Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Publisher: Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Adress: Bulevar vojvode Stepe Stepanovića 77 Banja Luka Telefon: +387/51/339-002 E-mail: info@pf.unibl.org Izdavač: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci Adresa: Bulevar vojvode Stepe Stepanovića 77 Banja Luka Phone: +387/51/339-002 E-mail: info@pf.unibl.org Editor-in-chief: Prof. dr Željko Mirjanić Glavni i odgovorni urednik: Prof.dr Željko Mirjanić Editor: Prof. Dr. Igor Milinković Urednik: Prof. dr Igor Milinković Print: Grafid d.o.o For Print: Branislav Ivanković Štampa: Grafid d.o.o Za štampariju: Branislav Ivanković Circulation: 100 Tiraž: 100 International Scientific Committee / Međunarodni naučni odbor Radoslav Gajanin, PhD, University of Banja Luka Željko Mirjanić, PhD, University of Banja Luka Vojin Rakić, PhD, The Center for the Study of Bioethics John Harris, PhD, University of Manchester Giovani Boniolo, PhD, University of Ferrara Nicholas Agar, PhD, University of Wellington Katrien Devolder, PhD, University of Oxford Igor Milinković, PhD, University of Banja Luka Oliver Feeney, PhD, National University of Ireland, Galway Goran Koevski, PhD, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje Miodrag Jovanović, PhD, University of Belgrade Branko Blanuša, PhD, University of Banja Luka Nevena Petrušić, PhD, University of Niš Irina Krylatova, PhD, The Ural State Law University Velimir Rakočević, PhD, University of Montenegro Katarzyna Miaskowska-Daszkiewicz, PhD, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin Lada Zibar, PhD, University of Osijek Zlatko Bundalo, PhD, University of Banja Luka Dragutin Avramović, PhD, University of Novi Sad International Scientific Conference of Special Importance: “Transformative Technologies: Legal and Ethical Challenges of the 21st Century” 07-08 February 2020, Banja Luka Conference Proceedings Međunarodni naučni skup od posebnog značaja: „Transformativne tehnologije: pravni i etički izazovi XXI vijeka“ 07-08. februar 2020, Banja Luka Zbornik radova Banja Luka, 2020. godine LIST OF CONTENTS SADRŽAJ Introductory Note / Uvodna napomena .......................................................................ix Katarzyna Miaskowska-Daszkiewicz ORGANOIDS – OPPORTUNITIES IN MEDICINE AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND BIOETHICS ................................................................................................... 1 Irina Krylatova THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES ......................................................................... 13 Nevena Petrušić SYBERJUSTICE: POTENCIJALI I IZAZOVI VANSUDSKOG REŠAVANJA SPOROVA ONLINE ....................................................................................................... 39 Ivana Tucak RETHINKING THE UNESCO UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ................................................................................................ 59 Suzana Kraljić LEGAL CHALLENGES AND DILLEMAS OF CROSS-BORDER REPRODUCTIVE CARE FROM SLOVENIAN VIEW............................................ 79 Oliver Feeney, ETHICS, PATENTS AND CRISPR: A NOVEL FORM OF TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE? ............................................................................................................. 91 Igor Milinković THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (PRESENT DILEMMAS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES) ................................... 103 Darko Radić, Dejan Pilipović SMART CONTRACT – CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES ......................... 119 Radenko Jotanović PRENATALNA ZAŠTITA PRAVA LIČNOSTI ........................................................ 141 Zoran Vasiljević LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE OF BUSINESS ENTITIES IN REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA ..................................................................... 161 Aleksandar Mojašević, Dejan Vučetić ELECTRONIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PARADIGM SHIFT OR A STATUS QUO? ............................................................................................................................... 181 v Vlado Lukić, Zlatko Bundalo, Branko Blanuša MONITORING HUMAN ACTIVITIES AND HEALTH PARAMETERS USING WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK AND MOBILE PHONE...................................199 Mirko Sajić, Dušanka Bundalo, Zlatko Bundalo USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION IN UNIVERSAL TELLER/COUNTER DIGITAL DEVICES ............................................................... 211 Dragana Vilić THE IMPACT OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ON DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL GOVERNANCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY .....................................225 Mile Šikman TRANSFORMATIVNE TEHNOLOGIJE I KRIMINAL (OBLICI ISPOLJAVANJA I MJERE SUZBIJANJA) ................................................................................................249 Dr. Pelin Işıntan IS WHAT IS ILLEGAL ALSO UNETHICAL? AN ANALYSIS OF TURKISH LAW REGARDING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND GENETIC ENGINEERING.............................................................................................................265 Ana Raquel Conceição CYBERCRIME, TERRORISM AND MONEY LAUNDERING. THE IMPERATIVE COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ......................... 281 Svetislav Janković LEGAL NATURE OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE CONCLUDED UNDER UBER SYSTEM ..............................................................................................................293 Радислав Лале РАДНОПРАВНИ АСПЕКТИ ОСТВАРИВАЊА И ЗАШТИТЕ ПРАВА НА ПОШТОВАЊЕ ПРИВАТНОГ ЖИВОТА РАДНИКА .........................................307 Svjetlana Ivanović ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND COPYRIGHT ..............................................323 Милијана Буха ЕЛЕКТРОНСКИ ДОКАЗ И ДОКАЗИВАЊЕ ВИСОКОТЕХНОЛОШКОГ КРИМИНАЛА..............................................................................................................341 Nevenko Vranješ THE EXTENT OF THE DIGITALIZATION OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ..................................365 Bojan Vlaški ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR DATA PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF E-GOVERNMENT..................................................................389 Suzana Dimić, Vanda Božić KRAĐA PODATAKA PORESKIH OBVEZNIKA KAO OBLIK CYBER KRIMINALITETA ........................................................................................................ 411 Dijana Zrnić LITERARY FUTURISTS: (SCIENCE) FICTION V. (DE)HUMANISING REALITY CAUGHT IN THE HANDS OF TRANSFORMATIVE TECHNOLOGIES ..........425 vi Mirjana Miškić SURROGACY AS A FORM OF THE THIRD-PARTY REPRODUCTION IN THE BIOMEDICALLY ASSISTED FERTILIZATION ACT OF REPUBLIC SRPSKA ...........................................................................................................................437 Milana Pisarić CROSS-BORDER ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ............................................................................................................................449 Nina Sajić POLITICAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY ON STATES: EUROPEAN CONTEXT ............461 Стојана Петровић ЕЛЕКТРОНСКИ ДОКАЗ И/ИЛИ ЕЛЕКТРОНСКА ИСПРАВА КАО ДОКАЗ У ПАРНИЧНОМ ПОСТУПКУ ....................................................................................477 Anil Ozturk ANTROPOMORPHIC MACHINES: IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN-ROBOT SOCIAL INTERACTIONS FOR LAW AND SOCIETY .........................................509 Dušica Kovačević IMPACT OF ADVANCED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUTHANASIA ....................................................................................... 527 Szymon Bokota HUMAN-ANIMAL CHIMERAS: MIRACULOUS CHILD OF BIOTECHNOLOGY OR WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING? .................................547 Wojciech Panek ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE VERSUS THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY ............... 561 Njegoslav Jović USE OF PROTECTED CONTENT BY ONLINE CONTENT-SHARING SERVICE PROVIDERS................................................................................................. 575 Irena Radić SPREČAVANJE IZBJEGAVANJA STATUSA STALNE POSLOVNE JEDINICE U DIGITALNOJ EKONOMIJI.........................................................................................589 Bosiljka Čubrilović PRAVNI STATUS AUTONOMNIH ROBOTA ........................................................ 613 Antonije Živković THE CHALLENGES OF PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF TRANSFORMATIVE, DIGITAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES WITH SPECIALL REFERENCE TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE................................................................................... 629 Miloš Radaković ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR ANIMAL EXPERIMENTS FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES ..................................................................................................................... 659 vii Introductory Note The development of new technologies can cause radical changes in the sphere of social and economic relations, as well as radical transformations of dominant ethical stances. The discoveries of steam engines, railways and electric power have already demonstrated the transformative power of technological development, which has become even more pronounced today. Transformative technologies have a profound impact on human lives. The international scientific conference of special importance: “Transformative Technologies: Legal and Ethical Challenges of the 21st Century”, held on February 7-8 of 2020 in Banja Luka, focused on two subthemes: legal and ethical dilemmas raised by the development of digital and reproductive technologies. The conference was organized by the Faculty of Law of University of Banja Luka, the European Division of the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics (Haifa), and the Center for the Study of Bioethics (Belgrade). The submitted conference papers, selected after a double-blind peer review process, are collected in this volume. Uvodna napomena Razvoj novih tehnologija može da izazove korjenite promjene u sferi društvenih i ekonomskih odnosa i dovede do radikalne transformacije dominantnih etičkih stavova. Otkrića parne mašine, željeznice i električne energije već su pokazala transformativnu snagu tehnološkog razvoja, koja je danas postala još naglašenija. Transformativne tehnologije duboko utiču na živote ljudi. Međunarodna naučna konferencija od posebnog značaja: „Transformativne tehnologije: pravni i etički izazovi XXI vijeka“, održana 07. i 08. februara 2020. godine u Banjoj Luci, u fokusu je imala dvije podteme: pravne i etičke dileme prouzrokovane razvojem digitalnih i reproduktivnih tehnologija. Konferenciju su organizovali Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci, Evropska divizija UNESKO-ve katedre za bietiku (Haifa) i Centar za bioetičke studije (Beograd). Prezentovani radovi dostavljeni u punom obimu, nakon što su dobili dvije pozitivne anonimne recenzije, uvršteni su o ovaj zbornik. ix Original scientific paper UDK ORGANOIDS – OPPORTUNITIES IN MEDICINE AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND BIOETHICS Katarzyna Miaskowska-Daszkiewicz1 Faculty of Law, Canon Law and Administration John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland Abstract: In 2017, the European Parliament identified organoids as one of 10 technologies that can change our lives. Indeed, the technology by which scientists can obtain brain, liver, kidney and many other organ-like material opens the way to ex vivo reproduction of organ function. Organoids as living organ miniatures can be used in many ways, in clinical trials of medicinal products, in transplantation, regenerative medicine or in modeling the disease’s mechanism. At the same time, the more scientists approach the reconstruction of an organ, the more ethical and legal dilemmas arise. They concern the property of produced organoids, their status as a product on the market, the principles of their storage and their use (for example, organoid of the uterus or human brain) This paper aims to reconstruct the problems associated with organoids that should be resolved on a normative level, using the achievements of bioethics. Keywords: organoid, personalized medicine, disruptive technology, biobanking. 1. INTRODUCTION – THE CONCEPT OF ORGANOIDS A clear answer to the question about the relationship between law, technological innovation and regulatory governance seems impossible. It is difficult to determine whether it is technology that challenges the law or the law that shapes development of new technologies. Disruptive technologies, which include organoids, “develop at such an exponential pace that traditional legal oversight mechanisms are outpaced by the rate of technological change, the evolution of which is so rapid that it can escape the language of existing regulations. By the time new regulations become legally binding, they are of1 PhD, Associate Professor of Law 1 Katarzyna Miaskowska-Daszkiewicz ten only able to address a minor part of the wider technological effects which have already spread beyond the conceptual scheme of law”2. Certainly law is an imperfect tool of regulating reality, usually responds with some delay to problems arising from the use of new technologies in various spheres of life. It is not surprising that the normative space lacks the definition of organoids. Attempting to reconstruct the legal problems associated with the use of organoids in medicine, it is therefore necessary to use the achievements of representatives of medical sciences in the field of defining organoids. First of all, it should be stated that this concept, although used by scientists at the turn of the last century to describe the concept of 3D cultures, has only gained autonomy in the last 10 years3. The research and development of 3D cell cultures should be considered a natural attempt to adapt to the in vivo situation for which 2D models were not representative. Structurally, 2D cultures simply do not provide the conditions for the organization and cellular relationships observed in vivo. As indicated in the literature, in the last decade, the meaning of “organoid” has lost precision and has come to cover a series of cell culture techniques that are not necessarily a single technique4. For example, two definitions can be cited, taking into account the previous findings of other scientists and pointing to broadly included examples and influences from several different organotypic culture systems: a. “Various subfields use these terms either interchangeably or distinctly; for example, in the field of mammary gland biology, the term organoids refers to primary explants of epithelial ducts into 3D extracellular matrix () gels. Conversely, in studies of intestinal biology, organoids can refer to clonal derivatives of primary epithelial stem cells that are grown without mesenchyme or can refer to epithelial–mesenchymal co-cultures that are derived from embryonic stem cells or induced pluripotent stem cells”5 and 2 Mihalis Kritikos, «What if law shaped technologies?”, Scientific Foresight Unit(STOA) European Parliament, PE514.672 (June 2018), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2018)614572. 3 Marina Simian, Mina J. Bissell, «Organoids: A historical perspective of thinking in three dimensions», The Journal of Cell Biology 216:31. 10.1083/jcb.201610056. 4 Ibidem. 5 Eliah R. Shamir, Andrew J. Ewald, «Three-dimensional organotypic culture: Experimental models of mammalian biology and disease», Nature Reviews Molecular Cell Biology 15:647–664. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ nrm3873. 2 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova b. “An organoid is now defined as a 3D structure grown from stem cells and consisting of organ-specific cell types that self-organizes through cell sorting and spatially restricted lineage commitment…”6. For the sake of order, it should also be noted that in the literature are coined analogue terms such as “enteroids” or “tumouroids”7. Organoids can be initiated from the two main types of stem cells: pluripotent embryonic stem cells and their synthetic induced pluripotent stem cell counterparts and organ-restricted adult stem cells. In simple terms, it can be pointed out that “an organoid is a miniature, simplifier organ that recreates physiological 3D tissue structure and cellular composition in vitro. Examples include a variety of 3D in vitro culture systems: cultured tissue fragments, tissue reconstituted from cultured cells and tissues grown from stem cells, usually in the presence of extracellular matrix (ECM) protein”8. 2. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF ORGANOIDS IN MEDICINE Technological progress has enabled creation of in vitro 3D tissues (organoids), which capture some of the key multicellular, anatomical and even functional hallmarks of real organs at the micrometre to millimetre scale. The potential hidden in organoids has not yet been completely reconstructed and scientists in centres around the world are engaging in research into the application of this modern technology. Recent studies have demonstrated that organoids can be used to model organ development and disease and have a wide range of applications in basic research, drug discovery and regenerative medicine. Organ- or tissue- like 3D model above all, it can serve cognitive and educational purposes for researchers and medical students. Research on them is to help better understand diseases and develop effective drugs - easier and at a lower cost than previously possible using animal models, imaging techniques and autopsy. Organoids are referred to as “novel model system for 6 Hans Clevers, «Modeling Development and Disease with Organoids», Cell 165, Issue 7 (June 2016): 1586, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2016.05.082. 7 Matthias Stelzner et al. «A nomenclature for intestinal in vitro cultures», American Journal of PhysiologyGastrointestinal and Liver Physiology,302 (March 2012), G1361. 8 Jennifer L. Hu, Michael E. Todhunter, Mark A. LaBarge, Zev J. Gartner, «Opportunities for organoids as new models of aging», Journal of Cell Biology 217(1) (January 2017): 39, https://doi.org/10.1083/jcb.201709054. 3 Katarzyna Miaskowska-Daszkiewicz understanding human development and genetics that complements, and in the future might reduce, the use of animal models”9 It is worth noting the potential role of organoids in the process of developing new drugs. The widespread use of organoids may revolutionize this segment of research, in particular, the pre-clinical phase, dedicated to finding a therapeutic hit. The failure rate of drug screening – as a method to obtain hit drugs that may potentially achieve the desired objectives – is high: about 80% of drugs fail during clinical trials10. It turns often out that substances that were supposed to show therapeutic effectiveness do not have it, because many cell- and animal-based models are not predictive of clinical efficacy, especially when dealing with heterogeneous diseases, such as cancers. The use of organoids in drug research may be of particular importance, especially in a situation where researchers do not have complete data on a specific disease entity, such as in the case of rare diseases (where there are several patients in the world) or in the case of rapid mutations of the pathogen (as in the case of COVID-19). Organoids may be also genetic modificated using CRISPR/Cas9 and can be generated from single cells to form clonal organoids with the desired genetic changes, either to analyze the effect of a specific mutation or to repair a mutation present in a patient. Future screens may be performed using organoids with the aim of not only identifying new drugs but also revealing which patients may benefit from treatment with certain (existing) drugs. This opens up a broad perspective for the development of personalized medicine11. The test can help identify patients for whom toxic chemotherapy may not be effective. This is important especially in the case of oncological diseases for which chemotherapy is the primary therapeutic path. Before its implementation, we do not know 100% of its effects on a given type of cancer, while being forced to accept its side effects. Many patients do not respond to treatment and at the same time experience serious side effects. That is why researchers’ priority is to develop methods to predict which patients are likely to benefit from chemotherapy. 9 Jihoon Kim, Bon-Kyoung Koo, Juergen A. Knoblich, «Human organoids: model systems for human biology and medicine», Nature Reviews Molecular Cell Biology (January 2020), doi: 10.1038/s41580-020-0259-3. 10 Jumpei Kondo, Masahiro Inoue, «Application of Cancer Organoid Model for Drug Screening and Personalized Therapy», Cells (2017), doi:10.3390/cells8050470. 11 Lukas Perkhofer, Pierre-Olivier Frappart, Martin Müller, Alexander Kleger, «Importance of organoids for personalized medicine», Personalized Medicine, 15(6) (January 2018): 461-465; Toshio Takahashi, «Organoids for Drug Discovery and Personalized Medicine», Annual Review of Pharmacology and Toxicology, vol. 59 (January 2019):447-462. 4 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova The implementation of such a model of operation would be a great support in making a therapeutic decision - which is an answer to the question about the relationship between the expected effects of therapy and its undesirable side effects - both for the doctor and the patient who ultimately decides for himself. 3. BIOBANKING OF ORGANOIDS Despite the enormous potential of the use of organoids in biomedical sciences, there are strictly technical obstacles to the development of this area. In the literature it is indicated that: “Organoids are difficult to generate due to multiple technical and logistical factors. Technically, their generation still requires craftmanship to prepare primary cells from individual patients’ tissue. Logistically, research institutes without affiliated hospitals will have poor access to the necessary materials”12. In this perspective, biobanks dedicated to the deposition of organoids play a huge role13. Yang and co-authors – researching in the field of cancer – assume that “more biobanks replicating features of a variety of carcinomas or mimicking different clinical stages of original tumors will be established”14. The perspective of the development of organoids biobanking requires considering the adequacy of the existing legal solutions for their functioning. There is no doubt that biobanks that store organoids have at their disposal personal data, in particular of sensitive people, whose cells became the substrate for the construction of the organoid. This issue certainly deserves an extensive discussion in a separate paper, here I will limit myself to pointing to a few problems arising from organoid biobanking. Firstly, biobanks that operate within the EU or handle the data of EU citizens are bound by the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)15. Consent to data collection, processing, and storage is a vital el12 Kondo, Inoue, «Application of Cancer Organoid Model for Drug Screening and Personalized Therapy». 13 Jacob F. Salinas et al., «A Patient-Derived Glioblastoma Organoid Model and Biobank Recapitulates Interand Intra-tumoral Heterogeneity», Cell vol. 180 (January 2020), 188-204. 14 Hui Yang, Ning Zhang, Yu-Cun Liu, «An organoids biobank for recapitulating tumor heterogeneity and personalized medicine», Chinese Journal of Cancer Research (June 2020) doi: 10.21147/j.issn.1000-9604.2020.03.12 15 OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, 1–88. 5 Katarzyna Miaskowska-Daszkiewicz ement of the GDPR and encouraging consumers and patients to give explicit permission for their data to be used (Art. 7. GDPR). In an open consent procedure, the data subject gives their consent to the biobank collecting and storing their data and genetic material. In the same consent, the data subject gives their permission for stored data and materials to be used in future research. The GDPR provides that the data subject’s consent must be “specific and informed”. This means that the use of consent forms containing blanket consent for any subsequent use of biological material deposited with the bank is excluded. The patient must know that it will be possible in the future to use his biological material to create an organoid, it is also necessary to be informed about the possible use of this organoid and any reservations that the patient may make in this connection16. Secondly, the question arises about the distinction between a right to a sample and a right to data, seen in the perspective the rights of donors. Research shows that “in Eastern European countries one identifies the protection of the right of the donors with the protection of personal data, while in Western Europe, data protection from the protection of the sample is clearly distinguished”17. Meanwhile, the GDPR relates to personal data. Although the established position, borrowed from the transplant law, that the donor has no rights to the transferred biological material, there are voices among researchers arguing for discussing the following legal problems, especially valid in the case of donors of cells forming organoids: “1) the rights and obligations of donors to samples and the extent of their participation in profits, 2) the right to control the use of samples for research purposes, 3) and the right balance between the right to autonomy and the rights of the community in the field of research”18. Indeed, given that the donor’s rights are universal (in view of research conducted in many centers around the world), one should expect a proposal of at least a regional (in the EU or Council of Europe) approach to regulating donor’s bio-rights to the donated biological material. As in the case of transplantation as a treatment method, the development of research on organoids and their widespread use in clinical practice will most likely be associated with social acceptance of such activities in medicine. In 16 Dara Hallinan, Michael Friedewald, «Open Consent, Biobanking and Data Protection Law: Can Open Consent Be ‘Informed’ Under the Forthcoming Data Protection Regulation?”, Life Sciences, Police, Society (January 2015,) doi: 10.1186/s40504-014-0020-9. 17 Dorota Krekora-Zając, «Conditions for the Admissibility of Scienti C Research in Biomedicine Biobanking: A Challenge in Times of Big Data», Studia Iuridica LXXII (June 2018), 63. 18 Ibidem and the literature cited there, 63. 6 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova this perspective, it is precisely the creation of a legal environment based on ethical standards established in a wide debate that cannot be overestimated. 4. PROTECTION OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE HUMAN BEING Scientists create models of various organs, but the miniature bladder, thymus or kidneys in Petri dishes do not arouse such controversy as the organoid of the brain, the organ whose functioning constitutes human. It is for this reason that the most ethical and legal problems are recognized with regard to brain organoids. From the researcher’s perspective, the more human-like the brain organoid is, the more reference data will be obtained from the research, but at the same time, the more human-like means greater ethical dilemmas and the need for increased protection. Let us begin perversely from the end, namely with death. Introduction of the criterion of brain death as a determinant of human death is a consequence of the progress of biomedical sciences and technology in the perspective of diagnosis of death. Due to the fact that the death of the body is a protracted process (dissociated), as a result of which human physiological functions, i.e. blood circulation and breathing, are stopped, while the disintegration process involves tissues and organ systems at different times, the paradigm of the criterion of human death that operated until the mid-fifties of the last century was based solely on its circulatory signs (mors clinica). In other words, a person was considered dead beyond doubt when their heart stopped beating and they were not breathing. The progress of biomedical sciences, anesthesiology and intensive care in particular, meant that after cardiac arrest and cessation of breathing, i.e. clinical death, these functions can be restored as a result of properly conducted resuscitation. A breakthrough in the verification of the criterion of human clinical death as the end of their life was the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death of 196819. The document indicates an irreversible coma as a medical criterion for human death. This term is used interchangeably with the term „brain death”, defined as permanently non-functioning brain. Thus, the criterion was ad19 «A Definition of Irreversible Coma. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death», The Journal of the American Medical Association vol. 205 (1968), No. 6, 85-88. 7 Katarzyna Miaskowska-Daszkiewicz opted by defining brain death as the lack of function of the entire nervous system, both central and peripheral, perceptible in clinical examination (mors cerebralis). The Harvard standard of diagnosis of death was modified in the USA in 1981 with guidelines included in the Uniform Determination of Death Act, developed by the presidential commission on ethical problems in medicine, biomedical and behavioural sciences, which specified that when the brain stem loses the ability to perform integrative functions, individual living organ systems no longer form a living organism as a whole. The basis for this definition of death was the fact that organs, cells and tissues that form a human being do not die at the same time, but this dissociated phenomenon causes disintegration of the system as a functional whole, and since the brain stem, as the coordinator of basic life functions of the body, dies, then also a person as a whole dies. The Harvard criterion of mortis cerebralis as a determinant of the end of human life has been universally accepted in the legal orders of many European countries. Taking the above into account, the question arises, what will happen if, after applying the organoid, the cessation of brain function might no longer be permanent and irreversible? What implications might have it for the legal definition of death? Of course, it should be noted that the scientists clearly state that “technologies that would restore a few neurons or certain limited kinds of brain activity would not restore clinical functionality of the brain and so would not raise this concern”20 at the same time, however, it is impossible to forget about the pace of the development of science in many centers around the world and the possibility of discovering this element in the brain, the activity of which (or lack thereof) determines its functioning as a whole, and it cannot be ruled out that in the future scientists will be able to grow the organoid of the brain as a whole organ, but on a smaller scale. It sounds futuristic, but we cannot rule it out and exclude it from the debate. This is the most serious issue with the future development of brain organoids. And that is why it is necessary to establish the strict limits of research on organoids of this organ. 20 Nita A. Farahany, Henry T. Greely et al., «The ethics of experimenting with human brain tissue», Nature vol. 556 (26 April 2018), 431. 8 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Farahany et al. argues that “As brain surrogates become larger and more sophisticated, the possibility of them having capabilities akin to human sentience might become less remote. Such capacities could include being able to feel (to some degree) pleasure, pain or distress; being able to store and retrieve memories; or perhaps even having some perception of agency or awareness of self ”21. This naturally raises the question of the moral status of brain organoids, which will determine further issues, such as: 1) protection of sensitive data about the donor; 2) implanting human brain oganoids into animals (does the moral status of such an animal change then? which would justify its different treatment in the light of legal protection); 3) how should brain organoids be treated after the research is completed? Can it be classified as medical waste and designed to utilization? 4) is it possible to consider a category such as “the good of the brain organoid”? If so, who is to guard it?; 5) the possibility for donors of cells from which organoids are cultivated to use organoids for specific scientific purposes or to exclude them (e.g. no consent to the creation of a human-animal chimera or to modification using CRISPR). In my opinion, taking into account that research in the field of medicine and biology is often conducted multicentrically and emphasizing the importance of the object (or maybe just the subject?) ff this research for determining the identity of a human being, agreement on the rules limiting the scope of research should be at least regional. 5. AVOIDING POLARIZATION IN THE SOCIETY – A QUESTION ABOUT AVAILABILITY It should be noted that what is technologically possible in medicine and accepted in legal norms does not mean that it is widely available to patients. The development of novel health technologies is a complex and costly process that follows an extensive set of regulatory guidelines and legal provisions intended to ensure that the treatments reach the patients that need them in a highly controlled and standardised manner. The requirement of standardization is a natural answer to the need to respect the principle of equality in access to health care services. The widespread use of organoids in everyday clinical practice raises questions about the criteria for entering it into the health care system financed by the public payer. 21 Ibidem. 9 Katarzyna Miaskowska-Daszkiewicz An important challenge in this aspect will be setting the criteria determining its price setting, reimbursement conditions and clinical application of organoids. Assuming the existence of many unexplored technological and clinical aspects of organoids and taking into account the high costs of this technology, it is particularly important to create an appropriate health technology assessment protocol which is the basis for financing the use of organoids in medicine by a public payer. With limited financial resources, which can be safely assumed, is a problem for almost every public health care system, the regulator will have to reasonably indicate the reasons why it is possible to involve public funds in the use of organoids in medicine (inclusive and de facto exclusive criteria). Hints in this regard can be, e.g. premises reimbursement of medicines used outside registration indications (off-label use) or medicines for unmet medical needs (in rare or ultra-rare diseases). 6. SUMMARY Awareness of the extensiveness and complexity of legal and ethical problems that may arise in the near future from the use of organoids requires an extensive social debate involving bioethics experts, philosophers, doctors, sociologists, lawyers and representatives of regulatory authorities at both national, regional (EU) and international levels . One should agree that technology itself is not a reason to regulate22, but at the same time it is very important for society and policy-makers to anticipate innovations, to analyse potential benefits, as well as unwanted effects, and to develop a proper legal response to them. When new technology and technological advance poses some – even - theoretical danger and risk, public policy, implemented mainly through legislative activity, should aim at indicating acceptable risks and damages and their minimization, while maintaining the maximum benefits resulting from new technological solutions. Given the legal challenges referred to above, applying de minimis lex non currat principle to organoids is highly undesirable (however their real size might inclines it). The development of a regulatory environment dedicated to organoids is certainly a challenge for legislators at every decision-making level. Perhaps, in effect, it will resemble chasing a bunny, but at the same time 22 Kritikos, «What if law shaped technologies?”, 2. 10 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova there is no denying that the inclusion in the normative regulation of specific problems related to organoids will contribute to the use of this new technology taking into account the values accepted and protected in a social contract, which is manifested in legal regulation. This paper is just one of the voices in the discussion on the need to recognize the potential of legal and ethical problems related to the use of organoids in medical practice. REFERENCES: 1. Clevers, Hans. “Modeling Development and Disease with Organoids”. Cell 165, Issue 7 (June 2016): 1586-1597. 2. Farahany, Nita A., Greely Henry T. et al. “The ethics of experimenting with human brain tissue”, Nature vol. 556 (26 April 2018): 429-432. 3. Hallinan, Dara, Friedewald Michael. “Open Consent, Biobanking and Data Protection Law: Can Open Consent Be ‘Informed’ Under the Forthcoming Data Protection Regulation?”, Life Sciences, Police, Society (January 2015), doi: 10.1186/s40504-014-0020-9. 4. Hu, Jennifer L., Todhunter Michael E., LaBarge Mark A., Gartner Zev J. . “Opportunities for organoids as new models of aging”. Journal of Cell Biology 217(1) (January 2017): 39-50, https://doi.org/10.1083/jcb.201709054. 5. Kim, Jihoon, Koo Bon-Kyoung, Knoblich Juergen A. “Human organoids: model systems for human biology and medicine”, Nature Reviews Molecular Cell Biology (January 2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41580-020-0259-3. 6. Kondo, Jumpei, Inoue Masahiro. “Application of Cancer Organoid Model for Drug Screening and Personalized Therapy”, Cells (2017), doi:10.3390/ cells8050470. 7. Krekora-Zając, Dorota, “Conditions for the Admissibility of Scienti C Research in Biomedicine Biobanking: A Challenge in Times of Big Data”, Studia Iuridica LXXII (June 2018): 59-71. 8. Kritikos, Mihalis. “What if law shaped technologies?”, Scientific Foresight Unit(STOA) European Parliament, PE514.672 (June 2018), https://www. europarl.europa.eu/stoa/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2018)614572. 9. Perkhofer, Lukas, Frappart Pierre-Olivier, Müller Martin, Kleger Alexander. “Importance of organoids for personalized medicine”, Personalized Medicine, 15(6) (January 2018): 461-465. 11 Katarzyna Miaskowska-Daszkiewicz 10. Salinas, Jacob F. et al., “A Patient-Derived Glioblastoma Organoid Model and Biobank Recapitulates Inter- and Intra-tumoral Heterogeneity”, Cell vol. 180 (January 2020): 188-204. 11. Simian, Marina, Bissell Mina J. “Organoids: A historical perspective of thinking in three dimensions”, The Journal of Cell Biology 216:31–40. 10.1083/ jcb.201610056. 12. Shamir, Eliah R., Ewald Andrew J. “Three-dimensional organotypic culture: Experimental models of mammalian biology and disease”, Nature Reviews Molecular Cell Biology 15:647–664. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrm3873. 13. Stelzner, Matthias et al. “A nomenclature for intestinal in vitro cultures”, American Journal of Physiology-Gastrointestinal and Liver Physiology,302 (March 2012): G1359–G1363 14. Takahashi, Toshio. “Organoids for Drug Discovery and Personalized Medicine”, Annual Review of Pharmacology and Toxicology, vol. 59 (January 2019): 447-462. 15. Yang, Hui, Zhang Ning, Liu Yu-Cun. “An organoids biobank for recapitulating tumor heterogeneity and personalized medicine”, Chinese Journal of Cancer Research (June 2020) doi: 10.21147/j.issn.1000-9604.2020.03.12. 12 Original scientific paper UDK THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES Irina Krylatova 1 Ural State Law University, Russia Abstract: Constitutional scholars who deal with classical liberties and rights call into question of the status of new generation of rights arisen from transformative techonilogies. As a result a new doctrine of bio constitutionalizm has appeared (Jasanoff, S., ed. 2011. Reframing Rights: Bioconstitutionalism in the Genetic Age. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), which suggests that basic categories for the allocation of rights and duties in law and policymaking are redefined together with and through specific and technological ways of understanding and intervening in life. Mentioned above core law and ethical dilemmas are vividly highlighted in reproductive technologies. Despite the policy of favoring genetic engineering it is necessary to involve a reasonable scheme of regulation with recognition of the universalism of human dignity and moral status of embryo. So, in my paper I will answer the following questions: Does the recognition of «full moral respect» of embryo provoke conflicts among different constitutional and international norms? Does the invisibility of human dignity and level of its respect concern all reproductive rights or is it limited to certain categories? Furthermore, I would like to clarify the very controversial issue of using human embryo with the purpose of human enhancement. Are there compatible ways of the existing biomedical science policy, constitutional doctrine of human dignity and constitutional national policy? Keywords: Human Dignity, Bioethics, Genetic Engineering, Embryo Research, Public Policy The limits of research and normative fixation of such fundamental human values as: right to life and death, right to dignity and other have always been in a close focus of constitutionalists. It may even be surprising how during 1 PhD, Associate Professor of Law; Chair of the Constitutional Law; Centre for Bioethics and Law, Director. 13 Irina Krylatova one of the biggest Russian conferences on medicine and bioethics – Biomedinn-2019 (held in Perm, Russia from November 5 to 8) medics and doctors during their discussions on bioethics from the medical point of view constantly referred to one of the to one of the basic legal categorical imperatives of Immanuel Kant (which were so beloved by S.S. Alekseev – one of the main creators of the Russian Constitution): ‘Do not consider man as the means, only as the goal’. This Kantian imperative in fact underlies the key principle of bioethics, that was formulated by its the founding father Van Rensselaer Potter. In 1970 Potter introduced bioethics as ‘the new discipline, connecting biological knowledge and the knowledge of human values’ in the ‘Bioethics: Bridge to the Future’ magazine. Amongst these values invariably stands out the value of human dignity. Today modern lawyers (constitutionalists and internationalists) can not stay aside from the bioethical problems, that are faced by the modern society. Russian constitutionalists studying the classic rights and freedoms appeal more and more often to the attempt of identifying the new generation of rights, that emerges due to the swift development of the above mentioned biotechnology. In specific, the researchers of the constitutional law (V.I. Kruss and M.A. Lavrik) attribute the above mentioned rights to the somatic (based on the confidence of a person to independently dispose of their own body). So, for example the representatives of the international right wing see these rights as the ‘defence of human rights in the sphere of bioethics’ (A.H. Abashidze, A.I. Yorysh, S.I. Glushakova). For example, Vladimir Kruss attributes these rights to the new generation of rights. He notes that the subject of claims of somatic rights is peculiar being partly material, it is determined by the personal characteristics of the copyright holder2. 4 years earlier, in 1996 A.P. Semitko also made a suggestion, that the human rights relating to abortions and euthanasia and other such credentials form the 4th generation of human rights3. Despite rather serious statements about the niche, which should be taken by the above mentioned rights and their rather frequently used classification, suggested by M.A. Lavrik4. The author himself notes, that somatic rights (as well as their analogy – the human rights in bioethics) did not receive wide 2 V.I. Krus, “Personal (somatic) human rights in philosophical-constitutional dimension: to the problem statement”, Gosudarstvo i pravo. № 10 (2000), 43-50. 3 A.P. Semitko, Development of the legal culture as the legal process (Ekaterinburg), 193. 4 M.A. Lavrik, “To the theory of somatic rights”, Sibirskiy Yuridicheskiy Vestnik, № 3 (2005). 14 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova recognition neither in the theory of state and law, nor in the constitutional law, nor in the sectoral rights. As it has been noted, only the rights which are fundamental both in their form and content have received recognition in the Russian Constitution. However, questions remain: can a fixed list of the fundamental human rights suffice for the constantly developing social relationships that become more and more complicated? Should all human rights, that may be named fundamental based on their nature and purpose, receive constitutional recognition? One of the signs of the serious interest of constitutionalists to this matter is the creation of the doctrine of bioconstitutionalism. This doctrine was introduced by Bruno Latour5 and actively deciphered by Jasanoff S.6 The doctrine suggests that the basic categories of distribution of rights and obligations in the state politics is again being reimagined (redefined) together with and through the specific technological ways of understanding and interruption into life. This doctrine is echoed by the project of the Federal Law № 97802181-2 ‘About the legal foundations of bioethics and guarantees of its provision’, that has been submitted to the State Duma of Russia in 1997 and has been rejected by it in 2003, according to which care about the health of the population provides its safety. Bioethics is a factor of political and state importance, considering which, the guarantees of its provision should be legally consolidated. The mentioned most serious legal and ethical dilemmas are most brightly highlighted in the reproductive technologies, which are not only one of the pillars of bioethics, but, perhaps, also one of the most swiftly developing areas of modern science. Only in the last five years such discoveries have been made and such experiments have been carried out with embryos as: China (2018, China, He Jiankui, The Southern University of Science and Technology)- birth of genome-edited twins, for who a part of DNA has been replaced for HIV ‘protection’, which was possessed by their father. Professor Jiankui told that the twin girls, known as ‘Lulu’ and ‘Nana’ have been purposely genetically modified. Alongside this, the author of the experiment has been found guilty of illegal editing of the genome of a human embryo and sentenced to 3 years in prison and a fine of 500 000 USD. 5 Bruno Latour, Catherine Porter, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993). 6 Reframing Rights. Bioconstitutionalizm in the Genetic Age, ed. Sheila Jasanoff (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2011), 12. 15 Irina Krylatova USA (2017, USA Jun Wu and Juan Carlos Izpisua Belmonte, Salk Institute, California) – creation of human chimeras by Juan Carlos Izpisua Belmonte – implantation of genetically modified human cells into pig embryos. The share of the human cells in the embryos constituted less than 0.001%, the rest were pig cells. Despite this, the embryos were allowed to develop for only 28 days, this was the first experience of growing human organs inside animals. United Kingdom (2016, UK, Kathy Niakan, Crick University) – experiments on life-capable embryos have been allowed through genetic manipulations with DNA to exclude the hazard of miscarriage in pregnancy. Mexico (2016, John Zhang, New York University and New Hope Fertility Center) - statement of the researcher John Zhang about the birth of the first child from 3 parents (Mitochondrial DNA of the mother has been replaced for a donor one to eliminate the risk of transferring a serious genetic disease to the child). Through this procedure medics helped the woman bearer of Leigh Syndrome (an inheritable genetic neurological disease). All these specified experiments, while pursuing the good constitutional and international goal of improving the quality of life and creating a worthy standard of living in a particular country, level other basic constitutional values such as right to life and worthy treatment. This way, not only the transformation of the concept of value of human life in reproductive technologies, but also the enrichment and deepening of this concept takes place. In this process, we can clearly see the dual problem, because from one side: firstly, the world society does not have a single formulated conception of human dignity, only attempts of declaration of the principle of dignity and the concept of the dignity doctrine. Secondly, all these concepts and declarations are rapidly starting to become more ethically and legally outdated with the swift and unpredictable development of biotechnology. As the result, certain states make an attempt at the constitutional level to consolidate a modern constitutional doctrine, implying that reaching an international consensus – is an energy- and time-consuming process. The declaration of the human dignity in essence as an international principle is reflected in such key documents as: The United Nations Charter7, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights8, International Covenant on Civil 7 United Nations Charter, preamble: “We, the peoples of the United Nations, are determined ... to reaffirm our faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person” (Charter of the United Nations. Adopted on June 26, 1945, San Francisco). 8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world …) All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with rea- 16 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova and Political Rights9, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine10, and other. Scholars point out that generally viewing dignity as a comprehensive and dynamic principle, which is able to respond to changes in circumstance11 is, possibly, not entirely correct, as, firstly, there are subtleties of perception of human dignity and human person12. The subtleties of the translation greatly contribute to this confusion. Secondly, the researchers reasonably formulate the conceptions of dignity as a status (status of person)13, as ‘mode of being’14, as a normative concept (substantive normative concept)15 or a foundation nor- son and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. (Articles 1,22,23,25) (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted by the General Assembly of UN on December 10, 1948). 9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, preamble: “Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”. Article 10 “All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person “(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted by the General Assembly of UN on December 16, 1966 ). 10 Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, preamble: “Convinced of the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human species and recognising the importance of ensuring the dignity of the human being; Conscious that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering human dignity. Article 1: “Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine” (Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Done at Oviedo April 4 1997). 11 Stephen Riley, “Human Dignity and Institutions: The Changing Circumstances of Justice”, The Future of Human Dignity. Bundled Abstracts. Utrecht, October 11-13, 2016, 58. https://humandignity.sites.uu.nl/wpcontent/uploads/sites/87/2016/10/Bundled-abstracts.pdf. 12 Marek Nowicki. Human rights. What is included and not included in this concept. (1) personal dignity as a concept, that is close to the concept of honour, which arises when a human acts nobly. A person loses dignity in case of meanness or unworthy behaviour. 2) human dignity, related to the concept of humaneness. This dignity belongs to every person, every human being: and a baby who has not done anything good or bad, but he is already a human and the most terrible criminal, because he is a human) (Marek Novitsky. Human rights. What is included and what is not is included in this concept? (Warsaw: Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, 2005), 9-10). 13 Jeremy J. Waldron, “Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?”, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 374, no. 1(Spring 2013): 1-29; Marcus Duwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, Dietmar Mieth, The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 200–207. 14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Colombia University Press, 1993); The Law of Peoples: With, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2001). 15 Adam Etinson, «What`s So Special About Human Dignity», The Future of Human Dignity. Bundled Abstracts. Utrecht, October 11-13, 2016, 33. https://humandignity.sites.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/87/2016/10/ Bundled-abstracts.pdf. 17 Irina Krylatova mative category16, the highest value17 or a moral-legal value18, a unified system of values19, a constitutional value20 and a constitutional right21, conditions of implementation of human rights22, a guideline for balancing conflicting rights referring to fundamental goods23, an axiomatic idea24, a legal axiom or a legal position on duty of the higher courts25. A part of the scholars come to the conclusion, that there is no such thing as a right to dignity (Conor O’Mahony26), also because an object of dignity of man seems quite hard to proof and the concept is intended the way a society establishes concepts itself. Thus both ways of explaining the meaning of the dignity of man seem to fail27. This way, a unified approach to definition of the international, as well as constitutional doctrine of human dignity does not exist to this day. Currently in Russia, a further stage-by-stage development of a dignity clause is occurring primarily through the prism of equality of the human rights and freedoms. Possibly, the position of V.V.Nevinskiy, according to which ‘it is necessary to speak not about the equality of people as such, but about the equality of the dignity of all people’28 can act as the most precise answer. Similarly, there is no unity of opinion in viewing the doctrine of human dignity and application of reproductive technology. This is caused by the fact 16 Sandra Milena Rios Oyola, “Human Dignity in Times of Transition”, The Future of Human Dignity. Bundled Abstracts. Utrecht, October 11-13, 2016, 60 https://humandignity.sites.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/ sites/87/2016/10/Bundled-abstracts.pdf. 17 Philipp Gisbertz, “Overcoming Doctrinal School Thought A Unifying Approach for a New Understanding of Human Dignity”, The Future of Human Dignity. Bundled Abstracts (Utrecht, October 11-13, 2016) , 35. https://humandignity.sites.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/87/2016/10/Bundled-abstracts.pdf. 18 O.V. Vlasova, Dignity of a human as a moral-legal value: a general theoretical research. Diss. … Doctor of Law, Khanty-Mansiysk, 2011. 19 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2011). 20 V.V. Nevinskiy, “The essence and universalization of constitutional values in modern society”, Lex Russia. No. 11 (144) (November 2018), 106-120. 21 Aharon Barak, “Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right”, in ed. Ch. McCrudden. Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford: British Academy, 2013), 361–380. 22 S.E. Nesmeyanova, Judicial practice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation with comments (M .: Prospect. 2007), 103. 23 Dietmar Hubner., “Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Instrumentalisation”, The Future of Human Dignity. Bundled Abstracts. Utrecht, October 11-13, 2016, 40 https://humandignity.sites.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/ sites/87/2016/10/Bundled-abstracts.pdf. 24 George Kateb, Human Dignity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 256. 25 I. A. Kravets, “The Constitution of the Russian Federation, human rights and the dignity of the individual: a dialogue between constitutional theory, practice of constitutional justice and international norms”, Yuridicheskaya nauka i praktika ,Vol. 15, No. 2 (2019), 93–104. 26 Conor O’Mahony, “There is No Such Thing as a Right to Dignity”, Oxford Journals, Constitutional Law 10, no. 2, 551-574. http://proxylibrary.hse.ru:3348/content/10/2/551.full?sid=9622327c-8619-4935-8d0c-b2373aa58d0f. 27 Thomas Wachtendorf. “The Dignity of Man as a Mythological Concept”, 70/ The Future of Human Dignity. Bundled Abstracts. Utrecht, October 11-13, 2016 p.33. https://humandignity.sites.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/ sites/87/2016/10/Bundled-abstracts.pdf. 28 V.V. Nevinsky, Citizen and fundamental principles of the Constitution of Germany: Diss. ... Doctor of Law, (Ekaterinburg, 1994), 90. 18 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova that the concept of constitutional human dignity generally varies from country to country. The understanding of dignity is based not only on the deeply personal concerns of the person themselves and the attitude of society towards them, but also on cultural, ethical and religious29 views and norms of peoples regarding to a human that is living, as well as not yet born. In other words, the internal meaning of this term ‘is left for intuitive understanding, which is to a large extent determined by the cultural factors’30. Despite a seemingly obvious universalism of the international values of the right to life and dignity, the approaches to their understanding vary significantly, especially concerning one of the hypostases of the right to life – the right to be born, which the embryo is attempting to fulfil up to 6-8 weeks before the birth of the foetus. Moreover, in essence each human being is possessing dignity. This seemingly obvious right – the right to be born, in comparison to the right to death, that mirrors right to life, becomes not so obvious. A voiceless, practically rightless and defenceless, in many countries a developing human (as the foetus) meets firstly the implementation of the woman’s reproductive rights (for example Poland and Russia), secondly the priorities of a rigid demographic policy of the state (China), and finally the scientific curiosity of researchers for carrying out experiments on them. Moreover, the phenomenon of the constitutional doctrine is a part of the legal doctrine, that possesses colossal differences in various modern legal systems. Acknowledging and respecting the legal systems of the muslim countries, India, Japan and China as well as Africa and Madagascar, it appears that the conflict of perception of the legal doctrine lies more likely in the plane of romano-germanic legal system and the common law system. The legal doctrine as an interpretation of well-known legal scholars when applying the rule of law or the presence of a gap in law has different legal and moral force in the last two legal systems. The common law system (the known representative of which is the United Kingdom) is more flexible, built on the general principles, where the precedent 29 On April 6, 2006, the Russian Orthodox Church adopted the Declaration on the Rights and Dignity of Man, according to which dignity is not irrelative, a human becomes a personality and acquires dignity. It should be noted that the binding of the embryo to the mother’s body is contrary to the norms of Orthodoxy. The Russian Orthodox Church, the dominant Russian religious organization, considers the embryo to be an organism separate from the mother about which the corresponding official statement of the Moscow Patriarchate was made - “the right to life should mean protecting human life from the moment of conception. Any encroachment on the life of an emerging human person is a violation of this right ”(Official website of the Moscow Patriarchate. Http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/428616.html(date of request January 12, 2018). 30 Oscar Schachter, “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept”, American Journal of International Law, 77, no. 4 (1983), 848–854. 19 Irina Krylatova has the key role. According to this, the doctrine, formulated inclusively in the doctrinal works written by judges, received great recognition and was qualified as one of ‘the books of authority’. The countries of the romano-germanic legal system (one of which is Russia) are more contained and do not officially recognize doctrines as the source of law. Alongside this, in these countries it is the doctrinal vision of the scholars that creates the vocabulary and the legal terms, that are used by the legislator. This is partly related to that until XIII-XIX centuries, the doctrine created in Universities was the main source of law31. In Russia, despite the lack of official recognition of the doctrine as the source of law, it is in fact formed through the legal positions of the judges of the Constitutional Court of Russia, who are recognised as the leading law experts in the country. Also, the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Russia are final, have direct effect and do not require adoption of additional laws for its implementation. All these important juristic features of the decisions made by the Constitutional Court of Russia inside the Russian legal system and legal regulation has practically lead to that for different questions, the legislator and the law enforcer started to use its legal positions and the constitutional doctrines contained in them – the opinions of the best judges and, at the same time legal scholars, based on the principles of constitutional right and in the spirit of the Russian Constitution regarding different aspects of social life. The above is the high level of legal elaboration, analysis and moral authority of these opinions, allows us to talk about the practice of informally forming a constitutional doctrine on key controversial ethical and legal issues, as well as about the beginning of them playing their key role in Russian politics and law. Therefore, it is so important to turn to an understanding of the essence of this doctrine at the present stage. It appears, that the constitutional doctrine of human dignity in applying reproductive technology can be understood as an attempt of pushing the Russian legislator, law enforcer and the society to following the main international general-humanitarian ideals and the principles of the Oviedo Convention, and also to creating an effective normative mechanism of consolidating the rights of the child before their birth, and after. It can be suggested, that those who got nearest to defining the constitutional doctrine of human dignity in applying reproductive technology(that would be applicable in different national legal systems) were international authors studying the doctrine of the moral status of the embryo. Here the essence of 31 R. David, K. Joffre-Spinoza, Basic Legal Systems of the Present. Translation from French by V.A. Tumanov (M.: Intern. Relations, 1999), 105-106, 264-268, 308-389. 20 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova the doctrine as a phenomenon can be seen, and specifically, the researchers are ahead of the international law-maker. In their works, they foresee both positive and negative consequences of reproductive experiments. Scholars specify one of the prioritised signs of the doctrine – the demand of the embryo for worthy treatment. On the problem of the moral status of the embryo, works have been written by: Sandel32, Robert George33, Bonnie Steinbock34, Likholaya V.A. 35, K.N. Svitnev36, I.V. Siluyanova37. This status implies recognising that the embryo has the same rights as a born human, including the right for worthy treatment. In this case, the unborn child is named nasciticurus. The problem lies in that, just like dignity in general, the legal status of a yet unborn child is not specifically and precisely defined in the international legal acts. The international community is kind of handing this highly delicate problem away to the national states. In specific, the above mentioned Convention on biomedicine on one side, in article 18, puts a ban on creating embryos in the purposes of scientific research, and on the other side the states, which signed the convention remain the right for carrying out research on in vitro embryos, by including a clause, that the law (i.e. the national law), allowing the carrying out of such experiments must ensure the appropriate protection of the embryo. This way, the international guarantee of protection will depend from the state policy and the priorities of each specific national state and its conscientiousness. The indicated strategy is also developing in the Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe N 1046(1986) ‘About the use of human embryos and foetuses in diagnostic, therapeutic, scientific, industrial and commercial purposes’; the Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe N 934(1982); The Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe N 1352(2003) ‘About the research on human stem cells’, allowing the use of the embryos of human foetuses in the diagnostic, therapeutic, scientific, industrial and commercial 32 Michael J. Sandel. The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 33 Robert P. George, Alfonso Gomes-Lobo, “The Moral Status of the Human Embryo”, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 48., no. 2 (Spring, 2005), 201-210. 34 Bonnie Steinbock, “Moral Status, Moral Value, and Human Embryos: Implication for Stem Cell Research”, in The Oxford Handbook in Bioethics , ed. Bonnie Steinbock (Oxford University Press, 2007), 416. 35 V.A. Likholaya, “Problems of correlation of biomedical ethics and legal regulation in the field of unborn life”, in Biomedical Law in Russia and Abroad: Monograph, eds. G.B. Romanovsky, N.N. Tarusina, A.A. Mokhov (M .: Prospect, 2015), 271-282. 36 K.N. Svitnev, “The status of the embryo: legal and moral-ethical aspects”, http://jurconsult.ru/publications/ embrio_status.pdf. 37 I.V. Siluyanova, Bioethics in Russia values and laws. M . (SibGMU, 1997). 21 Irina Krylatova purposes with the condition of creation of a national law, which would not allow the abuse of genetic engineering, in other words, for the constitutional doctrine of human dignity in reproductive technologies of the specific state. Possibly, it would be justified from this point of view, to adopt, in the form of an international declaration, the fundamental principles of such protection, which the national states (even if its only the part of them, that has signed the Convention) will have to follow. For the minimum sign of unification of the results of work of the International commission on ethics of science and technology (COMEST) by UNESCO, which was recommended by the Assembly for a continuous dialogue on re-imagining the concepts of ‘human dignity’, to improve its forms of work with the national legislator. This could become a certain instrument in the international unification of the standards of human dignity in reproductive technologies. Worthy protection of the embryo, which is declared by the states, expands, for example, in the Statement of the World Medical Association about artificial insemination and transplantation of embryos38, adopted during the 39th World Medical Assembly in Madrid in October 1987. According to the statement the use of foetal tissues in purposes of transplantation of the fetal tissues is acceptable from the ethical point of view, if a series of conditions is followed, inclusively, transplantation of embryo tissues is allowed by the law of the country and does not contradict the principles of the Medical Code of Medical ethics (1949), the Helsinki Declaration of the WMA (1964) and the Geneva Declaration of the WMA (1983). This way, already not the participant states of the international community, but now the non-commercial global organisations are passing the solution of this problem to the national level, making a clause. Along with this, it is not a secret to the medical society, that transplantation of embryo tissues causes death of the embryo. What legal protection and status consolidation can be mentioned in this context? This way, one of the key questions of the constitutional national doctrine becomes the question about the limits and acceptable borders for the use of embryos and their tissues. About the legal regulation of this process. Let’s address the practice of regulating this process on the example of Russian Federation. 38 Statement of the World Medical Association about transplantation of embryo tissues, September 1989, / :// www.med-pravo.ru/International/IVF.htm. 22 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova For Russia, the right to life and dignity is consolidated in the articles 17, 20 and 21 of the Russian constitution, according to which ‘In Russian Federation are acknowledged and guaranteed the rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen according to the commonly-accepted principles and norms of international law and in compliance with the current constitution. The fundamental rights and freedoms of a human are inalienable and belong to everyone from their birth. Everyone has a right to life. The dignity of a person is protected by the state. Nothing may be a ground for its derogation. Noone should be subject to torture, violence and other punishment or treatment, that is violent or humiliating to human dignity. Noone may be subject to medical, scientific or other experiments without free-willing consent. In this light, one of the most difficult dilemmas arises for Russian lawyers and scholar constitutionalists and internationalists : Russia in 1990 ratified the Convention about children’s rights (1989), which consolidated the child’s right to life and dignity before their birth39, however in 1993 adopted the Russian Constitution, where it consolidated the right to life and protection of dignity from the moment of birth (part 2 of article 17, 20 and 21 of the Russian Constitution). The attempt to doctrinally justify such a collision of applying the national and international norms was undertaken by the Constitutional Court of Russia in the epochal case40 on a different subject. In specific, the judges of the Constitutional Court of Russia pointed out, that ‘based on the interpretation of the Convention on protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the decisions of the European Court for Human Rights, including those containing propositions about necessity of submission of certain changes to the national legal norms, do not cancel the priority of the Russian Constitution for the Russian legal system, and therefore – in the context of its article 15 (parts 1 and 4) – are subject to implementation on the basis of the principle of supremacy and the higher legal power of specifically the Constitution of Russian Federation in the legal system of Russia, a part of which are the international legal acts.’ Along with this, it can not be ignored, that for the judges 39 “A child, in view of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special protection and care, including appropriate legal protection, both before and after birth” (Convention on the Rights of the Child. Adopted by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of November 20, 1989; Declaration of the rights of the child Adopted by resolution 1386 (XIV) of the UN General Assembly of November 20, 1959) 40 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of April 19, 2016 No. 12-P “In the case of resolving the issue of the possibility of enforcement in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of July 4, 2013 in the case of “ Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia ”in connection with request of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation ”/ Bulletin of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. 2016. No. 5. 23 Irina Krylatova of the Constitutional Court, the questions of protection of motherhood and childhood, protection of the rights and dignity of children (especially in restricting the assisted reproductive technology) are the questions, which they pay special attention to. The brightest doctrinal confirmation of this is the special opinion of the judge of the Constitutional Court of Russia – Kokotov A.N. on the Definition of the Constitutional Court of Russia from 27.09.2018 №2318-O. The Judge Kokotov A.N. expresses concerns in the correctness of rejection of the Constitutional Court of Russia to view the case on the complaints of two citizens (S.D. and S.T.), reasoning that with that a birth of a child, that has two mothers (Surrogate and Biological) gives rise to serious moral-ethical and legal problems, related to provision of the rights of such child and their parents. He notes, that currently, the Russian legislation is empty in regard to consolidation of the corresponding constitutional basis if contractual practice of motherhood, while the law-enforcing practice often applies evaluation criteria and lets down certain doctrinal interpretations. According to this, a need has arisen for constitutionally-judicial revision of the consequences of surrogate motherhood with the purpose of evaluation of how the lack of differentiation in the order and legal consequences of such motherhood complies with the Russian Constitution. This definition is not the only judicial practice of the Constitutional Court on the questions of protection and guarding the child rights. As one of the leading scholar-constitutionalists I.A. Kravets points out, the wide spectrum of cases viewed by the Constitutional Court of Russia with the use of provisions of part 1, article 21 of the Russian Constitution about the dignity of a person demonstrates the aspiration to expand the sphere of their applicability to the various kinds of rights and freedoms of a human and a citizen to create a constitutional-legal basis of the dignity of a person, which can play the role of a significant normative-interpretational rule in the difficult questions of the search for the balance of the state, social and personal interests. In many cases of reference to protection of the dignity of a person in the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Russia do not have an independent meaning and act as a reinforcement of the constitutional-legal argumentation in the evaluation of the constitutionality of a normative legal act (before all - the law), which breaches or unlawfully restricts the protected right and freedom. In this case, shows through the ‘constitutional-rhetoric’ and ‘constitutionalargumentational’ character of using such category as ‘ the dignity of a person’. However, the justice authority with its legal positions prepares the soil 24 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova for the dignity of a human person to gradually gain a complex metha-legal (and intersectoral) nature41 Considering the oversectoral and prioritised nature of consolidation of the category of dignity, it is possible to consider the question of adopting a certain declarative document, which would bring together the axiological and value positions of the constitutional doctrine of dignity. The indicated declaration could not only consolidate the value approaches to the established human rights, but also the newly-arising rights, the rights of the 4th generation, which come out of bioethics and the development of new biotechnology, including reproductive technology. The robing of the doctrinal principles as a Declaration could possibly become the legal mechanism of following the minimum guaranteeing standards, considered by part 2 of article 55 of the Russian Constitution. According to article 55 ‘the listing in the Constitution of Russian Federation of the main Rights and Freedoms should not be interpreted as rejection or derogation of other commonly-recognised rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen. The rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen may be restricted by the federal law only to the point, which is necessary for the protection of the foundations of the constitutional system, morale, health, rights and legal interests of other person, provision of the defence of the country and the security of the state’. Unfortunately, this Russian constitutional establishment about the human rights may only be restricted only by law is often breached, including the area of reproductive technologies. In specific, following the international message of the above mentioned international documents and the practice of the ECHR42 about the fact, that the national legislator independently forms the appropriate protection of the embryo and solves the questions of the starting point of the right to life. The Russian legislator has taken such important questions as: cryo-preservation, 41 Kravets, “Constitution of the Russian Federation, human rights and dignity of the individual: a dialogue between constitutional theory, practice of constitutional justice and international norms”, 100. 42 The issue of the starting point of the right to life is at the discretion of the states themselves. It is inappropriate to unify the legislative norms of different states on this issue, moreover, certain elements of the legal protection of the human embryo / fetus arise in the light of scientific progress and future results of scientific research in the field of genetic engineering, artificial insemination or experiments on embryos (case Vo v. France (para. 25 , 82, 84) - Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights of 08.07.2004 in the case “Vo v. France”; cases of Mehmet Shentyurk and Bekir Shentyurk v. Turkey (paragraph 107) – Decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Mehmet Shentyurk and Bekir Shentyurk v. Turkey dated 04/09/2013). 25 Irina Krylatova utilization and donation of embryos remaining after IVF43, medical44 and social indications45 for termination of pregnancy to the level of sub-legislative acts and the personal choice of the woman. As the result, the problematic of the ground for the origin of the right to life and the following protection of dignity of the unborn child is lowered to the level of procedural instructions. This example is a visual illustration of delegating the solving of the questions about implementation of the constitutional doctrine for maintaining the dignity in reproductive technologies away to the state legislator. An example of what further legislative and norm-creating practice may lead to. It appears that here all the concerns, which Conor O’Mahony expressed in his works with a reference to R. Dworkin will be appropriate. They suggested, that in the understanding of consolidating the dignity of a person in the law, each country keeps to the ‘baseline’ and ‘bad faith’ approaches. In the first case, the breaches of dignity are so reprehensible, that they start carrying a universal character and are recognised as unacceptable by the entire society. In the second case, the breaches ‘are applied’ to a specific cultural context of each country, the state in this case breaches human rights through the prism of the concept of human dignity set by itself46. In other words, the states themselves set the rules of the game and independently follow or breach them. In this case, one of the fundamental Oviedo principles is levelled – the principle of responsibility of the government in regulating the sphere of modern bio- and reproductive technology. In Russia, in turn, the right of the future child for care and protection of its dignity. The clause of the best interest of the child, which is relevant to one of the sides – is the right of the child to demand appropriate care from the side of the parents47, it is not openly, but transferred also onto the state mechanism. The unborn human may pretend to legal care not only from the side of the parent. But also from the state, the potential citizen of which it may become. 43 “Citizens, with the mutual consent, have the right to cryo preserve, dispose of or donate the embryos remaining after IVF. Sex cells, tissues of the reproductive organs and human embryos cannot be used for industrial purposes ”(paragraph 71, Appendix 12 of the Order of the Ministry of Health of Russia dated 30.08.2012 No. 107n“ On the procedure for using assisted reproductive technologies, contraindications and restrictions on their use ”// Russian Newspaper, Special Issue, No. 78/1, 2013, April 11). 44 Order of the Ministry of Health and Social Development of the Russian Federation dated 03.12.2007 No. 736 “On approval of the list of medical indications for artificial termination of pregnancy” / ATP “Consultant +”. 45 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of February 6, 2012 No. 98 “On the Social Indication for Artificial Termination of Pregnancy” / Russian newspaper. 2012. February 15. 46 Conor O’Mahony, “There is No Such Thing as a Right to Dignity”, Oxford Journals, Constitutional Law 10, no. 2, 551-574. http://proxylibrary.hse.ru:3348/content/10/2/551.full?sid=9622327c-8619-4935-8d0c-b2373aa58d0f. 47 “Motherhood and childhood, the family are protected by the state. Caring for children, raising them is an equal right and duty of parents ”(Article 38 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Adopted by popular vote. December 12, 1993). 26 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova The solution of this problem may be found, firstly, not in escaping from the standing problem through the courts’ rejections to view and hear the appeals, which are complex from the ethical point of view, where the life and interests of the unborn child at the different stages (embryo, blastema, foetus) are concerned, but viewing these decisions and a stage-by-stage formulation of a legal doctrine on this questions through the legal positions of courts and specific judges. Secondly, carrying out of paternalist social and demographic policy from the side of the state, including creation of friendly social and medical services for future mothers and an adequate national legal strategy of the state, for implementation of the right of the families to worthy life. In the end result, applying this model of co-interaction may aid the implementation of international standards of unconditional priority of human dignity despite the level of biological development of the human creature, and will aid the conventional principles of the best interest of child. This way, human dignity aids the formation of international bio-law, which is beginning to interact with the intra-state legal order, causing a need for comprehension of the questions about the possibility of constitutional regulation of human rights in the area of biomedicine48. The constitutional doctrine of human dignity in reproductive technologies as one of the elements of the national legal doctrine as a whole, today is undertaking attempts of implementing the international principles into national legislation through the constitutional values of human life and human dignity of every person. This acts as a kind of a method of resolving disputable legal collisions in this sphere. Any right (even international or constitutional) can not and should not replace bioethics, which will always be somewhat ahead to detect and indicate the problems, which require their legal solution49. Along with this, any law may transmit its spirit through the ideas of its followers – scholars, formulating the ethical and legal doctrines to be followed. It appears, that a special role should be played here by the acknowledging of the exclusivity and inseparability of the right to life and dignity of a person, despite their biological age. In this paradigm, in lack of legal regulation, it is necessary to actively form a constitutional doctrine of the moral status of the embryo in Russia, which 48 I. A. Kravets, “Constitution of the Russian Federation, human rights and dignity of the individual: a dialogue between constitutional theory, practice of constitutional justice and international norms”, Jurisprudence and practice, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2019), 93–104. 49 N.E. Krylova, Criminal law and bioethics (criminal law problems of applying modern medical technologies), Abstract ... diss. ... Doctor of Law M. (2006), 21. 27 Irina Krylatova would not allow the embryo to be viewed as medical raw material, a set of cells or a part of the mother’s organism. At the same time, applying the doctrinal interpretation may, at the present stage become an initial mediation (a peaceful co-existence) between the scientific interest of the biomedical science and the conservative views of the society (including its female part, pretending to respect to private life and full control and choice over their body) and the state. REFERENCES: 1. David, R. and K. Joffre-Spinoza, Basic Legal Systems of the Present. Translation from French by V.A. Tumanov (M.: Intern. Relations, 1999). 2. Dworkin, Ronald. Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2011). 3. Etinson, Adam. “What`s So Special About Human Dignity”, The Future of Human Dignity. Bundled Abstracts. Utrecht, October 11-13, 2016, 33. https:// humandignity.sites.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/87/2016/10/Bundledabstracts.pdf. 4. George, Robert P. and Alfonso Gomes-Lobo. “The Moral Status of the Human Embryo”, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 48., no. 2 (Spring, 2005) 5. Hubner, Dietmar. “Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Instrumentalisation”, The Future of Human Dignity. Bundled Abstracts. Utrecht, October 11-13, 2016, 40 https://humandignity.sites.uu.nl/wp6. Jasanoff Sheila (ed.). Reframing Rights. Bioconstitutionalizm in the Genetic Age, ed. Sheila Jasanoff (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2011) 7. Kravets, I.A. “Constitution of the Russian Federation, human rights and dignity of the individual: a dialogue between constitutional theory, practice of constitutional justice and international norms”, Jurisprudence and practice, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2019). 8. Krus, V.I. “Personal (somatic) human rights in philosophical-constitutional dimension: to the problem statement”, Gosudarstvo i pravo. № 10 (2000). 9. Krylova, N.E. Criminal law and bioethics (criminal law problems of applying modern medical technologies), Abstract ... diss. ... Doctor of Law M. (2006). 10. Latour, Bruno and Catherine Porter, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993). 11. Lavrik, M.A. “To the theory of somatic rights”, Sibirskiy Yuridicheskiy Vestnik, № 3 (2005). 28 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 12. Likholaya, V.A. “Problems of correlation of biomedical ethics and legal regulation in the field of unborn life”, in Biomedical Law in Russia and Abroad: Monograph, eds. G.B. Romanovsky, N.N. Tarusina, A.A. Mokhov (M .: Prospect, 2015) 13. O’Mahony, Conor. “There is No Such Thing as a Right to Dignity”, Oxford Journals, Constitutional Law 10, no. 2, 551-574. http://proxylibrary.hse. ru:3348/content/10/2/551.full?sid=9622327c-8619-4935-8d0c-b2373aa58d0f. 14. Nesmeyanova, S.E. Judicial practice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation with comments (M .: Prospect. 2007). 15. Novitsky, Marek. Human rights. What is included and what is not is included in this concept? (Warsaw: Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, 2005) 16. Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples: With, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2001). 17. Rawls, John. Political Liberalism (New York: Colombia University Press, 1993) 18. Sandel, Michael J. The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 19. Riley, Stephen. “Human Dignity and Institutions: The Changing Circumstances of Justice”, The Future of Human Dignity. Bundled Abstracts. Utrecht, October 11-13, 2016, 58. https://humandignity.sites.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/ sites/87/2016/10/Bundled-abstracts.pdf. 20. Schachter, Oscar. “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept”, American Journal of International Law, 77, no. 4 (1983). 21. Semitko, A.P. Development of the legal culture as the legal process (Ekaterinburg). 22. Steinbock, Bonnie. “Moral Status, Moral Value, and Human Embryos: Implication for Stem Cell Research”, in The Oxford Handbook in Bioethics , ed. Bonnie Steinbock (Oxford University Press, 2007) 23. Svitnev, K.N. “The status of the embryo: legal and moral-ethical aspects”, http://jurconsult.ru/publications/embrio_status.pdf. 24. Siluyanova, I.V. Bioethics in Russia values and laws. M . (SibGMU, 1997). 25. Vlasova, O.V. Dignity of a human as a moral-legal value: a general theoretical research. Diss. … Doctor of Law, Khanty-Mansiysk, 2011. 26. Wachtendorf, Thomas. “The Dignity of Man as a Mythological Concept”, 70/ The Future of Human Dignity. Bundled Abstracts. Utrecht, October 11-13, 2016 p.33. https://humandignity.sites.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/ sites/87/2016/10/Bundled-abstracts.pdf. 27. Waldron, Jeremy J. “Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?”, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 374, no. 1(Spring 2013) 29 Pregledni naučni članak UDK SYBERJUSTICE: POTENCIJALI I IZAZOVI VANSUDSKOG REŠAVANJA SPOROVA ONLINE Nevena Petrušić1 Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Nišu Apstrakt: Primena savremenih IKT promenila je iz korena sve segmente ljudske delatnosti i transformisala sve oblasti društvenih, ekonomskih i pravnih odnosa. Klasičnu prodaju zamenjuje elektronska trgovina, umesto gotovine koristi se elektronski novac, a mnogi tradicionalni pravni instituti dobijaju nove e-oblike (smart ugovori, blockchain tehnologija, e-fiskalizacija i sl.) Najnovijim LegalTech i RegTech dostignućima započela je modernizacija same pravničke profesije i pravničkog obrazovanja, a menja se i sam način rešavanja pravnih sporova. Dok su primena veštačke inteligencije u pravosuđu i kreiranje softvera za “prediktivnu pravdu” još uvek na nivou eksperimenata, alati za cyberjustice već su u širokoj upotrebi i usmereni su na olakšavanje pristupa pravdi, unapređenje komunikacije između sudova i pravnih profesionalaca, kao i na pružanje direktne pomoći sudijama, tužiocima i sudskim upravama u radu na predmetima. Važno polje primene IKT u rešavanju sporova jesu alternativni metodi za vansudsko rešavaje sporova – on line pregovaranje, medijacija i arbitraža (ODR). U ovom radu istražujemo njihove potencijale i ukazujemo na ključne izazove u razvoju i primeni ODR u kontekstu unapređenja pristupa pravdi i zaštite prava učesnika u postupku. Ključne reči: Rešavanje sporova, Syberjustice, Online dispute resolution. 1. UVODNE NAPOMENE „Stojimo na rubu tehnološke revolucije koja će u osnovi izmeniti način na koji živimo, radimo i odnosimo se jedni prema drugima. Po svom obimu, dubini i složenosti, transformacija će biti različita od bilo čega što je čovečanstvo doživelo ranije“ – ovo su reči Klausa Švaba, izgovorene 2015. godine na 45. 1 Redovni profesor; Rad je nastao kao rezultat finansiranja od strane Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja RS prema ugovor evidencioni broj 451-03-68/2020-14/200120. 31 Nevena Petrušić Svetskom ekonomskom forumu.2 Nova tehnološka revolucija, tzv. „Četvrta industrijska revolucija“, kako je Švab naziva, ima potencijal da potpuno promeni svet kakav poznajemo. Fuzija različitih tehnologija, koja polako briše linije između fizičke, digitalne i biološke sfere, menja sve aspekte ljudske delatnosti i ljudskih odnosa. Sve duži je spisak poslova koje mašina ili programski kod obavljaju bolje i efikasnije od čoveka. Veštačka inteligencija, mašinsko učenje, internet stvari (IoT), nanotehnologija, robotika, biotehnologija, 3D štampači, kriptovalute i drugi koncepti i inovacije ubrzano menjaju ne samo način rada, razmišljanja i komunikacije, već i celokupnu socio-ekonomsku i društvenu strukturu, ustaljene obrazce ponašanja, kao i samo poimanje ljudskog identiteta. 