg] bats are very widely dist ributed. Even
a rock or a heavy stick will do, and nothing resembling a weapon need be procured,
carried or subsequently disposed of.
Blows should be directed to the temple, the area just below and behind the ear, and the
lower, rear portion of the skull. Of course, if the blow is very heavy, any portion of the
upper skull will do. The lower frontal portion of the head, from th e eyes to the throat,
can withstand enormous blows without fatal consequences.
6. Firearms
Firearms are often used in assassination, often very ineffectively. The assassin usually
has insufficient technical knowledge of the limitations of weapons, and expects more
range, accuracy and killing power than can be provided with reliability. Since certainty of
death is the major requirement, firearms should be used which can provide destructive
power at least 100% in excess of that thought to be necessary, and ranges should be half
that considered practical for the weapon.
Firearms have other drawbacks. Their possession is often incriminating. They may be
difficult to obtain. They require a degree of experience from the user. They are [illeg].
Their [illeg] is consistently over-rated.
However, there are many cases in which firearms are probably more efficient than any
other means. These cases usually involve distance between the assassin and the subject,
or comparative physical weakness of the assassin, as with a woman.
35
62 kk and others of this type. These are preferable to ordinary military calibers, since
ammunition available for them is usually of the expanding bullet type, whereas most
ammunition for military rifles is full jacketed and hence not sufficiently let hal. Military
ammunition should not be altered by filing or drilling bullets, as this will adversely affect
accuracy.
The rifle may be of the "bull gun" variety, with extra heavy barrel and set triggers, but in
any case should be capable of maximum precision. Ideally, the weapon should be able to
group in one inch at one hundred yards, but 21/2" groups are adequa te. The sight should
be telescopic, not only for accuracy, but because such a sight is much better in dim light
or near darkness. As long as the bare outline of the target is discernable, a telescope sight
will work, even if the rifle and shooter are in total darkness.
Public figures or guarded officials may be killed with great reliability and some safety if
a firing point can be established prior to an official occasion. The propaganda value of
this system may be very high.
Machine guns may be used in most cases where the precision rifle is applicable. Usually,
this will require
The area fire capacity of the machine gun should not be used to search out a concealed
subject. This was tried with predictable lack of success on Trotsky. The automatic feature
of the machine gun should rather be used to increase reliability by placing a 5 second
36
burst on the subject. Even with full jacket ammunition, this will be absolute lethal is the
burst pattern is no larger than a man. This can be accomplished at about 150 yards. In
ideal circumstances, a properly padded and targeted ma chine gun can do it at 850 yards.
The major difficulty is placing the first burst exactly on the target, as most machine
gunners are trained to spot their fire on target by observation of strike. This will not do in
assassination as the subject will not wait.
This weapon, known as the "machine-pistol" by the Russians and Germans and
"machine-carbine" by the British, is occasionally useful in assassination. Unlike the rifle
and machine gun, this is a short range weapon and since it fires pistol ammu nition, much
less powerful. To be reliable, it should deliver at least 5 rounds into the subject's chest,
though the .45 caliber U.S. weapons have a much larger margin of killing efficiency than
the 9 mm European arms.
blank. While accurate single rounds can be delivered by sub-machine gunners at 50 yards
or more, this is not certain enough for assassination. Under ordinary circumstances, the
5MG should be used as a fully automatic weapon. In the hands of a capabl e gunner, a
high cyclic rate is a distinct advantage, as speed of execution is most desirable,
particularly in the case of multiple subjects.
The sub-machine gun is especially adapted to indoor work when more than one subject is
to be assassinated. An effective technique has been devised for the use of a pair of sub-
machine gunners, by which a room containing as many as a dozen subjects can be
"purifico" in about twenty seconds with little or no risk to the gunners. It is illustrated
below.
