Profiles in Folly: History's Worst Decisions and Why They Went Wrong

PART ONE

The Decision to

Gamble and Hope

The Trojans and the Trojan Horse (CA. 1250 BC)

THE DECISION TO LET DANGER IN

These days, uttering the phrase Trojan horse is likely to elicit a response such as, Did you lose any data? We think of a Trojan horse as a malicious software program that gets into computers by pretending to be something you want or need. You download a program that promises to rid your computer of viruses, for instance, and end up admitting into the inner sanctum of your virtual fortress a program that unleashes viruses.

As a label for malicious software, Trojan horse is derived from the Trojan War, an epic battle between Troy, which was located in what is now Turkey, and Sparta, a Greek city-state. Sparta won the battle after the Trojans were foolish enough to admit into their formidably fortified city a giant wooden horse they believed was a token of peace and submission from the Greeks. It was, to use another computer term, a fatal error.

The story of the Trojan War has come down to us through a mixture of history and mythology. In The Iliad, the Greek poet Homer tells us that the war was rooted in the marriage of Peleus to the sea goddess Thetis. The happy couple had neglected to invite Eris, the goddess of discord, to their wedding ceremony. Outraged, Eris crashed the wedding banquet and tossed onto the feast table a golden apple, announcing that it rightfully belonged to whoever was the fairest. That was sufficient to send Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite diving for the golden fruit, whereupon Zeus, chief among the gods, nominated a judge to award the apple and thereby determine who was the most beautiful. Since the prince of Troy, Paris, was universally deemed the handsomest man alive, Zeus reasoned that he was the most qualified to decide who among the three contenders deserved the apple.

Hermes, messenger of the gods, delivered Zeus’s nomination, and Paris agreed. The three contenders did their best to move his decision in their favor, Hera promising him power, Athena wealth, and Aphrodite assuring him that he would enjoy the most beautiful woman in the world.

That turned out to be just the ticket.

Paris chose Aphrodite, who responded by promising that Helen, wife of Menelaus, king of Sparta, would become Paris’s wife. Accordingly, Paris prepared to travel to Sparta for the purpose of taking Helen. His sister and brother, the prophetic twins Cassandra and Helenus, did their best to dissuade him, and in this they were joined by their mother, Hecuba; but heedless Paris was determined to collect the wife Aphrodite had promised him.

Menelaus, unsuspecting, greeted Prince Paris as a royal guest and treated him accordingly. But when the old king left Sparta to attend a funeral, Paris made his move. In some versions of the story, he snatched Helen away against her will. In others, moved by the young prince’s beauty and tired of life with the old king, Helen left with him willingly. In either case, the two were married in Troy about 1200 BC.

For his part, Menelaus did not go off quietly into the night. Enraged upon his return to Sparta to find both Paris and Helen gone, he called upon all of his wife’s former suitors to honor the pledges they had made to him years earlier. Each had sworn an oath to aid Helen’s husband in the defense of her honor.

All now backpedaled, and one particularly famous former suitor, Odysseus, feigned madness in an effort to avoid going to war for another man’s wife. His dodge, however, was exposed. Others also tried to wiggle out, including Cinyras, king of Paphos, a city-state on Cyprus. Not wishing to go to war, he nevertheless promised Agamemnon, brother of Menelaus, to contribute fifty ships to the Greek fleet. In fact, he did send the vessels, with the lead ship commanded by none other than his own son. The other forty-nine ships, however, were clay toys crewed by tiny clay sailors.

It fell to Agamemnon to assemble an invasion force from among the reluctant former suitors. He also successfully prevailed upon Achilles to join the expedition. Although Achilles was not among the legion of Helen’s former suitors, the seer Calchas had foretold that Troy would never be taken without Achilles’s participation in the fight. At length, the Greek fleet was assembled in Aulis—only to be delayed by yet another problem. Agamemnon, it seems, had offended the goddess Diana either by killing one of her sacred stags or by making a careless boast. Whatever the particular offense, an outraged Diana calmed the seas and stayed the wind so that the fleet could not get under way.

