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Cryptography, Volume 4, Issue 3 (September 2020) – 7 articles

Cover Story (view full-size image): This paper presents a new parameter set for faster commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie–Hellman (CSIDH). A computation of large odd-degree isogenies, the main obstacle of CSIDH, has been settled to some extent by using a two-torsion point. We hope that this work will be helpful for various discussions on optimization for CSIDH. View this paper
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22 pages, 854 KiB  
Article
Practical and Provably Secure Distributed Aggregation: Verifiable Additive Homomorphic Secret Sharing
by Georgia Tsaloli, Gustavo Banegas and Aikaterini Mitrokotsa
Cryptography 2020, 4(3), 25; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4030025 - 21 Sep 2020
Cited by 10 | Viewed by 4314
Abstract
Often clients (e.g., sensors, organizations) need to outsource joint computations that are based on some joint inputs to external untrusted servers. These computations often rely on the aggregation of data collected from multiple clients, while the clients want to guarantee that the results [...] Read more.
Often clients (e.g., sensors, organizations) need to outsource joint computations that are based on some joint inputs to external untrusted servers. These computations often rely on the aggregation of data collected from multiple clients, while the clients want to guarantee that the results are correct and, thus, an output that can be publicly verified is required. However, important security and privacy challenges are raised, since clients may hold sensitive information. In this paper, we propose an approach, called verifiable additive homomorphic secret sharing (VAHSS), to achieve practical and provably secure aggregation of data, while allowing for the clients to protect their secret data and providing public verifiability i.e., everyone should be able to verify the correctness of the computed result. We propose three VAHSS constructions by combining an additive homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) scheme, for computing the sum of the clients’ secret inputs, and three different methods for achieving public verifiability, namely: (i) homomorphic collision-resistant hash functions; (ii) linear homomorphic signatures; as well as (iii) a threshold RSA signature scheme. In all three constructions, we provide a detailed correctness, security, and verifiability analysis and detailed experimental evaluations. Our results demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed constructions, especially from the client side. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Techniques and Protocols to Preserve and Enhance Privacy)
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<p><span class="html-italic">n</span> clients outsourcing the joint addition of their joint inputs to <span class="html-italic">m</span> servers.</p>
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<p>Time for <b>PartialEval</b> and <b>PartialProof</b> in our constructions. (<b>a</b>) Time for <b>PartialEval</b> and <b>PartialProof</b> in VAHSS-HSS. (<b>b</b>) Time for <b>PartialEval</b> and <b>PartialProof</b> in VAHSS-LHS. (<b>c</b>) Time for <b>PartialEval</b> and <b>PartialProof</b> in VAHSS-TSS.</p>
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<p>Time for <b>FinalProof</b> in our constructions. (<b>a</b>) Time for the <b>FinalProof</b> algorithm in VAHSS-HSS. (<b>b</b>) Time for the <b>FinalProof</b> algorithm in VAHSS-LHS. (<b>c</b>) Time for the <b>FinalProof</b> algorithm in VAHSS-TSS.</p>
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<p>Time for running <b>Verify</b> for each of our constructions. (<b>a</b>) Time for the <b>Verify</b> algorithm in VAHSS-HSS. (<b>b</b>) Time for the <b>Verify</b> algorithm in VAHSS-LHS. (<b>c</b>) Time for the <b>Verify</b> algorithm in VAHSS-TSS.</p>
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<p>Bandwidth per serve and per client in bytes using VAHSS-HSS.</p>
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<p>Bandwidth per serve and per client in bytes using VAHSS-LHS.</p>
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<p>Bandwidth required per server and per client in bytes using VAHSS-TSS.</p>
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16 pages, 984 KiB  
Article
Chaotic Quantum Key Distribution
by Noah Cowper, Harry Shaw and David Thayer
Cryptography 2020, 4(3), 24; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4030024 - 31 Aug 2020
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 3908
Abstract
The ability to send information securely is a vital aspect of today’s society, and with the developments in quantum computing, new ways to communicate have to be researched. We explored a novel application of quantum key distribution (QKD) and synchronized chaos which was [...] Read more.
