Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

Next Issue
Volume 5, March
Previous Issue
Volume 4, September
You seem to have javascript disabled. Please note that many of the page functionalities won't work as expected without javascript enabled.
 
 

Cryptography, Volume 4, Issue 4 (December 2020) – 12 articles

Cover Story (view full-size image): In conventional cryptography, information-theoretically secure message authentication can be achieved by means of universal hash functions and requires that two legitimate users share a random secret key, which is at least twice as long as the tag. We address the question of whether quantum resources can offer any advantage over classical unconditionally secure message authentication codes (MACs). In particular, we consider a rather broad class of symmetric prepare-and-measure quantum MACs, where legitimate users share a common secret random key, and the quantum tag pertains to the state of a quantum system, which is sent to the receiver together with the message. It is shown that such quantum MACs cannot do better than their classical counterparts. View this paper
  • Issues are regarded as officially published after their release is announced to the table of contents alert mailing list.
  • You may sign up for e-mail alerts to receive table of contents of newly released issues.
  • PDF is the official format for papers published in both, html and pdf forms. To view the papers in pdf format, click on the "PDF Full-text" link, and use the free Adobe Reader to open them.
Order results
Result details
Section
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:
20 pages, 439 KiB  
Article
Statically Aggregate Verifiable Random Functions and Application to E-Lottery
by Bei Liang, Gustavo Banegas and Aikaterini Mitrokotsa
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 37; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040037 - 13 Dec 2020
Cited by 5 | Viewed by 4614
Abstract
Cohen, Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan (TCC’15) introduced the concept of aggregate pseudo-random functions (PRFs), which allow efficiently computing the aggregate of PRF values over exponential-sized sets. In this paper, we explore the aggregation augmentation on verifiable random function (VRFs), introduced by Micali, Rabin and [...] Read more.
Cohen, Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan (TCC’15) introduced the concept of aggregate pseudo-random functions (PRFs), which allow efficiently computing the aggregate of PRF values over exponential-sized sets. In this paper, we explore the aggregation augmentation on verifiable random function (VRFs), introduced by Micali, Rabin and Vadhan (FOCS’99), as well as its application to e-lottery schemes. We introduce the notion of static aggregate verifiable random functions (Agg-VRFs), which perform aggregation for VRFs in a static setting. Our contributions can be summarized as follows: (1) we define static aggregate VRFs, which allow the efficient aggregation of VRF values and the corresponding proofs over super-polynomially large sets; (2) we present a static Agg-VRF construction over bit-fixing sets with respect to product aggregation based on the q-decisional Diffie–Hellman exponent assumption; (3) we test the performance of our static Agg-VRFs instantiation in comparison to a standard (non-aggregate) VRF in terms of costing time for the aggregation and verification processes, which shows that Agg-VRFs lower considerably the timing of verification of big sets; and (4) by employing Agg-VRFs, we propose an improved e-lottery scheme based on the framework of Chow et al.’s VRF-based e-lottery proposal (ICCSA’05). We evaluate the performance of Chow et al.’s e-lottery scheme and our improved scheme, and the latter shows a significant improvement in the efficiency of generating the winning number and the player verification. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cryptographic Protocols 2022)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Time in milliseconds with respect to different numbers of fixed bits <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>τ</mi> </semantics></math> in the aggregate VRFs considering the cases of <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>ℓ</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>256</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>ℓ</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>1024</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math>.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>A blockchain <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi mathvariant="script">C</mi> </semantics></math> with <span class="html-italic">n</span> tickets sold so far.</p>
Full article ">
17 pages, 1203 KiB  
Article
How Bad Are Bad Templates? Optimistic Design-Stage Side-Channel Security Evaluation and its Cost
by Rinat Breuer and Itamar Levi
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 36; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040036 - 8 Dec 2020
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3777
Abstract
Cryptographic designs are vulnerable to side-channel analysis attacks. Evaluating their security during design stages is of crucial importance. The latter is achieved by very expensive (slow) analog transient-noise simulations over advanced fabrication process technologies. The main challenge of such rigorous security-evaluation analysis lies [...] Read more.
