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Search Results (564)

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16 pages, 754 KiB  
Article
Data-Sharing System with Attribute-Based Encryption in Blockchain and Privacy Computing
by Hao Wu, Yu Liu, Konglin Zhu and Lin Zhang
Symmetry 2024, 16(11), 1550; https://doi.org/10.3390/sym16111550 - 19 Nov 2024
Viewed by 287
Abstract
With the development of the data-sharing system in recent years, financial management systems and their privacy have sparked great interest. Existing financial data-sharing systems store metadata, which include a hash value and database index on the blockchain, and store high-capacity actual data in [...] Read more.
With the development of the data-sharing system in recent years, financial management systems and their privacy have sparked great interest. Existing financial data-sharing systems store metadata, which include a hash value and database index on the blockchain, and store high-capacity actual data in the center database. However, current data-sharing systems largely depend on centralized systems, which are susceptible to distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and present a centralized attack vector. Furthermore, storing data in a local center database has a high risk of information disclosure and tampering. In this paper, we propose the ChainMaker Privacy Computing (CPC) system, a new decentralized data-sharing system for secure financial data, to solve this problem. It provides a series of financial data information and a data structure rather than actual data on the blockchain to protect the privacy of data. We utilize a smart contract to establish a trusted platform for the local database to obtain encrypted data. We design a resource catalog to provide a trusted environment of data usage in the privacy computing system that is visible for members on the blockchain. Based on cipher-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE), We design a CPC-CP-ABE algorithm to enable fine-grained access control through attribute based encryption. Finally, We propose an efficient scheme that allows authenticated data-sharing systems to perform Boolean searches on encrypted data information. The results of experiment show that the CPC system can finish trusted data sharing to all organizations on the blockchain. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Computer)
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<p>CPC system framework.</p>
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<p>The process flow of data-sharing system.</p>
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<p>Evaluation for CPC performance.</p>
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<p>Comparison of attribute key generation time between the CPC on a smart contract and CP-ABE on bare metal.</p>
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<p>Comparison of the computation time. (<b>a</b>) Encryption; (<b>b</b>) decryption.</p>
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15 pages, 941 KiB  
Article
Embedding Tree-Based Intrusion Detection System in Smart Thermostats for Enhanced IoT Security
by Abbas Javed, Muhammad Naeem Awais, Ayyaz-ul-Haq Qureshi, Muhammad Jawad, Jehangir Arshad and Hadi Larijani
Sensors 2024, 24(22), 7320; https://doi.org/10.3390/s24227320 - 16 Nov 2024
Viewed by 329
Abstract
IoT devices with limited resources, and in the absence of gateways, become vulnerable to various attacks, such as denial of service (DoS) and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are designed to detect and respond to these threats in IoT environments. While [...] Read more.
IoT devices with limited resources, and in the absence of gateways, become vulnerable to various attacks, such as denial of service (DoS) and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are designed to detect and respond to these threats in IoT environments. While machine learning-based IDS have typically been deployed at the edge (gateways) or in the cloud, in the absence of gateways, the IDS must be embedded within the sensor nodes themselves. Available datasets mainly contain features extracted from network traffic at the edge (e.g., Raspberry Pi/computer) or cloud servers. We developed a unique dataset, named as Intrusion Detection in the Smart Homes (IDSH) dataset, which is based on features retrievable from microcontroller-based IoT devices. In this work, a Tree-based IDS is embedded into a smart thermostat for real-time intrusion detection. The results demonstrated that the IDS achieved an accuracy of 98.71% for binary classification with an inference time of 276 microseconds, and an accuracy of 97.51% for multi-classification with an inference time of 273 microseconds. Real-time testing showed that the smart thermostat is capable of detecting DoS and MITM attacks without relying on a gateway or cloud. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Sensor Data Privacy and Intrusion Detection for IoT Networks)
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<p>Proposed architecture of embedded IDS for smart thermostats.</p>
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<p>Dataset collection on smart thermostats.</p>
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<p>Comparison of IDS implemented with quantization and without quantization.</p>
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<p>Comparison of IDS implemented with CatBoost and XGBoost on the smart thermostat.</p>
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25 pages, 4366 KiB  
Article
Hybrid AI-Powered Real-Time Distributed Denial of Service Detection and Traffic Monitoring for Software-Defined-Based Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: A New Paradigm for Securing Intelligent Transportation Networks
by Onur Polat, Saadin Oyucu, Muammer Türkoğlu, Hüseyin Polat, Ahmet Aksoz and Fahri Yardımcı
Appl. Sci. 2024, 14(22), 10501; https://doi.org/10.3390/app142210501 - 14 Nov 2024
Viewed by 454
Abstract
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are wireless networks that improve traffic efficiency, safety, and comfort for smart vehicle users. However, with the rise of smart and electric vehicles, traditional VANETs struggle with issues like scalability, management, energy efficiency, and dynamic pricing. Software Defined [...] Read more.