The ability to send information securely is a vital aspect of today’s society, and with the developments in quantum computing, new ways to communicate have to be researched. We explored a novel application of quantum key distribution (QKD) and synchronized chaos which was utilized to mask a transmitted message. This communication scheme is not hampered by the ability to send single photons and consequently is not vulnerable to number splitting attacks like other QKD schemes that rely on single photon emission. This was shown by an eavesdropper gaining a maximum amount of information on the key during the first setup and listening to the key reconciliation to gain more information. We proved that there is a maximum amount of information an eavesdropper can gain during the communication, and this is insufficient to decode the message. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cryptographic Protocols 2022)
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<p>Diagram of communication protocol.</p>
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<p>(<b>A</b>) Differences in the y values between systems 1 and 2; (<b>B</b>) differences in the z values between systems 1 and 2.</p>
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<p>(<b>A</b>) Differences in the y values between systems 1 and 2; (<b>B</b>) differences in the z values between systems 1 and 2. From these two graphs it can be seen the solutions tend to converge as <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>t</mi> <mo>→</mo> <mo>∞</mo> </mrow> </semantics></math>.</p>
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<p>Convergence (difference) of the y and z solutions versus the decimal point precision of the drive solution.</p>
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<p>(<b>A</b>) Information read by Bob, (<b>B</b>) information read by Eve, (<b>C</b>) masked message using ordinary QKD.</p>
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<p>Error correction on one block of bits.</p>
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<p>The graph represents the error between Alice and Bob’s key associated with Eve’s measurement as the probability of double-photon emission goes up.</p>
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<p>The error in Eve’s key during the reconciliation protocol as the probability of two-photon emission goes up.</p>
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<p>(<b>A</b>) Differences in the y values between Eve and Alice; (<b>B</b>) differences in the z values between Eve and Alice.</p>
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<p>(<b>A</b>) Message read by Bob after subtraction of his chaotic solution, (<b>B</b>) message read by Eve after subtraction of her chaotic solution, (<b>C</b>) message masked with Alice’s chaotic solutions.</p>
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18 pages, 3389 KiB  
Article
Hardware Performance Evaluation of Authenticated Encryption SAEAES with Threshold Implementation
by Takeshi Sugawara
Cryptography 2020, 4(3), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4030023 - 9 Aug 2020
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 4386
Abstract
SAEAES is the authenticated encryption algorithm instantiated by combining the SAEB mode of operation with AES, and a candidate of the NIST’s lightweight cryptography competition. Using AES gives the advantage of backward compatibility with the existing accelerators and coprocessors that the industry has [...] Read more.
SAEAES is the authenticated encryption algorithm instantiated by combining the SAEB mode of operation with AES, and a candidate of the NIST’s lightweight cryptography competition. Using AES gives the advantage of backward compatibility with the existing accelerators and coprocessors that the industry has invested in so far. Still, the newer lightweight block cipher (e.g., GIFT) outperforms AES in compact implementation, especially with the side-channel attack countermeasure such as threshold implementation. This paper aims to implement the first threshold implementation of SAEAES and evaluate the cost we are trading with the backward compatibility. We design a new circuit architecture using the column-oriented serialization based on the recent 3-share and uniform threshold implementation (TI) of the AES S-box based on the generalized changing of the guards. Our design uses 18,288 GE with AES’s occupation reaching 97% of the total area. Meanwhile, the circuit area is roughly three times the conventional SAEB-GIFT implementation (6229 GE) because of a large memory size needed for the AES’s non-linear key schedule and the extended states for satisfying uniformity in TI. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Side Channel and Fault Injection Attacks and Countermeasures)
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<p>Diagram of <tt>SAEAES_128_64_128</tt>. <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">Com</mi> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">INIT</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>, <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">Com</mi> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">E</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>, <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">Com</mi> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">N</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>, <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">Com</mi> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">D</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>, and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">Com</mi> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">T</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> correspond to the commands supported in our implementation (see <a href="#sec5dot4-cryptography-04-00023" class="html-sec">Section 5.4</a>).</p>
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<p>The changing-of-the-guards sharing (<b>left</b>) and its unshared representation (<b>right</b>).</p>
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<p>3-share and uniform TI of the AES S-box based on the generalized <span class="html-italic">changing of the guards</span> [<a href="#B27-cryptography-04-00023" class="html-bibr">27</a>].</p>
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<p>The row-oriented state and key arrays in the conventional compact AES implementation [<a href="#B23-cryptography-04-00023" class="html-bibr">23</a>].</p>
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<p>The column-oriented state and key arrays. The all registers have an enable signal for controlling their data flow.</p>
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<p>Datapath diagram of our design without threshold implementation (TI). (C1)–(C8) are identifiers used in Table 6.</p>
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<p>The active datapaths in each of the <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">Com</mi> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">INIT</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>, <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">Com</mi> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">E</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>, <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">Com</mi> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">N</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>, <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">Com</mi> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">D</mi> </msub> </semantics></math>, and <math display="inline"><semantics> <msub> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">Com</mi> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">T</mi> </msub> </semantics></math> command.</p>
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<p>Datapath diagram of our design with TI. (C1)–(C8) are identifiers used in Table 6.</p>
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10 pages, 709 KiB  
Article
Security Analysis of Lightweight IoT Cipher: Chaskey
by Ashutosh Dhar Dwivedi
Cryptography 2020, 4(3), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4030022 - 5 Aug 2020
Cited by 18 | Viewed by 4988
Abstract
This paper presents the differential cryptanalysis of ARX based cipher Chaskey using tree search based heuristic approach. ARX algorithms are suitable for resource-constrained devices such as IoT and very resistant to standard cryptanalysis such as linear or differential. To make a differential attack, [...] Read more.