Cryptographic designs are vulnerable to side-channel analysis attacks. Evaluating their security during design stages is of crucial importance. The latter is achieved by very expensive (slow) analog transient-noise simulations over advanced fabrication process technologies. The main challenge of such rigorous security-evaluation analysis lies in the fact that technologies are becoming more and more complex and the physical properties of manufactured devices vary significantly due to process variations. In turn, a detailed security evaluation process imposes exponential time complexity with the circuit-size, the number of physical implementation corners (statistical variations) and the accuracy of the circuit-simulator. Given these circumstances, what is the cost of not exhausting the entire implementation space? In terms of simulation-time complexity, the benefits would clearly be significant; however, we are interested in evaluating the security implications. This question can be formulated for many other interesting side-channel contexts such as for example, how would an attack-outcome vary when the adversary is building a leakage template over one device, i.e., one physical corner, and it performs an evaluation (attack) phase of a device drawn from a different statistical corner? Alternatively, is it safe to assume that a typical (average) corner would represent the worst case in terms of security evaluation or would it be advisable to perform a security evaluation over another specific view? Finally, how would the outcome vary concretely? We ran in-depth experiments to answer these questions in the hope of finding a nice tradeoff between simulation efforts and expertise, and security-evaluation degradation. We evaluate the results utilizing methodologies such as template-attacks with a clear distinction between profiling and attack-phase statistical views. This exemplary view of what an adversary might capture in these scenarios is followed by a more complete statistical evaluation analysis utilizing tools such as the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence and the Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence to draw conclusions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Side Channel and Fault Injection Attacks and Countermeasures)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Security evaluation time costs: (<b>a</b>) Digital, Analog and transient noise Simulation Time vs. circuit size and (<b>b</b>) exponential increase in # of physical <span class="html-italic">corners</span> versus process technology.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Illustration of the SCA security assurance level versus cost and expertise for several ‘abstract’ example organizations.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Leakage for different y values for each corner, with marked POI values: (<b>a</b>) leakage trace for HW·HD = 1, (<b>b</b>) leakage trace for HW·HD = 14.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>SNR for each corner with marked POI: (<b>a</b>) zoom out, (<b>b</b>) zoom in.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Leakage distribution for HW·HD = 1, for each corner with different POI sources: (<b>a</b>) using the corner’s POI, (<b>b</b>) using the <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mo>{</mo> <mi>T</mi> <mi>T</mi> <mo>}</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> corner’s POI.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Mean and variance of the leakage for each y value: (<b>a</b>) using each corner’s POI, (<b>b</b>) using the <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mo>{</mo> <mi>T</mi> <mi>T</mi> <mo>}</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> corner’s POI.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>Maximum Likelihood results for the different profiling <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>v</mi> <mi>s</mi> <mo>.</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> <span class="html-italic">dua</span> corners.</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Maximum Likelihood results for various temperature and external voltage conditions: (<b>a</b>) SNR for each <span class="html-italic">mode</span> (<b>b</b>) Maximum-Likelihood values.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>Comparison of leakage distributions between different corners. The statistical distance between the distributions is shown in red.</p>
Full article ">Figure 10
<p>JS-Divergence results: (<b>a</b>) JS-Divergence per {profile, <span class="html-italic">dua</span>} corner (<b>b</b>) <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>D</mi> <mrow> <mi>J</mi> <mi>S</mi> </mrow> </msub> </semantics></math> used as a distinguisher - successful attack indicated in black.</p>
Full article ">
15 pages, 4076 KiB  
Article
Algorithm of Information Embedding into Digital Images Based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem for Data Security
by Oleg Evsutin and Kristina Dzhanashia
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 35; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040035 - 6 Dec 2020
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3908
Abstract
With the huge transfers of data involved in the modern world, it is both crucial and challenging to maintain the security of data. This paper proposes a novel algorithm of information embedding into digital images that could be used to protect confidential information. [...] Read more.