Once again, the Greeks turned to the seer Calchas. He prescribed the sacrifice of Iphigenia, Agamemnon’s daughter, to appease Diana. Agamemnon agreed, the poor girl was sacrificed, and the Greek fleet finally sailed—in search of Troy.

For no one quite knew where Troy was.

They landed first in Mysia, home of the Teuthranians (Teucrians). In some versions of the story, the Greeks were simply lost, but as the historian Herodotus (in the fifth century BC) tells the tale, they were under the misapprehension that the Teuthranians were holding Helen. This the Teuthranians denied, but the Greeks laid siege to Mysia anyway, ultimately taking the city, albeit at a heavy cost. And, of course, they emerged from the victory without Helen.

This instance of fighting the wrong battle in the wrong place nearly brought the Trojan War to a close before it had even begun. The Greek fleet turned back and headed for home; however, Telephus, king of Mysia, having been grievously wounded by Achilles in the siege of his city, sailed to Greece as well, in the hope of finding a cure for his wound. An oracle had told him that only the person who had wounded him—namely, Achilles—could cure him. Telephus thus sought out the warrior, who agreed to administer the cure. In return, Telephus told the Greeks how to get to Troy.

At this point came a rare interval of sanity. Instead of simply sailing off to war again, Odysseus, celebrated for his eloquence, embarked with Menelaus on an embassy to Priam, king of Troy. The pair demanded that Helen be returned. It was only when Priam stated his absolute refusal that the war was on.

Like many wars begun over relatively trivial matters, the Trojan War was much longer and much more costly than any of the combatants had imagined possible. For nine years there was fighting in Troy and neighboring regions—since the Greeks understood that Troy was being supplied by nearby kingdoms. Throughout, Troy took the worst of it. Its economy suffered, even as the Greeks enjoyed a steady stream of war’s spoils. Yet although the Greeks prevailed in battle after battle—and succeeded in killing the Trojan hero Hector—they were unable to penetrate the walled city of Troy itself. In the ongoing struggle for the city, Patroclus, friend—perhaps lover—of Achilles was slain, and then Achilles himself, greatest of the Greek heroes, was felled by none other than Paris.

In the meantime, Odysseus captured Helenus, son of King Priam. A prophet, Helenus revealed to the Greeks that the city of Troy would never fall unless four conditions were met: First, Pyrrhus, son of Achilles, must join the battle; second, the Greeks must employ the bow and arrows of Hercules against the Trojans; third, the remains of Pelops, a famous hero, must be brought to Troy; and, fourth, a statue of Athena, known as the Palladium, must be stolen from Troy. In accordance with the prophecy, Pyrrhus was persuaded to fight; Philoctetes, who had the bow and arrows of Hercules, was likewise persuaded to join the Greeks; the remains of Pelops were collected; and Odysseus managed to infiltrate the Trojan lines to steal the Palladium.

Yet the problem of how to enter the city—in force—remained. According to some accounts, it was Odysseus alone who came up with the winning stratagem. Others relate that he was aided in his scheming by Athena. In either case, it was Odysseus who ordered the artisan Epeius to build a massive wooden horse, hollow inside to accommodate a small band of elite soldiers. When the horse was completed, Odysseus and his warriors secreted themselves inside. Most daring of all, the entire Greek fleet set sail, withdrawing from Troy, thereby prompting the Trojans to believe that they had lifted the siege, given up, and gone home.

Just one Greek, Sinon, was left conspicuously behind. When the Trojans came out of their city to marvel at the great horse, Sinon was there to greet them. He spoke loudly and bitterly. The Greeks, he complained to the gawkers, had deserted him, leaving him behind with this great wooden horse. Sinon assured the Trojans that the marvelous statue would bring to Troy precisely what he lacked: luck.

Luck was something the Trojans had also long lacked. Yet two among them, Laocoön and Cassandra, warned against bringing the horse into the city. They were blithely ignored by the rest of the Trojan people, who were grateful at having been given a victory at long last. Surely the great horse was a wondrous token of their long-delayed triumph.

Like cicadas, which sit upon a tree in the forest and pour out their piping voices, so the leaders of the Trojans were sitting on the tower.

