https://doi.org/10.33595/2226-1478.10.2.384
Imagination and cinema: the notion of anthropos from the figure of the
spectator
Imaginación y cine: la noción de anthropos desde la figura del
espectador
Ignacio Riffo1, a
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6691-3572
Rubén Dittus2, b
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7613-1643
1
2
a
b
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, España
Universidad Central de Chile
ignacioriffopavon@gmail.com
ruben.dittus@ucentral.cl
Recibido el: 29/03/2019
Aceptado el: 28/11/2019
ABSTRACT
RESUMEN
The present work is presented as an approach
between the notion of the imaginary with the
theory of the film viewer, formulated in 1956 by
Edgar Morin, in his classic text The cinema or the
imaginary man and enlarged by Francesco Casetti
with the thesis of the enunciation in the cinema.
In this way, the main objective of this article is to
capture theoretical bases from the reflection of both
conceptualizations. Thus, this initiatory work aims
to be an epistemological contribution to future
research projects. For this, at the methodological
level, an initial theoretical path is developed that
has its anchor -and its respective critical reading- in
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the contributions of Gilbert Durand and Cornelius
Castoriadis, in the permanent concern of both for
“drawing” those elements inherent in anthropos
that allow the construction of their historicalsocial environment from subjectivity. The latter
conceived as intrinsic peculiarity to the human
being. It is concluded that through an artificialimaginary state the viewer feels close and is able
to recognize the reality of the images that the big
screen offers him, coming into direct contact with
his fantasies, fears and dreams. In other words,
here the double dimension of the film is observed
as an artifact and as a subjective experience.
Keywords: cinema, spectator,
subjectivity, Edgar Morin
imagination,
El presente trabajo se plantea como un acercamiento
entre la noción del imaginario con la teoría del
espectador cinematográfico, formulada en 1956
por Edgar Morin, en su clásico texto El cine o
el hombre imaginario y ampliada por Francesco
Casetti con la tesis de la enunciación en el cine.
De este modo, el objetivo principal de este artículo
es plasmar unas bases teóricas provenientes
de la reflexión de ambas conceptualizaciones.
Así este trabajo iniciático pretende ser un
aporte epistemológico para futuros proyectos
investigativos. Para ello, a nivel metodológico,
se desarrolla un recorrido teórico inicial que tiene
su anclaje –y su respectiva lectura crítica- en los
aportes de Gilbert Durand y Cornelius Castoriadis,
en la permanente preocupación de ambos por
“dibujar” aquellos elementos inherentes al
anthropos que permiten la construcción de su
entorno histórico-social desde la subjetividad. Esta
última concebida como particularidad intrínseca
al ser humano. Se concluye que a través de un
estado artificial-imaginario el espectador se siente
cercano y es capaz de reconocer la realidad de las
imágenes que la gran pantalla le ofrece, entrando
en contacto directo con sus fantasías, miedos y
sueños. Dicho de otra manera, aquí se observa la
doble dimensión del filme como artefacto y como
experiencia subjetiva.
Palabras clave: cine, espectador, imaginación,
subjetividad, Edgar Morin.
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Ignacio Riffo, Rubén Dittus
INTRODUCTION
Understanding the human being, writing about
him or thinking about him, is (not) an easy task.
Drawing sketches on us, a deep autobiography,
an abstraction of oneself, how to do and where to
start if it is so complex just to remember our own
history of which we are protagonists. The Being
proudly boasts its intellectual capacity, boasts its
reasoning, its broad cognitive abilities is one of
the standards of the human species. At present, the
Being lives in a world of opulence of information
and knowledge, pays homage to the operational
and technological. Sadly, for humanity, this Being
has more knowledge but less wisdom that guides
the harmonious and philanthropic transit of the
planet and its inhabitants. Not to forget the atomic
bombs created thanks to engineering and technique
knowing that they are capable of annihilating
entire cities.
The human being is a gregarious species that
needs to be in constant interaction with others.
Therefore, the Being has the particularity that
it uses mediations to live in society. Although
it is presented as an individual entity, it cannot
reach its total and complex development without
the relationship with others in the pre-given
environment it inhabits. The Being is indisputably
social because it inherently possesses various
faculties, such as language, - in which it will
deepen sink later - that transform it into an entity
completely suitable for living in society.