With the huge transfers of data involved in the modern world, it is both crucial and challenging to maintain the security of data. This paper proposes a novel algorithm of information embedding into digital images that could be used to protect confidential information. The presented algorithm makes use of the Chinese remainder theorem and adaptive embedding to achieve good imperceptibility along with the possibility of hiding a decent amount of confidential information. The algorithm is evaluated via computing experiments and evaluation results, as well as comparison with similar works, demonstrate good imperceptibility qualities of the proposed scheme. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Typical data transfers.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Example of embedding with empty values: (<b>a</b>) initial embedding fragment; (<b>b</b>) message fragment that is to be embedded in the initial embedding fragment; (<b>c</b>) first possible message distribution: 3/8 values match initial space; (<b>d</b>) second possible message distribution: 6/8 values match initial space. The second option is superior.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Embedding cover space preparation: (<b>a</b>) original image is divided into 8 × 8 pixel blocks; (<b>b</b>) IWT is applied to each block; (<b>c</b>) every set of <math display="inline"><semantics> <mi>k</mi> </semantics></math> coefficient corresponds to one embedding element and eight embedding elements to one embedding fragment.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>A flowchart demonstrating shortened embedding and extracting processes of the proposed method. The red color denotes example values.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>PSNR of the proposed method depending on the number of embedded bits for greyscale 512 × 512 pixels images.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Barbara.png: (<b>a</b>) before the embedding process; (<b>b</b>) after the embedding process.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>Barbara.png: comparison of histograms before and after embedding.</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Some test images used in the evaluation process.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>Comparison with information hiding scheme for digital images using difference expansion and modulus function [<a href="#B9-cryptography-04-00035" class="html-bibr">9</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 10
<p>Comparison with A new high capacity and reversible data hiding technique [<a href="#B7-cryptography-04-00035" class="html-bibr">7</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 11
<p>Comparison with encrypted signal-based reversible data hiding with public key cryptosystem [<a href="#B23-cryptography-04-00035" class="html-bibr">23</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 12
<p>The proposed algorithm applications (<b>a</b>) server transfers confidential data towards end devices without intermediate devices; (<b>b</b>) wearable Internet of Things.</p>
Full article ">
11 pages, 734 KiB  
Letter
On Secret Sharing with Newton’s Polynomial for Multi-Factor Authentication
by Sergey Bezzateev, Vadim Davydov and Aleksandr Ometov
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 34; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040034 - 1 Dec 2020
Cited by 11 | Viewed by 4012
Abstract
Security and access control aspects are becoming more and more essential to consider during the design of various systems and the tremendous growth of digitization. One of the related key building blocks in this regard is, essentially, the authentication process. Conventional schemes based [...] Read more.
Security and access control aspects are becoming more and more essential to consider during the design of various systems and the tremendous growth of digitization. One of the related key building blocks in this regard is, essentially, the authentication process. Conventional schemes based on one or two authenticating factors can no longer provide the required levels of flexibility and pro-activity of the access procedures, thus, the concept of threshold-based multi-factor authentication (MFA) was introduced, in which some of the factors may be missing, but the access can still be granted. In turn, secret sharing is a crucial component of the MFA systems, with Shamir’s schema being the most widely known one historically and based on Lagrange interpolation polynomial. Interestingly, the older Newtonian approach to the same problem is almost left without attention. At the same time, it means that the coefficients of the existing secret polynomial do not need to be re-calculated while adding a new factor. Therefore, this paper investigates this known property of Newton’s interpolation formula, illustrating that, in specific MFA cases, the whole system may become more flexible and scalable, which is essential for future authentication systems. Full article
28 pages, 506 KiB  
Article
Almost Fully Secured Lattice-Based Group Signatures with Verifier-Local Revocation
by Maharage Nisansala Sevwandi Perera and Takeshi Koshiba
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 33; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040033 - 30 Nov 2020
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 3538
Abstract
An efficient member revocation mechanism is a desirable feature when group signature schemes are applied in practical scenarios. Revocation methods, such as verifier-local revocation (VLR), provide an efficient member revocation in applications of group signatures. However, VLR-group signatures rely on a weaker security [...] Read more.
An efficient member revocation mechanism is a desirable feature when group signature schemes are applied in practical scenarios. Revocation methods, such as verifier-local revocation (VLR), provide an efficient member revocation in applications of group signatures. However, VLR-group signatures rely on a weaker security notion. On the other hand, group signature schemes for static groups gain stronger security with the full-anonymity security notion. Even though an outsider sees the secret signing keys of all group members in the full-anonymity, the signer is still anonymous. Achieving the full-anonymity for VLR group signature schemes is challenging due to the structure of secret signing keys. The secret signing keys of those schemes consist of tokens, which are used to manage revocation. The reveal of tokens may destroy the anonymity of the signers. We obtain stronger security for the lattice-based VLR group signature schemes by providing a new key generation method, which outputs revocation tokens without deriving from the members’ secret signing keys. We propose a new group signature scheme from lattices with VLR, which achieves stronger security than the previous related works. To avoid signature forgeries, we suggest a new zero-knowledge proof system that requires signers to validate themselves. Moreover, we output an efficient tracing mechanism. Full article
(This article belongs to the Section Cryptography Reviews)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Almost-full anonymity.</p>
Full article ">
15 pages, 321 KiB  
Article
A Taxonomy of Blockchain Consensus Methods
by Jeff Nijsse and Alan Litchfield
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 32; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040032 - 19 Nov 2020
Cited by 34 | Viewed by 9021
Abstract
For a blockchain, consensus is the foundation protocol that enables cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin to maintain state. Additionally, to ensure safety and liveness for a publicly accessible and verifiable ledger, fault tolerance must be robust. However, there appears to be a degree of [...] Read more.