—Homer, The Iliad, Book III

With light hearts, they dragged the heavy horse into the walled city, where it became the centerpiece of riotous celebration. By late night, all of Troy lay in drunken stupor, whereupon Sinon—the Greeks’ outside man—opened the horse, letting Odysseus and his band out. They moved swiftly through the city, slaughtering the Trojans. Priam was slain as he cowered by the altar of Zeus. Cassandra was raped. Troy fell, and the war ended with the sacrifice of Polyxena, daughter of Priam, at the tomb of Achilles, and Hector’s son, Astyanax.

The Trojan prince Aeneas managed to escape the city’s destruction; his story is told in Virgil’s Aeneid. Some sources claim that Aeneas was the only Trojan prince to survive the war, but other sources point out that Andromache later married Helenus, Cassandra’s twin brother. Perhaps, then, two princes survived.

As for Helen, retaken by the Greeks, she nearly fell victim to the jealous rage of Menelaus, who, apparently assuming that she had been a willing accomplice in her own abduction, swore to kill the faithless woman. In the end, however, her beauty and seductive charms mollified his passion for vengeance, and she was allowed to live. The rest of the women of Troy were apportioned among the Greeks as the spoils of war. Yet, as Homer relates in The Odyssey, the return home of Odysseus and the others proved as difficult and time-consuming as the Trojan War itself.

Whatever it is, I fear Greeks even when they bring gifts.

—Virgil, Aeneid

THE TALE OF THE TROJAN HORSE comes down to us as the archetypal parable of folly: an object lesson in how thoughtless vanity prompts people to bring about their own destruction. In the larger context of the Trojan War narrative, the episode of the horse is merely the crowning folly of an epic string of follies that make up a ruinous struggle set into motion by a goddess offended at nothing more than having been left off a wedding party’s A-list.

As mythology, the story of the Trojan War invites our meditation on the membrane-thin partition separating the most trivial of vanities from the epic sacrifice of the greatest of heroes. For thousands of years, people took some comfort in the fact that the story of the Trojan War was no more than mythology. And it is true that the full narrative of this war is known only through The Iliad and The Odyssey of Homer. Yet even in later ages there were a few who insisted that the mythic poetry was founded on historical fact, and, in the 1870s, the German-Russian treasure hunter and amateur archaeologist Heinrich Schliemann excavated a site generally accepted as that of Troy. Despite ongoing controversies, Schliemann’s discoveries confirmed a basis of historicity to the Homeric account, and in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, subsequent archaeological investigations have elaborated on this basis. The Trojan War—perhaps really a series of Late Bronze Age conflicts—now appears less as the stuff of poetry, myth, and parable than as an example of one of the innumerable, sometimes nameless, wars that mark the so-called progress of civilization, wars whose cost vastly outweighs the original cause and the potential gain.

In our own time, no less a warrior than General George S. Patton Jr., himself compounded of blended legend and fact, repeatedly observed that, next to war, all other human endeavor paled to puny insignificance. It is folly beyond the power of any mere parable to convey that this, though all history, should truly be so.

George Armstrong Custer and the

Little Bighorn (1876)

THE DECISION TO ATTACK WITHOUT LOOKING

It is the most famous battle of the so-called Indian Wars and one of the most celebrated military engagements in American history, yet we really know very little about what happened near the Little Bighorn River in Big Horn County, Montana, on June 25, 1876. We do have a reasonably accurate body count from the June 25 engagement and the fighting that continued into the next day: 16 officers and 242 troopers of the 7th U.S. Cavalry killed, along with 10 civilians and scouts. Fifty-five were wounded—although from the principal encounter, the last stand of George Armstrong Custer, not a single officer or trooper emerged alive. Thus we have no battle report from the army combatants, and the Indian accounts are vague with great variation in the details. In the battle’s main event, about 208 soldiers died, including Custer himself. Indian casualties are more difficult to determine. Chiefs Sitting Bull and Red Horse reported 60 killed and about 168 wounded, whereas modern U.S. government archaeological studies suggest that more than 200 Lakota (Sioux), Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho warriors fell.

