Disengaging From Insurgencies: Insights From History And Implications For Afghanistan
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Relatively unsuccessful results flowed from the British withdrawal from Aden during the 1960’s and the American withdrawal from Vietnam during 1972-1973. As the last British troop departed Aden, a state of turmoil prevailed. Not only could the insurgents realistically claim victory in evicting the British by force, but also the territory later became the Arab world’s first Marxist state and a base for terrorists. America’s departure from Vietnam produced similar disappointment.
More successful outcomes occurred during the British withdrawal from Malaya in the 1960’s and the American withdrawal from El Salvador in 1988-1989. After World War II, the British attempted to re-establish colonial control of Malaya and faced resistance from communist insurgents. In the midst of their counterinsurgency, the British government granted Malaya independence in August 1957. The Malayan government, backed by British support, continued its struggle against the communist insurgents for another three years. The Malayan government announced victory in 1960 and began to enjoy a relatively peaceful and prosperous aftermath. From kidnappings, assassinations, and other political-criminal activities, an insurgency emerged in El Salvador in 1979. As the movement transitioned to guerrilla warfare, the insurgent fighters rivaled the strength of the Salvadoran security forces. From 1980-1992, the government of the United States provided El Salvador extensive funding for social and political reforms, military material support, and training to counter the communist insurgents. These efforts, coupled with effective El Salvadoran governance, eventually led the communists to abandon their cause.
Major James M. Kimbrough IV
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Disengaging From Insurgencies - Major James M. Kimbrough IV
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DISENGAGING FROM INSURGENCIES: INSIGHTS FROM HISTORY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN
BY
JAMES M. KIMBROUGH IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 5
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 6
ABSTRACT 7
ILLUSTRATIONS 8
INTRODUCTION 9
Background and Significance of the Problem 9
Methodology 9
Preview of the Argument 11
CHAPTER 1—THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM ADEN IN THE 1960’S 13
Strategic Context of the Aden Insurgency 13
Historical Influences 13
Global Influences on the Aden Insurgency 16
Regional Influences 17
British Domestic Influences 19
Galula’s Model Applied to the Aden Insurgency 19
A Cause 19
Counterinsurgent Vulnerability 20
Favorable Geography 20
Outside Support 21
British Goals for Troop Commitment 22
Situation after British Troop Commitment 23
Radfan Campaign 23
Urban violence 26
Decision to Disengage 28
Long-term Outcomes after Withdrawal 31
Insights 31
Lack of Infrastructure Development 31
Premature Announcement of a Withdrawal Date 32
Lack of Intelligence 33
Unbalanced Approach 33
Inadequate Information Operations 33
Checkered Employment of Airpower 34
Insights for Withdrawal 35
CHAPTER 2—THE AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM IN 1972-1973 36
Strategic Context of the Vietnamese Insurgency 36
Historical Influences 36
Global Influences on the Vietnamese Insurgency 38
Regional Influences 40
American Domestic Influences 40
Galula’s Model Applied to Vietnamese Insurgency 41
A Cause 41
Counterinsurgent Vulnerability 42
Favorable Geography 46
Outside Support 49
American Goals for Troop Commitment 49
Situation after American Troop Commitment 50
Decision to Disengage 54
Long-term Outcomes after Withdrawal 55
Insights 56
Collective Amnesia 56
Political-Military Responsibility 57
Vietnamization 58
Mirror Imaging 58
Legitimacy Building Lacking 58
Insights for Withdrawal 59
CHAPTER 3—THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM MALAYA IN 1960 60
Strategic Context of the Malayan Insurgency 60
Historical Influences 60
Global Influences on the Malayan Insurgency 61
Regional Influences 62
British Domestic Influences 62
Galula’s Model Applied to Malayan Insurgency 63
A Cause 63
Counterinsurgent Vulnerability 63
Favorable Geography 64
Outside Support 67
British Goals for Troop Commitment 68
Situation after British Troop Commitment 69
Decision to Disengage 73
Long-term Outcomes after Withdrawal 74
Insights 75
Long-term Plan for Independence 75
Civil Supremacy 75
Village Relocation 76
Building Intelligence Networks 76
Insights for Withdrawal 77
CHAPTER 4—THE AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM EL SALVADOR IN 1988-1989 78
Strategic Context of the El Salvadoran Insurgency 78
Historical Influences 78
Global Influences on the Salvadoran Insurgency 85
Regional Influences 86
American Domestic Influences 87
Galula’s Model Applied to Salvadoran Insurgency 88
A Cause 88
Counterinsurgent Vulnerability 88
Favorable Geography 90
Outside Support 91
American Goals for Troop Commitment 91
Situation after American Troop Commitment 93
Decision to Disengage 97
Long-term Outcomes after Withdrawal 98
Insights 98
Stay Out of the Headlines 98
Limit the Number of Advisers 98
Sustain the Domestic Support 99
Building Government and Fighting 99
Insights for Withdrawal 99
CHAPTER 5—CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT FROM AFGHANISTAN 101
Historical Insights 101
The Current Situation in Afghanistan 103
Cause 103
Counterinsurgent Vulnerability 104
Favorable Geography 104
Outside Support 104
Implications for a Successful American Disengagement from Afghanistan 105
Conclusion 107
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 107
BIBLIOGRAPHY 109
Academic Papers 109
Articles 109
Books 110
Government Documents 113
Briefing / Memos / Messages / Point Papers / Reports / Interviews 113
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Major James M. Kimbrough IV graduated in 1990 from Fayette County High School in Fayetteville, Georgia. After a year at the University of Georgia, he entered undergraduate studies at the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY. He graduated with a Bachelor of Science Degree in International Relations in June 1995 and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant of Infantry in the US Army.