For a blockchain, consensus is the foundation protocol that enables cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin to maintain state. Additionally, to ensure safety and liveness for a publicly accessible and verifiable ledger, fault tolerance must be robust. However, there appears to be a degree of misunderstanding about how consensus is applied across blockchains. To assist researchers considering variations between them, this study presents a rational classification of consensus methods applied to current blockchains. The study provides a survey of 19 methods classified by the scarce resource they employ: clock-cycles, bits, tokens, votes, time, and biometrics. Blockchain implementations are split between consensus algorithms requiring proof of resource and those that use majority voting to update the ledger. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>A state diagram for a distributed computing system including a blockchain. A consensus algorithm answers the questions of how? and who?</p>
Full article ">
10 pages, 266 KiB  
Article
Information-Theoretically Secure Data Origin Authentication with Quantum and Classical Resources
by Georgios M. Nikolopoulos and Marc Fischlin
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 31; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040031 - 13 Nov 2020
Cited by 5 | Viewed by 7037
Abstract
In conventional cryptography, information-theoretically secure message authentication can be achieved by means of universal hash functions, and requires that the two legitimate users share a random secret key, which is at least twice as long as the tag. We address the question of [...] Read more.
In conventional cryptography, information-theoretically secure message authentication can be achieved by means of universal hash functions, and requires that the two legitimate users share a random secret key, which is at least twice as long as the tag. We address the question of whether quantum resources can offer any advantage over classical unconditionally secure message authentication codes. It is shown that a broad class of symmetric prepare-and-measure quantum message-authentication schemes cannot do better than their classical counterparts. Full article
19 pages, 2015 KiB  
Article
Electromagnetic and Power Side-Channel Analysis: Advanced Attacks and Low-Overhead Generic Countermeasures through White-Box Approach
by Debayan Das and Shreyas Sen
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 30; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040030 - 31 Oct 2020
Cited by 16 | Viewed by 7700
Abstract
Electromagnetic and power side-channel analysis (SCA) provides attackers a prominent tool to extract the secret key from the cryptographic engine. In this article, we present our cross-device deep learning (DL)-based side-channel attack (X-DeepSCA) which reduces the time to attack on embedded [...] Read more.
Electromagnetic and power side-channel analysis (SCA) provides attackers a prominent tool to extract the secret key from the cryptographic engine. In this article, we present our cross-device deep learning (DL)-based side-channel attack (X-DeepSCA) which reduces the time to attack on embedded devices, thereby increasing the threat surface significantly. Consequently, with the knowledge of such advanced attacks, we performed a ground-up white-box analysis of the crypto IC to root-cause the source of the electromagnetic (EM) side-channel leakage. Equipped with the understanding that the higher-level metals significantly contribute to the EM leakage, we present STELLAR, which proposes to route the crypto core within the lower metals and then embed it within a current-domain signature attenuation (CDSA) hardware to ensure that the critical correlated signature gets suppressed before it reaches the top-level metal layers. CDSA-AES256 with local lower metal routing was fabricated in a TSMC 65 nm process and evaluated against different profiled and non-profiled attacks, showing protection beyond 1B encryptions, compared to ∼10K for the unprotected AES. Overall, the presented countermeasure achieved a 100× improvement over the state-of-the-art countermeasures available, with comparable power/area overheads and without any performance degradation. Moreover, it is a generic countermeasure and can be used to protect any crypto cores while preserving the legacy of the existing implementations. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Feature Papers in Hardware Security)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Power/electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA) attack set-up: Power/EM traces are collected from the crypto engine using an oscilloscope/ADC for a set of known ciphertexts (or chosen plaintexts) and then a hamming distance/weight (HD/HW) model is used for correlational analysis. After multiple traces are analyzed, the correct key (byte) emerges out.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Classification of EM and power SCA attacks.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Evolution of EM and power SCA attacks over the last two decades since their inception in 1998 [<a href="#B8-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">8</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Evolution of machine learning-based SCA attacks. Starting with support vector machine (SVM) classifier attacks in 2011 [<a href="#B13-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">13</a>], the side-channel research community began focusing on improving deep-learning (DL) SCA attacks. In 2019, we demonstrated the first cross-device deep-learning attack (<span class="html-italic">X-DeepSCA</span>), showing the feasibility of single-trace attacks.