3 Naša stvarnost je već danas do te mere transformisana, da se, kako to primećuju savremeni folozofi, postepeno ostvaruje čuvena Marksova krilatica: „Sve što je čvrsto i ustaljeno pretvara se u dim“.4 Pravo je jedna od oblasti koja poslednjih par decenija doživljava korenitu transformaciju u svim svojim pojavnim oblicima i manifestacijama. Ne postoji ni jedno područje prava u kome promene nisu vidljive. Preoblikuju se tradicionalni pravni instituti, nove tehnologije, kao što su blockchain i drugi inovativni mrežni alati, menjaju sve oblasti pravnog saobraćaja, a LegalTech i RegTech industrije menjaju tradicionalni način rada pravnika i tržište pravničkih usluga.5 Nove digitalne tehnologije vrše snažan upliv i na pravosudne sisteme i načine njihovog funkcionisanja. Koncept Syberjustice je već konceptualizovan, a na delu je integracija informacionih i komunikacionih tehnologija (IKT) u proces rešavanja sporova.6 2 Klaus Schwab, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond”, https://www.weforum. org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond. 3 Procenjuje se da će 2025. godine 90% ljudi na planeti imati neograničen i besplatan pristup internetu (91 odsto verovatnoće), da će vlade prikupljati porez putem Blockchain (73,1 odsto verovatnoće), a da će u bordu direktora kompanija biti mašina sa veštačkom inteligencijom (45,2 odsto verovatnoće). Deep Shift Technology Tipping Points and Societal Impact, Survey Report (World Economic Forum: Global Agenda Council on the Future of Software & Society, 2015), 7. https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/system/files/ged/46-wef_gac15_technological tipping points_report_2015-toconnected.pdf. 4 Slavoj Žižek, Kao lopov usred bela dana, Moć u doba postčovečanstva, (Beograd: Laguna, 2020), 34. 5 Predviđa se da potreba za radom pravnika neće biti umanjena, te da su, pored pravnika, u malom riziku od automatizacije procesa rada zaposleni u oblasti zdravstva, obrazovanja, nauke, umetnosti, socijalnih usluga i masovnih medija. Razlog tome je što su za obavljanje ovih profesija neophodni ljudski kvaliteti, kao što su osetljivost, empatija, nestandardno razmišljanje, sposobnost ubeđivanja i pregovaranja. Videti: Anthony, B. Atkinson, Inequality: What Can Be Done? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 175. Ipak, ne misle svi tako. Kris Skiner, na primer, smatra da će kombinacija digitalnih registara i veštačke inteligencije digitalizovati pravosuđe i dovesti do toga da pravnici neće biti potrebni. Chris Skinner, Digital Human: The Fourth Revolution of Humanity Includes Everyone (Sussex, Marshal Cavendish International (Asia) Pte. Ltd: John Wise&Sons Ltd. Copyrighted Material, 2018), 112. 6 Karim Benyekhlef, “Cyberjustice”, Academic Foresights, October-December 2011, http://www.academicforesights.com/Cyberjustice.pdf. 32 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Iako tehnološki razvoj otvara nesagledive mogućnosti, on je praćen i brojnim rizicima i izazovima. Strah od masovne nezaposlenosti usled smanjenja potrebe za ljudskim radom, od ugrožavanja bezbednosti, povrede privatnosti i produbljivanja nejednakosti, strah od „tehnološkog darvinizma“, koji se već događa, moguća ograničenja slobodnog protoka informacija, nepoverenje u spremnost vlada da adekvatno odgovore promenama i izazovima, samo su deo bojazni koje prate razvoj i primenu savremenih IKT.7 Zabrinutost, oprez i dileme prate i primenu IKT u oblasti prava, čime se može objasniti i izvesno kašnjenje u izgradnji sveobuhvatnog pravnog okvira primene digitalnih tehnologija. Od budućnosti koja je već započela ljudi imaju velika očekivanja, ali nikada u ljudskoj istoriji nije postojao veći disbalans između mogućeg prosperiteta i potencijalne opasnosti.8 U ovom radu istražujemo potencijale i izazove rešavanja sporova on line, sagledavajući ih u kontekstu temeljnih pravozaštitnih postulata, kroz primere dobre prakse i najnovijih dostignuća koja su u ovoj oblasti ostvarena. Rad ima tri celine. U prvom delu rada razmotrena su dva ključna polja Syberjustice – digitalizacija standardnih poslova u pravosuđu i primena veštačke inteligencije. Drugi deo rada posvećen je potencijalima i izazovima u primeni alternativnih metoda rešavanja sporova u virtuelnom okruženju, a u zaključnim napomenama sumirani su rezultati istraživanja. 2. SYBERJUSTICE – PRAVCI RAZVOJA I TRENDOVI Termin Syberjustice, koji svoje poreklo ima u teoriji informacija obuhvata raznovrsne situacije u kojima koja primena IKT čini sastavni deo procesa rešavanja sporova, kao i transformaciju institucija i aktivnosti koje obavljaju koristeći IKT, u cilju boljeg prepoznavanja izazova sa kojima se suočavaju.9 On, dakle, ima šire značenje od termina e-justice, koji označava rešavanje sporova u digitalnom okruženju. Izgradnja syberjustice ostvaruje se upostavljanjem pravnog i institucionalnog okvira primene IKT alata i njihovom integracijom u proces rešavanja sporova. Krajnji cilj primene IKT jeste da se olakša pristup pravdi, unapredi 7 Deep Shift Technology Tipping Points and Societal Impact, 9. 8 Kosta Živanović, „Četvrta industrijska revolucija“, Centar za međunarodnu saradnju i održivi razvoj, 5.4.2018 , https://www.cirsd.org/sr-latn/mladi-eksperti/cetvrta-industrijska-revolucija 9 Videti: Guidelines on how to drive change towards Cyberjustice, Stock-taking of tools deployed and summary of good practices, European commission for the efficiency of justice (CEPEJ), 2016), 7, https://edoc.coe. int/en/efficiency-of-justice/7501-guidelines-on-how-to-drive-change-towards-cyberjustice-stock-taking-oftools-deployed-and-summary-of-good-practices.html 33 Nevena Petrušić efikasnost i ekonomičnost u ostvarivanju i zaštiti prava i poveća transparentnost pravosudnog sitema u svim njegovim aspektima. Drugim rečima, primena IKT alata nije sama sebi cilj, već je njihova funkcija unapređenje kvaliteta pravosuđa, što podrazumeva da su na raspolaganju kreatorima politika, pravnim profesionalcima i građanima. Na osnovu analize dosadašnjih rezultata u digitalizaciji pravosuđa, mogu se identifikovati nekoliko glavnih tokova u ovoj oblasti: 1) digitalizacija standardnih poslova u pravosuđu kroz primenu IKT radi unapređenja pristupa pravdi, efikasnije komunikacije između sudova i profesionalaca, iz prelazak na “spise bez papira”, digitalizacije sudnice, automatizacije sudske administracije, lakšeg vođenja pravosudne statistike, publikovanja sudske parakse i dr; 2) razvoj i primena alata veštačke inteligencije u postupcima za rešavanje sporova; 3) primena alternativnih metoda za rešavanje sporova u digitanom okruženju. 2.1. Digitalizacija pravosuđa U cilju povećanja efikasnosti i transparentnosti svojih pravosudnih sistema države širom sveta unapređuju primenu IKT u pravosuđu, koristeći različite informacione sisteme i softverske alate. Poslednjih godina realizovani su brojni projekti digitalizacije pravosuđa, finansirani iz javnih i privatnih fondova. Jedan od pionira u ovoj oblasti je Sajberjustice laboratorija u Montrealu, osnovana 2010. godine, koja razvija i testira softverske module i druge digitalne alate prilagođene realnosti pravosudnih sistema i analizira uticaj IKT na pravosuđe.10 U državama EU izgradnju syberjustice osnažila je Digitalna agenda za Evropu 2010-2020,11 jedan od sedam stubova Strategije EU 2020.12 Godišnji pregledi stanja u oblasti pravosuđa država EU, koji Evropska komisija redovno objavljuje počev od 2015. godine, pokazuju da u državama EU postoji značajan napredak u digitalizaciji pravosuđa, ali da je on prilično neujednačen. 10 Sajberjustice laboratoriju su osnovali profesor Karim Benyekhlef, sa Univerziteta u Montrelau, i Fabien Gélinas, sa McGill Universita. Multidisciplinarni međunarodni tim čine stručnjaci sa 20 univerziteta i istraživačkih centara, 36 nezavisnih istraživača i 9 partnera. Istraživačku infrastrukturu čine sudnice za održavanje suđenja i simulacija, kompjuterska laboratorija, server prostorija, mobilna sudnica za proučavanje implikacija upotrebe videokonferencija i daljinska razmena informacija u pravosudnom kontekstu. Posebno je značajan rad na edukaciji digitalno kompetentnih pravnika. Podaci o radu Laboratorije dostupni na: https://www.cyberjustice.ca/ en/ laboratoire/presentation/. 11 A Digital Agenda for Europe, COM(2010)245 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ HTML/?uri= CELEX:52010DC0245&from=en 12 EUROPE 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52010DC2020&from=en 34 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Tako, prema podacima iz Pregleda stanja u oblasti pravosuđa za 2019. godinu, samo u pet država EU elektronska sredstva komunikacije mogu se koristiti za pokretanje postupaka, dostavljanje pismena i praćenje toka postupka, a samo u sedam zemalja presude svih sudova dostupne su na internetu.13 Razlike u rezultatima na planu digitalizacije pravosuđa vidljive su i među državama članicama Saveta Evrope, ali se u svakoj državi beleži izvestan napredak. Primeri dobre prakse u ovoj oblasti publikovani su u dokumentu Evropske komisije za efikasnost pravosuđe (CEPEJ) Smernice za pokretanje promena ka sajber pravosuđu, Pregled alata i rezime dobrih praksi,14 koje prati i poseban Priručnik za njihovo sprovođenje,15 koji donosiocima odluka pruža jasnu mapu puta za kreiranje i upravljanje strategijom integrisanja IKT u pravosudni sistem, podršku izgradnji sistema za upravljanje predmetima, koracima i radnjama koje treba preduzeti tokom dizajniranja, razvoja i sprovođenja IKT projekta u okviru pravnog sistema, uključujući i set indikatora za procenu njihovih različitih dimenzija. Navodimo, radi ilustracije, rezultate tehnološke modernizacije pravosuđa u Estoniji, koja je evropski lider u digitalizaciji, i u Austriji, čiji je sistem upravljanja IKT u pravosuđu model po kome se u Srbiji sprovodi digitalizacija pravosuđa.16 Estonija je tokom poslednje dve decenije izgradila jedan od najefikasnijih pravosudnih sistema, upravo zahvaljujući primeni IKT. Proces digitalizacije je u potpunosti centralizovan i njime upravlja Centar registra i informacionih sistema, državna agencija pod upravom Ministarstva pravde Estonije, nadležna za uspostavljanje inovativnog okruženja koje pruža integrisane e-usluge u cilju efikasnijeg fukcionisanja državne uprave i pravosuđa i sprovođenja javnih politika.17 Jedan od 70 sistema koje je Centar do sada razvio jeste Centralni informacioni sistem (E-spis)18 – integrisani sistem koji omogućava pokretanje i uvid u tok sudskih postupaka i spise predmeta, kao i razmenu informacija između suda, različtih institucija i organa, kao i građana i njihovih zastupnika. Podnesci se mogu uputiti imejlom, ali se preferira korišćenje portala – Javni 13 The 2019 EU Justice Scoreboard COM(2019) 198 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/ PDF/ ?uri=CELEX:52019DC0198&from=EN. 14 Guidelines on how to drive change towards Cyberjustice. 15 Toolkit for supporting the implementation of the Guidelines on how to drive change towards Cyberjustice, European commission for the efficiency of justice (CEPEJ), 2019, https://rm.coe.int/cepej-toolkit-cyberjusticeen-cepej-2019-7/168094ef3e 16 Videti: Smernice razvoja IKT sistema u sektoru pravosuđa, (Beograd: Ministarstvo pravde, 2016), 3. https:// www.mpravde.gov.rs/files/IKT%20Development%20Guidelines%20in%20Justice%20Sector_SER%201.pdf 17 Podaci dostupni na portalu: https://www.rik.ee/en/international 18 Detaljne informacije o E-spisu dostupni su na: https://e-estonia.com/solutions/security-and-safety/e-justice/ 35 Nevena Petrušić e-spis, preko kojeg stranke ostvaruju komunikaciju sa sudom. Po pokretanju postupka, sud obaveštava protivnu stranku, ukoliko je korisnik portala, da je protiv nje pokrenut postupak, kako bi pristupila inicijalnom podnesku, a ako nije korisnik, podnesak šalje putem imejla ili pošte. Država favorizuje korišćenje Javnog e-spisa utvrđivanjem nižih sudskih taksi za one koji ga koriste. Takođe, licima protiv kojih je pokrenut postupak, a koji ne koriste Javni e-spis, o trošku suda dostavlja se samo inicijalni podnesak, dok za dostavljanje ostalih podnesaka plaćaju fiksni iznos za svaki list. Od 2014. godine korišćenje portala Javni e-spis obavezno je za advokate, pravne savetnike, prokuriste, javne beležnike, izvršitelje, stečajne upravnike i organe javne vlasti. Tokom 2006. godine otpočelo je funkcionisanje Sudskog informacionog sistema,19 koji svim sudovima Estonije nudi mogućnost automatizovanog upravljanja predmetima u svim vrstama sudskih postupaka. Sistem omogućava automatizovano raspoređivanje i upis predmeta, zakazivanje ročišta, kreiranje poziva, objavljivanje presuda na zvaničnom vebsajtu i prikupljanje metapodataka. Najnovija generacija sudskog informacionog sistema pruža sudijama uvid u sve faze postupka i njihovo trajanje, omogućava napredno pretraživanje teksta dokumenata i njihovo sortiranje, kreiranje poziva i obaveštenja i dr. U određenim vrstama sudskih predmeta, uglavnom upravnim i nekim manjim parničnim i krivičnim, papirnati spisi se uopšte ne formiraju, a počev od 1. januara 2020. godine digitalni sudski spis ima pravnu važnost u svim novopokrenutim građanskim i upravnim predmetima.20 Audio snimanje rasprava na ročištima i način korišćenja audio zapisa od strane suda i stranaka uređeni su aktom ministra pravde.21 Odluke svih sudova su aninimizirane i dostupne javnosti, u skladu sa politikom otvorenih podataka, što pravosudni sistem čini potpuno transparentnim. U Austriji procesom digitalizacije bavi se Federalni računarski centar (Bundesrechenzentrum/BRZ).22 U oblasti pravosuđa primenjuje se jedinstvena aplikacija Elektronsko upravljanje predmetima (Verfahrensautomation justiz) koji podržava rad svih sudova i državnih tužilaštava u okviru 66 različitih vrsta postupaka. Sprovođenje nekih postupaka, kao što je izdavanje platnog naloga, u potpunosti je automatizovano. Podnošenje podnesaka i dostavljanje vrši se 19 Podaci dostupni na portalu: https://www.rik.ee/sites/www.rik.ee/files/elfinder/article_files/RIK_e_Court_ Information_System %2B3mm _bleed.pdf 20 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), Country profiles, Estonia, https://www.coe.int /en/web/ cepej/country-profiles/estonia. 21 Procedure for audio recording of court hearings and preparation of digital minutes od 18.12.2017, br. 26 https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/120122017009 22 Videti: https://www.brz.gv.at/ 36 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova elektronski, putem sistema Elektronska pravna komunikacija (Elektronischer Rechtsverkehr), koji je uveden 1990. godine, čime je Austrija postala prva država na svetu koja je uspostavila elektronsku komunikaciju između sudova i korisnika. Tokom 2007. godine elektronska komunikacija je prebačena na internetsku tehnologiju, a od 2009. godine sudovi i javna tužilaštva su u mogućnosti da presude, zapisnike i druga dokumenta šalju strankama u PDF formatu, dok od 2013. godine svaki građanin može da pokrene postupak elektronskim podneskom.23 Podnesci se sastavljaju u definisanim elektronskim formama, a šalju se elektronski, putem zaštićene linije. Ako je elektronski podnesak uredan, dobija poslovni broj, a podnosilac dobija obaveštenje o prijemu podneska. Tokom sudskog postupka stranke primaju relevantne informacije elektronskim putem, kao i konačnu odluku suda, a sudske takse plaćaju se bezgotovinski.24 Osoblju u pravosuđu namenjena je interna informativna platforma – Intranet pravosudnog sistema, koja predstavlja važan alat za njihov rad. Obilje aplikacija omogućavaju uvid u podatke o pravnim izvorima, kao i u službene podatke brojnih institucija. Interanet se neprestano proširuje i fleksibilno prilagođava potrebama korisnika. Preko posebne aplikacije „Moje stranice“ korisnici su u mogućnosti da skladište sadržaje koje često koriste i na taj način stvaraju svoj individualni radni alat.25 Zakonskim izmenama tokom 2005. godine stvoreni su uslovi za korišćenje video konferencija u saslušanju svedoka i optuženih u prethodnom krivičnom postupku, svedoka na glavnom pretresu, kao i svedoka, stranaka, tumača i veštaka u građanskom sudskom postupku. Videokonferencijskim sistemima opremljeni su svi sudovi, državno tužilaštvo i zatvori. Za sada se saslušanje putem video konferencije primenjuje u slučajevima kada se lice koje treba saslušati nalazi na području drugog domaćeg ili stranog suda, ali se primena ove tehnologije postepeno proširuje. 26 Uspostavljena je sveobuhvatna nacionalna baza podataka pravosudnog sistema, koja, pored ostalog, sadrži podatke o radnom opterećenju zapo23 Tokom 2016. godine ostvarano je 14,7 miliona elektronskih komunikacija, uključujući 4,8 miliona elektronskih podnesaka, koji čine 94% svih podnetih tužbi i 76% svih predloga za izvršenje. E-Justice Austria, IKT applications in the Austrian justice system, (Viena: Federal Ministry of Justice, 2018), 7-8 https://www. justiz.gv.at/file/8ab4ac8322985dd501229ce3fb1900b4.de.0/it-justizbrosch%C3% BCre%20englisch _stand%20 dezember%202018.pdf?forcedownload=true 24 E- justice Austria, 7. Marco Velicogna, “Electronic Access to Justice: From Theory to Practice and Back”, Droit et cultures, Revue internationale interdisciplinaire, 61/2011-1, https://journals.openedition. org/droitcultures/2447 25 E-justice Austria, 38-39. 26 E-Justice Austria, 35. 37 Nevena Petrušić slenih, o dužini trajanja postupka i dr., uz mogućnost izrade ad hoc analiza za potrebe relevatnih korisnika. Statistička baza podataka dostupna je na Intranetu, s tim što je pristup određenim grupama podataka dopušten samo autorizovanim korisnicima. Srbija je na samom početku digitalizacije svog pravosudnog sistema. Proces evropskih integracija podstakao je aktivnosti na ovom planu, posebno nakon objavljivanja studije Funkcionalna analiza pravosuđa u Srbiji”,27 2014. godine, na osnovu koje je izrađen Akcioni plan za pridruživanje EU za Poglavlje 23 – Pravosuđe i osnovna prava.28 Tokom sprovođenja Akcionog plana, 2016. godine usvojene su Smernice razvoja IKT sistema u sektoru pravosuđa,29 kojima je utvrđen konceptualni model IKT sistema u pravosuđu i definisani su principi i smernice razvoja e-pravosuđa. Prema podacima Ministarstva pravde,30 pozitivni pomaci ostvareni su u primeni IKT u radu upravnih i privrednih sudova i javnih izvršitelja. U fazi je testiranje aplikacija za vođenje predmeta u sudovima (Case management system – SIPRIS), kojim se zamenjuje softverski alat Libra, a Portal E-sud31 već pruža mogućnost građanima i advokatima koji imaju sertifikat elektronskog potpisa da elektronski pokrenu upravni postupak, preduzimaju radnje, ostvare uvid u predmet i primaju obaveštenja putem SMS-a i imejla. Prvi koraci ostvareni su i na planu umrežavanja različitih institucija unapređivanjem Pravosudnog informacionog sistema.32 Prema oceni pravnih profesionalaca, digitalizacija pravosuđa odvija se u dobrom pravcu.33 Činjenica je, međutim, da predstoji mukotrpan put transformisanja pravosuđa primenom IKT, jer je stvarna upotreba IKT i umrežavanja radi lakše obrade sporova, upravljanja i rešavanja sporova još uvek u početnoj fazi, tako da su 27 Funkcionalna analiza pravosuđa u Srbiji, Izveštaj br. 94014-YF, Beograd, Multidonatorski poverenički fond za podršku sektoru pravosuđa u Srbiji, 2014. https://www.mdtfjss.org.rs/data/pub/sjfr/sr/Funkcionalnaanaliza-pravosudja-u-Srbiji.pdf. U izveštaju se konstatuje da se IKT još uvek ne sagledavaju kao insrtrument transformacije, da ne postoji rukovodeća grupa koja bi odredila reformske prioritete i izradila dugoročni plan za čitav pravosudni sistem. Hardver je često star; internet veze su nejednake na teritoriji zemlje, mogućnosti servera su slabe, a u primeni su raznovrsne nepovezane sisteme IKT za procesuiranje predmeta, upravljanje predmetima i dokumentacijom. 28 https://www.mpravde.gov.rs/ files/Akcioni %20plan%20PG%2023%20Treci%20nacrt-%20Konacna%20 verzija1.pdf 29 Smernice razvoja IKT sistema u sektoru pravosuđa, 3. 30 Rezultati Ministarstva pravde u 2019. godini, https://www.mpravde.gov.rs/vest/28569/rezultati-ministarstvapravde-u-2019-godini.php 31 https://esud.sud.rs/home/#/login 32 Ministarstvo pravde navodi da je u periodu 2018-2019. razmenjeno više od 4 miliona elektronskih upita, čime je ostvarena ušteda od 1.1 milijardi dinara u Budžetu Republike Srbije. Rezultati Ministarstva pravde u 2019. godini, 1 33 E-sud, aplikacija za ‘online’ pokretanje spora je stigla – stiže li konačno i e-fikasno sudstvo? Netokracija, 24.9.2018. https://www.netokracija.rs/e-sud-aplikacija-149640 38 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova sudski postupci i dalje snažno „vezani za papir“ i fizičko prisustvo stranaka i drugih učesnika u skoro svakoj fazi postupka. 2.2. Primena veštačke inteligencije u pravosuđu Veštačka inteligencija je skup naučnih metoda, teorija i tehnike čiji je cilj da se mašinom reprodukuju kognitivne sposobnosti ljudskih bića i da mašine preuzmu složene zadatke koje je čovek prethodno obavljao.34 Njena primene u pravosuđu jedno je od kontraverznih pitanja oko koga se vodi živa debata. Istovremeno, u svim delovima sveta multidisciplinarni timovi uveliko razvijaju algoritme i testiraju njihovu primenu. U Americi se prediktivni algoritmi već primjenjuju u proceni rizika od recidivizma prilikom izricanja alternativnih sankcija.35 Jedan od široko korišćenih alata je COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions). Algoritam je specijalno dizajniran za sudove, i pomaže im u donošenju odluka zasnovanih na podacima. Podaci se prikupljaju sprovođenjem intervjua sa počiniocima, koji odgovaraju na određena pitanja, a na osnovu njih algoritam procenjuje rizik od ponavljanja dela na skali od 1 do 10.36 U Nemačkoj se sprovodi projekat „Argumentum“, koji se zasniva na stavu da sudska argumentacija zahteva sofisticirani intelektualni napor i obilje informacija za čiju obradu ljudski um ima prirodna ograničenja, te je zato potrebno istražiti na koji način ispunjavanje ovog informaciono zahtevnog zadatka može biti podržano od strane računara. U okviru projekta razvija se prototip softvera koji automatski identifikuje i analizira argumentacijske strukture iz elektronski dostupnih odluka Saveznog suda, koje su osnov prototipa.37 34 European ethical Charter on the use of Artificial Intelligence in judicial systems and their environment, https://rm.coe.int/ethical-charter-en-for-publication-4-december-2018/16808f699c. 35 Vrhovni sud Viskonsina je već bio u prilici da procenjuje da li je upotrebom algoritma za procenu rizika od recidivizma prekršeno pravo optuženog na pravično suđenje i zauzeo stav da ovo pravo nije prekršeno, iako ni sud ni optuženi nisu imali saznanje o strukturi algoritma. Videti: State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (2016). https:// www.courts.ca.gov/documents/BTB24-2L-3.pdf. Videti komentar ove odluke u: Han-Wei Liu, Ching-Fu Lin, YuJie Chen, „Beyond State v Loomis: artificial intelligence, government algorithmization and accountability“ International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Volume 27, Issue 2, Summer 2019, Pages 122–141, https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/article/27/2/122/5316430. 36 Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner, „Machine Bias“, ProPublica, 23, 5. 2016. https:// www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing; Franciska Zsófia Gyuranecz - Bernadett Krausz - Dorottya Papp, „The AI is now in session – The impact of digitalization on courts“. http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/17916/TEAM%20HUNGARY%20TH%202019%20D.pdf 37 Towards automated identification and analysis of argumentation structures in the decision corpus of the German Federal Constitutional Court, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6611332. 39 Nevena Petrušić U Rusiji inženjeri rade na intelektualnom sistemu „Robot pravnik“, čiji je cilj da se olakša pružanje informacija pravnicima i građanima u vezi sa sudskim postupcima.38 U Brazilu naučnici proučavaju pravnu preciznost sistema za pronalaženje informacija, koji je zasnovan na modelu koji koristi tehniku veštačke inteligencije „rezonovanje na osnovu slučaja“.39 Na zahtev Ministarstva pravde Estonije, multidisciplinarni tim dizajnira „Robot-sudiju“, koji će pomoću algoritma donositi odluke u sporovima male vrednosti.40 U toku su pripreme da se ovim “sudijama” prizna pravni status, kako bi se defnisala odgovornost za donošenje odluka na osnovu algoritma.41 Svesna potencijalnih koristi, ali i opasnosti od neodgovorne primene veštačke inteligencije u pravosuđu i mogućih kršenja ljudskih prava i standarda pravičnog suđenja, Evropska komisija za efikasnost pravosuđa (CEPEJ) krajem 2018. godine usvojila je Evropsku etičku povelju o upotrebi veštačke inteligencije u pravosudnim sistemima i njihovom okruženju.42 Povelja opisuje alate veštačke inteligencije koji se koriste u različitim evropskim zemljama i evidentira brojna pitanja i dileme u vezi sa njihovim razvojem i primenom, uključujući i pitanje primene alata „prediktivne pravde“. Najveći doprinos Povelje ogleda se u utvrđivanju pet rukovodinih principa koji važe za sve aktere uključene u razvoj i primenu veštačke inteligencije u oblasti pravosuđa, a to su: 1) Princip poštovanja osnovnih prava: Osigurati da dizajn i primena alata i usluga veštačke inteligencije budu kompatibilni sa osnovnim pravima; 2) Princip nediskriminacije: Posebno sprečiti nastanak ili intenziviranje svake diskriminacije među pojedincima ili grupama pojedinaca; 3) Princip kvaliteta i sigurnosti: U postupku donošenja sudskih odluka i prikupljanju podataka koristiti potvrđene izvore i nematerijalne podatke pomoću modela koncipiranih na multidisciplinarni način, u sigurnom tehnološkom okruženju; 4) Princip transparentnosti, nepristrasnosti i poštenja: Omogućiti da metodi za obradu podataka budu dostupni i razumljivi, podložni autorizaciji eksterne revizije; i 5) Princip „pod kontrolom korisnika“: Isključiti pristup zasnovan na obaveznoj primeni i osigurati da korisnici budu informisani akteri, koji 38 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8674441 39 Symball Rufino de Oliveira, Marisa Bräscher Basílio Medeiros, “Legal Information Retrieval: Evaluating Case-Based Reasoning“, in: 2009 Seventh Brazilian Symposium in Information and Human Language Technology, 8-11. 9. 2009, 3 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5532453. 40 Stefan Philipsen, Erlis Themeli, “Artificial intelligence in courts: A (legal) introduction to the Robot Judge“, http://blog.montaignecentre.com/index.php/1940/artificial-intelligence-in-courts-a-legal-introduction-tothe-robot-judge-2/ 41 Joe Pinkstone, “Estonia creating AI powered judge”, Daily Mail Online, 26 March 2019), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/ sciencetech/ article-6851525/Estonia-creating-AI-powered-JUDGE.html) 42 European ethical Charter on the use of Artificial Intelligence in judicial systems and their environment, https://rm.coe.int/ethical-charter-en-for-publication-4-december-2018/16808f699c. 40 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova kontrolišu svoj izbor. Poštovanje ovih etičkih načela posebno je značajno u fazi dizajniranja algoritama, u kojoj mora biti ostvarena široka saradnja sudija, advokata i programera, kako bi se izbegao rizik svake pristrasnosti. Za ovakav pristup zalaže se i CEPEJ, koji je decembra 2019. formirao posebnu Radnu grupu za sajbersustice, i veštačku inteligenciju (CEPEJ-GT-CYBERJUST) sa zadatkom da državama članicama i pravnim stručnjacima koji žele da razvijaju ili koriste IKT i veštačku inteligenciju u pravosuđu ponudi okvir i garancije u cilju poboljšanja efikasnosti i kvaliteta pravde.43 Na nivou EU 2019. objavljene su Etičke smjernice za pouzdanu veštačku inteligenciju,44 koje je na zahtev Evropske komisije izradila nezavisna grupa eksperata. Njihov cilj je promocija pouzdane veštačke inteligencije, odnosno, veštačke inteligencije koja je zakonita, etična i otporna i iz tehničke i iz socijalne perspektive. U Smernicama se posebno naglašava važnost pristupa zasnovanog na ljudskim pravima, transparentnosti, nediskriminacije i pravičnosti. Ključna očekivanja od prediktivnih algoritama jesu racionalizacija procesa donošenja odluka sumiranjem svih relevantnih informacija na efikasniji način nego što to čini ljudski um, ali i smanjenje polja diskrecionog odlučivanja, uzimenjem u obzir kvantitativne procene koju pruža algoritam, isključujući svaku subjektivnost i emotivnost.45 To, međutim, ne znači da budućnost leži u delegiranju donošenja sudskih odluka sudiji-robotu, jer su rizici isuviše veliki. Istraživanja pokazuju46 da algoritmi nisu ni pravični i objektivni, jer mogu da ignorišu fundamentalne varijable i uključuju predrasude, tako da ne mogu biti fer i neutralni. S druge strane, opasnost leži i u tome da sudija, pod uticajem rezultata zasnovanih na algoritmu ne uzme u obzir specifičnosti konkretnog slučaja, ali i aktuelni socijalni kontekst, što može dovesti do nepravične odluke. Ne treba takođe izgubiti iz vida da pravozaštitni postulati u procesna ljudska prava koji proističu iz standarda pravičnog suđenja podrazumevaju postupak kojim upravlja ljudska individua. U tom smislu problem predstavljaju i netransparentnosti algoritama. Oni su najčešće intelektualna svojina privatnih korporacija, koje odgovaraju samo svojim akcionarima i izvan su bilo kakve demokratske kontrole, pa teoretičari upozoravaju da „odluke“ alagoritma 43 Videti: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/cepej-working-group-cyber-just 44 Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelinestrustworthy-ai 45 Camilla Ovi, Luigi Salvia, Pierluigi Tonnara, The judge of the future: artificial intelligence and justice, http:// www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/17916/TEAM%20IKTALY%20II%20TH%202019%20D.pdf 46 Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy (New York, Crown Publishers, 2016), navedeno prema The judge of the future: artificial intelligence and justice, 19. 41 Nevena Petrušić nemaju demokratski legitimitet.47 Poseban izazov su ograničene mogućnosti suda, stranaka i njihovih zastupnika da steknu uvid u sve korake algoritma, jer je njegova moć upravo u količini podataka i sposobnosti izvođenja niza logičkih operacija koja prevazilaze ljudske kapacitete.48 Zbog zabrinutosti da će primena veštačke inteligencije ubiti „ljudskost“ pravde, koja čini njegovu suštinu, odlučno se brani stav da bi pravda trebalo da ostane u potpunosti „ljudska“, jer je ona više od tehničkog prava. Automatizovana presuda, čak i ako je ispravna, ne bi mogla biti zaista pravedna ako je lišena ljudske strane, jer: „Sudije su više od ¢tehničara zakona¢“, a sudnica [...] „mesto na kome država šalje poruku da vas sluša kao građanina. Da li je to pravi način postupanja sa ranjivim ljudima u našem društvu, da im ne dozvolimo saosećajno uho, čak i ako je odluka koju dobijaju iz automatizovane presude objektivno tačna? “49 Naglašava se takođe da će široka primena veštačke inteligencije u donošenju odluka imati za posledicu gubitak poverenja u sudstvo, jer će se presuda sagledavati kao nerazumljiva jednačina, a ne kao rezultat složenog i ritualizovanog procesa u kome se spor rešava na društveno prihvatljiv način.50 Primena veštačke inteligencije u pravosuđu ima velike potencijale, a čini se da će njen dalji razvoj biti usmeren na razvijanje prediktivnih algoritama koji sudiji „pomažu“ da donese odluku. Ima svakako i jednostavnih imovinskopravnih sporova manjeg značaja, kao što su sporovi male vrednosti, koje bi mogli biti delegirani sudiji-robotu, uz mogućnost ulaganja žalbe ljudskom sudiji. Postoje, međutim, pravne stvari prilikom čijeg rešavanja treba isključiti primenu prediktivnih algoritama. Pravda treba da ostane u potpunosti „ljudska“ u svim onim pravnim stvarima koje tangiraju temeljne ljudske vrednosti, kao što je, na primer, sloboda, ili zahtevaju vaganje suprotstavljenih interesa, kakav je, na primer, slučaj sa procenom najboljih interesa deteta u postupcima u vezi sa vršenjem roditeljskog prava. S druge strane, sam proces dizajniranja algoritama mora biti transparentan, uz mogućnost otkrivanja njihovih tehničkih performansi subjektima postupka, a pre nego što budu primenjeni u pravosuđu, neohopodno je rigorozno testiranje kako bi se isključila svaka mogućnost upotrebe nepouzdanih, pristrasih i diskrimatornih algoritama.51 47 Paul Nemitz, Constitutional democracy and technology in the age of artificial intelligence, Philosophical Transactions A, 7 https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsta.2018.0089 48 The judge of the future: artificial intelligence and justice, 19. 49 Thomas McMullan, A.I. Judges: The Future of Justice Hangs in the Balance, Opezero, 14. 2. 2019. https:// onezero.medium.com/a-i-judges-the-future-of-justice-hangs-in-the-balance-6dea1540daaa 50 The judge of the future: artificial intelligence and justice, 21 51 Guidelines on how to drive change towards Cyberjustice, 48. 42 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 2.3. Alternativno rešavanje sporova on line Uticaj savremenih tehnologija vidljiv je i u oblasti alternativnog rešavanja sporova.52 Izraz “online rešavanje sporova” (Online dispute resolution – ODR), označava proces rešavanja sporova koji se u celini ili u najvećem delu odvija online.53 S obzirom da se najšeće primenjuju metodi za alternativno rešavanje sporova – pregovaranje, medijacija i arbitraža,54 ovaj izraz se na međunarodnom nivou koristi za označavanje online rešavanja sporova primenom alternativnih metoda.55 Online arbitraža je po prvi put sprovedena 1996. godine u Americi, u okviru projekta Virualni magistrat, koji je obezbedio platformu za rešavanje slučajeva povrede prava ličnosti putem online publikacija, krađe poslovnih tajni, slanja neželjene elektronske pošte i dr.56 Iste godine započeo je i projekat Online kancelarija omudsmana, u okviru koga su korisnicima interneta pružane besplatne usluge online medijacije.57 Ovi inovativni projekti označili su početak primene alternativnih metoda za rešavanje sporova u digitalnom okruženju, koja beleži stalni napredak, posebno u oblasti potrošačkih sporova iz online transakcija. Usluga ODR danas nude brojne privatne kompanije, koje na svojim portalima nude alate za raznovrsne vidove ODR: 1) online namirenje primenom algoritma koji obezeđuje automatizovano namirenje novčanih potraživanja; 2) online arbitraža, koja se sprovodi na veb platformi, uz pomoć kvalifikovanog arbitra, 3) online rešavanje potrošačkih sporova, u kome se koristi e-mail za 52 Ovaj pojam označava alternativne metode za rešavanje sporova (Alternative Dispute Resolution- ADR) – raznovrsne metode i tehnike prilagođene različitim vrstama sporova i sukoba. Njihov razvoj predstavlja svojevrsni odgovor na učmali, rigidni i neefikasni pravosudni sistem, koji ne zadovoljava potrebe ubrzanog pravnog saobraćaja i ozbiljno ugrožava ostvarivanje prava na pristup pravdi i prava na pravično suđenje. O tome, šire: Nevena Petrušić, “Medijacija − metod rešavanja pravnih sporova“, Temida, časopis o viktimizaciji, ljudskim pravima i rodu, 2/2004, 23-37; Nevena Petrušić, Evropski standardi i principi rešavanja sporova putem medijacije, Evropska zajednica naroda i univerzalne vrednosti / ur. Gordana Vukadinović i Agneš Kartag-Odri, (Novi Sad : Novosadska asocijacija za teoriju, etiku i filozofiju prava, 2010), 250-260. Videti i: McDowell Wyatt, Lyle Sussman, “Overcoming the Patology of Litigation: An ADR Primer for Executives”, Business Horizons, 39, 23-29. 53 Thomas Schultz, “Does Online Dispute Resolution Need Governmental Intervention? The Case for Architectures of Control and Trust”, North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 6, 2004. 71, https://papers. ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=896532 54 Nevena Petrušić “Oniline rešavanje sporova: put do pravde u globalizovanom svetu”, Međunarodna naučna konferencija Globalizacija i pravo, Niš, 21-22. april 2017. Zbornik sažetaka (Niš : Pravni fakultet, Centar za publikacije, 2017), 160. 55 Esther van den Heuvel, “Online dispute resolution as a solution to cross-border e-disputes”,7 http://www. oecd.org/internet/consumer/1878940.pdf 56 Robert Gellman, A Brief History of the Virtual Magistrate Project: The Early Months, http://www.umass. edu/ dispute/ncair/gellman.htm. 57 Ethan Katsh, The Online Ombuds Office: Adapting Dispute Resolution to Cyberspace, https://www.umass. edu/ dispute/ncair/katsh.htm 43 Nevena Petrušić razrešenje određenih vrsta potrošačkih prigovora; 4) Online medijacija, koja se sprovodi na veb platformi, uz pomoć kvalifikovanog medijatora.58 Tako, na primer, platforma Modria59 korisnicima nudi paket digitalnih alata čija primena omogućava dijagnostifikovanje pravnog problema uz pomoć algoritma, neposredno online pregovaranje, ekspertsku evaluaciju slučaja i pristup medijatoru i sprovođenje online medijacije. Osnivači Modrije kreirali su ODR sisteme na eBay-u i PayPal-u, koji godišnje rešavaju 60 miliona potrošačkih sporova, duplo brže u odnosu na brzinu sa kojom se rešavanja na tradicionalni način – offline.60 Pored potrošačkih sporova, platforma je specijalizovana za rešavanje sporova male vrednosti, sporova o dugovanjima, iz zakupnih odnosa, ali i za složenije vrste sporova. U Holandiji usluge ODR nudi platforma i aplikacija Rechtwijzer 2.0, koju je 2005. godine razvio Odbor za pravnu pomoć, u saradnji sa Univerzitetom Tilburg, a namenjena je rešavanju sporova iz porodičnih odnosa, potrošačkih sporova, sporova oko zakupa, otkaza i dugovanja. Aplikacija obezbeđuje da se najpre izvrši pravna procena slučaja kako bi se postiglo što brže rešenje i sprečilo dalje eskaliranje spora. Rezultat procene je plan “korak po korak”, koji strankama najpre pruža informacije o mogućim pravnim opcijama, kao i korišćenje različitih alata, kao što je, na primer, alat za obračun visine izdržavanja dece. Ako stranke ne mogu same da pronađu rešenje, aplikacija nudi uslugu medijacije koja se odvija preko platforme.61 Evropska komisija snažno podržava razvoj ODR, posebno u oblasti rešavanja prekograničnih sporova, što je deo njenih napora u izgradnji EU kao prostora slobode, bezbednosti i pravde. Preduzimanjem niza različitih mera poslednjih godina znatno je unapređen kapacitet EU i država-članica da pravnim subjektima obezbede delotvoran pristup pravdi u rešavanju sporova, posebno prekograničnih. Tome je, pored ostalog, doprinelo uspostavljanje brojih internet servisa, kao što su: European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters, European Consumer Centres Network, FIN-NET the Cross-border Out-of-Court Complaints Network for Financial Services), SOLVIKT network i dr.62 58 Online dispute resolution as a solution to cross-border e-disputes”, 8. 59 Podaci o platformi dostupni na: https://www.tylertech.com/products/modria 60 Robert Ambrog, Modria, Innovator of Online Dispute Resolution, Is Acquired By Tyler Technologies, LawSites, 12. jul, 2017, https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2017/06/modria-innovator-online-dispute-resolutionacquired-tyler-technologies.html 61 Emma van Gelder, Digitalisering in buitengerechtelijke geschiloplossing, KEIduidelijk, 10 december 2017, http://www.keiduidelijk.nl/2017/12/10/digitalisering-in-buitengerechtelijke-geschiloplossing/ 62 Šire: Nevena Petrušić, „Standardi EU o pružanju pravne pomoći u prekograničnim sporovima“, Pravo Republike Srbije i pravo Evropske unije - stanje i perspektive. sv. 2 , ur. Nataša Stojanović, Srđan Golubović ( Niš : 44 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Važan korak ka online rešavanju potrošačkih sporova učinjen je uspostavljanjem Evropske ODR platforme,63 koja je počela da funkcioniše 2016. godine. Prema Uredbi o online rešavanju potrošačkih sporova iz 2013. godine,64 na osnovu koje je platforma ustanovljena, online rešavanje potrošačkih sporova predstavlja samo mogućnost, tako da pristup sudu nije isključen. Platforma omogućava da se celokupna procedura vansudskog rešavanja potrošačkog spora, bez obzira da li je prekogranični ili domaći, sprovede online, s tim što se mogu rešavati samo sporovi proistekli iz ugovora o prometu robe i usluga sklopljenih online, što ograničava njene domete. Platforma za ODR ima oblik interaktivne veb stranice, koja subjektima online trgovine nudi jedinstvenu centralizovanu višejezičnu “početnu tačku” za vansudsko (alternativno) rešavanje sporova. Ona omogućava podnošenje pritužbi ispunjavanjem elektronskog obrasca, kao i prilaganje odgovarajuće dokumentacije, uključujući i fotografije. Platforma nudi alat za neposredne pregovore potrošača i trgovca, koji mogu trajati najduže 90 dama, kao i mogućnost da strane saglasno odrede telo za alternativno rešavanje spora sa spiska nacionalnih tela na teritoriji EU o vansudskom rešavanju sporova potrošača. Radi se o telima koja su ispunile kriterijume sadržane u Preporuci Komisije o principima za vansudska tela koja su uključena u sporazumno rešavanje potrošačkih sporova iz 2001. godine65 i na osnovu toga dobila notifikaciju svojih država.66 Izabranom telu se preko Platforme upućuje pritužba, a sam postupak telo sprovodi po pravilima države u kojoj ima sedište. Postoje, međutim, i izvesna zajednička pravila za sva tela,67 među kojima i pravilo po kome rešavanje sporova ne zahteva fizičku prisutnost stranaka ni njihovih Pravni fakultet, Centar za publikacije, 2009) 101-124; Nevena Petrušić, „Vansudsko rešavanje potrošačkih sporova“, u: Pravni život, tematski broj Pravo i odgovornost. (Beograd: Udruženje pravnika Srbije, 2011), 751-770. 63 https://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/main/index.cfm?event=main.home2.show&lng=EN. 64 Regulation (EU) no 524/2013 of the European parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/ EC (Regulation on consumer ODR) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013 R0524&from=HR 65 Commission Recommendation of 4 April 2001 on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes, 19.4.2001, OJ L 109/56. http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ redress/ out_of_court/ adr/acce_just12_en.pdf. 66 Council Resolution of 25 May 2000 on a Community-wide network of national bodies for the extrajudicial settlement of consumer disputes, 2000/C 155/01, OJ C 155/1. Kontakti svih tela nalaze se na Evropskoj ODR platformi https://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/main/?event=main.adr.show2. 67 Sve države EU su na svom području sertifikovale tela ovlašćena za alternativno rešavanje sporova. Njihov rad se zasniva na načelima pristupačnosti, stručnosti, nezavisnosti, nepristrasnosti, transparentnosti, delotvornosti, pravičnosti, slobode i zakonitosti, u skladu sa Direktivom o alternativnom rešavanju potrošačkih sporova (Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CEL EX:32013L0011&from=HR. 45 Nevena Petrušić predstavnika pred telima za alternativno rešavanje spora, izuzev ako pravila postupanja predviđaju tu mogućnost i ako su stranke sa tim saglasne. Platforma nudi telima za alternativno rešavanje spora besplatne alate za elektronsko upravljanje predmetima, ali njihovo korišćenje nije obavezno. Saglasno Uredbi, u svakoj državi članici EU određene su kontakt tačke za alternativno rešavanje sporova online, koje imaju najmanje dva savetnika. Njihov je zadatak da strankama pružaju podršku tokom postupka koji je pkrenut putem platforme za ODR. Prema oceni Evropske komisije, platforma za ODR još uvek je nedovoljno iskorišćena tako da nije ostvarila svoj puni potencijal.68 Najveći broj potrošačkih sporova rešen je online putem direktnih pregovora, dok je primena medijacije bila znatno ređa. Na to utču brojni činioci, među kojima i nezainteresovanost trgovaca i obaveza sporazumnog izbora tela za alternativno rešavanje spora. Čini se, međutim, da je jedan od glavnih razloga nedovoljna informisanost i nepoverenje javnosti u alternativne metode rešavanja sporova,69 koje prate i tihi otpori advokata. 3. ZAKLJUČAK Primena savremenih IKT otvorila je širok prostor za modernizaciju prava i pravničke profesije. Preoblikuju se tradicionalni pravni instituti, nove tehnologije menjaju način pravnog saobraćaja, a očigledne su promene i u radu pravnih profesionalaca. Nove digitalne tehnologije vrše snažan upliv i na pravosudne sisteme i načine njihovog funkcionisanja. Poslednjih godina ubrzano se radi na uspostavljanju pravnog, etičkog i institucionalnog okvira syberjustice i integraciji IKT u proces rešavanja sporova. Ovaj proces prate brojne debate, uglavnom vezane za primenu veštačke inteligencije, odnosno, prediktivnih algoritama, s aspetka poštovanja tradicionalnih pravozaštitnih postulata i standarda pravičnog suđenja. Na delu su nastojanja da se uspostavi jasan etički okvir za kreiranje i primenu prediktivnih algoritama, kako bi se 68 Videti: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European economic and social committee on the application of Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri= COM:2019:425:FIN. Prema podacima iz izveštaja, u približno 80 % sporova predmet je automatski zaključen nakon 30 dana jer trgovac nije putem platforme reagovao na obaveštenje o sporu i poziv da potrošaču predloži telo za alternativno rešavanje spora. Stranke su samo u približno 2 % predmeta sporazumele o telu za alternativno rešavanje spora. Međutim, u 42 % sporova koji su podneseni putem platforme stranke su spor rešile neposrednim pregovorima. 69 Online dispute resolution as a solution to cross-border e-disputes, 19. 46 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova očuvala “ljudskost” pravde. Jedno od važnih polja primene IKT alternativno rešavanje sporova u digitalnom okruženju, u kome su rizici od ugrožavanja ljudskih prava, s obzirom na prirodu samih metoda, nešto manji u odnosu na sudsko rešavanje sporova. Iako su prva iskustva ohrabrujuća, praktični rezultati su za sada skromni, na šta utiče nepoverenje javnosti u efikasnost i delotvornost alternativnih metoda za rešavanje sporova, koji još uvek nisu afirmisani i na adekvatan način promovisani. LITERATURA: 1. Anthony, B. Atkinson, Inequality: What Can Be Done? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). 2. Camilla Ovi, Luigi Salvia, Pierluigi Tonnara, „The judge of the future: artificial intelligence and justice“, http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/17916/TEAM%20 IKTALY%20II%20TH%202019%20D.pdf 3. Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy (New York, Crown Publishers, 2016) 4. Chris Skinner, Digital Human: The Fourth Revolution of Humanity Includes Everyone (Sussex, Marshal Cavendish International (Asia) Pte. Ltd: John Wise&Sons Ltd. Copyrighted Material, 2018). 5. Emma van Gelder, “Digitalisering in buitengerechtelijke geschiloplossing”, KEIduidelijk, 10 december 2017, http://www.keiduidelijk.nl/2017/12/10/ digitalisering-in-buitengerechtelijke-geschiloplossing/ 6. Esther van den Heuvel, “Online dispute resolution as a solution to crossborder e-disputes”,7 http://www.oecd.org/internet/consumer/1878940.pdf 7. Ethan Katsh, “The Online Ombuds Office: Adapting Dispute Resolution to Cyberspace”, https://www.umass.edu/ dispute/ncair/katsh.htm 8. Franciska Zsófia Gyuranecz - Bernadett Krausz - Dorottya Papp, „The AI is now in session – The impact of digitalization on courts“. http://www.ejtn.eu/ PageFiles/17916/TEAM% 20 HUNGARY%20TH%202019%20D.pdf 9. Towards automated identification and analysis of argumentation structures in the decision corpus of the German Federal Constitutional Court, https:// ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6611332. 10. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8674441 11. Han-Wei Liu, Ching-Fu Lin, Yu-Jie Chen, „Beyond State v Loomis: artificial intelligence, government algorithmization and accountability“, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Volume 27, Issue 2, Summer 2019, Pages 122–141, https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/article/27/2/122/5316430 47 Nevena Petrušić 12. Joe Pinkstone, “Estonia creating AI powered judge”, (Daily Mail Online, 26. 3.2019), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/ sciencetech/ article-6851525/Estoniacreating-AI-powered-JUDGE.html) 13. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner, „Machine Bias“, (ProPublica, 23, 5. 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-biasrisk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing; 14. Karim Benyekhlef, “Cyberjustice”, Academic Foresights, October-December 2011, http://www.academic-foresights.com/Cyberjustice.pdf. 15. Klaus Schwab, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond”, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrialrevolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond. 16. Kosta Živanović, „Četvrta industrijska revolucija“, Centar za međunarodnu saradnju i održivi razvoj, 5.4.2018 , https://www.cirsd.org/sr-latn/mladieksperti/cetvrta-industrijska-revolucija 17. McDowell Wyatt, Lyle Sussman, “Overcoming the Patology of Litigation: An ADR Primer for Executives”, Business Horizons, 39, 23-29. 18. Marco Velicogna, “Electronic Access to Justice: From Theory to Practice and Back”, Droit et cultures, Revue internationale interdisciplinaire, 61/2011-1, https://journals.openedition. org/droitcultures/2447 19. Nevena Petrušić, “Medijacija − metod rešavanja pravnih sporova“, Temida, časopis o viktimizaciji, ljudskim pravima i rodu, 2/2004, 23-37; 20. Nevena Petrušić, “Evropski standardi i principi rešavanja sporova putem medijacije”, Evropska zajednica naroda i univerzalne vrednosti / ur. Gordana Vukadinović i Agneš Kartag-Odri, (Novi Sad : Novosadska asocijacija za teoriju, etiku i filozofiju prava, 2010), 250-260. 21. Nevena Petrušić, „Standardi EU o pružanju pravne pomoći u prekograničnim sporovima“, Pravo Republike Srbije i pravo Evropske unije - stanje i perspektive. sv. 2 , ur. Nataša Stojanović, Srđan Golubović ( Niš : Pravni fakultet, Centar za publikacije, 2009) 101-124; 22. Nevena Petrušić, „Vansudsko rešavanje potrošačkih sporova“, u: Pravni život, tematski broj Pravo i odgovornost. (Beograd: Udruženje pravnika Srbije, 2011), 751-770. 23. Nevena Petrušić “Oniline rešavanje sporova: put do pravde u globalizovanom svetu”, Međunarodna naučna konferencija Globalizacija i pravo, Niš, 21-22. april 2017. Zbornik sažetaka (Niš : Pravni fakultet, Centar za publikacije, 2017), 160. 24. Paul Nemitz, „Constitutional democracy and technology in the age of artificial intelligence“, Philosophical Transactions A, 7 https://royalsocietypublishing. org/doi/pdf/10.1098/ rsta.2018.0089 48 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 25. Robert Gellman, “A Brief History of the Virtual Magistrate Project: The Early Months”, http://www.umass.edu/ dispute/ncair/gellman.htm. 26. Robert Ambrog, “Modria, Innovator of Online Dispute Resolution, Is Acquired By Tyler Technologies”, LawSites, 12. jul, 2017, https://www.lawsitesblog. com/2017/06/modria-innovator-online-dispute-resolution-acquired-tylertechnologies.html 27. Slavoj Žižek, Kao lopov usred bela dana, Moć u doba postčovečanstva, (Beograd: Laguna, 2020) 28. Symball Rufino de Oliveira, Marisa Bräscher Basílio Medeiros, “Legal Information Retrieval: Evaluating Case-Based Reasoning“, in: 2009 Seventh Brazilian Symposium in Information and Human Language Technology, 8-11. 9. 2009, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5532453. 29. Stefan Philipsen, Erlis Themeli, “Artificial intelligence in courts: A (legal) introduction to the Robot Judge, http://blog.montaignecentre.com/index. php/1940/artificial-intelligence-in-courts-a-legal-introduction-to-the-robotjudge-2/ 30. Thomas McMullan, „A.I. Judges: The Future of Justice Hangs in the Balance“, Opezero, 14. 2. 2019. https://onezero.medium.com/a-i-judges-the-future-ofjustice-hangs-in-the-balance-6dea1540daaa 31. Thomas Schultz, “Does Online Dispute Resolution Need Governmental Intervention? The Case for Architectures of Control and Trust”, North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 6, 2004. 71, https://papers. ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=896532 49 Nevena Petrušić SAYBERJUSTICE: POTENTIALS AND CHALLENGES OF ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION Nevena Petrušić70 Faculty of Law, University of Niš Abstract: Application of modern ICTs has fundamentally changed all the segments of human activities and transformed all the fields of social, economic, and legal relations. The classic sales have been replaced by electronic trade, electronic money is used instead of cash and many traditional legal institutes have been getting new e-forms (smart contracts, blockchain technology, e-fiscalization, etc.) Modernization of the very legal profession and legal education started by the latest LegalTech and RegTech achievements, and the very way of legal disputes resolving has changed, as well. While the implementation of artificial intelligence in judicature and creating software for “predictive justice” are still on the experimental level, the tools for cyberjustice have already been widely used and they are directed to facilitating the access to justice, improvement of communication among the courts and legal professionals, and also to rendering direct assistance to judges, prosecutors and judicial administrations in their working on cases. A significant field of ICT application in disputes resolving imply alternative methods for online dispute resolution– online negotiations, mediation and arbitration (ODR). This paper investigates their potentials and points out to key challenges in ODR development and its implementation within the context of the access improvement to justice and protection of the rights of participants in the proceedings. Keywords: Legal Disputes, Syberjustice, Online Dispute Resolution 70 PhD, Full Professor 50 Original scientific paper UDK RETHINKING THE UNESCO UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS Ivana Tucak1 Faculty of Law, University of Osijek Abstract: The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) was adopted at the 33rd session of the General Conference of UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), held in Paris on 19 October 2005. This international instrument keeps track with the prevailing trend to deal with bioethical issues from the perspective of human rights. Even before its adoption, the UDBHR had been thoroughly criticized. The authors criticize the UDBHR for being a weak instrument containing only minimum standards of protection and for having no binding legal effect since it represents the so-called soft law. The basic principles of the UDBHR are not, according to critics, formulated precisely but more than less generally. This paper is aimed at examining the content of the UDBHR. It indicates UDBHR importance as the first global law document which regulates the issue of human rights and bioethics in a comprehensive way. The significance of the UDBHR reflects in providing the member states with guidelines in tackling different bioethical issues. In this context, the role of UNESCO in bioethics is elaborated and so are its efforts to achieve a consensus among the states on bioethical issues. Keywords: Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, UNESCO, human rights, dignity, autonomy, solidarity 1. INTRODUCTION The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (hereinafter UDBHR) was adopted at the 33rd session of the General Conference of UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), held in Paris on 19 October 2005.2 This international instrument keeps track with the prevail1 PhD, Associate Professor of Law 2 UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. Accessed September 18, 2020. http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001461/146180E.pdf. 51 Ivana Tucak ing trend to deal with bioethical issues from the perspective of human rights. Even before its adoption, the UDBHR had been thoroughly criticized.3 The authors criticize the UDBHR for being a weak instrument containing only minimum standards of protection and for having no binding legal effect since it represents the so-called soft law.4 The basic principles of the UDBHR are not, according to critics, formulated precisely but more than less generally.5 This paper is aimed at examining the content of the UDBHR. It indicates the UDBHR importance as the first global law document which regulates the issue of human rights and bioethics in a comprehensive way. The significance of the UDBHR reflects in providing the member states with guidelines in tackling different bioethical issues. In this context, the role of UNESCO in bioethics is elaborated and so are its efforts to achieve a consensus among the states on bioethical issues. This paper is divided into three parts. The first part relates to the role of UNESCO in the field of bioethics; it particularly deals with UNESCO’s “ethical standard setting activity”6 concerning the preparation of the UDBHR; the second part hereof investigates the nature of the UDBHR and scrutinizes its fundamental principles while the last part hereof offers concluding considerations about the innovativeness of the UDBHR and its contribution to bioethics. 2. UNESCO AND BIOETHICS UNESCO is the only UN agency specialized in science and scientific research.7 Ethical problems of the life sciences are deeply rooted in the philosophical, cultural and religious traditions and since the scope of UNESCO’s activities includes natural and social sciences, it is no surprise that this organization appears as the leader in the field of bioethics.8 UNESCO is, as most 3 See Willem Landman and Udo Schüklenk, “UNESCO ‘declares’ universals on bioethics and human rights – many unexpected universal truths unearthed by UN body,” Developing World Bioethics 5, no. 3 (2005): iiivi; Adèle Langlois, “The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: Perspectives from Kenya and South Africa”, Health Care Anal 16 (2008):42. 4 Roberto Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights as a Common Ground for a Global Bioethics”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34 (2009): 225; Roberto Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO: in defence of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights”, J Med Ethics 33, no. 3(2007):151. 5 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 151. 6 “About the Bioethics Programme”, UNESCO, accessed February 2, 2020, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/about-bioethics/. 7 Henk ten Have, “The activities of UNESCO in the area of ethics” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 16, no. 4 (2006):333. “UNESCO in brief - Mission and Mandate“, UNESCO, accessed April 1, 2020, http://www.unesco. org/new/en/unesco/about-us/. 8 “Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, The background”, UNESCO, accessed April 1, 2020, https://en.unesco.org/themes/ethics-science-and-technology/bioethics-and-human-rights; See also Violeta 52 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova authors think, the best choice for providing a wide range of expertise in physical, psychological and social welfare.9 UNESCO’s Bioethics Programme was launched in 1993, 48 years after the establishment of this organisation. The Programme resulted from the establishment of the International Bioethics Committee (hereinafter IBC) whose tasks involve deliberating the legal and ethical effects of scientific advancement.10 The IBC is made of 36 independent bioethical experts. Similarly, the same number of government representatives constitute the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (hereinafter IGBC) which was founded in 1999.11 The committees have an advisory role and they cooperate whenever they are supposed to provide “advice, recommendations and proposals” on bioethical issues to the Director-General of UNESCO.12 According to the UNESCO website, The Programme comprises four operational areas.13 The first one refers to “an intellectual forum for multidisciplinary, pluralistic and multicultural reflections on bioethics“. The main function of the second operational area is formulating “a common ethical standard-setting framework“, which as well set grounds for UNESCO’s declarations on bioethics. The third operational area is depicted as “an advisory role and capacity-building“. The fourth operational area refers to bioethics training intended not only for different experts but also for relevant decisionmakers in a society. At university level, accomplishment of this goal implies establishment of bioethics chairs under UNESCO. UNESCO is “responsible” for three declarations on bioethics so far.14 With respect to the content of those declarations, they were adopted unanimously. The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights is deemed as the first major success of UNESCO’s bioethics programme.15. It was adopted at the 29th session of the UNESCO General Conference held on 11 November 199716 and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly Beširević, “Basic Norms of Bioethics: Informed Consent in UNESCO Bioethics Declarations”, Annals – Belgrade Law Review 3 (2008): 257-258. 9 Griffin Trotter, “The UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: A Canon for the Ages?, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34 (2009): 197. 10 “About the Bioethics Programme”, UNESCO, accessed February 2, 2020, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/about-bioethics/; Adèle Langlois, “The Global Governance of Bioethics: Negotiating UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005)”, Glob Health Gov. 5, no. 1 (2011): 2. 11 “About the Bioethics Programme”; Langlois, “The Global Governance of Bioethics,” 2. 12 “About the Bioethics Programme”. 13 “About the Bioethics Programme”. 14 “About the Bioethics Programme”; See also Beširević, “Basic Norms of Bioethics,” 257-258. 15 “About the Bioethics Programme”. 16 UNESCO, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13177&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 53 Ivana Tucak the following year. So far it has been the only bioethics instrument embraced at such a high level.17 The International Declaration on Human Genetic Data was adopted at the 32nd session of the General Conference held on 16 October 2003.18 The lines below focus on the UDBHR, which, unlike the preceding two declarations, has a much broader scope. 2.1 Emergence of the UDBHR The preparation of the UDBHR commenced in October 2003 when UNESCO was assigned to draw up a document on fundamental bioethical principles.19 The drafting group, consisting of members of the IBC, started to work on the document in January 2004, which was followed by “extensive” cooperation with the member states and other interested parties.20 The drafting group was chaired by Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia.21 The draft was being prepared from April 2004 to January 2005.22 It was amended at two meetings of the state representatives in April and June 2005,23 and the UDBHR was adopted unanimously by acclamation on 19 October 2005, at the 33rd session of the UNESCO General Conference.24 When drafting the UDBHR, the IBC copied the model used when preparing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter UDHR). Since its very beginnings, the new international bioethics instrument has been believed not to have the form of a convention but to be a legally non-binding declaration with broadly formulated bioethical principles.25 Its application was supposed to be at the discretion of the member states.26 The member states held that it was not the right time to adopt a binding document and that such an approach would accelerate reaching a consensus among the member states.27 It 17 “About the Bioethics Programme”. 18 “About the Bioethics Programme”; UNESCO, The International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, http:// portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=17720&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 19 ten Have, “The activities of UNESCO,” 339. 20 Langlois, “The Global Governance of Bioethics,” 2. 21 Thomas A. Faunce, “Will international human rights subsume medical ethics? Intersections in the UNESCO Universal Bioethics Declaration”, J Med Ethics 31 (2005): 177. 22 Michael Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UNESCO Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights”, J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 25 (2009): 321. 23 Langlois, “The Global Governance of Bioethics,” 2. 24 ten Have, “The activities of UNESCO,” 339. 25 Anna Gercas, “The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: Promoting International Discussion on the Morality of Non Therapeutic Research on Children”, MICH. J. INT’L L. 27 (2006): 635; Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 319. 26 Gercas, “The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights,” 635; Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 319. 27 Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 319-320. 54 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova was clear that the UDBHR could potentially become a binding instrument.28 That was the pathway that other relevant international human right declarations had already gone through and the UDBHR could, as was the case with the UDHR, become part of customary international law.29 Yet, one can notice that the UDBHR creators have not completely succeeded in accomplishing their mission, which was confirmed by Kirby himself who, in his text on the UDBHR, claims that it “lacks the pristine simplicity, brevity and conceptual clarity of the UDHR.”30 Moreover, the time of the emergence of the UDHR and the time of the emergence of the UDBHR are substantially different. From 1948 to 2005, the world saw important scientific advancement, a considerable rise in the number of UN member state and significant development of conventional law.31 Pursuant to the aforementioned, UNESCO began to deal with bioethics in 1993 when the IBC was established. Interestingly, even prior to the drafting process, there had already been criticism that UNESCO did not have legitimacy to act in this area and that it interfered with the area of interest of another UN agency – World Health Organization (WHO).32 Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is no strict delimitation between the competences of UN agencies, particularly when it comes to the blurred boundaries between different scientific disciplines.33 It has been generally accepted that the WHO should play “a major role in the standard-setting activities in biomedical sciences“.34 However, the WHO cannot be the only body in charge of bioethics.35 Andorno lays down persuasive reasons for this assertion: bioethics is rapidly developing and thus facing various and complex issues whereas the WHO does not have rich experience in international healthcare legislation. Such an approach would, as believes Andorno, exhaust WHO’s resources and diminish its ability to complete its key international healthcare tasks. Andorno sheds light on the activities of both agencies since “their standard setting activities” are carried out “at different levels”.36 UNESCO strives to create general philosophical or legal norms while the WHO concentrates on technical and 28 Gercas, “The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights,” 635. 29 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 226; Gercas, “The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights,” 635-6. 30 Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 330. Kirby cites as an example Article 7 of the UDBHR, which was added by the IGBC: “Persons without the capacity to consent.” 31 Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 318. 32 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 151. 33 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 151. 34 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 152. 35 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 152. 36 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 152. 55 Ivana Tucak special healthcare issues.37 Although UNESCO should play a leading role in bioethics, due to the range of issues covered by bioethics, it is important to determine not only the appropriate role of the WHO in achieving bioethical goals, but also the appropriate role of other specialized agencies.38 2. 2 Definition of Bioethics A pressing issue when working on the UDBHR was the definition of bioethics.39 Most authors agree that this neologism, which was coined from Greek words “bios (life)“ and “ethike (ethics)“40, began to be widely used in the 1970s, but they cannot agree about its creator. 41 Bioethics, in its narrow sense, can be defined as part of ethics, which entails the “ethical dimension” of life sciences.42 Nonetheless, this narrow meaning does not correspond, in Andorno’s, opinion, to the use of bioethics in UNESCO declarations. The declarations are not aimed at abstracting medical ethics but at introducing international human rights in the field of bioethics.43 The UDBHR is primarily a “legal” and not an “ethical” instrument. Although they seem to be related and overlap for the most part, ethics and law represent two different normative systems with different goals.44 The scope of law is much narrower, law is not aimed at making people more moral, thinks Andorno. Its main task is to ensure the principle of justice when regulating human relations. It should guarantee individual rights and common social interests. 37 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 152. 38 During the drafting stage, UN Secretary-General established an Interagency Committee on Bioethics. The goal was to “facilitate consultations” between the FAO, ILO, OESO, WHO, WTO and UNESCO in respect of matters to be covered by the declaration. Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 321; Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 152. 39 Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 322. 40 Duncan Wilson, The Making of British Bioethics (Manchester UK: Manchester University Press; 2014). Introduction, accessed April 1, 2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK248687/. 41 The creation of this term is thus attributed to various authors. Among its potential creators, one should mention Sargent Shriver and obstetrician André Hellegers, founders of the Joseph and Rose Kennedy Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction and Bioethics at Georgetown University, Washington DC, and oncologist Van Rensselaer Potter, who “advocated a comprehensive and global view of bioethics”. UNESCO, Explanatory memorandum on the elaboration of the preliminary draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, Conference: Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, 1st, Paris, 2005, paragraph 16, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000139024. See also Wilson, “The Making of British Bioethics”; Robert Baker, “Bioethics and human rights: a historical perspective”, Camb Q Healthc Ethics 10. no. 3 (2001): 251, n. 27; Michael Cook, “Sargent Shriver and the birth of bioethics”, January 25, 2011, https://www.bioedge.org/bioethics/bioethics_article/sargent_shriver_and_the_birth_of_bioethics. 42 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,”224. 43 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 225. 44 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 224. 56 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova The UDBHR does not include an explicit definition of the term of bioethics. In the Joint Session of the IBC and IGBC (26 - 27 January 2005), the participants rejected the definition proposed by the drafting group, which reads as follows: “bioethics is a systematic, pluralistic and interdisciplinary field of study (emphasized by I.T.) involving the theoretical and practical moral issues raised by medicine and life sciences as applied to human beings and humanity’s relationship with the biosphere”.45 The definition was deemed too academic.46 The final text of the UDBHR includes something that resembles the definition of bioethics in Article 1 (1) which sets forth its scope: “(…) addresses ethical issues related to medicine, life sciences and associated technologies as applied to human beings, taking into account their social, legal and environmental dimensions.” Bioethics has thus gone through transformation “from an academic discipline into the field of public debate and global policymaking“.47 Bioethical methods are interdisciplinary.48 Since bioethics focuses on “human problems of choice, governance, strategy and, in the end, the life well lived”, it encompasses all existing “methods of human inquiry and research”. 49 3. THE CONTENT OF THE UDBHR The UDBHR is the first global intergovernmental document that tackles both human rights and bioethics.50 Being based on human rights, the bioethics approach facilitates, holds Andorno, shaping universal standards since it is derived from the assumption that fundamental rights supersede cultural diversity.51 The Preamble of the UDBHR stresses “that it is necessary and timely for the international community to state universal principles that will provide a foundation for humanity’s response to the ever-increasing dilemmas and controversies that science and technology present for humankind and for the environment.“ UNESCO is not the only body that regulates bioethical issues from the aspect of human rights. In this context, the Preamble of the UDBHR also takes account of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application 45 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 17; Langlois, “The UNESCO,” 41. 46 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 18. 47 ten Have, “The activities of UNESCO,” 348. 48 Richard E. Ashcroft, “Could Human Rights Supersede Bioethics?”, Human Rights Law Review 10, no. 4 (2010): 641. 49 Ashcroft, “Could Human Rights Supersede Bioethics?” 641. 50 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 234-235; Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 150; Langlois, “The UNESCO,” 47. 51 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 234-235. 57 Ivana Tucak of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of the Council of Europe (hereinafter the Oviedo Convention).52 The UDBHR is a normative but also a legally non-binding instrument.53 Both UN and UNESCO declarations “set forth universal principles to which the community of States wished to attribute the greatest possible authority and to afford the broadest possible support.” 54 Medical ethics and international human rights law had been being perceived as different normative systems for long.55 It had been assumed that “non-binding norms (Bioethics) and binding rules (Convention)“ cannot go hand in hand. 56 That was the reason why the creators of the Oviedo Convention used the term of biomedicine instead of bioethics.57Although the UDBHR is neither legally binding nor shall be ratified by the member states, it provides the states with guidelines for undertaking legislative, administrative and other measures for respecting its principles.58 Countries, primarily those developing, should regard it as “a universal framework of principles and procedures (…) in the formulation of their legislation, policies or other instruments in the field of bioethics“ (Article 2 (a) ).59 Unlike the UDBHR, the Oviedo Convention is binding for the signatory states and disrespect for its provisions can be sanctioned at national courts (Article 23 of the Oviedo Convention).60 Moreover, the latter convention does not have a global but a regional character and has been ratified by 29 states so far.61 Among other documents mentioned in the Preamble of the UDBHR, one needs to single out the Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical Association on Ethical 52 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, European Treaty Series No. 164 — Oviedo, 4. 4. 1997, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168007cf98. See also Herman Nys, “Editorial: Towards an International Treaty on Human Rights and Biomedicine? Some Reflections Inspired by UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights”, European Journal of Health Law, 13 (2005): 8. 53 Langlois, “The UNESCO,” 48; Langlois, “The Global Governance of Bioethics,” 2. 54 “General introduction to the standard-setting instruments of UNESCO”, UNESCO, accessed April 1, 2020, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=23772&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 55 Nys, “Towards an International Treaty,” 6; Faunce, “Will international human rights,”174. 56 Nys, “Towards an International Treaty,” 6. 57 Nys, “Towards an International Treaty,” 6; Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 225. 58 Nys, “Towards an International Treaty,” 6 -7. 59 Langlois, “The UNESCO,” 48; Langlois, “The Global Governance of Bioethics,” 2. 60 Roberto Andorno, “The Oviedo Convention: A European Legal Framework at the Intersection of Human Rights and Health Law”, Journal of international biotechnology law 2, no 4 (2005): 136. 61 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 151; “Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 164”, Council of Europe, accessed May 8, 2020, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/164/signatures?p_auth=ij3Tr2sJ. 58 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects62 and the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences.63 Those documents were not initiated by states but by expert organizations and thus do not have the status of conventions. Furthermore, States are not bound to implement them. It is a liability of members of those organizations – researchers and doctors.64 4. SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES The UDBHR neither provides a definition of used expressions nor precisely denotes their meaning.65 In accordance with Andorno, this is not unusual. Law mostly avoids strict formulations. They are reserved for technical terms.66 Strict definitions may bring to insurmountable obstacles in the interpretation of law (Omnis definitio in iure periculosa est).67 On the occasion of the preparation of the UDBHR, this issue was connected with reaching global agreement on notions acceptable to different traditions and culture.68 The UDBHR does not contain legal rules but principles requiring further interpretation. The norms implicitly incorporated into principles should be transformed into “laws, policies, guidelines and practices“. 69 The operational area of the UDBHR is rather wide and does not refer only to the effects of scientific and technological advancement on humans but also on the environment and animals.70 It primarily addresses the member states, but its clauses should also serve as guidelines for groups, unions, institutions and corporations, regardless of their position in the private or public sector (Article 1(2)). Its objectives are stated in its Article 2. The first objective “is to provide a universal framework of principles and procedures to guide States in the formulation of their legislation, policies or other instruments in the 62 World Medical Association, WMA Declaration of Helsinki – Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, July 9, 2018, https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-helsinki-ethicalprinciples-for-medical-research-involving-human-subjects/. 63 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, International Ethical Guidelines for Healthrelated Research Involving Humans, Geneva 2016, https://cioms.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/WEB-CIOMS-EthicalGuidelines.pdf. 64 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 150-151; Langlois, “The UNESCO,” 40; 48. 65 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 151. 66 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 151. 67 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 230. 68 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 151. 69 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 33. 70 Cf. Langlois, “The Global Governance of Bioethics,” 2. 59 Ivana Tucak field of bioethics“ (2. a). The UDBHR should be perceived as a whole and the incorporated principles should be comprehended complementary and as mutually related (Article 26). This element needs to be highlighted since the development of bioethics has been featured by diverging views even in the West. For instance, the principle of solidarity has been present in the European tradition for long, but this cannot be said for American bioethics. As described by Baker, solidarity was included neither in the Belmont Report nor in Beauchamp’s and Childress’ fundamental principles which today enjoy canonical status.71 Among the incorporated principles, there is no hierarchy and there is no difference between “fundamental“ and “derived principles“, which was not the case in particular versions of the draft UDBHR.72 Yet, the order of principles relies on “rationale“ and follows the systematic approach.73 The first group of principles directly refers to dignity of the individual: human rights (Article 3), benefit and harm (Article 4), autonomy and individual responsibility (Article 5), consent (Articles 6 and 7), privacy and confidentiality (Article 9); the second group of principles covers relationships between people: equality, justice and equity (Article 10), non-discrimination and nonstigmatization (Article 11), respect for cultural diversity and pluralism (Article 12), solidarity and cooperation (Article 13), social responsibility (Article 14), sharing of benefits (Article 15); and the third group of principles concerns the relationship of humans with other life forms and the biosphere (Article 17), and protects the interests of future generations (Article 16).74 These principles prescribe gradual extension of duties, from duties with the respect to an individual himself/herself to the duties toward all leaving creatures and the environment.75 None of them “provides an overriding justification.” 76 Several principles can be applied to a certain decision and the decision maker shall constantly weigh arguments to determine the direction of action arising from reconciliation of all principles.77 Dignity plays the key role in international biomedical law, including the Oviedo Convention and the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights.78 Even though the UDBHR does not define human dignity, it is often assumed, deems Andorno, that it calls upon the intrinsic value 71 Baker, “Bioethics and human rights,” 246; 248. 72 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 36. 73 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 37. 74 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 37. 75 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 39; See also Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 322-323. 76 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 38. 77 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 38. 78 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 42. 60 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova of every human being and, in the derivative sense, to all mankind.79 Article 3 (2) thereof, which indicates that the interests and welfare of an individual are preferred over the interests of science or a society, is also closely related to the concept of dignity.80 The same formulation is incorporated into Article 2 of the Oviedo Convention.81 Dignity cannot, according to Andorno, resolve all the problems that practice is facing. For that reason, international biolaw merges human dignity with human rights, for example the right to informed consent and non-discrimination.82 Hence, it comes to development of “an efficient and practical” system for resolving bioethical dilemmas.83 Article 13 promotes solidarity between people and international cooperation while Article 24 (3) highlights the need for respect and promotion of solidarity between states and between “individuals, families, groups and communities, with special regard for those rendered vulnerable by disease or disability or other personal, societal or environmental conditions and those with the most limited resources”. Solidarity, which was first an exclusively legal term implying “a common responsibility for debts incurred by one of the members of a group”, was transformed “into a sociological and political concept” at the time of the French Revolution when it was used instead of the term of fraternite for denoting the feeling of affiliation to a political community.84 In the 21st century, solidarity is of utmost importance not only for social philosophers but also for European social-democratic, socialist and Christiandemocratic parties when they want to justify expansion of the social state.85 Article 12 envisages respect for cultural diversity and pluralism. However, it does not mean that reference thereto can infringe human dignity or the principles of the UDBHR or that their scope can be restrained. A similar restriction appears in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (Article 4).86 As believed by many, the Social Responsibility Principle represents the most important principle of the UDBHR.87 Promotion of health and social development are the goals which every state and every segment of a society including private sector should aspire towards (Article 14 (1)). The 79 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 238. 80 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 228; “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 41. 81 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 228; “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 41. 82 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 223; 234 83 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 223. 84 Steinar Stjernø, “The idea of solidarity in Europe”, European Journal of Social Law, no 3 (2011):156; Baker, “Bioethics and human rights,” 248. 85 Stjernø, “The idea of solidarity,” 157; Baker, “Bioethics and human rights,” 248. 86 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 51. 87 Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 326; Langlois, “The Global Governance of Bioethics,” 1. 61 Ivana Tucak fundamental right of every person is the right to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health” without any kind of discrimination (Article 14 (2)). Therefore, scientific and technological advancement should contribute to: “(a) access to quality health care and essential medicines, especially for the health of women88 and children (b) access to adequate nutrition and water; (c) improvement of living conditions and the environment; (d) elimination of the marginalization and the exclusion of persons on the basis of any grounds; (e) reduction of poverty and illiteracy” (14. 2). However, it should be pointed out that this list is not exhaustive. 89 The principle of social responsibility aroused great polemics among the Drafting Group, the IBC and the IGBC when preparing the draft UDBHR.90 Faunce sheds particular light on the fact that the UDBHR is applicable both to natural persons and legal entities and states.91 The Explanatory Memorandum on the Elaboration of the Preliminary Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics underlines that this “principle is designed to address the attention of policy makers in the field of medicine and life sciences to the practical concerns of bioethics, as viewed in most States and by general public.”92 This principle clearly depicts the extension of the scope of bioethics from the private to the “social dimension of scientific progress”. 93 Faunce puts the emphasis on this principle in regard to “the great social justice debates concerning access to essential medicines taking place in global fora such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO).“ Those phenomena relate to “the process of corporate globalisation“, which has harmful “effects on universal access to affordable essential medicine“ and makes “one of the most significant contemporary threats to public health“.94 Considering access to medicines, it would be good, believes Faunce, if the UDBHR include protection of whistle blowers who could reveal how corporations implement the principles of the UDBHR.95 Pursuant to Article 15 (1), “benefits resulting from any scientific research and its applications should be shared with society as a whole and within the international community, in particular with developing countries.” In this context, among other things, a benefit can mean access to high qual88 The final version of the UDBHR does not stipulate that “access to quality health care” include reproductive health care. “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 78. 89 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 78. 90 Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 326-327. 91 Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 326; Faunce, “The UNESCO Bioethics Declaration,” 17. 92 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 76. 93 “Explanatory memorandum”, paragraph 77. 94 Faunce, “The UNESCO Bioethics Declaration,” 17. 95 Faunce, “The UNESCO Bioethics Declaration,” 18. 62 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ity healthcare (Article 15 (1) (b)), support for the provision of health services (Article 15 (1) (d)) and the right of access to advanced scientific and technological knowledge (Article 15 (1) (e)). 3.2 Procedural Principles Section III of the UDBHR (‘‘Application of the principles’’) refers to procedural issues (“procedural principles“).96 Since principles imply complex formulations, the UDBHR provides guidelines for their implementation.97 It seeks to promote “professionalism”, “integrity” and “transparency in decisionmaking” and to use the best scientific achievements in addressing bioethical issues (Article 18 (1)). The UDBHR seeks “establishment of independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics committees“ that would encourage “debate, education and public awareness of, and engagement in, bioethics“ (Article 19 (d)). What is also promoted is “appropriate assessment and adequate management of risks related to medicine, life sciences and associated technologies“ (Article 20). Article 21 refers to transnational practice. States, but also all other actors, should ensure that any activity covered by the UDBHR, carried out at least partly in different countries, is in accordance with its principles (Article 21 (1) ). The reason for incorporation of this Article is the ambiguity of the rules relating to biomedical human subject research in different states. As such research is spreading throughout the world due to its globalization, this Article is aimed at avoiding the possibility of exploitation of human subjects from poor states by researchers from rich countries or in other words, one wishes to cater for “equitable treatment for the rich and the poor alike“.98 Articles 22-25 deal with the promotion of the UDBHR. Article 25 relates to follow-up action by UNESCO. UNESCO should promote bioethical principles with the help of the IGBC and the IBC, and support the cooperation of these two bodies. In line with Article 27, implementation of the principles of the UDBHR can be restrained only legally. The limitations can result only from the “interests of public safety, for the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, for the protection of public health or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. This Article does not handle the possibility of limiting principles for the sake of an individual’s health and/or life. 96 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 151. 97 Gercas, “The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights,” 637. 98 Leonardo D. de Castro, “Article 21: Transnational Practices“, in The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights Background, Principles and Application, edited by Henk A. M. J. ten Have and Michèle S. Jean (Ethics series: UNESCO Publishing 2009): 284. 63 Ivana Tucak 3.3 Controversies behind Linking Human Rights with Bioethics Merging human rights with bioethics leads to numerous controversies. Hence, Faunce investigates whether human rights will subsume medical ethics.99 As previously highlighted, medical ethics and international human rights were traditionally perceived as two separate normative systems.100 Medical ethics represents a special professional normative system originating from professional oaths, codes and guidelines.101 Yet, these two normative systems has had common interests and developed parallelly.102 Baker points to the “stunning similarity“ between bioethics and human rights:103 they both rose from the Holocaust: they both tend to protect vulnerable populations; they both honour human beings; they both strive for universality; they both were at a standstill during the Cold War; they both returned in the 1970s; they are both supported by state and non-governmental organizations: they both take advantage of public debates to democratize the domain that used to be reserved only for professional elites. Nevertheless, it is important to indicate the difference between bioethics-related international mechanisms for human rights protection, generated by lawyers in their legal reasoning, and bioethics developed from “the moral sense and practical experience“ of healthcare providers, mainly tailored by philosophers.104 Andorno gives several reasons for justifying the strategy of referring to human rights for the purpose of establishing global norms in international biolaw:105 connection between healthcare and fundamental human rights, universalism of human rights; the fact that domestic mechanisms for protection against medical malpractice already use the language of rights, and finally, the absence of any other instrument that would create “an institutional framework” for biomedical norms. Bioethics and human rights, Ashcroft argues, are today firmly grounded “sets of norms, practices, institutions and methods” governing life sciences, health policy and medicine.106 However, they are also the result of doctrines, institutional forms and political interests.107 Ashcroft argues that if human rights subsume 99 Faunce, “Will international human rights,” 173. 