Homo sapiens (from Latin homo: man, sapiens:
wise) is a symbolic Being, of rituals, ceremonies,
customs, traditions and that lives within a great
mythical mantle that gives meaning to his actions.
For this reason, humans, being symbolic entities or
‘symbolic animals’, in the words of Ernst Cassirer
(1995), make the difference with the rest of the
animals their vast capacity for symbolization.
In no way will an object be found isolated from
something else, that is to say that a word and
a symbol will never be abandoned, they will
always be in a constant relationship that precedes
and sends them. “Man is always on the verge
of invoicing very complex symbolic systems
in order to encourage his communion with the
alien” (González, 2012: 215-216). This question
is because the human being from the moment
he is born establishes close relations with the
world, which is composed of language, artistic
manifestations, science, traditions, myths, religious
dogmas, etc. that constitute the thick symbolic
network that conditions, but that never determines
(Castoriadis, 2013) the human becoming.
“The symbol’s own work is not limited to
‘meaning’ people, events or objects, but is to
‘conceive’ and ‘animate’ them: to give them life
in the midst of the sway of everyday life” (Duch
& Chillón, 2012: 170). It is in the middle of this
symbolic universe where there is a mixture of
innumerable experiences and experiences, the
latter understood as the fabric that sustains those
experiences, which happen individually or that
are socially apprehended thanks to the gregarious
characteristic of the human being.
From the heterogeneous symbolic world, the
most diverse human relationships arise, since
certain societies share a universe of symbols,
which is demarcated by various cultural codes
that allow individuals to travel smoothly in an
explicit space-time dimension. In other words, the
symbolic universe is a complex map designed by
and for humanity, meaning that the human being
does not have the key to access the natural world
itself, but can enter the universe of symbols that
he himself has created to know, understand and
settle in nature. “Literally, subjects must figure
out their reality, segregated by the devilish gust
that imagination, sensitivity and understanding
entail. They live, then, in a symbolic world urged
by images and concepts, first of all articulated by
language - rhetorical, symbolic and logomitic - and
substantiated in expressions: myth, art, religion,
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common sense, science” (Duch & Chillón, 2012:
240).
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (2006)
develop a thorough reflection on the important role
played by symbolic universes in the construction
of reality. In addition, these are the ones that
consistently constitute the positions, roles and
various relationships that are urged in the social.
“Symbolic universes are social products that
have a history. To understand their meaning,
it is necessary to understand the history of their
production, which is all the more important
because these products of human consciousness,
by their very nature, are presented as mature and
inevitable totalities” (Berger & Luckmann, 2006:
124- 125).
This is the powerful symbolic dimension in
which it is clear that the human being, because it
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Imagination and cinema: the notion of anthropos from the figure of the spectator
Imaginación y cine: la noción de anthropos desde la figura del espectador
is a ‘symbolic animal’, has the total capacity to
grasp reality, manipulate it, mold it and interpret
it, thus transcending the mere sensory limits.
This human suitability is what facilitates the
abstraction of an object or something, to which,
subsequently, another symbolically loaded content
is assigned. Therefore, the symbolic motive is
something that has a clearly patent and latent
content, the latter is polysemic and semantically
inexhaustible. Likewise, it follows that the symbol
is characterized by being an abstract expression to
the point that it is not known how it originated.
Thus, as the symbol deepens more and more, it is
noticed that it is dark and foggy. In short, thanks to
socially accepted conventions, symbols are images
that carry various categories grouped into the
sensory reality they represent. It is important that it
is clear that all symbols do not represent the same
in all cultures, so these symbols vary temporarily
and socially.
In the work The symbolic imagination its author,
Gilbert Durand, states very clearly that the symbol
is a representation that makes a secret sense appear,
like the epiphany of a mystery. “The visible part
of the symbol, the ‘signifier’, will always be
loaded with the maximum of concretes, and as
Paul Ricœur said, every authentic symbol has
three concrete dimensions: it is at the same time
‘cosmic’, ‘dreamlike’ and finally ‘poetic ‘, that
is to say that it also resorts to the most intimate
language, therefore the most concrete” (Durand,
1971: 15).