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Classification of the EM/power SCA countermeasures. Logical and architectural countermeasures are design-specific, while the physical circuit-level countermeasures are generic to any crypto implementation. Our work on signature attenuation with local lower metal routing has evolved over the years, starting with attenuated signature noise injection (ASNI) [<a href="#B18-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">18</a>,<a href="#B19-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">19</a>], moving on to STELLAR (signature attenuation embedded crypto with low-level metal routing) [<a href="#B20-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">20</a>,<a href="#B21-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">21</a>] and finally reaching the chip-level implementation on a form of CDSA (current domain signature attenuation) [<a href="#B22-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">22</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Motivation for the development of <span class="html-italic">X-DeepSCA</span> attack: (<b>a</b>) The inter-device variations for the same key are much higher compared to the inter-key variations of the same device, revealing the challenges in dealing with the issue of portability of these DL SCA attacks across devices [<a href="#B17-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">17</a>]. (<b>b</b>) Fully-connected DNN architecture with 2 hidden layers and 256 output classes used for the <span class="html-italic">X-DeepSCA</span> attack [<a href="#B17-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">17</a>]. (<b>c</b>) The confusion matrix plot shows that the test accuracy for the same device is significantly higher compared to the accuracy for a different device for the DNN model, showing the need for improvement in the domain of cross-device ML attacks.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p><span class="html-italic">X-DeepSCA</span> results: (<b>a</b>,<b>b</b>) Analysis of the individual class (key byte) distribution for 1-device and multi-device (4) training respectively. It can be seen that the entropy, that is, the distance between the red (maximum percentage of misprediction to a particular class, represents the bias of the DNN) and black curves (individual class accuracy), increases for the multi-device training, leading to higher accuracies for the <span class="html-italic">X-DeepSCA</span> attack. (<b>c</b>–<b>f</b>) Confusion matrices for the unseen test devices show significantly high accuracy (&gt;99.9%) for the single-trace <span class="html-italic">X-DeepSCA</span> attacks.</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Across different levels of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), the <span class="html-italic">X-DeepSCA</span> attack shows ∼<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mn>10</mn> <mo>×</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> lower minimum traces to disclosure (MTD) compared to the traditional correlational power attacks (CPA), enhancing the threat surface for embedded devices significantly.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>(<b>a</b>) <span class="html-italic">SCNIFFER</span> integrates the EM scanning, trace collection, intelligent fast localization and attack together, to enable an end-to-end EM SCA framework [<a href="#B32-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">32</a>]. (<b>b</b>) Implementation of the low-cost <span class="html-italic">SCNIFFER</span> system with the 3D EM scanner, H-probe, amplifier, target device and chipwhisperer system for the trace capture.</p>
Full article ">Figure 10
<p>(<b>a</b>) A 3D TVLA surface plot of AES-128 for a 30x30 grid across the chip. <span class="html-italic">SCNIFFER</span> determines the maximum leakage point within 30 iterations (linear time) utilizing a gradient search heuristic instead of the traditional exhaustive search. Once the best leakage point on the chip is found, <span class="html-italic">SCNIFFER</span> uses CEMA to perform the EM SCA attack to recover the correct key. (<b>b</b>) <span class="html-italic">SCNIFFER</span> with SNR/TVLA-based intelligent gradient search shows a ∼<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mn>100</mn> <mo>×</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> reduction in the number of traces required for the end-to-end attack compared to the exhaustive search [<a href="#B32-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">32</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 11
<p>Different abstraction levels of the state-of-the-art countermeasures. Circuit-level solutions are closest to the root of trust (transistor-level) and hence would provide the lowest overhead and generic solutions. However, it would be very critical to understand the root-cause of the side-channels to develop a low-overhead generic countermeasure.</p>
Full article ">Figure 12
<p>State-of-the-art circuit-level countermeasures include the switched capacitor current equalizer [<a href="#B27-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">27</a>], integrated voltage regulator (IVR) [<a href="#B28-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">28</a>] and series LDOs [<a href="#B29-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">29</a>]. The table highlights depicts the main challenges with these countermeasures. In the next few sections, we will see how we achieved a <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mn>100</mn> <mo>×</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> improvement in MTD over the previous works with comparable overheads.</p>
Full article ">Figure 13
<p>White-box modeling and analysis: (<b>a</b>) Intel 32 nm metal-interconnect stack, (<b>b</b>) the top-level metal layers and the copper bump are huge compared to the lower-level metal layers. (<b>c</b>) 3D FEM simulations performed in HFSS on the Intel 32nm metal stack reveal that the top metals M9 and above can be detected by the commercially available EM probes [<a href="#B20-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">20</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 14