While the U.S. sub-machine guns fire the most lethal cartridges, the higher cyclic rate of
some foreign weapons enable the gunner to cover a target quicker with acceptable pattern
density. The Bergmann Model 1934 is particularly good in this way. The Danish
Madman? SMG has a moderately good cyclic rate and is admirably compact and
concealable. The Russian SHG's have a good cyclic rate, but are handicapped by a small,
light protective which requires more kits for equivalent killing effect.
killing instrument as long as the range is kept under ten yards. It should normally be used
only on single targets as it cannot sustain fire successfully. The barrel may be "sawed" off
for convenience, but this is not a significant factor in its killi ng performance. Its
optimum range is just out of reach of the subject. 00 buckshot is considered the best shot
size for a twelve gage gun, but anything from single balls to bird shot will do if the range
is right. The assassin should aim for the solar plexus as the shot pattern is small at close
range and can easily [illeg] the head.
If a pistol is used, it should be as powerful as possible and fired from just beyond reach.
The pistol and the shotgun are used in similar tactical situations, except that the shotgun
is much more lethal and the pistol is much more easily conceale d.
In the hands of an expert, a powerful pistol is quite deadly, but such experts are rare and
not usually available for assassination missions.
.45 Colt, .44 Special, .455 Kly, .45 A.S.[illeg] (U.S. Service) and .357 Magnum are all
efficient calibers. Less powerful
rounds can suffice but are less reliable. Sub-power cartridges such as the .32s and .25s
should be avoided.
In all cases, the subject should be hit solidly at least three times for complete reliability.
The sound of the explosion of the proponent in a firearm can be effectively silenced by
appropriate attachments. However, the sound of the projective passing through the air
cannot, since this sound is generated outside the weapon. In cases w here the velocity of
the bullet greatly exceeds that of sound, the noise so generated is much louder than that
of the explosion. Since all powerful rifles have muzzle velocities of over 2000 feet per
second, they cannot be silenced.
Pistol bullets, on the other hand, usually travel slower than sound and the sound of their
flight is negligible. Therefore, pistols, submachine guns and any sort of improvised
carbine or rifle which will take a low velocity cartridge can be silenc ed. The user should
38
not forget that the sound of the operation of a repeating action is considerable, and that
the sound of bullet strike, particularly in bone is quite loud.
Silent firearms are only occasionally useful to the assassin, though they have been widely
publicized in this connection. Because permissible velocity is low, effective precision
range is held to about 100 yards with rifle or carbine type weapons, while with pistols,
silent or otherwise,
are most efficient just beyond arms length. The silent feature attempts to provide a degree
of safety to the assassin, but mere possession of a silent firearm is likely to create enough
hazard to counter the advantage of its silence. The silent pisto l combines the
disadvantages of any pistol with the added one of its obviously clandestine purpose.
7. Explosives.
Bombs and demolition charges of various sorts have been used frequently in
assassination. Such devices, in terroristic and open assassination, can provide safety and
overcome guard barriers, but it is curious that bombs have often been the imp lement of
lost assassinations.
The major factor which affects reliability is the use of explosives for assassination. the
charge must be very large and the detonation must be controlled exactly as to time by the
assassin who can observe the subject. A small or moderate explosi ve charge is highly
unreliable as a cause of death, and time delay or booby-trap devices are extremely prone
to kill the wrong man. In addition to the moral aspects of indiscriminate killing, the death
of casual bystanders can often produce public reacti ons unfavorable to the cause for
which the assassination is carried out.
will always cause a commotion and may even result in the subject's death, it is sloppy,
unreliable, and bad propaganda. The charge must be too small and the assassin is never
sure of: (1)reaching his attack position, (2) placing the charge close en ough to the target
and (3) firing the charge at the right time.