100 Faunce, “Will international human rights,” 174. 101 Faunce, “Will international human rights,” 173. 102 Faunce, “Will international human rights,” 174. 103 Baker, “Bioethics and human rights,” 247. 104 Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 317-318. 105 Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” 238. 106 Ashcroft, “Could Human Rights Supersede Bioethics?” 639. 107 Ashcroft, “Could Human Rights Supersede Bioethics?” 639. 64 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova bioethics, the reason will not be “intellectual necessity” but “historical and political contingencies.”108 4. CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS In the end, particular attention should be paid to the innovativeness and significance of the UDBHR. This actually represents its “added value“.109According to Kirby, the chairman of the Drafting Group, the greatest novelty of the UDBHR refers to the extension of the scope of bioethics from an individual to the entire community; all mankind and the environment. The UDBHR encompasses topics typical for medical bioethics, international human rights concepts and novelties such as social responsibility and benefit sharing.110The definition of bioethics has thus gone through a certain metamorphosis from medical ethics to “a Universal Declaration within the normative system of international human rights.” 111 The UDBHR has managed to reconcile two different worldviews, that of medical workers and that of jurists who are mostly to blame for the new system of international human rights.112 UNESCO has gradually taken the leading role in bioethical issues as no other international organization has as much experience in the field where science and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms intertwine.113 However, UNESCO’s role and actions are often exposed to criticism. There are still doubts about UNESCO’s expertise regarding regulation of bioethical issues. Furthermore, the content of the UDBHR is often challenged. In fact, some authors claim that the UDBHR is only a weak, legally non-binding instrument,114 and that its content is too ambiguous and general to create a unique moral message.115 The success of UNESCO’s bioethics programme does not encompass only its three declarations but also other achievements such as drawing up “reports on a wide range of bioethics issues“ like genetic counselling, ethics and neurosciences, confidentiality116 “follow-up capacity 108 Ashcroft, “Could Human Rights Supersede Bioethics?” 639. 109 Langlois, “The UNESCO,” 47. 110 Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 323. 111 Faunce, “Will international human rights,” 177-178. 112 Kirby, “Human Rights and Bioethics,” 325. 113 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 152; “Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, The background”. 114 Beširević, “Basic Norms of Bioethics,” 257. 115 Trotter, “The UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights”, 195, 202-203. 116 Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO,” 152. 65 Ivana Tucak building“ and “public education programmes”.117 Pursuant to Langlois, despite new and innovative principles, it is “follow-up capacity building activities” that represent the real added value of the UDBHR, at least in the medium term.118 The UDBHR should be particularly useful for countries without an established bioethics system and could act as a catalysator for accomplishment of contemporary bioethical goals.119 It is worth mentioning, holds Langlois, that implementation of bioethical principles at national level shall be compliant with the social and economic context of the state concerned, which might be a challenge similar to that relating to shaping of principles themselves.120 REFERENCES: 1. Roberto Andorno, “Global bioethics at UNESCO: in Defence of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights”, J Med Ethics 33, no. 3 (2007):150154. 2. Roberto Andorno, “Human Dignity and Human Rights as a Common Ground for a Global Bioethics”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34 (2009): 223 – 240. 3. Roberto Andorno, “The Oviedo Convention: A European Legal Framework at the Intersection of Human Rights and Health Law”, Journal of international biotechnology law 2, no 4 (2005): 133-143. 4. Richard E. Ashcroft, “Could Human Rights Supersede Bioethics?”, Human Rights Law Review 10, no. 4 (2010): 639–660. 5. Robert Baker, “Bioethics and Human Rights: A Historical Perspective”, Camb Q Healthc Ethics 10, no. 3 (2001):241-252. 6. Violeta Beširević, “Basic Norms of Bioethics: Informed Consent in UNESCO Bioethics Declarations”, Annals – Belgrade Law Review 3 (2008): 257-265. 7. Michael Cook, “Sargent Shriver and the Birth of Bioethics”. 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UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). Accessed September 18, 2020. https://www.refworld.org/ docid/3ae6b3712c.html. 23. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. Background, Principles and Application, edited by Henk A. M. J. ten Have 67 Ivana Tucak 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 68 and Michèle S. Jean (Ethics series: UNESCO Publishing 2009). Accessed September 18, 2020. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/in/documentViewer.xhtml?v=2.1.19 6&id=p::usmarcdef_0000212135&file=/in/rest/annotationSVC/ DownloadWatermarkedAttachment/attach_import_abfb8bde-3f4b-4ab78ee2-f53d7ffadbfd%3F_%3D179844eng.pdf&locale=en&multi=true&ark=/ ark:/48223/pf0000212135/PDF/179844eng.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A1 029%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22% 7D%2C0%2C680%2Cnull%5D. UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted by acclamation on 19 October 2005 by the 33rd session of the General Conference of UNESCO. Accessed September 18, 2020. http:// unesdoc. unesco.org/images/0014/001461/146180E.pdf. UNESCO, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, adopted at the 29th session of the UNESCO General Conference held on 11 November 1997. Accessed September 18, 2020. http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13177&URL_DO=DO_ TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. UNESCO, International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, adopted at the 32nd session of the General Conference held on 16 October 2003. Accessed September 18, 2020. http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ ID=17720&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. UNESCO, Explanatory Memorandum on the Elaboration of the Preliminary Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, Conference: Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Aimed at Finalizing a Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, 1st, Paris, 2005. Accessed September 18, 2020. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000139024. UNESCO, “About the Bioethics Programme”. Accessed February 2, 2020. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/ bioethics/about-bioethics/ UNESCO, “UNESCO in brief - Mission and Mandate”. Accessed April 1, 2020. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/about-us/. UNESCO, “General Introduction to the Standard-Setting Instruments of UNESCO”. Accessed April 1, 2020. http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ ID=23772&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. Duncan Wilson, The Making of British Bioethics (Manchester UK: Manchester University Press; 2014). Introduction. Accessed April 1, 2020. https://www. ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK248687/. Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 35. World Medical Association, WMA Declaration of Helsinki – Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects. July 9, 2018. Accessed April 1, 2020. https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-helsinkiethical-principles-for-medical-research-involving-human-subjects/. 69 Original scientific paper UDK LEGAL CHALLENGES AND DILLEMAS OF CROSS-BORDER REPRODUCTIVE CARE FROM SLOVENIAN VIEW Suzana Kraljić1 Faculty of Law, University of Maribor Abstract: Cross-border reproductive care is associated with the activities of patients traveling from their own to another country with the aim of seeking assisted reproductive services and treatment (e.g. preimplantation genetic diagnosis, gamete or embryo donation, surrogate motherhood, ...). Reasons for cross-border reproductive care, and therefore cross-border patient mobility, are mainly related to the costs, better quality, availability or legality of providing assisted reproductive services and treatments in the home country. Such mobility raises many legal as well as ethical issues, challenges and dilemmas. Keywords: travelling, health tourism, reproductive tourism, cross-border mobility, surrogate motherhood 1. INTRODUCTION Health represents one of the most wanted human values. We all strive to achieve it, especially when our health or life is at stake. In the past, people were also willing to travel to achieve or fulfill this desire. Then they travelled on foot or on horseback, but today they travel by plane also to the other end of the world. Nowadays, such mobility of people is named as health tourism. As a broad concept, health tourism refers to the activities of a consumer who travels across the borders of their own country to another country or even to another continent for the purpose of receiving medical treatment and care.2 Health tourism can even be considered one of the oldest forms of tourism, since people have always travelled with the desire to achieve better health. 1 PhD, Associate Professor of Law 2 Michael D. Horowitz, Jeffrey A. Rosensweig, and Christopher A. Jones, »Medical Tourism: Globalization of the Healthcare Marketplace,” MedGenMed vol. 9, no. 4 (2007): 33. 71 Suzana Kraljić Throughout history, health tourism has been intertwined many times with so called religious tourism (e.g. pilgrimage for the sake of healing). Health services that make an individual to travel abroad may be imperative (e.g. inaccessibility in their own country) or discretionary (e.g. aesthetic treatments are cheaper in other countries) medical treatments.3 Cross-border reproductive care is a sub-category of health tourism. Both health tourism as an umbrella term and cross-border reproductive care, as a subspecies of it, are today one of the fastest growing segments of the global tourism market.4 In Europe, Belgium and Spain appear to be the most frequently visited countries for reproductive treatments, while the USA remains a popular worldwide destination.5 Thus, in 2012, Thai medical tourism was estimated to be worth $ 4.3 billion USD. In India, which is one the biggest providers in the field of reproductive tourism, 600 IVF clinics performed 60.000 assisted reproductive treatments a year. The Akanksha clinic has employed 167 surrogate mothers who have delivered 216 healthy babies since 2003. The surrogacy industry was estimated to be worth $60 billion USD worldwide in 2008.6 Also United States of America is one the biggest providers of surrogate mothers. California and New Jersey produce approximately 100 births per year.7 And approximately 25,000 attempts at pregnancy using in vitro fertilization (IVF) with donated oocytes or embryos are initiated annually in the USA.8 Slovenia has three IVF clinics which are available for the population of 2 million people. These are: a. University Medical Centre Ljubljana (The Division of Gynaecology and Obstetrics); b. University Medical Centre Maribor (Department of Reproductive Medicine and Gynaecological Endocrinology); c. Centre for Biomedical Insemination in Postojna. 3 Sharon, Bassan, »Shared Responsibility Regulation Model for Cross-Border Reproductive Transactions,” Michigan Journal of International Law vol. 37 (2016): 300. 4 Galina, Romanova, Alexandr, Vetitnev and Frederic, Dimanche, »Chapter 7: Health and Wellness Tourism,” In Tourism in Russia: a Management Handbook, ed. Frederic, Dimanche and Lidia, Andrades (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015), 233. 5 ESHRE, »Cross border reproductive care, ESHRE Fact Sheets I, Januar 2017«, 1, accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.eshre.eu/-/media/sitecore-files/Press-room/Resources/1-CBRC.pdf?la=en&hash=8AFAEF005E C048226FC6EC1037BEE491209B6B67 6 Bassan, »Shared Responsibility,” 301. 7 Raywat, Deonandan, »Recent trends in reproductive tourism and international surrogacy: ethical considerations and challenges for policy,” Risk Management and Healthcare Policy vol. 8 (2015): 111. 8 Mark V., Sauer, »Oocyte donation for assisted reproduction,” accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.uptodate. com/contents/oocyte-donation-for-assisted-reproduction. 72 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova In these three clinics, they complete 3.000 to 4.000 cycles of IVF per year. Following these procedures, 1.300 children are born in Slovenia annually, which is just over five percent of children born annually (e.g. in 2019 in Slovenia 18946 chidren have been born). This places Slovenia at the very top of Europe.9 On the other hand, reproductive tourism is associated with the many hardships of individuals and / or couples who, in their desire to have a child, travel to another country and undergo different procedures that are not available to them in their original country for different reasons. Although the costs of assisted reproductive technologies / procedures are lower and affordable in many economically developed countries, but many individuals seek reproductive assistance abroad. They face many legal and ethical barriers as well as personal hardship. This is why the term 'reproductive tourism' is opposed.10 Instead, terms such as cross-border reproductive transaction',11 'cross-border reproductive care' or 'reproductive exile' are identified as more appropriate. Using them, we avoid stigmatization of the patients who do not see their quest for medical reproductive treatment as tourism, but as a forced necessity.12 Therefore, in the article the term cross-border reproductive care is used. 2. MOTIVATIONS FOR CROSS-BORDER REPRODUCTIVE TRAVEL Assisted reproductive technology includes techniques such as in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) and intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection. It can be defined as including all treatments that include medical and scientific manipulation of human gametes and embryos in order to produce a term pregnancy. Although some legislatures have considered artificial insemination, whether using donor semen or semen from the patient’s partner, as different, many of the issues about regulation in relation to obtaining, storing, using and disposing of gametes and embryos are closely interlinked. In this statement treatments such as artificial insemination are excluded.13 9 Mojca, Lorenčič, »S postopki zunajtelesne oploditve so osrečili že tisoče slovenskih staršev,” Dnevnik, August 3, 2018, accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.dnevnik.si/1042835052 10 Francoise, Shenfield, Jacques, de Mouzon, Guido, Pennings, Anna Pia, Ferraretti, Anders, Nyboe Andersen, Guido, de Wert, Veerle, Goossens and the ESHRE Taskforce on Cross Border Reproductive Care, »Cross border reproductive care in six European countries,” Human Reproduction, 25, no. 6 (2010): 1361, https://doi. org/10.1093/humrep/deq057. 11 Bassan, »Shared Responsibility,” 299-348. 12 Shenfield et al, »Cross border,” 1361. 13 WMA, 2006. 73 Suzana Kraljić Cross-border reproductive care refers to the mobility or travelling of citizens from their country of residence to another country or jurisdiction in order to obtain specific types of medical assistance in reproduction or fertility treatment through assisted reproductive technologies that they cannot receive in their own country.14 Historically, in the context of health tourism, mainly wealthy patients from developing countries travelled to developed countries, as the level of health services was better and of higher quality there. Today, the trend is different, as patients travel from industrialized countries to less affluent countries seeking more affordable, high-quality treatment or alternative medicical treatments.15 For this reason, in the case of cross-border reproductive care, it is stated that fertility transactions often reflect socioeconomic disparities between consumers and suppliers and the cause is called reproductive injustice.16 The internet has certainly contributed to the development of the international reproductive market. Due to the extraordinary development of reproductive medicine, in the tim of so calles 'cyberprocreation era'17, to create a child is required only the internet and a valid credit card.18 This led to the commercialization of human reproduction, which is contrary to the principle of of non-commercialization (also the principle of prohibition of financial gain), according to which the 'human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain'. Exemption of the human body and its parts from legal transactions (res extra commericum) follows also from: a. art. 21 of Oviedo convention19 (no. 164): »The human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain.«; b. art. 21 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin (no. 186): »1 The human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain or comparable advantage. The aforementioned provision shall not prevent payments which do not constitute a financial 14 Guido, Pennings, »Legal harmonization and reproductive tourism in Europe«, Human Reproduction, 19, No. 12 (2004): 2690. 15 Bassan, »Shared Responsibility,” 300. 16 Bassan, »Shared Responsibility,” 302-3. 17 Swink and Reich use the term ‘cyberprocreation’ to describe the phenomenon of ‘using the Internet to create human life’ (Dawn R., Swink and Brad, Reich, »Outsourcing Reproduction: Embryos and Surrogacy Services in the Cyberprocreation Era,” J Health Care Law & Policy, 14 (2011): 241. 18 Britta, van Beers, »Is Europe ‘giving in to baby markets?’ reproductive tourism in Europe and the gradual erosion of existing legal limits to reproductive markets.” Medical Law Review, Vol. 23, 1 (2015): 103. 19 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (ETS No 164): Uradni list RS – MP, št. 17/98. 74 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova gain or a comparable advantage, in particular: – compensation of living donors for loss of earnings and any other justifiable expenses caused by the removal or by the related medical examinations; – payment of a justifiable fee for legitimate medical or related technical services rendered in connection with transplantation; – compensation in case of undue damage resulting from the removal of organs or tissues from living persons. 2 Advertising the need for, or availability of, organs or tissues, with a view to offering or seeking financial gain or comparable advantage, shall be prohibited.«); c. art. 3(2)(3) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union:20 »In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in particular: … the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain …«).21 d. art. 4(1)1 Act Regulating the Obtaining and Transplantation of Human Body Parts for the Purposes of Medical Treatment:22 »1. Donation shall be based on the principles of voluntariness, default and altruism, according to which it is not permissible to give or receive any consideration or other pecuniary or non-material gain for the deprived parts of the body.« 3. SLOVENIA AND CROSS-BORDER REPRODUCTIVE CARE IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES AND DILLEMAS The decision to seek reproductive care abroad is influenced by many factors, such as dissatisfaction with home services, long waiting times for donated cells (especially for female germ cells), legal restrictions (restriction of access based on over-age, sexual orientation or partner status; prohibition of certain procedures), unavailability of reproductive procedures (lack of reproductive clinics, specific reproductive procedures are not performed), high success rates abroad, higher quality of care abroad, search for donor anonymity or desire for identifiable donors, a desire for treatments considered too experimental 20 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012. 21 See also Council of Europe (2018). »Guide for the implementation of the principle of prohibition of financial gain with respect to the human body and its parts from living or deceased donors. ” Strasbourg: Council of Europe. 22 Zakon o pridobivanju in presaditvi delov človeškega telesa zaradi zdravljenja (Act Regulating the Obtaining and Transplantation of Human Body Parts for the Purposes of Medical Treatment): Uradni list RS, št. 56/15. 75 Suzana Kraljić to be provided in the home country, long waiting times and lower costs of reproductive procedures outside the domestic country.23 Reasons why people are travelling for reproduction treatments to another country may be that some assisted reproductive technologies are prohibited in the country of their residence. In Slovenia the 'Infertility treatment and procedures of biomedically-assisted procreation act' (hereinafter: Infertility Act)24 in Art. 7 states that a woman, who intends to give the baby after the birth to a third party (surrogate motherhood), is not entitled to assisted reproductive technologies. The prohibition on the exercise of surrogate motherhood also follows from the Slovenian Penal Code25, which in Art. 121(4) (Illegal Abortion) defines: »Whoever illegally performs the procedure of fertilisation with biomedical assistance due to surrogate motherhood shall be punished…«. In Slovenia also IVF treatments, where both cells will be donated, ar prohibited. At least one person, perspective parent, shall be biological parent (Art. 8(3) Infertility Act). The next very common reason for cross-border reproductive care is that some assisted reproductive technologies are not accessible to individuals or couples in their country. Patients often seek cross-border fertility treatment due to restrictions on reproductive options in their own country state. Sometimes certain categories of patients are denied access to a particular service by law.26 In this connection, Cohen has termed this type of tourism as 'circumvention tourism'. which involves patients who travel abroad for healthcare services / treatments that are legal in the patient's destination country but illegal in the patient's home country.27 In Slovenia, to assisted reproductive technologies are entitled just men and women who are married or cohabiting and who cannot, in the light of medical science experience, be expected to get pregnant through the sexual intercourse and cannot be assisted by other infertility treatments (Art. 5(2) Infertility Act). The Infertility law therefore 23 Shenfield et al, »Cross border,” 1363 and 1366–7; ESHRE, »Cross border«, 1; Lorraine, Culley, Nicky, Hudson, Frances, Rapport, Eric, Blyth, Wendy, Norton and Allan A., Pacey, »Crossing borders for fertility treatment: motivations, destinations and outcomes of UK fertility travellers,” Human Reproduction, 26, No. 9 (2011): 2374. doi:10.1093/humrep/der191; Pennings, »Legal harmonization,” 2690. 24 Zakon o zdravljenju neplodnosti in postopkih oploditve z biomedicinsko pomočjo (Infertility treatment and procedures of biomedically-assisted procreation act): Uradni list RS, št. 70/00; 15/17– DZ. 25 Kazenski zakonik Republike Slovenije (Penal Code): Uradni list RS, št. 50/12 – officially consolidated version; 6/16 – popr.; 54/15; 38/16; 27/17; 23/20. 26 Bassan, »Shared Responsibility,” 300. 27 Glenn, Cohen, »S.H. and Others v. Austria and Circumvention Tourism.” Reproductive BioMedicine Online, Vol. 25, Issue 7 (2012): 660; see more Glenn, Cohen, »Circumvention Tourism,” Cornell L. Rev., Vol. 97, Issue 6 (2012): 1309-1398; Valeska, Ruiken, »Analyzing impacts of Circumvention Tourism: Cases on Prostitution, Abortion and Drug Tourism in Europe,” accessed April 18, 2020: http://www.cek.ef.uni-lj.si/magister/ ruiken2754-B.pdf . 76 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova explicitly stipulates that only couples are entitled to assisted reproductive technologies, and even just the couples of different sexes. On June 17, 2001 in Slovenia we had a referendum, related to the ammendment of the Infertility act, which was supposed to give the single woman the right to artificial insemination. The Slovenian voters voted against with 72,36 percent by turnout of 35,66 percent. The second referendum was on March 25, 2012. It was was about the new Family Code which was rejected with 54,5 percent of votes on a 30,3 percent turnout. Rejected was whole Family Code, which was very modern on many relations. The reason of the rejection was the regulation which was supposed to give to registered same-sex partners the same rights as the heterosexual spouses have, including marriage. On December 20, 2015, Slovenia had the third referendum, which was dealing on the question on legalizing the marriage also for same-sex couples. The voters voted against with 63,47 percent by turnout of 36,38 percent.28 Consequently to last two referendums, Slovenia adopted on April 21, 2016 the new Civil Union Act29 (hereiafter: CUA), which regulates civil unions in Slovenia. Nowadays, partners from same-sex civil unions have all, but three, rights and obligations that come with marriage. The three exceptions for them are: they cannot enter into marriage, cannot jointly adopt a child and cannot use the system of in-vitro fertilisation (comp. Art. 2(3) and Art. 3(3) CUA).30 Therefore, single women as well also female partners from civil unions (registred or not registred) can travel to other countries to provide assisted reproductive technologies (e.g. IVF) to both single and same-sex female partners from civil unions in order to fulfill their desire for a child. The third reason for cross-border reproductive care is that certain assisted reproductive technologies are inaccessible in the domestic healthcare system. In Slovenia, the ROPA (Reception of Oocytes from the Partner) method is not used in Slovenia, but in Spain. This methos makes possible that samesex couples could to join in ‘share motherhood’. ROPA method makes possible that both women can actively participate in pregnancy. It is based on an IVF procedure where one woman contributes with her oocytes and the other 28 Suzana, Kraljić, »Same-sex Partnerships in Eastern Europe: Marriage, Registration or No Regulation?,” In: Same-sex Relationships and Beyond – Gender Matters in the EU, ed. Katarina, Boele-Woelki & Angelica, Fuchs, European family law series, 42, Fully revised 3rd ed. (Cambridge; Antwerp; Portland: Intersentia, 2017), 63. 29 Zakon o partnerski zvezi (Civil Union Act): Uradni list RS, št. 33/16. 30 Suzana, Kraljić. »Družinski zakonik : [s komentarjem],” (Maribor: Poslovna založba MB, 2019), 45. 77 Suzana Kraljić women contributes with her uterus.31 As same-sex partners are not eligible for IVF in Slovenia, this method is not applicable in Slovenia. In Slovenia, a woman, from the age of 18 years to the age of 43, is entitled to to a maximum of six IVF procedures for the first birth of a live-born child, and for each subsequent up to a maximum of four IVF procedures. To a woman under the age of 35 the elective transmission of one embryo of good quality will performed in the first two procedures of extracorporeal fertilization. The process of IVF with thawed embryos is considered to be the procedure of out-of-body fertilization in which the embryos have been frozen.32 So, in Slovenia, the cost for six IVF treatments are covered by the insurance. If they were not successful, some couples search for addittional possibilities abroad. Because of the age restriction, which is set with the 43 years, women older then 43, are also searching for additional possibilities abroad. The next reason is based on the lack of donated cells and it is a common problem faced by many countries. Slovenia also faces small numbers of donated cells, especially oocytes. Waiting times are therefore long and that motivate Slovenes to seek reproductive assistance in other countries. The Slovenes chose the Czech Republic as their destination.33 The insured person in Slovenia shall be entitled to reimbursement of the costs of the biomedical assisted reproductive health service provided by the donor, which he or she asserts abroad. The costs of such health care reproductive service shall be reimbursed to the insured person in the amount of the average price of this service in the Republic of Slovenia, but not more than the actual costs (art. 138 Rules on compulsary health insurance). 4. FINAL THOUGHTS Although reproductive medicine is very well developed in Slovenia, that Slovenian institutions carry out quality and successful procedures, nevertheless there are a number of patients who cannot adequately meet their needs 31 Shulgina, Marina, David, Marina, Fernando, Marina, Nuria, Fosas, Nuria, Galiana, and Immaculada, Jove, »Sharing motherhood: biological lesbian co-mothers, a new IVF indication.” Human Reproduction, 4 (2010): 938. doi:10.1093/humrep/deq008 32 See art. 37(2) Pravila obveznega zdravstvenega zavarovanja (Rules on compulsory health insurance): Uradni list RS, št. 79/94, 73/95, 39/96, 70/96, 47/97, 3/98, 3/98, 51/98 – odl. US, 73/98 – odl. US, 90/98, 6/99 – popr., 109/99 – odl. US, 61/00, 64/00 – popr., 91/00 – popr., 59/02, 18/03, 30/03, 35/03 – popr., 78/03, 84/04, 44/05, 86/06, 90/06 – popr., 64/07, 33/08, 7/09, 88/09, 30/11, 49/12, 106/12, 99/13 – ZSVarPre-C, 25/14 – odl. US, 25/14, 85/14, 10/17 – ZČmIS, 64/18; 4/20. 33 Sandra, Bregar, »Stiska zaradi neplodnosti in postopki oploditve z biomedicinsko pomočjo v globalni perspektivi,” Socialno delo, 54, No. 5 (2015): 281-294. 78 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova within the scope of the Slovenian reproductive health care system. Their desire for a child is so great that they decide to try to realize it abroad. In particular, patients who are hampered by the Slovenian legislation (e.g. same-sex partners, age restriction, etc.) stand out here. In order to fulfill their desire for a child, they are ready to travel to other European as well as non-European countries. In doing so, however, they face both personal hardships, financial difficulties and human rights abuses. Because this is an extremely sensitive area of each individual's or couple's life, many times they face themselves alone with all the burdens they carry. REFERENCES: 1. Bassan, Sharon, »Shared Responsibility Regulation Model for Cross-Border Reproductive Transactions,” Michigan Journal of International Law 37 (2016): 299-349. 2. Bregar, Sandra, »Stiska zaradi neplodnosti in postopki oploditve z biomedicinsko pomočjo v globalni perspektivi,” Socialno delo, 54, No. 5 (2015): 281-294. 3. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012. 4. Cohen, Glenn, »Circumvention Tourism,” Cornell L. Rev., Vol. 97, Issue 6 (2012): 1309-1398. 5. Cohen, Glenn, »S.H. and Others v. Austria and Circumvention Tourism.” Reproductive BioMedicine Online, Vol. 25, Issue 7 (2012): 660-662. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.rbmo.2012.07.009 6. Council of Europe (2018). Guide for the implementation of the principle of prohibition of financial gain with respect to the human body and its parts from living or deceased donors. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. 7. 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Romanova Galina, Alexandr, Vetitnev and Frederic, Dimanche. »Chapter 7: Health and Wellness Tourism.” In Tourism in Russia : a Management Handbook, edited by Frederic, Dimanche and Lidia, Andrades, 231-287. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015. 20. Ruiken, Valeska, »Analyzing impacts of Circumvention Tourism: Cases on Prostitution, Abortion and Drug Tourism in Europe,” accessed April 18, 2020: http://www.cek.ef.uni-lj.si/magister/ruiken2754-B.pdf . 80 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 21. Sauer, Mark V., »Oocyte donation for assisted reproduction,” accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.uptodate.com/contents/oocyte-donation-for-assistedreproduction. 22. Shenfield, Francoise, Jacques, de Mouzon, Guido, Pennings, Anna Pia, Ferraretti, Anders, Nyboe Andersen, Guido, de Wert, Veerle, Goossens and the ESHRE Taskforce on Cross Border Reproductive Care, “Cross border reproductive care in six European countries, ”Human Reproduction, 25, no. 6 (2010): 1361–1368, https://doi.org/10.1093/humrep/deq057 23. Swink, Dawn R. and Brad, Reich, »Outsourcing Reproduction: Embryos and Surrogacy Services in the Cyberprocreation Era,” J Health Care Law & Policy, 14 (2011): 241-297. 24. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (ETS No 164): Uradni list RS – MP, št. 17/98. 25. van Beers, Britta, »Is Europe ‘giving in to baby markets?’ reproductive tourism in Europe and the gradual erosion of existing legal limits to reproductive markets.” Medical Law Review, Vol. 23, 1 (2015): 103–134. 26. Zakon o partnerski zvezi (Civil Union Act): Uradni list RS, št. 33/16. 27. Zakon o pridobivanju in presaditvi delov človeškega telesa zaradi zdravljenja (Act Regulating the Obtaining and Transplantation of Human Body Parts for the Purposes of Medical Treatment): Uradni list RS, št. 56/15. 28. Zakon o zdravljenju neplodnosti in postopkih oploditve z biomedicinsko pomočjo (Infertility treatment and procedures of biomedically-assisted procreation act): Uradni list RS, št. 70/00; 15/17– DZ. 81 Original scientific paper UDK ETHICS, PATENTS AND CRISPR: A NOVEL FORM OF TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE? Oliver Feeney1, University College Cork, Ireland Abstract: Compared to previous techniques of genetic interventions, CRISPRCas9, has been steadily transforming distant possibilities of making effective and realistic genetic changes to emerging realities. To underpin this, only six years passed between Charpentier and Doudna’s 2012 CRISPR-Cas9 paper and the first confirmed cases of gene-edited humans. While governments, international bodies and others, try to ensure that the legislative, regulatory and effective ethical, legal and societal frameworks catch up to the technical possibilities, the concern is that the eventual outcome will be either an ineffective mix of partial regulation or an equally ineffective overreaction in terms of widespread prohibition and blunt overregulation. However, alongside the technical progress, innovation has also been taking place in terms of ethical guidance from the field of patenting. The rise of so-called ‘ethical licencing’ (2017) is one such innovation, where patent holders’ control over CRISPR techniques creates a form of private governance over uses of gene-editing through ethical constraints built into their licensing agreements. In addition, Parthasarathy (2018) has begun an examination of another innovation in the patent system as an alternative to future regulation of gene-editing technologies. In this paper, I will evaluate the emerging prospect of patents as a form of ethical governance of CRISPR-Cas9 and will conclude that, so far, this avenue seems to raise as many issues as it seeks to resolve. Keywords: Patents, CRISPR, Ethical licencing, gene-editing, ethics 1 PhD, Lecturer in Healthcare Ethics, School of Nursing & Midwifery, University College Cork; Head, Irish Unit of the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics (Haifa), NUI Galway, Rep. Of Ireland. Vice-Chair for Research, European Division of the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics (Haifa) 83 Oliver Feeney 1. INTRODUCTION Compared to previous techniques of genetic interventions, CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats), particularly CRISPRCas9, has been steadily changing the discourse from one of future possibilities to emerging realities. To underscore the revolutionary advances in technical capacities, only six years passed between Charpentier and Doudna’s seminal 2012 paper outlining the reprogrammable CRISPR-Cas9 technique, and the first confirmed cases of gene-edited humans (Jinek 2012; Cyranoski 2018). He Jiankui’s germ-line reproductive gene-editing of twin girls was an attempt to confer immunity to HIV. This case has been significant due not only to the technical possibilities it displayed, but also due to the ethical and legal guidelines ignored in the process (ibid; Feeney 2019). Focussing not only on this case, but in general, it is clear that the international regulatory system when it comes to gene-editing, and CRISPR in particular, is currently insufficient to properly respond to such cases (Nordberg et al. 2020). While governments, international bodies and others, try to ensure that the legislative, regulatory and effective ethical, legal and societal frameworks catch up to the technical possibilities, the concern is that the eventual outcome will be either an ineffective mix of partial regulation or an equally ineffective overreaction2 in terms of widespread prohibition and blunt overregulation (Nordberg et al. 2020). Nevertheless, alongside the technical progress, innovation has also been taking place in new forms of ethical guidance and regulation in gene-editing – from the field of patenting. Guerrini et al. (2017) have noted the rise of socalled ‘ethical licencing’ where institutions, researchers and companies have used their patent control over CRISPR techniques (especially in the case of the foundational patents) to create an emerging form of private governance over uses of gene-editing. Unlike the partial, ineffective patchwork of uncoordinated and outdated regulatory and legislative systems across different jurisdictions at the international level, the patenting system has global scope through the 1994 TRIPS Agreement (Feeney et al., 2018). Another emerging form of patent-based regulation is highlighted by Parthasarathy (2018) who has begun an examination of a more formal, comprehensive and government administered regulation using the patent system. I will evaluate the emerging prospect of patents as a form of ethical governance of CRISPR-Cas9 by 2 Fears of a backlash were particularly felt by the scientific community as a result of He’s experimental work: https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/scientists-gene-edited-babies-future-research-1.4927391 84 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova examining the two aforementioned proposals. I will conclude that, so far, this avenue seems to raise as many issues as it seeks to resolve. 2. TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND REGULATORY INERTIA The phenomenon of CRISPR, or rather CRISPR-Cas9, has revolutionised what was usually termed genetic engineering (or gene therapy) into the cheaper, accurate and efficient forms of gene-editing, or genome-editing.3 This has also meant that the ethical discussions over the previous decades, on what changes, if any, can we morally make to humans is less one of future speculation and more one of imminent application. Such issues include arguments in favour of somatic, as opposed to germline, interventions; the latter, some argue, are problematic insofar as they can affect future generations in unpredictable and irreversible ways. This came to prominence in 2018 when Jiankui He claimed to perform a controversial germ-line reproductive geneediting of twin girls – Lulu and Nana – which consisted of inserting a variant of the CCR5 gene in an attempt to confer immunity to the human immunodeficiency virus (this was followed with a later claim of a third gene-edited child). Since then, claims by a Russian biochemist has raised the prospect of more such interventions in the future4. He’s claims gave rise to significant moral unease (and outrage) regarding safety concerns, lack of medical necessity, possibility of off-target mutations and mosaicism, reckless experimentation, lack of transparency, and more (Feeney 2019). While it appears that He was strongly sanctioned by the Chinese authorities, it exposed the lack of a clear and coherent international legal or regulatory structure. In fact, the only international ethical instrument with legal force (once ratified) is the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention). However, this only covers countries under the remit of the Council of Europe, who sign and ratify it. Moreover, this Convention entered forced in 1999 (after being opened for signatures in 1997), suggesting that there are, at least some, aspects to it that are long out of date, including missing some possibilities entirely (e.g. CRISPR). One of the contemporary concerns from the Chinese case is the possibility that the appropriate moral reaction may give rise to a regula3 This is not to suggest that CRISPR-Cas9 (or the ‘CRISPR-era’ technologies, such as base-editing, etc.) is ubiquitous. Other previously-existing gene-editing methods – Zinc-finger nucleases (ZFNs) and transcription activator-like effector nucleases (TALENs) – are also considered, alongside CRISPR-Cas9, as major contemporary forms of genome editing technologies (Li et al. 2020; Gaj et al. 2013). 4 See: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-29/future-of-genetically-modified-babies-may-liein-putin-s-hands 85 Oliver Feeney tory overreaction, due to the public outcry, and that widespread prohibition could arise as a consequence. Such justifiable concerns may give rise to prohibitions in future justifiable uses of gene-editing, which may slow positive innovation in addition to seeking to prevent such abuses. The likely progression of appropriately robust and well-balanced international legislation will be slow in its development, subject to persistent, albeit legitimate reasonable moral disagreement, and magnified at a global level (Nordberg et al. 2020). The fact that the Oviedo Convention is the only international legally binding form of legislation, over two decades old, which applies only within Europe and still with many European countries declining to join, is not entirely confidence building.5 3. A NOVEL FORM OF TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE? Blunt, or slow and ineffective forms of legislation, are not the only methods to regulate genome editing possibilities. Innovations in the field of patenting are giving rise to new forms of (potential) ethical guidance and regulation in gene-editing. The original CRISPR-Cas9 patents were taken out by two groups: the University of California, Berkeley and University of Vienna group of Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier regarding its use in general, and the MIT/Harvard/Broad Institute group of Feng Zhang regarding its use on eukaryotes in particular, including plants and animals (Feeney et al. 2018). These two groups, and various sub-groups, are issuing licences to various researchers, institutions, and companies throughout the globe, in order to use the CRISPR-Cas9. These licences are crucial as it is a genetic tool that is fundamental to many areas of research and applications in human, non-human animal, plant and microorganisms.6 The CRISPR-Cas9 technique is used in – and necessary to – a vast amount of gene-editing research and the patents on this technique are thereby foundational – you will need to get licences from the patent holders or any work using CRISPR-Cas9 is unauthorised and open to litigation.7 Accordingly, this puts the patent holders in a significant position of power and control over its uses; a control that can be exerted in the stipulations attached to any licence they decide to grant. In 5 I am not here giving any indications regarding the acceptability, or not, of the Oviedo Convention itself; rather I am highlighting that (good or bad) it is still the only show in town with regulatory bite, insofar as it is ratified. 6 I avoid here the many complications that the patent dispute has entailed for those institutions or researchers seeking licences. For more on this, see Feeney et al 2018 7 Basic, non-profit, pure academic research may be exempt from paying royalties or even needing a licence at all. However, even amongst such groups, a fear of litigation is present. 86 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova addition to the usual patent-related stipulations regarding payments of royalties and decisions over exclusivity or non-exclusivity, stipulations ostensibly based on ethical considerations are emerging in some of the CRISPR-Cas9 licencing decisions. Guerrini, Sherkow et al. (2017)have noted the rise of ‘ethical licencing’ where companies have used their patent control over CRISPR techniques to permit and forbid certain possible practices. This is done by having ethical constraints built (or ‘baked into’) into their licensing agreements. For instance, Broad’s CRISPR-Cas9 licences prevents the technique from being used in the editing of tobacco plants, gene drives or creating terminator seeds in agriculture. Their licencing practices also prohibit its use in human germline modification. All this, even if the law otherwise permits it, or does not adequately exist to prohibit it. Moreover, this is not just at a particular national or even regional level (e.g. USA, EU) but has global effect, through the court system, due to the global 1994 Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of the World Trade Organisation (TRIPS). While there are many issues one could raise against TRIPS itself, the salient point here is the effective creation of private governance of genome-editing where ethical considerations are ‘baked into’ the licencing agreements that are made with the patent holders (Guerrini et al. 2017). On the face of it, this is a potentially welcome initiative. In terms of regulation, rather than having nothing until we have a sufficient consensus, we have a smaller and faster form of ethical decision-making. Moreover, it is the scientists, institutions, and companies at the centre of the CRISPR-Cas9 discovery who are the patent holders. It could be argued that they are ideally placed to better appreciate the potential of their technology, as well as its possible positive and negative uses and, consequently, devise better, more balanced regulations. However, there are significant challenges to relying on it as an alternative form of regulation. Firstly, and importantly, this alternative of ethical licencing (even if perceived as a temporary measure) is without the democratic legitimacy and broader consensus that one would expect underlies the traditional systems of regulation. The focus perhaps should be to redouble efforts in the latter systems, rather than admitting the prospective of ethical licencing as anything more than a welcome additional ethical measure. Secondly, there is the issue of wider coordination difficulties and likely disagreements between different private actors (in different jurisdictions). Private governance priorities, if any, will depend on the individual patent holders and there is no reason to be assured 87 Oliver Feeney that all will follow the ethical licencing route. As outlined elsewhere (Feeney et al. 2018), much of the potential application of the currently dominant genome editing technique (including in human therapeutics, agriculture, basic research) is built upon a common ‘foundational’ technique of CRISPR-Cas9. This foundational technique is subject to the disputed, overlapping control of two groups (Doudna and Charpentier on one side; Zhang on the other) and their respective patent claims (Feeney et al 2018). This now infamous patent dispute has been held up as a pivotal example of how commercial interests can damage scientific collaborations (Sherkow, 2016). Even where ‘ethical licencing’ has been seen to arise from actors in this dispute, there are issues over how long such ethical standpoints last – particularly for a wider group of people, over time in a private arena where profitability, for instance, is an alternative and competing value. As with many other areas, there is also the problematic issue of self-regulation by the patent holders over their own (profitable) research and commercial activities. 4. CHANGING MOTIVATIONS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE In addition to the aforementioned concerns, there is an additional, less obvious issue that can problematise such a reliance on the ethical motivations arising in the private sphere. The sustainability of such voluntary non-profit (‘other-regarding’) motivations in a for-profit (incentive-based) environment cannot be assumed. To illustrate, one can review the trend of patent control since the onset of modern genetic interventions, particularly in the USA. The revolutionary developments in recombinant DNA technology by Herbert W. Boyer and Stanley N. Cohen were of significant commercial potential and, patented by Stanford University, generated a sizable source of university funding (Cook-Deegan and Heaney 2010). However, profit was not the primary goal of the Cohen-Boyer patents, and their licencing decisions largely reflected public service ideals, preventing public harm, and increasing revenue for educational and research purposes (Feldman et al. 2007, 1798). Nevertheless, in the intervening years – which included the Bayh-Dole Act (1980)8 – Peter Lee notes that through “a long (and still ongoing) process of norm contestation, academic culture has become much more receptive to exclusive rights and the commercial exploitation of scientific knowledge” (Lee 2013, 36). While there may be incidental reasons for this, I wish to investigate one possible, 8 Which allowed US universities to pursue ownership of inventions developed using US federal funds 88 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova underlying cause, which may increasingly erode the motivational foundations for the pursuant of such ethical licencing outlined above. This issue is also something that may face a similar ethical proposal in the leveraging of private sector motivations for a social or a public good. Working from non-ideal theory, Colin Farrelly (2016) pursues an approach to social justice in context of new genetic technologies that advances a form of patenting that he considers is morally justifiable while also reasonably achievable. In short, the use of patents to nurture private investment and innovation can be justified on broadly egalitarian grounds9 insofar as this encourages the arrival of effective interventions for the health of all, including (or especially) the least advantaged. I have assessed the strengths and weaknesses of Farrelly’s proposal elsewhere (Feeney 2018; Feeney forthcoming), but here I wish to focus on the common issue that may adversely affect the success of both Farrelly’s proposal and the potential of ethical licencing in the private sphere. This is concerned with the potential interplay between incentives and public-spirited motivations that can be seen with their attempted mutual accommodation in the wider Rawlsian literature.10 As can be noted in Farrelly’s non-ideal Rawlsian approach, one key complexity that non-ideal theory recognises are stronger feasibility constraints than an ideal-theoretical approach would acknowledge – such as what Rawls might consider ‘unreasonable levels of self-interest’ (Farrelly, 2016; 2007). While real people (e.g. ‘pro ethical licencing’ members of Broad) are not as the Homo oeconomicus image would suggest, giving insufficient regard to what (‘reasonably self-interested’) people are like in reality could render unworkable an overly ideal scheme of justice (e.g. in gene editing technologies) no matter how desirable it might otherwise be (Brennan and Pettit, 2005). While rejecting such an image of purely self-interested people as economists portray – devising institutional arrangements that are not sufficiently economically incentive-compatible is problematic for workable and stable institutions of (genomic) justice (Brennan and Pettit, 2005). People are not knavish and a principle that requires incentives as though we were would be too extreme. Nevertheless, we are not always motivated to an ideal level in order to comply with, or excel upon, socially just institutions (at least not all the time) nor, in so far as we do, could we simply be assumed to continuously do so over 9 More specifically, the egalitarian variant called prioritarianism. Prioritarianism holds that benefits to those who are worse off have a greater moral weight than benefits to those who are better off. 10 Although John Rawls famously stands accused of being too ideal, he does note that any proposal or theory regarding justice must take due account of the ‘strains of commitment’ where people should only be expected to act according to reasonable social rules, including accommodating a reasonable level of self-interest. 89 Oliver Feeney time and in all circumstances within which we find ourselves in the normal course of our lives). So far, nothing here seems particularly controversial. It only seems to suggest that the motivations of CRISPR patent-holders (who engage in ethical licensing) may not realistically be assumed to be purely other-motivated, or altruistic, but that they are also in it for commercial profitability, as well as other forms of incentives (such as winning a Nobel Prize!). 5. CRITICAL REVIEW OF FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS AND USE OF INCENTIVES However, insofar as such feasibility constraints are taken as limitations on what is realistic in terms of social justice, these limitations themselves must be subjected to critical scrutiny. What is feasible depends greatly on the balance between self-interested and other-interested motivations and, consequently, such feasibility constraints not only form the parameters of what can be done, they are also the consequences of what is done. For instance, we can see that Bowles and Hwang note that an espousal of economic incentive-based policies designed to harness self-interest to public ends wrongly assumes that ethical motivations will remain unaffected (2008). The concern, akin to that of Titmuss’ (1971) regarding blood donations, is that this use of incentives would lead to a ‘crowding out’ of social (or other-regarding) preferences, which, while arguably productive in pursuing social justice goals in the short term, would undermine such goals in the longer term. Benabou and Tirole (2006) note evidence that suggests that the provision of economic rewards and punishments to people in order to foster prosocial behaviour sometimes has a perverse effect of reducing the total contribution those people have been previously providing. They note that a crowding out of “intrinsic motivation” by extrinsic incentives has been observed in a variety of cases. Indeed, provisional evidence even suggests that explicit incentives diminish activity in distinct regions of the brain associated with social preferences (Bowles and Polanía Reyes, 2009). As noted above, the ongoing process of academic norm contestation and movement toward commercial interests, that Lee suggests (2013), may also be a symptom of such ‘crowding out’ dynamics. It may be the case that sometimes the gain from more economic incentives more than compensates for the loss in social preferences. In any case, it seems that the momentum in the context of new gene-editing technologies, such as CRISPR-Cas9, is in- 90 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova creasingly toward the ethos of the private sphere, and away from the ethos of (purer) scientific collaboration (Sherkow 2016). The concern is that this may increasingly ‘crowd-out’ social (other-regarding) preferences and undermine the motivational structure conducive to Farrelly’s non-ideal proposals and to the potential of ‘ethical licencing’ as a sustainable alternative to the traditional forms of regulation. 6. PATENTS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE? The other possibility seems a form of ‘half-way house’. Parthasarathy (2018) has begun an examination of the patent system as an alternative to future regulation of gene-editing technologies. Rather than the ethical licencing of private actors, Parthasarathy is seeking a more formal, comprehensive and government administered regulation using the patent system. Citing the EU’s 1998 Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, as well as other historical examples of government run patent control, a key model was highlighted by the US Congress’ use of the patent system to control the development and commercialisation of atomic weapons in the 1940s. Some relevant technologies would be patentable, some subject to compulsory licences if in the public interest and some excluded from patenting entirely (e.g. atomic weapons). This would be managed by an advisory committee for gene-editing patents – including (in the US case at hand) members of EPA, health sector, commercial sector and others, in conjunction with members from the US Patent Office. Parthasarathy does not see this as a comprehensive alternative to traditional regulation but argues that it should be part of a comprehensive approach. The problem here is that this addition to traditional regulation does not seem to improve things from mere reliance on that same traditional regulation itself. The problem of achieving agreement in terms of the ethical, legal and societal implications of such technologies or applications of technologies; in terms of devising the appropriate level of fostering or restriction of such technologies, or parts of such technologies, will be present in this approach, albeit focussed on the aforementioned advisory committee. If the decisionmaking process is still easier in the committee, the membership of this committee will become the new area of contention. If this is all avoided, by the top-down arrangement of such a committee (whether by government or state body) then there is an issue of a lack of democratic accountability, oversight, 91 Oliver Feeney and engagement. Whether or not genome editing of humans (or certain aspects) is to be welcomed or not, the assessment will entail the same challenges as existing democratically legitimated approaches to creating regulation. If this is short-circuited in some way, then that very democratic legitimacy may be damaged. Given the profound societal impact that can be anticipated, and the strong emotions and reactions that it can provoke, the wider acceptance of this technology could be damaged by the sense that it ‘slips in by the back door’. This route also loses the dynamic aspects of the ‘private ethical licencing’ route – it may require wider levels of compromise, or consensus, that one or a few patent owners can swiftly sidestep, albeit with even greater loss to democratic legitimacy and oversight, as well as the concerns over motivations outlined above. 7. CONCLUSION The purpose of this paper was not to offer a constructive alternative, but rather to further the exploration of any, or all, of the existing approaches – traditional, private patents and ethical licencing, government controlled patents and licencing for public good – offered to the regulation of the fast developing technology of CRISPR-Cas9 as well as genome-editing in general. What was offered was an outline of potential challenges to some of the patent-based suggestions that would need to be met in order to offer sustainable alternatives to traditional regulatory approaches, and that are democratically justifiable. Otherwise, the time would be better spent improving the current forms of regulatory approaches, rather than looking for new problems to solve. In the end, I suspect all three approaches will have a role to play in the future regulation of new genomic technologies and so much work will need to be done to ensure such challenges as outlined in the paper are resolved. REFERENCES: 1. Bayh-Dole Act. 1980. The Bayh–Dole Act or Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act (Pub. L. 96-517, December 12, 1980). 2. Bénabou, R.& Tirole (2006). “Incentives and Prosocial Behavior.” American Economic Review, 96 (5): 1652-1678. 3. Bowles, S., & Polania-Reyes, S. (2009) Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: A Preference-Based Lucas Critique of Public Policy (July 1, 92 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2734. Available at SSRN: https:// ssrn.com/abstract=1443865 Brennan, G. & Pettit, P. (2005) The economy of esteem. Oxford: Oxford University Press Broad Institute. 2017. Information about licensing CRISPR genome editing systems. Available at: https://www.broadinstitute.org/partnerships/officestrategic-alliances-and-partnering/information-about-licensing-crisprgenome-edi Cook-Deegan, R. and C. Heaney. 2010. Patents in Genomics and Human Genetics. Annual Review of Genomics and Human Genetics. 11:383–425. Cyranoski D, Ledford H (2018) Genome-edited baby claim provokes international outcry. Nature 26 Nov. 2018. Farrelly, C. 2016. Biologically Modified Justice. UK: Blackwell. Farrelly, Colin, ‘Gene Patents and Justice’, The Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2007a): 147-163 Farrelly, Colin ‘Colin Farrelly, ‘Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation’, Political Studies 55/4 (2007b): 844-864 Feeney, Oliver ‘Genetics and Justice, Non-ideal Theory and the Role of Patents: The Case of CIRSPR-Cas9’ in Timo Minssen, Ana Nordberg & Jakob Wested (eds.) 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(2018) Use the patent system to regulate gene editing. Nature Vol. 562: 486-488 22. Sherkow, J.S. (2016) CRISPR: Pursuit of profit poisons collaboration. Nature 532, 172–173 (14 April 2016) 23. Titmuss, Richard, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. (New York, Pantheon Books, New York, 1971) 94 Original scientific paper UDK THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (PRESENT DILEMMAS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES) Igor Milinković1 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Abstract: The rapid development of artificial intelligence systems raises dilemmas regarding their moral and legal status. Can artificial intelligence possess moral status (significance)? And under what conditions? Can one speak of the dignity of artificial intelligence as the basis of its moral status? According to some authors, if there are entities who have the capacities on which the dignity of human beings is based, they would also possess intrinsic dignity. If dignity is not an exclusive feature of human beings, such status could also be recognized by artificial intelligence entities. The first part of the paper deals with the problem of moral status of artificial intelligence and the conditions that must be fulfilled for such a status to be recognized. A precondition for the existence of moral status of artificial intelligence is its ability to make autonomous decisions. This part of the paper considers whether developing autonomous artificial intelligence is justified, or, as some authors suggest, the creation of artificial intelligence agents capable of autonomous action should be avoided. The recognition of the moral status of artificial intelligence would reflect on its legal status. The second part of the paper deals with the question of justifiability of ascribing legal personhood to the artificial intelligence agents. Under what conditions would recognition of legal personhood by the artificial intelligence be justified and should its legal subjectivity be recognized in full scope or only partially (by ascribing to the artificial intelligence agents a “halfway-status”, as some authors suggest)? Current state of the legal regulation of artificial intelligence will be observed as well. Keywords: artificial intelligence, moral status, dignity, legal personhood 1 PhD, Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka 95 Igor Milinković 1. INTRODUCTION: PROMISES AND PERILS OF AI DEVELOPMENT The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) raises numerous ethical and legal dilemmas. AI can be defined as “the theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence”2. According to Copeland, AI represents „the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings”3 (Mancini and Jenkins define AI as “the application of computer algorithms to perform intellectual tasks”)4. Today, AI is being increasingly used in various areas of everyday life, radically changing the way the modern world functions. AI technology has already reached a level “where autonomous vehicles, chatbots, autonomous planning and scheduling, gaming, translation, medical diagnosing and even spam fighting can be performed via machine intelligence”.5 AI agents are also becoming more intelligent at a fast rate. Ray Kurzweil, the world-renowned futurist, predicts that AI will reach human-level intelligence by 2029.6 According to the results of survey conducted by Müller and Bostrom in 2013, AI experts estimate that AI systems are likely to reach overall human ability by 2075, and that they will move on to superintelligence in less than 30 years thereafter7 (where superintelligence is understood as “any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest”)8. Not only is AI gradually becoming omnipresent, but the prospects of AI systems becoming omnipotent are getting stronger as well. One of dilemmas raised by AI development and applications concerns the legal status of AI agents. Can 2 David Schatsky, Craig Muraskin and Ragu Gurumurthy, “Demystifying artificial intelligence: what business leaders need to know about cognitive technologies” (University Press, Delloite, 2014), 3, quoted in Tania Sourdin and Richard Cornes, “Do Judges Need to Be Human? The Implications of Technology for Responsive Judging”, in The Responsive Judge. International Perspectives, eds. Tania Sourdin and Archie Zariski (Singapore: Springer, 2018), 90. 3 Jack B. Copeland, “Artificial Intelligence”, in Encyclopedia Britannica (Available at: https://www.britannica. com/technology/artificial-intelligence) 4 Peter Mancini and Marc Jenkins, “Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in the Legal Field” (Available at: https:// www.academia.edu/10089717/Ethics_of_Artificial_Intelligence_in_the_Legal_Field). According to these two authors, AI “describes an intelligent agent, able to act upon a task, determine the level of success at completion, learn from that experience and alter future behavior in order to improve future performance on the task”. 5 Yogesh K. Dwivedi, et al. “Artificial Intelligence (AI): Multidisciplinary perspectives on emerging challenges, opportunities, and agenda for research, practice and policy”, International Journal of Information Management (2019) (Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S026840121930917X) 6 Ray Kurzweil, “Interview with Ray Kurzweil. Interview by Vicki Glaser.” Rejuvenation research 14.5 (2011), 570. 7 Vincent C. Müller and Nick Bostrom, “Future progress in artificial intelligence: A survey of expert opinion”, in Fundamental issues of artificial intelligence, ed. Vincent C. Müller (Springer International Publishing, 2016), 555. 8 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, dangers, strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), Ch. 2, quoted in Müller and Bostrom, “Future progress in artificial intelligence: A survey of expert opinion”, 556. 96 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova fully intelligent AI agent, capable of autonomous thinking, be recognized as a legal person? And how should the moral status of AI agents be understood? Rapid advances in AI are likely to change every aspect of human lives. But will these changes necessarily be positive? The recent developments in AI inspired warnings by many prominent intellectuals and public persons. Stephen Hawking, Bill Gates, and Elon Musk, among others, have expressed concerns about the negative impact of the development of “full” or “strong”9 AI on the future of mankind. As Stephen Hawking warned in the BBC interview: “The development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of human race”.10 Once created, it “would take off on its own, and re-design itself at an ever increasing rate”.11 Perhaps no less terrifying future was described by Steve Wozniak, the co-founder of Apple. A future world described by Wozniak is not the world without humans, wiped out by a Terminatorlike catastrophe. Nor is it the world of severely exploited human slaves (kept perhaps in a Matrix-like computer-generated dream world). According to Wozniak, it would be the world of human beings transformed to pets of farsuperior AI agents (or, in best case scenario, the world where humans will be treated as children of “benevolent” AI parents). In Wozniak’s supposedly “sunnier” vision of AI future, humans “become cherished and mollycoddled pets of superintelligent AIs”12. Is the autonomy of AI agents threatening to diminish autonomy of human beings, and consequently their dignity? As Nicholas Agar pointed out, “the Wozniak and Hawking visions are equal affronts to those who hope for a vision of the future in which humans retain authority over the machines and over our own destinies”13. The Wozniak’s vision is, in a sense, even more unsettling since it implies voluntary acceptance of autonomy loss by human beings. Would people willingly sacrifice their autonomy to benevolent AI tyrants in exchange for comfort, security, and other potential benefits of an 9 It is common to differentiate between two forms of AI: “strong” and “weak”. The strong AI is capable to “perform the same cognitive tasks as a human being, such as learning independently, making choices when faced with uncertainty or even having a perception of one’s own consciousness and existence”. On the other hand, the weak or restricted AI focuses on “specific tasks, following pre-established rules”. (Maximilian Nominacher and Bertrand Peletier, “Artificial Intelligence Policies”, in The Digital Factory for Knowledge. Production and Validation of Scientific Results, eds. Renaud Fabre and Alain Bensoussan (London and Hoboken: ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2018), 71. 10 Rory Cellan-Jones, “Stephen Hawking warns artificial intelligence could end mankind”, BBC News, 02. December 2014 (https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540) 11 Cellan-Jones, “Stephen Hawking warns artificial intelligence could end mankind”. 12 Nicholas Agar, How to be human in the digital economy (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2019), 5. 13 Agar, How to be human in the digital economy, 6. 97 Igor Milinković AI governed world? In the movie the Matrix, one of the main protagonists, a renegade named Cypher, choose to sacrifice freedom and authenticity of “real” existence in exchange for comfort of Matrix’s artificial reality. “Ignorance is the bliss”, Cypher stated. So perhaps is the life free from the burden of responsibility. But how dignified existence of men would be in that scenario. Risks of developing “strong” AI are numerous and not easy to predict. To ignore these issues could lead to situations for which people are unprepared, with possibly catastrophic consequences. Ethical concerns have not been raised only in relation to the “existential threat” that fully autonomous super-intelligent AI could pose to humanity. Concerns for the well-being of AI agents have been raised as well. If humans create AI agents endowed with human-like intelligence and capable of autonomous thinking, would it be acceptable to continue treating them as mere objects? Can humans avoid a responsibility for the protection of their own creations? The so-called Frankenstein effect, the idea “that when humans dabble with science, they can create entities that will someday come back to haunt them”14, can also be interpreted as the criticism of rejection and moral indifference to the products of one’s own creation. Frankenstein’s creature was abandoned by the creator, who ignored his responsibility for the horrifying result of his experiments. Would it be morally acceptable for humans to be similarly indifferent toward their AI creations and to ignore the fact that they are endowed with the human-like capacities for rational and autonomous thinking? As Walker put it: “If we make machines with humanequivalent intelligence then we must start thinking about them as our moral equivalents. If they are our moral equivalents then it is prima facie wrong to own them, or design them for the express purpose of doing our labor; for this would be to treat them as slaves…”.15 But should AI entities be made like that in the first place? Some authors argue that AI entities should only be created as slaves or servants of human masters. In the paper entitled “Robots should be slaves”, Joanna Bryson advocates such a role and place of AI in society. Explaining her position, Bryson points out that her claim “Robots should be slaves” does not mean “Robots should be the people you own”. What she meant to say is 14 Cristopher DiCarlo, “How to Avoid a Robotic Apocalypse: A Consideration on the Future Developments of AI, Emergent Consciousness, and the Frankenstein Effect.” IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 35(4) (December 2016), 60. 15 Mark Walker, “A Moral Paradox in the Creation of Artificial Intelligence: Mary Poppins 3000s of the world unite!”, in Human Implications of Human-robot Interaction: Papers From the AAAI Workshop, 2006, https:// aaai.org/Library/Workshops/ws06-09.php 98 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova “Robots should be the servants you own”.16 And they should only be created in accordance with the role of a servant (as „objects subordinate to our own goals that are built with the intention of improving our lives)17. Bryson argues: “Remember, robots are wholly owned and designed by us. We determine their goals and desires. A robot cannot be frustrated unless it is given goals that cannot be met, and it cannot mind being frustrated unless we program it to perceive frustration as distressing, rather than as an indication of a planning puzzle.”18 Bryson claims that humans should not have ethical “obligations to robots that are their sole property … but ensuring this is the responsibility of robot builders. Robot builders are ethically obliged – obliged to make robots that robot owners have no ethical obligations to”.19 It may be technically possible to create AI agents that would meet requirements for moral agency. But even if possible, making AI moral agents would be neither necessary nor desirable. Bryson’s position, however, implies that if autonomous artificial agents of human-like intelligence were created anyway, their moral status could not be ignored. Where exactly is the line that should not be crossed in AI development? 2. MORAL STATUS OF AI AGENTS The development of AI agents endowed with increasingly advanced capabilities raises dilemmas regarding their moral status. Under what conditions a moral status of AI entities ought to be recognized? An answer to this question is also relevant for the regulation of legal status of AI. Even if legal personhood is treated as an “empty slot”, which can be filled in with any content that a legislator deems justified, moral status of AI entities would influence their legal status. The recognition of moral status of AI agents would certainly put pressure on a legislator to legally confirm such status. The understanding of capacities required for becoming an object of moral concern differ from author to author. While certain authors insist on the existence of self-awareness and the capacity for rational thinking as prerequisites of moral status, other writers base the moral standing of entities on the ability to feel pain or pleasures. As Bostrom and Yudkowsky observed, two criteria 16 Joanna J. Bryson, “Robots should be slaves”, in Close Engagements with Artificial Intelligence: Key Social, Psychological, Ethical and Design Issues, ed. Yorick Wilks (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2010), 65. 17 Joanna J. Bryson, “Robots should be slaves”, 65. 18 Joanna J. Bryson, “Robots should be slaves”, 72. 19 Joanna J. Bryson, “Robots should be slaves”, 73. 99 Igor Milinković are commonly proposed as being linked to moral status of entities: sentience and sapience. While sentience represents „the capacity for phenomenal experience or qualia, such as the capacity to feel pain and suffer“, sapience can be understood as „a set of capacities associated with higher intelligence, such as self-awareness and being a reason-responsive agent“.20 In a more detailed classification, Mishra differentiates between four main accounts of the grounds of moral status of AI: 1) Sophisticated Cognitive Capacities (SSC) accounts, 2) Potential for SSC, and Membership in SSC Species accounts, 3) Special Relationship accounts, and 4) Rudimentary Cognitive Capacities accounts.21 1. According to SCC accounts, the grounds of moral status are certain sophisticated cognitive capacities that entities can possess, such as selfawareness, being future-oriented in desires and plans, a capacity to value, bargain and assume duties and responsibilities, personhood etc.. Advocates of this account claim that if an entity possesses a certain relevant cognitive capacity, then it also possesses some level of moral status. These capacities are mostly related to the notion of sapience.22 2. Potential for SCC and Membership in SCC Species accounts claim that, even in absence of the sophisticated cognitive capacities, “having either the potential for such capacities or belonging to a species whose members typically have such capacities is also sufficient to endow an entity with moral status”23. 3. Special Relationship accounts ground moral status in relationships shared with other entities (e.g. people share the relationship of being co-members of the human community with all other human beings, which could be treated as a source of certain duties to other humans). 4. Rudimentary Cognitive Capacities accounts ground moral status in certain rudimentary cognitive capacities (such as the capacity for pleasure and pain, the capacity for basic emotions, the capacity for consciousness, the capacity for having interests etc.).24 All these accounts base the moral status of an entity on the existence of certain capacities or properties. Not all these capacities are suitable for AI agents 20 Nick Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky, “The ethics of artificial intelligence”, in The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence, eds. Keith Frankish and William M. Ramsey (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 322. 21 Abhishek Mishra, “Moral Status of Digital Agents: Acting Under Uncertainty”, in Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017, ed. Vincent C. Müller (Springer, 2018), 278. 22 Abhishek Mishra, “Moral Status of Digital Agents: Acting Under Uncertainty”, 278. 23 Abhishek Mishra, “Moral Status of Digital Agents: Acting Under Uncertainty”, 279. 24 Mishra, “Moral Status of Digital Agents: Acting Under Uncertainty”, 279. 100 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova to possess. If the ability to feel pain or pleasure is decisive in giving an entity a moral status, that would, at least at the present stage of AI development, eliminate the possibility of recognizing moral standing of AI agents (although some authors suggest that the existence of different forms of pain is possible, e.g. cognitive pain, and that certain forms of pain can be felt by AI agents)25. The problem of moral status of AI entities could also be observed through the lens of the value of human dignity. Human dignity is often treated as a foundation of human rights and the basis of the legal status of human beings. If the possibility of AI dignity were accepted, that would mean equating AI agents, to a large extent, with humans in terms of their moral status. And that would pave the way for the recognition of legal status of AI agents (considering the role that the value of human dignity already has within the traditionally dominant anthropocentric conception of legal personhood).26 According to some understandings of human dignity, dignity belongs to human beings because of certain capabilities they possess. Humans’ rational nature, capability of rational thinking and autonomous decision-making, among others, have been proposed as the basis of the special status (dignity) of human beings. What if these capabilities are not exclusively human? What if it turns out that they also characterize some other types of beings? Advocates of the so-called “anti-speciesist” theories of dignity claim that if other creatures possess the same dignity-relevant capabilities as humans, they will also possess dignity. Human dignity is not necessarily human – it could belong to other species as well. This approach would open the possibility of recognizing the dignity of AI entities. According to Daniel Sulmasy, a fundamental form of human dignity is the intrinsic dignity. Intrinsic values are the values something has by virtue of being the kind of thing that it is, so “intrinsic dignity is the value that human beings have by virtue of the fact that they are human beings”27. Sulmasy’s definition of intrinsic dignity is anti-speciesist by its character: „If there are other kinds of entities in the universe besides human beings that have, as a kind, 25 Stefan Lorenz Sogner, “The Dignity of Apes, Humans, and AI”, 13-14. (Available at: https://trivent-publishing. eu/books/thebioethicsofthecrazyape/1.%20Stefan%20Lorenz%20Sorgner.pdf) 26 As Pietrzykowski observes: “In modern Western legal culture, based on the assumptions of juridical humanism, personhood in law is inextricably connected with the requirement of ascribing it to each and every human being from birth to death. Subjects of law of this kind are traditionally referred to as natural or physical persons. Their legal status is a matter of certain superior, imperative moral reasons related primarily to human dignity and its value, which is taken to directly imply the obligation to treat each human being as a holder of his or her separate right ‘to hold rights’”. (Tomas Pietrzykowski, Personhood Beyond Humanism. Animals, Chimeras, Autonomous Agents and the Law (Springer, 2018), 35) 27 Daniel P. Sulmasy, “Human Dignity and Human Worth”, in Perspectives on Human Dignity, eds. Jeff Malpas and Norelle Lickiss (Springer, 2007), 12. 101 Igor Milinković these capacities, they would also have intrinsic dignity — whether angels or extraterrestrials.“28 If one treats human dignity as a source of human rights, as Sulmasy does, recognizing the dignity of AI agents would also mean an obligation to recognize their legal status (i.e. basic rights similar or equal to those possessed by humans). However, some of the capacities suggested by Sulmasy are still not suitable for AI entities to have (e.g., capability for love)29. Can AI agents meet the requirements set by Dworkin’s two principles of dignity. According to Dworkin, dignity is attached to two ethical principles: principle of self-respect, which demands taking seriously the objective importance of one‘s life (each person “must accept that it is a matter of importance that his life be a successful performance rather than a wasted opportunity”)30, and principle of authenticity, which requires taking personal responsibility for creating a life in accordance with one‘s own coherent narrative on what counts as success in life. Authenticity, Dworkin claims, is violated “when a person is made to accept someone else’s judgment in place of his own about the values or goals his life should display”.31 Although one can imagine AI agents who value they own existence and respect its objective importance, achieving the requirements of authenticity is much more demanding (and, at the moment, out of reach of AI entities). Can one talk about the authenticity of AI agents if their functioning, the goals they pursue and the means they use are defined in advance by human creators? Autonomy of AI agents is a necessary precondition of a dignified behavior, but possibility of autonomous decision-making is not enough. Every autonomous decision will not be necessarily authentic, nor dignified. This means that it is not enough to endow AI agents with a possibility of choice between several predefined options. Authenticity requires the freedom in developing one’s own system of values that would be consistently realized over the course of one’s existence. Authenticity can be achieved only through relatively freely constructed and 28 Sulmasy, “Human Dignity and Human Worth”, 16. 29 The roboticist David Levy claims that there is nothing about human love that could not be engineered into a suitably designed robot in the relatively near future and that such a machine would feel a love that may have artificial origins but that would nonetheless be a genuine feeling of love toward its user. (David Levy, Love and Sex With Robots: The Evolution of Human-Robot Relationships (Harper Collins, 2007), quoted in John P. Sullins, “Robots, Love and Sex: The Ethics of Building a Love Machine”, IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing, Vol. 3, No 4 (October – December 2012), 398. 30 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Massachusetts-London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 203. 31 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 212. 102 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova unsupervised model of machine learning.32 But what would be the price of implementing such model? Achieving the status of dignity-bearer is only possible through the process of machine learning. The practice has shown so far that machine learning is vulnerable to inappropriate influences and can lead to unpredictable results. This can be illustrated by several examples of chatbot applications. In the spring of 2016, Microsoft released a Twitter chatbot called MS Tay, designed to have automated discussions with Twitter users, mimicking the language they use. Within twenty-four hours, Twitter users learned how to miseducate the chatbot, which resulted in Holocaust-denying, transphobic, and misogynistic statements by MS Tay. Microsoft quickly ended this experiment.33 A year after MS Tay was shut down, Microsoft launched another chatbot called Zo. To avoid exhibiting biases, Zo included filters for rejecting discussions about controversial topics related to religion or politics. Despite these protective measures, Zo expressed biases similar to Tay’s.34 Besides that, the question arises as to whether this type of filtered learning can lead to “authentic” results and behavior? Therefore, it could be concluded that the development of fully autonomous AI, as a prerequisite of achieving moral status of AI agents, requires careful considerations, and, at least at the moment, seems too risky for realization. 3. LEGAL STATUS OF AI (IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OF THE IN-BETWEEN STATUS OF AI AGENTS?) How should one understand AI agents in legal terms? Are they legal persons? If they are not, under what conditions it would be appropriate to ascribe legal personhood to AI agents? And is the recognition of legal status of AI agents necessary, or desirable? According to the traditional (and still dominant) understanding, legal personhood is “identified with the capacity to have rights and duties”35. Legal persons are “all entities capable of being right-and-duty-bearing units – all entities recognized by the law as capable 32 The term machine learning “refers to a computer program that can learn to produce a behavior that is not explicitly programmed by the author of the program”. (Ameet V Joshi, Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence (Springer, 2020), 4) 33 Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton, and Margot E. Kaminski, “Siri-ously 2.0: What artificial intelligence reveals about the first amendment.” Minnesota Law Review, 101 (2016), 2481. 34 Daniel James Fuchs, “The dangers of human-like bias in machine-learning algorithms”, Missouri S&T’s Peer to Peer 2.1 (2018), 1 (Available at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/peer2peer/vol2/iss1/1/) 35 Tomasz Pietrzykowski, “The Idea of Non-personal Subjects in Law”, in Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn, eds. Visa A.J. Kurki and Tomasz Pietrzykowski (Springer, 2017), 51. 103 Igor Milinković of being parties to a legal relationship”.36 There are two types of legal persons: natural (physical) persons and juridicial (artificial) persons. A natural person (natürliche Person; personne physique) is an individual human being who possesses legal personhood.37 Legal persons cannot be identified with human beings. Throughout history some categories of human beings were deprived of legal subjectivity, such as slaves, while, on the other hand, legal personhood has been recognized by certain types of social collectivities (entities). Artificial persons (juristische Personen; personnes morales) encompass all “other types of legal persons, such as associations, limited liability companies, and foundations, all of which can own property and enter into contracts in their own names”.38 One can also differentiate between two types of legal personhood: legal capacity and legal competence (active and passive legal personhood). Legal capacity (Rechtsfähigkeit, capacité de jouissance) is usually defined “as the capacity to hold rights and bear duties, or as the capacity to be a party to legal relations”, while legal competence (Geschäftsfähigkeit, capacité d’exercice) is understood as “the ability to enter binding contracts and so forth”.39 While natural persons acquire legal capacity at birth, for acquiring legal competence a person must be of a certain age (the age of majority) and possess mental abilities that roughly correspond to those of an adult human being of sound mind. On the other hand, artificial persons acquire legal capacity and legal competence at the same time, from the moment of registration. Legal personhood is an artificial creation of law. The legal status does not arise from the intrinsic qualities of natural or artificial entities but is the result of a legislator’s choice. The same applies to both natural and artificial persons. As Kurki put it: “Whether or not X is a legal person is an institutional fact … Natural personhood as a legal category depends on legal decisions just as much as artificial personhood”.40 Legal personhood represents “a flexible and changeable aspect of the legal system”.41 That means that other subjects, not just natural and traditionally recognized artificial persons, may possess a certain 36 George W. Paton and David P. Derham, A Textbook of Jurisprudence (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 391. 37 „The common way of defining the physical (natural) person and, at the same time, distinguishing him from the juristic person is to say: the physical person is a human being, whereas the juristic person is not.“ (Hans Kelsen, General Theory of State and Law, Harvard University Press, 1949, 94) 38 Visa A.J. Kurki, A theory of legal personhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 7. 39 Visa A.J. Kurki, “Why Things Can Hold Rights: Reconceptualizing the Legal Person”, in Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn, eds. Visa A.J. Kurki and Tomasz Pietrzykowski (Springer, 2017), 76. 40 Kurki, A theory of legal personhood. 92. 41 Robert van den Hoven van Genderen, “Do we need new legal personhood in the age of robots and AI?”, in Robotics, AI and the Future of Law, eds. Marcelo Corrales, Mark Fenwick and Nikolaus Forgo (Singapore: Springer, 2018), 22. 