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In this field of symbolic universes that involve
human beings, the imaginative faculty of the
anthropos and their ability to institute society
(Castoriadis, 1988, 2001, 2013) are related to
film theory and imaginary man (Morin, 2001)
and spectator as enunciate (Casetti, 1989). In the
midst of a concatenation between symbolism,
imagination, subject, society, device and spectator,
we have tried to structure a theoretical basis and
clarify this complex warp that escapes from all
inherited reductive ontology, in order to break
through and reflect on (the) being and its abilities
of creation and symbolization, independent of the
languages, supports and formats used.
Anthropos and imagining ability
The imagining capacity is immanent to anthropos
and is a fundamental psychic faculty in the space
and time channel through which the human
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being transits. Before being rational, the Being is
imaginative, for the Being lives on its imagination.
This faculty allows us to form new ideas, imagine
desirable situations and broadens our ability to
know, since the human being is not imprisoned
in plain objective knowledge. Well, as it became
clear, anthropos is logomitic. In addition, it has
two columns: reason and imagination, which are
powers that make life possible. “The question of
imagination is decisive because knowledge - and
the possible communication, therefore rises and is
outlined above all as ‘image’ (mythos); and only
then, through a gradual symbolic and metaphorical
‘transubstantiation’, does it acquire precise
contours and become ‘concepts’ (logos)” (Duch &
Chillón, 2012: 237).
The study around the imaginary and, of course,
the imagination itself, has suffered hard attacks
from Cartesianism. They, with all the respect that
researchers deserve and the explorations they
carry out, pursue the hard data, the objective, the
tangible, what can be measured, everything else is
left over or serves as a referential additive, not as a
central vertebra. But this vision emanates a range of
errors, because studying Homo is thorny, since the
human being is a Being of a vast complexity. Not
to forget that the Being is ambivalent, wandering,
multifaceted, hermeneutical, instinctive, semiotic,
mythical, technical, to name some facets of who
the human being is. Gaston Bachelard’s disciple of
thought and founder of the Centre de Recherche sur
l’Imaginaire, Gilbert Durand, critically visualizes
an ‘Iconoclast West’ and states that positivism
was responsible for suppressing all that pertains
to the symbolic. Durand warns that Cartesianism
and empiricism have been the currents that have
depreciated the symbol to a greater extent. From
Aristotle, through scholasticism to reaching
factual empiricism, the experience of facts and
logical certainties have been conceived as the only
accesses to the truth. This reasoning, anchored
in factual experience and logical certainties, is
called dialectic or binary reasoning. “Cartesianism
ensures the triumph of iconoclasty, the triumph
of the ‘sign’ over symbol. All Cartesians reject
imagination, as well as sensation, as an inducer of
errors” (Durand, 1971: 27).
Based on Gilbert Durand’s perspective of thinking,
it is important to make distinctions in certain
concepts that are key and deal with each other.
First, a) ‘the imaginary’: is the native and inherent
capacity in the human being that allows him to
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Ignacio Riffo, Rubén Dittus
create and symbolize. Also, through symbolization
we know the material and immaterial world. The
imaginary is “that bound connector by which every
human representation is constituted” (Durand,
2000: 60). Secondly, b) ‘the imaginary’: refers
to what is culturally known as the fantastic, the
fictional, the false. This concept, in itself, directs
the dualistic reduction of the real and the unreal.
The imagination is so wide that it has the ability to
transport us to unique and unexplored worlds, to
spaces that are set to the taste of everyone whom
is imagining them. The imagination that “flows
constantly in the psychic torrent of the anthropos,
rises with an irreducible creative power that allows
to conjecture and travel beyond the geographical
and cultural boundaries established in a society”
(Riffo, 2019: 93). However, it must be clear that
these worlds and environments are imagined
according to the acquis and the particular sociohistorical preconceptions that each Being carries
or the personal equation (Baeza, 2015). This is
because we are historical beings who chained
traditions that merge into social reality. It should
be clear that “tradition is not an inert repertoire of
(old thoughts or beliefs), as common sense tends
to believe, but a kind of symbolic environment
that literally encourages communicative agents”
(Chillón, 2000: 122).
