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“Putting Out The Fire In Afghanistan”: - The Fire Model of Counterinsurgency: Focusing Efforts to Make an Insurgency Unsustainable
“Putting Out The Fire In Afghanistan”: - The Fire Model of Counterinsurgency: Focusing Efforts to Make an Insurgency Unsustainable
“Putting Out The Fire In Afghanistan”: - The Fire Model of Counterinsurgency: Focusing Efforts to Make an Insurgency Unsustainable
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“Putting Out The Fire In Afghanistan”: - The Fire Model of Counterinsurgency: Focusing Efforts to Make an Insurgency Unsustainable

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This monograph develops an alternative approach to counterinsurgency, and explains how the current narratives in the field of counterinsurgency are not completely accurate. Counterinsurgents only need to properly understand the environment and then concentrate their efforts in that critical area of the insurgency identified as the sustainer of that insurgency. The U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) plan does not need to address all those lines of effort not directly related to the root cause of an insurgency, as those efforts may actually fuel the insurgency due to building unrealistic expectations among the populace.
This monograph also develops the analogy that the four elements necessary for a fire (fuel, oxygen, heat, chain reaction) parallel the necessary elements of an insurgency (the fuel representing unresponsive government, oxygen representing existing structures/vulnerability, heat representing political/diplomatic factors, chain reaction representing the information environment, and the population). Like a fire, if one has a proper understanding of the environment, and can clearly identify the true sustainer of the insurgency (the root problem), then one only need to remove that one element from the equation, and that insurgency will be unsustainable.
Having a simple approach will not only allow the counterinsurgents to better utilize their resources-in an Economy of Force-and allow them to Mass their power on one clear Objective, it will also remind counterinsurgents of the other Principle of War that has proven to be so critical in complex environments-simplicity.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateAug 15, 2014
ISBN9781782896029
“Putting Out The Fire In Afghanistan”: - The Fire Model of Counterinsurgency: Focusing Efforts to Make an Insurgency Unsustainable

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    Book preview

    “Putting Out The Fire In Afghanistan” - Major Patrick Pascall

     This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

    To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – picklepublishing@gmail.com

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    Text originally published in 2009 under the same title.

    © Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

    Publisher’s Note

    Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

    We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

    Putting Out the Fire in Afghanistan — The Fire Model of Counterinsurgency: Focusing Efforts to Make an Insurgency Unsustainable

    A Monograph

    by

    MAJ Patrick Pascall United States Army

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Contents

    TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

    ABSTRACT 6

    ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7

    TABLE OF FIGURES 8

    CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 9

    CHAPTER 2: Review and Critique of Traditional COIN Theory and Doctrine 12

    CHAPTER 3: THE FIRE MODEL OF INSURGENCY 18

    THE FIRE MODEL OF INSURGENCY 20

    CORE ELEMENT 1: Fuel (Unresponsive Government) 21

    CORE ELEMENT 2: Heat (Political-Diplomatic Factors) 23

    CORE ELEMENT 3: Oxygen (Structures or Vulnerability) 25

    CONNECTOR ELEMENTS: Chain Reaction (Information and the Population) 26

    CHAPTER 4: Theory Applied: Afghanistan 30

    ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME AFGHANISTAN 31

    Unresponsive Government (Fuel) 33

    Political-Diplomatic (Heat) 36

    Structures and Vulnerability (Oxygen) 45

    Information/Population (Chain Reaction) 46

    Summary 47

    AFGHANISTAN: RECOMMENDATION FOR ACTION 47

    Put the Insurgent Fire Out 48

    Core Elements 48

    THE FIRE MODEL SOLUTION DEVELOPED, AFGHANISTAN 50

    Connector Elements 50

    Contain 51

    Summary 52

    CHAPTER 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 54

    REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 56

    BIBLIOGRAPHY 57

    ABSTRACT

    CAN A COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY FOCUS ON ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF AN INSURGENCY AND MAKE THAT INSURGENCY UNSUSTAINABLE? By Major Patrick M. Pascall.

    This monograph develops an alternative approach to counterinsurgency, and explains how the current narratives in the field of counterinsurgency are not completely accurate. Counterinsurgents only need to properly understand the environment and then concentrate their efforts in that critical area of the insurgency identified as the sustainer of that insurgency. The U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) plan does not need to address all those lines of effort not directly related to the root cause of an insurgency, as those efforts may actually fuel the insurgency due to building unrealistic expectations among the populace.