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are wireless networks that improve traffic efficiency, safety, and comfort for smart vehicle users. However, with the rise of smart and electric vehicles, traditional VANETs struggle with issues like scalability, management, energy efficiency, and dynamic pricing. Software Defined Networking (SDN) can help address these challenges by centralizing network control. The integration of SDN with VANETs, forming Software Defined-based VANETs (SD-VANETs), shows promise for intelligent transportation, particularly with autonomous vehicles. Nevertheless, SD-VANETs are susceptible to cyberattacks, especially Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, making cybersecurity a crucial consideration for their future development. This study proposes a security system that incorporates a hybrid artificial intelligence model to detect DDoS attacks targeting the SDN controller in SD-VANET architecture. The proposed system is designed to operate as a module within the SDN controller, enabling the detection of DDoS attacks. The proposed attack detection methodology involves the collection of network traffic data, data processing, and the classification of these data. This methodology is based on a hybrid artificial intelligence model that combines a one-dimensional Convolutional Neural Network (1D-CNN) and Decision Tree models. According to experimental results, the proposed attack detection system identified that approximately 90% of the traffic in the SD-VANET network under DDoS attack consisted of malicious DDoS traffic flows. These results demonstrate that the proposed security system provides a promising solution for detecting DDoS attacks targeting the SD-VANET architecture. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Emerging Technologies in Network Security and Cryptography)
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<p>General architecture of vehicular networks.</p>
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<p>Software Defined Network Architecture.</p>
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<p>Software Defined Vehicular Ad Hoc Network Architecture.</p>
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<p>SD-VANET_Guard intrusion detection system integration.</p>
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<p>The overall architecture of the 1DCNN-DT hybrid artificial intelligence model.</p>
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<p>The convolution process.</p>
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<p>The number of packets received and transmitted through the controller’s interface in the experimental SD-VANET topology.</p>
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<p>CPU utilization of the controller in the experimental SD-VANET topology.</p>
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<p>Percentage of DDoS traffic in the existing network flow within the experimental SD-VANET topology.</p>
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19 pages, 654 KiB  
Article
A Methodological Approach to Securing Cyber-Physical Systems for Critical Infrastructures
by Antonello Calabrò, Enrico Cambiaso, Manuel Cheminod, Ivan Cibrario Bertolotti, Luca Durante, Agostino Forestiero, Flavio Lombardi, Giuseppe Manco, Eda Marchetti, Albina Orlando and Giuseppe Papuzzo
Future Internet 2024, 16(11), 418; https://doi.org/10.3390/fi16110418 - 12 Nov 2024
Viewed by 399
Abstract
Modern ICT infrastructures, i.e., cyber-physical systems and critical infrastructures relying on interconnected IT (Information Technology)- and OT (Operational Technology)-based components and (sub-)systems, raise complex challenges in tackling security and safety issues. Nowadays, many security controls and mechanisms have been made available and exploitable [...] Read more.
Modern ICT infrastructures, i.e., cyber-physical systems and critical infrastructures relying on interconnected IT (Information Technology)- and OT (Operational Technology)-based components and (sub-)systems, raise complex challenges in tackling security and safety issues. Nowadays, many security controls and mechanisms have been made available and exploitable to solve specific security needs, but, when dealing with very complex and multifaceted heterogeneous systems, a methodology is needed on top of the selection of each security control that will allow the designer/maintainer to drive her/his choices to build and keep the system secure as a whole, leaving the choice of the security controls to the last step of the system design/development. This paper aims at providing a comprehensive methodological approach to design and preliminarily implement an Open Platform Architecture (OPA) to secure the cyber-physical systems of critical infrastructures. Here, the Open Platform Architecture (OPA) depicts how an already existing or under-design target system (TS) can be equipped with technologies that are modern or currently under development, to monitor and timely detect possibly dangerous situations and to react in an automatic way by putting in place suitable countermeasures. A multifaceted use case (UC) that is able to show the OPA, starting from the security and safety requirements to the fully designed system, will be developed step by step to show the feasibility and the effectiveness of the proposed methodology. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue State-of-the-Art Future Internet Technology in Italy 2024–2025)
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<p>Concise Open Platform Architecture (OPA) (updated with the addition of admin).</p>
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<p>Packet processing diagram (PPD).</p>
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<p>MCP abstract architectural view.</p>
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<p>ROS testbed for slow DoS attack evaluation (updated with the addition of admin).</p>
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<p>Automatic reconfiguration of network devices (updated with the addition of admin).</p>
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29 pages, 671 KiB  
Article
A Detailed Inspection of Machine Learning Based Intrusion Detection Systems for Software Defined Networks
by Saif AlDeen AlSharman, Osama Al-Khaleel and Mahmoud Al-Ayyoub
IoT 2024, 5(4), 756-784; https://doi.org/10.3390/iot5040034 - 11 Nov 2024
Viewed by 456
Abstract
The growing use of the Internet of Things (IoT) across a vast number of sectors in our daily life noticeably exposes IoT internet-connected devices, which generate, share, and store sensitive data, to a wide range of cyber threats. Software Defined Networks (SDNs) can [...] Read more.