As noted previously, it is essential to highlight
the relevance and power of the imaginary faculty
that anthropos possess, an aspect that Cornelius
Castoriadis went deeply in Figures of the thinkable
(2001). Castoriadis refers to ensidic dynamics
as the logic that establishes already determined
meanings and is characterized by defining elements
and grouping them into sets within rigid frames.
In fact, every society, envelops and transforms
itself by the ensidic dynamics. Societies constitute
themselves and its own social experience from a
necessary instituting order, based on elements
already circulating since the past. In this sense, it
can be emphasized that the history of humanity is
the product of the individuals and their collectives
who have created society through imagination
(Cristiano, 2009). “Therefore, it is absolutely natural
to call this faculty of radical innovation, of creation
and of formation, imaginary and imagination
(…) Having proven that, we must admit that in
human collectivities, there is a power of creation,
a vis formandi, which I call the instituting social
imaginary” (Castoriadis, 2001: 94).
We understand the imagination as a unique
psychic faculty capable of dreaming, of creating
new forms (eidos) and institutions, and capable
of mediating the relationship between the subject
and its environment. According to Cegarra (2012),
the imaginary shapes societies and allows it to be
remodeled, transformed or adjusted. In this sense,
the imaginary consents society to be grouped
in a coherent way, through socially instituted
meanings. The imaginary has a cardinal role in
the legitimation processes of the social order
(Carretero, 2003). “The role of the imaginary
is to institute society, that is, to offer a set of
meanings that make group life understandable and
meaningful” (Claval, 2012: 31). The importance is
that “the human being has created himself from his
own imaginary, those that are socially established.
It is socially constructed from the imagination”
(Dittus, 2018: 87).
The imaginary springs from the psyche which
is neither rational nor functional, but a flow of
desires and representations that pursues pleasure.
While for the psyche, pleasure is nothing other
than its meaning. The psyche is what distinguishes
the human being from other species, since this
psyche is not just full of impulses from reality,
but also radical imagination. For Castoriadis the
imaginary “is not an image of. It is incessant and
essentially indeterminate creation (historicalsocial and psychic) of figures / forms / images”
(2013: 12). The historical-social is self-creation, it
is constant poetry that has the particularity of being
ex nihilo. The society imagines and institutes itself
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elaborating a great institution. It is the latter that
keeps the society together with clear horizons of
reference and is the one that “determines what is
‘real’ and what is not, what it has a meaning and
what is meaningless” (Castoriadis, 1988: 69).
In the historical-social dimension is when
the radical imagination is synthesized into an
imaginary institution. In other words, it is the
creativity of the social collective. In this way the
imaginary social meanings arise. They “do not
correspond to ‘rational’ or ‘real’ elements and
are not consumed by reference to these elements.
Instead, they are given by creation. I appoint/
categorize them as social since they only exist if
being instituted and being object of participation
of an imperative and anonymous collective entity”
(Castoriadis, 1988: 68).
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Imaginación y cine: la noción de anthropos desde la figura del espectador
The imaginary, when instituted and once has
become social, is transcendental because it
allows to generate a coherent and meaningful
social dynamic, where desires, reveries and fears
are grouped, both individual and collective. In
agreement with Pintos (2015), the articulation of
the imaginary mosaic fulfills the role of cartography
with the socio-imaginary instituted signage. The
importance of the imaginary in societies is such
“because it institutes the systems of norms that
guide human action and leads individuals and
social groups to project themselves in the future
and to model it as well. (Claval, 2012: 32).
Morin and the thesis of the imaginary man
First it is necessary to note that “the imaginary word
awakens a certain invisible volume, a presence
that surrounds us but that we cannot touch”
(Franzone, 2005: 3). In other words, the imaginary
refers to “an alternate mechanism of presences
and absences, whose concealments must be as
significant as their underlines” (Fernández, 2010:
269). Hence the importance of social imaginary in
the field of symbolic fields (Gómez, 2001).