    This monograph also develops the analogy that the four elements necessary for a fire (fuel, oxygen, heat, chain reaction) parallel the necessary elements of an insurgency (the fuel representing unresponsive government, oxygen representing existing structures/vulnerability, heat representing political/diplomatic factors, chain reaction representing the information environment, and the population). Like a fire, if one has a proper understanding of the environment, and can clearly identify the true sustainer of the insurgency (the root problem), then one only need to remove that one element from the equation, and that insurgency will be unsustainable.

    Having a simple approach will not only allow the counterinsurgents to better utilize their resources—in an Economy of Force—and allow them to Mass their power on one clear Objective, it will also remind counterinsurgents of the other Principle of War that has proven to be so critical in complex environments—simplicity.

    ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

    Many individuals helped to bring this monograph together in a coherent fashion, and I owe them all a debt of gratitude. To my wonderful wife, Amy, for continuing to encourage me throughout the process, and managing the household while I was away, including my year at the Command and General Staff College, and many deployments overseas. To my son Ryan for continuing to excel in school given all those extra tasks that come with being a son, a student, and in my absence the man of the house. To LTC Andrew Johnson and Dr. Daniel G. Cox for their keen insights, wisdom and attention to detail that kept me on the path to success. To Mr. Frank Wenzel, whose mentoring, advisement and support throughout the school year was extraordinary and will never be forgotten. To the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), specifically LTC Philip Mauldin, whose dedicated persistence afforded me the extraordinary opportunity, as a reserve officer, to attend the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Last, but certainly not least, my seminar. If it were not for their hard work in developing the environmental frame for Afghanistan, this monograph would not be possible or as complete. Their knowledge, expertise, insight, and humor will be in my memory forever: MAJ Aaron Bohrer, MAJ Mandi Bohrer, MAJ Bryan Carroll, MAJ Tom Ehrhart, MAJ Tom Hough, MAJ Joseph Jackson, CDR Mark Lesher, MAJ Tray Mashack, Ms. Christiane Thompson, MAJ Mark Tromblee, MAJ Joel Vernetti and MAJ Derek Zitko.

    TABLE OF FIGURES

    FIGURE 1: COMPARING FIRE TO INSURGENCY

    FIGURE 2: THE FIRE MODEL OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

    FIGURE 3: ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME SKETCH

    FIGURE 4: FIRE MODEL SOLUTION DEVELOPED, AFGHANISTAN

    CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

    Learning is like rowing upstream: not to advance is to drop back. — Chinese proverb

    The U. S. is wasting much of its energy on counterinsurgency in Afghanistan unnecessarily. This is not because it is not providing enough troops or treasure, but because the U.S. has failed to frame the environment properly, and has not identified the true problem. Thus, the U.S. effort is focused on solving the wrong problems better instead of solving the right problem. This monograph proposes an alternative approach that, when combined with the emerging doctrinal concept of design, focuses on the environment in which the insurgency is operating, identifies the real problem, and once fully framed will allow commanders to focus resources towards that area, and thus place the problematic situation within the zone of tolerance{1} as determined by the strategic guidance. In a nut-shell, the U.S. COIN plan does not need to address those issues not directly related to the root cause of an insurgency, as those efforts may actually fuel the insurgency due to building unrealistic expectations among the populace.

    Since the introduction of the first comprehensive book on COIN theory in 1964, David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, the U.S. had not adapted doctrine, organization or training to the emerging enemy—the insurgent-in any large way since the civil war in El Salvador.{2} Then in the midst of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II, in 2004, U.S. commanders realized they were facing an insurgency—in both Iraq and Afghanistan—and that they needed a new approach. Rather than seeking to understand the current environment, and finding the root causes of the insurgency, the U.S. looked back in time and tried to use Galula’s theory from 1964 as a template, and low-intensity conflict doctrine from 1988 as a guide. The problem was that the insurgent had adapted, and added a different capability since the 1960s and 1980s. Now the 21st century insurgent was using a more powerful tool that was traditionally the purview of the state—information. In fact, not only is information no longer dominated by the state, but the state no longer has control over what is being broadcast, true or untrue, and most importantly, everyone now has access to the populace through the information domain. The U.S. had not fought a hands on insurgency since Vietnam, an experience it did not want to revisit. In effect, the U.S. misused Galula, did not learn from the CORDS{3} experience, and ultimately missed the opportunity to interdict the insurgency that ended up preying on the vulnerable populations in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

    Instead of understanding the environment, the U.S. over-adapted old theory and began using all of the assets available to it (PMES-II: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information) without proper coordination or properly understanding the problem (the root cause of the insurgency). The U.S. busied itself by building schools,

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