104 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova level of legal personhood. Over time, a traditional paradigm of personhood in law has been called into question as a result of “changes in the non-legal reality, connected with scientific development, advances in technology and biotechnology, and the evolution of social attitudes as well as socially accepted ethical standards”.42 The justifiability of the recognition of legal personhood of nonhuman animals and the environment, as well as some other entities, has been considered by an increasing number of authors. Legal systems already recognize a certain (limited) form of legal personhood to the unborn children (nasciturus), animals and the environment. According to the traditional conception of legal personhood, there is a strict distinction between legal persons and legal objects (things). An entity is either legal person or legal object. The traditional understanding has been developed as an all-or-nothing system - “either one had the potential to have all rights and obligations the legal system had to offer, or one was treated as a complete nobody”.43 Scientific and technological progress, however, requires a rethinking of the traditional dualistic or binary understanding of legal personhood. Is there possibility of establishing a half-way legal status for AI entities? According to the existing legal regulations, both at national and international level, AI agents are treated only as objects of law. In recent years, initiatives to reconsider appropriateness of such AI status have become increasingly vocal. Some authors advocate the establishment of partial legal subjectivity of AI agents. Rayan Calo suggests creating “a new category of a legal subject, halfway between person and object”44, as a way of avoiding the slippery slope effect (the situation where, for example, AI agents could use they legal status to claim the right to procreate or request democratic representation). In February 2017, the European Parliament adopted resolution containing recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2013(INL)), which raised the possibility of granting AI entities status of legal persons. It invited the European Commission to explore the implications of all possible legal solutions, including “creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons respon42 Pietrzykowski, Personhood Beyond Humanism. Animals, Chimeras, Autonomous Agents and the Law, 3. 43 Jan-Erik Schirmer, “Artificial Intelligence and Legal Personality: Introducing “Teilrechtsfähigkeit”: A Partial Legal Status Made in Germany”, in Regulating Artificial Intelligence, eds. Thomas Wischmeyer and Timo Rademacher (Springer, 2020), 134. 44 Rayan Calo, “Robotics and the lessons of cyberlaw”, California Law Review 103 (2015), 549, quoted in Schirmer, “Artificial Intelligence and Legal Personality: Introducing “Teilrechtsfähigkeit”: A Partial Legal Status Made in Germany”, 133. 105 Igor Milinković sible for making good any damage they may cause, and possibly applying electronic personality to cases where robots make autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently” (Article 59.f).45 However, the basic characteristics of this sui generis legal status are not specified. According to Schirmer, a basis for defining a “halfway” or “in-between” status of AI agents can be found in traditional legal concept of “Teilrechtsfähigkeit” (“partial legal personhood”), a status of partial legal subjectivity based on certain legal capabilities. Partial legal capacity follows function (as Schirmer points out, this concept can be called the Bauhaus School in law — form follows function).46 Applied to AI agents, the concept of partial legal subjectivity would mean that these agents “should be treated as legal subjects insofar as this status reflects their function as sophisticated servants”47. The recognition of partial legal subjectivity of AI agents, Schirmer argues, would help avoid dangers of “humanization trap”48 (arising from the normative upgrading of AI) and contribute to resolving “responsibility gaps” associated with their autonomous actions. 4. CONCLUSION AI has become a relevant part of social and legal reality. The growing presence of AI agents in day-to-day life and the influence they exert on human activity create a need for legal regulation of their status. According to Pagallo, the reasons for ascribing legal personhood to an AI entity can be ethical (preventing the ethical aberration of robots being treated as slaves) or pragmatic (e.g. solving a number of contentious issues in both the fields of contracts and torts).49 Certain authors advocate the recognition of partial legal personhood of AI as the optimal way to overcome the weaknesses of extreme positions (total absence of legal status of AI agents or the recognition of their full legal personhood). Pragmatic reasons speak in favor of considering the acceptance of the model of partial legal subjectivity, while the establishment 45 European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)) (Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/ TA-8-2017-0051_EN.html) 46 Schirmer, “Artificial Intelligence and Legal Personality: Introducing “Teilrechtsfähigkeit”: A Partial Legal Status Made in Germany”, 135. 47 Schirmer, “Artificial Intelligence and Legal Personality: Introducing “Teilrechtsfähigkeit”: A Partial Legal Status Made in Germany”, 140. 48 Schirmer, “Artificial Intelligence and Legal Personality: Introducing “Teilrechtsfähigkeit”: A Partial Legal Status Made in Germany”, 132. 49 Ugo Pagallo, The Laws of Robots. Crimes, Contracts and Torts (Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 163. 106 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova of such moral status of AI agents that would require the recognition of their full legal personhood should be avoided. REFERENCES: 1. Agar, Nicholas. How to be human in the digital economy. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2019. 2. Bostrom, Nick and Yudkowsky, Eliezer. “The ethics of artificial intelligence”. In The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence, edited by Keith Frankish and William M. Ramsey, 316-334. Cambridge University Press, 2014. 3. Bryson, Joanna J. “Robots should be slaves”. In Close Engagements with Artificial Intelligence: Key Social, Psychological, Ethical and Design Issues, edited by Yorick Wilks, 63-74. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2010. 4. Cellan-Jones, Rory. “Stephen Hawking warns artificial intelligence could end mankind”, BBC News (02. 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Fuchs, Daniel James. “The dangers of human-like bias in machine-learning algorithms”, Missouri S&T’s Peer to Peer 2.1 (2018) (Available at: https:// scholarsmine.mst.edu/peer2peer/vol2/iss1/1/) 10. Joshi, Ameet V. Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence. Springer, 2020. 11. Kelsen, Hans. General Theory of State and Law. Harvard University Press, 1949. 12. Kurki, Visa A.J. A theory of legal personhood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. 13. Kurki, Visa A.J. “Why Things Can Hold Rights: Reconceptualizing the Legal Person”. In Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn, edited by Visa A.J. Kurki and Tomasz Pietrzykowski, 69-90. Springer, 2017. 107 Igor Milinković 14. Kurzweil, Ray, “Interview with Ray Kurzweil. Interview by Vicki Glaser.” Rejuvenation research 14.5 (2011). 15. Mancini, Peter and Jenkins, Mark, “Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in the Legal Field” (Available at: https://www.academia.edu/10089717/Ethics_of_ Artificial_Intelligence_in_the_Legal_Field). 16. Massaro, Toni M., Norton, Helen, and Kaminski, Margot E. “Siri-ously 2.0: What artificial intelligence reveals about the first amendment.” Minnesota Law Review, 101 (2016). 17. Mishra, Abhishek. “Moral Status of Digital Agents: Acting Under Uncertainty”. In Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017, edited by Vincent C. Müller, 273-287. Springer, 2018. 18. Müller, Vincent C., and Bostrom, Nick. “Future progress in artificial intelligence: A survey of expert opinion”. In Fundamental issues of artificial intelligence, edited by Vincent C. Müller, 555-572. Springer International Publishing, 2016. 19. Nominacher, Maximilian and Peletier, Bertrand. “Artificial Intelligence Policies”. In The Digital Factory for Knowledge. Production and Validation of Scientific Results, edited by Renaud Fabre and Alain Bensoussan, 71-76. London and Hoboken: ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2018. 20. Pagallo, Ugo. The Laws of Robots. Crimes, Contracts and Torts. Springer Science & Business Media, 2013. 21. Paton, George W. and Derham, David P. A Textbook of Jurisprudence. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004. 22. Pietrzykowski, Tomas. Personhood Beyond Humanism. Animals, Chimeras, Autonomous Agents and the Law. Springer, 2018. 23. Pietrzykowski, Tomas. “The Idea of Non-personal Subjects in Law”. In Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn, edited by Visa A.J. Kurki and Tomasz Pietrzykowski, 49-68. Springer, 2017. 24. Schirmer, Jan-Erik. “Artificial Intelligence and Legal Personality: Introducing “Teilrechtsfähigkeit”: A Partial Legal Status Made in Germany”. In Regulating Artificial Intelligence, edited by Thomas Wischmeyer and Timo Rademacher, 123-142. Springer, 2020. 25. Sogner, Stefan Lorenz. “The Dignity of Apes, Humans, and AI”, 2019 (Available at: https://triventpublishing.eu/books/thebioethicsofthecrazyape/1.%20 Stefan%20Lorenz%20Sorgner.pdf) 26. Sourdin, Tania and Cornes, Richard. “Do Judges Need to Be Human? The Implications of Technology for Responsive Judging”. In The Responsive Judge. International Perspectives, edited by Tania Sourdin and Archie Zariski, 87119. Singapore: Springer, 2018. 108 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 27. Sullins, John P. “Robots, Love and Sex: The Ethics of Building a Love Machine”, IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing, Vol. 3, No 4 (October – December 2012). 28. Sulmasy, Daniel P. “Human Dignity and Human Worth”. In Perspectives on Human Dignity, edited by Jeff Malpas and Norelle Lickiss, 9-18. Springer, 2007. 29. Van Genderen, Robert van den Hoven. “Do we need new legal personhood in the age of robots and AI?”. In Robotics, AI and the Future of Law, edited by Marcelo Corrales, Mark Fenwick and Nikolaus Forgo, 15-56. Singapore: Springer, 2018. 30. Walker, Mark. “A Moral Paradox in the Creation of Artificial Intelligence: Mary Poppins 3000s of the world unite!”. In Human Implications of Humanrobot Interaction: Papers From the AAAI Workshop, 23-28, 2006. (Available at: https://aaai.org/Library/Workshops/ws06-09.php) 109 Original scientific paper UDK SMART CONTRACT – CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES Darko Radić1 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Dejan Pilipović2 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Abstract: Application of information and communication technologies (ICT), particularly artificial intelligence, opens new horizons and offers variety of possibilities. In this regard, there is need to reconsider how ICT reflects on regulating legal relations, especially in terms of smart contracts. Consequently, the authors seek to analyse the validity of the electronic contract form in positive legislation, and in particular the possibility of contract realization using blockchain technology. This raises many questions, especially from the standpoint of confrontation between classical contract law institutes and the execution of smart contracts, especially considering the limitation of contractor capabilities and the fact that smart contract enjoys autonomy. Key words: electronic contract, smart contract, electronic form, blockchain, execution of the contract. INTRODUCTION The end of the XX and the beginning of the XXI century marked the technological progress of the society, especially in the field of information and communication technologies (ICT). In addition to previously developed communication means (telegraph, telephone, fax, etc.), contemporary, fast and efficient communication means (electronic mail, electronic data exchange and the World Wide Web - Internet) have been introduced. Various systems and services based on electronic data processing and exchange of data via the Internet have been created. This development, among other things, entails 1 PhD, Associate Professor 2 MA, Senior Assistant 111 Darko Radić, Dejan Pilipović serious challenges for legal regulation. On the one hand, unlike the classical communication means, the usual way of entering into contractual relations and realisation of contracts, a number of questions and problems are now being raised - of a technological nature primarily - to which it is necessary to provide the answer and establish appropriate rules, in order to define binding rules of conduct for participants in electronic commerce (e-commerce) and to make contribution to legal certainty, which is a necessary component of electronic business (e-business) development. On the other hand, it is quite clear that many classical contract law institutes cannot offer appropriate solutions and that their application is not always and entirely possible, when it comes to electronic contracts and their realisation. Due to the above stated reasons, electronic business regulation began to develop at supranational level firstly, even though in other cases and other areas of legal relations, legal regulation was firstly developed at national level, with the aim of later harmonizing national regulations and facilitating the unification of solutions and practices at international level, in order to enable easier trade of goods and services. Consequently, international legal acts establishing certain principles and master solutions are of a great importance. In this respect, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has taken an important step by adopting a set of legal instruments: Model Law on Electronic Commerce (Model Law) from 19963, Model Law on Electronic Signatures4, Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records5 and the UN Convention on the Use of Electronic communications in International Contracts (Convention)6. At the European Union (EU) level Directive on certain legal aspects of information society services, especially in electronic commerce, on the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce)7 is particularly important. At the global level of major importance are the Model Law, which contains general rules on electronic commerce and specific rules on electronic commerce in certain areas (whose solutions were followed by some countries when adopting national regulations: the Unit3 “Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) with additional article 5 bis as adopted in 1998.”, Uncitral, accessed February 17, 2020, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/ecommerce/modellaw/electronic_commerce. 4 “Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001)”, Uncitral, accessed February 17, 2020, https://uncitral.un.org/ en/texts/ecommerce/modellaw/electronic_signatures. 5 “Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records (2007)”, Uncitral, accessed February 17, 2020, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/ecommerce/modellaw/electronic_transferable_records. 6 “UN Convention on the Use of Electronic communications in International Contracts (2005)”, Uncitral, accessed February 17, 2020, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/ecommerce/conventions/electronic_communications. 7 “Directive on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular in electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (2000) - Directive on electronic commerce”, LexEuropa, accessed February 17, 2020, https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:178:0001:0016:EN:PDF. 112 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ed States of America8, the United Kingdom9, Canada10, Ireland11, Slovenia12, Croatia13) and Convention, which is based on the principles of technological neutrality (no specific technology is imposed by the law14) and functional equivalence (equality of electronic and written contract form). Application of ICT in contract law does not end with this. The subject of the research in this paper is a smart contract, in order to determine its characteristics, and to examine the way and principles of legal regulation referring to this contract (locally and worldwide), and especially the adequacy and possibilities of applying classical contract law institutes. In this paper, we take as a starting point that conclusion of electronic contracts in domestic law is possible and that it is necessary to regulate the issue of electronic contracts more precisely, and that the legal regulation of smart contracts will represent the next development stage of this legislation area , which will depend on technological development of the environment in which these contracts are formed and realised and relations of the domestic authorities toward cryptocurrencies and similar phenomena. 8 “Uniform Electronic Transaction Act 1999”, National Conference of commissioners on Uniform States Laws (Denver, 1990), accessed February 17, 2020, 9 “Electronic Communication Act 2000”, Legislation, accessed February 17, 2020, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/7/contents. 10 “Uniform Electronic Commerce Act 1999”, ULCC, accessed February 17, 2020, https://www.ulcc.ca/en/1999winnipeg-mb/359-civil-section-documents/1138-1999-electronic-commerce-act-annotated. 11 “Electronic Commerce Act 2000”, accessed February 17, 2020, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2000/act/27/enacted/en/html. 12 Law on Electronic Commerce and Electronic Signatures (Official Gazette, No. 57/00). 13 Law on Electronic Commerce (Official Gazette, No. 173/03). 14 On the reasons for applying the principle of technological neutrality see Rajab Ali, “Technological neutrality”, Lex Electronica - Revue de Centre de recherché en droit public 14, no. 2 (Automne / Fall 2009): 11-12, https:// core.ac.uk/download/pdf/55652076.pdf. 113 Darko Radić, Dejan Pilipović 1. THE CONCEPT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF A SMART CONTRACT 1.1. The concept of a smart contract The idea and concept of a smart contract was first conveyed by Nick Szabo in 1996.15 Szabo introduced the smart contract16 as a self-executing computer program capable of realising the content of the contract, using mathematical algorithms to automatically execute transactions, as soon as the previously stipulated condition is satisfied. At the time, there was no blockchain technology - distributed ledger technology (DLT), thus realisation of the smart contract idea was not possible.17 With the advent of the first Bitcoin cryptocurrency, blockchain technology was introduced to the world and its architecture enabled the use of smart contracts. Therefore, in defining and determining the concept of smart contract, the matter of blockchain technology18 is an inevitable issue, because understanding this technology is useful for smart contract comprehension.19 Even though it was primarily created for the purpose of the need to use the Bitcoin cryptocurrency, blockchain technology has in the meantime shown tremendous potential, even in terms of implementation and affirmation of a smart contract. A blockchain is a set of digital information divided between nodes that are an integral part of a blockchain, which represents the data structure that is being distributed. Therefore, in blockchain technology, documents are linked into blocks - which are created by the consent of transaction participants, and blocks are linked together into a chain. Each block that is being 15 Nick Szabo, „Smart contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets“, EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought, no. 16 (1996), http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html. Jack Gilcrest, and Arthur Carvalho, „Smart contracts: Legal Considerations“, In Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Seattle: IEEE Big Data, 2018), 3277. 16 Some authors call these contracts digital contracts. In addition previously stated, some other names are also used: “Smart legal contract” and “smart contract code”. Alan Cohn, Travis West and Chelsea Parker, “Smart After All: Blockchain, Smart Contracts, Parametric Insurance, and Smart Energy Grids”, Georgetown Law Technology Review, Volume 1, Issue 2 (2017): 277, 280, https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/smart-after-all-blockchainsmart-contracts-parametric-insurance-and-smart-energy-grids/GLTR-04-2017/. 17 Zoran Bartolovic, „Pametni ugovor (Smart contract)“ (MA thesis, Polytechnic of Rijeka, 2018), 3. 18 There are views in legal theory, which seems justified, that a smart contract as a concept is not necessarily tied to blockchain technology. See Cohn, West, and Parker, “Smart After All,” 280. However, a smart contract basic performances (automation, self-execution) are best achieved by the use of blockchain technology. In this research, the focus will be on a smart contract based on the application of blockchain technology. 19 Cohn, West, and Parker, “Smart After All”, 280. 114 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova added to the chain contains a reference about the block to which it is being added - each participant can add a new block but cannot modify existing one in the chain.20 An important feature of a blockchain is the use of cryptography (especially for authentication) and the ability to read data from a blockchain and add only system nodes. Using this technology, all partners in the system have equal rights and possibilities, and the system (blockchain) is designed so that the data once created cannot be modified.21 The concept is, therefore, very similar to the database in which information is stored. The fact that the whole system is decentralized is particularly important, that is, there is no central or major part from which the system would be operated. Any blockchain participant can write and read a ‘’ledger’’, which is distributed and synchronized in real time between persons verifying the transaction, so this prevents any participant from making an irregular transaction or act that is not provided by the contract.22 This feature of blockchain technology is crucial for the use of digital currencies, as decentralisation of a blockchain (used by smart contract platforms) provides integrity and trust by the user, that is, facilitates a peer-to-peer system.23 In other words, the realisation of a smart contract in a centralised system would provide great power in hands of the person who owns the infrastructure, who would then have the ability to influence the smart contract - to modify or even cancel it.24 In light of the foregoing, a smart contract in technological terms represents a part of the programming code (part of a software) contained in a blockchain, which is activated by transaction contracting and on the basis of which transaction information is recorded and read in a blockchain database (which uses cryptographic algorithms). In other words, a smart contract is a digital protocol for transmission of information (that is being encrypted), which uses encrypted mathematical algorithms to automatically execute transaction (contract realisation) as soon as certain conditions are met. Therefore, automatic contract execution is enabled by computer code that „translates“ legal text (contract content) into an operational program.25 In legal terms, a smart contract could be defined as a set of rights and obligations - the rules of conduct for contracting parties (established by the 20 Gilcrest, and Carvalho, „Smart contracts: Legal Considerations“, 3278. 21 Gilcrest, and Carvalho, „Smart contracts: Legal Considerations“, 3277-3281. 22 Cohn, West, and Parker, “Smart After All”, 277-278. 23 Domina Hozjan, „Blockchain“ (Thesis, Faculty of Science, University of Zagreb, 2017), 16. 24 Gilcrest, and Carvalho, „Smart contracts: Legal Considerations“, 3278. 25 Max Raskin, “The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts”, Georgetown Law Technology Review, vol. 1:2 (2017): 309. 115 Darko Radić, Dejan Pilipović consent of their wills) expressed in digital form, which are stored in a blockchain database, so that these contracts, upon the conclusion, are automatically (without contractors’ influence) executed as soon as a certain condition is fulfilled. Not only the content of the contract is stored in a blockchain database, but also all transactions that have occurred after conclusion of the contract was recorded. Here, the software represents a trust point for both contracting parties, as the smart contract is automatically realised, according to the schedule that is programmed in advance, provided that certain conditions are met and the contracting parties cannot change anything or stop the realisation of the contract. One observation should be added to this legal definition of a smart contract, an observation according to which a smart contract can be perceived as strong or weak, depending on costs in the event of contract revision. Hence, if a court can revise a contract even after its execution at a relatively small cost, then this is a „weak smart contract“. Otherwise, if the revision of the contract by the court would be costly (so that it is not justified for the court to revise it), then it would be a „strong smart contract“.26 In legal theory, attempts to bridge the gap between the technological and legal comprehension of a smart contract are often made, and for that purpose unified (legal-technological) definitions are provided. In this respect, the emphasis is on the automation of a smart contract and its legally-binding effect. Finally, according to the opinion of some authors, in the context of new possibilities of smart contracts, there is a dialogue about the so-called alternatives to traditional contracts (“smart alternative contracts”). It is about, as explained in these opinions, a machine-to-machine commerce, which involves commercial interactions between smart and autonomous devices (computers, phones, cars, etc.), e.g. a washing machine that buys detergent on its own or a car that can pay to be refuelled.27 This approach to defining a smart contract would be fully justified only by the application of artificial intelligence. For the purpose of clarifying a smart contract, we will present you one example: Company Y commits to Company X to produce promotional video material that will have at least 100,000 views in the first month after being uploaded on the Web, and Company X obligates to pay fee of $1,000 to Company Y for that service. Upon the conclusion of the contract, company Y produces video material and publish it on the Web within the agreed time. 26 Raskin, “The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts”, 310. 27 Josh Stark, „Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts“, Coindesk, June 4, 2016, accessed January 29, 2020, https://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts. 116 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova After the video is viewed by more than 100,000 users, condition to transfer $1,000 from account of the Company X to account of the Company Y is met. Hence, the software disables one contracting party’s obligation (payment of fee), until the moment when it is laid down that obligation of the other contracting party has been fulfilled as well as the previously set condition (the production of video material, which has more than 100,000 views). 1.2. Basic features of a smart contract A smart contract was created as a result of the ability to carry out transactions in a simple, efficient and economical way, on the one hand, and as a necessity for the transaction participants to make above all safe and certain exchange of goods and services, on the other hand. Starting from the definition of a smart contract primarily, we can distinguish several of its characteristics, which are at the same time differentia specifica compared to other, above all, electronic contracts. a) Data encryption As previously noted, creation and realisation of a smart contract involves data encryption. The encrypted data is stored and replicated in a decentralised system, therefore it is not possible to forge or delete it. In other words, the content of a smart contract - the rules of conduct for contractors are encrypted (they become part of the developer code), and with the agreement of the contractors, the blocks that are contained in the chain are formed. The data contained in the blocks cannot be changed. In this way, the possibility of someone intervening in the content of a smart contract and affecting its execution is excluded. Encrypted algorithms protect contractors’ identity, privacy, and transaction authentication.28 Unlike other electronic contracts where, under certain circumstances, it may happen that a copy of the contract that does not correspond to the original or that the content of the contract at some point differentiates from the one created by the consent of the contractors will, in case of a smart contract this is not possible. Thus, a smart contract is immutable. 28 Cohn, West, and Parker, “Smart After All”, 278. 117 Darko Radić, Dejan Pilipović b) Autonomy in contract execution The previously described feature of a smart contract, which is basically reflected in the intangibility of its integrity - the immutability of the content of a smart contract, is complemented by the ability of a smart contract to execute transactions agreed between the contracting parties without their influence. Thus, as soon as an event occurs or an activity that was previously scheduled by the program, a smart contract is being self-executed by realising an operation whose initiation was conditioned by the event that have happened or the activity which was undertaken. In doing so, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the «trigger» for a transaction must be an objective fact whose existence or condition the program code can recognize, so that after identifying such information, the process of realisation of the agreed transaction can be initiated. In other words, the architecture of a smart contract is based on an „ifthen“ clause, so it is easy to convert this content into computer code and enable automated contract execution. People are required to define the content of the contract and enter the code.29 Therefore, no confirmation or statement of one contractor that its obligation has been fulfilled or consent of the other contractor to commence with the execution of its obligation is required. In our example, a transfer of funds from a company X account will only occur when the software recognises the release of the promotional video material and when it recognises that it has recorded 100,000 views. Even though it may seem strange, the potential problem of a smart contract reflected in its irreversibility (irrevocability) is precisely the reason why potential contractors opt for this way of arranging and realising transactions, because it guarantees them security and reliability. This is especially useful for persons and business partners who do not know each other, who have not previously been in a business cooperation relationship and who do not have mutual trust in each other. c) Recording of all contract implementation activities Unlike electronic contracts, a smart contract in digital form record not only the content of the contract, but also all activities in terms of its realisation. This is a particularly useful feature of smart contracts in the event of a possible dispute, where the interested party can easily prove the content of the contract and course of the events or activities that have happened so far towards the realisation of the contractual relationship (above all, orderly 29 Cohn, West, and Parker, “Smart After All”, 281. 118 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova implementation or breach of the contractual obligation of the other contractor). Thus, besides encryption and storage of data in a decentralised system (blocks in a chain), blockchain technology also enables reading of data. Certain legislations specifically regulate a smart contract and confirms its validity. 2. PRO ET CONTRA All previous interpretations suggest the indisputable conclusion that a smart contract has its advantages, but quite certainly its disadvantages as well. In this regard, we consider that it is useful to point out to a few basic advantages of a smart contract, risks of its usage at the same time and reasons explaining why smart contracts have not experienced sufficient affirmation in practice yet. a) Advantages: - Speed and efficiency: the architecture of a smart contract and the concept of its realisation enable prompt realisation of the intended transaction - the condition and the transaction occur in real time, without further requiring participation of a person who would be obliged to take certain actions and/ or monitor the fulfilment of conditions established by the contract, as well as the state of obligation fulfilment by his contractor. - Cost-effectiveness: a smart contract represents a mechanism for which it is irrelevant where the contracting parties are located, and what the geographical distance between them is; therefore, it is very suitable for a cross-border business cooperation, and on the other hand, costs that would be inevitable when concluding a contract, as well as cost incurred for the purpose of realisation of a classic contract would be eliminated, meaning that with the use of a smart contract new models of business cooperation would be enabled. - Security: is one of the major advantages of a smart contract, because the content of the contract is encrypted and split into blocks in a blockchain, thus the contract is immutable, which is at the same time one of the basic performances of a smart contract and also a reason why persons - especially when it comes to contractors who have not previously built mutual trust - choose to conclude such contract. - Contract autonomy: after its conclusion, a smart contract is independent from the contractors, that is, its integrity is untouchable and it will be executed exactly as it was programmed - precise definition of the contract 119 Darko Radić, Dejan Pilipović content prevents ambiguities and disputes,30 which, in conjunction with the previous advantage of a smart contract, represent a crucial reason why persons choose this contracting modality. b) Disadvantages: - Lack of legal regulation: it has already been said in the introductory section of the paper that the regulation of electronic contracts represent a great challenge for legislators, and the situation with smart contracts is even more drastic, therefore today there are only few legislations that have clear and precise rules to be applied specifically to these contracts, which limits their applicability - especially given that some classical contract law institutes (positive and comparative) are not applicable or the concept of a smart contract is in collision with them. - System vulnerability to hacking attacks: Despite the good sides of a smart contract electronic architecture, it is clear that the system is not perfect itself and it cannot be excluded that some third party may access data in an illicit manner, which is best evidenced by hacking attacks to various platforms. - Inflexibility: a smart contract is programmed in advance and it will function flawlessly with respect to all predicted (assigned) parameters, but it is not a suitable tool to take into account all the circumstances of a particular case (contractor status and behaviour and other events affecting the contractual relationship), which will be possible with the commencement of application of advanced artificial intelligence. - Immutability and irreversibility of contract: on the one hand, the inability to influence the content of the contract and its realisation (which was programmed in advance and thus automated) can be advantage, but on the other hand, this may be disadvantage of a smart contract as well, because unlike other contracts, contractors’ capabilities are here limited and a particular problem may arise if an error during realisation of the contract occurs (for which no contractor is responsible of course). - Anonymity: with smart contracts, anonymity of one or both contractors is possible, because cryptographic signatures are used, and with the use of cryptocurrency, there can be a room for various illicit transactions (money laundering, arms or narcotics trade, etc.). 30 Raskin, “The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts”, 321-322; Cohn, West, and Parker, “Smart After All”, 281. 120 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 3. A SMART CONTRACT AND APPLICATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE A smart contract, in terms of the current state of blockchain technology development and the capacity of platforms for this technology, has certain limits. A smart contract architecture is basically based on an „if-then“ construction, by oracle monitoring and verifying the external parameters involved in the contract and granting the approval to execute the transaction once the parameters have been reached.31 Abstracting the shortcomings previously described, it is evident that the functioning of a smart contract we recognise today is possible only when it comes to clearly specified and objectified facts that, as triggers, initiate its execution, that is, performance of one or more transactions. Therefore, a smart contract represents simply a set of rules programmed in advance, therefore a problem may arise when some other facts that do not have the above described qualities, i.e. the circumstances of a particular case, are also involved in a particular situation. This is especially a case when it is necessary to evaluate contractors’ conduct in terms of applying appropriate legal standards («acted reasonably», «could have known», «was aware of», etc.), or when it is necessary to make a decision regarding valuation - and not only pure validation – of certain facts („usual term“, „forgone benefit“, „amount of compensation“, etc.). We believe that this shortage of smart contract will be removed with the development and application of artificial intelligence. The use of advanced artificial intelligence will allow a smart contract to «live independently», by allowing the software to evaluate the circumstances of a particular case, evaluate certain contractors’ behaviours, make decisions on suspending some or introducing other clauses etc. In other words, a smart contract will overcome the automation phase and move into the level of autonomy, which implies that software (whose part is also a contract) can learn through experience, modify given instructions, create its own instructions and actually make decisions.32 On the other hand, artificial intelligence in the future, at least there are such expectations, will be able to be «filled» with various data that would serve it based on «imported experience» or «own experience» (from previously concluded and realised transactions) to make decisions independently on which the execution of the contract will depend, that is, the rights and obligations 31 Cohn, West, and Parker, “Smart After All”, 283. 32 See Tom Allen and Robin Widdison, „Can Computer Makes Contracts?“, Harward Journal of Law & Technology 9, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 27. 121 Darko Radić, Dejan Pilipović of contracting parties. If and when this happens, there will undoubtedly be a number of legal issues, from the collision of such contract architecture with classical institutes and general contract law rules, toward the problem of artificial intelligence subjectivity, to the model of creating and applying specific legal rules to other problems that the application of artificial intelligence implies. Artificial intelligence will be important in „searching for“ contractors and concluding a contract, its realisation, but also in resolving disputes arising between the contracting parties. 4. SMART CONTRACT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA / B&H AND IN THE WORLD? 4.1. Are smart contracts explicitly regulated in positive law? Most states do not have regulations (either general or specific) that explicitly contain legal norms for smart contracts (based on blockchain technology). However, exceptions are possible. In Arizona law (USA), cryptographic signatures, based on blockchain technology, have the legal power of an electronic signature. Also, a record, that is a document, or a contract based on blockchain technology is considered an electronic form and has the character of an electronic record that is document. Validity, legal effect or enforceability cannot be denied to a contract, solely because it contains a smart contract clause, thus smart contracts are expressly permitted.33 Similar provisions are contained in the law of the State of Nevada (USA).34 The law of Vermont state (USA) prescribes a rebuttable presumption of the validity of a contract based on blockchain technology.35 Some other US states have gone toward enabling smart contracts, that is, blockchain technology, either in the form of actual legal implementation (Tennessee, Florida, Nebraska), or in the form of research projects (Hawaii, Illinois).36 Nebraska has a legislation that regulates virtual currencies.37 33 Gilcrest and Carvalho, „Smart Contracts“, 3280. 34 Gilcrest and Carvalho, „Smart Contracts“, 3280. 35 Gilcrest and Carvalho, „Smart Contracts“, 3280. 36 „Blockchain State Legislation“, National Conference of State Legislatures, accessed February 17, 2020, https:// www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/the-fundamentals-of-risk-management-and-insurance-viewed-through-the-lens-of-emerging-technology-webinar.aspx. 37 „Blockchain State Legislation“. 122 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova At the European Union level, there is no regulation dealing with blockchain technology and smart contracts other than the European Commission project aimed at regulating blockchain technology frameworks.38 In 2019, Italy introduced specific legislation on smart contracts. It has acknowledged legal validity and enforceability of smart contracts by defining them and providing that a smart contract fulfils the requirement of a written form if this form is required by the law.39 In 2016, Sweden started with realisation of a project referring to the use of smart contracts based on blockchain technology in real estate sales and entering into real estate register, motivated by the reliability and promptness provided by this technology, so that in 2018, the entire transaction was successfully completed on this platform.40 In Belarus, the assumption was introduced according to which it is considered that anyone who concludes a smart contract understands its terms.41 The regulations of the Republic of Srpska and B&H, as well as surrounding countries, do not explicitly regulate smart contracts and related phenomena. As far as it is known, the specific rules inherent by smart contracts currently are not at the forefront of the legislature’s intervention either in the surrounding countries or in our country. 4.2. Is the use of smart contracts indirectly possible? Until provision of answer to this question, we will use the views of A. Cohn, T. West, and C. Parker. These authors believe that the US federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act - “ESIGN” and the laws of the federal states based on the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act - “UETA” enable the implementation of smart contracts based on a blockchain.42 They base their view on the provisions of the aforementioned acts which stipulate that there is a possibility of concluding a contract electronically, that an electronic document or electronic signature will not be legally invalid only because they are in electronic form, and that the same legal power is recognised to electronic document and electronic signature as it is in case of written docu38 Jelena Mamut, “Possibilities and dangers of using smart contracts” (graduate thesis, University of Split, 2019), 32-33, fn. 76. 39 Mateja Durovic and Franciszek Lech, “The Enforceability of Smart Contracts”, The Review of the Kopaonik School of Natural Law, no. 1 (2019): 81-82. see Italian Law No 12/2019 in relation to the Law Decree No 135/2018 (Decreto Semplificazioni). Stefania Lucchetti, „Italian law gives legal value to blockchain and smart contracts“, Law Cross Border, March 11, 2019, accessed February 17, 2020, https://lawcrossborder.com/2019/03/11/italianlaw-gives-legal-value-to-blockchain-and-smart-contracts/. 40 „Land Administration“, ChromaWay, accessed February 17, 2020, https://chromaway.com/landregistry/. 41 Durovic and Lech, “The Enforceability of Smart Contracts”, 81. 42 Cohn, West, and Parker, “Smart After All”, 273. 123 Darko Radić, Dejan Pilipović ment or a handwritten signature.43 In order to see whether this view can be implemented in our law, three issues need to be considered: (a) the contract in electronic form, (b) the electronic signature and (c) the electronic document. The norms on electronic business (so-called electronic environment) in our country are included in separate laws.44 Similar rules are contained in laws of the countries from the region, and have been created by the implementation of international legal instruments. The general rules of obligation law of the Republic of Srpska, as well as of the former Yugoslav states, are based on the Yugoslav Law on Obligations (ZOO).45 When it comes to the general institutes of obligation (contract) law, they are confronted with the concept of a smart contract. Thus, the ability of contracting parties to conclude a contract cannot be tested when concluding smart contracts.46 Smart contracts may have problems with consumer protection rules, with the enforcement of a defects clause or defects liability clause47, with occurring changed circumstances, reasons for nullity, or change of regulations, with legal principles and standards (e.g. execution in good faith, care of a good host or businessman, etc.)48, interpretation of the contract by the court49, etc. The most optimal use of smart contracts is possible with unambiguous contractual situations and clauses50, or with clauses on condition or deadline, or on contractual penalties, etc. Issues that may arise can be re43 Cohn, West, and Parker, “Smart After All”, 287. 44 The Law on Electronic Business of the Republic of Srpska (Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska, No. 59/09 and 33/16), The Law on Electronic Signature of the Republic of Srpska (Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska, No. 106/15 and 83/19), The Law on Electronic Document of the Republic of Srpska (Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska, No. 106/15), The Law on Electronic, Legal and Business Transport of B&H (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 88/07), The Law on Electronic Signature (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 91/06) and the Law on Electronic Document (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 58/14). 45 The Law on Obligations (Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89, 57/89 and the Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska, No. 17/93, 3/96, 39/03, 74/04); Law on Obligations (Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89 and 57/89, Official Gazette of the RB&H, No. 2/92, 13/93, 13/94, Official Gazette of the FB&H, no. 29/03 and 14/11); The Law on Obligations (Official Gazette of SFRY, No. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89 - Decision of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia and 57/89, Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 31/93 and Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro, No. 1/2003 - Constitutional Charter); The Law on Obligations (Official Gazette No. 35/05, 41/08, 125/11, 78/15 and 29/18); The Law on Obligations (Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 47/08, 04/11 and 22/17); Obligations Code (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 83/01, 32/04, 28/06, 29/07, 40/07, 97/07, 64/16, or Obligations Code - Official Consolidated Text - OZ, Official Gazette of the RS, No. 97/07, 64/16 – Decision of the Constitutional court and 20/18); The Law on Obligations (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No. 18/01, 78/01, 04/02, 59/02, 05/03, 84/08, 81/09, 161/09, 23/13 and 123 / 13). 46 Kevin Werbach and Nicolas Cornell, “Contracts Ex Machina”, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 67 (2017): 371-372. 47 Stark, „Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts“. 48 Maren K. Woebbeking, “The Impact of Smart Contracts on Traditional Concepts of Contract Law”, Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Electronic Commerce Law (JIPITEC) 10, no. 1 (2019): 110, https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-10-1-2019/4880/JIPITEC_10_1_2019_106_Woebbeking. 49 Woebbeking, “The Impact of Smart Contracts on Traditional Concepts of Contract Law”, 110-111. 50 Woebbeking, “The Impact of Smart Contracts on Traditional Concepts of Contract Law”, 110. 124 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova solved through the court, by concluding a subsequent agreement between the contracting parties, by out-of-court dispute resolution (including on line resolution), but also by the application of artificial intelligence in the field of administration of justice.51 a) Electronic contract form The domestic, Serbian, Slovenian and Macedonian Laws on Obligations do not contain (in the part of the law that regulates contracts form) provisions on the electronic form of contracts, not to mention on smart contracts. However, the Croatian Law on Obligations (Article 293), as well as Article 67 of the Montenegrin Law on Obligations, within the part of the law regulating the contract form, contain rules on the conclusion of contracts electronically. The planned or future obligation codes in B&H, Serbia and Northern Macedonia contain certain rules for the conclusion of contracts electronically.52 When it comes to special regulations, Article 3. Paragraph 1 Item 1 e) of the Law on Electronic Commerce of the Republic of Srpska defines contracts in electronic form. This law permits their conclusion53 and stipulates that the contract cannot be contested legal validity due to the fact that it was drawn up in the form of an electronic message, that is, in an electronic form.54 Thus, our law also contains similar postulates on conclusion of contracts electronically, as American law does. But is that enough? When it comes to form of the contract, in the legal theory of the states formed by the breakup of SFRY, there are wanderings and opting regarding thinking about the electronic form of the contract as an independent form or a subset of already known contract forms.55 This question is of a theoretical character and it is a matter of convention how something would be called, and it is de facto discussed in legal 51 On the inadmissibility of the full replacement of judges by systems of artificial intelligence in the domain of judicial power. See more Igor Milinkovic, “Artificial Intelligence and the Judiciary: Promises and Risks of Implementation”, Yearbook of the Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka, no. 41 (2019): 85–100. It is possible to make certain assumptions or shift the burden of proof when resolving disputes. Martin Fries, “Smart Contracts: Brauchen schlaue Verträge noch Anwälte? Zusammenspiel von Smart Contracts mit dem Beweismittelrecht der ZPO”, in Anwaltsblatt (Deutscher Anwaltverein, 2018), 90. 52 See Art. 78 paragraph 5. Draft Law on Obligations of FB&H/RS prepared by the Working Group as of 2003, Article 68, paragraph 5. Proposal of the Law on Obligations, which was not adopted by the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of B&H 10.02.2010. , Article 835 Paragraph 4. Proposal of the Law on Obligations in the Northern Macedonia, published in 2019 and Article 220 Paragraph 5. Working text of the Civil Code of the Republic of Serbia. 53 Art. 7 Paragraph 1 of the Law on Electronic Business of RS. 54 Art. 7 Paragraph 3 of the Law on Electronic Business of RS. 55 Tin Matic, “The Electronic Form of Contracts and Documents - A New Form?”, Code of the Faculty of Law in Zagreb 56, no. 1 (2006): 172 - 173, 177 - 179, 181 - 182. Sanja Radovanovic and Nikolina Miscevic, “On the Electronic Form of Contracts in Domestic Law”, Collection of works of the Faculty of Law in Novi Sad, no. 4 (2018): 1650. 125 Darko Radić, Dejan Pilipović theory and legislation about the electronic form of contracts. The electronic form of the contract should be legislated in the general law on obligations (ZOO), as it was done in Article 293 of the Croatian Law on Obligations, Article 67 of the Montenegrin ZOO, or Paragraph 126a of the German Civil Code (BGB). Electronic contracts are only the starting point for comparison with smart contracts and eventually some kind of ground; in certain sense they both have a common underlying electronic architecture. b) Electronic signature Prima faciae does not have to mean that our electronic business, electronic signature and document regulations are incompatible with the concept of smart contracts and blockchain technology; they are well suited especially when it comes to general provisions. However, some provisions will be inappropriate. General rules for the recognition of legal (qualified) power to electronic signature and document and the possibility of its valid use in proceedings and legal traffic exist in our law.56 Under US law, an electronic signature is an electronic sound, symbol, or process associated or logically allied to a record, by the person intending to sign the document. Our solution is somewhat more restrictive in understanding electronic documents and electronic signatures, but provides greater reliability and security. A positive regulation, unlike the US one, distinguishes between electronic and qualified electronic signature, which is relied on the EU law. Qualified electronic signature is based on encryption technology through so-called double keys (public and private keys) issued by certification bodies of commercial or governmental character. Cryptographic keys are also used in smart contracts. Blockchain technology may also be eligible to enable more advanced types of electronic signatures. Qualified electronic signature, by positive law, is an electronic signature that is exclusively associated with the signatory, reliably identifies the signatory, is created using the means that the signatory can independently manage, which are exclusively under control of the signatory and directly linked to data to which it relates to, in a way that unambiguously provides an insight into any change of the original data.57 While it might allow, for example, the inability to change (original) data, blockchain technology is characterized by an inability to manage and control original data by particular entity. A smart contract cryptographic keys are 56 See Article 5 and Art. 6 Paragraph 1 and 2 of the Law on Electronic Signature of the RS and Article 7 of the Law on Electronic Document of the RS. 57 Article 4 of the Law on Electronic Signature of the RS. 126 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova generated by independent software „wallets“ where they are stored, and not by the government body.58 Even though these cryptographic keys may serve to contract authentication, in terms of smart contracts contracting parties can still be anonymous without prior identifying the contractor the by the blockchain platform,59 which contradicts the requirement for exclusive connectivity with the signatory and the reliability of signatory identification in terms of qualified electronic signature. Smart contracts can have a problem with accessibility for parties (accessing and storing the content) and security of identification.60 However, since blockchain is intended in a way that is not possible to influence and control its system directly, how to understand the issues of who would monitor that system, but also who would be responsible for its functioning, as well as the accuracy of the data, which can be anticipated as a requirement from regulations governing so-called electronic environment. Certification bodies (issuing qualified electronic signatures) are required to report the commencement of work to the competent ministry, which gives them authorization to work, and they have certain obligations related to identification of users61, and they are subject to (inspection) supervision.62 c) Electronic document In American law, an electronic record is defined as a record created, made, sent, exchanged, received or stored by an electronic mean or source.63 However, in our law, the term electronic document also contains additional formal qualifications (identification of the author, credibility of the content and proof of the time when it was made).64 All actions used in the application and traffic of an electronic document may use any available and usable information and communication technology (which would obviously imply to the use of a blockchain as well), which must ensure adequate protection of personal data. In addition, there must be an ability to verify the authenticity, originality and immutability of the electronic document65, without excluding the potentials of the blockchain platform. Here again, a blockchain does not recognise the 58 Durovic and Lech, “The Enforceability of Smart Contracts”, 85. 59 Durovic and Lech, “The Enforceability of Smart Contracts”, 85 i 87. 60 Durovic and Lech, “The Enforceability of Smart Contracts”, 91. 61 Article 26 par. 1-3. the Law on Electronic Signature of the RS. 62 Article 20-22, 30, 34-35. The Law on Electronic Signature of the RS. 63 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (1999), With Prefatory Note And Comments (Chicago, 1999), 5, 9-11, http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/ Transactions/ueta.pdf. 64 Article 4. par. 1 of the Law on Electronic Document of the RS. 65 Article 12 of the Law on Electronic Document of the RS. 127 Darko Radić, Dejan Pilipović concept of supervision by public authorities unlike the legal resolution on inspection supervision. Perhaps this will not be incompatible with one another in the future. It is difficult to imagine in domestic legal and judicial practice that the application of some new legal institutes or phenomena will be accepted by extensive interpretation of existing legal norms, hence it is necessary to explicitly regulate the application of what is desired in legal practice, if the circumstances for regulating a new legal phenomena have matured. CONCLUSION A smart contract, as a kind of advanced form of electronic contract, has numerous advantages and great potential in terms of its use, and application of the advanced artificial intelligence can make it an extremely effective mechanism for exchange of goods and services globally. A smart contract does not exist as a legal category in domestic law - there are no specific rules regulating this type of contract, nor is the use of cryptocurrency legally sanctioned. Some of the features of smart contracts, such as blockchain technology which is based on a decentralised model without a possibility of supervision, payment means (most often cryptocurrencies), anonymity and irreversibility of execution, as well as inability to modify a contract after its execution, influence the smart contract to meet a number of difficulties in our law. International (relevant) instruments should be consulted, which should include in the future the legal sanctioning of cryptocurrencies, artificial intelligence and similar phenomena related to smart contracts and electronic business in general. The development of electronic business regulation is the foundation on which the legal framework for the smart contract and digital currencies should be created. In this regard, the best comparative legislative practices should be worth waiting. Electronic business regulations, especially electronic signatures and documents, need to be more flexible if recognition of smart contracts is considered. The law does not yet have a crystallized complete set of rules for smart contracts and solutions to all potential problems. 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Werbach, Kevin, and Nicolas Cornell. “Contracts Ex Machina.” Duke Law Journal, Vol. 67 (2017): 313-382. 35. Woebbeking, Maren. “The Impact of Smart Contracts on Traditional Concepts of Contract Law.” Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Electronic Commerce Law (JIPITEC) 10, no. 1 (2019): 106-113. https:// www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-10-1-2019/4880/JIPITEC_10_1_2019_106_ Woebbeking. 36. The Law on Obligations (Official Gazette of SFRJ, no. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89, 57/89 and Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska, no. 17/93, 3/96, 39/03, 74/04). 37. The Law on Obligations (Official Gazette of SFRJ, no. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89 and 57/89, Official Gazette of RB&H, no. 2/92, 13/93, 13/94, Official Gazette of FB&H, no. 29/03 and 14/11). 38. The Law on electronic commerce (Official Gazette, no. 173/03). 39. The Law on electronic commerce and electronic signatures (Official Gazette, no. 57/00). 40. The Law on electronic document (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 58/14). 41. The Law on electronic document of the Republic of Srpska (Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska, no. 106/15). 131 Darko Radić, Dejan Pilipović 42. The Law on electronic business of the Republic of Srpska (Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska, no. 59/09 i 33/16). 43. The Law on electronic signature (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 91/06). 44. The Law on electronic signature of the Republic of Srpska (Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska, no. 106/15 i 83/19). 45. The Law on electronic, legal and business traffic in B&H (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 88/07). 46. The Law on Obligations (Official Gazette of Montenegro, no. 47/08, 04/11 i 22/17). 47. The Law on Obligations (Official Gazette of SFRJ, no. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89 – Decision of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia and 57/89, Official Gazette of SRJ, no. 31/93 and Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro no. 1/2003 – Constitutional Charter). 48. The Law on Obligations (Official Gazette, no. 35/05, 41/08, 125/11, 78/15 i 29/18). 49. The Law on Obligations (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, no. 18/01, 78/01, 04/02, 59/02, 05/03, 84/08, 81/09, 161/09, 23/13 and 123/13). 132 Original scientific paper UDK PRENATALNA ZAŠTITA PRAVA LIČNOSTI Radenko Jotanović1 Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci Apstrakt: U modernoj građanskoj jurisprudenciji nesporno je da začeto, a nerođeno dijete (začetak) ima određenu (ograničenu, djelimičnu, uslovnu) pravnu sposobnost, ali ne postoji opšta saglasnost oko obima te sposobnosti i vremenskog momenta njenog sticanja. Ovo pitanje se posebno apostrofira u odnosu na prenatalna neimovinska prava (prava ličnosti) koja su samo djelimično zaštićena u pojedinim lex specialis zakonima, dok su prenatalna imovinska (nasljedna) prava potpuno zaštićena institutom nasciturusa. Zbog toga je potrebno uspostaviti integralnu pravnu zaštitu začetka, tj. ustanoviti jedinstven sistem građanskopravne zaštite njegovih imovinskih i neimovinskih prava od istog vremenskog momenta i u istom obimu. Postoji nekoliko stanovišta u pogledu pravne sposobnosti začetka (in vivo i in vitro) i sa njom povezanog pravnog položaja infans conceptus-a kao preduslova (građansko)pravne zaštite prava ličnosti: 1. da se ovdje radi o stvari, tj. objektu prava, 2. da ovi entiteti imaju opštu pravnu sposobnost i 3. kompromisno stanovište prema kojem je u pitanju posebna, sui generis pravna kategorija. Najširu primjenu ima kompromisno rješenje prema kojem pravni subjektivitet nastaje od samog začeća (pa čak i ranije) od kojeg momenta se vrši i stepenovanje (gradiranje) prava, da bi se rođenjem djetete stekla potpuna pravna sposobnost koju imaju sva fizičkog lica kao subjekti prava. Ključne riječi: pravni subjektivitet, (prenatalna) pravna sposobnost, začetak, prava ličnosti, (bio)medicinski ogledi 1 Vanredni profesor 133 Radenko Jotanović UVOD: PRAVNA SPOSOBNOST FIZIČKIH LICA Fizička lica (zajedno sa pravnim licima) kao subjekti građanskopravnih odnosa2 imaoci su pravne sposobnosti. Ona personalizuju građanskopravne odnose.3 Imati pravnu sposobnost znači biti subjekat „pravnih obaveza i subjektivnih prava“,4 odnosno to je zakonom priznata sposobnost biti subjekat prava i pravne dužnosti5. Pojam subjekta prava stvorila je pravna nauka na osnovu analize pravnih normi.6 Fizička lica nisu subjekti prava dok im to svojstvo ne odredi pravni poredak, tj. tvorevina su pravnog poretka i predstavljaju pravnu kategoriju. Suprotno tome, životinje, životna sredina (priroda) i drugi entiteti nisu eksplicitni subjekti prava ali im pravni poredak priznaje određeni (ograničeni) pravni subjektivetet.7 Fizičko lice je svaki živi čovjek - ljudsko biće, pripadnik ljudske vrste, ljudska jedinka. Međutim, pojmovi „fizičko lice“ i „čovjek“ su dva različita pojma i rezultat dva različita načina posmatranja: „Fizička materijalnost nije isto što i ličnost u pravu“8. Čovjek je biološki i fiziološki pojam, dok je fizičko lice kao subjekt prava pojam prava i pravne nauke. Pravo uzima u obzir i određene biološke i fiziološke karakteristike čovjeka da bi izgradilo pojam fizičkog lica kao subjekta prava pa se tako uzima da rođenje predstavlja trenutak nastanka pravne ličnosti, a smrt trenutak njenog prestanka. Ali momenat početka i kraja ljudskog života nije nužno vezan za momenat početka i prestanka njegove pravne zaštite jer je ljudski život „stvar“ medicinske nauke, a njegova zaštita „stvar“ prava i pravne nauke. Ni jedna, ni druga nauka nisu u potpunosti pružile tražene odgovore, a razlog tome su i pomijeranja granica 2 Za fizička lica kao subjekte prava, odnosno subjekte građanskopravnih odnosa koriste se različiti nazivi: persone (personae), lica, imaoci prava, nosioci prava, pravni subjekti, pravne jedinice, (pravni) entiteti, ličnosti u pravu, vidi: Ilija Babić i Radenko Jotanović, Građansko pravo, Knjiga 1: Uvod u građansko pravo (Banja Luka: Univerzitet u Banjoj Luci, Pravni fakultet, 2018), 87. 3 Radmila Kovačević-Kuštrimović i Miroslav Lazić, Uvod u građansko pravo (Niš, 2008), 107. 4 Hans Kelzen, Opšta teorija prava i države (Beograd, 1998), 150. 5 Toma Živanović, Sintetička filozofija prava I (Beograd, 1959), 277. 6 Dušan Nikolić, Uvod u sistem građanskog prava (Novi Sad: Pravni fakultet, Centar za izdavačku delatnost, 2014), 152. 7 Tako npr. doneseni su Zakon o zaštiti i dobrobiti životinja, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 25/09 i 9/18 i Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 118/08 kojima je definisan drugačiji pristup u odnosu između ljudi i životinja prema kojem životinje nisu samo interes čovjeka, već imaju i svoje sopstvene interese. Slično je i u odnosu čovjeka prema životnoj sredini gdje se sve više prihvata ekocentrični umjesto antropocentričnog koncepta prema kojem „čovjek ima pravo na zdravu životnu sredinu, ali i životna sredina ima pravo na čovjeka zdrave ekološke svijesti“, v. Radenko Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti (Banja Luka: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci, 2016), 363-387. 8 Lazar Marković, Građansko pravo, Knjiga prva: Opšti deo i stvarno pravo (Beograd: „Narodna samouprava“ a.d., 1927), 97. 134 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova početka/prestanka života u skladu sa neprestalnim razvojem (bio)medicine koju pravna nauka treba da prati.9 Pravna sposobnost je jedna od pretpostavki pravnog subjektiviteta koji u širem smislu predstavlja ukupan pravni položaj/status lica u građanskom pravu i obuhvata još i poslovnu sposobnost, deliktnu sposobnost i procesnu sposobnost.10 Priznata je fizičkim licima da bi mogla učestovati u pravnim poslovima i imati prava i obaveze - neko apsolutno ili obligaciono pravo. Fizičko lice koje ima prava i obaveze je, dakle, pravni subjekat i postoji jedino ako „...ima obaveze i prava; van toga, subjekat uopšte ne postoji“11. Savremeni pravni poreci ne isključuju niti ograničavaju sticanje pravnog subjektiviteta pojedinim kategorijama lica pa tako sva ona imaju opštu pravnu sposobnost koja je za sve ista, po obimu i po kvalitetu.12 Pravna sposobnost ne zavisi od sposobnosti za rasuđivanje i volje fizičkog lica, kao i od činjenice da li postupa samostalno ili je zastupano od strane zastupnika. Postojanje pravne sposobnosti je pretpostavka za nastanak poslovne sposobnosti koja se ispoljava upravo u mogućnosti fizičkog lica da svojom voljom preduzima pravne radnje i time proizvodi određena pravna dejstva. Za razliku od pravne sposobnosti, obim poslovne sposobnosti je kod pojedinih kategorija lica, zbog njihovog uzrasta i drugih svojstava, nejednak tako da pored kategorije „opšta poslovna sposobnost“ ili „neograničena (puna) poslovna sposobnost“, postoje i posebni oblici poslovne sposobnosti. Dakle, poslovna sposobnost se stiče postepeno (stupnjevito, po fazama) u zavisnosti od psihofizičke zrelosti i sposobnosti za rasuđivanje, karakterističnih za određeno životno doba čovjeka.13 1. PRAVNI SUBJEKTIVITET ZAČETKA Pravna sposobnost fizičkih lica postoji između dva ekstrema – rođenja i smrti, ali oba ova momenta su sporna. U jurisprudenciji ne postoji jedinstven stav o momentu početka ljudskog života i ljudske ličnosti, kao i o njihovom prestanku, ali se uzima da fizičko lice nastaje ako je rođeno, pokazuje znake života, a potiče od muškarca i žene.14 Ali, nesporno je da određenu pravnu 9 Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti, 122. 10 Nikolić, Uvod u sistem građanskog prava, 250. 11 Kelzen, Opšta teorija prava i države, 151-152. 12 Kovačević-Kuštrimović i Lazić, Uvod u građansko pravo, 109. 13 Nikolić, Uvod u sistem građanskog prava, 257. 14 Po jednom mišljenju, rođenje nije okončano izlaskom začetka iz utrobe majke nego se zahtijeva i presjecanje pupčane vrpce [Milan Bartoš, Osnovi privatnog prava (Beograd, bez godine), 25; Boris Vizner, Građansko 135 Radenko Jotanović sposobnost ima i začetak (nasciturus, infas conceptus),15 pa i „ljudski genetski materijal“ prije začeća (nondum conceptus). Još je rimsko pravo konstruisalo tzv. fikciju nasciturusa prema kojoj se začeto dijete smatra kao već rođeno ako su u pitanju njegova nasljedna prava.16 Ovo pravilo preuzeto je u savremenim pravnim porecima pa tako i u našem Zakonu o nasljeđivanju17. Razvoj novih (bio)medicinskih tehnologija omogućio je tzv. posthumnu reprodukciju (začeće post mortem). To prevazilazi postojeće zakonske okvire jer se kao nasljednik može pojaviti i posthumno začeto dijete pa je neophodno proširiti pravilo o nasciturusu i na slučajeve začeća i rođenja djece nakon smrti ostavioca.18 Pored toga, ono što ostavlja prostor za diskusiju jeste (ne)opravdanost primjene instituta nasciturusa samo u imovinskom građanskom pravu, odnosno razmatranje mogućnosti proširenja pravnog subjektiviteta začetka i na neimovinski dio građanskog prava, a to su prava ličnosti. Sa razvojem prava i pravne nauke u XX vijeku dolazi i do proširenja pravnog subjektiviteta začetka, prvenstveno zauzimanjem stanovišta prema kojem i začetak ima „određenu“, „smanjenu“, „ograničenu“, „djelimičnu“, „uslovnu“ ili sličnu pravnu sposobnost.19 Postoji nekoliko stanovišta u pogledu pravnog statusa začetka: začetak kao svar, objekat prava svojine; začetak kao subjekat prava i začetak kao posebna sui generis kategorija. Uglavnom je prihvaćeno ovo treće stanovište jer začetak nije ni objekat prava svojine, ali još uvijek nema ni pravni subjektivitet u punom kapacitetu pa je potebno razlikovati pojedine faze u nastanku i razvoju začetka, tj. gradirati (stepenovati) začetak i u zavisnosti od toga vršiti i gradaciju prava koja mu pripadaju.20 pravo u teoriji i praksi (Zagreb, 1962), 37; Mihajlo Vuković, Opći dio građanskog prava (Zagreb, 1959), 241]. Prema drugom mišljenju, za nastanak fizičkog lica zahtijeva se da je pupčana vrpca presječena v. Mihajlo Mitić, Fizičko lice – odrednica u EIP, Tom I (Beograd, 1978), U rimskom pravu su neki pisci zahtijevali da se dijete mora oglasiti plačem, a u španskom pravu da dijete po rođenju živi najmanje 24 časa. Francuski građanski zakonik (§ 725) zahtijeva da začetak bude rođen vitalan, a Srpski građanski zakonik (§ 36) da ima čovječji oblik. 15 Pored naziva „začetak“ koriste se i drugi nazivi: „ljudski zametak“, „plod“, „fetus“, „embrion“. 16 Lat. „Nasciturus pro iam nato habetur, quotiens de commodis ipsius partus quaeritur.“ 17 Prema čl. 148, st. 2 Zakona o nasljeđivanju, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 1/09, 55/09 i 91/16: „Dijete već začeto u trenutku otvaranja nasljeđa smatra se kao rođeno ako se rodi živo.“ 18 Dragica Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta (Kragujevac, 2009), 153-164. 19 Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti, 318-319. 20 Nenad Tešić, „Ljudski život in statu nascenti – pitanje svojine ili ograničenog pravnog subjektiviteta,“ Novo porodično zakonodavstvo, Zbornik radova sa savjetovanja u Vrnjačkoj Banji (Oktobar 2006): 337. 136 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 2. NASTANAK PRAVNOG SUBJEKTIVITETA ZAČETKA Prihvatanje stanovišta prema kojem se začetak smatra kao stvar, objekat prava svojine, implicira da se pravni subjektivitet fizičkih lica stiče tek momentom rođenja. Od momenta začeća pa do momenta rođenja „…u pitanju je samo „gomila ćelija“ obdarena biološkim životom nasuprot ljudskog, pa kao takav ne zaslužuje još uvek zaštitu i može biti žrtvovan. Ono što se mora poštovati nije život sam po sebi - biološki život, već živa ljudska ličnost (čovek)“.21 U skladu sa tim, začetak se smatra sastavnim dijelom tijela žene koja bez ograničenja, pravom na abortus, odlučuje o njegovom „pravu na život“, dok se povreda začetka od strane trećih lica smatra povredom fizičkog integriteta žene.22 Suprotno prethodnom stajalištu jeste da začetak ima pravni subjektivitet i da ljudski život, u stvari, započinje začećem jer je već tad „...određena genetska šifra ljudskog života, koja je različita od genetske šifre svih drugih živih bića“,23 tj. genetski kod mu je humanoidni (homo sapiens), a ne npr. ježev koji će rezultovati rođenjem ježa24. „Oplođenjem je dato sve što spada u čovečije biće: bitnost, oblik, različitost od majke, telesna i duhovna građa (njihova vrsta i jačina), temperament i karakter, identitet sa samim sobom i sudbina“.25 Prenatalna26 pravna sposobnost, mutatis mutandis, omogućuje začetku samostalno ostvarivanje svih prava iz korpusa prava na fizički integritet koje ima i rođeno dijete.27 To uključuje pravo na život začetka koje se suprostavlja pravu na abortus žene, a svaka vrsta povrede prouzrokovana od strane trećih lica smatra se povredom nekog prava na fizički integritet začetka. Tako npr. začetak ima (ljudsko) dostojanstvo i nije neophodno da li je neko svjestan svog dostojanstva ili nije i da li ga može zaštiti, već da društvo shvata da on zaslužuje određenu pravnu zaštitu.28 Socijalne funkcije, uključujući i pravne, ne mogu biti u suprotnosti sa biološkom realnosti, a to je da pravo na život počinje singamijom kad nastaje „individualizovana genetska konstrukcija“ (conceptus) koja ima svoj kontinuum i identitet od samog početka tako „... 21 Zoran Ponjavić, Prekid trudnoće – pravni aspekti (Kragujevac, 1997), 87-88. 22 Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti, 241. 23 Vladimir Vodinelić, „Sto pedeset godina kasnije: šta je još živo u Srpskom građanskom zakoniku?,“ Zbornik radova: Sto pedeset godina od donošenja Srpskog građanskog zakonika (1844- 1994), (1996): 336. 24 Tonči Matulić, „Je li ljudski embrij osoba ili jež?,“ Vladavina prava, br. 6 (1999): 19. 25 H. Naujoks H, E.Wolf, Anfang und Ende der Rechtsffahigkeit des Menschen, Klosterman, Frankfurt a.m 1955, str. 144, navedeno prema: Jelena Simić, „Pravni problemi definisanja polja pravne zaštite nondum conceptusa-a,“ Strani pravni život, br. 3 (2018): 27. 26 Lat. prae natalis - prije roditi. 27 Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti, 117-172. 28 Jakov Radišić, „Eksperimenti na čovječijem embrionu koji je stvoren „in vitro“ – granice dopuštenog,“ Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, br. 4 (1992): 227-229. 137 Radenko Jotanović da je zapravo moguće priznati jednak pravni i moralni status nerođenim, kao i rođenim ljudima“.29 Međutim, između pravnog subjektiviteta začetka i pravnog subjektiviteta rođenog djeteta ne može se staviti znak jednakosti, odnosno ovdje vrijedi formula: pravna sposobnost začetka ≠ pravna sposobnost rođenog djeteta. U tom smislu, svoje opravdanje nalazi stanovište o začeku kao sui generis kategoriji. „Čovek je čovek od trenutka svoga zečeća“,30 a začetak nesumljivo „... treba da uživa pravnu zaštitu jer je vrednost koja to zaslužuje“31. Formiranje određenih dijelova tijela, nastanak moždanih funkcija, nidacija32 predstavljaju različite faze u razvoju začetka, a ne i sam početak ljudskog života i ljudske ličnosti. U stvari, embrionalni razvoj začetka prvenstevno utiče na obim pravnog subjektiviteta, a ne na njegov nastanak, tj. vrši se gradacija prava koja pripadaju začetku u različitim fazama njegovog razvoja.33 Priznanje bezuslovnog pravnog subjektiviteta začetku nije „realna opcija“ zato što bi to „... zahtevalo potpunu zaštitu prava na život deteta, uključujući i zaštitu od prava majke na prekid trudnoće“34. 3. NASTANAK PRAVNOG SUBJEKTIVITETA IN VITRO ZAČETKA Začetak nastaje spajanjem ženskih i muških polnih ćelija (fertilizacija, oplodnja) nakon čega se formira embrion, a ovaj medicinski fenomen može biti rezultat prirodne ili vještačke oplodnje. Vještačka oplodnja35 nije rezultat polnog odnosa već primjene određenih (bio)medicinskih metoda, pa tako razlikujemo dvije vrste ove oplodnje: „in vivo fertilization“ i „in vitro fertilization“36. Kod in vivo fertilizacije spajanje gameta (ženskih i muških polnih ćelija) se odvija u uterusu (tijelu žene) pa je tako nastao embrion 29 Dragan Dakić, „Izazovi evropskog regionalnog zakonodavstva na polju zaštite života“ (Doktorska disertacija, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Kragujevcu, 2016), 307 i dalje. 30 Laufs, A., u: Laufs/Uhlenbruck, Handbuch des Arztrechts, München, 1999., str. 881, navedeno prema: Jakov Radišić, „Pravna zaštita embriona u Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj,“ Pravni život, br. 9 (2000): 140. 31 Radišić, „Eksperimenti na čovečijem embrionu koji je stvoren „in vitro“ – granice dopuštenog,“ 236-237. 32 Simić, „Pravni problemi definisanja polja pravne zaštite nondum conceptusa-a,“ 26. 33 Tako je u Holandiji nastala teorija pod nazivom: „progresivna pravna zaštita embriona“ prema kojoj različite faze embriogeneze imaju različitu pravnu zaštitu, tako da „…embrion kako se razvija, postaje sve manje i manje stvar, a sve više i više osoba“, Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta, 24. 34 Kovačević-Kuštrimović i Lazić, Uvod u građansko pravo, 111. 35 Koriste se različiti nazivi: vještačko začeće, vantjelesna oplodnja, umjetna prokreacija, artificijelna fertilizacija (inseminacija), (bio)medicinski potpomognuta oplodnja, asistirana reprodukcija (fertilizacija), medicinski asistirano roditeljstvo, humana reprodukcija i dr. O adekvatnom nazivu, v. Slobodan Panov, „Pravo na roditeljstvo“ (Doktorska disertacija, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beograd, 1998), 14-15. 36 In vitro što znači: u staklu i fertilization što znači: oplodnja. 138 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova izjednačen u pogledu pravnog položaja (statusa) sa začetkom nastalim prirodnom oplodnjom. Ali kod in vitro fertilizacije do oplodnje dolazi van uterusa, tj. u epruveti (tzv. Petrijeva šolja) pa se postavlja pitanje pravnog položaja ovako nastalog začetka u odnosu na začetak in vivo? U principu, postoje tri stanovišta o pravnom položaju začetka in vitro. Prema prvom stajalištu in vitro začetak je stvar, objekat prava svojine jer se radi o „gomili ćelija“37 koje su kao takve proizvodi ljudskog tijela slično krvi i njenim produktima, koži, koštanoj srži, kosi, majčinom mlijeku. S obzirom na to da je u pitanju objekat prava svojine, ovdje postoje sva svojinska ovlašćenja: držanje, korištenje i raspolaganje, ali i određene specifičnosti jer se radi o složenoj stvari različitih titulara.38 Drugo stanovište uvažava in vitro začetak kao subjekat prava jer „...posjeduje sve genetske informacije neophodne da dovedu do rođenja novog čovjeka“39 tako da je to mnogo više od „gomile ćelija“. Izazov može biti samo određivanje momenta sticanja njihovog subjektiviteta: momenat fertilizacije, momenat segmentacije (14. dan poslije fertilizacije) kad začetak stiče neizmijenjenu individualnost (formiranje nervnog sistema i mogućnost osjećanja bola) ili neki drugi vremenski momenat. Treće stanovište se zasniva na kompromisu između prethodna dva te u skladu sa tim in vitro začetak predstavlja jedinstvenu, sui generis kategoriju. Uvažava se stav da in vitro začetak nosi potencijal ljudskog života, ali za razliku od in vivo začetka, in vitro začetak ima samo pasivni potencijal jer je nastanak ličnosti odložen do momenta prenošenja u uterus, ali to ne znači da treba prihvatiti različit standard njihove pravne zaštite. Osim u reproduktivne svrhe, istovremeno postoji mogućnost da se in vitro embrioni upotrijebi i u neke druge svrhe, npr. eksperimentalne40 gdje je potrebno razlikovati tzv. prekobrojne, od tzv. istraživačkih embriona jer je stvaranje ovih drugih strogo zabranjeno. S toga je neophodno utvrditi graničnu tačku između prava na život in vitro začetka i negacije tog prava u slučaju njihove upotrebe za (bio)medicinske oglede ili druge svrhe. 37 Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta, 147. 38 Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti, 335. 39 Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta, 147. 40 Mogućnost (zlo)upotrebe in vitro embriona se shvata i u kontekstu trgovine ljudima (ropstva) i genocida, Dakić, „Izazovi evropskog regionalnog zakonodavstva na polju zaštite života,“ 256 i dalje, 265 i dalje. 139 Radenko Jotanović 4. PRAVNI POLOŽAJ NONDUM CONCEPTUS-A Pored uvažavanja određenog pravnog statusa začetka (nasciturus-a, infans conceptus-a) postoje zahtijevi da se uvaže i određeni interesi djeteta prije začeća u slučaju tzv. nondum conceptus-a. Opravdanje za takve zahtijeve proističe iz činjenice da pojedini oblici prava na fizički integritet djeteta mogu biti povrijeđeni i prije začeća ukoliko budući roditelji, svojom ili tuđom krivicom, konzumiraju hemikalijma zatrovanu hranu, koriste nedovoljno ispitane medikamente, zaraze se HIV infekcijom, izlažu se jonizirajućem zračenju ili na drugi način mijenjaju genetsku strukturu reproduktivnih ćelija41. Istovremeno razvojem biotehnologije (humane genetike) sve više se vrše genetske intervencije (ogledi, eksperimenti, istraživanja) na genomima, tzv. genetski inžinjering sa ciljem promjene (poboljšanja) „genetskog koda“, što može dovesti i dovodi do genetskih manipulacija.42 S toga se postavlja pitanje mogućnosti proširenja pravnog subjektiviteta i na nondum conceptus, nezačeti ali potencijalni (očekivani) ljudski život. U skladu sa prethodno navedenim stanovištima u pogledu pravnog subjektiviteta začetka (in vivo i in vitro) čini nam se da isti princip možemo primijeniti i u slučaju nondum conceptus-a.43 Pošto ne postoji jedinstven stav u pogledu početka ljudskog života, odnosno momenta sticanja pravne sposobnosti, onda to pitanje spada u polje slobodne procjene (tzv. „margin of appreciation“) kako bi se uvažili interesi svih zainteresovanih učesnika u ovom procesu. U tom kontekstu možemo govoriti o stanovištu prema kojem nondum conceptus predstavlja stvar - specifičan objekat prava svojine na dijelovima ljudskog tijela koje nazivamo preembrioni (gameti, muške i ženske polne ćelije).44 Ovdje ne može biti govora o pravnoj sposobnosti „...jer ono što još nije ništa ne može biti „neko““,45 odnosno o neimovinskoj pravnoj sposobnosti pošto nema nikakvih prava ličnosti46. Suprotno ovom stanovištu, postoji shvatanja prema kojem pravni poredak može priznati ograničeni pravni subjektivitet i za nondum conceptus. Tako npr. može se govoriti o imovinskoj pravnoj spo41 Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta, 112-113. 42 Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti, 348-354. 43 Smatramo da u pogledu pravnog položaja (statusa), a suprotno medicinskom stanovištu, ne postoji neka značajnija razlika između još neoplođenih polnih ćelija (gameta, preembriona) i oplođenih polnih ćelija (začetka, embriona), bilo da se radi o in vivo ili in vitro oplođenim, odnosno neoplođenim polnim ćelijama. Razlika može biti samo u stepenu pravne zaštite: oplođene polne ćelije uživaju veći stepen pravne zaštite. 44 Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta, 143-147. 45 Simić, „Pravni problemi definisanja polja pravne zaštite nondum conceptusa-a,“ 29. 46 Vladimir Vodinelić, Građansko pravo – Uvod u građansko pravo i Opšti deo građanskog prava, (Beograd, 2014), 346 i 350. 140 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova sobnosti nondum conceptus-a u slučaju da ostavilac za nasljednika odredi lice koje nije ni začeto u trenutku njegove smrti ako se kasnije živo rodi.47 Pravna sposobnost nondum conceptus-a može biti i neimovinske prirode, npr. kod genetskih oštećenja ili oštećenja prilikom začeća djeteta u kojem slučaju se može govoriti o tzv. neželjenom rođenju (wrongful life), tj. „životu koji nije vrijedan življenja“.48 Radi se o povredi prava iz korpusa prava na fizički integritet ličnosti, prvenstveno prava na zaštitu zdravlja,49 ali u jednom specifičnom, sui generis obliku koji podrazumijeva retroaktivnu zaštitu, kad (ako) dođe do rođenja djeteta. Slično tome, nondum conceptus ima i pravo na (ljudsko) dostojanstvo za čije postojanje su dovoljna potencijalna (moguća) svojstva koja su od početka usađena u ljudsko postojanje. (Ljudsko) dostojanstvo nondum conceptus-a ima i poseban značaj sa aspekta biomedicine, jer pojedini njeni oblici (npr. genetski inženjering – kloniranje)50 mogu dovesti do povrede ovog prava ličnosti. Ova i druga prava ličnosti, a naročito „pravo na život“ nondum conceptus-a suprostavljaju se pravu na biomedicinske oglede (istraživanja, eksperimente).51 U svakom slučaju, pravna sposobnost nondum conceptus-a je „pravni konstrukt“,52 (pravna konstrukcija) jer se pravna sposobnost priznaje i van tradicionalnog građanskopravnog poimanja fizičkog lica, tj. pravnu sposobnost se pripisuje nondum conceptus-u bez obzira da li će ikad doći do začeća, a potom i do rođenja, samo zato što je to nečiji moralni, odnosno pravni stav. 5. PRENATALNA ZAŠTITA PRAVA NA ŽIVOT Dostignuti nivo razvoja prava i pravne nauke u pogledu pravnog subjektiviteta začetka širi svoje granice u odnosu na momenat njegovog sticanja i obima prava, a samim tim i (građansko)pravnu zaštitu. Naročito je to izraženo u pogledu neimovinskih prava (prava ličnosti), dok se imovinska prava (prvenstveno nasljedno pravo) i dalje štite fikcijom nasciturusa. Nelogično je da 47 Ovakvo rješenje usvojeno je u Njemačkom građanskom zakoniku (§ 2100): „Ostavilac može nekog odrediti za nasljednika tako da on postane nasljednik tek pošto je nasljednik postao neko drugi (drugi nasljednik ili panasljednik)“ i § 2101: „Ako je za nasljednika određeno lice koje u trenutku smrti ostavioca još nije začeto, tada u sumnji treba smatrati da je ono određeno kao nasljednikov nasljednik – panasljednik.“, vidi: Jochem Schmitt, Munchener Kommentar zum Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Band 1: Allgemeiner Teil (München, 2001), 116. 48 Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta, 124-136. 49 Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti, 126. 50 Ibidem, 350-354. 51 Ibidem, 345 i dalje. 52 Simić, „Pravni problemi definisanja polja pravne zaštite nondum conceptusa-a,“ 35-37. 141 Radenko Jotanović se štite imovinska prava začetka, a da se ne štiti i njegovo pravo na život.53 Najmanje što se može prihvatiti jeste da se i za neimovinska prava začetka uspostavi pravna konstrukcija o određenoj pravnoj sposobnosti. U stvari, najbolje bi bilo uspostaviti jedinstven režim pravne sposobnosti začetka i od istog momenta,54 jer ne mogu postojati dvije prenatalne pravne sposobnosti, jedna imovinskopravna, a druga neimovinskopravna. Imovinska i neimovinska prava su na „istom kolosijeku“, a s obzirom na to da je ličnost viša i veća vrijednost od imovine, onda zaštita ličnosti mora postojati, ako ne prije, a ono barem istovremeno sa zaštitom imovine.55 Tako je npr. zakonopisac u Prednacrtu Građanskog zakonika Republike Srbije, u dijelu pod nazivom „Posebne odredbe“, u čl. 22, pod naslovom „Prenatalna pravna sposobnost“ predložio: „Začeto dijete pod pretpostavkom da će se živo roditi, smatra se kao rođeno, u pogledu prava koja bi imalo da je rođeno, a u obimu koji utvrđuje poseban zakon“.56 Ovako predloženom normom se proširuje fikcija nasciturusa van okvira nasljednog, odnosno imovinskog prava, tj. određuje se pravani subjektivitet začetka i u kontekstu njegovog prava na život i drugih prava ličnosti. Pravo na život je osnovno, apsolutno i najvažnije pravo, to je „...vitalni osnov svih drugih prava, životna pretpostavka njihova,... vrednost iznad svih ostalih, sveta i nedodirljiva...“57. Kao takvo regulisano je i najvišim pravnim aktima: „Život čovjeka je neprikosnoven“,58 „Svako ljudsko biće ima urođeno pravo na život“59 itd. Međutim, pravo na život podliježe i određenim ograničenjima u sukobu sa potrebom ostvarivanja drugih interesa, pa je tako pravo na život jednog lica ograničeno tim istim pravom na život drugog lica, odnosno drugim pravima ličnosti. Brojni su slučajevi u kojima postoje konfliktne situacije 53 Ponjavić, Prekid trudnoće – pravni aspekti, 100. 54 Vladimir Vodinelić, „Moderni okvir prava na život – pokušajh inventara osnovnih problema i rešenja,“ Pravni život, br. 9 (1995), 15. Suprotno tome: Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta. 32. 55 Aldo Radolović, „Pravo ličnosti kao kategorija građanskog prava“ (Doktorska disertacija, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 1985), 125. 56 Ovo je, u stvari, alternativa članu Prednacrta koji glasi: „Začeto dete još pre rođenja ima posebnu pravnu sposobnost čija se sadržina i obim utvrđuju posebnim zakonom.“ 57 Vodinelić, „Moderni okvir prava na život – pokušaj inventara osnovnih problema i rješenja,“ 46. 58 Čl. 11 Ustava Republike Srpske, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 21/92 – prečišćen tekst, 28/94 – Amandmani XXVI-XLIII, 8/96 - Amandmani XLIV-LI, 13/96 – Amandman LII, 15/1996 – ispr., 16/96 - Amandman LIII, 21/96 - Amandmani LIV-LXV, 21/02 - Amandmani LXVI-XCII, 26/02 – ispr., 30/02 – ispr., 31/02 – Amandmani XCIII-XCVIII, 69/02 - Amandmani XCIX-CIII, 31/03 - Amandmani CIV i CV, 98/03 - Amandmani CVI-CXII, 115/05 - Amandman CXIV, 117/05 - Amandmani CXV-CXXI i 48/11 - Amandman CXXII i Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 73/19 – odluka US BiH. 59 Čl. 6, t. 1 Međunarodnog pakta o građanskim i političkim pravima iz 1966. godine, pristuljeno 30. 3. 2020,https://pravosudje.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/dokumenti/Pravo%20na%20pristup%20informacijama/Zakoni%20i%20ostali%20propisi/UN%20konvencije/Medjunarodni_pakt_o_gradjanskim_i_politickim_pravima_HR. 142 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova koje su veoma kompleksne za pravno vrednovanje, tako reći radi se o pravno bezizlaznim situacijama u kojima se odlučuje o legitimitetu prava na život. U takvim situacijama pravo na život može biti i negirano prilikom odmjeravanja suprostavljenih (konkurišućih) interesa. Upravo zbog toga se i govori o „pravu“ na život, jer se u pravu štiti „pravo na život“, a ne i sam „život“, tj. razlikuje se „pravni život“ čovjeka od „biološko – fiziološkog“ života, od kojih je samo ovaj prvi predmet iteresovanja prava i pravne nauke.60 Posebno je to interesantno u kontekstu „prenatalnog prava na život“.61 5.1. Pravo na život začetka Odmjeravanje sukobljenih interesa vrši se prilikom rasprava o pravu na život začetka u odnosu na pravo na abortus žene [pravo na slobodno roditeljstvo, pravo na autonomiju, pravo na tjelesni integritet, a u širem smislu to je pravo na privatnost (right of privacy) ili pravo da raspolaže svojim tijelom (right to be laet alone)].62 Pored toga, sve više se potencira i legitimitet muža da odlučuje o pravu na život začetka (reinkarnacija rimskog ius vitae ac necis?),63 ali i ljekara ili konzilijuma da o tome odlučuju u slučaju postojanja određenih medicinskih indikacija na strani začetka ili na strani žene.64 Između potpune zabrane i potpune legalizacije uglavnom je prihvaćen stav da je abortus dozvoljen uz ispunjenje određenih pretpostavki.65 Ove pretpostavke imaju za cilj da uvaže interese obje strane (začetka i žene, ali i trećih lica) u cilju iznalaženja „pravične ravnoteže“66 u ostvarivanju njihovih prava. Prvenstveno se uzima u obzir vremenska distanca ostvarivanja suprostavljenih prava začetka i žene. Tako do određenog vremenskog momenta koji se naziva „granična tačka“ ili „polje slobodne procjene“ („margin of appreciation“) prednost se daje majci da ostvari svoje pravo na abortus, a nakon toga prednost ima ostvarivanje prava na život začetka. 60 Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti, 120 i 122. 61 U jurisprudenciji se navode i komponenet prenatalnog prava na život, tzv. gradiranje prava na život: prva kompomenta (pravo da se ne bude ubijen), druga komponenta (pravo na preventivnu pravnu zaštitu) i treća komponenta (pravo na održanje života), Dakić, „Izazovi evropskog regionalnog zakonodavstva na polju zaštite života,“ 300 i dalje. 62 O istorijskoj genezi (ne)dozvoljenog abortusa v. Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta, 51-78. 63 Ponjavić, Prekid trudnoće – pravni aspekti, 94-95. 64 Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti, 124. 65 Jelena Stojšić, „Pravna regulativa abortusa u Republici Srbiji (Usklađenost sa evropskim standardima i praksom),“ Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, br. 1 (2010), 249-256; Evropski sud za ljudska prava je zauzeo afirmativan stav u odnosu na abortus uz prepuštanje nacionalnim zakonodavstvima da regulišu uslove za vršenje abortusa, v. Odluka Boso v. Italy, application no. 50490/99. 66 Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta, 103. 143 Radenko Jotanović U našem pravu „granična tačka“ je određena Zakonom o uslovima i postupku za prekid trudnoće67 (čl. 8 i 11) i iznosi 10 gestacijskih nedelja. Praktično to znači da do tog vremenskog momenta žena može slobodno da ostvari svoje pravo na abortus i u slučaju da ne postoje nikakve medicinske indikacije sa njene strane ili na strani začetka. Jedini uslov koji ovaj zakon dodatno reguliše jeste da se abortusom neće neposredno ugroziti život žene (čl. 8, st. 1, t. b). Bez vremenskog ograničenja abortusa začetak ne bi imao pravo na život, jer bi to njegovo pravo bilo negirano u potpunosti pravom žene na abortus sve do momenta rođenja djeteta. Međutim, vremenski momenat od 10 gestacijskih nedelja ne prejudicira momenat sticanja pravnog subjektiviteta začetka, već je to „...izuzetak od pravila da je ljudski život zaštićen od samog početka“68. Pravni subjektivitet začetka nastaje od momenta samog začeća, ali je ograničen pravom žene na abortus do momenta „granične tačke“, a nakon toga je ograničeno pravo žene na abortus u korist prava na život začetka. Može se reći da je pravo na abortus široko postavljeno i žena može iskoristiti to svoje pravo ako želi, ali ako to ne uradi u ostavljenom roku zakonodavac staje na stranu začetka i zahtijeva od žene da iznese trudnoću i rodi, a u suprotnom slijedi sankcija.69 Dakle, pravo na abortus žene ne prestaje nakon dosezanja „granične tačke“, već se može iskoristiti i nakon toga, ali su u tom slučaju postavljeni stroži uslovi u smislu da je dozvoljen samo tzv. terapeutski abortus, tj. kad postoje određene medicinske indikacije da će doći do rođenja djeteta sa tjelesnim ili psihičkim nedostacima, odnosno da je ugroženo zdravlje i/ili život žene.70 Ovdje, takođe, imamo konflikt interesa ali sada između prava na život začetka i njegovog prava na određeni kvalitet života (tzv. wrongful life), odnosno prava na život i zdravlje žene, a ovi interesi su preovlađujućeg (pretežnijeg) karaktera. U određenim slučajevima se pravo na život začetka suprostavlja neželjenom začeću (tzv. wrongful birth) do kojeg je došlo izvršenjem krivičnog djela (silovanje, incest).71 67 Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 34/08. 68 Ponjavić, Prekid trudnoće – pravni aspekti, 119. 69 Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta, 103-104. 70 Prema čl. 11, st. 1, t. a-g) Zakona o uslovima i postupku za prekid trudnoće u Republici Srpskoj, prekid trudnoće poslije navršene 10. gestacijske nedjelje može se izvršiti u sljedećim slučajevima: kad se na osnovu medicinskih indikacija utvrdi da se na drugi način ne može spasiti život ili otkloniti teško narušavanje zdravlja žene; kad se na osnovu naučno-medicinskih saznanja može očekivati da će se dijete roditi sa teškim tjelesnim ili duševnim nedostacima; kad je do začeća došlo izvršenjem krivičnog djela i kad se utvrdi postojanje psihosocijalnih indikacija za prekid trudnoće. 71 Ovdje se pravo na život začetka „...ne posmatra kao pravo da ne budeš ubijen, već kao pravo da ne budeš nepravedno/neopravdano ubijen, tako da se abortus opravdava u slučajevima neželjene trudnoće – silovanja, 144 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova U slučaju da nisu ispunjene zakonom predviđene pretpostavke (osnovne i dopunske) na osnovu kojih je dopušten abortus, regulisana je krivičnopravna odgovornost (krivično djelo – protivpravni prekid trudnoće),72 ali je građanskopravna odgovornost šira i uključuje zaštitu prava na život začetka, kao i proširenu zaštitu prava na abortus žene. Naime, pravo na abortus koje ima žena i pravo na život začetka se može posmatrati i u korelacija sa ljekarom/ zdravstvenom ustanovom ako ljekar ne izvrši abortus lege artis na osnovu prethodno pribavljenog informisanog pristanka žene (i muža?) usljed čega dođe do neželjenog rođenja (wrongful birth) ili nesrećnog života (wrongful life).73 5.2. Pravo na život in vitro začetka U skladu sa preovlađujućem stanovištem in vitro začetak ima određeni, sui generis pravni subjektivitet, analogno začetku in vivo. Ali, s obzirom na to da se in vitro začetak nalazi van tijela žene, u epruveti, njegovo pravo na život ima određene specifičnosti u smislu da se ovdje „pravična ravnoteža“ iznalazi na relaciji: pravo na život in vitro začetka – mogućnost upotrebe u neke druge svrhe koje predstavljaju negaciju prava na život in vitro začetka. Osim u svrhu rođenja djeteta, in vitro embrioni se najčešće koriste za (bio)medicinske oglede, druge medicinske i sa njima povezane komercijalne svrhe,74 pa se odmjeravanje suprostavljenih interesa vrši između prava naučnika (embriologa, drugih lica) da upotrijebe embrion u te svrhe i prava na život in vitro embriona koji će se ostvariti transferom u uterus žene.75 „Granična tačka“ kod in vitro embriona je 14 dana nakon fertilizacije,76 a ova vremenska distanca je određena na osnovu medicinskih kriterijuma jer je to momenat formiranja tzv. embrionalne (primitivne) brazde kada nastaje nervni sistem začetka, a time i mogućnost osjećaja bola. Dakle, do momenta isteka 14 dana od dana fertilizacije pravo na život in vitro embriona ima prednost, a nakon tog momenta preovlađujući su interesi drugih subjekata.77 Pored incesta...“, Silvija Panović – Đurić, „Pravo na prekid trudnoće – problem konflikta interesa,“ Pravni život, br. 9 (1997): 30. 72 V. čl. 130 Krivičnog zakonika Republike Srpske, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 64/2017 i 104/2018 - odluka US. 73 Hajrija Mujović – Zornić, „Odgovornost za štetu zbog „nesrećnog života“ i zbog neželjenog rođenja deteta u pravu SAD,“ Pravni život, br. 9-10 (1992): 1794. 74 Korištenje in vitro embriona za (bio)medicinska istraživanja i u druge svrhe moguće je u zemljama gdje ne postoji potpuna (bezuslovna) zabrana njihove upotrebe u te svrhe kao npr. u Njemačkoj gdje je Zakonom o zaštiti embriona iz 1990. godine „...nerođenom čovečijem životu priznat viši rang vrednosti u odnosu na slobodu naučnog istraživanja“, Radišić, „Pravna zaštita embriona u Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj,“ 138. 75 Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti, 336. 76 Rok od 14 dana nije jedinstven, pa tako npr. u francuskom pravu iznosi 7 dana. 77 Valentin Pozaić, „Čovjek na razini embrija,“ Vladavina prava, br. 3-4 (1999); 132. 145 Radenko Jotanović granične tačke od 14 dana mogu se postaviti i dodatni uslovi za upotrebu in vitro embriona u neke druge, a ne u prokreativne svrhe kao npr. da nije dozvoljeno stvaranje embriona u svrhe istraživanja već da se istraživanje vrši samo na tzv. prekobrojnim embrionima, zatim da se istraživanje može vršiti samo na tzv. non-viable embrionima itd.78 Takođe, na in vitro embrionima moguće je preinplantacionom genetskom dijagnostikom (kao što je to moguće prenatalnom dijagnostikom kod in vivo embriona) utvrditi eventualne anomalije koje mogu rezultovati uništenjem takvog embriona.79 Vidljivo je da je prisutna tendencija ujednačavanja pravne zaštite in vivo i in vitro embriona jer je i kod jednih i kod drugih entiteta određena tzv. granična tačka (uz određene dodatne uslove) poslije koje preovlađujući interes ima pravo na život začetka u odnosu na pravo na život drugih subjekata, a razlika je samo u momentu određivanja te granične tačke. Slično je i u slučaju postojanja nekih medicinskih indikacija kada se vrši selekcija (odstranjivanje) in vitro embriona za transfer u uterus žene. 5.3. Pravo na život nondum conceptus-a U skladu sa pravnom konstrukcijom kojom se i nondum conceptus-u pripisuje odgovarajuća moralna i pravna sposobnost, govori se i o njegovom pravu na život. Mogućnost ostvarivanja prava na život nondum conceptus-a je u najbližoj vezi sa pravom na život začetka (in vivo i in vitro) jer se u oba slučaja radi o ljudskom genomu, bilo kod još neoplođenih reproduktivnih ćelija (preembrion) ili o oplođenim polnim ćelijama (embrion) i bez obzira da li se nalaze van tijela žene ili u uterusu. Posebno je interesantna relacija između in vitro embriona i nondum conceptus-a sa aspekta vršenja (bio)medicinskih ogleda. Slično kao kod in vitro embriona (bio)medicinski ogledi se vrše i na preembrionima, najčešće iz terapeutskih, ali i onih drugih, neterapeutskih razloga. Terapeutske intervencije u muške i ženske reproduktivne ćelije imaju za cilj liječenje genetskih bolesti unošenjem genetskog materijala u tjelesne ćelije, tzv. somatska genetska terapija, kako bi se ostvarilo pravo na „genetsko 78 Zakonom o lečenju neplodnosti postupcima biomedicinski potpomognutog oplođenja, Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 72/09 propisana su ukupno 35 slučaja u kojima je zabranjena upotreba in vitro embriona, npr. zabranjeno je korišćenje mješavine polnih ćelija dva ili više donora, odnosno miješanje sjemenih ćelija više muškaraca ili upotreba jajnih ćelija više žena; upotreba reproduktivnih ćelija donora koji nije živ; vršenje ektogeneze; upotreba u svrhu usluga surogat materinstva; stvaranje djece od lica istog pola itd. 79 Zorica Kandić-Popović, „Eksperimenti na vantelesnim embrionima – ka pravnom konsenzusu,“ Pravni život, br. 9 (1995): 598 i dalje. 146 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova nasljeđe“.80 Suprotno tome, neterapeutske intervencije imaju za cilj poboljšanje određenih svojstva čovjeka kao što su viši stepen inteligencije, fizičkog izgleda, odabir boje očiju i sl. (tzv. genetski inženjering, koji se najčešće ostvaruje kloniranjem).81 Postavlja se pitanje dozvoljenosti upotrebe genoma u terapeutske i neterapeutske svrhe čime se, praktično, odlučuje o njihovom pravu na život, ali i o pravu na dostojanstvo i drugim pravima na fizički integritet, a u skladu sa priznatim pravnim subjektivitetom. Opšti pristup jeste da je korištenje genoma u terapeutske svrhe dozvoljeno i obrnuto da njihovo korištenje u neterapeutske svrhe nije dozvoljeno. Ne postoji nesaglasnost da prednost prilikom vršenja terapeutskih intervencija [(bio) medicinskih ogleda] ima budući začetak, odnosno dijete da bude rođeno bez genetskih poremećaja. Za ostvarivanje ovog cilja mogu se postaviti i određeni uslovi, npr. prethodna verifikacija nasljedne genske terapije na životinjama, informisani pristanak roditelja, verifikacija ovlaštenog (stručnog) tijela i dr.82 Argumenti za preduzimanje neterapeutskih intervencija na genomima (kloniranje) mogu se podijeliti na one „za“ i „ protiv“.83 Međutim, kloniranje može imati i terapeutske svrhe prilikom stvaranja matičnih ćelija koje imaju veliki značaj za liječenje mnogih bolesti. Preovlađujuće stanovište jeste da je neterapeutsko (reproduktivno) kloniranje (za sada) zabranjeno jer bi dovelo do „dupliranja“ pravnog subjektiviteta, a da je terapeutsko kloniranje u principu dozvoljeno,84 mada je različito regulisano u legislativi pojedinih zemalja. Kako god gledali na kloniranje, evidentno je da se radi o sve raširenijoj praksi čija je pozadina komercijalne prirode.85 I svakako ne treba zaboraviti još jednu tendenciju vezanu za genome, a to je njihovo zamrzavanje (krioprezervacija) čime se otvara Pandorina kutija u pogledu posthumne oplodnje, surogat materinstva itd.86 80 Tako npr. da bi se izbjeglo prenošenje hemofilije sa majke na djecu muškog pola može se izvšiti selekcija pola, tzv. terapeutsko selektovanje pola. 81 Kloniranje, takođe, može imati karakter „terapeutskog“ u slučaju izdvajanja matičnih (stem)ćelija koje se mogu koristiti za liječenje nekih bolesti (leukemije, Parkinskove bolesti i dr.). 82 Kandić-Popović, „Eksperimenti na vantelesnim embrionima – ka pravnom konsenzusu,“ 592. 83 O tome naročito vidjeti kod: Pens E. Gregori, Klasični slučajevi iz medicinske etike - opis slučajeva koji su uobličili medicinsku etiku, sa njihovom filozofskom, pravnom i istorijskom pozadinom (Beograd, 2007), 354-369; Vesna Klajn – Tatić, „Etička i pravna pitanja genske terapije,“ Pravni život, br. 9 (2006): 405-407. 84 Slobodanka Tomić i N. Tomić, „Etička dilema kloniranja,“ Pravni život, br. 9 (2003): 312. 85 Jotanović, Pravo na fizički integritet kao osnova drugih prava ličnosti, 353-354. 86 Živojinović, Pravni položaj nerođenog deteta, 140, 153 i 160. 147 Radenko Jotanović ZAKLJUČAK Pravna sposobnost je jedno naročito svojstvo fizičkih (i pravnih) lica koje je zajedno sa drugim atributima pravnog subjektiviteta tvorevina pravnog poretka. U punom kapacitetu stiče se rođenjem djeteta, ali je nesporno da se određena pravna sposobnost može steći i prije rođenja djeteta. Ova, tzv. prenatalna pravna sposobnost, je eksplicitno priznata kod imovinskih prava, dok je za neimovinska prava (prava ličnosti) priznat određeni moralni status (položaj) koji treba da postane pravni status verifikovan od strane pravnog poretka. Između više stanovišta o prenatalnoj pravnoj sposobnosti u jurisprudenciji je najšire prihvaćeno ono prema kojem je začetak posebna, sui generis kategorija koja podrazumijeva određeni (ograničeni, uslovni) pravni subjektivitet. Začetak stiče posebnu pravnu sposobnost već u momentu začeća, čiji obim se stepenuje (gradira) u zavisnosti od njegovog biološkog rasta. Ali specifičnost začetka jeste da njegova prenatalna prava podliježu brojnim ograničenjima u relaciji sa suprostavljenim (konkurišućim) pravima drugih subjekata. Tako se pravo na život začetka sukobljava sa pravom na abortus žene, pa je „pravična ravnoteža“ postignuta određivanjem vremenskog momenta koji se naziva „granična tačka“ do kada se može ostvariti pravo na abortus žene, nakon čega prednost ima pravo na život začetka. Slično začetku in vivo, posebnu pravnu sposobnost ima i začetak in vitro s tim da se ovdje „granična tačka“ u skladu s medicinskih kriterijuma određuje u kraćem vremenskom momentu čijim protekom prioritet ima pravo na vršenje (bio)medicinskih odgleda naučnika u odnosu na pravo na život in vitro začetka. Vršenje (bio)medicinskih ogleda se odmjerava kao suprostavljeni interes i naspram prava na život nondum conceptus-a. Poseban izazov zakonopisaca u tom smislu jeste vrednovanje neterapetskih intervencija u odnosu na primarno terapeutsku upotrebu preembriona. LITERATURA 1. Babić, Ilija i Jotanović, Radenko. Građansko pravo, Knjiga 1: Uvod u građansko pravo. Banja Luka: Univerzitet u Banjoj Luci, Pravni fakultet, 2018. 2. 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Radišić, Jakov. „Eksperimenti na čovječijem embrionu koji je stvoren „in vitro“ – granice dopuštenog.“ Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, br. 4 (1992): 227-229. 27. Radišić, Jakov. „Pravna zaštita embriona u Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj.“ 28. Pravni život, br. 9 (2000): 140. 29. Radolović, Aldo. „Pravo ličnosti kao kategorija građanskog prava.“ Doktorska disertacija, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 1985. 30. Simić, Jelena. „Pravni problemi definisanja polja pravne zaštite nondum conceptusa-a.“ Strani pravni život, br. 3 (2018): 27. 31. Stojšić, Jelena. „Pravna regulativa abortusa u Republici Srbiji (Usklađenost sa evropskim standardima i praksom).“ Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, br. 1 (2010), 249-256. 32. Schmitt, Jochem. Munchener Kommentar zum Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Band 1: Allgemeiner Teil. München, 2001. 33. Tešić, Nenad. „Ljudski život in statu nascenti – pitanje svojine ili ograničenog pravnog subjektiviteta.“ Novo porodično zakonodavstvo, Zbornik radova sa savjetovanja u Vrnjačkoj Banji (Oktobar 2006): 337. 34. Tomić, Slobodanka i Tomić, N. „Etička dilema kloniranja.“ Pravni život, br. 9 (2003): 312. 35. Ustav Republike Srpske, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 21/92 – prečišćen tekst, 28/94 – Amandmani XXVI-XLIII, 8/96 - Amandmani XLIVLI, 13/96 – Amandman LII, 15/1996 – ispr., 16/96 - Amandman LIII, 21/96 - Amandmani LIV-LXV, 21/02 - Amandmani LXVI-XCII, 26/02 – ispr., 30/02 – ispr., 31/02 – Amandmani XCIII-XCVIII, 69/02 - Amandmani XCIX-CIII, 31/03 - Amandmani CIV i CV, 98/03 - Amandmani CVI-CXII, 115/05 Amandman CXIV, 117/05 - Amandmani CXV-CXXI i 48/11 - Amandman CXXII i Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 73/19 – odluka US BiH. 36. Zakon o zaštiti i dobrobiti životinja, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 25/09 i 9/18. 37. Zakon o zaštiti i dobrobiti životinja, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 118/08. 38. Zakon o lečenju neplodnosti postupcima biomedicinski potpomognutog oplođenja, 39. Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 72/09. 40. Zakon o nasljeđivanju, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 1/09, 55/09 i 91/16. 41. Zakon o uslovima i postupku za prekid trudnoće, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 34/08. 150 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 42. Krivični zakonik Republike Srpske, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 64/2017 i 104/2018 - odluka US. 43. Međunarodni pakt o građanskim i političkimpravima iz 1966. godine, pristupljeno 30.3.2020, https://pravosudje.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/ dokumenti/Pravo%20na%20pristup%20infor macijama/Zakoni%20i%20 ostali%20propisi/UN%20konvencije/Medjunarodni_pakt_o_g radjanskim_i_ politickim_pravima_HR.pdf. 151 Radenko Jotanović PRENATAL PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS Radenko Jotanović87 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Abstract: In modern civil jurisprudence, it is indisputable that a conceived and unborn child (nasciturus) has a certain (limited, partial, conditional) legal capacity, but there is no general agreement on the extent of that ability and the timing of its acquisition. This issue is particularly emphasized concerning prenatal non-property rights (personal rights) which are only partially protected in certain lex specialis laws, while prenatal property (inherited) rights are fully protected by the nasciturus institute. Therefore, it is necessary to establish integral legal protection of the nasciturus, ie. to establish a unique system of civil protection of his property and non-property rights from the same time moment and to the same extent. There are several points of view regarding the legal capacity to nasciturus (in vivo and in vitro) and the associated legal position of the infans conceptus as a prerequisite for the (civil) legal protection of a person’s rights: 2. that these entities have a general legal capacity and 3. a compromise position according to which a specific, sui generis legal category is concerned. The most widely used solution is the compromise solution according to which legal subjectivity arises from the very conception (and even earlier) from which moment the graduation of rights is done, to acquire the full legal capacity that all-natural persons have as subjects of law with the birth of a child. Keywords: legal subjectivity, (prenatal) legal capacity, nasciturus, personality rights, (bio) medical examinations. 87 PhD, Associate Professor 152 Original scientific paper UDK LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE OF BUSINESS ENTITIES IN REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA Zoran Vasiljević1 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Abstract: In Republic of Srpska, as well as at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was adopted a set of laws which enables the activities of business entities to be performed in electronic form, starting from the submission of the application for company registration to the performance of unilateral and bilateral legal affairs. It is about the laws of the same title, which are adopted at the both levels of government, namely the laws on electronic signature and electronic document, as well as the Law on Electronic Commerce of Republic of Srpska. These legal acts regulate the way of performing legal actions in electronic form in order to achieve the same legal power which have the same legal actions expressed in the paper form. This creates conditions for significant acceleration and reduction of costs in performing the activities. However, this modernization also brings challenges related to resolving a number of legal issues in the matter of rights, obligations and liability of business entities, such as, for example, determination of the moment when legal relationship has arisen, determination of the authenticity of content of the legal act, as well as of its signature, how electronic documents and signatures should be kept, etc. A particular problem that arises in practice relates to the establishment of „certification bodies“ which would deal with the provision of services in this domain. It could be concluded that the gap between the real and the normative is quite visible from the analysed institutes. Nevertheless, this is a real challenge of the 21st century which is needed foremost in the business sector and which must be solved in the most adequate way. Keywords: Company, individual entrepreneur, registration, contract, electronic document, electronic signature. 1 PhD, Associate Professor 153 Zoran Vasiljević 1. INTRODUCTION The beginning of e-commerce, although there are certain understandings that connect it to the first use of telephones and telegraphs in the mid-nineteenth century, is tied to the end of the twentieth century, when there was an increased commercial use of computers and modern forms of communication. During this period, e-commerce developed through the Internet, that is, in the so called cyberspace. The use of modern technologies for these purposes has witnessed enormous growth in a very short period of time, and the need to create a legal framework has emerged to prevent anarchy in the law enforcement. This need was addressed almost simultaneously at the international and national levels, so that intervention was undertaken not only by national legislators but also by certain international organizations, among which the most influential is the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter: UNCITRAL).2 Both Republic of Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina have very quickly become part of this global process, which is why the question of legal regulation of e-commerce of business entities has been raised in our country, and that starts with the very filing of an application for electronic registration of company, the whole registration process, up to the completion of unilateral and bilateral legal actions in electronic form. Legislation, both at the level of BiH and at the level of the Republic of Srpska, is largely aligned with the sources of electronic communications law at the level of the European Union. Namely, at both levels three laws were adopted, which exclusively treat the problems of e-commerce and electronic communications of business entities, both between themselves and with other entities (consumers and administrative bodies and institutions at all levels of government). The two laws have the same titles, namely the laws on electronic document and electronic signature. They are largely harmonized, given that 2 This organization has adopted three model laws and one convention relating to the subject matter. These are the Model Law on Electronic Commerce of 1996 (with subsequent amendment to Art. 5 of 1998), the Model Law on Electronic Signatures of 2001, the Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records of 2017, and the UN Convention on the use of electronic communications in international contracts of 2005. The Model Law on Electronic Commerce alone has been used as a source for national laws in over 60 countries, although it must be acknowledged that it has experienced greater implementation in the Anglo-Saxon legal field. This act, in fact, does not specifically interfere with contract law, but deals with the principles of functional equivalence of electronic media in commercial transactions. The most recently adopted Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records applies to electronic substitutes for transferable instruments (which grant rights to money, such as a bill of exchange, check or certificate of deposit) and transferable documents (which grant rights on goods, such as bill of lading, warehouse receipts, orders for delivery of goods, etc.). Currently, Bahrain is the only country which fully implemented this Model Law. More: Henry D. Gabriel, “The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records,” Uniform Law Review, vol. 24 (2019): 261-280, doi: 10.1093/ulr/unz013. 154 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova they have a common source in the acquis communautaire, but they also have different application domains. Thus, the Law on Electronic Document of BiH3 refers to the procedures that business entities take before the administrative bodies and other institutions of BiH entrusted with administrative tasks, as well as institutions with public authority, while the Law on Electronic Document of RS4 refers to the use of electronic document by a wide range of entities in performing their activities and in various procedures at the Republic of Srpska level. On the other hand, the difference between the Law on Electronic Signature of RS5 and the Law on Electronic Signature of BiH,6 except that the Law at the BiH level is conceived as a framework law, consists in that it is applied in closed systems, which are completely regulated by contracts between a known number of contracting parties, while the Law at the RS level refers to the use of electronic signatures in various procedures, as well as commercial and other activities of all natural and legal persons in the territory of Republic of Srpska. Finally the third set of laws bears different titles but refers to the same subject matter. Namely, the Law on Electronic Legal and Business Transactions of BiH7 has the role of a framework law for the subject matter of undertaking and providing information society services, information service provider obligations, contracting and service provider liability. On the other hand, the RS Law on Electronic Commerce8 regulates the same matter at the level of Republic of Srpska. In addition to the above laws, which are most directly related to the issues that are the subject of the analysis in this paper, there are other laws that deal with electronic communication issues, such is, for example, Law on Registration of Business Entities in Republic of Srpska,9 which contains a whole set of provisions related to electronic registration of business entities in Republic of Srpska, for which the amendments to the Law adopted in 2019 are particuarly creditable, which have also been made in order to comply with European Union law, that is, Directive 2019/1151 on the use of digital tools and procedures in company law.10 For the same purpose,in the Companies Act of RS,11 as amended in 2019, was introduced a provision on the possi3 Official Gazette of BiH, no. 58/2014, Art. 1. 4 Official Gazette of RS, no. 106/2015, Art.1. 5 Official Gazette of RS, no. 106/2015 and 83/2019, Art. 1. 6 Official Gazette of BiH, no. 91/2006, Art. 1-2. 7 Official Gazette of BiH, no. 126/07, Art. 1. 8 Official Gazette of RS, no. 59/09 and 33/16, čl. 1. 9 Official Gazette of RS, no. 67/13, 15/16 and 84/19. 10 Official journal of the European Union, L 186/80 of 11.7.2019. 11 Official Gazette of RS, no. 127/08, 58/09, 100/11, 67/13, 100/17 and 82/19, Art. 7. par. 5. 155 Zoran Vasiljević bility of drafting the founding act in electronic form, in accordance with the regulations governing electronic signature and electronic document, but so far only in the case of a single-member limited liability company. For the purposes of this paper, however, we will confine ourselves to analyzing the legal framework for facilitating electronic communication of business entities, primarily on the level of Republic of Srpska’s legislation, while pointing out certain differences and dilemmas regarding the enforcement of laws in the event of conflict with the provisions of the laws at the level of BiH. The basic questions are, therefore, what conditions are required to be fulfilled for business subjects to be able to communicate in legal transactions, and that this kind of communication has legal force. In other words, how are electronic document, electronic signature, electronic seal and other electronic communications instruments created, and then determination of sources of law applicable to the legal relations established in this way between the business entities themselves, especially in the field of electronic trade, ie. specifying whether and to what extent they deviate from traditional contract law. 2. CREATION AND LEGAL EFFECT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT For communication between business entities in electronic form, an electronic document must be created, which is sent by one party to the other. Our Law defines this form as a uniquely linked, complete set of data that is electronically formatted, i.e. created using computers and other electronic devices, sent, received, or stored in electronic, magnetic, optical, or other medium, and that contains perormances for identifying of the author, authenticity of content, and proving the time when the document was made.12 The legal definition is, therefore, quite broad and leaves the possibility of subsuming various forms of electronic communications under this term. Therefore, not only records on the computer but also on other electronic devices need to be dealt with, but in any case they must be reliable and relevant in order to have the capacity of a means of evidence. These can be various forms of electronic communication, such as email messages or audio tapes.13 In any case, the 12 Law on Electronic Document RS, Art. 4. par. 1. 13 In England, for example, audio tapes have been accepted as a discoverable document, ie. a document from which information can be learned in the case of Grant v Southwestern and Country Properties Ltd, 1975. See: Stephen Mason, “Documents signed or executed with electronic signatures in English law,” Computer Law & Security Review, no. 34 (2018): 935. 156 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova content of the electronic document includes all forms of written text, data, images, drawings, maps, tone, music and speech. The basic prerequisite is that all of these formats are preserved, ie. that they can also be subsequently used or reproduced. Particularly significant is written form, which should include various forms of word reproduction in a visible form, such as typing, printing, lithography, photography, and other forms. This is significant because of the multitude of functions that written form has, such as providing reliable evidence of the existence and nature of the parties’ intention to be bound by the contract, understanding the consequences of entering into a contractual relationship, ensuring the invariability of the document over a period of time and possibility of its duplicating, authenticating, storage, etc.14 From the legal definition can be derived the conditions required for the validity of the electronic document, such as the ability to identify the author, the ability to authenticate the document, i.e. to determine the authenticity of its content (which includes ability of reading its content), as well as the ability to determine the time of creation of document. An additional requirement is that the entity to whom the document is intended accept the use and circulation of the document in electronic form.15 Thereafter, addressee can no longer reject a document merely because of the form in which it was made, and the opposite action also produces liability for the offense of such entity (company or entrepreneur), or a liable person in the same entity. In terms of consent, it could also be asked whether it should be explicitly given for the use of each individual electronic document, i.e. for each repeated electronic communication, since our legislator did not specify the solution. In the interests of simpler e-commerce, it would be better to adopt the interpretation that the notion of consent also includes consent that can reasonably be inferred from the conduct of the person concerned, respectively that no explicit consent for each electronic communication is required.16 An electronic document, in principle, consists of two parts: a general part that makes up the content of the document, and a special part, which contains one or more electronic signatures, information on the time of drafting, as well as the sending and receipt of the document, or other features created 14 These functions are also listed in the Guide to Enactment the Model Law on Electronic Commerce. More about that: Stephen Mason, “Documents signed or executed with electronic signatures in English law,” 938-939. 15 Law on Electronic Document RS, Art. 2. par. 2. 16 Such a solution is, for example, contained in the legislation of Australia (in the Electronic Transactions Act 1999), which is otherwise based on UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Electronic Commerce. Similar is provided in the United States Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, in Section 5 (b), which states that this may be interpreted from the context and circumstances of the case. More: Alan Davidson, The Law of Electronic Commerce, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 49, 51. 157 Zoran Vasiljević during the its drafting.17 It is precisely from the electronic signature that the identity of the author of the document can be ascertained. The signature itself can be of different quality or level of reliability, and its drafting is regulated by a special Law on Electronic Signature of the RS. If an electronic document meets all of the above requirements, then its legal validity is recognized in our legislation as if it were a paper document. Electronic document reproduction is also possible. However, an electronic document may only have a copy in paper form and not in electronic form. In the case of making a paper copy, the printout of the external form of electronic document presentation must be certified, which must be marked as a copy.18 Certification of copies may be made by authorized persons in republic bodies, bodies of local self-government units, companies, institutions, entrepreneurs and legal entities, or individuals. This broad definition certainly includes notaries, who are of particular importance for conducting business transactions and who have been specifically emphasized in the Law on Electronic Document of BiH.19 Copies made in accordance with legal acts have the same legal force as the original electronic document. However, it must be emphasized that in some other legal systems copies of electronic documents, which are themselves in electronic form, made by digital forensics and certified, are possible.20 In this sense, the term original electronic document should not be used, as the Law on Electronic Document of BiH does it.21 The terminological designation as “izvornik” is more correct, which was done in the Law on Electronic Document of RS,22 in the sense of “first in time”, which term is used in English law.23 Namely, there is no difference between these documents, and sometimes making a difference between the original and the copy would cause absurd situations. This is best illustrated by an example of an email that one person sends to another and then deletes the email he sent. The question is what is the original, the email that was deleted and that should logically be the original, or the email that is stored on the recipient’s computer and is identical to the one created by the sender. Certainly both should be treated equally and that is, after all, the reason why our legislature prescribed an impossibility of making a copy in 17 See: Law on Electronic Document RS, Art. 5. 18 Law on Electronic Document RS, Art. 9. par. 3. 19 See Art. 10. par. 2. of the cited Act. 20 For English law, see: Stephen Mason, “Documents signed or executed with electronic signatures in English law,” 941. 21 See Art. 9. of the cited Act. 22 Art. 8. par. 1 of the cited Act. 23 See: Stephen Mason, “Documents signed or executed with electronic signatures in English law,” 941. 158 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova electronic form. However, if this possibility is accepted, the concept of the “original” cannot be retained, but only the concept of an electronic document that was produced “first in time”. In order for an electronic document to be used as evidence in the event of a dispute, it must be stored originally in the information system or in the media that enables its durability, in accordance with the regulations governing archive activity, office operation, information security and other regulations relevant for the subject matter. Safekeeping may also be entrusted to an entity that is professionally engaged in the business of keeping electronic documents.24 In Anglo-Saxon law has long been applicable the so-called “rule of secondary evidence”, on the basis of which the probative value of electronic documents was not recognized if the primary paper evidence was available. However, with the development of standards of keeping and understanding of the durability and reliability of an electronic document, this rule has been abandoned and now in the countries of this legal system, i.e. in their jurisprudence, it is equalized the evidential strength of documents in electronic and paper form, as well as “originals” and copies of the electronic documents themselves.25 3. SIGNING THE ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT In order for electronic documents to be used in electronic commerce as reliable communication tools, from which their author can be accurately identified, they must also contain an electronic signature. It is an electronic signature that forms a separate part of each electronic document made in accordance with the Law on Electronic Document of RS.26 If electronic signature were to be disabled, the identity of the author would have to be otherwise identified, such as by paper documents with handwritten signatures, which would be more expensive and more complicated and would certainly hinder the development of e-commerce.27 Therefore, electronic signatures are an indispensable instrument of electronic commerce, which main function is to determine the identity of the signatory, i.e. the author of the electronic document. 24 See: Law on Electronic Document RS, Art. 22. par. 1. 25 More: Alan Davidson, The Law of Electronic Commerce, 298-312. 26 See: Art. 5 of the cited Law. 27 Also: Drago Divljak, “Pravno dejstvo elektronskih potpisa u međunarodnoj regulative i pravu Srbije,” Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, no. 2 (2019), 355, doi:10.5937/zrpfns53-23127. 159 Zoran Vasiljević By legal definition, an electronic signature is a set of electronic data that is associated with or logically linked to other electronic data and serves to identify the signatory and authenticate the signed electronic document.28 From the very definition, the basic function of an electronic signature is clearly visible, that is identification and authentication, which entails guarantee of the identity of the signatory of the document. In addition to this function, an electronic signature should indicate the author’s confirmation of the contents of the electronic document, ie. that the signatory will not deny the contents of the document or the authenticity of his signature, and to preserve the integrity of the document in terms of the invariability of its contents after signing.29 However, not every electronic signature can meet the required conditions in full capacity. Namely, it can be any electronic data, including any letter, character, number, or other symbol attached or logically associated with the electronic document.30 Thus, the case law of Australia has also recognized the common typing of the name of the sender as a form of authentication of the electronic document, ie. of an email. It is enough that the intention was for the signature to serve such a purpose.31 Certainly this is a much more uncertain way of identifying an author than, for example, a digital signature. An electronic signature can, in principle, be in any form. It may include only the phrase “I accept”, PIN code, typing the name in an email, a scanned signature, a code for which use the parties agree (eg, a specific number), a biodynamic signature (eg, an agreed method for calculating the number, such as, for example, the sum of the date digits multiplied by a certain number) or a digital signature. It is important that it indicates the identity of the signatory.32 And our Law on Electronic Signature, which distinguishes electronic signature from qualified electronic signature, emphasizes that electronic signature cannot be contested in judicial or other proceedings solely on the grounds that it is in electronic form or because it does not meet all requirements for a qualified electronic signature.33 Therefore, a digital signature, which meets the requirements for the qualified electronic signature category, is just one 28 Law on Electronic Signature of RS, Art. 3. 29 See: Nikolaos A. Karanikolas, “Digital Signature Legality in Different Jurisdictions: Legally Binding Issues,” (Master thesis, University of Thessaloniki, 2019), 15. 30 See: Alan Davidson, The Law of Electronic Commerce, 82. 31 R v Frolchenko, (1998) QCA 43, more: Alan Davidson, The Law of Electronic Commerce, 77. 32 See: Stephen Mason, “Documents signed or executed with electronic signatures in English law,” 942.; Alan Davidson, The Law of Electronic Commerce, 83. 33 Law on Electronic Signature of RS, Art. 6. par. 2. The cited provision is modeled on Art. 25. of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, L 257/101 of 28.08.2014. This regulation is directly applicable in all EU Mem- 160 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova type of electronic signature. It should also be distinguished from a digitized signature, which is a scanned version of a handwritten signature that, for example, can simply be attached to an email. Anyone who comes into possession of a sent email may download and misuse such a signature, which has a low level of protection. Our legislator, having in mind the limited possibilities of various forms of electronic signatures, although acknowledging their evidentiary power, opted to give only qualified electronic signature the same legal force as a handwritten signature and even handwritten signature with a seal. Therefore, this form of signature may replace the traditional seal. In order for an electronic signature to qualify as qualified signature, it must first meet the criteria for the advanced signature category prescribed in EU Regulation no. 910/2014, ie. It must be associated solely with the signer, to reliably identify the signer, to be created using means that the signer can independently manage and which are exclusively under his control, and to be directly related to the data to which it refers in a way that clearly allows access to any modification of the original data.34 In addition, the means of creating and verifying a qualified electronic signature must meet the required legal requirements which include, inter alia, data for the creation and verification of signatures that represent unique data, such as codes or private cryptographic keys used to create signatures and codes or public cryptographic keys used to validate the signature.35 In addition to the requirements for advanced signature and the conditions required for qualified means of creating and verifying a qualified electronic signature,36 although this is not stated in the very definition of a qualified electronic signature, this category of signature should also be based on a qualified electronic certificate for electronic signature. It is a certificate in electronic form by which the certification body certifying the qualified electronic signature, the content of which is prescribed by law.37 With this certificate, the certification body also guarantees the identity of the signer, thus placing itself in a role of notary.38 The certification body is a legal entity or an entrepreneur, ber States and has served as a model for drafting of our Electronic Signature Act. Yet, unlike our law, it distinguishes three types of electronic signatures: electronic, advanced electronic and qualified electronic signature. 34 Compare EU Regulation No. 910/2014, Art. 26. and RS Law on Electronic Signature, Art. 4. 35 Law on Electronic Signature of RS, Art. 2 par. 1. lines 4) and 7), in connection with Art. 8 and Art. 9. 36 Unlike, for example, the legal definition in Serbia, where, in Art. 2 par. 1. line 30 of the Law on Electronic Document, Electronic Identification and Services of Confidence in Electronic Commerce of 2017 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 94/2017), that is explicitly stated. See also Drago Divljak, “Pravno dejstvo elektronskih potpisa u međunarodnoj regulative i pravu Srbije,” 358-359. 37 See: Law on Electronic Signature of RS, Art. 16. 38 Thomas Hoeren, “Electronic commerce and law – some fragmentary thoughts on the future of internet regulation from a German perspective,” Computer Law & Security Report, vol. 16, no. 1 (2000): 116. 161 Zoran Vasiljević who are registered for this type of business and who can also issue unqualified certificates, in which case it is sufficient to check in at least 14 days before starting the activity to the Ministry of Scientific and Technological Development, Higher Education and Information Society of RS, which keeps a register of these bodies. However, the issuance of qualified electronic certificates requires the prior issuance of a license from the competent Ministry, as well as the fulfillment of additional requirements related to the organization of business, expertise of employees, reliability and liquidity.39 Additional conditions have been prescribed in order to ensure the higher quality of the electronic signatures that are certified. Therefore, qualified electronic signatures are digital signatures based on the method of asymmetric cryptography. In fact, a more correct determination would be that they are an element of the digital certification process.40 Namely, this process uses a private and public key, which is issued by an authorized certification body. The encryption is first performed by the private key holder, and then decryption by the public key holder, which is correspondent and, if there is a correct mathematical relation, the public key holder can confirm that the contents of the document have not been altered and that it come from the private key holder. This method of asymmetric public encryption also overcomes the problem of private encryption, which is symmetric and where both parties must own a private key, so the risk of the acquisition of the key by a third party is higher.41 Users are free to choose the certification body and may also use the services of such body that is registered abroad.42 In order to further ensure the authenticity and completeness of the contents of the electronic document, it is also possible to use an electronic seal, that is, a qualified electronic seal, which is based on a qualified electronic seal certificate and which must meet conditions identical to those required for a qualified electronic signature.43 Certification bodies may also create timestamps, which contain official time associated with electronic documents confirming their content at the time of creation. Qualified timestamps may also be issued, which additionally, to a reasonable extent, exclude the possibility of unauthorized data change. This category of timestamps must be signed 39 Ibid, Art. 21. 40 See: Nikolaos A. Karanikolas, “Digital Signature Legality in Different Jurisdictions: Legally Binding Issues,” 25. 41 More: Alan Davidson, The Law of Electronic Commerce, 84-85. 42 The rights, obligations and liabilities of users and certification bodies are prescribed by the Law on Electronic Signature of RS, Art. 25-33. 43 Compare Art. 4 and Art. 13 par. 2 of the Law on Electronic Signature of RS. 162 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova by a qualified electronic signature or sealed by a qualified electronic seal or otherwise providing an equivalent level of security.44 Finally, regarding the domain of application of legislation, one should also point out an absurd solution of the Law on Electronic Signature of BiH, according to which this Law is applied only in closed systems, which are completely regulated by contracts between a known number of contracting parties, while in open electronic communication it apply only in relations with the court and other institutions.45 This is in contrast to EU Regulation No. 910/2014, which explicitly stipulates that it does not apply to the provision of trust services exclusively used within closed systems,46 and likewise to the solutions of most comparative legislations.47 The second provision, which has also been overcome, refers to exclusion of the effect of written form of a qualified (secure) electronic signature in certain legal matters in the field of family and hereditary law, those requiring official certification, judicial or notarial authentication or which have to be created in the form of a notarial deed (especially in the field of land registry law), and in the case of guarantee statements by entities in certain fields.48 There is no reason to exclude any of the aforementioned legal actions or acts from being drafted in electronic form, since all entities, and notaries in particular, have the opportunity and the need to engage in the process of business modernization through electronic communications. However, the Law on Electronic Signature of BiH also contains one precise provision that resolves the dilemma regarding the liability of the certification bodies for the damage caused to any person who relies on certain data related to the qualified certificates issued or guaranteed by those bodies. Namely, a system of subjective liability with assumed guilt was adopted.49 Also, if the use of a qualified certificate (electronic certificate) is restricted, the certification body is not liable for any damage caused by the use of the certificate beyond the restriction (eg, regarding the value of the transaction for which it can be used).50 The provisions of this Law are, in any case, intended to be framework in terms of regulating the basis for the 44 Law on Electronic Signature of RS, Art. 11. 45 See Law on Electronic Signature of BiH, Art. 2. 46 See Art. 2 par. 2. of cited EU Regulation. 47 More about criticism of cited legal solution: Genc Trnavci, “Zaključenje, punovažnost i dokazivanje elektronskih ugovora: komparativna analiza,” Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, vol. 30, no. 1 (2009), 462. 48 See Law on Electronic Signature of BiH, Art. 5. par. 2. 49 What is in line with EU Regulation No. 910/2014. Compare Art. 13 par. 3 of the Regulation and Art. 19 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Law on Electronic Signature of BiH. According to the Regulation, the burden of proving liability lies on the injured party only in the case of an unqualified trust service provider (ie, a certification body). 50 Law on Electronic Signature of BiH, Art. 19 par. 4. 163 Zoran Vasiljević formation and use of an electronic signature and the provision of services in connection therewith. 4. SPECIFICITIES OF E-COMMERCE Business entities in the Republic of Srpska have the possibility to conclude contracts in electronic form, which is also recognized by the Law on Electronic Commerce of Republic of Srpska. Only certain issues are excluded from the application of the Law, namely data protection, the field of taxation, representation of parties and the protection of their interests before the courts, and gambling with cash depozit,51 which is in line with the EU E-Commerce Directive.52 Moreover, the Directive contains a somewhat broader circle of excluded issues. For example, the field of notarial activity was originally excluded in the Law of RS, but with the amendments since 2016, that provision was deleted. The same amendments deleted the provision of Art. 7 par. 4, which pertained to the group of contracts in the field of family and hereditary law, as well as some contracts in the field of law on obligations. Namely, these were contracts for which drawing up compulsory written form is prescribed, mostly solemn, with the appropriate participation of notaries (notarial certification of the act or even notarial processing, as in the case of contracts on transfer of ownership of real estate). By inclusion of notaries in the sphere of legal transactions that realize in electronic form, disappeared the reason for exclusion of the said group of legal affairs. Our legislation, therefore, with regard to regulating e-commerce, has a stronghold in European Union law, that is, the E-Commerce Directive, which is based on the concept of minimalist encroachment and focusing only on certain specific problems that may arise in e-commerce.53 The Directive is, in fact, more neutral in relation to contract law and leaves national rights alone to resolve the dilemmas that arise on certain issues. Thus, in Art. 11. there is no statement as to whether the offering of services through the website is an offer or an invitation for the offer, ie. whether the consumer accepts the offer 51 Law on Electronic Commerce of Republic of Srpska, Art. 2. 52 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular elecronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic Commerce), Official Journal of European Union, L 178, 17.07.2000., Art. 5. 53 Unlike the approaches that have the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce or the US law relating to this matter (above all the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act-UCITA as well as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act- UETA), the Directive is criticized for insufficient clear definitions and fragmentary character. More: Jane Kaufman Winn and Jens Haubold, “Electronic Promises: Contract Law Reform and E-Commerce in a Comparative Perspective,” EU Law Report, no. 25 (2002), 1-16 164 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova or makes an offer by placing an order (by clicking on the website). Practically, the only provision that allows direct application in national contract laws is that of the time of receipt of the order and confirmation of its receipt, which is the time when the parties can access it.54 Republic of Srpska’s law also follows the concept of the EU Directive and minimally intervenes in the area of traditional contract law. This prevents the creation of a dual legal regime in this matter. In fact, only the rules on the recognition of electronic contracts and the time of their conclusion can be treated as special rules, the adoption of which has been necessary in order to comply with modern technological development.55 For all other issues that do not have a specific provision, the relevant provisions of the regulations governing the obligations are applicable.56 E-commerce,57 namely, leads to dematerialization, deterritorialization, extemporalization and depersonalization of the law.58 As a result, correction of national contract law in certain segments is inevitable. However, a much bigger problem that these phenomena cause is finding applicable national law in specific cases. Namely, it is impossible to determine from an email address from which country, for example, is the seller of certain goods. Therefore, one possible solution would be to place all electronic transaction actors in the same so-called “cyberspace”, however, drawback is in the absence of uniform legal rules that would apply to such relationships. The only solution left is to define a specific criterion in the context of rules of private international law, which would refer to a specific national law. Thus, the place of intended use is proposed as one of the acceptable criteria, which bears similarities to the principle of minimum contact, that is applied in US law. Under this concept, national law of a particular country would only apply to the extent that the seller of a particular good or service provider intends to use a particular market.59 In any case, in our legal system, contracts in electronic mode are contracts that are in whole or in part concluded, sent, received, terminated, canceled, 54 EU E-Commerce Directive, Art. 11 par. 1. See: Jane Kaufman Winn and Jens Haubold, “Electronic Promises: Contract Law Reform and E-Commerce in a Comparative Perspective,” 11-12. 55 See: Drago Divljak, “Harmonizacija pravila o elektronskoj trgovini i pravo Srbije,” Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, no. 3 (2018), 920-921, doi: 10.5937/zrpfns52-18796. 56 See: Law on Electronic Commerce of Republic of Srpska, Art. 8. 57 Defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a trade that encompasses all forms of commercial transactions that are based on electronic processing and transmission of data, including text, sound and visual images. See: Drago Divljak, “Harmonizacija pravila o elektronskoj trgovini i pravo Srbije,” 910. 58 See Thomas Hoeren, “Electronic commerce and law – some fragmentary thoughts on the future of internet regulation from a German perspective,” 116. 59 Ibid, 114. 165 Zoran Vasiljević accessed and displayed electronically by legal and natural persons, using electronic, optical or similar means, including, but not limited to Internet transmission.60 In theory, there are also insights about the need to explicitly define contracts in electronic form, which should be distinguished from any mode of electronic communication. The argument for this is in the view that only an electronic form of the appropriate quality can replace the written form, when it is required for the validity of the contract (form ad solemnitatem).61 The solution is found in another element of the written form, ie. signature, which when it comes to electronic signature, must meet conditions for the category of qualified signature in accordance with the Law on Electronic Signature.62 Certainly, it would be a good solution to envisage an electronic form of appropriate quality as one of the modes of written form in the Law on Obligations (hereinafter: LOO). Nevertheless, the provision of Art. 72 par. 4 of LOO is still flexible enough and allows the adaptability of written form in line with the development of modern technologies.63 Also, the Law on Electronic Commerce of Republic of Srpska recognizes the legal validity of contracts concluded through electronic modes of communication, and in case of conditionality of the contract by signature, the electronic signature made in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Electronic Signature of RS is acceptable.64 In Republic of Srpska’s law, an electronic contract is considered to be concluded, according to the general theory of receipt, when a bidder receives an electronic message containing a statement of the accepter’s acceptance of the bid.65 A party that has a contractual role as an information society service 60 Law on Electronic Commerce of Republic of Srpska, Art. 3 par. 1 line e). An interesting definition of an electronic contract is contained in the Chinese Electronic Signature Act, which defines this contractt as an agreement between two or more parties to establish, modify or terminate civil rights and duties in property through electronic information net and by using electronic format. For more on the treatment of e-commerce and the creation of an electronic negotiation platform that precedes the conclusion of electronic contract, see Juntao Gu and Xiaodong Zhu, “Designing and Implementing an Online System for Electronic Contract Negotiation Based on Electronic Signature,” Journal of Software, vol. 9, no. 12 (December 2014): 3020-3026, doi: 10.4304 / jsw.9.12.3030-3027. 61 See Sanja M. Radovanović and Nikolina B. Miščević, “O elektronskoj formi ugovora u domaćem pravu,” Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, no. 4 (2018): 1644, doi: 10.5937/zrpfns52-20325. 62 Namely, the text as the first element of the form is not different, whether it is in paper or electronic form. The only difference is of the technical nature, in the sense that electronic text cognition requires some additional technical means. See: Sanja M. Radovanović and Nikolina B. Miščević, “O elektronskoj formi ugovora u domaćem pravu,” 1647. 63 Ibid, 1656-1657. Namely, according to the aforementioned provision “if the parties exchange letters or agree by teleprint or by any other means that enables the content and the submitter of the statement to be determined with certainty”, the request of the written form is satisfied. 64 Law on Electronic Commerce of Republic of Srpska, Art. 7 and Art. 9. 65 Ibid, Art. 13. 166 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova provider, which in particular includes the sale of goods and services, offering data, advertising, and other commercial activities through the Internet, is obliged, without delay, electronically (especially by e-mail) to acknowledge receipt of a message containing an offer or acceptance of an offer for the conclusion of a contract, provided that this legal rule is considered dispositive in the case of relations between business entities and they can deviate from it. This is also in line with the provisions of the Law on Electronic Document, according to which, in cases where confirmation of receipt of an electronic document is required, the recipient must confirm receipt within the time limit set by the sender’s previous request. In case of failure to submit the acknowledgment of receipt, the sender is obliged to set a new deadline, upon expiration of which, in case of failure to submit the acknowledgment of receipt, such electronic document shall be deemed not to have been sent.66 It can be concluded that the Law on Electronic Document of RS regulates this issue more precisely and it can be applied as a lex specialis in relation to the Law on Electronic Commerce of RS in the case of submitting statements in a form that meets the criteria of an electronic document from the said Law. However, even in the Law on Electronic Document, there is one discrepancy regarding the moment when the electronic document is received. Namely, in Art. 16 par. 6 this is considered to be the moment when the sender receives the acknowledgment of receipt from the recipient, while according to Art. 17 par. 3 it is considered that this is the moment when the recipient sends an acknowledgment of receipt of the electronic document.67 This is not in accordance with the provision of Art. 13 par. 2 of the Law on Electronic Commerce, according to which an offer, acceptance of an offer and other statements of will taken electronically are considered to be received only when the person to whom they are addressed can access, so the interpretation should be in favor of the decision referred to in Art. 16 par. 6 of the Law on Electronic Document. Otherwise, the question is what if the acknowledgment of receipt never arrives at the sender. He may then reasonably consider that the electronic document has not even been received. If the opposite assumption is accepted, it could cause various controversial situations in practice. To address this issue, the Law on Electronic Legal and Business Transactions of BiH contains an interesting provision according to which “if the sender has not agreed with the recipient the form of the acknowledgment of receipt, as the acknowledgment of receipt is considered any independent or other ac66 Law on Electronic Document of Republic of Srpska, Art. 16 par. 1, 4 and 5. 67 The identical solution is also contained in the Law on Electronic Document of BiH, Art. 18 par. 3. 167 Zoran Vasiljević knowledgment of the recipient, that is, the behavior of the recipient which is sufficient that the sender knows or may know that the electronic message has been received.68 Thus, the said Law allows for the treatment of acknowledgment of receipt even a concludent behaviour, but of course even in this case, it must be received by the person to whom it is intended. Even in English law, in the case of electronic communications, it is almost completely deviated from the theory of transmission (dispatch theory), that is, the “mailbox” rule, especially since these are mostly messages that arrive at intervals of a few seconds. Therefore, the theory of receipt is also accepted here.69 Otherwise, this system also discusses the dilemma of sending and accepting an offer and accepts, it could be concluded, the majority view that advertising is not an offer but an invitation for the offer. However, depending on the content of the website of the information society service provider (eg. the vendor), it may also be an issue of his offering, as is, for example, the case when just one click from the buyer is enough to accept the offer.70 Finally, in Art. 11 par. 1. line 2, the EU E-Commerce Directive states that not only an order but also an acknowledgment of receipt of an order will be considered received when the party to whom it is addressed is able to access it. Finally, another dilemma could be pointed out regarding the permissibility of sending commercial communications by email. Our legislation permits to do so only with the prior consent of the person to whom such communication is intended.71 Interestingly, the Law on Electronic Legal and Business Transactions of BiH, which should serve as a framework law, contains a slightly different solution. Namely, under this Law, a service provider may send emails without the prior consent of the recipient, provided that the commercial nature of such a message is clearly and unambiguously recognizable. The recipient, if he does not wish to receive such messages, must register on a list (or register) kept by the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH.72 The solution of the Law on the level of BiH is less favorable for the recipient of the communication, as he must engage himself in order to exclude the possibility of receiving unwanted communications. This option is called the optout system, as opposed to the first opt-in system, where traders are allowed 68 Law on Electronic Legal and Business Transactions of BiH, Art. 8 par. 3. 69 See Steven Gallagher, “Contracting in cyberspace - a minefield for the unwary,” Computer Law & Security Report, vol. 16. no. 2 (2000): 103-104. Also, similar for the US law: Genc Trnavci, “Zaključenje, punovažnost i dokazivanje elektronskih ugovora: komparativna analiza,” 461. 70 See: Paul Richards, Law of Contract, (Harlow: 2011), 23. 71 Law on Electronic Commerce of Republic of Srpska, Art. 6. 72 Law on Electronic Legal and Business Transactions of BiH, Art. 17. 168 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova to send messages only to those who explicitly ask for it, while in relation to others they have to seek prior consent.73 Here too, it could be criticized the existence of too many examples of non-compliance of the legislation. In any case, the provision at the level of Republic of Srpska has an imperative character, while the provision at the level of BiH could be interpreted as dispositive pursuant to the norm of Art. 4 of this Law. 5. CONCLUSION With the development of e-commerce, the importance of legislative intervention to prevent legal anarchy in this area of law enforcement is growing. The Republic of Srpska, as well as BiH, has responded to this challenge by adopting a set of laws that regulate the issue of electronic communications between a broader circle of subjects, and among other, businesses entities. The adopted provisions rely on the sources of European Union law in the reviewed field. The aforementioned legal acts define the method of creating and forming the content of electronic instruments of communications (documents, signatures, seals, etc.), which must be applied in practice, in order to recognize their legal validity, and thus to equalize the legal force of legal actions that take place electronically, with those conducted in the traditional form. However, there are still practical problems that prevent the implementation of the adopted provisions in full capacity. Thus, for example, in the field of registration of business entities, a platform for electronic registration has not yet been created, and only the first qualified certification bodies necessary for the creation of qualified electronic signatures are registered, although legal solutions have been in place for years. These and other shortcomings inevitably slow down the development of e-commerce in our market. However, in the future, the realization of legal relations electronically in our country should go ascending, together with the modernization of the technology necessary for monitoring this process and raising the level of expertise of the persons involved in it. The legal basis, though with minimal intrusion into traditional contract law, is made. The importance of such an approach is to prevent the creation of a dual legal regime, ie. in facilitating the application of traditional contract law, unless otherwise is provided by special provisions in the field of electronic commerce. Certainly, e-commerce has a reverse ef73 The countries of the European Union are also divided on the solution to this dilemma. See Emilia Cotoi, “The Conclusion of Electronic Contract,” Annals & Proceedings of DAAAM International, vol. 22, no. 1 (2011): 0528. 169 Zoran Vasiljević fect on traditional law, especially in the domain of its deterritorialization, and often depersonalization. What the legislation should do is to find more precise solutions to certain legal loopholes that have been noticed in practice (eg, defining the electronic contract form) and align legal solutions both at different and the same level of government and even within one and the same legal text (e.g., specifying when an acknowledgment of receipt is received). LITERATURE 1. Cotoi, Emilia. “The conclusion of electronic contract.” Annals & Proceedings of DAAAM International, vol. 22, no. 1 (2011): 0527-0528. 2. Davidson, Alan. The Law of Electronic Commerce. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 3. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic Commerce), Official Journal of European Union, L 178, 17.07.2000. 4. Divljak, Drago. “Harmonizacija pravila o elektronskoj trgovini i pravo Srbije.” Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, no. 3 (2018), 909-923, doi: 10.5937/zrpfns52-18796. 5. Divljak, Drago. “Pravno dejstvo elektronskih potpisa u međunarodnoj regulativi i pravu Srbije.” Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, no. 2 (2019), 347-362, doi:10.5937/zrpfns53-23127. 6. Gabriel, Henry D. “The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records.” Uniform Law Review., vol. 24 (2019): 261-280, doi:10.1093/ulr/ unz013. 7. Gallagher, Steven. “Contracting in cyberspace – a minefield for the unwary.” Computer Law & Security Report, vol. 16, no. 2 (2000): 101-104. 8. Gu, Juntao and Zhu, Xiaodong. “Designing and Implementation of an Online System for Electronic Contract Negotiation Based on Electronic Signature.” Journal of Software, vol. 9, no. 12 (december 2014): 3020-3027, doi:10.4304/ jsw.9.12.3030-3027. 9. Hoeren, Thomas. “Electronic commerce and law – some fragmentary thoughts on the future of internet regulation from a German perspective.” Computer Law & Security Report, vol. 16, no. 1 (2000): 113-117. 10. Karanikolas, Nikolaos A. “Digital Signature Legality in Different Jurisdictions: Legally Binding Issues.” Master thesis, University of Thessaloniki, 2019. 170 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 11. Kaufman Winn, Jane and Haubold, Jens. “Electronic Promises: Contract Law Reform and E-Commerce in a Comparative Perspective.” EU Law Report, no. 25 (2002), 1-31. 12. Law on Electronic Document, Official Gazette of BiH, no. 58/2014. 13. Law on Electronic Document of the Republic of Srpska, Official Gazette of RS, no. 106/2015. 14. Law on Electronic Document, Electronic Identification and Services of Confidence in Electronic Commerce, Oficial Gazette of Rep. Serbia, no. 94/2017. 15. Law on Electronic Commerce of the Republic of Srpska, Official Gazette of RS, no. 33/2016, 59/2009. 16. Law on Electronic Legal and Business Transactions, Official Gazette of BiH, no. 126/2007. 17. Law on Electronic Signature, Official Gazette of BiH, no. 91/2006. 18. Law on Electronic Signature of the Republic of Srpska, Official Gazette of RS, no. 106/2015, 83/2019. 19. Mason, Stephen. “Documents signed or executed with electronic signatures in English law.” Computer Law & Security Review, no. 34 (2018): 933-944. 20. Radovanović, Sanja M. and Miščević, Nikolina B. “O elektronskoj formi ugovora u domaćem pravu.” Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, no. 4 (2018): 1641-1659, doi: 10.5937/zrpfns52-20325. 21. Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, Official journal of the European Union, L 257/101, 28.08.2014. 22. Richards, Paul. Law of Contract. Harlow: Pearson, 2011. 23. Trnavci, Genc. “Zaključenje, punovažnost i dokazivanje elektronskih ugovora: komparativna analiza.” Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, vol. 30, no. 1 (2009), 449-470. 171 Original scientific paper UDK ELECTRONIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PARADIGM SHIFT OR A STATUS QUO? Aleksandar Mojašević1 Faculty of Law, University of Niš Dejan Vučetić2 Faculty of Law, University of Niš Abstract: In recent years, the attention of the legal and general public worldwide has been increasingly captured by electronic or online dispute resolution (ODR). Online legal innovations take the form of various alternative e-commerce dispute resolution platforms as well as platforms for resolving various legal issues, conflicts and disputes in family law matters, for example. Moreover, online innovations are also being implemented in criminal, civil and administrative matters within the jurisdictions of some countries, such as England and Wales. This paper aims to present and compare the various online dispute resolution systems developed thus far in some countries, and to discuss their prospects and the prospects of traditional dispute resolution methods. In particular, this research focuses on online innovations in the field of dispute resolution in the Republic of Serbia, their current level of development as compared to other countries, and their prospective development. The authors address the key question: is the domestic legal and general public prepared for a paradigm shift in dispute resolution and, if so, to what extent? For this purpose, a relevant sample survey was conducted. Keywords: electronic (online) dispute resolution, legal online innovations, paradigm shift. 1 PhD, Associate Professor 2 PhD, Associate Professor This article is the result of research within the program funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia (contract number 451-03-68/2020-14/200120). 173 Aleksandar Mojašević, Dejan Vučetić DISPUTE RESOLUTION PLATFORMS: CONCEPT AND TYPES The concept of a paradigm shift was for the first time introduced to public by American philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (Thomas Samuel Kuhn, 1922-1996) in his famous book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.3 Although Kuhn initially used the concept to describe the processes in natural sciences, its use has been extended to social sciences to point to the fundamental change in perception of things. In jurisprudence, there was a traditionally accepted consensus that legal disputes can only be resolved by courts under the specifically designed procedures (in civil, criminal and administrative proceedings). This perception has started changing in the last decade of the XX and in the first decades of the XXI century, upon the introduction of various alternative dispute resolution methods (ADR).4 Furthermore, in addition to dispute resolution methods which involve the direct contact of a third party (a judge, an arbitrator or a mediator) and the disputing parties, the development of technology has introduced another form of dispute resolution method – electronic or online dispute resolution (ODR). At the international level5, in the US and more recently in Europe, this system is becoming increasingly popular, above all, for the settlement of disputes between parties (contracting parties) in e-commerce. In particular, at the EU level, a special legal act (Directive 2013/11/EU)6 was adopted to unify the dispute resolution system, primarily in the e-commerce domain.7 The Directive aims to ensure that consumers can voluntarily submit complaints against traders to entities offering independent, fast and fair ADR (Article 1). These ADR procedures are available both online and offline, without charge or at a nominal fee, and provide an outcome within 90 days (Article 8).8 3 See: Tomas Kun, Struktura naučnih revolucija (Beograd: Nolit, 1974). The book was translated into Serbian in 1974. 4 Aleksandar Mojašević, Ekonomska analiza medijacije – teorijsko-empirijska studija [Economic Analysis of Mediation: a theoretical-empirical study] (Niš: Pravni fakultet, 2014); Dejan Vučetić, “Is mediation viable in administrative matters?,” Facta Universitatis – Law and Politics, vol. 14, no. 4 (2016): 495-504. 5 See an overview of relevant sources of the UN Commission on International Trade Law on online dispute resolution, https://uncitral.un.org/en/library/online_resources/online_dispute_resolution, accessed March 3, 2020 6 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (“Directive on Consumer ADR”), OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 63-79. 7 The second very important legal act is the Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters (“Mediation Directive”), OJ L 136, 24.5.2008, p. 3-8. 8 For more on Directive on Consumer ADR, see: Aleksandar Mojašević and Ljubica Nikolić, “Online Dispute Resolution and Electronic Commerce,” Collection of Pappers of Faculty of Law Niš, no.76 (2017): 645-649. 174 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Based on the Regulation (EU) No 524/2013,9 the European Commission (EC) has created a special e-commerce dispute resolution platform: The European Online Dispute Resolution Platform (hereinafter: ODR platform),10 which started operating in February 2016 in accordance with the provisions of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1051.11 According to the available data,12 260 special dispute resolution bodies from European countries are registered on this ODR platform. During the first year of operation, over 24,000 consumers lodged complaints, of which more than a third concerned cross-border trade within the EU. Most of the disputes involved the purchase of wardrobe and footwear, airline tickets or technology products. For example, a Luxembourg customer (buyer) complained about an online car rental service provided by a Greek dealer. The platform successfully forwarded the complaint to the Greek competent authority and the dispute was resolved within two months; the dealer was obliged to fully reimburse additional rental costs to the buyer. Also, at the EU level, there is a specialized financial dispute platform: Financial Dispute Resolution Network (FIN-NET).13 In some EU countries, such as Spain, there is a special e-commerce dispute resolution platform, the Electronic Consumer Dispute Resolution (ECODIR).14 A highly developed online divorce service exists in the Netherlands (Dutch Rechtwijzer Divorce platform).15 In addition to the European ODR platform, large companies also have ecommerce dispute resolution platforms. Such is the world-renowned Ebay Company,16 which allows online auction purchase and sale of products and services through an interactive website, or Alibaba,17 which resolves about one 9 See: Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/ EC (“Regulation on Consumer ODR”), OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 1-12. 10 See: https://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/main/?event=main.trader.register, accessed March 3, 2020. 11 See: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1051 of 1 July 2015 on the modalities for the exercise of the functions of the online dispute resolution platform, on the modalities of the electronic complaint form and on the modalities of the cooperation between contact points provided for in Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes, p. 1-4. 12 Data, and example below, downloaded from Internet, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-727_ en.htm. accessed January 22, 2020. 13 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/consumer-finance-and-payments/retail-financial-services/financial-dispute-resolution-network-fin-net_en, accessed January 3, 2020. 14 See: http://www.ecodir.org 15 See: http://www.hiil.org/insight/rechtwijzer-press-release 16 See: http://www.ebay.com/ 17 See: https://www.alibaba.com/ 175 Aleksandar Mojašević, Dejan Vučetić million disputes electronically every day, 70% of which are resolved without any human intervention.18 Platforms for online dispute resolution of various types of disputes or legal issues are also being developed outside the EU. For example, in British Columbia (Canada), the Legal Services Society of British Columbia has a special platform (MyLawBC)19 that allows people to come up with useful information and “tools” to resolve various legal issues. This service also offers self-help for resolving disputes in divorce cases. According to the Council of Europe study on online dispute resolution mechanisms, Canada’s Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT) is “the only ODR system in the world that is fully integrated into the justice system”.20 The system provides full support to condominium property and small claims disputes resolution, including “interactive information pathways, tools, and in a tiered structure, a variety of dispute resolution methods including negotiation, facilitation and, if necessary, adjudication.”21 First, the disputed issue is analyzed with the online tool (Solution Explorer) through a series of questions in order to help the party decide whether he/she will initiate online dispute resolution procedure. After that, the party can file a claim with the CRT by entering all necessary data and documents online. This can be done only once. Then, the System notifies the other party (or parties) about the claim and offers the possibility of direct negotiation between the parties, providing them with necessary resource to do that. If the negotiation phase was not successful, the next phase is the facilitation with the professional facilitator; this phase is primarily conducted by humans on the CRT platform. If settlement cannot be reached, the dispute enters its third phase, the resolution. Dispute is resolved by the tribunal member, expert lawyer, who conducts the adjudicative process which “is very similar to that of other large administrative tribunals”, upon which the CRT issues a binding decision.22 18 Jin Ho Verdonschot, “Online Mediation and Dispute Resolution: Legal and Practical Issues,” In The Implementation of the Mediation Directive, ed. Rosa Raffaelli (Brussels: Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2016), 98, accessed January 3, 2020. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/571395/IPOL_ IDA(2016)571395_EN.pdf. 19 See: http://mylawbc.com/ 20 Council of Europe, European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ), Technical Study on Online Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (Prepared by Julia Hӧrnle, Matthew Hewitson and Illia Chernohorenko), Strasbourgh, 2018, https://rm.coe.int/cdcj-2018-5e-technical-study-odr/1680913249, accessed March 16, 2020. 21 Idem, 45-46. 22 Shannon Salter, ‘ODR and Justice System Integration: B.C.’s Civil Resolution Tribunal’ (2017) at pg. 13, according to Council of Europe, European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ), Technical Study on Online Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, Strasbourgh, 2018, p. 46 (footnote 20). 176 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova In Serbia, the field of e-commerce is regulated by a lex specialis – the Ecommerce Act,23 which took effects in 2009, but it was significantly amended in 2019.24 Despite the legal regulations that follow the current legislative trends and the increasing number of e-commerce users,25 we cannot speak of a developed electronic trade in Serbia. This is supported by the fact that almost half of the domestic Internet users (45.5%) have never purchased goods or services electronically.26 However, some domestic e-commerce platforms, such as Limundo or Kupindo,27 offer online dispute resolution by initiating a complaint product process where the platform service provider, after verifying the allegations in the complaint, decides in favor of the seller or the buyer. This is a kind of online arbitration. Moreover, the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications of the Republic of Serbia has a special platform for consumer protection.28 Within this platform, there is the possibility of submitting consumer complaints electronically.29 To this end, the National Consumer Complaints Register30 has been set up to enable consumers to be informed of their rights and to file a complaint in a very simple way if they believe that their consumer rights have been threatened and/or violated. Otherwise, consumer protection associations31 registered with the competent Ministry make decisions based on these complaints. 23 Zakon o elektronskoj trgovini, “Službeni glasnik RS”, br. 41/2009, 95/2013 i 52/2019 [Electronic Commerce Act, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, no. 41/2009, 95/2013 and 52/2019]. 24 The amendments to the E-commerce Act are aimed at removing barriers to e-commerce and are part of the process of harmonizing our regulations with EU regulations. Some of the significant innovations are: 1) in addition to a legal entity, an individual may also be an information society service provider of (non-commercial) information (Article 3); 2) the sending of commercial messages by electronic means is allowed only with the prior consent of the person for whom such message is intended (Article 8); freedom to provide cross-border services is prescribed and the conditions under which it may be restricted (Article 5a); the information society service provider is obliged to remove the inadmissible content without delay, not later than two working days from the day of receipt of the act of the body competent for implementation and acting under the law whose provision has been violated, ordering to remove the inadmissible content (Article 7); the information society service provider who transmits the electronic messages delivered by the user is obliged to keep the information about the information society service user and, in particular, the IP address from which the user accesses the information society services during the provision of the information society service, at least 30 days after the service is terminated, etc. 25 The number of e-commerce users has increased 1.7 times over the past seven-year period: from 18% of the total number of Internet users in 2011 to 30.9% in 2018, accessed January 22, 2020, https://mtt.gov.rs/slider/ pocetak-projekta-jacanje-%d0%b5-%d1%82rgovine-u-srbiji/?script=lat 26 Idem. 27 See: http://www.limundo.com/; https://www.kupindo.com/ 28 See: https://zastitapotrosaca.gov.rs/ 29 The legal basis for consumer protection in Serbia is Zakon o zaštiti potrošača, “Službeni glasnik RS”, br. 62/2014, 6/2016 - dr. zakon i 44/2018 – dr. zakon [Consumer Protection Act, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, no. 62/2014, 6/2016 - another Law, 44/2018 – another Law]. 30 See: https://zapotrosace.gov.rs/ 31 These are three associations, all based in Belgrade: the Consumer Center of Serbia (http://www.ceps.rs/), the Consumer Protection Association (http://www.zastitapotrosaca.com/), and the National Consumer Or- 177 Aleksandar Mojašević, Dejan Vučetić ONLINE INNOVATIONS IN THE JUDICIARY Online innovations are also present in the jurisdictions of certain countries. For example, in England and Wales, there are programs for the development of online criminal courts32 or civil courts (for small claim litigations).33 Such courts facilitate parties’ access to justice and largely simulate the existing litigation in a digital environment. Besides, there is a tendency in England to develop innovative hybrid methods for resolving disputes of up to £ 25,000, which are a combination of online trials and ADR methods, with minimal lawyer assistance.34 As for the ODR of administrative disputes, things are moving at a much slower pace, but in the right direction. In this area, most countries have implemented some kind of document management system (DMS) for the online filing of claims against the administrative bodies. It includes Serbia, where it is possible to file a claim with all additional documents and evidence over the web page of the Administrative Court of Serbia.35 Two countries (Netherland and Portugal) have gone furthest when it comes to the ODR in administrative law cases. In Netherland, the Ministry of Security and Justice and the Council for the Judiciary have developed an ambitious program for the modernization of the judiciary which includes a mandatory digital procedure in civil and administrative cases.36 In compliance with the envisaged program, the new legislation was enacted in July 2016, with the ultimate goal to preclude paper communication and make the digital procedure standard in both civil and administrative cases. Following this strategic goal, ever since June 2017, all asylum cases have been resolved in a full digital capacity.37 Portugal has also developed a special online platform designed for administrative courts.38 Both states have gone furthest towards “creating an ganization of Serbia (http: //www.nops.org.rs/). 32 See: Michael Cross, “Transforming justice: digital courts get green light in £1bn initiative,” The Law Society Gazzete, September 15, 2016, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/transforming-justice-digital-courts-getgreen-light-in-1bn-initiative/5057639.article 33 See: Neil Rose, “Government and judges urge lawyers to innovate as era of online justice and fixed fees approaches,” Legal Futures, September 15, 2016, http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/government-judgesurge-lawyers-innovate-era-online-justice-fixed-fees-approaches 34 See: John Hyde, “‘Minimal assistance’ from lawyers in online court,” The Law Society Gazzete, July 27, 2016, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/briggs-online-court-needs-minimal-assistance-from-lawyers/5056850.article 35 The online system of the Administrative Court of Serbia also provides other services, such as: case monitoring, etc. See: http://www.up.sud.rs 36 Council of Europe, European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ), Technical Study on Online Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, Strasbourgh, 2018, p. 34. 37 Although these cannot be strictly considered as a complete ODR system, according to the authors of the Technical Study on Online Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (idem). 38 See: www.taf.mj.pt. 178 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova online platform where court users can file and access statements, evidence, and court documents online and incorporating synchronous communication channels such as video-conferencing, thus replacing traditional courts.”39 Many other states provide secure and authenticated filing of claims by using e-signatures, with the possibility to access the case files upon authentication (Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Slovakia, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova, Turkey, and the Czech Republic).40 Generally, numerous electronic platforms for resolving various types of disputes/conflicts/legal issues are more developed in the world than in Serbia. It gives rise to a number of related questions: How much do our citizens know about electronic ways of resolving disputes/conflicts? What is their experience with online dispute resolution? Are they familiar with the legal matter governing this area, and to what extent? Seeking to find answers to these questions, we have conducted an empirical study, whose results are presented in the next part of this paper. The answers to these questions are important because they can help the policy makers in Serbia and serve as guidelines in view of the factors that have to be considered in order to increase the efficiency in dispute resolution. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH Sample description and method of conducting the research The empirical research on a convenient sample was conducted in December 2019. A total of 88 respondents were surveyed (N = 88, 62.5% female, 37.5% male). In terms of age, 80 respondents (91%) were between 20 and 50 years old, six respondents (6.8%) were between 50 and 60 years old, one respondent was below the age of 20 and one respondent was below the age of 60. The vast majority of respondents (69 or 78.4%) were employed, six respondents (6.8%) were unemployed, and 13 respondents (14.8%) were students. In terms of place of residence, 84 respondents (95.5%) live in the city, while four (4.5%) live in the countryside. When it comes to education, 33 respondents (37.5%) completed their doctoral studies, 22 respondents (25%) completed undergraduate studies, 20 respondents (22.7%) completed master’s degree 39 Council of Europe, European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ), Technical Study on Online Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, Strasbourgh, 2018, p. 43. 40 Idem. 179 Aleksandar Mojašević, Dejan Vučetić studies, 8 respondents (9.1%) graduated from a college, and 5 respondents (5.7%) had a secondary/high school education. The survey was conducted through an electronic survey, specially designed for research purposes.41 Respondents were asked to express their preferences regarding the electronic way of resolving disputes/conflicts by answering a total of eleven short and simple questions. The goal of the survey was twofold. First, it was intended to check their level of knowledge, i.e. whether they have relevant information on electronic ways of resolving disputes/conflicts and on the legal matter in this area. Second, it was to determine whether the respondents had any experience in resolving disputes/conflicts electronically (online). The starting hypothesis of our research was that the respondents did not have sufficient knowledge and relevant information regarding this method of dispute/conflict resolution and, accordingly, little or no experience in this regard. SURVEY RESULTS When asked whether they were generally familiar with electronic dispute resolution, 84 out of 88 respondents (95.5%) said they were unfamiliar with the ODR and a very small percentage of respondents (4.5%) said they were familiar with the ODR (Graph 1). When asked to name one of the electronic dispute resolution platforms, the following answers were obtained: ODR, AskGamblers.com, and the European Platform for Internet Dispute Resolution – Consumer Protection. 41 A Google form questionnaire was distributed to respondents. A total of 139 questionnaires were sent to various e-mail addresses, a total of 88 respondents replied. It follows that the response rate is 63.3%, while 51 potential respondents (36.6%) did not respond. 180 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Graph 1. Test question: Are you generally familiar with the electronic way of resolving disputes? As the vast majority of respondents are not familiar with the ODR at all, a logical answer to the question regarding experience in resolving disputes/ conflicts electronically followed; thus, 97.7% of respondents had no experience, while only two respondents (2,3%) said they had experience with ODR (Graph 2). The respondents who had the experience listed three electronic platforms: market.metalac.com, online.bankaintesa.rs, and Facebook. When asked what kind of experience they had, we received one negative response (the dispute not resolved) and three positive responses (dispute resolved).42 On the question concerning the type of dispute in which they had the experience, four respondents reported to have participated in a consumer dispute, two respondents participated in a family dispute, one respondent was involved in a “conflict in the College of Technical Studies”, and one respondent was involved in a dispute on “services”.43 When asked whether they are familiar with electronic dispute resolution in Serbia, the answers were similar: 86 respondents (97.7%) said they were unfamiliar. Accordingly, no one has listed any of the domestic online dispute resolution platforms. 42 Since only two respondents said they had experience in electronic dispute resolution, and three positive and one negative response about the experience (positive/negative) have been received, it leads us to conclude that some respondents did not read well and/or did not understood the questions well and did not answer consistently. Because there are extremely few respondents who did not consistently answer, the basic findings of the survey cannot be called into question. 43 Similar comment as in previous footnote. It is also possible that some respondents had experience in some dispute/conflict, but not in its resolution, and therefore there is a discrepancy in the number of answers received to two related but different questions. 181 Aleksandar Mojašević, Dejan Vučetić Graph 2. Test question: Have you ever had any experience in electronic dispute resolution? The next question concerned the respondent’s knowledge about the law governing this area. A total of 77 respondents (87.5%) said that they did not know which laws (legislative acts) regulated this area (Graph 3). Eleven respondents (12.5%) said they knew something about it. Of these eleven, six respondents mentioned the Electronic Commerce Act, one respondent mentioned the Electronic Communications Act, one respondent mentioned the Peaceful Dispute Resolution Act, and one respondent mentioned the Electronic Document Act. Graph 3. Test question: Do you know which legislative acts regulate electronic dispute resolution? In terms of the perspective of electronic dispute resolution in Serbia, midscale responses dominate: 39 respondents (44.3%) said that the perspective 182 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova was moderate, 25 respondents (28.4%) said that it was low, 10 respondents (11.4%) said it was strong, and five respondents (9.1%) said it was excellent. Graph 4. Test question: What is the perspective of electronic dispute resolution in Serbia? Finally, in the comments section, fourteen respondents made the following comments on the subject of electronic dispute resolution: 1. “A faster way to resolve disputes, without wasting time, but perhaps riskier.” 2. “The court does not recognize it. It continues to demand in court proceedings that the documentation be stamped with the company seal and signed ...” 3. “It did not come to life because neither banks nor state institutions can explain how it works...” 4. “It is necessary to raise the citizens’ awareness about the importance of this topic. In my opinion, regardless of educational background, people are generally either unaware of or do not recognize all the benefits of the ODR. In this regard, I think that there should be lectures on this topic, which will eliminate many dilemmas.” 5. “Right now, I don’t think that the general public is aware of the ODR possibilities.” 6. “I believe that education of young people might contribute that a new generation would successfully use platforms for out-of-court dispute resolution. On the other hand, there is a huge number of people who can’t use electronic communication devices, and thus would have limited access to the ODR.” 7. “I don’t have enough information.” 183 Aleksandar Mojašević, Dejan Vučetić 8. “I think it will be hard for our people to accept electronic dispute resolution; they see courts as a safer way, just as banks are still crowded with clients who want to pay their bills traditionally.” 9. “Obviously, this is a new way of communication with business partners (in commerce, finance) through the website. Given the level of digitization and education of most citizens, it will take time for this mode of business to reach primacy. There is some risk at this stage of implementation and many people do not have trust in ODR, among other things, due to the low level of protection during (possible) dispute resolution.” 10. “I would like it to come to life. I think it would be a more economical and efficient way, it would be timely and the bureaucracy would be reduced.” 11. “I was not familiar with the ODR; the media should inform the public; it needs to come to life and we should use it and of course, the ODR in Serbia should keep pace with other platforms in the more developed countries.” 12. “Unaware of electronic dispute resolution platforms.” 13. “I’m not familiar.” 14. “I would support an electronic dispute resolution method. I have no experience and do not know exactly what it is about, so I would love to hear more about this in the media.” CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION The general findings of the survey can be summarized in several points. The first and very important finding is that respondents are not familiar with electronic ways of resolving disputes/conflicts. On the one hand, this finding indicates a general lack of awareness of this type of dispute resolution/conflict and, on the other hand, the respondents’ greater familiarity with traditional dispute resolution methods, primarily the judicial proceedings. As the vast majority of respondents are highly educated people, this result is indicative. Therefore, if highly educated people do not know or do not know enough about electronic dispute resolution methods, it is likely that this percentage is higher among people of lower level of education (secondary or elementary school). This is a premise that needs to be tested in future research. Second, respondents have no experience in electronic dispute resolution/ conflict resolution. Taking into account the previous finding about the lack of knowledge about the ODR, such a result is quite logical. Of course, to ex- 184 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova perience electronic (or any other) dispute resolution, disputes/conflicts have to occur at all (most commonly in e-commerce). But, logically, disputes are not so frequent as compared to the regular flow of business relationships (for example, between buyers and sellers in e-commerce). As noted in the introduction, the percentage of those doing business electronically in Serbia is lower than the percentage of those doing business traditionally; yet, it does not mean that in the latter case the possible dispute cannot be resolved through some of the known online platforms. On the other hand, even when disputes do occur, people’s lack of awareness of the ODR can only result in a higher frequency of using traditional dispute resolution methods. Thus, the general lack of awareness of the ODR in Serbia is a matter of considerable concern. Third, the respondents are not aware of the legislative acts governing this matter. This finding logically follows the previous two and indicates that the general lack of information is related not only to platforms through which dispute/conflict can be resolved but also to the legal dimension of e-commerce and dispute resolution. The latest changes to the domestic E-Commerce Act should be seen in light of this fact. Namely, if people do not even know what law regulates this matter, then the efforts of the competent Ministry, in addition to changing the regulation, should primarily be aimed at informing people about e-commerce and resolving disputes electronically. Relying on the presented research results, we send general messages to the key actors of dispute resolution policy: the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Trade, and Consumer Associations. First of all, the affirmation of modern dispute resolution methods cannot be achieved if citizens are uninformed or if we expected that they will get informed themselves. Information should go in three directions: general education, information on the electronic platforms (domestic and foreign), and information on consumer rights and other legal rights. The cost of greater involvement of key actors in this area will certainly be offset by the cost savings achieved by the increased frequency of online dispute resolution. These costs include the cost of operating an expensive state (court) apparatus, the cost of hiring lawyers, and especially the opportunity costs of resources that could have been used in another more productive way. The electronic way of resolving disputes is certainly of the greatest benefit to the citizens themselves, as they will be able not only to resolve disputes in a cheaper and faster way but also with a greater degree of satisfaction. Therefore, all stakeholders have some benefit: the state or, more precisely, taxpayers, and the potential parties (consumers). 185 Aleksandar Mojašević, Dejan Vučetić After informing the citizens, the second step would be to consider introducing online dispute resolution platforms in the Serbian judiciary, modeled on the English judiciary. While this may seem like a “giant step”, the main motivation should be to save significant resources absorbed by the judicial way of resolving disputes. There is a trade-off between litigation and extrajudicial dispute resolution. In general, there are no barriers to the affirmation of (online) mediation and other alternative dispute resolution methods (ADR) in Serbia.44 Particularly encouraging is our research finding that almost two-thirds of the respondents have a fundamentally positive attitude towards the prospects of electronic dispute resolution. In this regard, a “cheerful” tone prevails in the respondents’ comments. So, if the citizens are provided accurate and reliable information, and if the efforts of policymakers become even more visible, the alternative (online and offline) dispute resolution methods may be implemented concurrently in Serbia. But, there are some risks in the process of affirmation and implementation of alternative (online and offline) dispute resolution methods. Some authors45 distinguish the following risks: 1) disputing parties will be denied an independent judicial assessment; 2) disputants will settle their disputes without having a prior access to independent legal advice; 3) mediators or other decision-makers are inadequately qualified for the ODR; 4) disputants have an inadequate understanding of the available dispute resolution methods; 5) the identification of the online decision-makers may not be possible; 6) mediation is under-used; and 7) there is a possibility of abuse of the power of large governmental or commercial entities in the ADR process. In that context, it is necessary to establish a balance between the traditional judicial and the ADR dispute resolution methods. One solution that Serbian policymakers need to consider is to introduce a multi-door courthouse, modeled on similar ones in the United States46 or some EU member states;47 it entails a dispute resolution center in courts which offer an array of options for 44 For the in-depth analysis of mediation and other alternative dispute resolution methods, see: Felix Steffek, “The Relationship between Mediation and Other Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution,” In The Implementation of the Mediation Directive, ed. Rosa Raffaelli (Brussels: Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2016), 43-69, accessed March 4, 2020, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ IDAN/2016/571395/IPOL_ IDA(2016)571395_EN.pdf 45 See: Geoffrey Vos, “The Relationship between Formal and Informal Justice: the Courts and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR),” In The Implementation of the Mediation Directive, ed. Rosa Raffaelli (Brussels: Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2016), 36-38, accessed 3 March 2020 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/571395/IPOL_ IDA(2016)571395_EN.pdf. 46 For more details, see: Gladys Kessler and Linda J. Finkelstein, “The Evolution of a Multi-Door Courthouse,” Catholic University Law Review 37, no. 3 (Spring 1988): 577-590. 47 Vos, “The Relationship between Formal and Informal Justice,” 40. 186 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova resolving legal disputes (litigation, mediation, arbitration, conciliation, etc). Thus, any disputant can access the court-house and be directed to the adequate justice service provider, after being subjected to a triage process aimed at determining the most appropriate way for resolving the dispute. Another approach is to introduce purely private web-based dispute resolution models that might have the same effect as the multi-door courthouse model. The first solution seems to be more appropriate for Serbia, at least at this stage of technological and cultural development. Finally, there is a potential for the development of individual private ADR (online and offline) providers in Serbia. The state should have an active but not excessive role in encouraging and regulating this ADR market. The general recommendation is that innovations should be introduced wherever cost savings can be achieved in dispute resolution. Modern technology actually serves that goal – to increase efficiency in dispute resolution (and greater party satisfaction) by “taking” the role of the mediator in dispute resolution. Thus, why not put technology to good use? REFERENCES: 1. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1051 of 1 July 2015 on the modalities for the exercise of the functions of the online dispute resolution platform, on the modalities of the electronic complaint form and on the modalities of the cooperation between contact points provided for in Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes, p. 1-4. 2. Council of Europe, European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ). Technical Study on Online Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, Strasbourg, 2018, https://rm.coe.int/cdcj-2018-5e-technical-study-odr/1680913249. 3. Cross, Michael. “Transforming justice: digital courts get green light in £1bn initiative.” The Law Society Gazzete, September 15, 2016. 4. https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/transforming-justice-digital-courts-getgreen-light-in-1bn initiative/5057639.article 5. 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Hyde, John. “‘Minimal assistance’ from lawyers in online court.” The Law Society Gazzete, July 27, 2016, 25. https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/briggs-online-court-needs-minimalassistance-from-lawyers/5056850.article 26. Kessler, Gladys and Linda J. Finkelstein. “The Evolution of a Multi-Door Courthouse.” Catholic University Law Review 37, no. 3 (Spring 1988): 577-590. 27. Kun, Tomas. Struktura naunih revolucija [The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]. Beograd, Nolit, 1974. 28. Mojašević, Aleksandar. Ekonomska analiza medijacije (teorijsko-empirijska studija) [Economic Analysis of Mediation: a theoretical-empirical study]. Niš: Pravni fakultet, 2014. 188 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 29. Mojašević, Aleksandar and Ljubica Nikolić. “Online Dispute Resolution and Electronic Commerce.” Collection of Pappers of Faculty of Law Niš, no. 76 (2017): 641-657. 30. Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (“Regulation on Consumer ODR”), OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, p. 1-12. 31. Rose, Neil. “Government and judges urge lawyers to innovate as era of online justice and fixed fees approaches.” Legal Futures, September 15, 2016. 32. http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/government-judges-urge-lawyersinnovate-era-online-justice-fixed-fees-approaches 33. Salter, Shannon. “Online Dispute Resolution and Justice System Integration: British Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal.” Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice/Recueil annuel de Windsor d’accès à la justice, 2017, 34.1: 112-129. 34. Steffek, Felix. “The Relationship between Mediation and Other Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution.” In The Implementation of the Mediation Directive, ed. Rosa Raffaelli (Brussels: Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2016), 43-69, accessed March 4, 2020, 35. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/571395/IPOL_ IDA(2016)571395_EN.pdf 36. Verdonschot, Jin Ho. “Online Mediation and Dispute Resolution: Legal and Practical Issues.” In The Implementation of the Mediation Directive, edited by Rosa Raffaelli, 95-110. Brussels: Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2016. Accessed January 3, 2020. 37. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/571395/IPOL_ IDA(2016)571 95_EN.pdf. 38. Vos, Geoffrey. “The Relationship between Formal and Informal Justice: the Courts and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).” In The Implementation of the Mediation Directive, ed. Rosa Raffaelli (Brussels: Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2016), 31-42, accessed March 3, 2020, 39. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/571395/IPOL_ IDA(2016)571395_EN.pdf 40. Vučetić. Dejan. “Is mediation viable in administrative matters? ” FACTA UNIVERSITATIS-Law and Politics 14 (4), Niš, 2016, 495-504. 41. www.taf.mj.pt 42. Zakon o elektronskoj trgovini, “Službeni glasnik RS”, br. 41/2009, 95/2013 i 52/2019 [Electronic Commerce Act, “Official Gazette of the Rebublic of Serbia”, no. 41/2009, 95/2013 and 52/2019]. 189 Aleksandar Mojašević, Dejan Vučetić 43. Zakon o zaštiti potrošača, “Službeni glasnik RS”, br. 62/2014, 6/2016 - dr. zakon i 44/2018 – dr. zakon [Consumer Protection Act, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, no. 62/2014, 6/2016 - another Law, 44/2018 – another Law]. 190 Original scientific paper UDK MONITORING HUMAN ACTIVITIES AND HEALTH PARAMETERS USING WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK AND MOBILE PHONE Vlado Lukić University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Banja Luka Zlatko Bundalo University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Banja Luka Branko Blanuša University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Banja Luka Abstract: Possibilities and ways of using wireless sensor networks and mobile phones for monitoring of acctivities and health characteristics of people are proposed and described in the paper. It is also proposed and described one practicaly designed and implemented system for monitoring of some activities and some health parameters of people. The system is based on application of microcontroller, wireless sensor network and smart mobile phone. Structure, used elements and possibilities of the system are described. Some legal and ethical aspects and challenges of such applications and of usage of proposed system are also considered and described. Keywords: Human activities, health parameters, digital technologies, digital transformation, microcontroller based systems, wireless sensor networks, mobile phone 1. INTRODUCTION Development of digital and telecommunication technologies enabled implementation and rapid expansion of wireless sensor networks (WSN) application in many fields of human activities. Some of the most important areas of wireless sensor networks application are: military applications, security, buildings, medicine and health, agriculture, traffic and similar. Development of wireless sensor networks has especially contributed to rapid progress in the fields of medicine and health. e-Health is based on application of informa- 191 Vlado Lukić, Zlatko Bundalo, Branko Blanuša tion and communication technologies with the aim of improvement of health services, acquisition of data about health condition of patient in real time, prevention of disease and providing medical services at a distance. m-Health is based on application of mobile information and communication technologies in health (Al-Aubidy at all., 2017, Burchfield at all., 2019, Kumar, 2012, Tmar-Ben Hamida at all., 2015). Possibilities and ways of application of wireless sensor networks and mobile phones for monitoring of acctivities and helth characteristics of people are proposed and described in the paper. It is also proposed and described one practicaly designed and implemented system for monitoring of some activities and some helth parameters of people. Some legal and ethical aspects and challenges of such applications and of usage of proposed system are also considered and described. 2. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS Wireless sensor networks are a field of intelligent sensors of small dimensions that have possibility of measurement, data processing and wireless communication on short distances. Such networks are one of key factors that enable expansion of the Internet to the Internet of things (IoT) and further expansion to the Internet of everything (IoE). Basic characteristics of wireless sensor networks are: short distance wireless communication, low price, mobility of sensor nodes, high accuracy, low energy consumption. Development of wireless sensor networks is moving in the direction of decreasing dimensions, increasing of life cycle of sensors and increasing of speed of operation with the aim of work in real time. Wireless sensor node is a basic element of a wireless sensor networks. There are four basic units of a wireless sensor node: microprocessor unit, sensor unit, receiver/transmitter unit, power supply unit. As optional units also can be used: unit for determination of sensor location, mobilizer, energy generator. Depending on the number, position and purpose of sensor nodes the sensor networks can be of different topologies. Some of the most used network topologies are: tree, star, ring, bus, fully connected network, mesh. The most often practically used standard wireless network technologies for wireless transmission of data are: ZigBee, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity), WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access). All that technologies can be used also in wireless sensor networks. Bluetooth com- 192 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova munication technology was used in the practical implementation of developed system. Bluetooth standard is used for performing of radio connection on distances of 10m to 100m. Bluetooth is operating on free ISM (Industrial, Scientific & Medical) range frequency of 2.4GHz. 3. SMART MOBILE PHONE Smartphone is advanced mobile telephone that combines functions of personal digital assistant and standard mobile phone. It also operates as mobile multimedia player and camera, with high resolution touch-screen display, for access to the Internet, for GPS navigation, for Wi-Fi access. Term smartphone is usually used to indicate that such telephones have more advanced computer possibilities then standard phones. Hardware platform of smart mobile phones is formed around processor for processing of data connected with communication. The second, general purpose processor (Application Processor) performs processing of data necessary for servicing of user interface and user applications. 4. M-HEALTH m-Health belongs to broader area of е-Health. Development of biomedical sensors and mobile devices contributed that m-Health systems can to offer broad range of new services. All that makes that monitoring of the health in house becomes practically possible. It is possible to offer to patients mobile systems for their health monitoring that their can use in their homes. Collected and recorded data from sensors on patient body are transmitted to distant medical centres for further analysis and evaluation of results (Al-Aubidy at all., 2017, Burchfield at all., 2019, Kumar, 2012, Tmar-Ben Hamida at all., 2015).. For communication in m-Health systems are used WBAN (Wireless Body Area Networks) networks. General architecture of WBAN system (Figure 1) consists of three main components: mobile sensors, coordinating device, clinical back-end services (Tmar-Ben Hamida at all., 2015). 193 Vlado Lukić, Zlatko Bundalo, Branko Blanuša Figure 1 Architecture of WBAN networks based m-Health system 5. SYSTEM FOR MONITORING OF PERSON MOVEMENT AND FALL DETECTION Practically designed and implemented system is based on sensor node that patient carries with him/her and that is by wireless way connected to smartphone of user. For realization of the system were used Arduino Uno platform, 3-axis gyroscope and accelerometer MPU-6050, Bluetooth module HC-06 and smartphone (“ArduinoUNO”, “MPU6050 Interfacing With Arduino UNO”, “Connect Android device to Arduino via HC-06 Bluetooth module”, 2019). Figure 2 shows block diagram of implemented system (Figure 2). Accelerometer is connected to Arduino Uno platform that performs A/D conversion. Arduino Uno platform receives data about acceleration and performs algorithms for detection of activities and fall of the person (user). Sending data to smartphone was realized by Bluetooth module HC-06. Data are received, processed and shown to user on the smartphone using developed Android application. Android application shows data about body temperature, physical activity (inactivity, movement and fall), number of steps and location of user. 194 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova After detection of fall of user, smartphone by SMS message informs members of user family or competent health institution about fall of user. SENSOR NODE Figure 2 Block diagram of implemented system 5.1. Program support for Arduino Uno platform For development of program support was used Arduino IDE development environment. Basic programming language that is used on Arduino platform is simplified version of C programming language. Developed program support for Arduino Uno performs reading of data from sensors, processing of the data, detection of movement of user and wireless transmission of detected state to smartphone (receiving node). Accelerometer measures force of acceleration in three axis (X,Y,Z). Based on that are obtained data as measure of movement or fall of user. Figure 3 shows implemented program for detection of fall of user. Program code for detection of activity and inactivity of user is shown in Figure 4. 195 Vlado Lukić, Zlatko Bundalo, Branko Blanuša // Detekcija pada if( br>5 ) { int T=br-4; br_pada=0; for (int i=T;i<=br;i++) { float element=pristup(lista,i); if(element>400) br_pada+=1; } } if(br_pada==5) { //Serial.print(“Detektovan pad”);Serial.println(); stanje=2; } Figure 3 Program for detection of fall of user // Detekcija aktivnosti i neaktivnosti else if(br>20) { float elementt=pristup(lista,br); if(elementt>175) br_aktivnosti+=1; if(elementt<=175) { int TT=br-Tn; for (int i=TT;i<=br;i++) { float elementt=pristup(lista,i); if(elementt<=175) br_neaktivnosti+=1; if(br_neaktivnosti==Tn) { br_aktivnosti=0; stanje=0; br_neaktivnosti=0; } } } } if(br_aktivnosti==Ta) { stanje=1; } Figure 4. Program for detection of activity and inactivity of user 196 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 5.2. Program support for smartphone MIT App Inventor 2 platform was used for development of program for smartphone. Working environment of the MIT App Inventor 2 has two parts: Designer and Blocks. Figure 5 shows the Designer environment of the MIT App Inventor 2. Figure 6 shows the Blocks environment of the MIT App Inventor 2. It was also developed and designed Android application for smartphone. Graphical environment of the Android application is shown in Figure 7. Android application was divided in more logical parts. The upper part of the application graphical environment contains buttons for enabling connection via Bluetooth. Under the buttons there is place for entering telephone number on what the application sends SMS message in case of user fall detection. In the middle part of the application there are buttons for start, stop and reset of the application. The lower part of the application shows detected state, temperature and GPS location of the user. SMS message that is sent consists of coordinates of latitude and longitude and address where the user is located in that moment (Figure 8). Such systems and such devices impose many dilemmas and challenges of ethical and legal nature. Figure 5 Designer environment of the MIT App Inventor 2 197 Vlado Lukić, Zlatko Bundalo, Branko Blanuša Figure 6 Blocks environment of the MIT App Inventor 2 Figure 7 Graphical environment of the Android application for smartphone 198 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Fall Bosnia and Herzegovina SEND Figure 8 Structure of SMS message in the case of user fall detection 6. ETHICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF SYSTEM APPLICATION 6.1. Some ethical aspects and challenges Such systems replace humans, replace need for permanent human monitoring and permanent human presence. It is replacement for medical workers. It enables the absence of constant human monitoring and control of patients. It causes decreasing in number of needed employees in such activities. There is also the absence of contact of patients with medical workers. There are also problems of acceptance of such systems and such way of performing monitoring and control from patient (user) side. All that causes many challenges of ethical and legal nature. One of important problems is need for smaller number of employees in monitoring and control of patients. But, all this does not mean that it is needed to leave workers without jobs. There are many other possibilities as are: shorten the working hours and increase the number of work shifts. That will cause need for employment of more new workers. Absence of permanent human presence and permanent monitoring and control of patients can cause some serious problems in the moment of problem detection. But, there are possible appropriate technical solutions for the problems. Some such solutions are: using video monitoring and cameras for monitoring what is going on in the moment of problem detection, using occasional or permanent video and audio communication of patient with medical staff or with family. 199 Vlado Lukić, Zlatko Bundalo, Branko Blanuša 6.2. Some legal aspects and challenges Such systems impose many dilemmas and challenges of legal nature. First of all it is challenge about law regulation and legislation. The main dilemmas are about contracts between service providers (medical institutions) and users (patients). There are also many dilemmas about rights, obligations and responsibilities of patients, medical professionals, medical institutions and equipment providers and ways to legally regulate all that. One more problem is legal responsibility if the system fails or causes some problems. Also, it should be regulated system maintenance aspects and legislation. Very important issue that should also be legally regulated is responsibility of patient if the patient gives up the service or damages equipment. 7. CONCLUSION Application of wireless sensor networks and mobile phones for monitoring some human activities aand health parameters is possible, convenient, relatively cheap and simple. Such systems are increasingly used in m-Health. Application of sensors and wireless sensor networks in medicine and monitoring of human activities is more and more practically represented. There is base for further expansion of such applications. Application of smartphone for monitoring of activities of patients is still in development and standardization in that area is expected. Android platform is suitable environment for development of telemedicine applications since it is open code platform and has good organization. Practically developed and implemented system performs measurement and monitoring of movement and detects fall of a person. Such system and devices of such type can find large practical application because of their concrete and very important advantages: small dimensions, low cost, easy way of using and significant contribution for improvement of life quality for users. As well as other technical systems that are used in medical applications such systems and such devices impose many dilemmas and challenges of ethical and legal nature. 200 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova REFERENCES: 1. Al-Aubidy, K.M., Derbas, A.M., and Al-Mutairi, A.W.. “Real-time healthcare monitoring system using wireless sensor network.” Int. J. Digital Signals and Smart Systems 1, no. 1 (2017): 26–42. 2. Burchfield, T.R., and Venkatesan, S.. “Accelerometer-Based Human Abnormal Movement Detection in Wireless Sensor Networks.”, University of Texas at Dallas, (2007).http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.12 0.296&rep=rep1&type=pdf, Accessed June 21, 2019. 3. Kumar, D.W.. “Healthcare monitoring system using wireless sensor network.” Intr. Journalof Advanced Networking & Applications 4, no. 1, (2012): 1497– 1500. 4. Tmar-Ben Hamida, S., Ben Hamida, E., and Ahmed, B.. “A New mHealth Communication Framework for Use in Wearable WBANs and Mobile Technologies.” Sensors 15, no. 2, (2015): 3379-3408. 5. “ArduinoUNO.”, https://www.arduino.cc, Accessed August 8, 2019. 6. “MPU6050 Interfacing With Arduino UNO.”, 7. https://www.electronicwings.com/arduino/mpu6050-interfacing-witharduino-uno, Accessed August 8, 2019. 8. “Connect Android device to Arduino via HC-06 Bluetooth module.”, http:// androidsmile.com/index.php/android/connect-android-to-arduino/, Accessed September 2, 2019. 201 Original scientific paper UDK USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION IN UNIVERSAL TELLER/COUNTER DIGITAL DEVICES Mirko Sajić Sberbank a.d. Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina Dušanka Bundalo Faculty of Philopsophy, University of Banja Luka Zlatko Bundalo Faculty of Electrical Engineering, University of Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina Abstract: Proposed universal intelligent teller/counter device is described in the paper. Structure, used elements and possibilities of the device are described. It is also proposed and described way for obtaining secure identification and authentication of users, what is very important in many applications of such devices. One example of practical application of the devices and secure user identification and authentication in process of automated generation and issuing of standard type documents and contracts is proposed and described. Legal and ethical aspects, questions and challenges of application of such devices and way of user identification and authentication are also considered and described.. Keywords: User identification, user authentication, digital technologies, digital devices, digital transformation, teller/counter devices, generation and issuing of documents and contracts 1. INTRODUCTION With the evident accelerated development of digital technologies and their widespread deployment in all spheres of business and service, the conditions for their application in the automation of customer service delivery have matured. In many cases, this automation is complete, i.e. adequately composed and programmed digital devices can completely replace the human workforce. From the point of view of cost savings, speed and quality of services, reducing the risk of errors (eliminating possibility of human error 203 Mirko Sajić, Dušanka Bundalo, Zlatko Bundalo in service delivery), increasing service delivery time to 24/7/365, it is absolutely clear that such automation devices are becoming more cost effective. However, one of the biggest obstacles in the implementation of these devices is the existing legal regulations, that do not keep pace with the times. In some cases this becomes the only obstacle to automating services through digital devices, while in other cases it complicates the construction of these devices so much. Otherwise, there are various places and institutions that would benefit from such service automation devices. In short, all those places where a customer comes to get a certain type of certificates, make a certain money transaction, buy or pay for a certain service. For example, such places would include companies providing services such as electricity and water distribution, hotels, schools, universities, parking places, theatres, cinemas, various types of transport, banks, municipalities, post offices, etc. All these places and institutions issue various certificates, contracts and other services, that are closely related to legal regulations. This primarily refers to the method of authentication for the issuance of the necessary documents and the provision of services, that must be in accordance with the prescribed legal norms and applicable legal obligations. The modernization of almost every kind of teller/counter type of operations and services necessarily involves the introduction and application of modern digital devices based on using different types of digital electronic technologies, automation and robotization and carefully designed software applications. It all increases efficiency, speed and security and reduces the cost of such activities and services. It also brings many other benefits, benefits to providers and users of teller/counter services. That all creates the need for the transformation of teller/counter services from the classical way with the use of human work into the modern digital organizational model. It assumes the creation and application of modern digital devices for performing all needed teller/counter and similar activities and services. One such device is a smart universal multifunctional digital terminal or a portal that is proposed and described here. Possibility and way of application of modern digital electronic technologies for design and implementation of embedded devices such as smart universal multifunctional digital terminal/portal for effective transformation of classical to modern way of offering teller/counter type services are considered, proposed and described in the paper. The smart universal multifunctional digital terminal/device design way was proposed and described with particular 204 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova reference to the use of certain hardware components and software solutions for safety authentication of service users. 2. REASONS AND BEFITS OF USING MULTIFUNCTIONAL DIGITAL TELLER/COUNTER DEVICES FOR AUTOMATION OF SERVICES The impact of modern information and mobile digital technologies is visible in all business segments and activities. That impact is so strong in some areas of business and human work that it requires major and significant changes in the way of organizing and providing many services. And also changes in applicable legal regulations, which have been able to properly support the provision of these services. Drastic changes have already undergone in music industry jobs, book publishing, as well as music industry jobs. Also, major changes are to be made in the way how banks and whole financial sector are organized and how provide services (King, 2012). Very similar situation is in the organization and functioning of services provided by institutions of cities and municipalities (especially in the concept of a smart digital city) where faster, more efficient and cheaper teller/counter services are required (Stimmel, 2016). Until recently, the provision of teller/counter services was only possible by using the human workforce. The degree of automation with the use of existing technologies still requires necessity of use of human labour in the provision of teller/counter services. However, with the occurrence of new digital technologies, it is possible, with the proper use of certain hardware and software, to implement a fully automated and robotized device/terminal that can provide certain teller/counter services without the presence and assistance of teller/counter workers (Skinner, 2014). The benefits of that type of providing and offering of such service are many (https://newgensoft.com/products/business-process-management/ bpm-robotic-process-automation, 2020): • Cost of providing services is significantly reduced, leading to a decrease in the prices of these services, • In order to simplify service offering, due to possibility of free choice of time by the user, and because of reduction of the cost of the service, it is realistic to expect increase in the number and types of such services, 205 Mirko Sajić, Dušanka Bundalo, Zlatko Bundalo • Providing of the service is no longer limited to the working hours of the institution providing the service and the service is available nonstop (of type 24/7/365), • Customer may choose, in accordance with his/her needs and other obligations, right time to receive the service, • Organization of the provision of the service and the place from which the service is provided is simplified, • Number of places where that service can be obtained can be much higher than before, • User becomes more satisfied because of all mentioned reasons. But all this is not possible to do, if it turns out to be impossible or extremely complex and unprofitable, to satisfy the prescribed legislation, which is outdated and as such could not even foresee new ways of satisfying this type of legal regulation service. Because these new ways have emerged with the advancement of technology and have come more recently, and as such, could not even be legally considered. When considering the enumerated benefits of implementing new digital technology in automating service delivery, it is a real pity not to make the extra effort to regulate such benefits. The basic requirements of users of these services have always been availability, ease of delivery, quality, speed and affordable price (Sajić at all., 2019). It is clear that with the conventional (traditional) way of providing these services, the first problem was and remains, accessibility. It is very difficult to arrange availability as user would like. Problem is because the institutions that provide that services have such working hours that most often coincide with the working hours of the users. That causes the situation in what the user is needed, in order to obtain the desired service, to seek in his company permission to interrupt his work during working hours and to go to an institution, which provides the service that the user wants or has to finish. That creates problems and dissatisfaction for both the user and his employer. Providers should prioritize meeting these enumerated requirements of service users and can adequately address this by implementing the aforementioned digital devices to automate service delivery, but compliance with legal requirements is imposed as an initial requirement. And what is especially imposed when fulfilling legal norms is adequate authentication of service users. With the classic i.e. the traditional provision of services using the human workforce is all pretty clear. The service provider is tasked, first and 206 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova foremost with the physical perception, and only then with the help of personal documents and other written documents, to establish proper authentication of the clients. However, using digital automated devices to provide services to the user, this authentication should be performed by various digital devices, while being sufficiently accurate and legally supported in determining user authentication. 3. PROPOSED MULTIFUNCTIONAL DIGITAL DEVICE FOR TELLER/COUNTER AUTOMATION The proposed device variant, shown in Fig. 1., is multifunctional and can support a wide variety of services. Some of these services already have practical applications or ready-to-use prototypes, such as: • Teller/counter services in the banking sector; • Certification services for providing variety of certification documents by city institutions, e.g. municipalities; • Automated hotel reception services and similar facilities that rent rooms and apartments; • Ticketing services, concerts, theatres, transportation tickets; • Recording the presence and issuance of access electronic /magnetic cards; • Issuing of mobile phone personalized cards; • Provision of bill payment services issued by service provider companies, such as power utilities, water utilities, urban cleanliness, mobile providers, etc. (Sajić at all., 2019). Which components will be installed on the device depends on its intended purpose, i.e. of the types of services that would be intended to be supported, the degree of authentication and the appropriate software solution. Only the very demanding automated service solutions would require the use of all hardware components, which will be mentioned below (Sajić at all., 2019). The basic configuration of the device consists of the following components: • Housing, • Power Supply (UPS), • Desktop computer – industrial standard, • Touch Screen Display (“22), • Light for better picture. 207 Mirko Sajić, Dušanka Bundalo, Zlatko Bundalo Issuance of printed certificates, statements, receipts, invoices, tickets, etc. are performed over the following hardware components: • Printer Device (usually A4 format), • POS Printer for receipt on thermal paper, • Colour Card Printer. For purpose of better automation of payment bills, A4 scanner can be used. Figure1 Proposed model of universal digital device/terminal for automation teller/counter services (Sajić at all., 2019) Billing for the services provided may be made through the following hardware components: • Payment with Bank Note, Top Up and recycler, • Payment with Coins, Top Up and recycler, • Payment with Credit/debit bank cards via EFT POS. Some devices can be used like options for device improvement: • Instant Issuing of Mobile phone SIM Cards, • Plastic Card Colour Printer, • Phone set (for offering help service, usually via Call Centre) • Additional Advertising 22“ Monitor (for commercial and marketing reasons), • Dual Iris Camera. 208 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova To achieve satisfactory user authentication, the following components were used, individually or in combination: • Webcam, • Personal document ID and Passport Scanner with OCR Software, • Barcode reader, • QR code reader, • Fingerprint scanner, • Signature Pad. As it can be seen from the proposed services and the proposed hardware components, in many places it would be a matter of providing services by entering into certain types of contracts, most often type contracts offered by such institutions. For example. one of the possible realizations of such services could be organized through Signature Pad, which would ensure that the client signs the offered contract, which would be listed on the device screen, to compare that signature with the already deposited signature of the user, if necessary for authentication. At the same time, a built-in Web camera would take a picture of the client, and that image would serve as further proof of authentication. One of the printers’ drawers would place papers with the signature already prepared by the authorized persons of the contracting authority. The content of the contract (which would be basically typical) would be completed with the required text and a copy of the client’s signature. If additional authentication is required, additional devices listed as hardware components of the device could be used. 4. WAYS OF AUTHORIZATION OF SERVICE USERS 1. Webcam – The built-in Webcam can provide images of users of the device, where, in addition to the client’s image, information about the exact date and time at which the service was made is provided. Software can be configured to capture multiple images, i.e. each important phase of providing one or more services. Videos can also be recorded instead of or in combination with images, all depending on the needs and degree of authentication required. In this way, the presence of users on the device at a specific time, at a specific date is uniquely determined. And again, based on that, the services he used. The condition is that the user is not masked. 209 Mirko Sajić, Dušanka Bundalo, Zlatko Bundalo 2. Personal document ID and Passport Scanner with OCR Software – By scanning personal documents, i.e. by converting the data on these documents into pictures, and then by using suitable programs for the so-called OCR, which essentially means converting a scanned image to a text document, reads the required data from those documents. Then the obtained data is checked against the data from the relevant database, to which the program on the device is connected and compared. For example. using data from an institution such as CIPS, or in the case of banks by taking data from their official databases. 3. Combination using Webcam and Personal document ID and Passport Scanner – Webcam captures the client’s face, and then compares that image with the image obtained by scanning personal documents. This method is commonly referred to as Face Recognition and they are becoming better and better identity-based software solutions, now with over 90% security. Normally, the degree of identity assurance here depends on the quality of the above-mentioned components, which is directly related to the quality of the obtained images. In addition, the quality of the software solution used to compare the resulting images is crucial. Such software solution is desirable to be adequately certified, if possible, due to the legality of the procedure. 4. Fingerprint scanner – This device produces a scanned fingerprint of the user and compares with the previously memorized fingerprints of clients, verifying the client’s identity. Verification is done using a convenient software solution. Such software solution is desirable to be adequately certified, if possible, due to the legality of the procedure. 5. Signature Pad – This device scans the client’s signature and compares it to the previously deposited signature, which is located in the database used by the service provider. This comparison is made through an adequate comparison program. Such software solution is desirable to be adequately certified, if possible, due to the legality of the procedure. 6. Barcode reader – It is this kind of solution, which is able to read data encoded through barcode procedure from a document, so that based on the read data and usually in combination with some of the other offered authentication hardware solutions, it performs authentication of service users. The most common use of these hardware components is to read data from attached accounts, to automate payments and in similar cases of service delivery. 7. QR code reader – It is this kind of solution, which is able to read the data encoded through the QR code procedure from a document, so that based on 210 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova the read data and usually in combination with some of the other offered authentication hardware solutions, it performs authentication of service users. The most common use of these hardware components is to read data from attached accounts, to automate payments and in similar cases of service delivery. 8. Using POS device – A POS device is a device that reads data from electronic payment cards issued by a bank. Authentication is done by reading the validity of the electronic payment card inserted into the POS device and verifying the PIN entered. Verification is performed by establishing a communication link with the payment card processor, which again establishes a connection with the bank when verifying the data. It implies the use of verified, official POS devices of a specific bank, which has all the necessary licenses for the operation of these POS devices. 9. Using personal mobile devices – For example, when providing services provided by mobile providers, it is necessary to determine the user’s phone number. Such verification can be accomplished through a convenient software solution, which is through the establishment of a Bluetooth connection of a service automation device and a mobile phone and by downloading the necessary data. It is understood that it is necessary for the user to consent through the application to complete the said process. Fig. 2 shows a picture of one of the already implemented software solutions when using the described device. 211 Mirko Sajić, Dušanka Bundalo, Zlatko Bundalo Figure 2 An example of one possible software solution to use multifunctional digital devices to automate service delivery (Sajić at all., 2019) 5. IMPACT OF GDPR REGULATION ON THE COMPLEXITY OF HARDWARE/SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SERVICE AUTOMATION GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) is a general regulation and regulation on data protection of the European Union that regulates data protection and privacy of EU residents (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 2016, Directive 95/46/EC, 1995). It entered into force 25.05.2018. years. All legal entities that collect and use personal data of their clients are obliged to apply this regulation in the EU, regardless of whether they have physical contact with clients or base their business through the so-called cloud solutions or by robotizing and automating their services. The regulation also covers legal entities that are nominally outside the EU but have EU residents for clients. Due to the realistic possibility of an EU user appearing as an automatic service provider, it is highly recommended that the device should be constructed in such a way as to be able to support the stringent requirements of the GDPR regulations. In addition, it is expected that this directive will be adopted very soon locally. It is understood that the fulfilment of the requirements of this directive complicates the hardware and software component of the service automation device. It should also be remembered that the penalties for noncompliance with this Directive are very strict with high amounts of money. To clarify the complexity of meeting the requirements of the GDPR directive, some of the basic features of this directive are outlined here: • Definition of what personal information is; • Consent; • GDPR aims to protect all EU citizens in the area of privacy and protection of personal data; • Right to information about the processing method (access right); • Right to delete personal data (right to be forgotten); • Transferability of personal data; • Increased territorial scope (applicability within and outside EU territory); • Penalties provided for; • Treatment of younger persons’ data. 212 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova From the basic elements and characteristics of the GDPR regulation described above, we can clearly see the tightening of conditions in relation to the use of personal information so far. This will in particular affect the use of personal information on social networks and similar websites, which have based almost all of their previous earnings and success on the collection, commercial placement and use of this information. Clearly, software solutions to date and the very way in which personal data is used, stored and protected will have to undergo considerable adjustments to the new regulation. Therefore, the described device for automation of service provision, if in any way using the personal data of the user, which is inevitably at least in terms of authentication, will have to be carefully constructed both hardware and software in order to satisfy the set conditions. The following documents may be used as a basis for explaining the purpose and impact of GDPR regulation: • Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Europe of 27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46 / EC (General Regulation on data protection) (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 2016), • Directive 95/46 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Europe of 24 October 1995. on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (Directive 95/46/EC, 1995). 6. CONCLUSION From the presented possibilities of this and similar devices for the automation of service delivery, and based on the enumerated advantages provided by their use, it is clear that the future is in their use. Currently, in many countries, there are certain legal provisions that more or less complicate and in some cases completely prevent the use of these devices for specific purposes. However, as it is clear that statutory standards must be observed, it is also clear that work needs to be done to adapt existing legal standards to simplify the use of these devices. An example is the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the way in which birth certificates and similar documents are printed. Certain authorized printing companies print the forms of these 213 Mirko Sajić, Dušanka Bundalo, Zlatko Bundalo documents, submit them to the municipalities, and then the competent person performing the service completes on-site the necessary information in the already prepared forms. In order to implement this method through the proposed service automation device described here or in a similar device, it is necessary to have in this case a printer with 5 drawers, where one device could print only e.g. birth certificate. Because each pre-printed and printed birth certificate template goes in one drawer. And they need 5 because of the birth certificate in Serbian Cyrillic, Serbian Latin, Croatian, Bosnian and international format. The first difficulty is to get an atypical printer with 5 drawers (up to 3 are in mass production), then projecting the physical dimensions of the device due to its height and lastly the most important, for each of the certificates issued by the municipality would require a separate physical device. But if the applicable regulations were changed and certified copies of paper were prepared in the printer trays, and the necessary content was printed for the selected types of certificates by software, one device (birth certificates, birth certificates, cadastral records, etc.) could do the whole thing. The above example, as well as the other arguments presented in this paper, sufficiently support the need to initiate the necessary legal changes and adjustments to the modern digital age and manipulation of digital documentation as soon as possible. When adopting these new legal regulations, the harmonization with EU GDPR regulation should be taken into account. REFERENCES 1. King B., BANK 3.0: Why Banking Is No Longer Somewhere You Go But Something You Do. Wiley, (2012): 7267-7441 Kindle Edition 2. Stimmel C. L., “Building Smart Cities: Analytics, ICT, and Design Thinking”, CRC Press, 2016. 3. Skinner C., Digital Bank: Strategies for Launching or Becoming a Digital Bank, Marshall Cavendish Business, (2014):19-80. 4. https://newgensoft.com/products/business-process-management/bpmrobotic-process-automation, 2020. 5. Sajić M., Bundalo D., Bundalo Z., Sajić L., Lalić D., Kuzmić G., „Smart Universal Multifunctional Digital Terminal/Portal Devices“, Proceedings of International Conference MECO, (2019):171-174. 6. Sajić M., Bundalo D., Bundalo Z., Lalić D., Kuzmić G., „Automation of teller/ counter services in smart cities concept using universal digital devices“, 214 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Proceedings of International Conference TELFOR (2019), Serbia, Belgrade, November 26-27.. 7. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Europe of 27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Regulation on data protection). 8. https://publications.europa.eu/hr/publication-detail/-/publication/40dfa8b20e0a-11e6-ba9a-01aa75ed71a1/language-hr/format-PDF/source-search 9. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Europe of 24 October 1995. on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 215 Review article UDK THE IMPACT OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ON DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL GOVERNANCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY Dragana Vilić1 Faculty of Economics, University of Banja Luka Abstract: Digital technology and new social media have brought new opportunities, but also challenges for democratic political life in the off-line and online space (civic activism, opinion creation, innovation of governance). In the digital age citizens need more flexible policies and new forms of direct participation. In their opinion, parliamentary institutions are unsatisfactory, unacceptable and sluggish. The paper discusses the possibility of developing a new model of direct digital democracy - a more active role and more effective participation of modern demos in democratic processes enabled by digital technology and modern interactive communication systems. This does not imply upgrading the existing political participationwhich supports participatory democracy, but greater personal responsibility of citizens who, within the limits of political knowledge, participate in the discussion of all issues of importance for living in the community with experts, politicians and other citizens and who play a role in the decision-making process. “Network“ is a social space of interaction, political activism, governance and decision-making by citizens that shape political processes in a “real“ society (from national to global). Digital democracy brings a change in party, political and collective organization, activism and criticism. However, technology itself does not create democracy. Democracy has a material and social basis, therefore, real obstacles to the development of digital democracy are still in: the present digital divide between the rich and the poor within states and between states, in tensions between democracy and modern corporate capitalism, in the pursuit of democratic and undemocratic governments to control information and social media, in creating a personalized world through social media, within the limits of citizens’ political knowledge, in citizen’s (dis)interest, in transforming the dimensions of public space, etc. 1 Doctor of social sciences, associate professor for narrow scientific field Theoretical sociology at the Faculty of Economics University of Banja Luka 217 Dragana Vilić Keywords: Digital technology, digital democracy, political governance, contemporary demos, contemporary society. INTRODUCTION The development of ideas and practices of democracy over time in different social, economic, political and cultural contexts has had an impact on the diversity of its concepts and types. The concept of democracy is still imprecise, vague and incomplete due to its complexity and multilayeredness. Democracy as a procedure, process, happening has two dimensions: “first, democracy as an ideal, as a moral dimension, ie. as a rule by the people directly, which cannot be achieved in practice, except rarely in very small communities and special conditions; second, democracy is understood as a procedure, the ’rules of the game’ in political life.“2 The political crises in many countries in the modern world are a clear indicator that existing institutions cannot answer a number of questions, problems and challenges. Therefore, it is justified to emphasize the need for a new concept and practice of democracy. Given that the basis of a contemporary society is the development of modern interactive and network technologies, the vision and reality of democracy appropriate to such a society are directed towards digital democracy (e-democracy, teledemocracy, virtual democracy, etc.). It is a potentially new form in the development of democracy appropriate to the specific characteristics, capabilities and limitations of a contemporary society. In order to have a clear perspective on observing and predicting the emergence of this form of democracy in a contemporary society, we need to answer some questions in the paper: What is digital democracy? Is it electronic reform of democracy or a radically new form of democracy that will replace representative democracy? What are the opportunities and limitations of the digital democracy framework in a contemporary society? Answering these questions will allow us to see how much the ideas and practices of this form of democracy in a contemporary network society have similarities, or rather, how different they are from all their previous manifestations (direct democracy in the polis, representative democracy in the nation state, transnational democracy). In the paper, it is important to analyze the numerous political and socio-economic problems that emerge as obstacles to the development of digital democracy. New information and communication technologies bring about changes in party, political and col2 Ivan Šijaković and Dragana Vilić, Sociologija savremenog društva (Banja Luka: Ekonomski fakultet, 2010), 217. 218 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova lective organizing, activism and criticism, which can be clearly seen on the example of new digital political parties, revolts of people in some parts of the world and the activities of new social movements. 1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS AND PRACTICES OF DEMOCRACY FROM THE ANCIENT PERIOD TO THE PRESENT The tendency to create a framework of well-organized common life with the best ways and forms of managing common affairs where all people can reach their potential, has always been present. Since the mid-5th century BC, a new political practice was established, the concept of small-scale rule, in certain city-states (polis) in ancient Greece (Athens, Corinth, Sparta, etc.), denoted by the term democracy (Greek δεµος and κρατειν) - the rule of the demos. As Robert Dahl observes, neither in theory nor in practice, all ancient Greeks-Hellenes constituted demos, the people with the right to political independence. Only certain segments of the polis – adult, free men (foreigners, women and slaves did not have the status of citizens in a polis) had the right to participate in governance (the status of citizen, “the qualified“).3 The reality and notion of democracy disappeared after one and a half century of its existence, after which the republic (res publica) was an ideal political form (different from democracy).4 Two millennia later, after the disappearance of ancient democracy, the idea of democracy was applied in a much broader context than the polis, in the space of the nation state (on a large scale). New institutions of democracy were established, as well as a new way of accomplishing the democratic process, first in Europe and in English-speaking countries. But the exclusivity characteristic of Greek democracy remained until the twentieth century when women exercised their right to vote.5 Institutions of representative democracy were a good answer to the demands and challenges in such a complex political community. Citizens had the opportunity to elect their representatives (representatives of the whole nation) when the class-state disappeared.6 Only modern democracy enabled the inclusive character of the citizen and the respect for universal demands for freedom, 3 Robert Dal, Demokratija i njeni kritičari, trans. Đurica Krstić (Podgorica: CID, 1999), 59-60. 4 Đovani Sartori, Demokratija - šta je to?, trans. Dragan Mraović and Vučina Vasović (Podgorica: CID, 2001), 187-88. 5 Dal, Demokratija i njeni kritičari, 60. 6 Norberto Bobio, Liberalizam i demokratija, trans. Slobodan Divjak (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1995), 51. 219 Dragana Vilić equality and political or human rights.7 In the contemporary society, the process of democratization takes place at the transnational level. Democracy is expanding increasingly from the level of modern nation states to the global level. Under the influence of globalization, the notion of sovereignty becomes vague, so the process of democratization cannot be efficient at the level of, still strong, nation states. Many problems go beyond the borders of states - environmental, economic, etc.8 That is why, as David Held observes, democracy in the contemporary society should be viewed in the context of global interdependence, and not just within individual states, as a relationship between people and power.9 The modern world has its specific characteristics, limitations and possibilities, therefore, the contemporary meaning of the concept of democracy and its essence cannot be linked to that of previous periods of its development. Interactive and network technologies have great potential for enhancing democratic and social participation opportunities. 2. THE APPLICATION OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY IN THE CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL GOVERNANCE Modern information and communication technologies (ICT) play a significant role in achieving sustainable growth and development of society. Authorities increasingly view access to quality and affordable network infrastructure as a political responsibility to citizens and the areas they govern. “Investing in ICT networks and services has become a key element in effectively delivering quality public services, preventing depopulation and relocation of economic activity, promoting social and economic development and enhancing cultural and political participation.“10 These technologies have brought progress, new opportunities, but also a challenge for political life activism of citizens (information, mobilization and organization), the creation of opinions and innovations of governance. They enable a more active and effective role of demos in the decision-making process important for life in the community, increase its power and freedom, enable greater personal accountability of citizens, reduce the gap between the political elite and citizens, 7 Dal, Demokratija i njeni kritičari, 60. 8 Entoni Gidens, Odbegli svet: kako globalizacija preoblikuje naše živote, trans. Ivan Radosavljević (Beograd: Stubovi kulture, 2005), 98-102. 9 David Held, Modeli demokracije, trans. Nikica Petrak (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1990), 15. 10 “Guide to High-Speed Broadband Investment,” European Commission, May 3–7, 2015, http://ec.europa. eu/digital-agenda/en/news/broadband-investment-guide 220 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova bring new access to political participation and decision-making through online platforms for discussions and voting, allow an increase in the number of participants in public policy-making and better awareness and involvement of citizens in political processes, transform party, political and social life as a whole, can give an incentive to make politics more flexible and accessible, satisfy the need for a new form of participation, etc. Digital democracy, or rather, the electronic political platform, in the contemporary society, represents the implementation of electronic and internet technologies in political life, that is, putting them into the service of democracy - electronic support for democracy with the aim of empowering it. “It is not affiliated with a particular type of democracy and, for the time being, does not lead to a whole new, revolutionary type of democracy. Citizens engage in democratic processes through it in order to participate in the social decision-making process and transfer their sovereignty to their representatives (as it is done in representative democracies).“11 However, it is important to consider the impact of these technologies on the emergence of a potentially new model of “immediate democracy through which citizens will participate in the near future, replacing the existing representative political system“.12 In addition to many benefits that these technologies have brought to the political life of modern countries, the question is whether the use of digital media and networks can lead to more or less political participation, which will eventually lead to more or less democracy.13 Modern ICTs are applied in different spheres of governing: in state (public) administration (digital exchange of information, digital services, digitization of office work within government agencies, etc.), for voting and active participation of citizens in democratic political processes.14 Some countries in Europe are introducing an electronic reform of political life, that is, establishing systems that allow citizens to vote in elections online (Estonia, France, Switzerland, etc.). Designing a service that would allow citizens to vote online is a responsible and challenging task, as they must comply with standard security protocols (authentication, integrity, undeniability and privacy). But there is a question and a problem regarding the trust that citizens have in this service, anonymity, counting, etc. The introduction of this service would reduce the 11 Dragoljub Pilipović and Bogdan Mirković, “Koncept e-demokrtije – osnova i/ili poboljšanje digitalnog uređenja društva,“ Economics 3, no 1, (2015): 150. 12 Pilipović and Mirković, “Koncept e-demokrtije – osnova i/ili poboljšanje digitalnog uređenja društva,“ 152. 13 Based on: Jan A.G.M. van Dijk and Kenneth L. Hacker, Internet and Democracy in the Network Society (New York: Routledge, 2018). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351110716 14 Pilipović and Mirković, “Koncept e-demokrtije – osnova i/ili poboljšanje digitalnog uređenja društva,“ 154-55. 221 Dragana Vilić cost and time regarding the organization of the election process and reliable (safe) and accurate processing of results, an increase in the number of citizens at the elections (especially, the younger population, persons with special needs, etc.), voting from distant places, which would contribute to better decisions.15 Regardless of the many benefits that new technologies bring to the political life of citizens, nevertheless, as Jan A. G. M. van Dijk and Kenneth L. Hacker observe, the mere use of the Internet as a medium does not produce democracy. It is not only the technological basis (digital media and networking) that is important to democracy, but the material and social basis which is often more important in a society. The democratic nature of this network depends on its mode and the context of use.16 That is why we need a firmer foundation for the grand claim that the digital revolution is essentially empowering democracy.17 3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS IMPEDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY The most significant and important advance in the development of human civilization over the past few centuries has been the widespread digital revolution that can be “traced to the sheer amount of information that is generated and shared” and “the amount of time people spend on the media” and the advent of the Internet which is increasingly becoming “an integral part of the central nervous system of society”.18 From the middle of the last century to the present, globally, the number of Internet users has increased steadily. However, in terms of access to information technology, the global network and the possession of ICT skills, there are differences within countries, between countries and different regions of the world. Existing socioeconomic inequalities are further emphasized by the digital gap. According to the International Telecommunications Union, 53.6% of people used the Internet in 2019, which is 5.3% more than in 2018, and 36.8% more than in 2005. In developed countries, there are 86.6% of people using the Internet, in 15 Marko Marković and Saša Adamović, “Mogućnost primene elektronskog servisa za glasanje putem interneta u Srbiji,” Synthesis 2015 - Information security and cryptographic applicationsInternational, Scientific Conference of IT and Business-Related Research, (2015): 76. https://doi: 10.15308/Synthesis-2015-76-80. 16 Based on: Jan A.G.M. van Dijk and Kenneth L. Hacker, Internet and Democracy in the Network Society (New York: Routledge, 2018). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351110716 17 McChesney, Digitalna isključenost - Kako kapitalizam okreće internet protiv demokracije, trans. Domagoj Orlić (Zagreb/Beograd: Multimedijalni institut & Fakultet za medije i komunikacije, 2014), 41. 18 McChesney, Digitalna isključenost - Kako kapitalizam okreće internet protiv demokracije, 21. 222 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova developing countries 47.0%, while in underdeveloped countries only 19.1%. Europe is the region with the highest Internet usage rates in the world and Africa is the region with the lowest rates. There is a correlation between the percentage of households with Internet access at home and the degree of development of the region. In Africa and developing countries, there is a small percentage of households that have Internet access or have a computer. The international data transfer rate (Gbit/s) increased by 33.4% on average annually in the period 2015 - 2019 (Europe has the highest bandwidth - 211 Kbit/s per Internet user, and Africa has the smallest - 31 Kbit/s). Lack of ICT skills is a major barrier to efficient Internet use (less than half of the population in 40 surveyed countries has basic computer skills, while the percentages are lower for more complex activities – the so-called standard skills, while the percentage is lower for advanced computer skills like writing computer programs using a specialized programming language in the previous three months). Although significant progress has been made in the affordability of the broadband package over the past few years, this remains a challenge for many countries.19 The consequences of being disconnected from the network are large and growing steadily: “they can be equal to not being there as a person. It is a good way to understand the importance of fighting for Internet neutrality and the widespread availability of broadband Internet that people can afford.“20 One of the important problems that obstract the development of digital democracy are, as Robert Dahl notes, the limits of citizens’ political knowledge. Interactive telecommunication systems provide technical solutions to narrow the gap between political elites and demos, but protection and advancement of citizens’ interests cannot be achieved without adequate knowledge of the matter. It is therefore necessary, in a convenient form and scope, to provide all citizens with available information and the highest level of political knowledge on public issues, so they could participate in relevant debates, discussions with experts, politicians and other citizens, and in order to play a role in decision making. Countries would, according to R. Dahl, differ in institutions that would provide citizens with the availability of knowledge of different specialists in the field of politics. However, in order to achieve this, it is necessary to have a large number of active well-informed citizens (widely informed and active demos) and not all (it would not be possible to fulfill 19 “Measuring digital development Facts and figures 2019,” International Telecommunications, Geneva, 2019. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/FactsFigures2019.pdf 20 McChesney, Digitalna isključenost - Kako kapitalizam okreće internet protiv demokracije, 170. 223 Dragana Vilić such a requirement).21 Nevertheless, this active public, which is narrower than demos, does not need to be a representative public. “If, however, such a public is not only well-informed but also representative, its very existence and views will make all options, including those which political elites and the informed demos advocate, become visible and comparable.“22 One can imagine, according to R. Dahl, that in one democratic country a mini-populus is formed to solve a specific issue, for each area, for the order of solving particular issues, at various levels of government, of thousands of randomly selected citizens from the demos, who would meet over the course of one year through telecommunications and publish their findings. Such bodies could be assisted by an advisory committee of scientists, experts and a number of administrative staff. The institution of the mini-populus would be a complement to the legislative body - its evaluations and judgments would be the demos’ evaluations and judgments if it were able to take advantage of the highest quality knowledge needed to make political decisions. This would allow citizens to adapt to changes in the modern world.23 According to Robert W. McChesney, in order to look at the impact of the Internet on changes in society, it is necessary first to look at the relationship between democracy and capitalism, which is often characterized by intense tensions and open conflicts. The economic capitalist system is based on its tendency to promote inequality, monopoly, hyper-commercialism, stagnation, which undermines political democracy. The first three factors influence depoliticization, because those deprived of material resources are alienated from the political process.24 Economic inequality always poses a threat to political equality which forms the basic premise of democracy. Political democracy is always threatened when large socio-economic inequalities are present, when they grow, when economic power is concentrated and when economic growth is small and stagnant.25 The Internet cannot be held responsible for increasing inequality (only to the extent that it can be linked to the financialization of the economy), but the digital revolution has done nothing to remedy this situation.26 There is no indication that in the digital age, the ever-present aspiration of capitalists to maximize returns and minimize the risk of loss of 21 Dal, Demokratija i njeni kritičari, 439-40. 22 Dal, Demokratija i njeni kritičari, 441. 23 Dal, Demokratija i njeni kritičari, 441. 24 McChesney, Digitalna isključenost - Kako kapitalizam okreće internet protiv demokracije, 47. 25 McChesney, Digitalna isključenost - Kako kapitalizam okreće internet protiv demokracije, 41. 26 McChesney, Digitalna isključenost - Kako kapitalizam okreće internet protiv demokracije, 60-61. 224 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova investment may disappear.27 Technological change is embedded in the capitalist system, thus, the digital revolution for capitalist economies is important because of the benefits of technologies to “increase productivity and create an edge over competition“, and because the capitalist economic system must provide growth in order to survive. Today, digital leading sectors of corporate capitalism, the Internet and information technology have restructured investment, but there is no evidence of rapid economic growth.28 In the world, less militant scattered groups with a horizontal and ad hoc “structure“ act independently or gather to attack, and successfully establish public relations by using the posibilities of modern information technology (publish information about their ventures in print or video releases, on the Internet). “The notoriety provided by a worldwide television network and the Internet can also feed a general fear of vulnerability and a sense of pervasive danger far beyond the existing capacities of terrorists.“29 The public and public opinion are important for the democratization of a society. Jürgen Habermas analyzed the emergence of the “public sphere“, the space for public debate and the formation of opinions on the basis of publicly available information on issues of general importance, from the period of parliamentarism in England and the revolution in France, and its decline. The bourgeois sphere of the public emerges at the time when the literate bourgeois public begins to engage in the decision-making process of public interest by (publicly) using the reason in “rational-critical“ debates – “the use of reason (ie, raisonnement) in the public.“ After the disappearance of the representative public of the medieval European states, first, as a part of the private world (family), the public sphere is moved into the public domain, and then a literary public sphere is formed, which is later transformed into the political bourgeois public sphere in the bourgeois constitutional state. Thus, a critical public that criticizes state power through the use of reason is developed. It plays the role of a political factor in controlling society. Wherever there was communication regarding the affairs of the “community“, the public of “human beings“ involved in the rational-critical debate was constituted in the “citizens“.30 Later, the development of the cultural industry (the proliferation of mass media and mass entertainment) suppresses the democratic debate, 27 McChesney, Digitalna isključenost - Kako kapitalizam okreće internet protiv demokracije, 52-53. 28 McChesney, Digitalna isključenost - Kako kapitalizam okreće internet protiv demokracije, 72-74. 29 Bauman, Zigmunt, Fluidni strah, trans. Siniša Božović and Nataša Mrdak (Novi Sad: Mediterran Publishing, 2010), 125. 30 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge/Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991), 107. 225 Dragana Vilić and the role of the public sphere in political decision-making is greatly diminished. In parliament and the media, politics is conducted in a well-known way, public interests are suppressed by commercial ones, and public opinion is formed through manipulation and control (for example, marketing).31 In the contemporary society, the conceptualization of the public is increasingly focused on the mass media. In many countries, the media have assumed the role of the public sphere. Media freedom and overcoming the challenges faced by the freedom of speech in many countries in the world are very important for the promotion and strengthening of democracy. Public reasoning and free press as a key institution of the public sphere are prerequisites for forming public opinion. Favorable conditions for the expansion of free speech should be provided by the Internet and other media. However, in reality, the situation is different - freedom of expression is increasingly restricted - in 2017 more than half of the world’s population had access to free or partially free media and right to free speech. In many countries in the world, these freedoms and rights are endangered, and censorship is increasingly used in democratic countries and it is not characteristic only of authoritarian regimes.32 Efforts to limit the openness and egalitarianism of the Internet have been shown in the past two decades by the corporate media sector (making it closed, proprietary, encouraging covert corporate and government control over its users, removing the barriers to commercialism), as its survival and progress depend on it.33 Despite the increasing number of media, many news do not contain original reporting, they are mostly repetitive or repackaged information that were previously published (8 out of 10 stories explored), while the most original news are still produced by the old media (more than 95%). There was a noticeable decline in the number of independent news media during the 1980s and 1990s, due to frequent waves of business integration and the entry of large conglomerates into play. The consequences are felt especially at the local level, because almost complete disappearance of smaller news media and newsrooms deprives citizens of credible information pertaining to their community and brings it closer, negatively affecting democracy, community cohesion and citizen engagement.34 31 Entoni Gidens, Sociologija, trans. Nadežda Silaški and Tatjana Đurović (Beograd: Ekonomski fakultet, 2005), 465. 32 “Democracy Index 2017 - Free speech under attack,“ The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018, 11. http:// www.eiu.com 33 McChesney, Digitalna isključenost - Kako kapitalizam okreće internet protiv demokracije, 159. 34 McChesney, Digitalna isključenost - Kako kapitalizam okreće internet protiv demokracije, 223-26. 226 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 4. NEW WAYS OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN A DIGITAL SOCIETY Digital political parties (forum parties, “network“ parties) emerged at the time of the new global economic crisis in 2008, as a new type of political party that reflects the nature of digital society. They use digital technology to build new forms of direct participatory democracy, experiment with new forms of political organization of citizens and new forms of participatory policy development, facilitate the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of people who have been removed from the political process in an effort to improve and simplify politics.35 They operate nationally - for example, the Five Star Movement in Italy, Podemos in Spain and the like. These political parties mark the evolution of political parties in line with the development of social media and applications.36 They promise new democracy, and they are response to the current state of growing inequality, insecurity and injustice in the contemporary society, resulting from disagreement between voters and their representatives and moving away from the real needs of ordinary people. In external communication they use the power of social networks (for example, Facebook, Twitter) to build a huge base of supporters and sympathizers, while in internal communication they use fast messaging services (for example, WhatsApp). They are more efficient than the usual political parties, lack a solid and massive bureaucracy, grow fast and disappear. A digital forum becomes the meeting place (like an ancient forum) where scattered individuals can participate in group discussions and accept shared identities.37 Their members are registered through social networks and they belong to different classes. They are interested in resolving some specific and current issues, they do not have a long-term vision of society.38 They have developed online digital platforms for discussion and decision-making, which is an essential novelty of these political parties. These platforms allow registered members to participate directly in discussions and voting on political proposals, candidates and leadership. Gathering people into these parties is similar to the logic of some companies and the way they gather and profile their custom35 Paolo Gerbaudo, “The Digital Party: The Transformation of Political Organisation in the Era of Big Data,“ in Digital Objects, Digital Subjects: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Capitalism, Labour and Politics in the Age of Big Data, edited by David Chandler and Christian Fuchs (London: University of Westminster Press, 2019), 189. https:// doi.org/10.16997/book29.p. License: CCBY-NC-ND 4.0 36 Gerbaudo, “The Digital Party: The Transformation of Political Organisation in the Era of Big Data,“ 190. 