This paper presents the differential cryptanalysis of ARX based cipher Chaskey using tree search based heuristic approach. ARX algorithms are suitable for resource-constrained devices such as IoT and very resistant to standard cryptanalysis such as linear or differential. To make a differential attack, it is important to make differential characteristics of the cipher. Finding differential characteristics in ARX is the most challenging task nowadays. Due to the bigger block size, it is infeasible to calculate lookup tables for non-linear components. Transition through the non-linear layer of cipher faces a huge state space problem. The problem of huge state space is a serious research topic in artificial intelligence (AI). The proposed heuristic tool use such methods inspired by Nested Tree-based sampling to find differential paths in ARX cipher and successfully applied to get a state of art results for differential cryptanalysis with a very fast and simpler framework. The algorithm can also be applied in different research areas in cryptanalysis where such huge state space is a problem. Full article
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<p>One round of the Chaskey permutation.</p>
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<p>Difference propagation of plaintext pair.</p>
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<p>A differential characteristic over a sequence of rounds.</p>
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<p>4-bit S-box.</p>
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<p>Difference distribution table for 4-bit S-box.</p>
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<p>Transition through modular addition box.</p>
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<p>Nested tree search.</p>
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19 pages, 398 KiB  
Article
Implementation of a New Strongly-Asymmetric Algorithm and Its Optimization
by Koki Jimbo, Satoshi Iriyama and Massimo Regoli
Cryptography 2020, 4(3), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4030021 - 30 Jul 2020
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3168
Abstract
A new public key agreement (PKA) algorithm, called the strongly-asymmetric algorithm (SAA-5), was introduced by Accardi et al. The main differences from the usual PKA algorithms are that Bob has some independent public keys and Alice produces her public key by using some [...] Read more.
A new public key agreement (PKA) algorithm, called the strongly-asymmetric algorithm (SAA-5), was introduced by Accardi et al. The main differences from the usual PKA algorithms are that Bob has some independent public keys and Alice produces her public key by using some part of the public keys from Bob. Then, the preparation and calculation processes are essentially asymmetric. This algorithms has several free parameters more than the usual symmetric PKA algorithms and the velocity of calculation is largely dependent on the parameters chosen; however, the performance of it has not yet been tested. The purpose of our study was to discuss efficient parameters to share the key with high speeds in SAA-5 and to optimize SAA-5 in terms of calculation speed. To find efficient parameters of SAA-5, we compared the calculation speed with Diffie–Hellman (D-H) while varying values of some parameters under the circumstance where the length of the secret shared key (SSK) was fixed. For optimization, we discuss a more general framework of SAA-5 to find more efficient operations. By fixing the parameters of the framework properly, a new PKA algorithm with the same security level as SAA-5 was produced. The result shows that the calculation speed of the proposed PKA algorithm is faster than D-H, especially for large key lengths. The calculation speed of the proposed PKA algorithm increases linearly as the SSK length increases, whereas D-H increases exponentially. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cryptographic Protocols 2022)
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<p>Changing time to compute a fixed-length key when <span class="html-italic">d</span> is a variable.</p>
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<p>Comparison of the time to generate SSK.</p>
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<p>Calculation speed for each SSK Length with strongly-asymmetric algorithm (SAA-5) while <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mi>d</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>10</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math> and <math display="inline"><semantics> <mrow> <mo>|</mo> <mi>I</mi> <mo>|</mo> <mo>=</mo> <mn>10</mn> </mrow> </semantics></math>.</p>
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<p>Comparison of the generation time of the SSK with SAA-5.</p>
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13 pages, 379 KiB  
Article
Optimized CSIDH Implementation Using a 2-Torsion Point
by Donghoe Heo, Suhri Kim, Kisoon Yoon, Young-Ho Park and Seokhie Hong
Cryptography 2020, 4(3), 20; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4030020 - 29 Jul 2020
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 3322
Abstract
The implementation of isogeny-based cryptography mainly use Montgomery curves, as they offer fast elliptic curve arithmetic and isogeny computation. However, although Montgomery curves have efficient 3- and 4-isogeny formula, it becomes inefficient when recovering the coefficient of the image curve for large degree [...] Read more.