<p>EM SCA countermeasure: With the white-box understanding of the EM leakage, we present <span class="html-italic">STELLAR</span>, which proposes to route the crypto core within the lower metal layers and then embed it within a signature attenuation hardware (SAH) which suppresses the correlated crypto signature significantly before it reaches the higher metal layers to connect to the external pins [<a href="#B20-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">20</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 15
<p>(<b>a</b>) In order to have a supply current independent of the crypto current, the first thing that comes to our mind is a constant current source (CS). An ideal implementation of the CS on top of the crypto engine is shown. However, this topology is highly unstable since it is difficult to maintain the exact average current through the CS. (<b>b</b>) Our proposed current-domain signature attenuation (CDSA) circuit ensures that the goal of high signature attenuation along with stability of the system is achieved by using a shunt bleed path and a low-bandwidth switched mode control loop which turns on or off the required number of CS slices [<a href="#B22-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">22</a>].</p>
Full article ">Figure 16
<p>(<b>a</b>) Die micrograph of the system in 65 nm CMOS. The fabricated test chip contains both unprotected and protected AES-256. (<b>b</b>) PCB for power and EM SCA evaluation.</p>
Full article ">Figure 17
<p>Time-domain measurements of the CDSA-AES: (<b>a</b>) For the unprotected AES, the power trace shows an amplitude of ∼150 mV, while (<b>c</b>) for the CDSA-AES256, the power trace remains below the noise floor, showing &gt;<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mn>350</mn> <mo>×</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> active signature suppression. Similarly, for the EM traces (<b>d</b>,<b>e</b>), the 14 rounds of the AES are clearly visible for the unprotected implementation, while it remains below the noise floor for the CDSA-AES. (<b>b</b>) Although the <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi>V</mi> <mrow> <mi>D</mi> <mi>I</mi> <mi>G</mi> </mrow> </msub> </semantics></math> node across the AES shows the 14 rounds of the AES, it is only kept for debugging purposes and is not accessible to an attacker. It should be noted that we tolerate this ∼50 mV droop across the AES (due to lower load cap) and the high impedance CS on top ensures that the fluctuations are highly suppressed at the supply pin.</p>
Full article ">Figure 18
<p>EM and power SCA attack evaluation. (<b>a</b>) CPA attack on the unprotected AES shows a MTD of <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mn>8</mn> <mi>K</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math>, while (<b>b</b>) the CDSA-AES remains protected even after <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mn>1</mn> <mi>B</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math> traces are analyzed. (<b>c</b>) Effect of the metal layers on EM leakage is evaluated using test vector leakage analysis (TVLA). It can be seen that the CDSA-AES with higher metal routing has significantly higher leakage compared to the CDSA-AES with lower metal routing, proving for the first time the effect of metal routing on the EM side-channel leakage.</p>
Full article ">Figure 19
<p>Summary: MTD comparison with the state-of-the-art countermeasures.</p>
Full article ">Figure 20
<p>CDSA-AES256 evaluated against DL SCA attacks: (<b>a</b>,<b>b</b>) For the unprotected AES, the training and validation accuracy reaches ∼99.9% and the confusion plot reveals a test accuracy of &gt;99.9% [<a href="#B35-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">35</a>]. (<b>c</b>,<b>d</b>) Now, for the protected CDSA-AES256, the DNN could not be trained, even with <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mn>10</mn> <mi>M</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math> traces, showing the efficacy of the proposed countermeasure against these advanced DL SCA attacks.</p>
Full article ">Figure 21
<p>The CDSA-AES256 has been evaluated against both EM and power SCA attacks (CPA/CEMA) in both time and frequency domains. [<a href="#B22-cryptography-04-00030" class="html-bibr">22</a>]. When subjected to CPA/CEMA attacks, the unprotected AES-256 could be broken with ∼<math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mn>10</mn> <mi>K</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math> traces, while the secret key for the CDSA-AES could not be revealed, even after <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mn>1</mn> <mi>B</mi> </mrow> </semantics></math> encryptions, showing an <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mn>100</mn> <mo>×</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math> MTD improvement over the previous countermeasures with comparable overheads.</p>
Full article ">
21 pages, 744 KiB  
Article
ESPADE: An Efficient and Semantically Secure Shortest Path Discovery for Outsourced Location-Based Services
by Bharath K. Samanthula, Divya Karthikeyan, Boxiang Dong and K. Anitha Kumari
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 29; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040029 - 18 Oct 2020
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 3456
Abstract
With the rapid growth of smart devices and technological advancements in tracking geospatial data, the demand for Location-Based Services (LBS) is facing a constant rise in several domains, including military, healthcare and transportation. It is a natural step to migrate LBS to a [...] Read more.