Ten pounds of high explosive should normally be regarded as a minimum, and this is
explosive of fragmentation material. The latter can consist of any hard, [illeg] material as
long as the fragments are large enough. Metal or rock fragments should be walnut-size
rather than pen-size. If solid plates are used, to be ruptured by the explosion, cast iron, 1"
thick, gives excellent fragmentation. Military or commercial high explosives are practical
for use in assassination. Homemade or improvised e xplosives should be avoided. While
possibly powerful, they tend to be dangerous and unreliable. Anti-personnel explosive
missiles are excellent, provided the assassin has sufficient technical knowledge to fuse
them properly. 81 or 82 mm mortar shells, or the 120 mm mortar shell, are particularly
good. Anti-personnel shells for 85, 88, 90, 100 and 105 mm guns and howitzers are both
large enough to be completely reliable and small enough to be carried by one man.
The charge should be so placed that the subject is not ever six feet from it at the moment
of detonation.
A large, shaped charge with the [illeg] filled with iron fragments (such as 1" nuts and
bolts) will fire a highly lethal shotgun-type
[illeg] to 50 yards. This reaction has not been thoroughly tested, however, and an exact
replica of the proposed device should be fired in advance to determine exact range,
pattern-size, and penetration of fragments. Fragments should penetrate at lea st 1" of
seasoned pine or equivalent for minimum reliability. Any firing device may be used
which permits exact control by the assassin. An ordinary commercial or military explorer
is efficient, as long as it is rigged for instantaneous action with no time fuse in the
system. The wise [illeg] electric target can serve as the triggering device and provide
exact timing from as far away as the assassin can reliably hit the target. This will avid the
disadvantages olitary or commercial high explosives are practical for use in assassination.
Homemade or improvised explosives should be avoided. While possibly powerful, they
tend to be dangerous and unreliable. Anti-personnel explosive missiles are excellent,
provided the assassin has sufficient techn ical knowledge to fuse them properly. 81 or 82
mm mortar shells, or the 120 mm mortar shell, are particularly good. Anti-personnel
shells for 85, 88, 90, 100 and 105 mm guns and howitzers are both large enough to be
completely reliable and small enough to be carried by one man.
The charge should be so placed that the subject is not ever six feet from it at the moment
of detonation.
A large, shaped charge with the [illeg] filled with iron fragments (such as 1" nuts and
bolts) will fire a highly lethal shotgun-type
[illeg] to 50 yards. This reaction has not been thoroughly tested, however, and an exact
replica of the proposed device should be fired in advance to determine exact range,
40
Any firing device may be used which permits exact control by the assassin. An ordinary
commercial or military explorer is efficient, as long as it is rigged for instantaneous
action with no time fuse in the system.
The wise [illeg] electric target can serve as the triggering device and provide exact timing
from as far away as the assassin can reliably hit the target. This will avid the
disadvantages of stringing wire between the proposed positions of the ass assin and the
subject, and also permit the assassin to fire the charge from a variety of possible
positions.
The radio switch can be [illeg] to fire [illeg], though its reliability is somewhat lower and
its procurement may not be easy.
EXAMPLES
([illeg] may be presented brief outlines, with critical evaluations of the following
assassinations and attempts:
Marat Hedrich
Lincoln Hitler
Harding Roosevelt
Grand Duke Sergei Truman
Pirhivie Mussolini
Archduke Francis Ferdinand Benes
Rasputin Aung Sang
Madero [illeg]
Kirov Abdullah
Huey Long Ghandi
Alexander of Yugoslvia
Trotsky
41
1. 2.
3. 4.
(2) Finishes burst. Commands"Shift." Drops (1) Finishes burst. Commands "shift". Drops
back thru [sic] door. Replaces empty magazine. back thru [sic] door. Replaces magazine.
Covers corridor. Covers corridor.
(1) On command "shift", opens fire on opposite (2) On command, "shift", re-enters room.
side of target, swings one burst across group. Covers group: kills survivors with two-round
42
5. 6.