37 Gerbaudo, “The Digital Party: The Transformation of Political Organisation in the Era of Big Data,“ 193-95. 38 Gerbaudo, “The Digital Party: The Transformation of Political Organisation in the Era of Big Data,“ 191. 227 Dragana Vilić ers. They are intended to bring together all people interested in a particular policy and related public good (for example, clean air). They bring a change in citizens’ political engagement through social media. Digital parties seek to remove the constraints of representative democracy - the distance between voters and their representatives.39 Although they are characterized by intense participation of members in discussions and decision-making, they are not characterized by complete horizontality (equality is not guaranteed there), the absence of representation and hierarchy. They have a “distributed“ centralization of power concentrated in a charismatic hyper leader. Most often, he is the founder of the party, the guarantor of the party and its founding principles, he is informed, has great power and freedom of action, and represents the party in the media.40 He reflects the “super-base“ which is made up of extremely active and reactive digital party members (or users) who have found a new opportunity for participation in the party’s online platforms for decision-making, discussion and online voting. They are affiliated with the hyper leader, respond ad hoc to incentives from the top, ratify his proposals. These parties also have management - few strategically important people who are responsible for managing the party’s resources, communication channels and platforms. The base of this party is made up of ordinary party members who have the possibility to be involved in decision making. However, these parties already display limited democratic qualities in terms of the ways in which they participate (the frequency of consultations, their outcomes, etc.).41 In the contemporary society, the democratic potential of social networks is observed in terms of organizing social protests and, in general, the operation of new social movements. Digital technology has become a key tool for organizing social movements. New, different and more effective forms of activism have been developed in the space of social networks, compared to those in the “real“ social space. Manuel Castells analyzed the revolts of citizens in Tunisia (led by unemployed graduates) and Iceland (after the post-economic crisis) from 2009 to 2011 as role models for social movements in the events that followed in some Arab countries in resisting dictatorial or pseudodemocratic regimes (the so-called “Arab Spring“), through communion realized in virtual and urban space. Although different from each other, all these revolts have similarities in terms of: participants (digital youth), mode of action (gathering on city squares and streets by calling through social media) and reasons 39 Gerbaudo, “The Digital Party: The Transformation of Political Organisation in the Era of Big Data,“ 194-95. 40 Gerbaudo, “The Digital Party: The Transformation of Political Organisation in the Era of Big Data,“ 189. 41 Gerbaudo, “The Digital Party: The Transformation of Political Organisation in the Era of Big Data,“ 196-97. 228 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova for appearing (pressure on governments to resign and foster democratization processes). Communion encourages people to act in this way, and the revolt provoked by information in the virtual world creates a strong emotion for action arising from real events. The occupied public space is the place for creation of a community that ignores all the differences that exist between its members. The multimodality of communication platforms made it impossible to disconnect from the Internet and mobile networks, which prevented the authorities from stifling the revolution. What all these different contexts in which revolts occurred have in common is their ability to connect individuals and groups through social media. Revolts in Arab countries, according to M. Kastels, have placed a challenge before political institutions in the United States (Occupy Wall Street) and in Europe (Los Indignados in Spain).42 According to some theorists, the role of digital technology is overestimated in all these revolts, it facilitates social changes but does not cause them, they are important for mobilizing citizens, but not for changing the political situation, for directing the results of political processes.43 CONCLUSION Digital technology and modern interactive communication systems have brought about numerous changes, opportunities and incentives for the development of the contemporary society. This is especially important for the advancement of democratic political governance in the contemporary society - more effective civic activism, opinion creation, innovative ways of governing, possibilities for direct participation, more flexible and accessible politics, etc. However, technology itself does not create democracy, but it does create favorable conditions for the advancement of democratic institutions and processes in the contemporary society. There are numerous socioeconomic problems that hinder the development of political democracy, and therefore of digital democracy. The digital divide within countries, between countries and regions in the world (not having equal access to this technology and the skills to use it) leads to greater stratification among citizens and makes it difficult to participate in democratic processes on equal terms. Major 42 Based on: Manuel Kastels, Mreže revolta i nade: društveni pokreti u doba interneta, trans. Vanja Savić and Daniela Nikolić (Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2018). 43 Based on: Jan A.G.M. van Dijk and Kenneth L. Hacker, Internet and Democracy in the Network Society (New York: Routledge, 2018) https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351110716; Albina Osrečki, “Novi mediji i ʼArapsko proljećeʼ”, Politička misao 51, no 3, (2014). 229 Dragana Vilić socio-economic inequalities threaten political equality as a prerequisite for democracy. Companies and democratic and non-democratic governments influence democratic discussions, voter preferences and information formation. Modern technologies are used by militant groups to interconnect, act and spread fear. The limits of citizens’ political knowledge are one of the important obstacles to democracy development. There are numerous examples of restrictions on public reasoning and press freedom, on the one hand, and examples of the negative influence of the mass media on the formation of public opinion, on the other. However, the emergence and operation of new digital parties and new social movements testify to the great democratic potential of digital technology - the development of new forms of participatory politics, facilitating the mobilization of citizens who have been removed from political processes, different and more effective ways of citizens’ activism, etc. All this contributes to strengthening the power of demos, but in the terms of directing the results of political processes technology has not had a major impact in many countries. Therefore, all social actors in the contemporary society should recognize their role in advancing democracy, taking the advantage of modern technology. LITERATURE 1. Bauman, Zigmunt. Fluidni strah. Translated by Siniša Božović and Nataša Mrdak. Novi Sad: Mediterran Publishing, 2010. 2. Bobio, Norberto. Liberalizam i demokratija. Translated by Slobodan Divjak. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1995. 3. Dal, Robert. Demokratija i njeni kritičari. Translated by Đurica Krstić. Podgorica: CID, 1999. 4. European Commission, “Guide to High-Speed Broadband Investment,” May 3 – 7, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/broadbandinvestment-guide 5. Gerbaudo, Paolo. „The Digital Party: The Transformation of Political Organisation in the Era of Big Data“. In: Chandler, David, and Christian Fuchs, eds. Digital Objects, Digital Subjects: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Capitalism, Labour and Politics in the Age of Big Data. London: University of Westminster Press, 2019. 187-98. https:// doi.org/10.16997/book29.p. License: CCBY-NC-ND 4.0 6. Gidens, Entoni. Odbegli svet: kako globalizacija preoblikuje naše živote. Translated by Ivan Radosavljević. Beograd: Stubovi kulture, 2005. 230 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 7. Gidens, Entoni. Sociologija. Translated by Nadežda Silaški and Tatjana Đurović. Beograd: Ekonomski fakultet, 2005. 8. Held, David. Modeli demokracije. Translated by Nikica Petrak. Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1990. 9. International Telecommunications Union, “Measuring digital development Facts and figures 2019,” Geneva, 2019. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/ Statistics/Documents/facts/FactsFigures2019.pdf 10. Kastels, Manuel. Mreže revolta i nade: društveni pokreti u doba internet. Translated by Vanja Savić and Daniela Nikolić. Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2018. 11. Marković, Marko, and Saša Adamović. “Mogućnost primene elektronskog servisa za glasanje putem Interneta u Srbiji”. Synthesis 2015 - Information security and cryptographic applications International, Scientific Conference of IT and Business-Related Research, (2015): 76–80. 12. McChesney, Robert W. Digitalna isključenost - Kako kapitalizam okreće internet protiv demokracije. Translated by Domagoj Orlić. Zagreb/Beograd: Multimedijalni institut & Fakultet za medije i komunikacije, 2014. 13. Osrečki, Albina. “Novi mediji i ʼArapsko proljećeʼ”. Politička misao 51, no 3, (2014): 101-122. 14. Pilipović, Dragoljub, and Bogdan Mirković. „Koncept e-demokratije – osnova i/ili poboljšanje digitalnog uređenja društva“. Economics 3, no 1, (2015): 149161. 15. Sartori, Đovani. Demokratija - šta je to? Translated by Dragan Mraović and Vučina Vasović. Podgorica: CID, 2001. 16. Van Dijk, Jan A.G.M., and Kenneth L. Hacker. Internet and Democracy in the Network Society. New York: Routledge, 2018. https://doi. org/10.4324/9781351110716 17. Šijaković, Ivan, and Dragana Vilić. Sociologija savremenog društva. Banja Luka: Ekonomski fakultet, 2010. 231 Pregledni naučni članak UDK TRANSFORMATIVNE TEHNOLOGIJE I KRIMINAL (OBLICI ISPOLJAVANJA I MJERE SUZBIJANJA) Mile Šikman1 Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci Apstrakt: Već smo svjedoci da je razvoj savremenih tehnologija u mnogome uticao na svakodenvni život ljudi. Tako je digitalno doba ostvarilo uticaj i na kriminal, kao a/anti društvenu pojavu. U tom smislu naslovljenu temu posmatramo sa dva glavna aspekta: prvog, oblike ispoljavanja kriminala povezanih sa transformativnim tehnologijama i drugog, prevencija i suzbijanje kriminala zasnovana na novim tehnologijama. Dakle, činjenica je da je sa pojavom novih tehnologija istovremeno prisutna i njihova zloupotreba u svrhe, tako što se skoro svi oblici kriminala koji su poznati u realnom, mogu se izvšiti i u virtuelnom svijetu. Izdvojili bi problem manipulacije sa ličnim podacima, s obzirom da oni danas predstavljaju jednu od najvećih vrijednosti, koje su višestruko ugrožene u digitalnom svijetu. Isto tako, blockchain tehnologija, na osnovu koje su nastali kriptovalute (npr. Bitcoin), koncept pametnih ugovora, kao i čitav niz novih tehnoloških servisa, donosi rizik od kriminalnih aktivnosti u ovim novim oblastima. On se može manifestovati od krivičnih djela krađe (npr. krađa privatnih ključeva bitcoina), preko prevara (Ponzi shema putem kriptovaluta), zatim zloupotreba putem online kockarnica, do teških krivičnih djela kao što su pranje novca, ilegalna trgovina opojnim drogama, oružjem, itd. (zasnovanim na kripotovalutama). S druge strane, sve više se savremene tehnologije koriste i u prevenciji i suzbijanju kriminala. Primjenjena su mnoga tehnološka rješenja koja su unaprijedila prevenciju i suzbijanje kriminaliteta. Isto tako, danas se kao dokazi mogu prikupljati i činjenice zapisane u digitalnom obliku, što je uslovilo razvijanje potpuno novih oblasti kao što su digitalna forenzika i slično. U radu ćemo dati osnovne teze odnosa trasformativnih tehnologija i kriminala. Ključne riječi: Transformativne tehnologije, kriminal, fenomenologija, etiologija, prevencija, represija. 1 Vanredni profesor 233 Mile Šikman UVOD Razvoj savremenih tehnologija i njihova upotreba u mnogome je promjenio sve sfere ljudske djelatnosti i života. Čini se da taj trend rapidno raste i u vremenima koja su pred nama, a ogledaće se u masovnoj upotrebi transformativnih tehnologija u svakoj djelatnosti savremenog života2. Istovremeno, kriminalitet kao negativna društvena pojava je stalni ‘’pratilac’’ ljudskog društva, jer od njegovog nastanka i razvoja postoje ponašanja koja označvamo kriminalitetom i zločinom3. Kako kriminalitet nije statičan i fiksno određen, te je kontinuirano izložen promjenama u strukturi i oblicima ispoljavanja, sasvim je realno očekivati i promjene koje su povezane sa transformativnim tehnologijama. Mnoge od njih su se već ispoljile, a neke će tek biti predmetom manipulacija i zloupotreba. Pored toga, savremene tehnologije se koriste i u praksi suzbijanja kriminaliteta. Čak bi mogli reći da je upotreba tehnologije u ove svrhe unaprijedila u mnogome rad državnih i pravosudnih organa, a da su njene mogućnosti praktično neograničene. Upravo zbog toga imamo jednu paradoksalnu sitauciju: savremene tehnologije stvaraju nove mogućnosti, koje jednako koriste i izvršioci krivičnih djela i agencije za sprovođenje zakona, samo u suprotstavljenim interesima4. S tim u vezi odnos transformativnih tehnologija i kriminaliteta, uslovno posmatrano, možemo sagledati sa pozitivnog i negativnog stanovišta. Pozitivno bi se ogledalo u korišćenju savremenih tehnologija u suzbijanju kriminaliteta, a negativno u (zlo)upotrebi istih u kriminalne svrhe. U radu ćemo prvo izložiti fenomenološku dimenziju kriminala povezanog sa transformativnim tehnologijama. Iako polazimo od toga da se radi o visokotehnološkom kriminalitetu, poseban akcenat ćemo dati na oblike koji se manifestuju manipulacijama podataka i zloupotrebama blockchain tehnologija. Nakon toga, daćemo kratak prikaz primjene savremenih tehnologija u suzbijanju kriminala, sa posebnim osvrtom na korišćenje digitalnih dokaza. Kada je riječ o korišćenju literature postoje određena ograničenja. Ona se prije svega ogleda u tome da su pojedini oblici visokotehnološkog kriminala, kao i korišćenje savremene tehnologije u njegovom suzbijanju više praktične 2 Na primjer izraelski publicista Juval Noa Harari (Yuval Noah Harari) u romanu Homo Deus – kratka istroja sturašnjice (2015) vizionarski navodi: ‘’Kiborg-inženjering otići ći još korak dalje, spajajući organsko tijelo sa neorganskim uređajima kao što su bioničke šake, vještačke oči ili milioni nanorobota koji će se kretati kroz naš krvotok, dijagnostikovati probleme i popravljati oštećenja’’. Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus - A Brief History of Tomorrow (London: Harvill Secker, 2015), 61. 3 Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović i Slobodanka Konstatinović-Vilić, Kriminologija (Beograd: Prometej, 2018), 21. 4 Uporedi: Maryke Silalahi Nuth, ‘’Taking advantage of new technologies: For and against crime.’’ Computer Law & Security Review 24, no. 5 (2008), 437. 234 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova prirode, a manje teoretske. Zbog toga smo se u radu prije oslonili na izvještaje i studije o visokotehnološkom kriminalitetu međunarodnih i regionalnih organizacija kao što su Kancelarija Ujedinjenih Nacija za suzbijanje droga i kriminala [UNODC]5, Evropske policijske agencije6 [EUROPOL] i drugih. Pored toga korišćena je akademska literatura o shvatanju visokotehnološkog kriminaliteta u kojoj se navode različiti pogledi o ovom kriminalnom fenomenu i korišćenju digitalne tehnologije u krivičnom postupku. OBLICI KRIMINALA POVEZANI SA TRANSFORAMTIVNIM TEHNOLOGIJAMA Različiti su oblici kriminaliteta koji se mogu dovesti u vezu sa savremenim tehnologijama. Još na samom početku razvoja savremenih tehnologija, pojavljivali su se i pojedini oblici kriminalteta, dakle od 1960-tih godina prošlog vijeka7. Manifestovali su se u zloupotrebama računara i računarskih sistema u kojima su oni tretirani kao objekat napada ili kao sredstvo izvršenja8, a uključivali su napad na hardver, softver, program, podatke, zaštitu sistema i usluge9. Istovremeno, sa razvojem Interneta, eksponencijalno su povećane mogućnosti za nove oblike visokotehnološkog kriminaliteta, koja do tada 5 United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime (New York: United Nations, 2013). accessed March 5, 2020, https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/UNODC_CCPCJ_ EG.4_2013/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf 6 EUROPOL, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2019 (Hague: European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2019), accessed March 8, 2020, https://www.europol.europa.eu/activitiesservices/main-reports/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment-iocta-2019; EUROPOL, European Union (EU) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2017. (Hague: European Police Office, 2017), accessed March 8, 2020. https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-unionserious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment-2017; EUROPOL, Crime in the age of technology, (Hague: European Police Office, 2017), accessed March 8, 2020, https://www.cepol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/924156v7-Crime_in_the_age_of_technology_.pdf 7 Tako su Ronald Slivka i Joel Darrow još 1975. godine pisali o kriminalnim djelatnostima povezanim sa kompjuterima, uključujući fizičko oštećenje računarskih sistema i podataka. Walter Schmidt 1981. godine ukazuje na pojavu neovlašćenog korišćenja autorskih prava (softversko pirtstvo), dok Elizabeth A. Glynn 1984. godine visokotehnološki kriminalitet klasifikuje u četiri kategorije: ‘’(1) krađe novca, finansijskih instrumenata, imovine, usluga i vrijednih podataka; (2) neovlašćenog pristupa računarskim sistemima; (3) nelegalno korišćenje kompjuterskih programa; (4) neovlašćeno pribavljanje sačuvanih podataka’’. Vidi opširnije: Ronald T. Slivka and Joel W. Darrow, ‘’Methods and Problems in Computer Security.’’ Rutgers Journal of Computers and Law, 5 (1975): 217; Elizabeth A. Glynn, ’’Computer Abuse: The Emerging Crime and the Need for Legislation.’’ Fordham Urban Law Journal 12, no. 1 (1984), 75.; Walter E. Schmidt, ‘’Legal Proprietary Interests in Computer Programs: The American Experience.’’ Jurimetrics Journal 21, no. 4 (1981), 345. Uporedi: United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, 5. 8 Vidi opširnije: Đorđe Ignjatović, ‘’Pojmovno određenje kompjuterskog kriminaliteta.’’ Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu 39, br. 1-3 (1991), 136-144; Mićo Bošković, Kriminalistika metodika II (Beograd: Policijska akademija, 2000), 301, 302; Branislav Simonović, Kriminalistika (Beograd: Pravni fakultet u Kragujevcu, 2004), 665. 9 Slobodan Petrović, Komjuterski kriminal (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 2004). 235 Mile Šikman nisu egzistirala10, ali i omogućila da se brojna tradicionalna krivična djela izvršavaju na jedan novi, drugačiji i lakši način nego ikad prije,11 što se odrazilo na njegove ukupne trendove12. Ekstrman primjer je krivično djelo terorizma, koje se ranije uglavnom vršilo upotrebom nasilja, dok se danas ovo krivično djelo podjednako vrši zlopotrebom Interneta u terorističke svrhe13. Visokotehnološki kriminalitet danas se ispoljava podjednako protiv pojedinaca, kompanija/organizacija i državnih organa, čime se ostvaruju višestruko negativni efekti po društvu u cjelni,14 što je i jedna od njegovih osnovnih karakteristika (izuzetno visok stepen društvene opasnosti15). Ipak, ono što posebno karakteriše ovaj vid kriminaliteta jeste njegova izražena dinamičnost, koji zapravo danas dominiraju u fenomenološkoj osnovi kriminaliteta i predstavljaju rizik po bezbjednost16, čiji se tokovi ne mogu u potpunosti precizno i jasno predvidjeti. Današnje aktivnosti visoktehnološkog kriminaliteta fokusiraju se na korišćenje globalizovane informacijsko-komunikacione tehnologije za vršenje krivičnih djela sa transnacionalnim dometom.17 Na ovom mjestu dolazimo na teren povezanosti visokotehnološkog kriminaliteta sa transformativnim tehnologijama. Prije svega mislimo na dvije vrste djelatnosti: prvu, manipulacije podacima i drugu, zloupotrebu blockchain tehnologija. Manipulacija podacima podrazumijeva zloupotrebu informacione tehnologije u svrhu prikrivenog uticaja na donošenje odluka drugog čovjeka, 10 Graham Farrell and Daniel Birks, ‘’Did cybercrime cause the crime drop?.’’ Crime Science 7, no. 8 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40163-018-0082-8 11 Vitomir Grbavac, Božidar Tepeš i Franko Rotim. “Informacijska tehnološka revolucija na početku 21. stoljeća.” Društvena istraživanja 12, br. 5 (67) (2003): 864.; 12 Fernando Miró-Llinares and Asier Moneva, ‘’What about cyberspace (and cybercrime alongside it)? A reply to Farrell and Birks “Did cybercrime cause the crime drop?” Crime Science 8, no. 12 (2019), 5. 13 Vidi opširnije: Mile Šikman i Velibor Bajičić. ‘’Izmjene u krivičnom zakonodavstvu Republike Srpske kao izraz potrebe adekvatnog reagovanja na kriminalitet.’’ U Izmene u krivičnom zakonodavstvu i status nosilaca pravosudnih funkcija i adekvatnost državne reakcije na kriminalitet (međunarodni pravni standardi i stanje u Srbiji), urednik Stanko Bejatović (Zlatibor: Srpsko udruženje za krivičnopravnu teroriju i praksu), 307. 14 Prema Sveobuhvatnoj studiji o visoktehnološkom kriminalitetu čiji je izdavač UNODC (2013) prevare u finansijskom poslovanju čine skoro trećinu svih krivičnih djela visokotehnološkog kriminaliteta, delikti u vezi sa dječijom pornografijom obuhvataju drugu trećinu krivičnih djela visokotehnološkog kriminaliteta, dok ostatak čine krivična djela usmjerena protiv kompijuterskih sistema i druga krivična djela (terorizam, govor mržnje, itd.). United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, 16. 15 Stanko Bejatović, ‘’Visokotehnološki kriminal i krivičnopravni instrumenti suprotstavljanja.’’ U Suzbijanje kriminala i evropske integracije, s osvrtom na visokotehnološki kriminalitet, urednik Mile Šikman (Banja Luka: Visoka škola untrašnjih poslova, 2012), 17. 16 U prilog tome najbolje svjedoči izjava Christopher Wray, direktora FBI (2019): ‘’Gotovo svaka prijetnja nacionalnoj bezbjednosti i kriminalna aktivnost s kojima se FBI suočava temelji se na cyber osnovi. Suočavamo se s prijetnjama državnih hakera, unajmnjenih hakera, organizovanih cyber sindikata i terorista… Oni pokušavaju ugroziti kritičnu infrastrukturu, naštetiti ekonomiji i ograničiti slobodu govora’’. Christopher Wray, ‘’Global Terrorism: Threats to the Homeland’’. Statement Before the House Homeland Security Committee. Washington, D.C. October 30, 2019. available from https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/global-terrorism-threats-to-thehomeland-103019 17 United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, 4. 236 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova na način da se iskorištava njegova slabost1819. Online manipulacija može se posmatrati kroz ciklus prikupljanje podataka, zatim profilisanje korisnika i na kraju mikrociljanje i manipulaciju20. Čini se da upravo poslednja faza ovog ciklusa u značajnoj mjeri ugrožavaju brojna prava i slobode građana, a samim tim ulazi u kriminalnu zonu. I kao što se navodi u Mišljenju Evropskog supervizora za zaštitu podataka (2018): ‘’problem je stvaran i hitan, a vjerovatno će se pogoršati kako se što veći broj ljudi bude povezivao sa Internetom, uz povećanu ulogu sistema vještačke inteligencije’’21. Na koncu treba dodati i masovne zloupotrebe blockchain tehnologija22 u kriminalne svrhe. Korišćenjem mogućnosti koje nudi ova tehnologija, a posebno koncpta privatnosti i anonimnosti, putem mračnog interneta (darknet)23 vrši se snažna povezanost sa kriminalnim aktivnostima, s obzirom na široku dostupnost svega onog što je prema važećim propisima zabranjeno, a na kojoj cyber kriminalci nude svoje usluge (DDos napadi, virusi, neželjene kampanje, i dr.). Rezultati istraživanja Daniel Moore i Thomas Rid (2016)24 ukazuju na to da su najčešće korišćenja veb lokacija na Toru skrivene usluge koje su kriminalnog karaktera, uključujući ilegalnu trgovinu opojnim drogama, nedozvoljene finansijske transakcije i pornografski sadržaj, koji uključuju nasilje, zloupotrebu djece i životinja. Tržište droga je nesumnjivo najveće 18 Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler and Helen Nissenbaum. “Technology, autonomy, and manipulation”. Internet Policy Review 8, no. 2 (2019), 1. DOI: 10.14763/2019.2.1410. 19 Skandal sa Cambridge Analytica je tipičan primjer mogućnosti korišćenja mrežnih podataka kako bi se algoritamski predvidjeli i uticali na ljudsko ponašanje na način koji zaobilazi svijest korisnika o takvom uticaju. Vidi šire: Marcello Ienca and Effy Vayena, ‘’Cambridge Analytica and Online Manipulation,’’ Scientific American, March 30, 2018, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/cambridge-analytica-and-online-manipulation/ 20 European Data Protection Supervisor, EDPS Opinion on online manipulation and personal data, (Brussels: European Data Protection Supervisor, 2018), 7. accessed March 15, 2020, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/ files/publication/18-03-19_online_manipulation_en.pdf 21 European Data Protection Supervisor, EDPS Opinion on online manipulation and personal data, 22 22 Blockchain tehnologije su decentralizovane, distribuirane i otvorena baza podataka, koja omogućava realizaciju digitalnih transakcija bez posrednika. Njih je prvi put opisao Satoshi Nakamoto (2008) kao način organizovanja i obezbjeđenja zapisa, koje jednom uvedne u bazu podataka, automatski se matematički tačno zapisuju i ne postoji mogućnost njihove izmjene, niti u trenutku zapisivanja, niti nakon toga. Vidi: Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘’Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System.’’ www.bitcoin.org, 1-3 accessed March 15, 2020, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf; Tiana Laurence, Introduction to Blockchain Technology (‘s Hertogenbosch: Van Haren, 2019), 2-4. 23 Darknet je distribuirana i anonimna mreža unutar dubokog veba kojoj može samo da se pristupa pomoću softvera poput The Onion Router (TOR), I2P i Freenet. Prema podacima ToR Metrics najveći broj direktno povezanih korisnika bio je 2018. godine kada je bilo preko 4.000.000 registrovanih korisnika. Više od polovine sajtova bilo je povezano sa nelegalnim aktivnostima: Vidi opširnije: Tor Metrics, Users, avaiable https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2018-01-01&end=2020-03-31&country=all&events=off; EUROPOL, European Union (EU) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2017, 22 24 Daniel Moore and Thomas Rid, ‘’Cryptopolitik and the Darknet.’’ Survival 58, no. 1 (2016), 23. 237 Mile Šikman kriminalno tržište na Darknetu25, koje nudi gotovo sve vrste opojnih droga, pri čemu je registrovano 68% svih unosa na ovoj mreži26. Finansijske manipulacije na darknetu uključuju pranje novca zasnovanog na Bitcoin-u, ilegalnu trgovinu ukradenih kreditnih kartica i ilegalnu trgovinu ukradenim računima i nelegalnu trgovinu falsifikovanim proizvodima27. Seksualna eksploatacija djece na internetu, prema nalazima EUROPOLA (2019)28 uključuje čitav niz kriminalnih aktivnosti, kao što su seksualno zlostavljanje i eksploataciju dece putem Interneta29, proizvodnja i distribucija pornografskog sadržaja, online navođenje djece radi seksualne eksploatacije, ‘’uživo’’ zlostavljanje djece na distanci30, ali i jedan posebno zabrinjavajući trend nazvan ‘’duboka laž’’, koji se zasniva na zloupotrebi Al based tehnike31. Tako, integrisanje digitalnih sistema u mnoge kriminalne aktivnosti uporedo sa širenjem onlajn trgovine nelegalnom robom i uslugama utiče i na koncept organizovanog kriminaliteta32. Iz navedene kratke analize proizilazi, a što se podudara sa zaključkom EUROPOL (2019): ‘’da visokotehnološki kriminal predstavlja ključni izazov 25 Prema podacima Evropskog centra za praćenje droga i zavisnosnti od drogama (2019) organizovane kriminalne grupe koje djeluju u Velikoj Britaniji generišu više novca od prodaje ilegalnih droga na mračnom internetu nego u bilo kojoj drugoj zemlji u Evropi (procjenjuje se da su prodali opojne droge u vrijednosti većoj od 24 miliona funti, ukupne težine od 2.825 kilograma). Isto tako, kao primjer se navodi međunarodna policijska akcija 2019. godine u Njemačkoj pod nazivom ‘’Wall Street Market’’ u kojoj je zatvoreno jedno od najvećih ilegalnih tržišta mračnog interneta koje se uglavnom koristilo za prodaju kokaina, heroina, kanabisa i amfetamina, kao i za razmjenu hakovanih podataka, falsifikovanih dokumenata i malvara. Ovo tržište je dvije godine bilo u funkciji, sa više od 1.150.000 kupaca (nalozi su registrovani na mreži tržišta) i više od 63.000 ponuda, u preko 5.400 prodavca. Prema: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report 2019, (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017.), 70 accessed March 8, 2020, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/12078/20192630_TD0319332ENN_PDF.pdf. 26 EUROPOL, Crime in the age of technology, 5. 27 Moore and Rid, ‘’Cryptopolitik and the Darknet.’’, 22. 28 Vidi opšrinije: EUROPOL, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2019, 29-34 29 Dok je seksualno zlostavljanje ili iskorištavanje pristupno u fizičkom svijetu, naknadno dijeljenje slika i video snimaka značajno pogoršava uticaj ovih delikata. Prema podacima EUROPOL (2009) količina ovih podataka na mreži je zapanjujuća i nastavlja da se povećava. Naime, kako se broj mladih i djece koja pristupaju internetu povećava, rastu i prestupnici, koji svjesnije zloupotrebljavaju anonimnosti i mogućnosti Interneta. EUROPOL, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2019, 30 30 Tako je u maju 2019. godine u Velikoj Britaniji izrečena kazna zatvora od pet godina zbog pokušaja navođenja maloljetnika mlađih od 13 godina, na Filipinima, na seksualno iskroišćavanje i planiranja seksualnog zlostavljanja. Osuđeni, britanski državljanin, u vrijeme izvršenja krivičnog djela radio je kao nastavnik u Maleziji i na Tajlandu, a prikupljeni dokazi potvrđuju da je majci troje djece slao novac za hranu, tražeći da zauzvrat pošalje fotgrafije njenih 11-godišnje i 7-godišnje djevojčice, nakon čega je imao razgovore sekusalne konotacije. Vidi: EUROPOL, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2019, 33 31 Ovom tehnikom se postavljaju fotografije ili video zapisi preko drugog video zapisa. Već je korišćena kako bi se postavila lica poznatih ličnosti na postojeće pornografske video snimke. Iako je tehnologija još uvijek relativno nova, brzo se poboljšava i postaje pristupačnija i lakša za upotrebu. Zbog toga prema procjeni EUROPOL (2019) postoji realna opasnost da se iskoristi i za dječiju pornografiju. EUROPOL, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2019, 34 32 EUROPOL (2017) procjenjuje da će online trgovina i dalje ubrzano rasti, pri čemu će Internet platforma pojaviti kao ključna platforma za distribuciju svih vrsta nedozvoljene robe u Evropskoj uniji. EUROPOL, European Union (EU) Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2017, 22. 238 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova za digitalnu ekonomiju i društvo’’33. To zapravo znači da će ovaj kriminalni fenomen u budućnosti biti glavni problem, s obzirom na sve veće korišćenje savremenih/pametnih tehnologija u svakodnevnom životu. SUZBIJANJE KRIMINALA ZASNOVANO NA TRASFORMATIVNIM TEHNOLOGIJAMA Razvojem inforamacionih tehnologija uvedene su nove mogućnosti i u prikpljanju i obezbjeđivanju dokaza, s jedne strane i policijskom radu na sprečavanju i suzbijanju kriminaliteta, s druge strane. Prije bi rekli da je takav razvoj situacije bila nužnost, nego inovatinost u radu, jer je vršenje krivičnih djela zasnovano na savremenim tehnologijama zahtijevao isti takav odgovor. Naime, izuzetno široka rasprostranjenost nosilaca digitalnih podataka (npr. personalni računari, mobilni telefoni, USB diskovi, itd.) uslovila je njihovo korišćenje za krivično gonjenje ne samo krivičnih djela iz oblasti visokotehnološkog kriminaliteta, već i konvencionalnih krivičnih djela (imovinski i nasilnički delikti, i dr.).34 Zbog toga se posebno razvija naučna disciplina Digitalna forenzika, koja upotrebom naučnih metoda vrši pronalaženje, prikupljanje, obezbjeđivanje, analiziranje, tumačenje i predstavljanje digitalnih dokaza vezanih za krivični predmet u zakonitom sudskom postupku35. Pored toga, savremena tehnologija je već uveliko dio infrastrukture krivičnog pravosuđa, koja danas u mnogome prevazilazi tradicionalno shvatanje (računar, mreža, baza podataka), a sve više se zasniva na sveobuhvatnoj infrastukturi povezanoj u sistem krivičnog pravosuđa36. Takođe, razvijene su potpuno nove tehnološke inovacije koje policija i organi krivičnog pravosuđa koristi u svom radu, u okviru strategije prevencije kriminaliteta, a koje imaju potencijal da višestruko povećaju njihovu efikas- 33 EUROPOL, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2019, 11 34 Martin Novak, Jonathan Grier and Daniel Gonzales. ‘’New Approaches to Digital Evidence Acquisition and Analysis.’’ NIJ Journal 50, no. 280 (2019), 17. 35 Uporedi: Sriram Raghavan, ‘’Digital forensic research: current state of the art.’’ CSI Transactions on ICT 1 (2013): 91–114 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40012-012-0008-7; Ankit Agarwal, Saurabh Gupta, Subhash Chand, Megha Gupta, ‘’Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model’’ International Journal of Computer Science and Security 5, no. 1 (2011): 118-131. Citirano u: Yudi Prayudi, Ahmad Ashari, ‘’A Study on Secure Communication for Digital Forensics Environment’’ International Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research 6, no. 1 (2015): 1036. 36 Samuel Nunn, ‘’The Criminal Justice Technology Infrastructure: What it is and how it is Changing.’’ In Criminal Justice Technology In The 21st Century, Editor Laura J. Moriarty (Springfield: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 2017), 11. 239 Mile Šikman nost, a istovremeno zamijene tradicionalni način rada37. Na ovaj način kako smatra McGuire (2017) tehnologija se može nametnuti kao oblik socijalne kontrole kriminaliteta38. Iako je od velikog značaja korišćenje savremene opreme i sredstava (npr. dronovi, kamere za tijelo, sredstva za video snimanje, i dr.) koja se koriste u radu policije, još važnije je korišćenje sistema koji se zasnivaju na automatskoj obradi velikih količina podataka (npr. kriminalističkoobavještajni rad, mapiranje kriminaliteta, analiza kriminaliteta, amber upozorenje, lokacija pucnja, itd.)39 što je od ključne važnosti u postupku otkrivanja i dokazivanja krivičnih djela. Korišćenje digitalnih dokaza u krivičnom postupku Digitalni dokazi su zapravo materijlni dokazi40 kod kojih se podaci i informacije (fotografije, video snimci, audio snimci, tekst) čuvaju, primaju i prenose u binarnom obliku putem elektronskih uređaja, a koji prikupljeni i obezbjeđeni na zakonit način mogu se koristiti u krivičnom postupku41. S obzirom da je koncept digitalnog društva u velikoj mjeri zasnovan na korišćenju različitih digitalnih uređaja, onda je jasno da se radi o opsežnom obimu dokaza koji mogu biti pohranjeni na korišćenim uređajima42. Zbog toga je Zakonom o krivičnom postupku Republike Srpske43 propisano da pretresanje pokretnih stvari obuhvata i pretresanje kompjuterskih sistema, uređaja za pohranjivanje kompjuterskih i elektronskih podataka, kao i mobilnih telefonskih aparata (čl. 115 st. 2). Pretresu se pristupa kada postoji sumnja da su na nekom od ovih uređaja sadržani podaci, dokumenta, komunikacije itd., koji mogu biti značajni u krivičnom postupku. Važno je da se ova radnja obavi 37 James Byrne and Gary Marx, ‘’Technological Innovations in Crime Prevention and Policing. A Review of the Research on Implementation and Impact’’ Journal of Police Studies 3, no. 20 (2011), 17. 38 M. R. McGuire, ‘’Technology crime and technology control. Contexts and history.’’ In The Routledge Handbook of Technology, Crime and Justice, Editors M. R. McGuire and Thomas J. Holt, 35-60 (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2017), 35. 39 Ibid. 40 Za razliku od klasičnih materijalnih dokaza dokazi zapisani u digitalnom obliku imaju nekoliko prednosti, koje se ogledaju u jednostavnijem načinu njihovog čuvanja i korišćenja u daljem postpku. Uporedi: Nikola Protrka, ‘’Računalni podaci kao elektronični (digitalni) dokazi.’’ Policija i sigurnost 20, no. 1 (2011), 3. 41 Uporedi: National Institute of Justice, Electronic crime scene investigation: A guide for first responders (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2008), ix; Novak, Martin, Jonathan Grier and Daniel Gonzales. ‘’New Approaches to Digital Evidence Acquisition and Analysis.’’ NIJ Journal 50, no. 280 (2019), 17 42 Sean E. Goodison, Robert C. Davis, and Brian A. Jackson, Digital Evidence and the U.S. Criminal Justice System: Identifying Technology and Other Needs to More Effectively Acquire and Utilize Digital Evidence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 37. 43 Zakon o krivičnom postupku Republike Srpske, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 53/12, 91/17, 66/18. 240 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova uz pomoć stručnih lica44, što je i zakonom propisano (vidi: čl. 115 st. 3) jer se podaci, ukoliko uređaju pristupi nestručno lice, mogu izmijeniti ili uništiti45. Takođe, potrebno je imati na umu da su digitalni dokazi pohranjeni na elektronskom uređaju u dinamičnom (podložnom promjenama) elektronskom okruženju46, te da bez specifične opreme i softvera neće biti moguće ostvariti uvid u vrstu i obim dokaza, niti njihovo prikupljanje i obezbjeđivanje47. Zbog toga je od izuzetne važnosti u radu sa digitalnim dokazima poštovanje i određenih pravila kriminalistike, koji se prije svega odnose na postupanje prilikom prikupljanja i analize ove vrste dokaza48, uzimajući u obzir čitav niz problema sa kojima se mogu suočiti istražioci49. Naravno, ovo je polje koje se progresivno razvija, te su neophodne kontinuirane obuke i usavršavanja50. Pored ove, možemo je nazvati tradicionalne uloge digitalnih dokaza, sve više se ukazuje na njihovu povezanost sa blockchain tehnologijama. Tema o kojoj se govori jeste korišćenje bockhcain tehnologija za prikupljanje, obradu skladištenje, dijeljenjem i sinhronizaciju podataka u mreži disperziranih i decentralizovano povezanih računara što može efikasno riješiti problem gubitka i falsifikovanja podataka u centralizovanom sistemu skladištenja51. Na taj način se smanjuju troškovi i utiče na povjerenje, a pruža pouzdanija metoda za sudsko ispitivanje digitalnih dokaza52. Profesori Hong Wu i Guan Zheng (2020) opisali su dva nedavna slučaja u kojima su kineski sudovi po 44 Zvonimir Ivanović, “Pitanje postupanja sa digitalnim dokazima u srpskom zakonodavstvu.” Kriminalistička teorija i praksa 2., br. 1/2015. (2015), 14. 45 Dragan Radovanović i Mirzeta Begić, Pribavljanje zakonitih dokaza u krivičnom postupku (Sarajevo: Visoki sudskti i tužilački savjet BiH, 2016), 28. 46 Mark Pollitt, Michael A. Caloyannides, Jon Novotny, Sujeet Shenoi, ‘’Digital Forensics: Operational, Legal and Research Issues.’’ In Data and Applications Security XVII, Editors Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Indrakshi Ray, Indrajit Ray (Boston: International Federation for Information Processing, 2003), 402. 47 Tako Bruce L. Berg (2007) pravi poređenje ove vrste dokaza sa otiskom prsta. I jedni i drugi su nevidljivi dokazi, te kao što su potrebni posebni praškovi kako bi se izazvali latentni tragovi otisaka pristiju, tako je neophodno korišćenje posebne tehnike da dođe i do elektronskih dokaza. Bruce L. Berg, Criminal Investigation (New York: McGraw Hill, 2007), 427. 48 Tako je npr. u Priručniku za elektronsku istragu mjesta zločina (2008) navedeno da treba preduzeti mjere predostrožnosti pri prikupljanju, čuvanju, i prevozu digitalnih dokaza, uključujući: prepoznavanje, identifikaciju, oduzimanje i obezbjeđivanje svih digitalnih dokaza na licu mjesta; dokumentovanje kompletnog lica mjesta i specifične lokacije gdje su pronađeni dokazi; prikupljanje, označavanje i čuvanje digitalnih dokaza; i pakovanje i transport digitalnih dokaza na siguran način. National Institute of Justice, Electronic crime scene investigation: A guide for first responders, ix. 49 Simonović, Kriminalistika, 689-690. 50 Npr. UNODC je razvio poseban obrazovni modul ‘’Praktični aspekti istraga visokotehnološkog kriminaliteta i digitalna forenzika’’ koji ima za cilj obuku i usavršavanje u ovoj oblasti. Vidi više: UNODC, Module 6. Practical Aspects of Cybercrime Investigations and Digital Forensics, UNODC’s Education for Justice (E4J), available https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/cybercrime/module-6/index.html 51 Hong Wu and Guan Zheng, ‘’Electronic evidence in the blockchain era: New rules on authenticity and integrity.’’ Computer Law & Security Review 36, (April 2020), 2. 52 Ibidem. 241 Mile Šikman prvi put potvrdili da elektronski podaci pohranjeni na ili generisani blochchain tehnologijom ispunjavaju zahtjeve autentičnosti i integriteta i predložili su poseban proceduralni test da bi se identifikovali dokazi o blockchainu53. Izazovi u zaštiti garantovnih ljudskih prava i sloboda Garantivna funkcija krivičnog prava54 u kontekstu visokotehnološkog kriminaliteta, ali i korišćenja digitalnih dokaza u krivičnom postpuku je pod posebnim pritiskom. Postavlja se pitanje kako, ionako složena pitanja zaštite garantovanih ljudskih prava i sloboda, obezbijediti u virtuelnom okruženju, odnosno prilikom prikupljanja digitalnih dokaza i kasnije njihovog korišćenja u krivičnom postupku. U tom smislu jeste i izazov pred krivično zakodavstvo: na koji način zaštiti društvo od sve raznovrsniijih oblika visokotehnološkog kriminaliteta (uključujući i nove oblike ispoljavanja), s jedne strane, i obezbijediti visok stepen garantovanja prava i sloboda građanima, s druge strane. U prilog navedenom ne ide ni činjenica da društveni razvoj neće ići u pravcu ukidanja državnopravne represivne prinude, već naprotiv, ide za tim da se sve više povećava normativizam, koji ima za cilj ograničavanje zone slobode i prava građana55. Ne samo da će se inkriminisati nova ponašanja kao krivična djela, već će se i krivično procesno zakonodavstvo kretati u pravcu sve većeg ograničavanja ljudskih prava i sloboda. To se prije svega odnosi na mogućnosti prikupljanja dokaza korišćenjem savremenih tehnologija. Pored toga, nisu u pitanju isključivo digitalni dokazi, već i neograničene mogućnosti nadziranja komunikacije i kretanja ljudi, te obrađivanja podataka prikupljenih na taj način. Kako smo i u ranijim radovima ukazivali: ‘’najbolji primjer je zaštita ličnih podataka, jer je to jedan od najvrijednihih ljudskih resursa, koji se danas masovno, potpuno dobrovoljno predaje tehnološkim kompanijama za njihove usluge’’56. S druge strane, iako na potpuno legitiman način prikupljaju 53 Tako navode: ‘’U prvom sudskom slučaju koji je prepoznao dokaze o blockchainu (Huatai Yimei Ltd. v. Daotong Ltd.), ova tehnologija je korišćena kao uređaj za skladištenje elektronskih dokaza. U drugom slučaju (Huatai Yimei Ltd. v. Yangguang Feihua Ltd.) Sud je, potvrđujući digitalne dokaze generisane blockchain tehnologijom, promijenio svoj neutralan odnos prema blockchain i priznao vjerodostojnost digitalnih dokaza koji se generišu i čuvaju na njemu’’. Wu and Zheng, ‘’Electronic evidence in the blockchain era: New rules on authenticity and integrity.’’, 7-9. 54 Kako navodi profesor Stojanović: ‘’pravna država ne samo da štiti građane krivičnim pravom, ona ih mora zaštititi i od krivičnog prava’’. Zoran Stojanović, ‘’Garantivna funkcija krivičnog prava.’’ U Kaznena reakcija u Srbiji – VI deo, urednik Đorđe Ignjatović, 1-15. (Beograd: Univerzitet u Beogradu – Pravni fakultet, 2019), 2. 55 Jovan Ćirić. ‘’Anti-humanizam idologije ljudskih prava.’’ Sociološki pregled 34, br. 1-2 (2000), 78. 56 Šikman i Bajičić, ‘’Izmjene u krivičnom zakonodavstvu Republike Srpske kao izraz potrebe adekvatnog reagovanja na kriminalitet’’, 309, 310. 242 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ove podatke, postavlja se pitanje njihove zaštite i sprečavanja zloupotreba od tehnoloških kompanija koje pružaju ove usluge57. Zbog toga možda izgleda i paradoksalno, ali na zaštiti garantovanih prava i sloboda građana, u suzbijanju manipulacije putem interneta, mogu najviše da urade nosioci podataka, dakle sami građani. Zato, ova ‘’borba’’ kako navode Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler, i Helen Nissenbaum (2019) zahtijeva lišavanje ličnih podataka tehnoloških kompanija, ‘’kiseonika koji to omogućuje’’ i jačanje svijesti i razumijevanja da drugi nastoje da utiču na naše odluke58. ZAKLJUČAK U pisanju rada postavili smo ozbiljnu ambiciju, a to je da u jednom članku obradimo više međusobno povezanih tema. Jasno je da u tome nije bilo moguće u potpunosti uspjeti. Razlog je jednostavan: živimo u vrijeme tehnološke revolucije, koja se eksponencijalno razvija i nismo u potpunosti svjesni njenih razmjera. Naše poimanje visokotehnološkog kriminaliteta u ovom mometnu je problematično. One pojavne oblike koje smo donedavno razmatrali, već su postali ‘’tradicionalni’’ oblici ispoljavanja. Internet je dostigao tolike razmjere da je pitanje manipulacije podacima već postavljeno kao oblik ugrožavanja nacionalne bezbjednosti država (npr. uticaj na izborni proces). Takođe, zloupotreba transformativnih tehnologija, posmatrana kroz blockchain uveliko kreira kriminalna tržišta (droge, falsifkovani proizvodi, itd.) ostvarujući pri tome velika novčana sredstva izražena kroz virtuelnu valutu (npr. bitcoin). Opravdano se postavlja pitanje ili bojazan šta će se desiti kada transformativne tehnologije postepeno preuzmu upravljanje većinom društvenih djelanosti (pametni gradovi, zdravstveni sistem, obrazovni sistem, poreski poslovi, katastarsko-geodetski, i dr.), kolika će biti mogućnost njihovih zloupotreba u kriminalne svrhe. Na drugoj strani jesu pitanja korišćenja transformativnih tehnologija u prevneciji i suzbijanju kriminaliteta. Ova pitanja su, kako smo već naglašavali, pod posebnim izazovom. Na to utiče mnogo faktora, a prije svega tromost u prilagođavanju promjenama, odnosno virtuelnom okruženju. Jer kriminalci su vrlo brzo iskoristili blockchain tehnologiju za vršenje krivičnih djela, dok 57 U navedenom radu ukazali smo na tužbe i sudske presude protiv tehnoloških kompanija, kao što su Fejsbuk (Facebook) i Gugl (Google) zbog uočenih zloupotreba ličnih podataka, a koji su vođeni pred Evropskim sudom pravde (npr. Mario Costeja Gonsales vs Google Spain; Maximillian Schrems vs Facebook Ireland). Šikman i Bajičić, ‘’Izmjene u krivičnom zakonodavstvu Republike Srpske kao izraz potrebe adekvatnog reagovanja na kriminalitet’’, 309, 310. 58 Susser, Roessler and Nissenbaum. “Technology, autonomy, and manipulation.”, 13, 14, 243 Mile Šikman istovremeno organi krivičnog pravosuđa nisu tako agilni kada je u pitanju korišćenje istih tehnogija u suzbijanju kriminaliteta. Zbog toga smo i naveli primjer kineske sudske prakse u kojima su upravo korišćene ove tehnologije za prikupljanje i obezbjeđivanje digitalnih dokaza. Naravno da treba imati na umu i zakonsku regulativu, odnosno neophodost prilagođavanja iste kako bi se omogućilo zakonito postupanje na ovaj način, uz puno poštovanje garantovanih ljudskih prava i sloboda. LITERATURA: 1. 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Hague: European Police Office, 2017. accessed March 8, 2020,. https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/ main-reports/european-union-serious-and-organised-crime-threatassessment-2017; 11. EUROPOL, Crime in the age of technology, Hague: European Police Office, 2017, accessed March 5, 2020, https://www.cepol.europa.eu/sites/default/ files/924156-v7-Crime_in_the_age_of_technology_.pdf 12. Farrell, Graham and Daniel Birks, ‘’Did cybercrime cause the crime drop?.’’ Crime Science 7, no. 8 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40163-0180082-8 13. Glynn, Elizabeth A. ’’Computer Abuse: The Emerging Crime and the Need for Legislation.’’ Fordham Urban Law Journal 12, no. 1 (1984): 73-101. 14. Grbavac, Vitomir, Božidar Tepeš i Franko Rotim. “Informacijska tehnološka revolucija na početku 21. stoljeća.” Društvena istraživanja 12, br. 5 (67) (2003):847-870. 15. Goodison, Sean E., Robert C. Davis, and Brian A. Jackson. Digital Evidence and the U.S. Criminal Justice System: Identifying Technology and Other Needs to More Effectively Acquire and Utilize Digital Evidence. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015. 16. Harari, Yuval Noah. Homo Deus - A Brief History of Tomorrow. London: Harvill Secker, 2015. 17. Ienca, Marcello and Effy Vayena. ‘’Cambridge Analytica and Online Manipulation.’’ Scientific American, March 30, 2018. https://blogs. scientificamerican.com/observations/cambridge-analytica-and-onlinemanipulation/ 18. Ignjatović, Đorđe. ‘’Pojmovno određenje kompjuterskog kriminaliteta.’’ Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu 39, br. 1-3 (1991): 136-144. 19. Ivanović, Zvonimir. “Pitanje postupanja sa digitalnim dokazima u srpskom zakonodavstvu.” Kriminalistička teorija i praksa 2., br. 1/2015. (2015): 7-21. 20. Laurence, Tiana. Introduction to Blockchain Technology. ‘s Hertogenbosch: Van Haren, 2019. 21. McGuire, M. R. and Thomas J. Holt. The Routledge Handbook of Technology, Crime and Justice. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2017. 22. McGuire, M. R. ‘’Technology crime and technology control. Contexts and history.’’ In The Routledge Handbook of Technology, Crime and Justice, Editors M. R. McGuire and Thomas J. Holt, 35-60. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2017. 23. Moore, Daniel and Thomas Rid, ‘’Cryptopolitik and the Darknet.’’ Survival 58, no. 1 (2016): 7-38, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2016.1142085 245 Mile Šikman 24. Miró-Llinares, Fernando and Asier Moneva. ‘’What about cyberspace (and cybercrime alongside it)? A reply to Farrell and Birks “Did cybercrime cause the crime drop?” Crime Science 8, no. 12 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1186/ s40163-019-0107-y 25. Nakamoto, Satoshi. ‘’Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System.’’ www. bitcoin.org, 1-3 accessed March 15, 2020, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 26. National Institute of Justice, Electronic crime scene investigation: A guide for first responders. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2008. 27. Nikolić-Ristanović, Vesna i Slobodanka Konstatinović-Vilić. Kriminologija. Beograd: Prometej, 2018. 28. Novak, Martin, Jonathan Grier and Daniel Gonzales. ‘’New Approaches to Digital Evidence Acquisition and Analysis.’’ NIJ Journal 50, no. 280 (2019): 17-23. 29. Nunn, Samuel. ‘’The Criminal Justice Technology Infrastructure: What it is and how it is Changing.’’ In Criminal Justice Technology In The 21st Century, Editor Laura J. Moriarty, 3-38. Springfield: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 2017. 30. Nuth, Maryke Silalahi. ‘’Taking advantage of new technologies: For and against crime.’’ Computer Law & Security Review 24, no. 5 (2008): 437-446 31. Petrović, Slobodan. Komjuterski kriminal. Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 2004. 32. Pollitt, Mark, Michael A. Caloyannides, Jon Novotny, Sujeet Shenoi. ‘’Digital Forensics: Operational, Legal and Research Issues.’’ In Data and Applications Security XVII, Editors Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Indrakshi Ray, Indrajit Ray, 393-403. Boston: International Federation for Information Processing, 2003. 33. Prayudi, Yudi, Ahmad Ashari. ‘’A Study on Secure Communication for Digital Forensics Environment’’ International Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research 6, no. 1 (2015): 1036- 1043. 34. Protrka, Nikola. ‘’Računalni podaci kao elektronični (digitalni) dokazi,’’ Policija i sigurnost 20, no. 1 (2011): 1-13. 35. Radovanović, Dragana i Mirzeta Begić. Pribavljanje zakonitih dokaza u krivičnom postupku. Sarajevo: Visoki sudskti i tužilački savjet BiH, 2016. 36. Raghavan, Sriram. ‘’Digital forensic research: current state of the art.’’ CSI Transactions on ICT 1 (2013): 91–114 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40012-0120008-7 37. Schmidt, Walter E. ‘’Legal Proprietary Interests in Computer Programs: The American Experience.’’ Jurimetrics Journal 21, no. 4 (1981), 345-404. 38. Simonović, Branislav. Kriminalistika. Beograd: Pravni fakultet u Kragujevcu, 2004. 246 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 39. Slivka Ronald T. and Joel W. Darrow. ‘’Methods and Problems in Computer Security.’’ Rutgers Journal of Computers and Law 5, no. 2 (1975): 217-270. 40. Stojanović, Zoran. ‘’Garantivna funkcija krivičnog prava.’’ U Kaznena reakcija u Srbiji – VI deo, urednik Đorđe Ignjatović, 1-15. Beograd: Univerzitet u Beogradu – Pravni fakultet, 2016. 41. Susser, Daniel, Beate Roessler and Helen Nissenbaum. “Technology, autonomy, and manipulation.” Internet Policy Review 8, no. 2 (2019). DOI: 10.14763/2019.2.1410. 42. Šikman, Mile i Bajičić, Velibor. ‘’Izmjene u krivičnom zakonodavstvu Republike Srpske kao izraz potrebe adekvatnog reagovanja na kriminalitet.’’ U Izmene u krivičnom zakonodavstvu i status nosilaca pravosudnih funkcija i adekvatnost državne reakcije na kriminalitet (međunarodni pravni standardi i stanje u Srbiji), urednik Stanko Bejatović, 307-326. Zlatibor: Srpsko udruženje za krivičnopravnu teroriju i praksu, 2019. 43. Tor Metrics, Users, accessed March 12, 2020, https://metrics.torproject. org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2018-01-01&end=2020-0331&country=all&events=off 44. United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime. New York: United Nations, 2013. accessed March 10, 2020,https:// www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/UNODC_CCPCJ_EG.4_2013/ CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf 45. UNODC. Module 6. Practical Aspects of Cybercrime Investigations and Digital Forensics. UNODC’s Education for Justice (E4J), accessed March 10, 2020,https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/cybercrime/module-6/index.html 46. Zakon o krivičnom postupku Republike Srpske, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 53/12, 91/17, 66/18. 47. Wray, Christopher. (2019). Global Terrorism: Threats to the Homeland. Statement Before the House Homeland Security Committee. Washington, D.C. October 30, 2019. accessed March 9, 2020,https://www.fbi.gov/ news/testimony/global-terrorism-threats-to-the-homeland-103019 access 20.03.2020 48. Wu, Hong and Guan Zheng. ‘’ Electronic evidence in the blockchain era: New rules on authenticity and integrity.’’ Computer Law & Security Review 36, (April 2020): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2020.105401. 247 Mile Šikman TRANSFORMATIVE TECHNOLOGY AND CRIME (PHENOMENOLOGY AND CRIME PREVENTION) Abstract: We have been witness to the development of modern technology and its influence on people‘s daily lives. Hence the digital age has been an influence on crime and an a(nti)social phenomenon. In that regard we can observe the topic from two key aspects: firstly, the form of crime manifestation associated to transformative technology and secondly, crime prevention and suppression based on new techonology. Therefore, it is a fact that at the same time with the mergence of new technology there is also abuse for criminal purposes; almost all forms of crimes that are present in the real world can also be carried out in the virtual world. The problem of manipulation with personal data can be singled out, since this is one of the most valuable things in todays world and which is greaty jeopardized in the digital world. Likewise, blockchain technology, from which cryptocurrencies emerged (i.e. Bitcoin), the concept of smart contracts, as well as a whole slew of technology services, brings a risk of criminal activity in these new areas. It can be manifested through the criminal act of theft (i.e. the theft of private Bitcoin keys), through scams (Cryptocurrency Ponzi schemes), then scams through online casinos, all the way to serious criminal acts like money laundering, illegal drug trafficking, weapons, etc. (based on cryptocurrencies). On the other hand, modern technology is increasingly being used in crime prevention and suppression. An array of technological tools has been implemented in crime prevention and suppression. Likewise, evidence in the form of digital data can be gathered which has brought about new branches like digital forensics and the like. The paper will introduce the basic elements in the relationship between transformative technology and crime. Key words: Transformative technology, crime, phenomenology, etiology, prevention, repression. 248 Original scientific paper UDK IS WHAT IS ILLEGAL ALSO UNETHICAL? AN ANALYSIS OF TURKISH LAW REGARDING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND GENETIC ENGINEERING Dr. Pelin Işıntan1 MEF University, Faculty of Law, Istanbul, Turkey Abstract: The development in biotechnology is enormous and legal systems try to find their way in a field they barely know or understand. The concepts of family, filiation or reproduction are not what they used to be. With the use of new technologies, a man and/or a woman can have an offspring without even having a partner. They can choose to have a girl or a boy. They can choose to have a healthy child who doesn’t inherit their genetic defects, etc. Many people can’t conceive in a „natural“ way because of personal, biological or genetic challenges and wanting to have a child is so powerful that these people will go to any length and ordeal to achieve their dream. This is where the legal system comes into play with many questions along with ethical challenges. Should we let people have what they want in order to have a family? What about filiation? Can we keep the embryos forever? Who has the right over them? Can the father or the mother change their mind before the implantation? There are many other questions left to be answered. Though the reproduction technologies used in Turkey are state of the art, Turkish law is quite restrictive on these matters mostly on the basis of public order. A restrictive system may only seemingly solve some of these legal problems while it creates others as there would always be a more liberal country where people can go and have the procedure. What will happen then? Keywords: Assisted reproduction, embryo, human decency, artificial insemination, genetic defects, biolaw, infertility, public order 1 Assistant Professor, MEF University Faculty of Law, TR- 34396 Istanbul, Turkey (ORCID 0000-0002-8283234X) 249 Dr. Pelin Işıntan INTRODUCTION The development in biotechnology is enormous and legal systems try to find their way in a field they barely know or understand. The concepts of family, filiation or reproduction are not what they used to be. With the use of new technologies, a man and/or a woman can have an offspring without even having a partner by using a sperm bank or a surrogate mother. Thanks to genetic engineering we can enhance our babies making them more intelligent or more beautiful. We can prefer to have a boy or a girl and we can make sure to have a healthy child who doesn’t inherit our genetic defects. All in all, we can enhance mankind, shape it as we like. As the technology evolves we move into this world we only could have imagined happening in science fiction films and a question arises: Should we do everything we are capable of doing? Does being doable also mean that it should be done? Reproduction is a sensitive issue. In most societies, pregnancy is an occasion for celebration and the woman who can give birth is almost sacred. But many people can’t conceive in a “natural” way because of personal, biological or genetic challenges. Infertility is one of the main reasons in resorting to assisted reproductive technologies (ART) whether it’s IVF or ICSI or another treatment. Another reason would be to eliminate a genetic disorder. For example, in Turkey, there are 4.500 beta-thalassemia patients and 1.300.000 people carrying the gene that causes beta-thalassemia according to Turkish Hematology Association2. For these people the risk of having a diseased offspring can be avoided by preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and IVF combined as it is possible to identify embryos carrying this monogenetic disease and to place only the healthy embryos in the womb. ART also presents a valuable option for people who don’t want to be confined within the limits of heterosexual nuclear family3 whether because of their sexual orientation or because of a desire to be a single parent. In any of these cases wanting to have a child is so powerful that these people will go to any length and ordeal to achieve their dream. This is where legal systems come into play. There are various factors such as cultural behavior, religion, tradition, moral positions and ethical challenges when it comes to legislating the area of assisted reproduction. In this paper we’ll take the Turkish legislation as an example and analyze its solutions or lack thereof to the most common problems in the field 2 Turkish Hematology Association, “Akdeniz Anemisi”, last accessed March 1, 2020, http://www.thd.org.tr/ thd_halk/?sayfa=akdeniz_anemisi. 3 Karen Throsby, “New Reproductive Technologies”, in The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, ed. George Ritzer (John Wiley & Sons, 2007): 1, doi: 10.1002/9781405165518.wbeosn021. 250 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova of ART. We will firstly begin by presenting some general ethical questions relating to this field and then we will unfold the Turkish legislator’s approach and answers to some of these questions. I – ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN THE FIELD OF ART Although not far from criticism, the principles set forth by Beauchamp and Childress namely respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice are considered to be the pillars of bio-ethics and when we are faced with a problem they help us determine whether the solution we choose is the “right” one.4 In the field of ART we are often faced with difficult dilemmas and choices about very important issues such as the beginning or ending of life. We can cite a few of those questions as follows: Do we have a right to create embryos in laboratories? If yes, to what purpose? Can they be used for scientific research or donated to another couple? Can we keep the embryos forever? Who has the right over them? Can the father or the mother change their mind before the implantation? Should we treat the gametes or embryos as a commodity and trade them for money? Undergoing ART procedures in order to create a family has also social, psychological and legal ramifications and the questions continue: How to determine filiation, especially when using third party assisted reproduction? How do we balance the right of an individual to reproduce and the right to information regarding one’s genetic origins or the right to privacy of a donor? How many is too many when it comes to the number of cycles? Are women the victims or happy beneficiaries of these technologies?5 Should there be a mandatory psychological support when resorting to ART about the emotional risks and benefits? The financial aspect of ART creates another question mark as a couple with moderate financial means will not have the same access to care as a couple with enough financial strength thus creating an inequality between couples with same needs. Therefore, we can ask: should the national health care system support people at least partially for covering the cost of ART in order to balance inequalities between its citizens? 4 Sevtap Metin, Biyo-Tıp Etiği ve Hukuk (İstanbul: BETİM 2019), 103. 5 For the toll the ART treatments take on a woman’s body and mind see Karen Throsby, “Vials, ampoules and a bucketful of syringes”: the experience of the self-administration of hormonal drugs in IVF”, Feminist Review 72 (2002): 62 ff, doi: 10.1057/palgrave.fr.9400046. 251 Dr. Pelin Işıntan As can be seen there are many questions that have to be answered. Although the law cannot compete with technology’s galloping rate of development this is an area that needs to be addressed by legislation especially in order to develop rules treating the ethical dilemmas we are facing and making sure that these treatments are accessible to people who need them. II – TURKISH LAW AND ITS REGULATIONS REGARDING ART Although the exact figures regarding the number of people resorting to ART are hard to obtain,6 in 2011 there were already 118 fertility clinics operating in Turkey within public or university hospitals or as independent centers.7 Today, this number is around 270.8 It is reported in the press that some 34,840 foreigners travelled to the country for gynecology-related and reproductive treatments in 2018.9 The increase in the number of foreign patients coming to Turkey to receive reproductive treatments is around 15 percent in 2018 and it is expected to increase even more in the foreseeable future.10 Clearly this is a thriving market that needs to be addressed by legislation. In Turkey assisted reproduction is a State-regulated area and although the reproduction technologies used in Turkey are state of the art, Turkish law is quite restrictive on these matters mostly on the basis of public order. Turkey’s first IVF baby was born on April 18, 1989 merely two years after the first piece of legislation namely the Regulation on Assisted Reproduction Treatment Centers entered into force in 1987.11 Curiously, ART is not regulated by a special law but rather by a regulation based on the general law regarding the Fundamental Health Services and also on the decree-law regarding the 6 Although the treatment centers are mandated to report their numbers to the Ministry of Health, the Ministry for some reason does not share this information. The number of couples undergoing ART, clinical pregnancy rates, multiple pregnancy rates, delivery rates and the outcome of pregnancies generated through IVF are unknown. It seems possible to estimate the number of treatment cycles undertaken each year from the consumption of gonadotrophin ampoules. See Bülent Urman and Kayhan Yakın, “New Turkish legislation on assited reproductive techniques and centers: a step in the right direction?”, Reproductive BioMedicine Online 21 (2010): 729, doi:10.1016/j.rbmo.2010.06.030. 7 Zeynep B Gürtin, “Banning reproductive travel: Turkey’s ART legislation and third-party assisted reproduction”, Reproductive BioMedicine Online 23 (2011): 557. 8 Üreme Sağlığı ve İnfertilite Derneği, Türkiyedeki IVF Merkezleri. Accessed March 29, 2020. https://www. tsrm.org.tr/pro/konu/harita/index.htm. 9 “Turkey Becomes Go-to Destination for those seeking IVF Treatment”, Turkish Daily News, last accessed March 1, 2020, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-becomes-go-to-destination-of-for-foreignersseeking-ivf-treatment-142107. 10 “Turkey Becomes Go-to Destination for those seeking IVF Treatment”, Turkish Daily News, last accessed March 1, 2020, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-becomes-go-to-destination-of-for-foreignersseeking-ivf-treatment-142107. 11 Official Gazette 21.8.1987/19551. 252 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Organization and Duties of the Ministry of Health. The many modifications this area was subject to ever since 1987 may seem to justify this choice of the legislator as a more difficult and lengthy process is needed to change a law than to change a regulation. After going through a few changes, the Regulation on Assisted Reproduction Treatment Centers of 1987 has been replaced in 2010 by the Regulation on Assisted Reproduction Treatments and Assisted Reproduction Treatment Centers12 which brought important restrictions to the field. This Regulation is largely modified in 201413 and received a few changes mostly regarding the structure of the treatment centers and its personnel in 2016 and 2018.14 We will go through this 2014 Regulation to determine its position on some important issues concerning assisted reproductive treatments. A. Embryos It is important to start by indicating that under Turkish law creating embryos in laboratories is only possible for reproductive purposes. It’s not permitted to create embryos for the sole purpose of scientific research, i.e. embryonic stem cell research. In 2005 the Ministry of Health requested by a Circular15 not to do any research on embryonic stem cells until the legal, cultural and ethical controversies surrounding the matter is regulated. Following this circular, in 2006, the Ministry issued a Guideline for non-embryonic stem cell research with clinical purposes in another Circular16 and no other legal regulation has been done regarding the issue of embryonic stem cell research ever since.17 This approach of prohibiting the creation of embryos for research purposes is also in line with the disposition in article 18 of Human Rights and Biomedicine Act of the European Council that Turkey signed and accepted as part of its legislative body in 2004. The Regulation itself doesn’t expressly state this prohibition on creating embryos or their use for scientific research although it is possible to deduct it 12 Official Gazette 06.03.2010/27513. 13 Official Gazette 30.09.2014/29135. 14 Official Gazette 25.08.2016/29812 and Official Gazette 14.04.2018/30391 respectively. 15 Ministry of Health, “Embriyonik Kök Hücre Çalışmaları Hakkında Sağlık Bakanlığı Genelgesi.”, Türk Tabipleri Birliği, last accessed March 8, 2020. http://www.ttb.org.tr/mevzuat/index.php?option=com_content&view =article&id=347:embron-k-hre-arairmalari-hakkinda-saik-bakanli-genelges&catid=3:tebligenelge&Itemid=35. 16 Ministry of Health, “Kök Hücre Çalışmaları Hakkında Sağlık Bakanlığı Genelgesi.” Türk Tabipleri Birliği. last accessed March 8, 2020. http://www.ttb.org.tr/mevzuat/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=387:khre-lialari-hakkinda-saik-bakanli-genelgesmayis-2006&catid=3:tebligenelge&Itemid=35. 17 Metin suggests that there is a legal void concerning the area of embryonic stem cell research. See Metin, Biyo-Tıp Etiği ve Hukuk, 419. I am of the opinion that the legislator is purposefully silent about the matter. 253 Dr. Pelin Işıntan argumentum ad contrario of its dispositions as it only mentions the creation and preservation of embryos in a limited way and for a limited purpose. Under Turkish law embryos are not considered as legal entities and they do not have personhood or specific legal rights. Having said that, according to Turkish Civil Code article 28 the child will gain legal rights if he/she is born alive retrospectively from the moment he/she is conceived. Therefore, there is no personhood rights before a live birth for embryos. As we will see below, they can be destroyed after a certain period of time when cryopreserved and we can also add that abortion on request is legal until the tenth week of pregnancy and it is also permitted beyond the tenth week if there is imminent danger to the mother’s health. In this scheme of things, it seems fair to ask whether it is consistent to consider embryos as destructible with no legal status but not to allow any research on them that can save or prolong lives.18 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) or preimplantation genetic testing (PGT) that helps couples identify embryos carrying a genetic disorder is allowed but only to prevent a hereditary medical condition. PGD/PGT cannot be used for gender selection in principal unless it is used to prevent a sex-linked medical disorder. Here lies another question of consistency. It is possible to create not only healthy babies but also siblings who are genetically compatible thru PGT for children who suffer from a genetic disorder and thus use those siblings as donors of stem cells.19 How and why would this be any more acceptable than creating or using spare embryos for research purposes? Although it can be said that this will save the life of one child is this not a huge burden on the other child that is created for the sole purpose of harvesting tissue that would cure his or her sibling? If we try not to commodify the human body or its parts how do we explain creating and using this new born as a donor without his or her consent? B. Definition of assisted reproductive treatments The very definition of assisted reproduction treatment in this Regulation openly shows the preference of Turkish legislator pertaining the concepts of family and reproduction. As defined under art. 4/ğ the assisted reproduction treatments are: 18 John Harris, “Stem Cells, Sex, and Procreation”, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 12, 4 (2003): 353, 359, 368, https://doi.org/10.1017/S096318010312405X. 19 Şule Çelikkan, Ufuk Bircan and Aynur Demir Niman, “Ethical and Legal Issues Driven by Genetic Intervention in the Embryo”, International Journal of Scientific and Technological Research 3, 6 (2017): 4. 254 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Procedures, accepted as treatment methods by modern medicine, which involve assisting the fertilization of the prospective mother’s egg with her husband’s sperm in various ways, enabling them to fertilize outside of the body when necessary, and transferring the gametes or the embryo back to the prospective mother’s genital organs.20 This definition is extremely important as it also defines the limits of our playground. By using the terms prospective mother and her husband the legislator extends the invitation only to the married couples thus excluding gay and lesbian couples, single parents by choice or any other type of family that exceeds the limits of a classical heterosexual definition. Also, by referring to the prospective mother’s egg and her husband’s sperm and the transfer back to the prospective mother’s genital organs the legislation excludes any type of third-party assisted reproduction. This definition clearly does not represent the reality of what is clinically possible.21 However it reveals what is acceptable to the legislator in terms of family and reproduction. C. Third-party assisted reproduction The Regulation doesn’t leave any room for deduction and expressly states the prohibition on third-party assisted reproduction. According to this legislation The use of the eggs and sperm or the embryo of applicants undergoing ART for any other purpose, or in the treatment of other applicants, or the use of those [spermatozoa, eggs or embryos] obtained from anyone other than the applicants in the treatment of the applicants, or the storage, use, transfer, and sale [of spermatozoa, eggs or embryos] for any sort of purpose falling outside the definitions of this legislation, are prohibited.22 It is also clearly stated that the use of donors in any way is prohibited as well. These restrictions are applicable not only to the treatment centers but also to the man and woman undergoing these procedures. Recently there has been an amendment to the Law Regarding Harvesting, Storage, Grafting and Transplantation of Organs and Tissues relating to the prohibitions and punishments.23 According to article 15/2 of this Law any person who donates, grafts, holds, uses, stores and transfers embryos or gametes in a way that is in contravention with this law as well as anyone 20 Translation Gürtin, “Banning reproductive travel”, 557. 21 Gürtin, “Banning reproductive travel”, 557. 22 Translation Gürtin, “Banning reproductive travel”, 557. 23 Official Gazette 05.12.2018/30616. 255 Dr. Pelin Işıntan who trades, acts as an intermediary or a broker in the trade of embryos or gametes or anyone who would abet or advertise or publishes advertisements of these acts is punishable by 3 to 5 years in prison and a punitive fine of 1000 to 2000 days. This Law also states that the assisted reproduction treatments are only available for married couples and expressly prohibits any kind of surrogacy. As cited above this choice of the legislator can be supported on ethical24 or judicial ground. This way there is no confusion about the filiation25 or no danger of unintended inter-sibling marriages, the commodification of human tissues or gametes and exploitation of human bodies is refused and so the public order is preserved. But as things stand the ethics may not be the only concern of the legislator because this choice happens to mimic exactly the approach of Sunni Muslims.26 In a decision in 1992, High Council of Religious Affairs, stated that there would be no harm in resorting to IVF as long as the gametes belonged to the married couple and there is no third-party involved.27 According to this decision the fertilized egg should not be placed in the womb of another woman other than the one who owns the egg and the procedure should not bear any negative effects on the physical and mental health of the parents or the child to be born. The High Council, expressly stated that it is not acceptable to impregnate a woman by using another woman’s eggs or sperm from a man other than her husband’s. What is surprising, is that Turkey is a secular state and has been a secular state since 1937 and as such it cannot base its legislation on any particular religion and the religious opinions should not have a direct impact on regulations.28 Although the Regulation does not in its 24 Throsby points out the asymmetrical power relations between the doctors and patients when the use of third- party gametes or embryos is permitted, underlining the situation of women who feel the pressure to be benevolent and please the medical team, especially those who can only afford the treatment as a counterpart of donating their spare embryos. See Throsby, “Vials, ampoules and a bucketful of syringes”, 65. 25 For possible ways of confusion about filiation see Haluk N. Nomer, “Suni Döllenme Dolayısıyla Ortaya Çıkabilecek Nesep Problemleri”, in Prof. Dr. M. Kemal Oğuzman’ın Anısına Armağan (İstanbul: Vedat Kitapçılık, 2000), 556 ff. 26 Gürtin, “Banning reproductive travel”, 558. Shi’aa Muslims however, as in the example of Iran, permit the surrogacy. See Amir Samavati Pirouz and Nassrin Mehra, “Legal Issues of a Surrogacy Contract Based on Iranian Acts Continuation”, Journal of Family and Reproductive Health 5, 2 (June 2011) : 42. 27 Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu Başkanlığı, “Tüp bebek yöntemi ile çocuk sahibi olmak caiz midir?”, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, last accessed March 4, 2020, https://kurul.diyanet.gov.tr/Cevap-Ara/996/tup-bebek-yontemi-ilecocuk-sahibi-olmak-caiz-midir-. See also GI Serour, “Islamic perspectives in human reproduction”, Reproductive BioMedicine Online 17, Supp. 3 (2008): 35 for other Islamic bodies’ opinions about ART and Islam. 28 Berna Arda, “The importance of secularism in medical ethics: the Turkish example”, Reproductive BioMedicine Online 14, Supp. 1 (2007): 28; Urman and Yakın, 730. Purdy suggests that only secular, naturalistic ethics can provide a guidance in any matter because the religious theorists can never provide a universal sexual ethic without recourse to secular, naturalistic ethics. See Laura Purdy, “What religious ethics can and cannot tell us about reproduction and sexuality”, Reproductive BioMedicine Online 17, Supp. 3 (2008): 15, https://doi. org/10.1016/S1472-6483(10)60325-2. 256 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova entirety follow the Islamic view29, the definition of ART and the outcasting of third-party assistance arguably reflects a certain inspiration. D. Cross-border reproductive care (CBRC) By reading these legislations one can clearly understand that the Turkish legislator is serious about keeping the nuclear family and the bloodline intact. Therefore, a restrictive system may only seemingly solve some of the legal problems while it creates others as there would always be a more liberal country where people can go and have the procedure because there is no universal consensus that these treatments are harmful or morally wrong.30 Such travel for cross-border reproductive care (CBRC) is mostly a by-product of ART legislation31 and Turkey is actually one of the countries that benefits from infertility tourism as stated above. Although it was never legal for Turkish men and women to use donor eggs, spermatozoa or surrogacy in Turkey, until 2010 this was considered as a grey area and it was possible to make carefully orchestrated arrangements through treatment centers to have the procedure across the national borders.32 Until 2009 Republic of Northern Cyprus would be the first choice for Turkish couples but the article 16 of the By-law on Assisted Reproduction Centers in Northern Cyprus forbade the use of donors for Turkish citizens in Northern Cyprus.33 The Regulation that entered into force in 2010 in Turkey expressly banned Turkish citizens from resorting to thirdparty assisted reproduction in other countries repeating the same ban despite the uproar from clinicians to patients in the 2014 Regulation. Despite this ban Turkish people still resort to CBRC clandestinely most likely in Greece/ Island of Crete, Georgia, Great Britain or US34 because the social stigma attached to infertility is perceived more damaging than any legal consequences. 29 For example, cryopreservation of gametes or gonads for social reasons is permitted under Islamic approach. Also, the use of PGD for non-medical sex selection or non-reproductive cloning are acceptable practices in many Muslim countries. See Serour, “Islamic Perspectives”, 36-38. 30 Wannes Van Hoof and Guido Pennings. “Extraterritoriality for cross-border reproductive care: should states act against citizens travelling abroad for illegal infertility treatment?” Reproductive BioMedicine Online 23 (2011): 547, 552, doi:10.1016/j.rbmo.2011.07.015; Richard F. Storrow, “Assisted reproduction on treacherous terrain: the legal hazards of cross-border reproductive travel.”, Reproductive BioMedicine Online 23 (2011): 542; Ayfer Uyanık, “Fertilite Turizminin Hukuki Arka Planı”, Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Hukuk, ed. Zeynep Özlem Üskül Engin (İstanbul: Oniki Levha, 2019), 5. 31 Although a major trigger, legal restrictions are not the only reason for CBRC: Storrow, “Legal Hazards”, 539. Patients travel to other countries in order to get a cheaper or a more effective treatment. The need for privacy also plays an important role. 32 For details of this arrangements see Gürtin, “Banning reproductive travel”, 560-562. 33 Republic of Northern Cyprus Official Gazette 26.08.2009/149. 34 Uyanık, “Fertilite Turizmi”, 5. Urman and Yakın report an annual number of 4000-5000 Turkish couples who receive gamete (mostly egg) donation abroad. See Urman and Yakın, 730. 257 Dr. Pelin Işıntan The recent version of the Regulation also openly forbids and makes it illegal to make such arrangements by stating in its adjunct form no. 17 that If it is discovered that any center and/or any center personnel has participated in acts of referring or sending patients to domestic or international ART centers, encouraging patients or acting as intermediary, in a way that is in contravention with this Regulation, such centers will be closed down for 3 months in the first instance, and indefinitely in the event of such acts being repeated. Those who are not center personnel but are discovered to have acted as intermediaries in such cases will have their certificates, if such exist, nullified by the Ministry. In the event of a discovery at any stage of practices contravening the particulars outlined in the lines 3, 4 and 5 of this form the person who has conducted this procedure, the persons who have referred patients or acted as intermediaries, the impregnated person, her husband and the donor will be reported to the state prosecutor.35 A prohibition without deep thinking and consideration will create further problems whether they are economical, ethical, legal or social. It is also possible to question the justifiability of imposing a restrictive law with extraterritoriality in areas of contested morality.36 Understanding that a person who wants to conceive will stop at nothing should be the first step before making any legal decisions. It is not right or ethical to push these people to make hard decisions or take illegal measures in an already troublesome part of their lives. Therefore, legally prohibiting an act that is widely practiced is bound to create more problems than solutions and will only swipe the unwanted consequences under the rug making them invisible hence impossible to prevent. E. Cryopreservation and posthumous reproduction Preserving the reproductive cells and tissues is possible for men and women under the Regulation article 20. This article permits cryopreservation only if there is a medical indication, the cryopreservation for social reasons is not allowed. What would be considered as a medical indication are cited differently according to gender. For men the medical indications cited under article 20/2 are sperm retrieval through surgery, treatments or surgery that will damage reproductive tissues such as chemotherapy, radiotherapy or removal of testicules. The case 35 Translation (modified by the author) Gürtin, “Banning reproductive travel”, 558. 36 Van Hoof and Pennings, “Extraterritorialty”, 549. 258 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova of cryptozoospermia is also considered as a medical indication to support crypreservation for men. For women article 20/3 states as a medical indication the treatments or surgery that will damage or destroy the reproductive tissues such as removal of the ovaries. It is also possible for a woman to resort to cryopreservation in case she has low ovarian reserve and never gave birth or has a family history of early menopause that is certified by a board of 3 specialist physicians. These reproductive cells and tissues can be preserved for a period of one year but the protocol is renewable for up to five years. The preserved tissues will be destroyed in case the protocol is not renewed or the person to whom the tissues belong to demands it. The tissues will also be destroyed upon the person’s death. Preserving the tissues after 5 years have passed is at Health Ministry’s discretion. The cryopreservation of embryos is also possible under article 20/5 in case there are “extra” or “spare” embryos in a cycle of IVF. To preserve the embryos both the husband and the wife need to give their consent and renew this consent every year if by the end of one year they still want to preserve the embryos. Embryos will be destroyed by joint demand form the couple, by the death of one of them or if their divorce is final. They will also be destroyed by the end of preservation term without renewal. There is no maximum time limit for cryopreserving embryos as there is for tissues. As can be seen there is no option for posthumous reproduction as death is one of the situations that lead to the destruction of tissues and embryos. These dispositions are in accordance with the idea of family and public order that the legislator presented in the definition of ART as stated above. Of course, this approach is open to criticism especially as it may take away the last chance of a woman to become a mother just because she is divorced or her husband is dead. F. Multiple gestation In the beginning of ART practices in order to increase the chances of success it was common practice to transfer multiple embryos.37 But as it turned out multiple births present high risks both for the mother and the fetuses such as extreme prematurity, spontaneous fetal loss and even pregnancy-related 37 B.M. Dickens and R.J. Cook, “Some ethical and legal issues in assisted reproductive technology”, International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics 66 (1999), 58. 259 Dr. Pelin Işıntan morbidity.38 Under Turkish law the number of transferred embryos is limited. The Regulation aims for a single embryo transfer (SET) but allows 2 embryos from third cycle onwards if the candidate is under 35 years old. Patients over 35 are allowed 2 embryos in each cycle. This solution is also in line with recent developments in ART. The trend of SET was already predictable according to Brezina and Zhao in 2011 as they pointed out that single embryo transfer would inherently decrease maternal and infant health risks associated with multiple gestation pregnancies.39 Today, the use of blastocyst culture and implantation allows the transfer of fewer and good quality embryos as it allows embryologists to make a better selection.40 Therefore, the need to transfer multiple embryos is decreasing and more and more countries are implementing regulations mandating SET for women under the age of 40.41 Aiming for SET is also consistent with the prohibition of selective fetal or embryonic reduction stated in the Regulation. G. National health care coverage Assisted reproductive treatments are expensive and therefore it is not always available to people with limited economic means. But as with all medical treatments it is utterly unfair to deny a treatment that can change a person’s (or a couple’s in this matter) life and offer it only to people with high income. Therefore, it is important that people with less income are supported by a national health care system because the aspiration to have children should not be considered as a privilege for the wealthy. This is especially true when assisted reproductive treatment is necessary to prevent a genetic disorder and the couple don’t have the economic wealth of undergoing PGD and IVF in order to have a healthy offspring. Giving them the needed economic support would prevent harm to themselves, to their child and to the society as this 38 Dickens and Cook, 58-59; Paul R. Brezina and Yulian Zhao, “The Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Impacted by Modern Assisted Reproductive Technologies”, Obstrerics and Gynecology International (2012): 2, doi:10.11555/2012/686253; Keziban Amanak and Oya Kavlak, “Etik Boyutu Tartışılan Yardımcı Üreme Teknikleri ve Yasal Düzenlemeler”, Ege Üniversitesi Hemşirelik Fakültesi Dergisi 29 no. 1 (2013): 70-71; Çelikkan, Bircan and Demir Niman, “Genetic Intervention in the Embryo”: 4. 39 Brezina and Zhao, “The Ethical, Legal and Social Issues”, 2. See also Dickens and Cook, 59 for the extent of these health risks. 40 International Federation of Fertility Societies, “International Federation of Fertility Societies’ Surveillance (IFFS) 2019: Global Trends in Reproductive Policy and Practice.” Global Reproductive Health (Wolters Kluwer) 4 (1): 46. 41 IFFS 2019, 46. 260 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova could prevent a later abortion or more future pregnancies in order to have a healthy child.42,43 Although this support is needed to ensure equity of access to ART the funding can be subject to some limitations as the resources are not endless.44 In Turkey, ART is partially covered by national health care system with limitations regarding the age of the woman, duration of infertility and number of cycles. According to these limitations a couple would be eligible for public funding if the woman is between the ages of 23 and 39 and if there is a duration of infertility for 3 years. The funding is offered for up to 3 cycles of assisted reproductive treatments. The coverage is %70 of the cost on first cycle, %75 on second and %80 on third cycle. CONCLUSION ART is a controversial field that is full of difficult choices and dilemmas. Although there is a Regulation in place, in Turkey some of the legal and ethical questions still remain to be resolved as in most countries. These new reproduction treatments and developing technics have the potential to exceed the “normal” boundaries of reproduction and family as they offer new possibilities for men and women who don’t want to be confined in the stereotype of a heterosexual nuclear family structure. There are a myriad of answers and legal approaches to some very hard questions and mostly there is no definite answer. A technic used for treatment can create other unwanted outcomes. Banning a procedure might mean to condemn people who want a child to a lifetime of misery but allowing it also might open a door towards uncertainty of not knowing the genetic lineage or commodification of human values. ART itself carries the risk of becoming a commodity sold only to the ones who can afford it. By supporting the people financially, it becomes possible to democratize ART within the limits of public resources and make it accessible to people according to their needs and not just according to their financial capabilities. Assisted reproduction is not only a medical or only a legal issue. ART and its ramifications need to be addressed in a multidisciplinary way. Therefore, it is incumbent not only upon physicians but maybe even more so upon so42 G. Pennings et al., “ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 14: Equity of access to assisted reproductive technology”, Human Reproduction 23 no. 4 (2008): 773, doi:10.1093/humrep/den037. 