The growing use of the Internet of Things (IoT) across a vast number of sectors in our daily life noticeably exposes IoT internet-connected devices, which generate, share, and store sensitive data, to a wide range of cyber threats. Software Defined Networks (SDNs) can play a significant role in enhancing the security of IoT networks against any potential attacks. The goal of the SDN approach to network administration is to enhance network performance and monitoring. This is achieved by allowing more dynamic and programmatically efficient network configuration; hence, simplifying networks through centralized management and control. There are many difficulties for manufacturers to manage the risks associated with evolving technology as the technology itself introduces a variety of vulnerabilities and dangers. Therefore, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are an essential component for keeping tabs on suspicious behaviors. While IDSs can be implemented with more simplicity due to the centralized view of an SDN, the effectiveness of modern detection methods, which are mainly based on machine learning (ML) or deep learning (DL), is dependent on the quality of the data used in their modeling. Anomaly-based detection systems employed in SDNs have a hard time getting started due to the lack of publicly available data, especially on the data layer. The large majority of existing literature relies on data from conventional networks. This study aims to generate multiple types of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks over the data plane (Southbound) portion of an SDN implementation. The cutting-edge virtualization technology is used to simulate a real-world environment of Docker Orchestration as a distributed system. The collected dataset contains examples of both benign and suspicious forms of attacks on the data plane of an SDN infrastructure. We also conduct an experimental evaluation of our collected dataset with well-known machine learning-based techniques and statistical measures to prove their usefulness. Both resources we build in this work (the dataset we create and the baseline models we train on it) can be useful for researchers and practitioners working on improving the security of IoT networks by using SDN technologies. Full article
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<p>Abstract view of the proposed topology.</p>
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<p>Abstract view of the proposed testbed network.</p>
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<p>Detailed view of the proposed testbed network.</p>
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<p>Abstraction view of the proposed DDoS topology.</p>
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<p>Abstraction view of the Docker with Docker daemons in process of attack.</p>
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<p>Abstraction view of the proposed DoS topology.</p>
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<p>The features that are selected using the MRMR algorithm with the DDoS Dataset.</p>
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<p>Ordered features of <a href="#IoT-05-00034-f007" class="html-fig">Figure 7</a>.</p>
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<p>The features that are selected using the RF algorithm with the DDoS Dataset.</p>
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<p>The features that are selected using the RF algorithm with the DoS dataset.</p>
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<p>Prediction accuracy with the collected DDoS data versus the count of the features.</p>
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<p>Training time with the collected DDoS data versus the count of the features.</p>
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<p>Prediction accuracy with the collected DoS data versus the count of the features.</p>
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<p>Training time with the collected DoS data versus the count of the features.</p>
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15 pages, 996 KiB  
Data Descriptor
The VNF Cybersecurity Dataset for Research (VNFCYBERDATA)
by Believe Ayodele and Victor Buttigieg
Data 2024, 9(11), 132; https://doi.org/10.3390/data9110132 - 8 Nov 2024
Viewed by 484
Abstract
Virtualisation has received widespread adoption and deployment across a wide range of enterprises and industries throughout the years. Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) is a technical concept that presents a method for dynamically delivering virtualised network functions as virtualised or software components. Virtualised Network [...] Read more.
Virtualisation has received widespread adoption and deployment across a wide range of enterprises and industries throughout the years. Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) is a technical concept that presents a method for dynamically delivering virtualised network functions as virtualised or software components. Virtualised Network Function (VNF) has distinct advantages, but it also faces serious security challenges. Cyberattacks such as Denial of Service (DoS), malware/rootkit injection, port scanning, and so on can target VNF appliances just like any other network infrastructure. To create exceptional training exercises for machine or deep learning (ML/DL) models to combat cyberattacks in VNF, a suitable dataset (VNFCYBERDATA) exhibiting an actual reflection, or one that is reasonably close to an actual reflection, of the problem that the ML/DL model could address is required. This article describes a real VNF dataset that contains over seven million data points and twenty-five cyberattacks generated from five VNF appliances. To facilitate a realistic examination of VNF traffic, the dataset includes both benign and malicious traffic. Full article
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<p>Folder structure of the dataset.</p>
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<p>The environment for capturing VNFCYBERDATA dataset.</p>
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<p>Image showing an example of how the vSwitch are connected to a VNF appliance.</p>
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17 pages, 3387 KiB  
Article
FedDB: A Federated Learning Approach Using DBSCAN for DDoS Attack Detection
by Yi-Chen Lee, Wei-Che Chien and Yao-Chung Chang
Appl. Sci. 2024, 14(22), 10236; https://doi.org/10.3390/app142210236 - 7 Nov 2024
Viewed by 519
Abstract
The rise of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on the internet has necessitated the development of robust and efficient detection mechanisms. DDoS attacks continue to present a significant threat, making it imperative to find efficient ways to detect and prevent these attacks [...] Read more.
