Remembering World War I
In late July and early August 1914, the great powers of Europe embarked on a course of action that would claim millions of lives, topple empires, reshape the political structure of the continent, and contribute to an even more destructive conflict a generation later. Known at the time as the Great War or simply the World War, the conflict that is today called World War I was characterized by British tactician and historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart in this manner:
The World War may be briefly epitomized as a progress from convention through chaos to co-operation. The nations entered upon the conflict with the conventional outlook and system of the 18th century merely modified by the events of the 19th century. Politically, they conceived of it as a struggle between rival coalitions based on the traditional system of diplomatic alliances, and militarily as between professional armies—swollen, it is true, owing to the continental system of conscription, yet, essentially fought out by soldiers while the mass of the people watched, from seats in the amphitheatre, the efforts of their champions.
Liddell Hart, who was writing for the 13th edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica (1926), continued:
The Germans alone had a glimpse of the truth, but—one or two prophetic minds apart—the “Nation in Arms” theory evolved by them during the 19th century visualized the nation rather as a reservoir to pour its reinforcements into the army than as a mighty river in which are merged many tributary forces, of which the army is but one. Their conception was the “Nation in Arms,” hardly the “Nation at War.” Even today this fundamental truth has yet to be grasped in its entirety and its full implications understood. Progressively throughout the years 1914–18 the warring nations enlisted the research of the scientist, the inventive powers and technical skill of the engineer, the manual labour of industry and the pen of the propagandist. For long this fusion of many forces tended to a chaotic maelstrom of forces; the old order had broken down, the new had not yet evolved. Only gradually did a working co-operation emerge, and it is a moot point whether even in the last phase co-operation of forces had attained to the higher level of co-ordination—direction by unity of diversity.
As Liddell Hart made clear, the concept of a “Nation in Arms” was not a new one. Prussian military scholar Carl von Clausewitz had advocated a form of total war in his classic work Vom Kriege (1832; On War). Although Clausewitz later modified his position to state that military aims were subordinate to political necessity, the concept was made manifest in the structure of the German military. On the eve of World War I, conscription was an established practice in Germany, and an able-bodied German man was subject to up to three years of full-time military service, followed by more than two decades of progression through numerous tiers of reserve status. At the commencement of hostilities, German land forces numbered almost two million troops, divided among 98 regular divisions as well as 27 Landwehr reserve brigades. Reserve units had traditionally been relegated to noncombat duties, but German reserves were of such high quality that they were utilized as an integral part of the frontline advance. At the core of this sizable conscript force was perhaps the German military’s greatest strength, its career commissioned and noncommissioned officers.
In contrast, the British army could field just 120,000 men in August 1914, but it had benefited from a series of organizational reforms implemented by Secretary of State for War Richard Burdon Haldane. Haldane had restructured the army into an expeditionary force of six infantry divisions and a cavalry division, supplemented by a 14-division Territorial Force that, while committed primarily to the defense of the British Isles, could, at the discretion of the unit’s commander, volunteer for deployment abroad. Haldane also reformed the top levels of command by creating a general staff inspired by the German model. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) that embarked for France in August and September 1914 would prove crucial in checking the advance of the German right flank and frustrating the Schlieffen Plan, Helmuth von Moltke’s modification of Count Alfred von Schlieffen’s proposal that Germany strike a rapid, decisive blow with a large force at France’s flank through Belgium, then sweep around and crush the French armies against a smaller German force in the south. But the BEF would achieve that at an enormous cost.
French military planners had grossly miscalculated German strength on the Western Front, most notably failing to account for the combat readiness of German reserves. That failure produced troop estimates that were roughly half their actual levels. Thus, from the Battle of Mons (August 23, 1914) to the First Battle of Ypres (October 12–November 11, 1914), the BEF consistently faced superior numbers but still performed admirably, thanks largely to the remarkable discipline and enviable marksmanship exhibited by its soldiers. However, the attrition that would characterize the war as a whole meant that few of the men and officers of the BEF remained in action by the end of 1914. The burden of service would shift to the Territorial Forces, Lord Horatio Kitchener’s “New Army” divisions, and troops from Britain’s colonies and dominions. By war’s end, almost 9,000,000 men would serve in the British army: more than 4,000,000 came from England, 1,300,000 from India, more than 600,000 from Canada, roughly 560,000 from Scotland, almost 420,000 from Australia, 270,000 from Wales, 136,000 from South Africa, 134,000 from Ireland, 124,000 from New Zealand, 26,000 from British East Africa, approximately 16,000 from Nigeria, an additional 16,000 from Britain’s Caribbean possessions, almost 11,000 from Nyasaland, 10,000 from Gold Coast, and thousands of others from throughout the British Empire. According to official records, 908,371 of those men were killed, and an additional 2,000,000 were wounded.
What, then, was the result of this sacrifice? Liddell Hart, writing in the 1920s, viewed the war’s outcome through a lens that was uncoloured by the later horrors of World War II:
It is…futile to ask which country won the war; France did not win the war, but unless she had held the fort while the forces of Britain were preparing and those of America still a dream the release of civilization from this nightmare of militarism would have been impossible. Britain did not win the war, but without her command of the sea, her financial support and her army to take over the main burden of the struggle from 1916 onwards, defeat would have been inevitable. The United States did not win the war, but without their economic aid to ease the strain, without the arrival of their troops to turn the numerical balance, and, above all, without the moral tonic which their coming gave, victory would have been impossible. And let us not forget how many times Russia had sacrificed herself to save her Allies; preparing the way for their ultimate victory as surely as for her downfall. Finally, whatever be the verdict of history on her policy, unstinted tribute is due to the incomparable endurance and skill with which Germany more than held her own for four years against superior numbers, an epic of military and human achievement.
What follows is a survey of the political and military leaders of World War I, the technology that forever changed the nature of armed conflict, and the battles that claimed the lives of millions. It examines the war’s cultural impact through poetry and the visual language of wartime propaganda. Also included is a timeline of significant events of the war.