With the rapid growth of smart devices and technological advancements in tracking geospatial data, the demand for Location-Based Services (LBS) is facing a constant rise in several domains, including military, healthcare and transportation. It is a natural step to migrate LBS to a cloud environment to achieve on-demand scalability and increased resiliency. Nonetheless, outsourcing sensitive location data to a third-party cloud provider raises a host of privacy concerns as the data owners have reduced visibility and control over the outsourced data. In this paper, we consider outsourced LBS where users want to retrieve map directions without disclosing their location information. Specifically, our paper aims to address the following problem: Given a user’s location s, a target destination t, and a graph G stored in a cloud, can users retrieve the shortest path route from s to t in a privacy-preserving manner? Although there exist a few solutions to this problem, they are either inefficient or insecure. For example, existing solutions either leak intermediate results to untrusted cloud providers or incur significant costs on the end-user. To address this gap, we propose an efficient and secure solution based on homomorphic encryption properties combined with a novel data aggregation technique. We formally show that our solution achieves semantic security guarantees under the semi-honest model. Additionally, we provide complexity analysis and experimental results to demonstrate that the proposed protocol is significantly more efficient than the current state-of-the-art techniques. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>The Proposed ESPADE Model.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>A snapshot of geospatial network <span class="html-italic">G</span> with 16 vertices which are divided into four square grids.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Shortest path exploration and intermediate results during the execution of proposed ESPADE protocol.</p>
Full article ">
14 pages, 546 KiB  
Article
Privacy-Preserving and Efficient Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search Based on CP-ABE in Cloud
by Yunhong Zhou, Shihui Zheng and Licheng Wang
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 28; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040028 - 13 Oct 2020
Cited by 13 | Viewed by 5815
Abstract
In the area of searchable encryption, public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) has been a critically important and promising technique which provides secure search over encrypted data in cloud computing. PEKS can protect user data privacy without affecting the usage of the [...] Read more.
In the area of searchable encryption, public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) has been a critically important and promising technique which provides secure search over encrypted data in cloud computing. PEKS can protect user data privacy without affecting the usage of the data stored in the untrusted cloud server environment. However, most of the existing PEKS schemes concentrate on data users’ rich search functionalities, regardless of their search permission. Attribute-based encryption technology is a good method to solve the security issues, which provides fine-grained access control to the encrypted data. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving and efficient public key encryption with keyword search scheme by using the ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) technique to support both fine-grained access control and keyword search over encrypted data simultaneously. We formalize the security definition, and prove that our scheme achieves selective indistinguishability security against an adaptive chosen keyword attack. Finally, we present the performance analysis in terms of theoretical analysis and experimental analysis, and demonstrate the efficiency of our scheme. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>System Model of Our Scheme.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>The performance comparison of various schemes.</p>
Full article ">
17 pages, 857 KiB  
Article
Side-Channel Evaluation Methodology on Software
by Sylvain Guilley, Khaled Karray, Thomas Perianin, Ritu-Ranjan Shrivastwa, Youssef Souissi and Sofiane Takarabt
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 27; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040027 - 25 Sep 2020
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 4204
Abstract
Cryptographic implementations need to be robust amidst the widespread use of crypto-libraries and attacks targeting their implementation, such as side-channel attacks (SCA). Many certification schemes, such as Common Criteria and FIPS 140, continue without addressing side-channel flaws. Research works mostly tackle sophisticated attacks [...] Read more.