Whatever the facts of the Battle of the Little Bighorn may have been, two things are certain: It was just one among many bloody encounters in four centuries of North American white-Indian warfare, and its U.S. Army commander was among the most famous and controversial military leaders in American history.

Those four hundred years of racial warfare were marked by suffering, bravery, nobility, good intentions, tragedy, a lust for conquest, greed, racial mythology, racial hatred, cruelty, and sheer folly, the very ingredients of the Little Bighorn battle itself. As for the army commander, George Armstrong Custer represented both the best and the worst of American soldiery. Brave, bold, aggressive, and of unquestionably heroic mold, he was also reckless, bigoted, cruel, and blundering.

Custer was born in 1839 in New Rumley, Ohio, but spent most of his childhood with his half sister Lydia Reed in Monroe, Michigan. He enrolled at West Point, barely managing to graduate—at the very bottom of his class—on the eve of the Civil War. Despite his weak academic achievement and nearly scandalous record of conduct, in combat he found his calling. As a staff officer for General George B. McClellan and, later, General Alfred Pleasonton, Captain Custer leaped through the ranks, rapidly achieving promotion to brevet brigadier general and obtaining a Michigan cavalry brigade to command. At twenty-three, he was the youngest general officer in U.S. Army history, and the press—which dubbed him the boy general—loved him for his long golden hair, flamboyant velvet uniform of his own design, and, from Gettysburg to Appomattox, his slashing cavalry charges. Some of these actions were productive of nothing but bloodshed, but a number proved tactically decisive and earned Custer a reputation for personal fearlessness. By war’s end, he had become a major general commanding a full division, but after the war, Custer was returned to Regular Army service and assigned the rank of lieutenant colonel in the newly authorized 7th Cavalry Regiment.

Custer set about doing in the Wild West what he had done on the battlefields of the War Between the States. Exchanging his Civil War black velvet and gold lace for fringed buckskin, he let his yellow hair grow longer—in the manner of a mountain man—transforming himself into the very embodiment of the dashing Indian fighter. Because the regiment’s commanding colonel was often absent, Custer led the 7th in his stead, and, for all practical purposes, it became his regiment.

The popular press was primed for more Custer exploits. Yet his first experience fighting Indians, in Kansas in 1867, ended not only in the 7th’s failure to defeat any braves, but also in the lieutenant colonel’s court-martial on charges of taking unauthorized leave to visit his wife, the beautiful and worshipful Elizabeth Libby Custer, and mistreating his men by ruthlessly overmarching them. Sentenced to a year’s suspension of rank and pay, he redeemed himself in the eyes of his military superiors in 1868 with a devastating surprise attack on Chief Black Kettle’s Cheyenne village on the Washita River in present-day Oklahoma. The public, however, had a mixed reaction. After all, Black Kettle was an advocate of peace, and his village contained few warriors yet many old men, women, and children. The village was a civilian target. Some Americans were outraged, although many others subscribed to a mangled maxim attributed to Gen. Philip Sheridan shortly after Washita: The only good Indian is a dead Indian. In either case, the colorful Custer had made his reputation as an Indian fighter, and fighting the Sioux while guarding railroad surveyors on the Yellowstone River in 1873 embellished the image.

Although the public, especially easterners, saw Custer as the army’s leading Indian fighter, he was actually no more successful than many of his peers and less effective than a few. Worse, his regiment was badly factionalized, compounded of idolaters on the one hand and nearly mutinous detractors on the other. Custer himself was a shameless self-promoter, who wrote popular magazine articles and a best-selling memoir, My Life on the Plains. In 1874, he led the 7th on patrol in the Black Hills of the Dakota Territory. Part of the Great Sioux Reservation, guaranteed to the Indians by the Treaty of 1868, the Black Hills had long been coveted by whites who thought its dark recesses harbored gold—which is precisely what miners traveling with the Custer expedition found. To no one’s surprise, news of the discovery touched off a mad gold rush.