The rise of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on the internet has necessitated the development of robust and efficient detection mechanisms. DDoS attacks continue to present a significant threat, making it imperative to find efficient ways to detect and prevent these attacks promptly. Traditional machine learning approaches raise privacy concerns when handling sensitive data. In response, federated learning has emerged as a promising paradigm, allowing model training across decentralized devices without centralizing data. However, challenges such as the non-IID (Non-Independent and Identically Distributed) problem persist due to data distribution imbalances among devices. In this research, we propose personalized federated learning (PFL) as a solution for detecting DDoS attacks. PFL preserves data privacy by keeping sensitive information localized on individual devices during model training, thus addressing privacy concerns that are inherent in traditional approaches. In this paper, we propose federated learning with DBSCAN clustering (FedDB). By combining personalized training with model aggregation, our approach effectively mitigates the common challenge of non-IID data in federated learning setups. The integration of DBSCAN clustering further enhances our method by effectively handling data distribution imbalances and improving the overall detection accuracy. Results indicate that our proposed model improves performance, achieving relatively consistent accuracy across all clients, demonstrating that our method effectively overcomes the non-IID problem. Evaluation of our approach utilizes the CICDDOS2019 dataset. Through comprehensive experimentation, we demonstrate the efficacy of personalized federated learning in enhancing detection accuracy while safeguarding data privacy and mitigating non-IID concerns. Full article
(This article belongs to the Topic Innovation, Communication and Engineering)
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<p>FedDB architecture.</p>
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<p>Taxonomy of DDoS attacks in the CICDDOS2019 dataset [<a href="#B24-applsci-14-10236" class="html-bibr">24</a>].</p>
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<p>The distribution with alpha = 0.9.</p>
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<p>The distribution with alpha = 0.2.</p>
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<p>Accuracy results of federated learning models trained for 70 epochs with alpha set to 0.9.</p>
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<p>Loss results of federated learning models trained for 70 epochs with alpha set to 0.9.</p>
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<p>Accuracy results of federated learning models trained for 70 epochs with alpha set to 0.2.</p>
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<p>Loss results of federated learning models trained for 70 epochs with alpha set to 0.2.</p>
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27 pages, 2374 KiB  
Review
Cybersecurity at Sea: A Literature Review of Cyber-Attack Impacts and Defenses in Maritime Supply Chains
by Maria Valentina Clavijo Mesa, Carmen Elena Patino-Rodriguez and Fernando Jesus Guevara Carazas
Information 2024, 15(11), 710; https://doi.org/10.3390/info15110710 - 6 Nov 2024
Viewed by 930
Abstract
The maritime industry is constantly evolving and posing new challenges, especially with increasing digitalization, which has raised concerns about cyber-attacks on maritime supply chain agents. Although scholars have proposed various methods and classification models to counter these cyber threats, a comprehensive cyber-attack taxonomy [...] Read more.
