The US Adviser
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This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion.
“The United States advisory mission in South Vietnam encompassed many fields of endeavor and affected almost every level of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. It was a demanding exercise of professional duties and a unique human experience for the American adviser who had not only to struggle with problems of environment and culture differences and face the complexities and hazards of the war, but also devote his time and energy to supplement our Vietnamese experience with US Army professionalism. The total effort by US advisers contributed directly and immeasurably to the development and modernization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.
To the Vietnamese officers and men who benefited from his expertise and experience, the US adviser was both a mentor and a Samaritan. Regardless of his level of assignment or branch of service, he could be subsumed by a common trait: a sincere desire to help and devotion to those he advised. Whatever his approach to advisory duties, he always performed with dedication and competence. For nearly two decades, these qualities were the hallmark of the US adviser in South Vietnam.
To analyze and evaluate the United States advisory experience in its entirety is not an easy task. It cannot be accomplished thoroughly and effectively by a single author since there were several types of advisers representing different areas of specialty but all dedicated to a common goal. Therefore, each member of the Control Group for the Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program has made a significant contribution as we presented the Vietnamese point of view.”-Author’s preface.
General Cao Van Vien
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The US Adviser - General Cao Van Vien
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INDOCHINA MONOGRAPHS
THE U.S. ADVISER
BY
GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN/LT. GEN. NGO QUANG TRUONG
LT. GEN. DONG VAN KHUYEN/MAJ. GEN. NGUYEN DUY HINH
BRIG. GEN. TRAN DINH THO/COL. HOANG NGOC LUNG
AND
LT. COL. CHU XUAN VIEN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
INDOCHINA MONOGRAPHS 5
PREFACE 6
CHARTS 8
MAPS 9
ILLUSTRATIONS 10
CHAPTER I—INTRODUCTION 11
A Brief Comparative Historical Account 11
The U.S. Advisory System 16
Vietnamese Requirements For Advisory Assistance and Support to the U.S. Advisory Effort 21
CHAPTER II—THE JGS AND MACV 25
A Matter of Personal Relationship 25
Reorganization and Development of the RWAF 26
Highlights of a Fruitful Relationship 30
Procedures for Cooperation 35
An Evaluation 38
CHAPTER III—ARVN BATTALION TO CORPS AND THE TACTICAL ADVISER 40
The Tactical Advisory System 40
The Tactical Adviser’s Responsibilities 44
The Adviser’s Rote in Operational Planning and Combat Intelligence 48
U.S. Support and the Problem of Leverage 53
Observations on Tours of Duty and Relationships 56
An Evaluation 58
CHAPTER IV—THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISER 62
A Pioneering Effort 62
Increasing Commitment 63
The Period of Full-Fledged Cooperation 66
Anatomy of a Relationship 70
CHAPTER V—THE LOGISTIC AND TECHNICAL ADVISER 74
Significant Milestones 74
The Base Depot Upgrade Program 80
Path-Finder I and Path-Finder II 81
Observations of the U.S. Logistical Advisory Effort 83
Some Lessons Learned 88
CHAPTER VI—THE PACIFICATION ADVISER 91
The U.S. Response to Insurgency 91
CORDS Organization and Operations 93
Relations and Contributions 101
Some Lessons Learned 111
CHAPTER VII—THE TRAINING ADVISER 115
A Monumental Achievement 115
Organization for Training and Training Support 118
Training Advisory Activities 123
Observations and Comments 132
CHAPTER VIII—OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 136
APPENDIX A—MEMORANDUM 144
APPENDIX B—MEMORANDUM 147
GLOSSARY 149
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 151
INDOCHINA MONOGRAPHS
This is one of a series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. They were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodian, Laotian, and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. The General Research Corporation provided writing facilities and other necessary support under an Army contract with the Center of Military History. The monographs were not edited or altered and reflect the views of their authors—not necessarily those of the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense. The authors were not attempting to write definitive accounts but to set down how they saw the war in Southeast Asia.