The U.S. government responded by offering to buy the Black Hills from the Sioux, but when the Indians refused to sell land considered sacred, the Sioux War of 1876 erupted. It was in this context that the Little Bighorn battle was fought. Despite enduring popular beliefs to the contrary, U.S. Indian policy never advocated genocide against the Indians, but it did call for tribal confinement to reservations. Most military operations against the Indians were, in effect, policing operations, designed to round up those who had left the reservations and to compel their return. So it was in 1876. General George Crook led nine hundred men out of Fort Fetterman, on the North Platte River in Wyoming Territory, on March 1, 1876, and, while battling winter storms, he searched the Powder River country for Indians. After three discouraging weeks without results, he finally found a trail and dispatched Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds with about three hundred cavalry troopers to attack a village of 105 lodges beside the Powder River. Although taken by surprise, the Oglalas (a Sioux band), under He Dog, and the Cheyennes, led by Old Bear, counterattacked so effectively that Reynolds was forced to withdraw back to Crook’s main column. Crook’s abortive campaign did nothing more than galvanize the Sioux and Cheyenne into a large and unified fighting force under the inspired leadership of Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull.

If I were an Indian, I would certainly prefer to cast my lot … to the free open plains rather than submit to the confined limits of a reservation, there to be the recipient of the blessed benefits of civilization with its vices thrown in.

—George Armstrong Custer, 1874

Late in the spring of 1876, Philip Sheridan devised a three-pronged campaign intended to round up the Sioux and return them to the reservations. General Alfred Terry would lead a force from the east (including Custer and his 7th Cavalry), while Colonel John Gibbon would approach from the west, and Crook would once again march out of Fort Fetterman. The three columns were to converge on the Yellowstone River, even as the Indians were traveling toward it. The braves would be caught in this convergence and duly battled into submission.

On the morning of June 17, Crook, with more than one thousand men, halted for a rest at the head of the Rosebud Creek. Crow and Shoshoni scouts attached to Crook’s column sighted Sitting Bull’s Sioux and Cheyenne as they descended upon the column. The scouts were able to give sufficient warning to avert outright annihilation, but, even so, the Indians withdrew only after a sharp six-hour fight in which Crook’s column took a severe beating.

Unaware of Crook’s defeat and retreat, Terry joined his column with that of Colonel Gibbon at the mouth of the Rosebud. The officers of both commands, including Custer, convened in the cabin of the Yellowstone steamer Far West to lay out a campaign strategy. They were confident that they would find the Sioux encampment on the stream that Indians called the Greasy Grass and that white men called the Little Bighorn. They had no notion, however, of the size of the camp, but they all operated on the cherished assumption that Indians were incapable of organizing large-scale attacks. It was an article of faith in the U.S. Army that Indian leaders lacked the logistical skill to maintain more than about five hundred warriors in the field at any one time. Even if an encampment contained many more than this number, it was believed that they could never be marshaled into an effective fighting unit—certainly not one to offer serious threat to well-organized army troopers.

The Far West plan called for Custer to lead his 7th up the Rosebud, cross to the Little Bighorn, then proceed down its valley from the south as Terry and Gibbon marched up the Yellowstone and Little Bighorn to block the Indians from the north. In this way, Sitting Bull would be caught between the pincers of a two-column flanking movement.

The operation stepped off on the morning of June 22. It was assumed that Custer’s highly mobile cavalry would be the first to make contact and would therefore begin the fight, driving the Indians against the other column, so that the Sioux would be caught between Custer and the forces of Gibbon and Terry. Nevertheless, on the morning of the twenty-second, after Custer’s six hundred men passed in review before Terry, Gibbon, and Custer himself—marching to the regiment’s cheerful trademark tune, Garry Owen—Gibbon jauntily called after Custer as the lieutenant colonel rode off to join his men: Now, Custer, don’t be greedy, but wait for us.

Custer turned in his saddle. No, he replied, I will not.

Indeed, left to his own devices Custer almost immediately deviated from the plan of crossing to the Little Bighorn Valley south of the Indians’ position. Indian fighting characteristically involved very little fighting but a great deal of marching and riding, so that troopers returned from an expedition exhausted and half starved with little of military value to show for their labors. When Custer determined that the trail was much fresher than anticipated, he decided to push the attack, even though Terry and Gibbon were still far away. He did not want another long ride for no result.