Surveillance Recognition
by U.S. Dept. of State
Surveillance is required for successful terrorist planning. Experience has taught us that
terrorist attacks are generally preceded by pre-operational surveillance in which terrorists
gather target intelligence. Surveillance is defined as the process of keeping facilities,
vehicles and persons under observation in order to obtain detailed information. Any
indications of surveillance should be reported immediately to the the security office of
your organization and/or the police. All training programs designed to protect individuals
from becoming victims of terrorism recommend that people be alert to surveillance. This
is excellent advice, but, unfortunately, in most instances it is insufficient, because people
have had no training in detecting surveillance, and terrorist organizations are often
relatively sophisticated in their surveillance methods. Detecting surveillance conducted
by trained experts is not as easy as most Hollywood films would lead us to believe.
Fortunately, however, the type of surveillance conducted by terrorist organizations is not
normally as elaborate as that done by intelligence organizations nor does it involve as
many people or as much equipment. Nevertheless, for people to have a reasonable chance
at detecting most forms of surveillance they would have to be somewhat familiar with the
techniques used. The purpose of surveillance is to determine (1) the suitability of the
potential target based upon the physical and procedural security precautions that the
individual has taken and (2) the most suitable time, location, and method of attack. This
43
surveillance may last for days or weeks depending upon the length of time it takes the
surveillants to obtain the information that they require. Naturally, the surveillance of a
person who has set routines and who takes few precautions will take less time. The
people undertaking the surveillance will often not take part in the attack, nor will the
attack take place while surveillance is still in progress. Before undertaking surveillance
most experts gather information about the subject from other sources. Public records of
information made available to the terrorist organization from a sympathetic individual
within an organization, local police, or other government office may reveal useful facts
about an individual such as the names of family members, an address, a description of
vehicles and license numbers, photographs, etc. The surveillants will also make a
reconnaissance of the neighborhood in which the target lives and works. This permits
them to select positions of observation, the types of vehicles to use, the clothing to be
worn, and the type of ruse to use that will give them an ordinary or normal appearance
and plausible reasons to be in the area. There are basically three forms of surveillance:
foot, vehicle, and stationary (generally categorized as either mobile or static). A brief
description of the most common techniques used for each of these forms and methods for
detecting each one follows:
One or more individuals may undertake foot surveillance. One-person foot surveillance is
rather complicated and fairly easy to detect. The surveillance must remain close to the
target, particularly in congested areas, to avoid losing him or her. In less congested areas
the surveillant can maintain a greater distance, but the lack of other pedestrians makes the
surveillant that much more noticeable. The one complicating factor is the use of a
disguise to make the surveillant look different (perhaps a uniform). One possible use of a
disguise is a shopping bag or some other container for a change of clothes, particularly if
the shopping bag is from a store not found in the area or the container somehow seems
out of place. Where a disguise is suspected, pay particular attention to shoes and slacks or
skirts. These items are less easily and, therefore, less commonly changed. In elevators,
watch for people who seem to wait for you to push a button and then select a floor one
flight above or below yours. Two-person foot surveillance is more effective in that the
second surveillant provides greater flexibility. Normally, one surveillant remains close to
the target while the other stays at a greater distance. The second surveillant may follow
the first on the same side of the street or travel on the opposite side. Periodically the two
surveillants change position so that if the target spots one of them, that one will soon be
out of sight, leading the target to think that he or she was mistaken. Obviously, spotting
this form of surveillance is more complicated, but individuals who are alert to the people
in their vicinity will eventually detect the same surveillant over a period of time. Foot
surveillance with three or more people uses the most sophisticated techniques and is the
most difficult to spot. Generally, one surveillant remains behind the target close enough
to respond to any sudden moves. A second surveillant remains behind the first on the
same side of the street with the first surveillant in sight. A third surveillant travels on the
opposite side of the street parallel with or just behind the target. In areas where the target
has few paths to choose, one surveillant may walk in front of the target, where he or she
is least likely to cause suspicion. The positions of the surveillants are frequently changed,
most commonly at intersections. The surveillant directly behind the target may move to
the opposite side of the street, while another surveillant moves in close behind the target.