The implementation of isogeny-based cryptography mainly use Montgomery curves, as they offer fast elliptic curve arithmetic and isogeny computation. However, although Montgomery curves have efficient 3- and 4-isogeny formula, it becomes inefficient when recovering the coefficient of the image curve for large degree isogenies. Because the Commutative Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (CSIDH) requires odd-degree isogenies up to at least 587, this inefficiency is the main bottleneck of using a Montgomery curve for CSIDH. In this paper, we present a new optimization method for faster CSIDH protocols entirely on Montgomery curves. To this end, we present a new parameter for CSIDH, in which the three rational two-torsion points exist. By using the proposed parameters, the CSIDH moves around the surface. The curve coefficient of the image curve can be recovered by a two-torsion point. We also proved that the CSIDH while using the proposed parameter guarantees a free and transitive group action. Additionally, we present the implementation result using our method. We demonstrated that our method is 6.4% faster than the original CSIDH. Our works show that quite higher performance of CSIDH is achieved while only using Montgomery curves. Full article
24 pages, 5043 KiB  
Article
Tamper and Clone-Resistant Authentication Scheme for Medical Image Systems
by Mayssa Tayachi, Saleh Mulhem, Wael Adi, Laurent Nana, Anca Pascu and Faouzi Benzarti
Cryptography 2020, 4(3), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography4030019 - 6 Jul 2020
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 4448
Abstract
Telemedicine applications are more and more used due to the rapid development of digital imaging and information and communication technologies. Medical information which include digital medical images and patient’s information are extracted and transmitted over insecure networks for clinical diagnosis and treatments. Digital [...] Read more.
Telemedicine applications are more and more used due to the rapid development of digital imaging and information and communication technologies. Medical information which include digital medical images and patient’s information are extracted and transmitted over insecure networks for clinical diagnosis and treatments. Digital watermarking is one of the main approaches used to ensure the security of medical images. Nevertheless, in some cases, the only use of digital watermarking is not sufficient to reach a high level of security. Indeed, the watermark could carry essential patient information and needs to be protected. In such cases, cryptography may be used to protect the watermark and to improve the overall secured management in the medical environment. In this paper, we propose a clone-resistant watermarking approach combining a difference expansion watermarking technique with a cryptographic technique based on secret keys generated by a clone-resistant device called Secret Unknown Ciphers (SUCs). The use of SUCs to sign the watermark enforces the security of medical images during their transfer and storage. Experimental results show that the system provides a high level of security against various forms of attacks. Full article
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<p>Two state of the art proposals of secure medical image transmission systems.</p>
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<p>Medical image system deploying the physical unclonable function (PUF) together with an encryption algorithm and RSA system. Adapted from [<a href="#B6-cryptography-04-00019" class="html-bibr">6</a>].</p>
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<p>Possible secret unknown cipher (SUC) generation scenario. Adapted from [<a href="#B32-cryptography-04-00019" class="html-bibr">32</a>].</p>
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<p>Mutating an SUC into a system-on-chip (SoC) [<a href="#B32-cryptography-04-00019" class="html-bibr">32</a>].</p>
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<p>SUC-based generic identification protocol. Adapted from [<a href="#B32-cryptography-04-00019" class="html-bibr">32</a>].</p>
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<p>The proposed concept of making medical images clone-resistant by embedding the SUC technique.</p>
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<p>A proposed system operation scenario.</p>
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<p>An example of a patient’s record in the database (DB).</p>
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<p>Clone-resistant watermark generation and embedding process.</p>
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<p>Watermark extraction process.</p>
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<p>Medical device-server authentication protocol for secured logging of a medical image transaction and image verification.</p>
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<p>User-server authentication protocol for exchanging registered medical images.</p>
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<p>Original images and corresponding watermarks examples.</p>
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<p>DICOM images used in experiments.</p>
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<p>Hands image and generated watermark used in experiments.</p>
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<p>An example of the original image, corresponding generated and signed watermarks, and the resulting watermarked image.</p>
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