After completing the Infantry Officer Basic Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, he reported to Fort Stewart, Georgia for assignment with the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment. He served as a mechanized infantry platoon leader, company executive officer, and the battalion maintenance officer; including 4 months deployed to Kuwait in support of Operation Intrinsic Action. After graduation for the Infantry Captain Career Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, MAJ Kimbrough reported to Fort Polk, Louisiana for assignment as the combat training center planner for the installation G3. Afterwards he served as the regimental training officer for the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ACR), as the commander of Mad Dog Company, 2ACR, and the commander of 3rd Squadron’s Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 2ACR; including 15 months as a commander deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Upon redeployment in 2004, MAJ Kimbrough became a small group instructor at the Armor Captain Career Course at the US Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky. In 2008, MAJ Kimbrough graduated from the Graduate School of Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, with a Masters of Logistics Management degree. Upon graduation from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, MAJ Kimbrough will serve as a planner for the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The initial idea for this thesis emerged during an office call with Dr. James Kiras to discuss my third topic proposal. As I struggled to refine my interest, we discussed the recent announcement of America’s SOFA agreement with Iraq, which included a withdrawal date. Attempting to divine Iraq’s future, we discussed the outcomes of previous counterinsurgencies. Dr. Kiras quickly made me realize that I lacked an understanding of how previous irregular conflicts ended. From this musing, I became interested in historical insights that might apply to Afghanistan.
From there, I owe my sincere appreciation to my thesis advisor, Dr. Harold R. Winton. His vast historical knowledge provided an extensive list of previous conflicts that I might want to consider exploring. Although I felt frustrated at the time, I now value his Socratic approach to help me narrow my cases and to develop my basic assertions. His guidance and tireless support during this research project motivated me throughout the year. Finally, Dr. Winton’s thorough review of my numerous drafts provided critical feedback, refined my ideas, and greatly improved my writing mechanics.
Finally, but foremost, my love, thanks, and deepest gratitude go to my family. My wife, Jennifer, never complained about my long hours spent reading, writing, or revising. I remain in awe of her ability to juggle the responsibilities of being a wife, mother, daughter, and volunteer. My sons, James and Charlie, may never understand how much I enjoyed their interruptions. I needed those breaks to play backyard baseball; to build a fort from blocks; to read a Dr. Seuss book; or to finish last in Mario Kart. I only wish I could have taken more timeouts.
ABSTRACT
To determine insights for future disengagements, this thesis examines four historical episodes in which Western nations withdrew from on-going conflicts against insurgent-like enemies.
Relatively unsuccessful results flowed from the British withdrawal from Aden during the 1960’s and the American withdrawal from Vietnam during 1972-1973. As the last British troop departed Aden, a state of turmoil prevailed. Not only could the insurgents realistically claim victory in evicting the British by force, but also the territory later became the Arab world’s first Marxist state and a base for terrorists. America’s departure from Vietnam produced similar disappointment. Less than three years after the Americans departed, insurgents combined with a North Vietnamese conventional assault to shatter the South Vietnam’s defenses and united the countries under communism.