Colonel William E. Le Gro, U.S. Army, retired, has written a forthcoming work allied with this series, Vietnam: From Cease-Fire to Capitulation. Another book, The Final Collapse by General Cao Van Vien, the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff, will be formally published and sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
Taken together these works should provide useful source materials for serious historians pending publication of the more definitive series, the U.S. Army in Vietnam.
JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
PREFACE
The United States advisory mission in South Vietnam encompassed many fields of endeavor and affected almost every level of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. It was a demanding exercise of professional duties and a unique human experience for the American adviser who had not only to struggle with problems of environment and culture differences and face the complexities and hazards of the war, but also devote his time and energy to supplement our Vietnamese experience with US Army professionalism. The total effort by US advisers contributed directly and immeasurably to the development and modernization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.
To the Vietnamese officers and men who benefited from his expertise and experience, the US adviser was both a mentor and a Samaritan. Regardless of his level of assignment or branch of service, he could be subsumed by a common trait: a sincere desire to help and devotion to those he advised. Whatever his approach to advisory duties, he always performed with dedication and competence. For nearly two decades, these qualities were the hallmark of the US adviser in South Vietnam.
To analyze and evaluate the United States advisory experience in its entirety is not an easy task. It cannot be accomplished thoroughly and effectively by a single author since there were several types of advisers representing different areas of specialty but all dedicated to a common goal. Therefore, each member of the Control Group for the Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program has made a significant contribution as we presented the Vietnamese point of view.
As the last Chairman of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF, a position I held for a decade, I have contributed the chapter concerning the relationship between The JGS and MACV. As I see it, the advisory effort at that level was largely a matter of personal relationship which set the tone and example for the entire system. I am sure that the tributes I pay to the successive MACV commanders, living or deceased, are but a small part of their towering contributions and achievements.
Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, former commander of the 1st Infantry Division and IV Corps and the last commander of I Corps, has provided our evaluation of The Tactical Adviser, a subject for which I am sure no one else is better qualified. A professional soldier who held command positions at every tactical echelon during his distinguished career, General Truong presents a candid appraisal of the US tactical adviser, his role, and his contributions at every level, drawing from his invaluable combat experience. The Intelligence Adviser has been prepared by Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, former chief J-2, JGS and our foremost expert in RVNAF intelligence. In his assessment of the US intelligence adviser, Colonel Lung is backed by years of cooperation with US Army intelligence agencies. Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, commander of the Central Logistics Command, RVNAF, and the last Chief of Staff, JGS, has produced The Logistic and Technical Adviser. His truthful account of the US logistical advisory effort reflects the long experience of a man involved with the system he helped develop from the start with the assistance of US advisers. The Pacification Adviser has been written by Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, the last commander of the ARVN 3d Infantry Division, who draws from his experience as Chief of Staff of III Corps and I Corps, Deputy Commander for Territorial Security, IV Corps and as Chief of Staff of the RF and PF Command during the middle 1960’s. Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, has developed our contribution on The Training Adviser, drawing on his experience as a division and corps G-3, and seven years as the J-3 of the Joint General Staff.
To provide cohesiveness and unity for the monograph, the authors and I have relied on the editorial services of Lieutenant Colonel Chu Xuan Vien, our last Army Attaché serving at the Embassy of Vietnam in Washington, D.C. Colonel Vien, a knowledgeable analyst with a keen sense of military history and an author in his own right, compiled the introductory and closing chapters. The observations and conclusions are an excellent compendium of suggestions and comments made by the individual authors who, like myself, all feel we owe him a special debt of gratitude.
Finally, we are all indebted to Ms. Pham Thi Bong, formerly a Captain in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and also a former member of the Vietnamese Embassy staff who spent long hours typing, editing and in the administrative preparation of this manuscript in final form.
Cao Van Vien
General, ARVN
McLean, Virginia
31 May 1997
CHARTS
No.