The maritime industry is constantly evolving and posing new challenges, especially with increasing digitalization, which has raised concerns about cyber-attacks on maritime supply chain agents. Although scholars have proposed various methods and classification models to counter these cyber threats, a comprehensive cyber-attack taxonomy for maritime supply chain actors based on a systematic literature review is still lacking. This review aims to provide a clear picture of common cyber-attacks and develop a taxonomy for their categorization. In addition, it outlines best practices derived from academic research in maritime cybersecurity using PRISMA principles for a systematic literature review, which identified 110 relevant journal papers. This study highlights that distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and malware are top concerns for all maritime supply chain stakeholders. In particular, shipping companies are urged to prioritize defenses against hijacking, spoofing, and jamming. The report identifies 18 practices to combat cyber-attacks, categorized into information security management solutions, information security policies, and cybersecurity awareness and training. Finally, this paper explores how emerging technologies can address cyber-attacks in the maritime supply chain network (MSCN). While Industry 4.0 technologies are highlighted as significant trends in the literature, this study aims to equip MSCN stakeholders with the knowledge to effectively leverage a broader range of emerging technologies. In doing so, it provides forward-looking solutions to prevent and mitigate cyber-attacks, emphasizing that Industry 4.0 is part of a larger landscape of technological innovation. Full article
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<p>MSCN links, adapted from [<a href="#B2-information-15-00710" class="html-bibr">2</a>].</p>
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<p>SLR Methodology.</p>
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<p>Bibliometric Overview: Geographical Distribution, Recurring Research Topics, and Publication Trends.</p>
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<p>Proportion of papers according to the MSCN actor.</p>
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<p>Historical evidence of cyber-attacks reported by year.</p>
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<p>Countries where the reported cyber-attacks occurred.</p>
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<p>Cyber-attack Taxonomy for the MSCN.</p>
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<p>Industry 4.0 technologies identified in the literature review.</p>
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26 pages, 8632 KiB  
Article
An Innovative Honeypot Architecture for Detecting and Mitigating Hardware Trojans in IoT Devices
by Amira Hossam Eldin Omar, Hassan Soubra, Donatien Koulla Moulla and Alain Abran
IoT 2024, 5(4), 730-755; https://doi.org/10.3390/iot5040033 - 31 Oct 2024
Viewed by 584
Abstract
The exponential growth and widespread adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) devices have introduced many vulnerabilities. Attackers frequently exploit these flaws, necessitating advanced technological approaches to protect against emerging cyber threats. This paper introduces a novel approach utilizing hardware honeypots as an additional [...] Read more.
The exponential growth and widespread adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) devices have introduced many vulnerabilities. Attackers frequently exploit these flaws, necessitating advanced technological approaches to protect against emerging cyber threats. This paper introduces a novel approach utilizing hardware honeypots as an additional defensive layer against hardware vulnerabilities, particularly hardware Trojans (HTs). HTs pose significant risks to the security of modern integrated circuits (ICs), potentially causing operational failures, denial of service, or data leakage through intentional modifications. The proposed system was implemented on a Raspberry Pi and tested on an emulated HT circuit using a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). This approach leverages hardware honeypots to detect and mitigate HTs in the IoT devices. The results demonstrate that the system effectively detects and mitigates HTs without imposing additional complexity on the IoT devices. The Trojan-agnostic solution offers full customization to meet specific security needs, providing a flexible and robust layer of security. These findings provide valuable insights into enhancing the security of IoT devices against hardware-based cyber threats, thereby contributing to the overall resilience of IoT networks. This innovative approach offers a promising solution to address the growing security challenges in IoT environments. Full article
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<p>The Honeypot System architecture.</p>
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<p>SmartLock Fake Webpage.</p>
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<p>Output of the terminal.</p>
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<p>Honeypot logs Excel sheet.</p>
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<p>Python logger file.</p>
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<p>.pcap file additional logs.</p>
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<p>Attack logs.</p>
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<p>Counter-based Trojan circuit architecture [<a href="#B26-IoT-05-00033" class="html-bibr">26</a>].</p>
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<p>Circuit (a) without the hardware Trojan.</p>
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<p>Circuit (b) with the hardware Trojan.</p>
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<p>Proposed System Architecture with a counter HT.</p>
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<p>Hardware Trojan Simulation in ModelSim.</p>
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<p>System hardware components schematic.</p>
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<p>Flowchart of Our Honeypot System’s Processes.</p>
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<p>Generated password with trigger off.</p>
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<p>Generated password with trigger on.</p>
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<p>Generated password with trigger off.</p>
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<p>Generated password with trigger on.</p>
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<p>Authorized attacks.</p>
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<p>Unauthorized Attack.</p>
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<p>Logs Gathering.</p>
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<p>Triggering The HT.</p>
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<p>Triggered Trojan with correct credentials.</p>
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<p>Unauthorized triggered.</p>
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<p>Attempt in triggering the Trojan—logger view.</p>
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<p>Fetching the Correct Interface.</p>
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<p>TCPdump Capturing Incoming Packets.</p>
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20 pages, 430 KiB  
Article
Consensus-Based Power System State Estimation Algorithm Under Collaborative Attack
by Zhijian Cheng, Guanjun Chen, Xiao-Meng Li and Hongru Ren
Sensors 2024, 24(21), 6886; https://doi.org/10.3390/s24216886 - 27 Oct 2024
Viewed by 689
Abstract
Due to its vulnerability to a variety of cyber attacks, research on cyber security for power systems has become especially crucial. In order to maintain the safe and stable operation of power systems, it is worthwhile to gain insight into the complex characteristics [...] Read more.