More successful outcomes occurred during the British withdrawal from Malaya in the 1960’s and the American withdrawal from El Salvador in 1988-1989. After World War II, the British attempted to re-establish colonial control of Malaya and faced resistance from communist insurgents. In the midst of their counterinsurgency, the British government granted Malaya independence in August 1957. The Malayan government, backed by British support, continued its struggle against the communist insurgents for another three years. The Malayan government announced victory in 1960 and began to enjoy a relatively peaceful and prosperous aftermath. From kidnappings, assassinations, and other political-criminal activities, an insurgency emerged in El Salvador in 1979. As the movement transitioned to guerrilla warfare, the insurgent fighters rivaled the strength of the Salvadoran security forces. From 1980-1992, the government of the United States provided El Salvador extensive funding for social and political reforms, military material support, and training to counter the communist insurgents. These efforts, coupled with effective El Salvadoran governance, eventually led the communists to abandon their cause. The El Salvadoran government has since preserved a legitimate, enduring democratic government and husbanded a growing economy.
This historical examination revealed that nations can successfully disengage from confronting insurgencies on foreign soil. Success requires a significant reduction of the insurgent’s military capability. The indigenous government must develop or maintain its autonomy and independence from the supporting nation. The merger of political and military efforts creates the reciprocating benefits of sound governance and enduring security. A strong political leader amplifies these developments and further reduces the insurgency’s attractiveness. Host nations must develop indigenous capabilities, while advisors must avoid the pitfall of mirror-imaging. When the indigenous government establishes its self-sufficiency and legitimacy, the supporting nation can announce its withdrawal without further empowering the insurgency. These historical insights are transferable to the current Afghanistan situation.
While the Afghanistan’s future remains undetermined, the United States can make decisions to foster a successful disengagement. Which course America takes in Afghanistan depends on the wisdom, courage, and vision of both Americans and Afghans. Getting it right will not be easy, but it can happen.
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1: Aden and Vicinity
Figure 2: Vietnam
Figure 3: Malaya During the Emergency, 1948-1960
Figure 4: El Salvador
INTRODUCTION
War’s objective is victory—not prolonged indecision. In war, there is no substitute for victory.
—General Douglas MacArthur
How long is it worthwhile to suffer—and to inflict—further casualties and destruction in order to accomplish the initial objectives of fighting?
—Fred Charles Ikle in Every War Must End
For the first time its history, the United States is simultaneously engaged in two major engagements on foreign soil against insurgent adversaries. Uneasy with the progress in Iraq and ambivalent about the situation in Afghanistan, the nation elected a president campaigning on a promise to change radically the handling of these conflicts. Prior to President Barack Obama’s inauguration, the United States and Iraq reached an agreement calling for a withdrawal of all American forces by the end of 2011.{1} In Afghanistan, President Obama has inherited a war against a resilient enemy with no immediate end in sight.
America’s previous engagement in counterinsurgencies suggests strongly that eventually all or most of American forces will withdrawal from Afghanistan. This disengagement may come about because our efforts have been successful and a relatively stable, prosperous, and representative government has been established in Afghanistan with the Taliban and regional Al Qaeda threats effectively neutralized. Or it may come about because our efforts have been insufficiently successful to warrant continued expenditure of blood, treasure, and political capital. To enhance the likelihood of the former, historical insights derived from the previous experience of democratic societies withdrawing from insurgencies in foreign countries can yield useful insights for America’s military and political leaders. This thesis seeks to glean such insights.
Background and Significance of the Problem
While American and Iraqi political leaders have determined a policy of gradually ending US involvement in Iraq, the potential withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan remains less certain. US policies and actions can still shape the conditions in and surrounding Afghanistan that would foster a successful disengagement. Alternately, the American experience in Afghanistan could turn into a Soviet-style quagmire. Examining several historical cases should provide insights that will assist in the proper planning of a successful withdrawal when conditions warrant its implementation. The aim here is to discover guidelines that will foster the prospects of implementing a withdrawal plan that leaves in place a secure, prosperous, and politically viable Afghani government that generally aligns with the furtherance of American interests in South Asia.
Methodology
To uncover these insights, this thesis examines four historical examples in which nations withdrew from on-going conflicts against insurgent-like adversaries. Relatively unsuccessful results flowed from the British withdrawal from Aden during the 1960’s and the American withdrawal from Vietnam during 1972-1973. Outcomes that were more successful occurred during the British withdrawal from Malaya in 1960 and the American withdrawal from El Salvador in 1988-1989. By examining these examples, this study hopes to gain insights that can support suggestions for a successful American withdrawal from Afghanistan.
To describe the situations in the respective nations, this study utilizes the four prerequisites for a successful insurgency outlined by David Galula in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. The first states that an insurgency