Organization, U.S. Advisory System, 1970
Organization, MACV Headquarters Staff Advisers, 1970
Organization, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1956
Organization, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 1972
Organization, Joint General Staff and Armed Forces Structure, 1972
Organization, U.S. Army Advisory System, Corps Tactical Zone
Organization, Regional Assistance Command, 1971-1972
Organization, Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, 1956
CORDS in MACV Command Channel
Organization, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS, MACV
Organization, CTZ/Region CORDS
Advisory Relationships, Corps, Province and District Levels
Advisory Relationships, ARVN Hierarchy
Organization, MACV Training Directorate
Organization, Central Training Command
MAPS
No.
Location, Military Academies and Service Schools
Location, National Territorial Force Training Centers
ILLUSTRATIONS
No.
FRAC Ending A Fruitful Relationship with I Corps, 20 March, 1973
An Odd-Looking But Harmonious Couple: The ARVN Tactical Commander and His Adviser
ARVN Rangers Going Out on a Patrol with U.S. Adviser (Ba To, Quang Ngai, Dec. 1970)
CIDG Troopers and U.S. Special Forces Adviser Back From Patrol (Ban Me Thuot, March 1962)
ARVN 8th Marine Bn Staff Discussing Operational Plan with U.S. Adviser (Quang Tri, Sept. 1970)
ARVN Battalion Commander (9th Infantry Division) Reviewing Position with His Adviser During Combat Operation (Kien Phong, Dec. 1970)
U.S. Advisers Briefing ARVN Rangers Prior to Long Range Reconnaissance Mission (Near Cambodian Border, Nov. 1970)
On-The-Job Training Provided by U.S. Photography Technician (Oct. 1970)
Civilian Technicians and Specialists of the U.S. Army Materiel Command as Advisers to the Army Arsenal, 1972
MAT In Action: On A Firing Range with PF Troops (Long An, December 1970)
MAT Members Checking Targets After PF Troops Practice Firing the M-16 Rifle (Long An, Dec. 1970)
A First-Aid Class for PF Troopers by MAT Member (Dec. 1970)
MAT Member as Adviser to Vietnamese NP Field Force (Da Nang, 1970)
U.S. Adviser Instructing ARVN Troops on Helilift Procedures (March, 1962)
ARVN Paratroopers in Combat Assault Training, 1966
Assisting Students at the RVNAF Language School (Dec. 1970) The National Military Academy at Dalat: A Significant Contribution of U.S. Advisory Effort
The Cadets of Dalat NMA: A Source of Pride for the RVNAF
Training ARVN Rangers How to Use Compass to Bring In a Helicopter for Landing (Oct. 1970)
Advisers Looking On as Ranger Student Successfully Guides Helicopter on Landing Pad (Oct. 1970)
CHAPTER I—INTRODUCTION
A Brief Comparative Historical Account
To understand and appreciate the full impact of the United States adviser on the RVN Armed Forces from the Vietnamese viewpoint, it is desirable first to review briefly the evolution of the advisory system to include how it was organized, supported and how it functioned at different echelons.
The United States began providing direct military advisory assistance to the Vietnamese National Army in early 1955. However, American commitment in Indochina had started five years earlier when, coming to the help of a hard-pressed war ally, the US supplied war materiel to the French Expeditionary Corps which was fighting a dubious war against the Communists-led Viet Minh, then the champion of a strong cause for national independence.
When the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina was established in late 1950 under Brigadier General Francis G. Brink to administer this aid, the new state of Vietnam had been born only a year earlier as a result of compromises between ex-Emperor Bao Dai, Chief of State, and the French who sought to set up a regime capable of competing with the Viet Minh. The US had promptly recognized Bao Dai and signed with France and the Associated States
of Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos) in December 1950 what came to be known as the Pentalateral Agreements. These agreements formed the basis of US economic and military aid for Vietnam, the first step toward a growing commitment which terminated only a quarter of a century later.