The theory of the imaginary is directly associated
with the relationship of cinema with the figure of
the spectator. The first antecedent of important
theoretical repercussions is found in Edgar
Morin’s book, Le cinema ou l’homme imaginaire
(1956). Demonstrating a broad conceptual journey
through Lacanian psychoanalysis, Sartrean
existentialism and image theory, Morin demystifies
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in an anthropological essay some conceptions
around the imaginary to transfer them into the
cinematic territory’s field. The notion of imaginary
- in Morin’s thesis - follows the background of
Lacan’s theory for whom the imaginary refers,
to the subject’s relationship with his formative
identifications (...) and to the subject’s relationship
with the real, whose characteristic is to be illusory.
That is, the image and the imaginary are part of the
same psychic nature, so the imaginary formations
of the subject are images, not only in a sense of
substitution or mediation but in the sense that they
eventually become embodied in material images.
It is in an intermediate ontological plane level
where the mental image is found, whose reality as it happens - is never questioned. As for Sartre,
the mental image is an essential structure of
consciousness or, written in another way, it fulfills
an important psychological function by associating
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man with his material environment; For Morin, the
cinematographic object is absent within its very
presence in the viewer’s psyche. It is the presenceabsence duality that defines the nature of the film
image. The subjective overvaluation made by the
subject of his immediate or distant environment
depends on the objectivity of the mental image in
its apparent material exteriority, that is, in shapes,
colors, size or density. For Morin, all of this is
part of the psyche, we imagine it. As the objective
necessity increases, the image tends to project and
objectify itself. By increasing its degree of realism
acquires autonomy and immortality, generating
other realities. These new realities are characterized
by concentrating fears, needs and dreams of
humankind and that are enhanced in collective
images, magnifying, fetishizing or mythologizing
elements that are part of the objective culture of a
group of people.
These are cultural features that contribute from
the unreal, the illusory, the reverie and the
supernatural, the basis for the success of the big
screen in the West. It is through cinema -claims
Morin- where our dreams are visualized and where
the imagination of the human being becomes
a reality. Cinema represents materiality where
the impossible becomes possible. The unreality
of cinema is an illusion that becomes reality.
However, it is paradoxical. “It is not this machine
the most absurd thing to imagine since it only
serves to project images for the pleasure of seeing
them?” Asks Morin (2001: 19). Furthermore, he
writes: “The cinematographer is a true image in
an elementary and anthropologically state of
shadow-reflection. In the twentieth century it
resurrects the double imaginary. More specifically,
in this adaptation to project in spectacle an image
perceived as an exact reflection of real life” (Morin,
2001: 48).
In Morin’s thesis, cinema, like photography,
confirms the presence of something that is absent.
However, it adds a double impression of reality,
“restoring the movement of things and beings,
projecting them, freeing them from the film on a
surface on which they seem autonomous” (Morin,
2001: 21). In this way, the richness of the cinema
lies not in what it represents, but on what the
viewer focus on or is able to project. Thus, the
imagination is activated.
How is it possible to activate those images
so characteristic of the subject’s exclusive
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subjectivity, nourishing them with a visual device
such as cinema? The mental image, explains
Morin, is projected twice, and spontaneously. But
it also does it on images and material forms, such
as drawings, engravings or sculptures, in a clear
tendency towards deformation or the fantastic.
Because of that, the mental image and the material
image rise its value or deteriorate the reality
provided, addressing importance to a representation
seemingly worthless. It is an unreal world which
has effects on reality itself. These are two poles of
the same reality: the double and the image, an idea
that Morin explains: “In the unreal world of the
doubles (…) a psychic projective power creates a
double of everything to open it in the imaginary. An
imaginary power unfolds everything in the psychic
projection (...) and the image has the magical
quality of the double, but internalized, nascent
and subjective. The double possesses the psychic,
affective quality of the image, but alienated and
magical” (Morin, 2001: 35).
Morin’s quotation bases supports the idea that
cinema inextricably connects objective reality and
subjective vision. In that practical assimilation
of knowledge that the cinematographer makes
possible, the dreams of the humankind are
visualized, projected, objectified, industrialized
and shared by contemporaneity. The first reality
support are the forms. Faithful to the appearances
of a referent, they give an impression of reality.