Due to its vulnerability to a variety of cyber attacks, research on cyber security for power systems has become especially crucial. In order to maintain the safe and stable operation of power systems, it is worthwhile to gain insight into the complex characteristics and behaviors of cyber attacks from the attacker’s perspective. The consensus-based distributed state estimation problem is investigated for power systems subject to collaborative attacks. In order to describe such attack behaviors, the denial of service (DoS) attack model for hybrid remote terminal unit (RTU) and phasor measurement unit (PMU) measurements, and the false data injection (FDI) attack model for neighboring estimation information, are constructed. By integrating these two types of attack models, a different consensus-based distributed estimator is designed to accurately estimate the state of the power system under collaborative attacks. Then, through Lyapunov stability analysis theory, a sufficient condition is provided to ensure that the proposed distributed estimator is stable, and a suitable consensus gain matrix is devised. Finally, to confirm the viability and efficacy of the suggested algorithm, a simulation experiment on an IEEE benchmark 14-bus power system is carried out. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Sensor Networks)
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<p>IEEE 14-bus system partitioned in 4 areas.</p>
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<p>The communication topology of the interconnected subsystems.</p>
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<p>The estimated values from the presented algorithm under collaborative attacks for the real parts of states at bus 1.</p>
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<p>The estimated values from the presented algorithm under collaborative attacks for the imaginary parts of states at bus 1.</p>
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<p>MSEs of the estimated real and imaginary parts of states at bus 1 under collaborative attacks.</p>
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<p>MSEs of the estimated real parts of states at bus 1 under different attack cases.</p>
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<p>MSEs of the estimated imaginary parts of states at bus 1 under different attack cases.</p>
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<p>MSEs of the estimated real parts of states at bus 1 under different DoS attack probabilities.</p>
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<p>MSEs of the estimated imaginary parts of states at bus 1 different DoS attack probabilities.</p>
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<p>MSEs of the estimated real parts of states at bus 1 under DCEA and DEA.</p>
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<p>MSEs of the estimated imaginary parts of states at bus 1 under DCEA and DEA.</p>
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16 pages, 3377 KiB  
Article
Data-Driven Prescribed Performance Platooning Control Under Aperiodic Denial-of- Service Attacks
by Peng Zhang, Zhenling Wang and Weiwei Che
Mathematics 2024, 12(21), 3313; https://doi.org/10.3390/math12213313 - 22 Oct 2024
Viewed by 501
Abstract
This article studies a data-driven prescribed performance platooning control method for nonlinear connected automated vehicle systems (CAVs) under aperiodic denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Firstly, the dynamic linearization technique is employed to transform the nonlinear CAV system into an equivalent linearized data model. Secondly, to [...] Read more.
This article studies a data-driven prescribed performance platooning control method for nonlinear connected automated vehicle systems (CAVs) under aperiodic denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Firstly, the dynamic linearization technique is employed to transform the nonlinear CAV system into an equivalent linearized data model. Secondly, to improve the system’s transient performance, a prescribed performance transformation (PPT) scheme is proposed to transform the constrained output into the unconstrained one. In addition, an attack compensation mechanism is designed to reduce the adverse impact. Combining the PPT scheme and the attack compensation mechanism, the data-driven adaptive platooning control scheme is proposed to achieve the vehicular tracking control task. Lastly, the merits of the developed control method are illustrated by an actual simulation. Full article
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<p>The general block diagram.</p>
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<p>System block diagram of the data-driven platooning control scheme.</p>
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<p>Illustration of aperiodic DoS attack.</p>
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<p>The connected automated vehicle systems.</p>
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<p>The trajectories of the estimated PPD parameter <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mover accent="true"> <mi>φ</mi> <mo>^</mo> </mover> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>k</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math> (<b>a</b>) and controller input <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>u</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <mi>k</mi> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math> (<b>b</b>) for the nonlinear connected automated vehicle system.</p>
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<p>The trajectories of the position and position error with our method.</p>
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<p>The trajectories of the position and position error with the method in [<a href="#B23-mathematics-12-03313" class="html-bibr">23</a>].</p>
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18 pages, 4998 KiB  
Article
Predicting the Impact of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks in Long-Term Evolution for Machine (LTE-M) Networks Using a Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) Model
by Mohammed Hammood Mutar, Ahmad Hani El Fawal, Abbass Nasser and Ali Mansour
Electronics 2024, 13(21), 4145; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13214145 - 22 Oct 2024
Viewed by 832
Abstract
The way we connect with the physical world has completely changed because of the advancement of the Internet of Things (IoT). However, there are several difficulties associated with this change. A significant advancement has been the emergence of intelligent machines that are able [...] Read more.