After a forced march by night during June 24/25, Custer awaited word from his Crow Indian scouts. At length, they reported a very large Sioux camp—a cluster of large camps, in fact. Apparently undaunted—if anything, more eager than ever to fight—Custer made no further attempt to ascertain the numbers of Indians in and around the camps. Focused solely on striking before the always-elusive enemy evaded him, Custer divided his forces four ways. He would personally lead Troops C, E, F, I, and L—13 officers and 198 troopers (seven of whom would be detached before the battle—and would therefore survive)—together with three civilians and two Indian scouts, along the ridge line on the east bank of the Little Bighorn so as to enter the encampment from the north. A second detachment, under Maj. Marcus Reno, was sent into the valley of the Little Bighorn to provoke a fight there. This detachment consisted of 11 officers and 131 troopers, plus some 35 Indian scouts. Capt. Frederick Benteen was assigned to lead the third detachment, the 5 officers and 110 men of Troops D, H, and K. Benteen appears to have been given ambiguous orders. It is unclear whether he was supposed merely to scout the nearby valleys or to advance into the Little Bighorn Valley and make a drive into the village to coordinate directly with Custer’s main column. Finally, the small regimental supply train was, quite properly, held in the rear.

Custer’s overall plan was for each of the three combat detachments to attack and pin down any Indians encountered, holding them in place until both of the other detachments arrived as reinforcement. It was, in effect, a tactic of first to arrive, first to fight. Whatever detachment made initial contact would receive the support of the other two. Apparently, little or no thought was given to the possibility that two or all three of the detachments would fall under simultaneous attack—or that all three would simply be overwhelmed. All Custer knew was that he had used this tactic at Washita, and he had won. Of course, at Washita he had been fighting mostly old men, women, and children.

Most historians now estimate that the Sioux encampment on which Custer descended had about seven thousand inhabitants, of whom at least fifteen hundred (some estimates say much more) were warriors. Custer’s combined strength was just six hundred—and this number had been divided four ways.

Reno’s detachment of 142 soldiers plus 35 scouts was the first to make contact, sighting and then pursuing some 40 warriors. Reno dispatched a message to Custer, but, receiving no reply, he advanced on his own, driving the warriors before him. Despite—or perhaps because of—the ease with which he drove the enemy, Reno suspected a trap and stopped well short of the main Indian encampment. He resorted to the army manual, dismounting his men, and deploying precisely what standard doctrine called for: a skirmish line, in which every fifth trooper handled the horses for the four other troopers who took up firing positions. Highly mobile, cavalry could be very effective against the mounted Indians of the Plains. Once dismounted in the field, however, the cavalrymen’s horses became burdens rather than assets. In effect, this conventional line of skirmish tactic reduced the fighting force by twenty percent, as one out of five troopers did nothing but hold horses.

And as Reno waited in his line of skirmish, the numbers of Indians multiplied. Soon he calculated that he was outnumbered five to one. As time passed and no reply—let alone reinforcements—came from Custer, Reno ordered a retreat, during which three officers and twenty-nine troopers were killed.

Reno managed to link up with Benteen’s detachment, which had arrived from the south. Benteen reported to Reno that Giovanni Martini, one of Custer’s buglers, an Italian immigrant who sometimes called himself John Martin, had delivered a message from Custer to him: Come on … big village, be quick … Martini’s courier mission saved his life. He was the last white man to see George Armstrong Custer alive.

Benteen’s fortuitous arrival saved Reno from meeting the same fate as Custer—but, in the aftermath of the Little Bighorn, few would praise Benteen for rescuing Reno and many more would condemn him for not riding to the aid of Custer. Benteen always claimed that he had followed Custer’s orders, which, however, were so vague as to allow a wide range of interpretation.