What the cinematographer does with the
movement, is to contribute to development,
duration, time and spatial depth. The movement
restores autonomy and corporality to forms. Thus,
“film projection releases the image of the plate
and the photographic paper” (Morin, 2001: 108).
To achieve this imaginary effect, in this initial
empirical process of vision and perception, the
camera puts the psychological vision into action.
These are fragmentary visions that concur in a
global perception, which means that an object
is seen psychologically from every single angle
(objective perception), both by the camera and by
the viewer. The making and editing process of the
film mechanizes the perceptual processes, unifying
them in a psychological vision.
All this is possible because psychic processes
lead on the one hand, to a practical, objective and
rational vision and, on the other, to an affective,
subjective and fantastical vision. Both are joined
in the cinema. Objective and subjective images
are juxtaposed, prefabricated through an initial
deciphering made by the camera from the first
image captures. The viewer activates the mixture
that Morin talks about, because although the film
has a reality outside the viewer, a materiality,
the spectator recognizes the film as unreal and
imaginary. Proof of this is that aesthetic vision
is used, which only applies to double images. It
decodes the cinema, giving it subjectivity and
imaginary value. For Morin, as for Jean Epstein,
cinema is psychic. Two psyches are united in it,
the one of the film and the one of the spectator.
Therefore, the cinema seems to drag the
subjectivity of the spectator in a single flow, and
the latter - an active subject in the dark room
- does not realize that it is an essential part of
that projection, identification and participation
machine called ‘cinematograph’. The film is our
total psyche, as if it was imagining for each one of
us. Thus, the figure of the spectator as part of this
psychic relationship with the cinema guarantees
the existence of a device that exceeds the notion of
a mere technical apparatus system. It’s everything
that surrounds the film. And inside it, the viewer
has a main role.
The cinematographic spectator as a speaker
The study of the Italian Franceso Casetti, The film
and its viewer (1986), analyzes this figure, from a
clear semiotic perspective, and does so by entering
the cinematographic enunciation. For Casetti,
it is possible to observe the “implicit reader”
or the “image of the public” that the film text
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outlines. In this thesis, the imaginary link becomes
possible with the search for a presence, that of the
interlocutor, which materializes in a kind of circular
relationship where both -spectator and film- are
needed. That means, the film builds its viewer,
draws it, gives it a place, makes it follow a path
(Casetti, 1989: 35). The place of the spectator is
part of the imaginary construction process, it is the
position of the subject-receiver as it is constructed
by the film itself when addressing the audience.
In this way, the viewer stops being considered as
an empirical subject located materially in the dark
room, but is an integral part of the film, involved
in the form of the text.
When considering the film as text, the premise
is assumed that it is seen or institutes its own
purpose, this feature also extends to the viewer. In
the words of Casetti (1989: 29), “far from being
in the unarmed camp, and long before offering a
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Imagination and cinema: the notion of anthropos from the figure of the spectator
Imaginación y cine: la noción de anthropos desde la figura del espectador
personal reaction, whoever sits in the room helps
to build what appears on the screen.” Or what is
the same, whoever sits in the showing room lives
with the film, better yet, lives inside it. In this
way, the inside and outside of the text converge
on the viewer. It is the field of enunciation that
Casetti offers to take charge of this imaginary
spectatorial. It is from that enunciative analysis
where the figure of the viewer makes sense and is
revealed. There, the film draws it, gives it a site,
places it in the structure of its story, as an active
entity. According to Casetti, the cinematographic
enunciation refers to the act of “appropriating or
seizing the expressive possibilities offered by the
cinema to give body and consistency to a film”
(Casetti, 1989: 42). That saying and its modalities
is nourished from a point of view that organizes
the different aspects of the film, such as the taking,
the framing, the sequence, the depth of field or the
music. From the enunciation, the position in which
the person watching the projected scene on the
screen is placed, is observed. Thus, the presence
and importance of its destination, of its assigned
place is manifested.