With the additional surveillants, any surveillant who feels that he or she has been
44
observed may drop out of the formation. The use of this sophisticated technique requires
that people be alert not only to those people behind them but also to those across the
street and perhaps in front of them. If the same person is seen more than once over a
certain distance, surveillance may be suspected even if that person is not continuously
seen. Common methods for detecting surveillance apply to all three forms of foot
surveillance. The most effective are: 1. stopping abruptly and looking to the rear, 2.
suddenly reversing your course, 3. stopping abruptly after turning a corner, 4. watching
reflections in shop windows or other reflective surfaces, 5. entering a building and
leaving immediately by another exit,
6. walking slowly and then rapidly at intervals, 7. dropping a piece of paper to see if
anyone retrieves it, 8. boarding or exiting a bus or subway just before it starts, and 9.
making sudden turns or walking around the block. While taking these actions, watch for
people who are taken by surprise, react inappropriately, suddenly change direction, or
give a signal to someone else. Surveillants will not normally look directly at the target,
but they may do so if they are surprised or unaware that you are observing them. Foot
surveillance is often used in conjunction with vehicle surveillance since it is likely that
the target will use a combination of foot and vehicle transportation. Vehicles used for
surveillance are inconspicuous in appearance and of a subdued color. Frequently, the
inside dome light is made inoperative so that it will not illuminate the interior of the car
when the door is opened. Vehicles will have two or more people in them so that if the
target parks his or her vehicle and walks away, the surveillance can be resumed on foot
while the driver remains with the vehicle. While moving, the driver gives full attention to
driving while the observer operates the radio, watches the target, and makes notes on the
target's activities. Sometimes it will be necessary for surveillants to break traffic
regulations to avoid losing you. If you see a vehicle run a red light, make an illegal
U?turn, travel over the speed limit, or make dangerous or sudden lane changes in an
apparent effort to keep up with you, you should, of course, be suspicious of that vehicle.
The distance between a surveillance vehicle and the target will vary depending on the
speed at which the vehicles are traveling and the amount of traffic. Surveillants will try to
keep one or two vehicles between themselves and the target. As with foot surveillance,
vehicle surveillance may be undertaken using only one vehicle or using two or more
vehicles. One-vehicle surveillance suffers from the same drawbacks as one-person foot
surveillance. The target has to be kept in view at all times and followed by the same
vehicle. Surveillants can try to overcome this advantage somewhat by changing seating
arrangements within the vehicle; putting on and taking off hats, coats, and sunglasses;
changing license plates; and turning off onto side streets and then turning back to resume
the tail. This makes it necessary for a person suspecting surveillance to remember aspects
of a following vehicle that cannot easily be changed such as the make, model, and color
of the car and any body damage such as rust, dents, etc. The use of two or more vehicles
permits surveillance to switch positions or to drop out of the surveillance when necessary.
One vehicle follows the target vehicle and directs other vehicles by radio. The other
vehicle may follow behind the lead surveillance vehicle, precede the target vehicle, or
travel on parallel roads. At intersections, the vehicle following directly behind the target
vehicle will generally travel straight ahead while alerting all other vehicles of the
direction in which the target vehicle has turned. Another vehicle in the formation will
45
then take a position behind the target and become the lead vehicle, taking over the
responsibility for giving instructions to other surveillants. The
former lead vehicle then makes a U?turn or travels around the block to take up a new
position ready to resume the lead vehicle position again when necessary. People who
have well established routines permit surveillants to use methods that are much more
difficult to detect. If, for example, you leave the office at the same time each day and
travel by the most direct route to your home or if you live in a remote area with a few or
no alternate routes to your home, surveillants have no need to follow you all the way to
your residence. An alternative method of surveillance in such situations is leading
surveillance and progressive surveillance. In leading surveillance the surveillant travels in
front of the target while the observer watches for turns. When the target turns, this is
noted. The next day the surveillant makes a turn where the target did the previous day.