In the meantime, Custer and his men were engulfed. He had led his troopers against a force he knew to be very large—though he did not know how large, and he had not tried to find out. Most modern authorities believe that, overall, Custer was outnumbered three to one, a ratio that, at times, was increased to five to one. Moreover, Custer made his stand on ground unfavorable to him. The Indians held the high ground, while he and his men occupied lower ground from which they often could not fire directly on their attackers. In contrast, the Indians could make use of indirect fire, launching volleys of arrows at high trajectory—from cover—so that they would rain down upon men huddled below. Not that the Indians were armed only with bows and arrows. Many warriors carried modern repeating rifles. In fact, their repeaters outclassed the single-shot Springfield carbines with which the conservative cavalry was equipped. Thus the Indians occupied better ground and at least some of them fought with a better class of weapon.

Archaeological evidence suggests that Custer—at least initially—deployed his men much as Reno did: dismounted, in a line of skirmish. Some historians have concluded from this that the skirmish line would have disintegrated, fallen apart during the onslaught, and that the so-called last stand really did not take place. Instead, the Indians would have swarmed down upon the much-depleted line of skirmish and simply picked off survivors one by one. Yet the very latest archaeological evidence has led National Park Service researchers to conclude that some two hundred Indian warriors fell in the Battle of the Little Bighorn, a figure that indicates extremely strong—and effective—resistance on the part of Custer and his men. Indeed, various Indian participants in the battle reported that Custer had fought with extraordinary bravery. If Indian casualties were indeed so high—on a par with Custer’s own casualties—it is almost certain that, even if Custer had begun with a line of skirmish, he ended the battle in a more effective, more cohesive last stand, which may have held out as long as three hours.

The women … pushed the point of an awl into each of his ears, into his head. This was done to improve his hearing, as it seemed he had not heard what our chiefs in the south had said when he smoked the pipe with them. They told him then that if ever afterward he should break that peace promise and should fight the Cheyennes, the Everywhere Spirit surely would cause him to be killed.

—Kate Big Head, Cheyenne,

commenting on July 4, 1876, on the

treatment of Custer’s body as it lay on

the field at the Little Bighorn

In the immediate aftermath of the battle, the combined forces of Reno and Benteen dug in along the bluffs and fought off a daylong siege, which was renewed on June 26, only to be lifted upon the approach of Terry and Gibbon.

The defeat and death of one of the army’s most celebrated officers, along with his entire command, stunned the nation and prompted Congress to increase the army’s strength and to give it military control of all the Sioux agencies and reservations. Despite this, the Custer catastrophe unnerved the army, which made little further attempt to engage the Indians until November, when the 4th Cavalry’s Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie won a significant victory in the Bighorn Mountains against a Cheyenne band led by Dull Knife and Little Wolf.

AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY LEADER is aggressive and even single-minded in focusing on his objective. Yet for Custer at the Little Bighorn, single-mindedness became a lack of imagination and focus turned to blindness. His absolute determination to attack drove him to reckless, heedless action, attacking without adequate reconnaissance, taking up a position on unfavorable ground, and failing to answer Reno’s call for help. It is not known why Custer led his men north, into the main part of the Indian encampment, rather than abide by his own plan to reinforce the first detachment that made contact with the enemy. We can assume that Custer was afraid the Indians would run unless they were immediately encircled and cut off. Why he did not retreat once he finally saw the size of the forces confronting him is another mystery. Perhaps he believed—quite rightly—that he would suffer very heavily in a retreat. Perhaps he judged—incorrectly—that he would have a better chance making a stand and fighting it out.

Arrogance, blind ambition, recklessness, these were the elements of folly in Custer’s Last Stand. They were, however, qualities that verge on what makes for greatness in a military leader: self-confidence, desire for glory, aggressive boldness. But there was another factor that doomed Custer at the Little Bighorn. It was his absolute conviction—both as an individual and as an army officer—that even a very large group of Indians was incapable of defeating the officers and men of the United States Army. This conviction was born of a failure to understand the full military capability of the Indians and, even more, to appreciate the depth of their determination to hold the sacred Black Hills. For four centuries, whites and Indians had failed to comprehend each other. The Battle of the Little Bighorn was one more product of that long incomprehension.

André Maginot and His Line (1930–40)

THE DECISION TO HUNKER DOWN AND

HOPE FOR THE BEST

It was a masterpiece of military engineering, a multitiered fortified line extending from Switzerland to Luxembourg, with a sketchy extension all the way to the English Channel. The Maginot Line was