The way we connect with the physical world has completely changed because of the advancement of the Internet of Things (IoT). However, there are several difficulties associated with this change. A significant advancement has been the emergence of intelligent machines that are able to gather data for analysis and decision-making. In terms of IoT security, we are seeing a sharp increase in hacker activities worldwide. Botnets are more common now in many countries, and such attacks are very difficult to counter. In this context, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks pose a significant threat to the availability and integrity of online services. In this paper, we developed a predictive model called Markov Detection and Prediction (MDP) using a Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) to identify and preemptively mitigate DDoS attacks. The MDP model helps in studying, analyzing, and predicting DDoS attacks in Long-Term Evolution for Machine (LTE-M) networks and IoT environments. The results show that using our MDP model, the system is able to differentiate between Authentic, Suspicious, and Malicious traffic. Additionally, we are able to predict the system behavior when facing different DDoS attacks. Full article
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Figure 1
<p>Limited bandwidth of LTE-M carrier in LTE-A carrier with a Resource Element (RE) and Resource Block (RB).</p>
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<p>Authentic, Suspicious, and Malicious requests.</p>
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<p>MDP flow chart upon the arrival of Authentic, Suspicious, or Malicious requests. Where “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of the Authentic phase, “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of the Suspicious phase, and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>D</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing Malicious Delete Requests.</p>
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<p>Representation of the MDP model as a set of generic states, where “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” represents the number of ongoing services for Read Request (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of the Authentic phase, “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of suspicious phase, and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>D</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing Malicious Delete Requests.</p>
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<p>Representation of the MDP model as a set of states (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <mn>3</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math>), where “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” is the state with certain <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math> requests, “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” represents the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of the Authentic phase, “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>C</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </msub> <mo>=</mo> <mn>3</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the threshold of the suspicious phase, and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>D</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing Malicious Delete Requests.</p>
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<p>Transitioning from S(0,0) in the “Initial phase” to different states in the “Authentic phase”; “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, where “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>) and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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<p>Transitioning from the “Authentic phase” to the “Initial phase” or the “Suspicious phase”; “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, where “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>) and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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<p>Transitioning from the “Malicious phase” to the “Suspicious phase”; “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, where “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>i</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>) and “<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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<p>The probability values for each state S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) in the normal cycle, where “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, <span class="html-italic">π</span>(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) is the steady-state probability, “<span class="html-italic">i</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), and “<span class="html-italic">j</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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<p>The probability values for each state S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) in the Suspicious scenario, where “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, <span class="html-italic">π</span>(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) is the steady-state probability, “<span class="html-italic">i</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), and “<span class="html-italic">j</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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<p>The probability values for each state S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) in the attack scenario, where “S(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>)” represents different states, <span class="html-italic">π</span>(<span class="html-italic">i</span>,<span class="html-italic">j</span>) is the steady-state probability, “<span class="html-italic">i</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Read Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>), and “<span class="html-italic">j</span>” is the number of ongoing services for Modify Requests (<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mrow> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>R</mi> </mrow> </msub> </mrow> </semantics></math>).</p>
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20 pages, 1607 KiB  
Article
Securing the Edge: CatBoost Classifier Optimized by the Lyrebird Algorithm to Detect Denial of Service Attacks in Internet of Things-Based Wireless Sensor Networks
by Sennanur Srinivasan Abinayaa, Prakash Arumugam, Divya Bhavani Mohan, Anand Rajendran, Abderezak Lashab, Baoze Wei and Josep M. Guerrero
Future Internet 2024, 16(10), 381; https://doi.org/10.3390/fi16100381 - 19 Oct 2024
Viewed by 714
Abstract
The security of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is of the utmost importance because of their widespread use in various applications. Protecting WSNs from harmful activity is a vital function of intrusion detection systems (IDSs). An innovative approach to WSN intrusion detection (ID) utilizing [...] Read more.
The security of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is of the utmost importance because of their widespread use in various applications. Protecting WSNs from harmful activity is a vital function of intrusion detection systems (IDSs). An innovative approach to WSN intrusion detection (ID) utilizing the CatBoost classifier (Cb-C) and the Lyrebird Optimization Algorithm is presented in this work (LOA). As is typical in ID settings, Cb-C excels at handling datasets that are imbalanced. The lyrebird’s remarkable capacity to imitate the sounds of its surroundings served as inspiration for the LOA, a metaheuristic optimization algorithm. The WSN-DS dataset, acquired from Prince Sultan University in Saudi Arabia, is used to assess the suggested method. Among the models presented, LOA-Cb-C produces the highest accuracy of 99.66%; nevertheless, when compared with the other methods discussed in this article, its error value of 0.34% is the lowest. Experimental results reveal that the suggested strategy improves WSN-IoT security over the existing methods in terms of detection accuracy and the false alarm rate. Full article
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<p>IoT-based Wireless Sensor Network—the basic structure [<a href="#B1-futureinternet-16-00381" class="html-bibr">1</a>].</p>
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<p>Flowchart of the LOA.</p>
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<p>Flowchart of the CatBoost classifier.</p>
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<p>Flow diagram of the proposed LOA-Cb-C.</p>
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21 pages, 3001 KiB  
Article
Security Analysis of Smart Contract Migration from Ethereum to Arbitrum
by Xueyan Tang and Lingzhi Shi
Blockchains 2024, 2(4), 424-444; https://doi.org/10.3390/blockchains2040018 - 15 Oct 2024
Viewed by 644
Abstract
When migrating smart contracts from one blockchain platform to another, there are potential security risks. This is because different blockchain platforms have different environments and characteristics for executing smart contracts. The focus of this paper is to study the security risks associated with [...] Read more.