Over a period of time the surveillants will discover the entire route to the residence while
still driving in a position that creates much less suspicion. There are two forms of
progressive surveillance. In the first form, surveillants are placed at intersections along
the probable routes of the target. When the target makes a turn, this is noted and the
position of the surveillants is adjusted to check the next intersection. Eventually, this
method leads the surveillants to the residence. In the second form or progressive
surveillance, a vehicle will follow the target for a short distance and then turn off. On
successive days the surveillant picks up the target where he or she left off the previous
day. Leading and progressive surveillance are extremely difficult to detect, but you
should not give anyone the opportunity to use these methods. The most effective methods
for detecting most forms of vehicle surveillance are: 1. making a U-turn where it is safe
to do so, 2. making a turn to the right or left (in general, right turns create greater
complications for surveillants because of oncoming traffic that may delay a turn), 3.
going through a traffic light just as it is turning red, stopping just beyond a curve or hill,
and circling a block. In each case, watch for the reactions of any vehicles that you may
suspect. Any vehicles that make unusual maneuvers should be carefully noted. Do not
forget to check for motorcycles or motorbikes, since in many parts of the world they
seem to be favored by surveillants because they move easily through heavy traffic.
Stationary surveillance is commonly used by terrorist organizations. As mentioned
earlier, most attacks take place near the residence or office because that part of the route
is least easily varied. Most people are more vulnerable in the morning when departing for
work, because morning departure times are more predictable than are evening arrivals.
Surveillants seek a position that permits them to observe the residence or office clearly
without being observed or suspected. Surveillants want to identify observation points that
afford the best view of the target. Foot and vehicular traffic, buildings and terrain around
each government facility vary with each location. Pedestrian traffic, rush hour traffic
flow, temporary street closure, etc. will affect observation points. If the surveillants
decide that it is best not to be seen, they may obtain an apartment or rent office space in
the area that provides for an adequate view, but such apartments or office space may not
be available and the renting of an apartment or office space could provide clues for a
subsequent investigation. The use of an apartment or office space for surveillance, while
possibly the most difficult to detect, is generally not the easiest or safest method. Many
surveillance teams use vans with windows in the side or back that permit observation
from the interior of the van. Often the van will have the name of a store or utility
46
company to provide some pretext for its being in the area. The driver may park the van
and walk away, leaving the surveillance team inside. Some teams use automobiles for
stationary surveillance, parking the vehicle far enough from the residence or office to be
less noticeable, using other vehicles for cover, facing the vehicle away from the target,
and using the rear view mirrors to watch. Where it is not possible to watch the residence
or office unobserved, surveillants must come up with a plausible reason for being in the
area. The types of ruses used are limited only by the surveillant's imagination. Some of
the more commonly used covers are automotive repairs due to engine trouble or a flat
tire, door to door sales, utility repair crews, lovers in a park, walking a dog, construction
work, or sitting at a cafe. Women and children are often used to give a greater appearance
of innocence. Some things to check for are parked vehicles with people in them, cars with
more mirrors or mirrors that are larger than normal, people seen in the area more
frequently than seems normal, people who are dressed inappropriately, and workers who
seem to accomplish nothing. If you become suspicious of a van, note any information
printed on the side of the van, including telephone numbers. Check the telephone book to
see if such a business exists. Note the license numbers of any suspicious vehicles and
provide them to your security office so they can be checked. Make a habit of checking
the neighborhood through a window before you go out each day. Detecting surveillance
requires a constant state of alertness and must become an unconscious habit. We do not
want to encourage paranoia, but a good sense of what is normal and what is unusual in
your surroundings could be more important than any other type of security precaution
you take. Above all, do not hesitate to report any unusual events to the police. Many
people who have been kidnapped realized afterwards that their suspicions had been well
founded. If those suspicions had been reported, their ordeal might have been avoided.
Since surveillance attempts to determine the suitability of a potential target and the most
opportune time for an attack, it is crucial to avoid predictability. Although the
recommendation to vary routes and times of arrivals and departures has become trite,
implementing it in one's daily schedule has proven to be effective in deterring sufficient
terrorist planning. Varying times and routes apply to jogging, shopping and all activities
where a pattern can develop.