As an Associated State of the French Union, Vietnam was granted some degree of autonomy, but not total independence, which came only in the aftermath of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. It was during this period that the National Army of Vietnam came into being, its creation sanctioned by the French need to Vietnamize the war. The Vietnamese Army, which initially consisted of auxiliary elements recruited, trained, and led by French cadre, was gradually upgraded into infantry battalions, then mobile groups by 1953, all under the command of Vietnamese officers. During 1952, command and control of the new national army was established, first with the General Staff, then four military region headquarters, but these bodies were still heavily staffed by French officers. During all this time, the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) remained far removed from the scene. Its main function was to make sure that US equipment was delivered and properly maintained through liaison with the French High Command. Most Vietnamese tactical commanders in the field were even unaware of its existence until 1953 when they received the first visits by MAAG officers.
The nature of US commitment in Vietnam radically changed after the 1954 Geneva Accords to become a true military assistance and advisory role with the advent of South Vietnam, now a separate nation south of the 17th parallel. This came about as a result of an agreement reached between General J. Lawton Collins, President Eisenhower’s special envoy and General Paul Ely, the French High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of the French Expeditionary Corps in Indochina. Under the terms of the agreement, the Vietnamese Armed Forces were to receive organization and training assistance from the MAAG as of 1 January 1955 and to become fully autonomous six months later. By this time, the General Staff had become all-Vietnamese under Major General Le Van Ty and after the regrouping of the 3d Military Region units from North Vietnam, the entire Vietnamese Armed Forces strength stood at 215,997, to include 179,197 regular troops who made up about 168 infantry battalions. The day the Collins-Ely agreement went into effect was also the day that three infantry divisions, the 11th, 21st and 31st, were activated for the first time.
Such was the. general status of the Vietnamese Army when the MAAG began its organization and training efforts. In cooperation with the French, Lieutenant General John W. O’Daniel, who replaced Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnell as Chief MAAG in April 1954, organized the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) on 1 February 1955. TRIM was essentially an American concept but for the purpose of political convenience, its staff also included French officers who performed mostly in a consultant’s role. The first TRIM advisory training teams, largely composed of US Army officers, began their field assignments in April 1955. They were attached to infantry divisions, the airborne brigade, service schools and training centers. One month later the first US advisers were placed at military region headquarters.
As defined in a memorandum published by the Vietnamese General Staff on 10 April 1955, the mission of TRIM advisers was to assist and advise, on strictly technical aspects, Vietnamese military commanders to whom they were assigned, in order to rapidly and effectively rebuild the Vietnamese Armed Forces on a new basis.
{1} The insistence on strictly technical aspects
set the tone and direction for the US Army advisory effort which was to remain technically-oriented throughout its existence. The new basis
for reorganization needed no clarification: it was understood to be the doctrine of the US Army.
These combined arrangements for training and reorganizing the Vietnamese Army continued for more than a year. When the French High Command in Indochina was deactivated on 28 April 1956, TRIM personnel were immediately reassigned to the MAAG’s Combat Arms Training and Organization (CATO) Division. It was only then that the Vietnamese Armed Forces became fully autonomous after taking over all military responsibilities from the departing French. But French officers continued advising and training the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force for another year, until asked by the Government of Vietnam to terminate their mission in May 1957.
During this period, the major difficulties of MAAG stemmed from the ceiling imposed on US military personnel by the Geneva Accords. Faced with an increasing commitment to training activities and growing logistical problems, the MAAG was authorized only 342 spaces, of which about two-thirds were devoted to training. The Vietnamese General Staff was also hard pressed by the same problem of a ceiling which was imposed, not by the Geneva Accords, but by the MAAG at the 150,000 level.
With the support of direct US economic and military assistance, South Vietnam confidently began its task of nation-building. On 26 October 1955, Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam and installed himself as President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The National Armed Forces of Vietnam became the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the National Army took on its acronym ARVN so familiar to US Army advisers. At about the same time, MAAG, Indochina was redesignated MAAG, Vietnam, marking the separation of duties for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
The final pull-out of the French Expeditionary Corps from South Vietnam resulted in logistical problems which plagued both the RVNAF General Staff and the MAAG. Not being adequately