The difficulty lies in the fact that both the
enunciation and enunciating subject are never
presented as such. It is the enunciation that
becomes invisible to the eyes of the beholder.
The enunciator in a film -Casetti explains- always
exists, either in an obvious or implicit way. That
accompanies the text throughout its development,
and even may not be in the plot. It has a capacity
to act in the text that proclaims it as one of the
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basic and active elements of the cinematographic
text. The interpellation is one of the resources
used by the cinematographic language so that the
spectator intervenes in the text, “when the film
speaks to him, he looks him in the eye from the
screen, as if he wanted to invite him to participate
in the story,” says Casetti (1989: 39). And give two
examples of it. On the one hand, The great train
robbery (Edwin Porter, USA, 1903), in which
at the end of the film, the head of the assailants
band, in the foreground, points and shoots looking
at the camera, watching the spectators. The other
case is Vent d’est (Jean Luc Godard, Italy/France/
Germany, 1969), where a young man in the
foreground and then in general, facing, looking
straight ahead, invites viewers to reach him; then,
a voiceover realizes the impossibility of such a
request. In both there is a “you” that the film seems
to suggest, starting-also-from the narrative context
in which the interpellations occur.
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Thus, the viewer is a brand within the film,
a presence that designates being seen and
understood, but that evidence is always relative,
and depends on how clear the interpretation is
and what psychological factors of the subject
help or hinder the setting in the presence of this
presence in the text. A kind of dedication that
Casetti graphs as “It is you who I am addressing”:
“It is the enunciation that sets the coordinates of
a film (and the “you” who emerges owes its own
consistency to that starting gesture) (...) emergent
or submerged, obvious or hidden, is the place of
affirmation and installation of an enunciator; it is
the field in which a paper will be welded with a
body to define behaviors and profiles of what is
called the viewer ”(Casetti, 1989: 50-51).
In this sense, it is clear that Casetti’s thesis draws
on literary theory to address this kind of “model
spectator”, referring to the figure that Umberto
Eco recognizes for the literary text. The mysterious
relationship between the author and an imaginary
reader drawn on the reading path defined by
the text, and which Eco describes the Reader in
fabula (1979), inspires Casetti, and from there
he builds his thesis. That someone to whom the
author directs his work is in the film. And with
him - separated from any abstraction - the figures
of the narrator and narratee. Not to be confused,
Casetti seems to exclaim. While the enunciator
and enunciatario respond to abstract instances and
are not personalized or corporatized in someone or
something, the narrator and the narratee assume
the figurativizations of those on the surface of the
text, it is the I and you that are said and shown,
presented, mostly, as simple characters.
How does a statement that does not become a
protagonist manifest itself in the text? How is
this constructed in the complex cinematographic
enunciation? The key is the point of view, that is,
the summary position that is assumed both from
what is shown, what is not shown and how it is
displayed on the big screen. The point of view
guarantees that the enunciator - the spectator - does
not become a protagonist, but is only a witness.
That allows him not to intervene on stage, but
becoming a nobody with open possibility for all. It
is a role that the enunciator is in charge of defining
and that, in passing, puts his complicity into
play, because if there is someone who looks - the
enunciatario - it is due to someone who questions
and let’s look, the enunciator.
Comuni@ccion: Revista de Investigación en Comunicación y Desarrollo, 10(2), 122-130 JUL- DIC 2019
ISSN 2219-7168
Ignacio Riffo, Rubén Dittus
The statement, in short, defines the contours that
articulate the statement, and with it the fields of
action of the enunciatario and enunciator. For
example, with the subjective camera, the film
offers images through someone’s eyes. It is the
enunciatario that is concretized from a component
of the enunciator, elevating it to a narrator. In this
case, the viewer is the one who penetrates the film
in the eyes of a character and adopts his behaviors.
The enunciatario pushes the viewer to participate
without intention, imprisoned in the confines of
the scene. The situation is different in the case of
the objective camera, where in front of an effective
witness, but mute or hidden, a neutral space or
without marked boundaries is displayed. Here both
the enunciatario and the enunciator unfold entirely
implicitly. In the interpellation, however, the
viewer is required but stays away from the action
or on the margins of the scene. With the subjective
camera, as discussed, it is the speaker who looks
with the eyes of a character, and becomes a field
viewer.