Cryptographic implementations need to be robust amidst the widespread use of crypto-libraries and attacks targeting their implementation, such as side-channel attacks (SCA). Many certification schemes, such as Common Criteria and FIPS 140, continue without addressing side-channel flaws. Research works mostly tackle sophisticated attacks with simple use-cases, which is not the reality where end-to-end evaluation is not trivial. In this study we used all due diligence to assess the invulnerability of a given implementation from the shoes of an evaluator. In this work we underline that there are two kinds of SCA: horizontal and vertical. In terms of quotation, measurement and exploitation, horizontal SCA is easier. If traces are constant-time, then vertical attacks become convenient, since there is no need for specific alignment (“value based analysis”). We introduce our new methodology: Vary the key to select sensitive samples, where the values depend upon the key, and subsequently vary the mask to uncover unmasked key-dependent leakage, i.e., the flaws. This can be done in the source code (pre-silicon) for the designer or on the actual traces (post-silicon) for the test-lab. We also propose a methodology for quotations regarding SCA unlike standards that focus on only one aspect (like number of traces) and forgets about other aspects (such as equipment; cf. ISO/IEC 20085-1. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Side Channel and Fault Injection Attacks and Countermeasures)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p><span class="html-italic">Top</span>: Insecure RSA. <span class="html-italic">Bottom</span>: Plaintext masking of RSA (note that this countermeasure has been initially proposed against timing attacks [<a href="#B9-cryptography-04-00027" class="html-bibr">9</a>], at the time where vertical attacks where not known—however it fits the purpose of protecting against such attacks) built on top of an insecure RSA.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Horizontal leakages of MbedTLS RSA (full – base and exponent).</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Horizontal leakages of MbedTLS RSA (modular exponentiation only).</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Frequency analysis of vulnerabilities with GDB (logarithmic scale).</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Some typical leakage functions <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <msub> <mi>l</mi> <mi>v</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo>[</mo> <mi>t</mi> <mo>]</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </semantics></math>, shown as matrices of values.</p>
Full article ">
15 pages, 1934 KiB  
Article
Secure Boot for Reconfigurable Architectures
by Ali Shuja Siddiqui, Yutian Gui and Fareena Saqib
Cryptography 2020, 4(4), 26; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4040026 - 25 Sep 2020
Cited by 5 | Viewed by 5342
Abstract
Reconfigurable computing is becoming ubiquitous in the form of consumer-based Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Reconfigurable computing architectures have found their place in safety-critical infrastructures such as the automotive industry. As the target architecture evolves, it also needs to be updated remotely on [...] Read more.
Reconfigurable computing is becoming ubiquitous in the form of consumer-based Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Reconfigurable computing architectures have found their place in safety-critical infrastructures such as the automotive industry. As the target architecture evolves, it also needs to be updated remotely on the target platform. This process is susceptible to remote hijacking, where the attacker can maliciously update the reconfigurable hardware target with tainted hardware configuration. This paper proposes an architecture of establishing Root of Trust at the hardware level using cryptographic co-processors and Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) and enable over the air updates. The proposed framework implements a secure boot protocol on Xilinx based FPGAs. The project demonstrates the configuration of the bitstream, boot process integration with TPM and secure over-the-air updates for the hardware reconfiguration. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Feature Papers in Hardware Security)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1
<p>Proposed System Architecture.</p>
Full article ">Figure 2
<p>Content Provider connected with clients in an untrusted field.</p>
Full article ">Figure 3
<p>Key exchange in a trusted environment.</p>
Full article ">Figure 4
<p>Keys shared between a client and server.</p>
Full article ">Figure 5
<p>Server Client Interaction for Bitstream Updates.</p>
Full article ">Figure 6
<p>Bitstream Update Archive.</p>
Full article ">Figure 7
<p>Secure Bitstream Update Process.</p>
Full article ">Figure 8
<p>Experimental setup featuring TPM connected with an FPGA.</p>
Full article ">Figure 9
<p>Difference in computed hash and PCR based reference hash found during the boot process.</p>
Full article ">
Previous Issue
Next Issue
Back to TopTop