When migrating smart contracts from one blockchain platform to another, there are potential security risks. This is because different blockchain platforms have different environments and characteristics for executing smart contracts. The focus of this paper is to study the security risks associated with the migration of smart contracts from Ethereum to Arbitrum. We collected relevant data and analyzed smart contract migration cases to explore the differences between Ethereum and Arbitrum in areas such as Arbitrum cross-chain messaging, block properties, contract address alias, and gas fees. From the 36 types of smart contract migration cases we identified, we selected four typical types of cases and summarized their security risks. The research shows that smart contracts deployed on Ethereum may face certain potential security risks during migration to Arbitrum, mainly due to issues inherent in public blockchain characteristics, such as outdated off-chain data obtained by the inactive sequencer, logic errors based on time, failed permission checks, and denial of service (DOS) attacks. To mitigate these security risks, we proposed avoidance methods and provided considerations for users and developers to ensure a secure migration process. It is worth noting that this study is the first to conduct an in-depth analysis of the secure migration of smart contracts from Ethereum to Arbitrum. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Key Technologies for Security and Privacy in Web 3.0)
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<p>Distribution of TVL in L2. Arbitrum One has the largest share, followed by Polygon Pos and Optimism.</p>
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<p>Smart contract migration process diagram. Migrating smart contracts deployed on Ethereum to Arbitrum, where Ethereum is the source blockchain for migration and Arbitrum is the target blockchain.</p>
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<p>Transaction classification diagram. L2-to-L1 transactions require the involvement of the Arbitrum sequencer, while L1-to-L2 transactions are implemented through the bridge and retryable tickets.</p>
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<p>Transaction delay execution diagram. The sequencer’s downtime results in transaction accumulation and delayed execution, compromising the real-time nature of transaction execution.</p>
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<p>Illustration of L1-to-L2 messaging invocation. Asset transfer is achieved based on ticket generation on L1 and the redeem operation on L2.</p>
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<p>Block packaging illustration. Among the data dependencies for block packaging, three aspects are relevant to our research: L1 block number, local timestamp, and Txs (transactions).</p>
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<p>Diagram of retrieving “msg.sender”. The ‘msg.sender’ returns the address of the message sender. However, it is important to note that on Arbitrum, the message sender may have an alias address.</p>
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13 pages, 255 KiB  
Article
Abortion as a Muted Reality in Uganda: Narratives of Adolescent Girls’ Agentive Experiences with Pregnancy Termination
by Doris M. Kakuru, Jackline Nabirye and Jacqueline Nassimbwa
Youth 2024, 4(4), 1481-1493; https://doi.org/10.3390/youth4040094 - 14 Oct 2024
Viewed by 779
Abstract
Pregnancy termination, also referred to as abortion, is a contentious subject in many countries. Uganda’s culture requires young people to remain celibate; they therefore suffer from restricted access to any sexual and reproductive health information, products, and services, including contraceptives. Girls who are [...] Read more.
Pregnancy termination, also referred to as abortion, is a contentious subject in many countries. Uganda’s culture requires young people to remain celibate; they therefore suffer from restricted access to any sexual and reproductive health information, products, and services, including contraceptives. Girls who are pregnant in Uganda are oppressed in various ways, including being expelled from school. Since abortion is illegal under Ugandan law, those abortions that take place are assumed to have a high risk of being unsafe. Most previous studies in the African context have thus focused on the phenomenon of unsafe abortion. Adolescent abortion is characterized by a rhetoric of pathology that frames girls as victims of deadly unsafe abortion practices. This paper aims to critique the view that pregnant adolescent girls are merely vulnerable victims who passively accept the denial of SRH services, including abortion. We analyzed the life histories of 14 girls in Uganda who had undergone pregnancy termination. Our findings showed that adolescent girls are not passive victims of the structural barriers to abortion. They use their agency to obtain knowledge, make decisions, successfully terminate pregnancy, and conceal the information as needed. It is therefore important for policymakers to acknowledge the agency of adolescent girls in regard to pregnancy termination and how this recognition could be of benefit in terms of devising appropriate supports for them. Full article
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