As can be seen, the film -based on a diversity of
aesthetic and narrative resources- draws a viewer
who participates according to different degrees of
diegetic intervention, giving him high doses of
realism. In Casetti’s words, “these images, often
used as mere metaphors, actually synthesize very
well the fact that the text is not only a gamble,
but also a real maneuvering ground” (Casetti,
1989: 174), achieving a true interface, that is, that
connection between the world represented on the
screen and the world of which the screen is one
of many other objects. Two machines in which
images (visual and psychical) are juxtaposed,
forming the cinematographic device. It is the
filmic text that is confronted from within - through
the enunciation mechanisms described by Casetti and from its exterior, those imaginary spaces with
which it comes into contact, the outside, the real
world. An inside and an outside that always end up
coming together in the viewer.
CONCLUSIONS
After this reflexive effort, in order to try to clarify
and lay down epistemological bases around the
notions of the imaginary and the theory of the
cinematographic spectator, it is established by
way of conclusions, always provisional, that the
imaginary faculty of the human being can not
be reduced to reductionist logics, categorical
and purely rational logics. The power to create
and dream new possible worlds is unique in the
anthropos, and it is this purely imaginary question
that sets us apart from the rest of the animals.
In addition, the cinematographer is considered to
be the space where the rational-objective-practical
vision and the affective-subjective vision converge.
Both emanate from the human being himself, since
he is able to figure and create new forms thanks to
his imaginary faculty. If our dreams and fears are
visualized in the cinema, it is because cinema has
the capacity to realize what is impossible for us.
Our greatest creations and delusions are within a
film. It is the image of the public that is articulated,
technically, within the film.
It is not possible to conceive a world without
images and a human being without imagination.
The images, with all that symbolic load they
possess, are dynamic and provide the imaginary,
that is to say the creative capacity. The creation, in
this case that of a filmmaker, gathers the objectified
world to, as spectators, put ourselves inside, for
this matter the film becomes coherent, plausible
and intelligible. This question is ascribed to the
idea that the film manifests itself as a social psyche
where our imaginary world is contained.
As a result, it follows that from the fascination
of the images that appear / disappear on the big
screen, the scope of the subjectivation propitiated
by the device that makes cinema possible, can
be explained. The game of perceptions that he
raises in his creative and testimonial account
129
only emphasizes the ethical dimension of being,
constituting an incentive for the conscience of
the masses, but always through the director’s
temperament. It is also the occasion to confirm the
old saying that “what is inside is also outside”.
In summary, thanks to the reflection on the
imaginary and the cinematographic spectator it
is concluded that through an artificial-imaginary
state the spectator feels close to the reality of the
images that the cinema offers him. You feel part of
them. Thus, the device-cinema that can not evade
the idea of reverie and referential illusion, because
the viewer comes into direct contact with his
fantasies and dreams, capturing in the reception the
ideal means through which the cinematographic
mechanism enters into action. That is, the double
dimension of the film is observed as an artifact and
as a subjective experience. It is an indissoluble
link that unites objective reality with subjective
Comuni@ccion: Revista de Investigación en Comunicación y Desarrollo, 10(2), 122-130 JUL- DIC 2019
Imagination and cinema: the notion of anthropos from the figure of the spectator
Imaginación y cine: la noción de anthropos desde la figura del espectador
vision, recognizing in the spectatorial subject
the bridge through which cinema is concretized
in a symbiosis. In short, two seemingly opposite
worlds come into contact: the outside world and
the viewer’s psyche. In the film, the subject does
not make his marks visible as an enunciatario,
since the device suppresses any reference to the
enunciator. It is a piece of reality that speaks and
reveals itself. The reason is that the anthropos
has always needed to place everything in images,
and the current technological tools facilitate the
operation. The images themselves are one of
the main ways of understanding and expressing
ourselves in the daily life that occurs.
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Comuni@ccion: Revista de Investigación en Comunicación y Desarrollo, 10(2), 122-130 JUL- DIC 2019