43 Çelikkan, Bircan and Demir Niman, “Genetic Intervention in the Embryo”, 4. 44 G. Pennings et al., “Equity of access”, 773. 261 Dr. Pelin Işıntan cial scientists to monitor these issues and balance patient care with social and moral responsibility.45 REFERENCES: 1. Amanak, Keziban, and Oya Kavlak. 2013. “Etik Boyutu Tartışılan Yardımcı Üreme Teknikleri ve Yasal Düzenlemeler.” Ege Üniversitesi Hemşirelik Fakültesi Dergisi 29 (1): 68-75. 2. Arda, Berna. 2007. “The importance of secularism in medical ethics: the Turkish example.” Reproductive BioMedicine Online 14 (Supp. 1): 24-28. 3. Brezina, Paul R., and Zhao Yulian. 2012. “The Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Impacted by Modern Assisted Reproductive Tehcnologies.” Obstretics and Gynecology International 1-7. doi:10.1155/2012/686253 4. Çelikkan, Şule, Ufuk Bircan, and Aynur Niman Demir. 2017. “Ethical and Legal Issues Driven by Genetic Intervention in the Embryo.” International Journal of Scientific and Technological Research 3 (6 ): 1-5. 5. Dickens, B.M., and R.J. Cook. 1999. “Some ethical and legal issues in assisted reproductive technology.” International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics 66 : 55 - 61. 6. Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu. 1992. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. May 20. Accessed March 4, 2020. https://kurul.diyanet.gov.tr/Cevap-Ara/996/tup-bebekyontemi-ile-cocuk-sahibi-olmak-caiz-midir-. 7. Gürtin, Zeynep B. 2011. “Banning reproductive travel: Turkey’s ART legislationand third-party assisted reproduction.” Reproductive BioMedicine Online (Elsevier) 23: 555-564. www.rbmonline.com. doi:10.1016/j. rbmo.2011.08.004 8. Harris, John. 2003. “Stem Cells, Sex, and Procreation.” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 12 (4) October: 353-371, https://doi.org/10.1017/ S096318010312405X. 9. International Federation of Fertility Societies. 2019. “International Federation of Fertility Societies’ Surveillance (IFFS) 2019: Global Trends in Reproductive Policy and Practice.” Global Reproductive Health (Wolters Kluwer) 4 (1): 1-138. 10. Üreme Sağlığı ve İnfertilite Derneği. Türkiyedeki IVF Merkezleri. Accessed March 29, 2020. https://www.tsrm.org.tr/pro/konu/harita/index.htm. 11. Metin, Sevtap. 2019. Biyo-Tıp Etiği ve Hukuk. 2nd Edition. İstanbul: BETİM. 12. Ministry of Health. 2005. “Embriyonik Kök Hücre Çalışmaları Hakkında Sağlık Bakanlığı Genelgesi.” Türk Tabipleri Birliği . September 30. Accessed 45 Arda, “The importance of secularism”, 27. For a different view see Brezina and Zhao, “The Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues”, 5. 262 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. March 2020. http://www.ttb.org.tr/mevzuat/index.php?option=com_content &view=article&id=347:embron-k-hre-arairmalari-hakkinda-saik-bakanli-ge nelges&catid=3:tebligenelge&Itemid=35. —. 2006. “Kök Hücre Çalışmaları Hakkında Sağlık Bakanlığı Genelgesi.” Türk Tabipleri Birliği. May 4. Accessed March 8, 2020. http://www.ttb.org. tr/mevzuat/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=387:k-hrelialari-hakkinda-saik-bakanli-genelgesmayis-2006&catid=3:tebligenelge&I temid=35. Nomer, Haluk N. 2000. “Suni Döllenme Dolayısıyla Ortaya Çıkabilecek Nesep Problemleri.” In Prof. Dr. M. Kemal Oğuzman’ın Anısına Armağan, 545-594. İstanbul: Vedat Kitapçılık. Pennings, G., G. de Wert, F. Shenfield, J. Cohen, B. Tartlatzis, and P. Devroey. 2008. “ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 14: Equity of access to assited reproductive technology.” Human Reproduction 23 (4): 772-774. doi:10.1093/ humrep/den037 Pirouz, Amir Smavati, and Nassrin Mehra. 2011. “Legal Issues of A Surrogacy Contract Based on Iranian Acts Continuation.” Journal of Family and Reproductive Health 5 (2): 41-50. Purdy, Laura. 2008. “What religious ethics can and cannot tell us about reproduction and sexuality.” Reproductive BioMedicine Online 17 (Supp. 3): 9-16, HYPERLINK “https://doi.org/10.1016/S1472-6483(10)60325-2” https:// doi.org/10.1016/S1472-6483(10)60325-2 . Serour, GI. 2008. “Islamic perspectives in human reproduction.” Reproductive BioMedicine Online 17 (Supp. 3): 34-38. Storrow, Richard F. 2011. “Assisted reproduction on treacherous terrain: the legal hazards of cross-border reproductive travel.” Reproductive BioMedicine Online (Elsevier) (23): 538-545. Throsby, Karen. 2002. “”Vials, ampoules and a bucketful of syringes”: the experience of the self-administration of hormonal drugs in IVF.” Feminist Review 72: 62-77, doi: 10.1057/palgrave.fr.9400046. —. 2007. “New Reproductive Technologies.” The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Edited by George Ritzer. John Wiley & Sons. doi: 10.1002/9781405165518.wbeosn021. Turkish Hematology Association. n.d. Akdeniz Anemisi. Accessed March 1, 2020. http://www.thd.org.tr/thd_halk/?sayfa=akdeniz_anemisi. Urman, Bülent, and Kayhan Yakın. 2010. “New Turkish legislation on assisted reproductive techniques and centers: a step in the right direction?” Reproductive BioMedicine Online (Elsevier) (21): 729-731, doi:10.1016/j. rbmo.2010.06.030. 263 Dr. Pelin Işıntan 24. Uyanık, Ayfer. 2019. Fertilite Turizminin Hukuki Arka Planı. Vol. I, in Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Hukuk. Edited by Zeynep Özlem Üskül Engin, 1-21. İstanbul: Oniki Levha. 25. Van Hoof, Wannes, and Guido Pennings. 2011. “Extraterritoriality for crossborder reproductive care: should states act against citizens travelling abroad for illegal infertility treatment?” Reproductive BioMedicine Online (Elsevier) 23: 546-554, doi:10.1016/j.rbmo.2011.07.015. 264 Original scientific paper UDK CYBERCRIME, TERRORISM AND MONEY LAUNDERING. THE IMPERATIVE COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Ana Raquel Conceição1 Law School of Minho’s University, Portugal Abstract: With this article we intent to present the relation between cybercrime, terrorism financing and money laundering. That relation implies that, in most of the times, those crimes are practiced among organized groups which its development and organization, imposes a necessary union of forces between the states, in order to prevent and combat them. The agents and their conducts are all over the world and among the main measures, that the states must imply, are their union. The principal measure of union in the Europe is the creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. We will analyse its powers and its consequences in the domestic law of the members states, in preventing and combat those types of organized crime. Keywords: Cybercrime – terrorism – money laundering – cooperation - European Union - European Public Prosecutor’s Office. INTRODUCTION: Typically, cybercrime and terrorism are committed by criminal groups whose ingenuity, development and organization are its main characteristics. Those characteristics money laundering also entails. Crimes, therefore, that has a highly organized and violent character. Because of this feature, there’s a need for international cooperation by states not only in their criminalization, but especially in their prevention and repression. Thus, the fight against 1 Professor at the Law School of Minho’s University; Integrated Researcher at JusGov- Research Center for Justice and Governance (member of JusCrim) https://www.jusgov.uminho.pt/pt-pt/; This text corresponds, in part, to our doctoral thesis, that we defended on September 6, 2018 at Lusíada’s University - Norte (Porto), entitled: O Branqueamento de Capitais e o Estatuto do Arrependido colaborador: uma nova exigência no (ainda) admirável mundo novo. 265 Ana Raquel Conceição these types of crimes are being shared by the various states at global level, both from the point of view of cooperation and in the harmonization of the material domestic law of all states. From the resolutions of the European Parliament and the European Commission with a view to creating the so-called European lawyer, the proposal for a Council Regulation of March 13, 2013, the legal regime of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is outlined. The European Parliament adopted on October 23, 2013 a European Union action plan for the period 2014-2019 to combat organized crime and among its main measures is the creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. This is particularly noteworthy in the development of European cooperation in criminal matters and, particularly true, in the context of the substantive competence of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which includes crossborder fraud. The undeniable need for a European prosecution service is essential because of territorial jurisdiction for the whole of the European Union, with common rules on criminal matters. The digital technologies are in the both sides: assisting criminal practices and assisting their prevention and repression. 1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CYBERCRIME, TERRORISM FINANCING AND MONEY LAUNDERING. There is a very special relationship between cybercrimes and the financing of terrorism, due to money laundering. In other words, cybercrimes are a vehicle for money laundering and its serves to finance terrorism. Thus, in these crimes the relationship with money laundering is totally different from its relationship with its precedent’s crimes. Cybercrime and terrorism crimes are usually committed by criminal groups, whose ingenuity and cunning determine greater erudition in the practice of these crimes, characteristics that money laundering also includes. Crimes, therefore, with a highly organized and violent character and therefore also determinant in the existence of the organized groups in order to practice crimes. Due to this characteristic, there is a need for international cooperation by States not only in their incrimination, but mainly in their prevention and repression.2 2 About this topic see better point two of the this work. 266 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova The global society also triggers a dizzying evolution of the technology and, consequently, has repercussions on criminal practices. In Portugal exits the law 109/2009, 15 of September, a law that denotes a growing concern in the incrimination of behaviors that until recently were out of criminal tutelage, either because they are completely impossible to be practiced, or because there is still no great advance in the field of information technology. It also shows a great concern in the way in which these crimes can be investigated, bringing to the criminal investigation new and effective means of obtaining evidence which, by virtue of their instrumental relationship with money laundering, may also be used in the repression and investigation of this crime. Rui Gonçalves had already determined that.3 The author dedicates his study on tax fraud, but nonetheless demonstrates the need to prevent money laundering conduct using the internet. In fact, the characteristics of the internet, enhance the practice of any crime, especially white-collar crimes. The Internet is now a necessary enemy. It is impossible to set up a society without the possibility of using the Internet, which helps us a lot and is sometimes essential in terms of work, health, justice, etc. Being transversal to all sectors of society. However, it can also be used for the purpose of committing crimes whose investigation is hardly fruitful attending its own characteristics. In other words, the anonymity of authorship, the impossibility of determining the place of its practice, the technicality it involves, its worldwide dimension and its instantaneous effect, determine a serious investigative difficulty. However, these characteristics also trigger the creation of new legal instruments that determine the use of computer applications in order to promote the discovery of whitening behaviours. In other words, information technology serves as a vehicle for the practice of crime, but it can also serve as a way of repressing or preventing it. The very computerization of society in all sectors and the essential use of the internet facilitate whitening behaviors. In other words, even without illegal conduct in terms of cybercrime, the Internet itself is a means for the practice of money laundering, because it is easy and accessible to everyone, because it allows the practice of acts at a distance, because it is often not pos3 n his words: “ Um factor importantíssimo a ter em atenção no combate a este tipo de criminalidade é também o desenvolvimento tecnológico que se verifica, especialmente inovações ao nível da computação, permitindo a utilização de meios- por parte de quem comete crimes- extremamente difíceis de controlar, como sejam, entre outros, o uso de comunicação móvel por voz via satélite, o uso de comunicação de imagem e voz através da Internet, a utilização de discos rígidos externos cada vez menores e com maior capacidade de informação, o acesso a servidores de informação via Internet localizados em qualquer parte do mundo e o acesso a contas bancárias via Internet.” (Gonçalves, 2007), 16. 267 Ana Raquel Conceição sible to determine who actually used it, and therefore deserves special attention when the crime is at stake, whether in the context of repression or mainly in the area of prevention. Money laundering can be practiced through various conducts, however, in our understanding, to do so, cybercrimes are used with some frequency for this purpose, that is, some of the cybercrimes are the way of executing the crime of money laundering. However, they can also be one of it’s the precedent crimes, and in this case, they have the treatment that most precedent crimes have from a dogmatic point of view. When, however, they are the vehicle for the practice of whitening conducts, the dogmatic and procedural issues may be different. It is emphasized, now, that the doctrine understands that cybercrimes or crimes practiced my an informatic system, can be different things, which may reinforce our thinking that we will present next. Based on different classifications, authors tend to distinguish crimes committed through informatic systems from cybercrimes, as they are typified by law. This distinction, which is broadly based on the (im)possibility that crimes may be committed, or not, with other means, than just informatic system and based on the axiology underlying their regulation.4 That demonstrates the specificity and the necessary consumption by money laundering, since cybercrime fills a legal type, for example it is a computer fraud, and, at the same time, an instrument for the practice of it. In our understanding, taking as a reference the crimes described in the referred law and analyzing the objective elements of money laundering, in particular the conducts described in its paragraph 2 and 3 of article 368-A of the Portuguese criminal code, these may be executed through various computer operations which, in themselves, are also autonomous crimes. Just think about it and pay attention to the typical description of the computer falsification, computer sabotage or illegitimate access, and we can easily see that these are the ways that often are used to operate the conversion, transfer or facilitation of any of them with a view to preventing the liability of the perpetrator of the preceding crime or to conceal the true origin, location, disposition, movement or ownership of the advantages. It is true that the conduct can be practiced without any computer falsehood, but computer science, as we have 4 Pedro Venâncio distinguishes cybercrime in the broad sense from cybercrime in the strict sense. The author writes, distinguishing them respectively: “(…) englobará toda a panóplia de actividade criminosa que pode ser levada a cabo por meios informáticos, ainda que estes não sejam mais do que um instrumento para a sua prática, mas não integra o seu tipo legal, pelo que o mesmo crime poderá ser praticado por recurso a outros meios. (…) abarcará aqueles crimes em que o elemento digital surge como parte integrador do tipo legal ou mesmo como seu objeto de protecção.” (Venâncio, 2011), 17. 268 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova seen, enhances such conduct. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the laundering consists of one of the conducts described in the law of cybercrime if there will be competition of rules or competition of crimes? In order to answer the question raised, it is important to take the legal values that those crime intend to protect. In fact, legal values of cybercrimes are distinct from money laundering. Today, doctrine and jurisprudence are almost unanimous stands, that most cybercrimes aim to protect the authenticity or integrity of any computer or information system and not the achievement of justice which is the principal value that money laundering intends to protect. By tendency, the Portuguese judges consider that there is a real competition between the crimes that are written in the criminal Portuguese code and cybercrimes, which means that the defendant will be condemned by the practice of both crimes, and the justification is based on the difference of values that those crimes intend to protect. Such reasoning cannot be automatic. The circumstances of the specific case must be considered, both regarding the judgment of ethical-legal reproach, especially in the context of the devaluation of the action, and regarding the purposes of the penalties. To assess whether the purposes of the penalties are satisfied with the punishment in an apparent contest or whether the actual contest will be necessary. Thus, if such reasoning is not legitimate, immediately. In the analysis of the context with the previous crimes, much more will be illegitimate when in question are cybercrimes used as a vehicle of money laundering and these are not the sources of the constant advantages of the incriminating type. We refer, in particular, to the situation where the act of executing the money laundering is a cybercrime, that is, for example when the concealment of the origin or location of the advantage obtained through the illicit acts described in paragraph 1 of Article 368-A, is done through a modification of computer data. Here, the conduct is one, the computer falsehood is the means of bleaching. Although they protect distinct legal values, as far as we are concerned it is a violation of ne bis in idem their punishment in real competition, so there will rather be a relation of consonance between these rules. If laundering was only carried out by means of a computer hoax, there is also a relationship of consumption, because the agent’s conduct ends up in the crime of laundering, which is always punished with a penalty higher than any cybercrime. What is more, the different censure that money laundering entails, and the need to punish it, is guaranteed with the punishment in competition for standards. In these cases, there is no greater devaluation 269 Ana Raquel Conceição of the action, degree of censorship on the behavior of the agent, or greater illicit of the fact, that deserves punishment of both crimes. There is a “criminal unit” and, as Figueiredo Dias says, the agent’s conduct is completed by the money laundering, this is his ultimate purpose.5 Although we defend the punishment of only money laundering, when it is committed through a cybercrime, in particular computer falsification, and consequently the perpetrator is being investigated only for money laundering and not for the cybercrime that has been consumed, such a consequence does not prevent of using of the investigative tools described in the procedural part of the cybercrime law. First of all because the law says so, when it legitimizes the use of its investigative tools when the crime is committed through an information system; however, we must bear in mind that some of the means of obtaining evidence of cybercrimes are special for those type of crime, as such, can only be used in the investigation of these and others that are common to all crime provided that they comply with legal requirements, that are nothing more than the respect for the principles of proportionality, adequacy and necessity. 2. THE UNION BETWEEN STATES: THE EUROPEAN LAWYER. The union between the States is essential in the fight against money laundering, and cybercrime. So, the fight against these types of crimes is constantly being shared by the different States at a global level, both from the point of view of field cooperation and in terms of the harmonization of the material domestic law of all States. As Spanish doctrine rightly points out, specially, Juan Carlos Ortiz Pradillo, Portuguese legislation is an example of the reinforcement of the need for the joining of forces between States, mainly in terms of electronic or digital evidence.6 As Vincenzo Militello defends, the union between the States in Europe began with the Treaty of Amsterdam and has been strengthened successively 5 In his Words “(…) apesar de o comportamento global ser subsumível a uma pluralidade de tipos legais concretamente aplicáveis, todavia deva concluir-se pela unidade do sentido social de ilicitude do facto punível.” (Dias, 2007), 993. 6 In his words: “Quizá el mejor exponente de legislación adaptada al entorno digital en la persecución criminal y a los instrumentos internacionales establecidos para la cooperación judicial en la obtención de prueba electrónica sea la legislación portuguesa.” (Pradillo, 2012), p. 285. 270 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova with other treaties, especially by the Palermo Convention signed in 2000 to combat organised crime.7 Strictly speaking, much of the domestic legislation on the prevention of money laundering is already a clear manifestation of this union, in that the imposition of similar domestic law among all the Member States arises in order to facilitate the functionality and effectiveness of the measures, because they are similar or homogeneous. Many of these measures are recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is nothing more than the formalisation of a common concern for all countries. This Office is also a result of the union of efforts between states. Currently composed of 36 members, 34 countries and 2 regional organizations, Portugal being one of these countries and the European Commission one of the regional organizations, the FATF has developed several recommendations, which form the basis of a coordinated response to the threats of money laundering and terrorist financing. There are several resolutions of Parliament and the European Commission with a view to creating the so-called ‘lawyer of Europe’. We will refer the proposal for a Council regulation of 17/07/20138 which explains the legal regime of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which is expected to be adopted shortly.9 As set out in the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, the establishment of this office and the reform of Eurojust, resulted from the Treaty of Lisbon, also known as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provided for the involvement of the European Parliament and national parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities, with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office being established on the basis of that Treaty. If we look at the proposal for a regulation, it is clear that the scope of the prosecutor’s office’s material jurisdiction encompasses crimes against the Union’s financial interests, in particular cross-border fraud, that is to say, its scope relates to fraud relating to European Union funds with a special focus on corruption relating to funding and subsidies from the European Union that 7 In his words: De este modo, el ya tradicional objetivo de «aproximación de las disposiciones legislativas y reglamentarias de los Estados miembros» podrá alcanzar un resultado innovador: en palabras del Tratado de Amsterdam, la adopción de «normas mínimas en materia de elementos constitutivos de los delitos y de las sanciones», al menos en sectores como la criminalidad organizada, el terrorismo y el tráfico de estupefacientes (art. 23.e) TUE).” (Militello, 2002), 49. 8 Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013PC0534 9 On October 12th, 2017, Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 established the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. It is expected to operate by 2020/2021. 271 Ana Raquel Conceição damage its budget. Strictly speaking, it is a question of legitimising through public prosecutors the object of OLAF - the European Anti-Fraud Office which has been given more and more material powers, with money laundering also in its line of sight, both because corruption is one of its previous crimes and, above all, because it is also in its catalogue as a criminal offence against the financial interests of the European Union. In our opinion, the European Union, in the guise of corruption and fraud, is directing its fight against money laundering independently of predicate offense, because if all these bodies and resolutions are directed at combating and preventing conduct that damages the financial interests of the European Union, money laundering is in fact and in law one of the types of offence that comply with this offence, but it is still a fraud in objective terms. Even the European Parliament, on 23 October 2013, approved a European Union action plan for the period 2014-2019 to combat organised crime, corruption and money laundering.10 Among its main measures is the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the elimination of offshores in the European Union and the ineligibility and loss of public office of persons sentenced by final judgment, for organised crime, corruption and money laundering. As can be seen, preventing and combating money laundering is a priority task in the European Union. The following aspects of the proposal for a regulation by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office should be highlighted: dual or double hat; respect for the criterion of necessity and the processing of personal data; and its relationship with Europol. Double-hat inquiry determines the existence of the European Public Prosecutor and Deputy European Public Prosecutors in each Member State, elected by the European Public Prosecutor, by means of a list submitted by each Member State, which must offer guarantees of impartiality and appointed by each Member State. In addition to being under the direction of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, European Public Prosecutors are also integrated into internal judicial procedures, allowing greater control and intervention 10 In this respect the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee on a comprehensive EU policy against corruption: While from a legal point of view not covering the area of judicial and police cooperation, it is useful to recall in this context that the second Money Laundering Directive, adopted in November 2001, extends the range of predicate offences to all serious crimes, explicitly including “corruption”, obliging Member States to combat and prevent the laundering of the proceeds of such offences. Actions which, under Member States’ legislation, are understood as corruption, be it passive or active or in the public or private sector, should be covered taking into account common rules and definitions developed on the basis of EU instruments, the OECD Convention and the Council of Europe conventions on corruption. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52003DC0317 272 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova in ongoing investigations and prosecutions. Applying the Public Prosecutor’s Office rules and, in the absence of regulations, the national law of the Member State where the investigation was opened. The dual investigation consists of applying the prosecutor’s rules of investigation and the rules of investigation of each Member State, notwithstanding the exclusive competence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to open investigations and prosecutions concerning offences committed against the financial interests of the European Union. But its jurisdiction could be extended to internal investigations where the fact under investigation is inseparable from the facts falling within its exclusive jurisdiction, with constant mutual assistance and consultation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the prosecution services of each Member State. In more invasive investigation measures, there is a harmonised requirement in all European Union countries that prior authorisation from the competent judicial authority is required. Thus, searches, wiretaps, surveillance operations, infiltrations, among other measures, always require the authorisation of the competent judge, in accordance with the rules of the Member State where such operations are to be carried out. In this context, it is also necessary to highlight the concern about the processing of personal data obtained through the intervention of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, in particular those containing racial or ethnic elements, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or data concerning health or sex life. Processing of such data is possible only when strictly necessary for investigations and if it complements other personal data already processed, and time-limits for the storage of such data are also laid down. This regulation demonstrates respect for the criteria that legitimise the restriction of the fundamental rights. With the entry into force of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which, as mentioned earlier, is expected to come soon, money laundering with links to several countries of the European Union and thus damaging its financial interests, will fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, and so, all the mechanisms provided for in that Regulation and the internal measures of each Member State, can be used to prevent and prosecute it, and new solutions will then emerge in its investigation, taking particular account of its international, organised and evolved nature. 273 Ana Raquel Conceição CONCLUSIONS: The new borderless society, where knowledge and information are at a click away, associated with rapid and uncontrollable technological and informational developments, also offers the best conditions for committing this organized crime - where cybercrime, money laundering, and terrorism financing have a privileged space - and increased difficulties in its prevention and repression; furthermore, its’ almost symbiotic relationship with computer crime and the financing of terrorism have contributed decisively to the increase, even more, of the natural investigative difficulties and have added a more latent and universal danger, always boosting organized crime. Overcoming these difficulties has gone through various solutions, mechanisms, and strategies of action. There are several special preventive measures that have been and are created to avoid whitening conducts, whose scope ranges from the enlargement to communication duties (or others), to certain entities, to the creation of a concept of politically exposed persons. Always in the motto of the Union between the States, where at European level Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor stand out. The European Lawyer will be an important measure in preventing and combat organized crime, where cybercrime and money laundering always as its space. Respecting the autonomy of the domestic law of the members state, will imply more effective diligences, by unifying the actuation of the criminal investigation of those types of crimes. This office shows us that the union of forces between state s is the way, the only way that will be effective in this type of criminal investigations. REFERENCES: 1. Albrecht, H.-J. (2010). Criminalidade organizada na Europa: perspectiva teorética e empírica. In F. Palma, A. S. Dias, & P. S. Mendes (Coord.), 2º Congresso de Investigação Criminal (pp. 73-99). Coimbra: Almedina. 2. Brandão, N. (2002). Branqueamento de capitais: o sistema comunitário de prevenção. Coimbra: Coimbra editora. 3. Caeiro, P. (2010b). A consunção do branqueamento pelo facto precedente (Em especial: 4. as implicações do Acórdão do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça n.º 13/2007, de 22 de Março; ii) a punição da consunção impura). In M. C. Andrade, M. J. 274 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. Antunes & S. A. Sousa (Org.). Estudos em homenagem ao Prof. Doutor Jorge de Figueiredo Dias (Vol. III, pp. 187-222). Coimbra: Coimbra Editora. 4. Conceição, A. R. (2009). Escutas Telefónicas. Regime Processual Penal. Porto: Quid Iuris. Conceição, A. R. (2015). A relevância probatória das gravações realizadas por particulares. In Em Lusíada Direito (pp. 137-152). Lisboa. Dias, F. (2007). Direito Penal, Parte Geral Tomo I 2ª edição Questões Fundamentais A Doutrina Geral do Crime. . Coimbra: Coimbra Editora. Gonçalves, R. M. (2007). Fraude Fiscal e Branqueamento de Capitais. . Porto: Almedina & Leitão Lda. Militello, V. e. (2002). Una experiencia comparativa: el proyecto común europeo de lucha contra la criminalidad organizada. Em L. Rodríguez, & C. R. Santos, El Derecho Penal Ante la Globalización. (pp. 27-49). Madrid: Editorial Colex. Pradillo, J. (2012). Nuevas medidas tecnológicas de investigación criminal para la ontención de prueba electrónica. Em J. P. Gil, El processo penal en la sociedad de la información. Las nuevas tecnologías para investigar y probar el delito (pp. 267-310). Madrid: La ley. Ramos, A. D. (2014). A prova digital em processo penal: o correio eletrónico. Lisboa: Chiado Editora. Venâncio, P. D. (2011). Lei do Cibercrime: anotada e comentada. Coimbra: Coimbra Editora. Verdelho, P. (2004). Apreensão de correio electrónico em Processo Penal. In Revista do Ministério Público, ano 25 Outubro-Dezembro n.º 100, pp. 25-48. 275 Original scientific paper UDK LEGAL NATURE OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE CONCLUDED UNDER UBER SYSTEM Svetislav Janković1 University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law Abstract: At the beginning of the 21st century, computer technology and Internet connection have changed the communication among people and that modification of communication had a special reflection on the process of concluding a contract. This change had a particular impact in the field of transportation because people now could arrange their voyage through Internet platforms, without a physical presence in the pre-contracting process and the election of the appropriate carrier. It is the case in all branches of the public transport of passengers (sea, inland water, air, road, and railway carriage), where common carrier conventionally accepts to transport passengers. But, from 2010, previously in the USA, but afterward worldwide, it has appeared a new mode of transport people in the road branch, named Uber. At first sight, it looked like other types of transport, particularly to the taxi, because people under the Uber system were carried just like via taxi. But, it was and is, only at first sight, because regarding the Uber exist, at least, two opposite legal standpoints. First, legal standpoint, actually legal qualification of the Uber carriage from the Uber representatives who claim that Uber does not carriage the people (especially not as a taxi), but only makes intermediation between passengers and drivers. This qualification is based in the sharing economy which enables Uber and similar systems (for example, Airbnb) in the way that common people who have a surplus with their goods and service, share them with others who at that moment have a bigger economical preference of consumption of that good or service. Two contracts appear – first, between Uber and driver, and second, between driver and passenger. Having in mind this type of legitimation, Uber serves only for the matching between drivers (common people who have cars and are ready to share) and passengers. Through its system, Uber resolves information asymmetry, due to its list of free and prepared drivers who are logged to the Internet platform from which passengers can potentially choose and conclude the 1 PhD, Assistant Professor 277 Svetislav Janković contract of carriage with some of them. As a conclusion of this standpoint, Uber is not a carrier but only an intermediary. The second legal qualification is summarized in the claim that Uber is, as opposed to the first sight, carrier. This qualification is based on the fact that Uber does not make only the link between driver and passenger, but organizes, enables and supervises the whole process of transportation which begins with matching the passenger with the driver and ends with the payment (which, inter alia, is collected by Uber through its banking account and after collection, divided between Uber and driver). Uber enables this kind of transport because, in the absence of it, this kind of transport would not exist, due to Uber being presented in the legal context not only as a company (legal person) but also as a market maker. It could be visible from this, also, an organizational role that appeared in the launch of this concept of transportation (through Internet platform) and, via it, linked the driver and passenger. Finally, the monitoring function is obvious. The Uber keeps the right to get the driver, one who does not accord with the Uber’s way of doing business, off the list. All of these arguments confirm indisputably the carrier’s side of the Uber, but not only that; this qualification of the Uber, from the angle of Labor Law, makes it an employer. In reality, the driver is not someone who shares his leisure time and a car (the surplus of it), as would be in the idealistic type of sharing economy, but someone who spends the most of the working hours in serving directly to the Uber, and indirectly, through the Uber, to the passengers. Finally, the third legal qualification of Uber appeared, which is manifested in hiring the car with the driver. Unlike the aforementioned intermediary role and role as the transporter, in this qualification the Uber „leases“, for a short period time, a car with driver to the passenger. This is, of course, not the truth because the passenger does not take direct possession of the car and driver, but only temporarily like in the limo service contract. But, unlike the limo service, Uber is more like a taxi, especially having in mind the purpose of these two types of service. The user concludes limo service contract for enjoying a luxury drive and, on the other side, in Uber system one concludes a contract only for a simple carriage, but not for luxury. To conclude, Uber is the most similar to the taxi service. Keywords: Uber, intermediary, carriage, wet-lease of a car, employer-employee relation. 278 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova I INTRODUCTION The 21st century, on contrary to all other centuries (except maybe to the 20 ) has brought much more novelty than any other to our civilization. Due to the Internet, our civilization has changed from the point of information asymmetry to the point of information inflation.2 This consequence has a big influence on consumer’s choices relating to all goods and services which consumer needs. As opposed to the limited choice in the 20th and previous centuries, in the 21st century, the consumers have an unlimited choice regarding, practically, all goods and services which they need. This is because the Internet creates one dimension within which all users of the Internet can meet regardless of the geographic location and offer (or accept) their business (or even personal) proposals. In line with technology development, it has created new programs, more accurately, computer algorithms that enable easier matching between people (actually, between providers of goods and services on one side, and consumers on the other). At the beginning stage, it only improved (and accelerated) the existing way of linking business people which has, also, been established through the innovation of telephone, fax, and e-mail. But, thanks to the concept of sharing economy in correlation with innovation in technology it was possible to create a business link between common people who want to offer their, own, goods and services, and others who need it. To be precise, they want to share their, own, goods and services to the extent that they do not need it, because, this surplus has greater economic usability for others than for them.3 For example, if someone has a flat in the touristic area and uses it only for one month per year, it is economically unjustified to keep it empty for the other 11 months and not rent it. The same logic could be applied to all the other goods and services, e.g. cars/vehicles, computers, agricultural machines, even bicycles, and also, all types of work engagements. Having in mind sharing economy, the founders of Uber launched it in 2009, wishing to offer a new mode of transporting the passengers, which would satisfy consumer’s needs and expectations in a better way.4 The advantages of Uber, at the beginning phase, consist of (from the passenger’s perspective) th 2 Yushu Ding, “Impact of the Internet on International – Trade from the Perspective of Information Asymmetry”, in Cyber Security Intelligence and Analytics, eds. Cheng Xu et alia (Switzerland: Springer, 2020), 153. 3 Arun Sundararajan, The Sharing Economy – The end of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism (London: MIT Press, 2016), 26-30. 4 Andreas Hein, Markus Böhm and Helmut Krcmar, “Tight and Loose Coupling in Evolving Platform Ecosystem: The Cases of Airbnb and Uber“, in Business Information Systems, eds. Witold Abramowicz and Adrian Paschke (Berlin: Springer, 2018), 299. 279 Svetislav Janković easier matching with a driver than with a taxi, kinder staff, newer and better vehicles, possibility to transport people with disabilities, etc. At the other side, Uber did not have all the needed licenses for transporting people and on that occasion, it came into conflict with taxi drivers who felt their business was threatened due to spreading the idea of Uber among passengers and, therefore, taking the piece of (taxi) market cake. Besides the economic aspect of Uber, the problem of legal qualification has been created, which has particularly amplified the conflict between representatives of Uber and taxis. The focus of this dispute is oriented on the basic question – whether Uber is carrier or it is a simple intermediary. II THE UBER’S WAY OF DOING BUSINESS Uber was established in 2009, in San Francisco, USA, and has been operating under the same principles ever since. Uber is a company, but more importantly for this article, Uber is an application for smartphones which enables access to data related to transport. Also, at last, but not least, Uber is the transportation market. More precisely, Uber’s way of doing business consists of three legal parties – Uber, as the first, driver, as the second, and passenger (consumer) as the third party. In this structure, Uber suitably organizes matching within the transportation market, between one of the drivers and one of the passengers. It does through linking free (not engaged at that moment) driver with the passenger who needs a ride from one point to another. The crucial fact in this process is an application for smartphones through which members (drivers and passengers) are linked. Application is, actually, an algorithm through which offer and demand for transport can meet and, consequently, make a contract of carriage. Once the potential driver or passenger register themselves on the application, the passenger can access the database of many drivers who offer a ride and, according to the need for location, convenience and other aspects of the ride, he chooses one of the drivers from the list. Even though Uber on one virtual place links two parties (driver and passenger), it is, in fact, consumer-oriented service. This is because the consumer finally decides whether or not the contract of carriage will arise. Uber’s list of available and prepared for ride drivers is, actually, a list of pending, potential, contracts of carriage which would be concluded in the moment when the passenger decides that. From this perspective, the will of the passenger is 280 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova decisive and creative for the future contract of carriage. To summarize, once the passenger opts for one driver from Uber’s list, the contract of carriage will be created. But, still, at this point, it is vague whether the contract between passenger and driver or between passenger and Uber arises – in which case, the driver is a simple performer of the aforementioned contract, but not a contractor. From the angle of the driver’s legal viewpoint, he is not a decisive factor for the contract conclusion; because his will has an impact only to the performance, but not on the conclusion of the mentioned contract. Moreover, Uber, as such, can get a “disobedient” driver off the list if it estimates that he did not perform his obligation related to riding (his position in Uber system) in the right way after some time. The crucial proof for this is the negative reputation of the driver which consists of negative comments/rates and dislikes from unsatisfied passengers. III LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF UBER’S CONTRACT As was aforementioned, it is vague; between what parties the contract of carriage is concluded. Two options exist. Firstly, the contract of carriage is concluded between the Uber and consumer (passenger) and, secondly, directly between the driver and the passenger. The first option leads to the qualification of Uber as a carrier and the second only to the intermediary role of it. In this contribution, it will be started with the second one.5 1. Uber as an intermediary The representatives of Uber have been claiming for a long time that Uber is not a transporter, but the only intermediary between driver and passenger who possess the full legal capacity to conclude a contract, opposing to Uber which is only computer’s algorithm (program) and, as such, has not any legal capacity.6 Basic motivation to claim intermediary role is strict and extensive rules on driver and vehicle qualification (licenses and roadworthiness, primarily).7 Besides that, Uber does not want to take over any responsibility 5 Svetislav Janković, “Legal regime of the contract of carriage of passengers by road concluded under Internet platform”, Law and Business, no. 7-9 (2019): 390-392. 6 To be precise, Uber is the technology platform. See detailed Henrique Schnieder, Uber – innovation in society, (Seatle: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 33. 7 Eran Kaplinsky, “Should license plate owners be compensated when Uber comes to town?”, in Law and the Sharing Economy, Regulating online market platforms, eds. Derek MecKee, Finn Makela, Teresa Scassa, Sabrina 281 Svetislav Janković for a lack of performance of the contract of carriage concluded directly between driver and rider.8 Uber is an authentic marketplace that connects drivers and passengers who offer and seek rides through already mentioned Uber’s computer program.9 This computer program is user-friendly mobile phone application which on an online basis connects suppliers and demanders of ride. In this way of thinking Uber, as such, does not conclude a contract of carriage with anyone, but does the mere connection between driver and rider. Uber provides only information society service which enables suppliers and demanders for transport services to get into contract.10 Below and usually before the final transportation contract (between driver and rider), Uber can conclude two contracts separately with supplier and consumer. These contracts could be in their nature agency contracts, but it is not clear and even not true, due to the lack of integration into driver’s or rider’s business, as well as the lack of control by some of them.11 Driver and rider are independent contractors who normally conclude the contract of carriage with which existence and content Uber does not any matter.12 Uber does not involve itself into the process of conclusion of the contract, leaving both parties option to choose the time and, generally, terms under which contract will be concluded.13 1.1. Passive position of Uber Uber has a passive position regarding contract of carriage having in mind two levels of this contract – concluding and performing. Firstly, Uber, in its intermediary role, has a passive position, because it does not search driver Tremplay-Huet (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2018): 228. 8 Uber representatives constantly seek to avoid responsibility for the proper performance of the main contract (of carriage). See detailed Felix Maultzsch, “Contractual liability of online platform operators: European proposals and established principles”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3074301, 1-2. 9 Damien Geradin, “Principles for Regulating Uber and other intermediation platforms in the EU”, TILEC Discussion paper, no. 18 (2017): 5. 10 Information society service is a term that is used in EC Directive 2000/31 and has a meaning of service provided at distance, using computer tools and equipment, at the individual request of the recipient (of service) and, always for remuneration. See Directive 2000/31/EC of the European parliament and EU Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society service, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal market, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000L0031&from=EN, art. 2(a). 11 Jeremias Prassl and Martin Risak, “Uber, TaskRabbit, & Co: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733003, 26.02.2020, 13. 12 The Driver and rider are completely free to join Uber. This is on a fully voluntary basis (e.g. rider voluntarily join to the platform and input credit card number and, finally, decide to ask for a ride. On the other side, driver, also, voluntarily accepts or reject the concrete ride). See Schnieder, Uber – innovation in society, 37. 13 Joellan Riley, “Brand New ‘Sharing’ or Plain Old ‘Sweating’? A Proposal for Regulating the New ‘Gig Economy’”, in New Directions for Law in Australia: Essays in Contemporary Law Reform, eds. Ron Levy at alia (Australia: ANU Press, 2017): 62. 282 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova and rider; due to both of them search each other through Uber application. Moreover, the driver has also a passive position because rider (consumer) once it registers on the application can choose one of the more potentially apt drivers. So, the driver is not someone who actively searches for a connection with the rider. Once it registers on the application, the driver permanently offers a ride to an unlimited number of registered consumers. Of course, this offer is not irrevocable, due to the driver can refuse to conclude a particular contract of carriage with a particular client. But, refusing to contract has an implication at Uber rating list (losing credibility by clients) and, consequently, getting in the situation to be excluded from the list without explained reason. Claiming its intermediary role, Uber representatives want to show how Uber has not decisive influence in the contracting process, but the only technical, practically neutral and automatic role in matching potentially interested parties.14 Therefore, Uber should not bear a risk of nonperformance of the concrete contract of carriage, because Uber did not conclude it and did not take over obligations from it. Only the driver and passenger are obligated by the contract and, therefore, only they can be held responsible for failure in the performance of the mentioned contract. 1.2. Concluding remarks on the intermediary role of Uber Finally, Uber is not a transporter because it does not own the cars, due to partner drivers are someone who owns or, at least, possess the cars. Additionally, partner drivers are independent contractors who, as above mentioned, decide by their, own, criteria whether or not to conclude a contract with a passenger. The direct effect of this contract of carriage is physical transferring passengers from one point to another using the car and driver service. On the other side, Uber contract does not have for the main purpose of physical conveying goods and people, but intermediation service connecting partner drivers with riders.15 This kind of intermediation service is not different, not in the slightest, from intermediary services in other branches in commerce as in tourism, accommodation, IT sector, etc. Because of that, Uber representatives deem and claim that Uber has not any peculiarity concerning others, mentioned, services, which would deeply relate to the transport industry. The model of doing business is the same – just matching supply and demand, regardless to 14 Felix Maultzsch, “Contractual liability of online platform operators: European proposals and established principles”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3074301, 27.02.2020, 31. 15 Geradin, “Principles for regulating Uber and other intermediation platform in EU”: 9-11. 283 Svetislav Janković a branch of industry, and not involved in the core activities neither supply or demand. To conclude, the main purpose of Uber contract is just to connect driver and rider (consumer) and, therefore, Uber’s liability is limited only to its intermediary legal role, due to Uber is not involved in performing the contract of carriage. 2. Uber as a carrier As an opposite to intermediary role of Uber, stands its role as a carrier (transporter) which one is represented by city and state authorities, taxi drivers and the majority of legal theorist and practitioners (above all, judges). The basic reason for this way of thinking is some kind of defense from illegal and unverified public transport. Of course, this argumentation is viewed from different corners. Represents of state and city authorities claim that Uber and its partner drivers do not have proper licenses which prove the quality of their service. Taxi drivers, on behalf of their interests, state that Uber confronts with main rules of fair competition, because, it wants to participate in already, by taxi drivers, created and divided market.16 Finally, legal theorists and practitioners advocate the carrier’s role of Uber from the point of decisive influence to the main purpose of the contract – to transfer people from one point to another. This impact consists of an exclusive right of Uber to collect fare and to control the overall process of performing the contract (which is operated through determining legal conditions of carriage and monitoring every ride from beginning to the end) and, finally, right to exclude disobedient driver from the Uber’s list of offered drivers.17 So, it seems convincing that Uber does not possess only the intermediary role, because it is obvious its involvement in the whole process of transportation including, but not limited, to pre-contractual intermediation. 2.1. The State’s interest to regulate Uber The representatives of the State tend to argue that Uber is transporter because they see it as an integrative part of public transport in the State’s territory. Uber is represented as a complex system which consists of computer’s algorithm and drivers (with their, own, cars) which are, from the Uber’s 16 Daniel Rauch, David Schleider, “Like Uber, but for local governmental policy: The future of local regulation of the ‘sharing economy’”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2549919, 2.03.2020: 2-3. 17 Christoph Busch, “The sharing economy at the CJEU: Does Airbnb pass the ‘Uber’ test? Some observations on the pending case C-390/18 – Airbnb Ireland”, EuCML (2018): 173. 284 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova perspective, separated, but from the State’s view united. The authorities see algorithm and drivers united and as one contractual party, because drivers are not independent of Uber, on the one side, and the other, drivers are not private carrier due to commonly and ordinarily provide riding service for remuneration. Consequently, they form, in cooperation with the computer’s algorithm, public carrier.18 Public authorities worldwide negate the intermediate role of Uber due to public interest involved. The concern of the safety of passengers is the main reason for the interested in regulating this type of transport.19 The passenger as a simple consumer of transport service is unprotected because it does not get the complete information about concrete ride regarding personification the contractual party, its expertise and licenses for it as a prove, and finally about insurance which should cover potential damage or injure which could be occurred during the ride. On the other side, all public transporters (irrespective of a branch in transport) must have properly issued licenses for providing public ride and, consequently general liability insurance. In reality, Uber is not under the State’s legal system (of transportation) and must accord with it if wants dully legally to do in the transport business. To be precise in the legal qualification of Uber as a transporter from the state’s perspective it should be stressed that Uber has to take over legal responsibility from drivers because Uber is more organized than its partner drivers and they can be considered only as a mere performer of Uber’s contract of carriage. Because of monitoring and generally control function of Uber, the states worldwide want to impose on Uber obligations related to all licenses which are required for ordinarily public transport. 2.2. Taxi driver’s standpoint From the taxi driver’s perspective, Uber is something (or, if it has legal capacity, someone) that violates the Law in regard to fair competition, consumer fraud and deceptive business practice.20 The basic argument of the illegal business of Uber is related to unfair competition because taxi drivers deem that Uber takes their piece of market cake which has been made for a 18 Public carriers are professionals who provide carriage to any interested customer under the same terms of the contract, with charging reward. Contrary to the public, exists private carriers who provide transport only to themselves alone or third parties but not on ordinarily and commercially basis, and very often without charging reward. Nebojša Jovanović, Transport Law of Serbia & Montenegro (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005), 284. 19 Hannah A. Posen, “Ridesharing in the sharing economy: Should regulators impose über regulations on Uber?”, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 101 (2015): 408. 20 Posen, “Ridesharing in the sharing economy: Should regulators impose über regulations on Uber?”, 418. 285 Svetislav Janković long time ago and, as they believe, reserved for them. At the beginning of taxi transport and especially during the great depression in 1930, taxi regulation has become strict and exact with intent to prevent chaos in taxi market due to this kind of business has developed rapidly.21 The essence of the regulative has consisted of two parts – the first, the need for a license to operate as a taxi driver, and, the second, the limited number of licenses which should prevent an unlimited number of drivers and, consequently, traffic jams.22 By this way of considering, Uber is not a mere intermediation service separated from partner drivers, due to partner drivers are not an independent factor at the transport market, but wholly dependent from the Uber system (from beginning to the end of every concrete ride). Besides that, Uber through partner drivers avoids the rule of limiting public carriers in the transport market, by providing public transport without proper licenses, which licenses, by the way, it cannot get due to limited and already issued taxi licenses. 2.3. Concluding remarks regarding carriers role of Uber As has been shown, Uber is not a temporary agent who connects provider and consumer without integrating into the driver’s business and without any control regarding the process of performing the ride contract and, also, payment process.23 It has been proved that Uber is in a considerable extent involved in providing transport service but stays open question what is the liability of Uber. The liability of Uber is twofold and regarded to both the partner driver and the passenger. To the passenger, Uber can be liable only under the contract of carriage and to the partner driver it could be considered as liable only from the labor relation. Moreover, according to doctrine respondeat superior, especially under California Law (where Uber is legalized), Uber is deemed liable accord passen21 Damien Geradin, “Uber and the rule of law: Should spontaneous liberalization be applauded or criticized?”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693683, 26.02.2020: 4. 22 The appearance of Uber in the Mexico City is very interesting. In that city, the number of licensed taxi drivers is not limited and Uber is considered as TNC (Transportation Network Company) which means that it is allowed as such, but under different requirements than traditional taxis. TNC and Uber, as the main TNC, is controlled by Secretary of Mobility which controls, basically, quality requirements regarding vehicle characteristics and operation permits for drivers, but does not deal with the quotas and number of vehicles allowed in the streets. Therefore, in Mexico Uber is not forbidden. See Maria Lorena Puche, “Regulation of TNCs in Latin America: The case of Uber Regulation in Mexico City and Bogota”, in The Governance of Smart Transportation Systems, eds. Matthias Finger and Maxime Audouin (Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 46. The similar legal regime of Uber is in California where state regulators allowed it to operate in exchange for requiring driver background checks and increased insurance coverage. Rauch and Schleider, “Like Uber, but for local governmental policy: The future of local regulation of the ‘sharing economy’”: 26. 23 Prassl and Risak, “Uber, TaskRabbit, & Co: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork”: 13. 286 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova gers not only under the contract of carriage but also under the labor contract. Justification of this standpoint is founded in developed undelaying principles of mentioned doctrine, especially in preventing future injuries and damages, compensating victims and damaged persons. Therefore, Uber must have the preventing and compensating role to make the legal balance in relations derived from its business structure.24 So, if Uber is considered as a transporter it should bear in mind that in that constellation it also could be an employer regarding partner drivers.25 Uber’s power to exclude the driver from the list is an argument in favor of the labor relationship between Uber and driver, and pure evidence of controlling the driver by Uber in the traditional sense of the subordinated position of the employee.26 But, unfortunately, there is no explicit contract for either of these two possible legal relationships and, therefore, no explicit protecting rights for the consumer (in the carriage contract) and driver (in the labor contract).27 Because of that, it is strongly recommended to explicitly regulate Uber legal structure regarding which would relate not only to the passengers but also to the partner drivers and in that manner make clear legal relations between involved parties. IV CONCLUSION Having in mind all the above mentioned, it could be undisputable to conclude that Uber has more transporters’ than intermediary features and, therefore, it could be deemed as a carrier. But, once it considered like transporter it should hold that role and bear all the risks and responsibilities which derived from it. However, it is not completely true, due to Uber has, beside transporters’, also intermediary features. Because Uber’s role is not completely clear, 24 Constance E. Bagley, Managers and the Legal Environment, ninth edition (Boston: Cengage, 2019), 125. 25 The basic argument opposing the employer’s role of Uber is found in the evidence that partner drivers, like other independent contractors, provide their, own, cars and have substantial discretion over their hours of work. But, this is not sufficient argument for claiming that Uber is not the employer, because it does decisive control over the whole and all contracts of carriage. Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson and Debra Satz, Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy and Public Policy, third edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 324. 26 A mere control is usually common to agency and labor contract, but in the case of Uber, the control is sufficient to deem Uber as an employer and, therefore, to held Uber vicariously liable for the acts of the driver (its employee, actually). Bagley, Managers and the Legal Environment, 125. More detailed explanation about the driver’s legal position (whether is it an employee or an independent contractor) could be seen in Henry H. Perrit, JR. Employment Law – Update (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2018), 1-28-1-35 27 Besides the aforementioned consumer’s rights, on the other side, it should exists rights for drivers-employees like ones related to the minimum wage and working time, to the health and safety and, finally, to the unfair dismissal protection. Prassl and Risak, “Uber, TaskRabbit, & Co: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork”, 1. 287 Svetislav Janković especially having in the mind presence of intermediary features in its legal structure, it should be proposed that Uber legal position regarding its liability should be between transporter and freight forwarder. On the one hand, Uber should bear transporters’ liability, but not in whole, and on another, it should bear freight forwarders’ liability which one considered usually as “culpa in eligendo” liability.28 The mixture of these two types of liabilities seems adequate because if Uber’s liability would be only the one which bears freight forwarder, then it would seem Uber’s legal position very often without any liability for the performance of the concrete carriage on the basis on the evidence that Uber has properly selected the partner driver and set it on its list. Thus, Uber should bear the type of carrier’s liability but corrected with the liability of freight forwarder in cases when the selected partner driver was dully legally licensed by state authority. To conclude, Uber has to bear two legal regimes regarding its liability to passengers. The first, liability only for the adequate selection of partner driver if the driver has a properly issued license, and the second, liability for the whole performance of the contract of carriage if the partner does not have a properly issued license by state authority. It seems justifiable that Uber in the first-mentioned regime has an intermediary legal position and in the second, the legal position of a transporter and so established legal balance makes Uber’s legal position much more certain, reliable and predictable for the concrete passenger. REFERENCES: 1. Bagley Constance E., Managers and the Legal Environment, ninth edition (Boston: Cengage, 2019) 2. Busch Christoph, “The sharing economy at the CJEU: Does Airbnb pass the ‘Uber’ test? Some observations on the pending case C-390/18 – Airbnb Ireland”, EuCML (2018) 28 Usually, forwarder makes all the necessary arrangements for the carriage of goods by others (transporters), but it is not involved in the performance of the contract of carriage, because his role is limited only to the linking his consignor with the transporter and eventually to right to select an appropriate carrier. Therefore, the forwarder is not liable for non-performance of the contract of carriage, but only for the adequate and proper choice of (licensed) transporter. Marian Hoeks, Multimodal Transport Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2010), 52-55. 288 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 3. Ding, Yushu, “Impact of Internet on International – Trade from the Perspective of Information Asymmetry”, in Cyber Security Intelligence and Analytics, eds. Cheng Xu et alia (Switzerland: Springer, 2020) 4. Geradin Damien, “Principles for Regulating Uber and other intermediation plaforms in the EU”, TILEC Discussion paper, no. 18 (2017) 5. Geradin Damien, “Uber and the rule of law: Should spontaneous liberalization be applauded or criticized?”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693683 6. Hausman Daniel, McPherson Michael and Satz Debra, Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy and Public Policy, third edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 7. Hein Andreas, Böhm Markus and Krcmar Helmut, “Tight and Loose Coupling in Evolving Platform Ecosystem: The Cases of Airbnb and Uber“, in Business Information Systems, eds. Abramowicz Witold and Paschke Adrian (Berlin: Springer, 2018) 8. Hoeks Marian, Multimodal Transport Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2010) 9. Janković Svetislav, “Legal regime of contract of carriage of passengers by road concluded under Internet platform”, Law and Business, no. 7-9 (2019) 10. Jovanović Nebojša, Transport Law of Serbia & Montenegro (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005) 11. Kaplinsky Eran, “Should licence plate owners be compensated when Uber comes to town?”, in Law and the Sharing Economy, Regulating online market platforms, eds. Derek MecKee, Finn Makela, Teresa Scassa, Tremplay-Huet Sabrina (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2018) 12. Maultzsch Felix, “Contractual liability of online platform operators: European proposals and established principles”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=3074301 13. Maultzsch Felix, “Contractual liability of online platform operators: European proposals and established principles”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=3074301 14. Perrit Henry H., JR. Employment Law – update (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2018) 15. Posen Hannah A., “Ridesharing in the sharing economy: Should regulators impose über regulations on Uber?”, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 101 (2015) 16. Prassl Jeremias and Risak Martin, “Uber, TaskRabbit, & Co: Platforms as Empleyers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork”, https://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733003 289 Svetislav Janković 17. Puche Maria Lorena, “Regulation of TNCs in Latin America: The case of Uber Regulation in Mexico City and Bogota”, in The Governance of Smart Transportation Systems, eds. Matthias Finger and Maxime Audouin (Switzerland: Springer, 2019 18. Rauch Daniel, Schleider David, “Like Uber, but for local governmental policy: The future of local regulation of the ‘sharing economy’”, https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2549919 19. Riley Joellan, “Brand New ‘Sharing’ or Plain Old ‘Sweating’? A Proposal for Regulating the New ‘Gig Economy’”, in New Directions for Law in Australia: Essays in Contemporary Law Reform, eds. Ron Levy at alia (Australia: ANU Press, 2017) 20. Henrique, Uber – innovation in society, (Seatle: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) 21. Sundararajan Arun, The Sharing Economy – The end of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism (London: MIT Press, 2016) 290 Оригинални научни чланак UDK РАДНОПРАВНИ АСПЕКТИ ОСТВАРИВАЊА И ЗАШТИТЕ ПРАВА НА ПОШТОВАЊЕ ПРИВАТНОГ ЖИВОТА РАДНИКА Радислав Лале1 Правни факултет Универзитета у Источном Сарајеву Апстракт: У раду се систематично разматра питање остваривања и заштите права на поштовање приватног живота радника у домаћем, упоредном и међународном праву. Аутор jе извршиo анализу позитивноправног уређења кључних аспеката поштовања приватности радника и кандидата за запослење, са посебним освртом на неке специфичне послодавчеве контролно-надзорне мјере над радом запослених (контрола употребе службених средстава за комуникацију и видео – надзор). Аутор закључује да је de lege ferenda потребно, кроз будуће новелирање првенствено когентне, али и аутономне радноправне регулативе, унаприједити заштиту радника од прекомјерног и неоправданог коришћења различитих техника и метода у вршењу надзорних овлашћења од стране послодаваца на радном мјесту, и то свеобухватнијим, строжијим и темељнијим нормирањем надзорних мјера уз одговарајућу управну и судску контролу. Кључне ријечи: Приватни живот радника; Подаци о личности; Контролно-надзорне мјере; Средства за комуникацију; Видео-надзор. 1. УВОД Питање права на поштовање приватног живота радника и кандидата за запослење, као фундаменталног елемента људске слободе и достојанства,2 једно је од кључних изазова са којим се суочава савремено 1 Доктор правних наука, доцент: 2 У том смислу види: Љубинка Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе (Београд: Правни факултет Универзитета у Београду, 2013), 485. Достојанство на раду нужно подразумијева одговарајућу заштиту приватности на раду. Право на поштовање приватности (и породичног живота) предвиђено је у Европској конвенцији о људским правима (1950), коју су ратификовале све државе чланице ЕУ, а на коју се у својим одлукама позива и Европски суд правде. Види: Бранко Лубарда, Радно 291 Радислав Лале радно и социјално право. Ово нарочито из разлога што поштовање приватног живота радника и кандидата за запослење има много аспеката, од заштите података о личности, преко (не)допуштености одређених надзорних мјера (контрола употребе службених средстава за комуникацију, захтјев да се запослени подвргну алко-тесту или тесту на употребу дрога, примјена различитих техника и технологија за контролу кретања и присуства запослених у просторијама послодавца, као што су видео-надзор, биометријски верификациони системи који омогућавају препознавање запослених на основу неког непромјенљивог физичког обиљежја, нпр. зенице ока или отиска прста),3 до утицаја одређених чињеница из приватног живота на заснивање (утврђивање посебних услова за заснивање радног односа и захтијевање доказа о њиховој испуњености, избор кандидата за запослење) и престанак радног односа.4 Наиме, употреба многобројних техника и технологија од стране послодаваца у вршењу контролно-надзорних овлашћења5 над радом запослених предмет је бројних научних и стручних расправа које се концентришу око питања њихове допуштености, нарочито у свјетлу заштите људских права и основних слобода радника.6 Надзорна овлашћења послодавца произилазе из његове управљачке власти која подразумијева право послодавца да организује рад запослених.7 Организација самог процеса рада остварује се првенствено кроз доношење одлука и издавање налога и упутстава за рад запосленима. Веома важан сегмент управљачке власти послодавца представљају и надзорна овлашћења која подразумијевају право послодавца да надгледа, односно контролише реализацију издатих радних налога и право – Расправа о достојанству на раду и социјалном дијалогу (Београд: Правни факултет Универзитета у Београду, 2013), 404. 3 Љубинка Ковачевић, ,,Прикупљање и коришћење података о личности као радноправни проблем“, Радно и социјално право, (2011): 61. 4 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 484-485. О томе види више: Љубинка Ковачевић, ,,Радни однос и право на поштовање приватног живота“, Радно и социјално право, (2010): 166. 5 Један од општих битних елемената радног односа јесте субординација, тј. економска и правна подређеност радника послодавцу. О општим битним елементима радног односа види: Предраг Јовановић, Радно право (Нови Сад: Правни факултет у Новом Саду, 2018), 186. Правна субординација подразумијева да радник обавља престацију рада директно под влашћу послодавца. Дакле, подређивање запосленог послодавчевим управљачким, нормативним и дисциплинским овлашћењима јесте суштинско обиљежје правне субординације у радном односу. Види: Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 135. 6 Ковачевић, ,,Прикупљање и коришћење података о личности као радноправни проблем“, 61. 7 Дарко Божичић, ,,Границе послодавчевих надзорних овлашћења у односу на заштиту права на приватност запослених“, Радно и социјално право 2, (2018): 90. У том смислу види: Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 146. 292 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova упутстава радницима, као и резултате њиховог рада.8 Начини, тј. методи путем којих се остварује надзор над радом запослених су бројни, и непрестано се унапређују и проширују са континуираним развојем информационих технологија.9 У литератури се истиче шест група разлога који послодавчевим надзорним овлашћењима обезбјеђују легитимитет, као што су обезбјеђивање продуктивности и конкурентности, контрола квалитета услуга које пружа послодавац, примјена закона и подзаконских прописа, помоћ у обучавању, обезбјеђивање безбиједних и здравих услова рада, и заштита имовине послодавца.10 Масовна употреба модерних технологија донијела је значајне новине у свијет рада и у сам процес управљања радом запослених, нарочито када је ријеч о надзору над њиховим радом.11 То, најприје, подразумијева потребу послодавца да, поред осталих аспеката организације рада, надгледа и употребу службених рачунара и других електронских и комуникационих уређаја које запослени користе у раду, а да при томе, у савременом информационом друштву, има на располагању разноврсне надзорне мјере, као што су видео-надзор или системи који омогућавају послодавцу ,,контролу на даљину“, готово без икаквог географског и временског ограничења,12 о чему ће бити више ријечи у одговарајућим дијеловима овог рада. Према томе, вршење надзора над радом запослених може да укључи и поступке, средства, технике и нове технологије чија примјена има за посљедицу задирање у права и слободе запослених, посебно када је ријеч о њиховом праву на достојанство и поштовање приватног живота.13 8 Божичић, ,,Границе послодавчевих надзорних овлашћења у односу на заштиту права на приватност запослених“, 90. 9 Ibid. 10 Michele Jankanish, ,,Monitoring and surveillance in the workplace: Privacy issues in a international perspective“, Conditions of Work Digest 1, (1993): 17. 11 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 155-156. Послодавци су од тренутка настанка радних односа прикупљали и чували одређене податке о запосленима. Међутим, могућности сазнања и проток тих информација се значајно повећавају са појавом информационих технологија, шездесетих година прошлог вијека. Међу првим повредама у тој области било је праћење и прислушкивање телефонских разговора, преписке запослених, а затим долази и до увођења видеонадзора. Права револуција у овој области настаће са појавом персоналног компјутера, као и интернета. Такође, ту је и све савременија дигитална опрема за снимање, нова опрема за праћење, тестирање радника (полиграф, алко-тестови, тестови на употребу дрога). О томе види више у: Сенад Јашаревић, ,,Нове тенденције у области заштите личних података на раду у међународном праву“, Радно и социјално право 1, (2016): 73-74. 12 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 156. 13 Ibid. Послодавци иначе прикупљају информације како о радницима, тако и о лицима која траже запослење и то није нова пракса. Захваљујући технологији у област обраде података уносе се несагледиве могућности, које имају како позитивне, тако и негативне аспекте. Повећава се простор за повреде права 293 Радислав Лале 2. ПРАВО НА ПРИВАТНОСТ РАДНИКА Право на приватност запослених, као рефлексија општег права на приватност, једно је од темељних вриједности западне правне културе. Заснована је на исконској човјековој потреби за постојањем одређеног заштићеног простора.14 Право на поштовање приватног живота прокламовано је у међународним и регионалним инструментима за заштиту људских права15 и уставима већине држава, укључујући и Устав Републике Српске,16 који у дијелу посвећеном људским правима и слободама кроз више одредаба гарантује различите сфере приватности. Приватност може бити просторна, информациона и комуникациона. Просторна приватност односи се на дом и други простор у којем особа води живот одвојено од других. Информациона приватност подразумијева да појединац одлучује коме ће, када и колико саопштити личне податке, водећи рачуна о својим правима и потребама, али и о правима и потребама заједнице.17 Комуникациона приватност односи се на све врсте коминицирања лица (лични записи, дописивање, СМС, e-mail, контакти преко друштвених мрежа). У том контексту помиње се и нови термин ,,е-приватност“ – електронска приватност.18 Када је у питању радно законодавство, преовлађујуће рјешење у упоредном праву је да се заштита права на поштовање приватног живота радника и кандидата за запослење обезбјеђује на апстрактан начин, на основу уставне гаранције права на достојанство, интегритет и поштовање приватног и породичног живота.19 Поред тога, ова заштита се редовно остварује посредним путем, кроз различите одредбе радног законодавства (одредбе о ограниченом радном времену, плаћеном годишњем одмору), које доприносе и успостављању равнотеже између приватног и професионалног живота радника. Са друге стране, веома су запослених, које се углавном састоје у повреди приватности, достојанства и људских права. Види: Јашаревић, ,,Нове тенденције у области заштите личних података на раду у међународном праву“, 74. 14 Ibid., 75. Види више: Иво Розић, Марија Бобан, Хрвоје Бобан, ,,Утјецај информацијских и комуникацијских технологија на заштиту приватности на радном мјесту“, Актуелности грађанског и трговачког законодавства и правне праксе, Зборник радова са Савјетовања, (2016): 349. 15 Општа декларација о правима човјека, Уједињених нација из 1948. године (чл. 12.); Међународни пакт о грађанским и политичким правима, Уједињених нација из 1966. године (чл. 17.); Европска конвенција о људским правима, Савјета Европе из 1950. године (чл. 8.); Повеља о основним правима ЕУ (чл. 7.). 16 Устав Републике Српске, Службени гласник РС, бр. 21/92, 28/94, 8/96, 13/96, 15/96, 16/96, 21/96, 21/02, 26/02, 30/02, 31/02, 69/02, 31/03, 98/03, 115/05, и 117/05, чл. 13, 22. и 23. 17 Види више: Розић, М. Бобан, Х. Бобан, ,,Утјецај информацијских и комуникацијских технологија на заштиту приватности на радном мјесту“, 350. 18 Јашаревић, ,,Нове тенденције у области заштите личних података на раду у међународном праву“, 75. 19 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 485. 294 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ријетки примјери непосредне заштите овог права у матичним законима за област радних односа (нпр. француски Законик о раду) или у законима који за искључиви предмет регулисања имају предметну материју (нпр. фински Закон бр. 2000:477 о заштити приватности у професионалном животу).20 Као и у упоредним системима, радно законодавство Републике Српске не предвиђа непосредну и свеобухватну радноправну заштиту права на поштовање приватног живота, него то чини посредно, кроз заштиту личног интегритета радника.21 У пракси, поменута генерална клаузула о заштити личног интегритета радника може да послужи као правни основ за заштиту права на приватан живот.22 Веома је битно напоменути да питање остваривања и заштите права на поштовање приватног живота запослених и кандидата за запослење директно произилази из напетости која постоји између гаранције права на поштовање приватног живота, са једне стране, и гаранције слободе предузетништва и легитимних захтјева послодавца да заштити интересе и добро функционисање одређене радне средине, са друге стране.23 Према томе, потребно је имати у виду два аспекта приватног живота радника и кандидата за запослење. Први, који обухвата чињенице и радње које наступају или се предузимају на мјесту рада и у радно вријеме, и други који се односи на чињенице и радње које наступају или се предузимају ван мјеста рада и ван радног времена. Поменути аспекти приватног живота разликују се с обзиром на то да ли и у којој мјери до њих допире послодавчева власт.24 Из тог разлога, у истраживању предмета проучавања овог рада, потребно је поћи од хипотезе да право на поштовање приватног живота запосленог може бити ограничено на мјесту рада и у радно вријеме, а да изван радног времена и мјеста рада, послодавчева управљачка, нормативна и дисциплинска власт, по правилу, не допире до сфере приватног живота радника.25 Пошто би темељно излагање о свим аспектима поштовања приватног живота запослених и кандидата за запослење захтијевало много више 20 Ibid. 21 Види: Закон о раду, Службени гласник РС, бр. 1/16 и 66/18, чл. 12, ст. 1, тач. 4). 22 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 485. 23 Ibid., 486. Према мишљењу проф. др Сенада Јашаревића, овдје имамо два релативно противријечна права: права послодавца на информације и права запослених на приватност, које треба избалансирати. Види: Јашаревић, ,,Нове тенденције у области заштите личних података на раду у међународном праву“, 75. 24 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 486. 25 Ibid. 295 Радислав Лале простора, овдје ћемо се ограничити на аспект допуштености одређених надзорних мјера, и то на контролу употребе службених средстава за комуникацију, и примјену видео-надзора као једне од многобројних техника и технологија за аутоматску контролу кретања и присуства запослених у просторијама послодавца, које иначе изазивају велике расправе и правне и етичке контроверзе у стручној радноправној литератури. 3. ОДРЕЂЕНЕ СПЕЦИФИЧНЕ МЈЕРЕ НАДЗОРА И ЗАШТИТА ПРАВА НА ПРИВАТНОСТ РАДНИКА Послодавац предузима различите мјере с циљем обезбјеђивања сигурности мјеста рада, као и намјенског коришћења средстава за рад. Поједине мјере могу угрозити достојанство и приватност запослених као што је то случај са контролом употребе службених средстава за комуникацију, видео-надзором или захтијевањем од радника да се подвргну алко-тесту или тесту на употребу дрога.26 Допуштеност тих мјера предмет је полемика у стручној литератури, а као централни проблем истиче се ,,двојење“ интереса послодавца (интерес да обезбиједи сигурност мјеста рада и безбједне и здраве услове рада) и радника (поштовање приватности и достојанства), те њихово довођење у равнотежу.27 Имајући у виду да послодавац због своје економске, али и правне позиције у радном односу представља субјекта јаче снаге, ту равнотежу интереса радно право остварује ограничавањем послодавчеве власти.28 Изузетак не представља ни сукоб интереса који постоји између ових субјеката поводом надзорних овлашћења послодавца и права радника на приватност. У том смислу, овлашћења послодавца за успостављање надзора над процесом рада ограничена су правом на приватност запослених и обрнуто, право на приватност запослених није апсолутно, него трпи одређена ограничења управо у надзору послодавца, односно у његовој управљачкој власти.29 Од суштинског значаја је да ограничења послодавчеве власти у радном односу буду легална - унапријед утврђена когентним и аутономним прописима и тако 26 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 516. 27 Ibid. О сукобу интереса у радном односу види више: Предраг Јовановић, ,,Сукоби интереса радника и послодаваца као узрок права“, Зборник Матице српске за друштвене науке 95, (1993): 307-313. 28 Божичић, ,,Границе послодавчевих надзорних овлашћења у односу на заштиту права на приватност запослених“, 96-97. 29 Ibid. 296 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova унапријед позната субјектима радног односа; и легитимна – оправдана и допуштена, у смислу да се тичу потреба и природе процеса рада, интересних позиција субјеката тог процеса, и да та ограничења буду сразмјерна циљу који се њима тежи остварити.30 Иако је јасно да су права и слободе једних, ограничена правима и слободама других, у литератури се с правом поставља питање гдје су границе послодавчевих надзорних овлашћења у односу на заштиту права на приватност запослених?31 Да одговор на ово питање није једноставно дати свједочи и то што се законодавци, по правилу, не упуштају у непосредно нормирање питања надзора послодавца над радом запослених,32 те је тако веома мали број држава које су на непосредан начин одговарајућим законским рјешењима уредиле ово питање (Аустрија, Финска, Луксембург, Португал, Словачка и Велика Британија). Значајно су бројније оне које на заштиту приватности запослених на радном мјесту примјењују општа правила о заштити приватности, те је с тога овдје од посебног значаја улога судова у примјени тих општих правила на заштиту приватности у радном односу, при чему у конципирању недостајуће законске регулативе, од нарочите помоћи треба да буде и пракса Европског суда за људска права.33 3.1. Контрола употребе службених средстава за комуникацију С обзиром да је намјена службених средстава за комуникацију у потпуности везана за извршавање престације рада, послодавац као њихов власник, има право и интерес да контролише и ограничи употребу ових средстава.34 Поменути облик контроле намеће више интересантних питања, од којих су посебно деликатна два: 1) прво је питање могућности запослених да користе службена средства за комуникацију у приватне сврхе; 2) друго питање се односи на заштиту достојанства и приватности запослених у поступку вршења ове контроле.35 Наиме, основни циљ контроле употребе службених средстава за комуникацију представља откривање, кажњавање и спречавање њихове ненамјенске употребе (како 30 Види: Предраг Јовановић, ,,Интересни сукоби и социјална стабилност у сфери радних односа“, Радно и социјално право 1, (2013): 38. 31 Божичић, ,,Границе послодавчевих надзорних овлашћења у односу на заштиту права на приватност запослених“, 95. 32 Љубинка Ковачевић, ,,Интернет и приватан живот запослених: границе послодавчевих надзорних, дисциплинских и нормативних овлашћења“, у Интернет и друштво, (2014): 350. 33 Божичић, ,,Границе послодавчевих надзорних овлашћења у односу на заштиту права на приватност запослених“, 95 и 99. 34 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 516. 35 Ibid., 516-517. 297 Радислав Лале би се контролисали трошкови, спријечило траћење радног времена и оштећење опреме и сл.). Законодавци и социјални партнери, по правилу, не уређују непосредно ово питање, као што је то случај и у нашем праву, већ препуштају послодавцима да самостално одлучују о њему.36 Иако је употреба службених средстава за комуникацију везана за извршавање престације рада, већина послодаваца толерише симболичну употребу ових средстава у приватне сврхе, нарочито када је у питању употреба службених телефона, приступ интернету и слање и пријем електронске поште преко службеног рачунара. То је и разлог што се у пракси сматра да је, у одсуству изричите забране, употреба службених средстава за комуникацију у приватне сврхе – допуштена. Међутим, претпостављена дозвола подразумијева ограничен приступ овим средствима, у смислу умјереног и разумног коришћења рачунара или службеног телефона у приватне сврхе за личне потребе, које значајније не омета запосленог у извршавању послова и радних задатака и није усмјерено на остваривање лукративног циља.37 Чест проблем у домену заштите података у данашњем типичном радном окружењу јесте легитиман опсег надзора електроничких комуникација запослених на раду. Неки сматрају да се тај проблем може лако ријешити забраном приватне употребе средстава за комуницирање на радном мјесту. Међутим, тако нешто је немогуће искључити у модерним околностима. Таква забрана општег типа у савременом информатичком друштву не би ни била реална.38 Друго значајно питање које прати контролу употребе службених средстава за комуникацију односи се на сукоб одговарајућих послодавчевих овлашћења са правом радника на поштовање приватног живота. Ово право се остварује на раду, и то у погледу различитих облика комуникације запосленог са трећим лицима – усмена и електронска on-line комуникација (разговор преко службеног телефона и слање и пријем докумената путем факса, пријем и слање порука са службеног мобилног телефона, слање и пријем електронске поште и коришћење интернета уз помоћ службеног 36 Ibid. Оно што би несумњиво дало легитимитет актима послодавца којима се нормира питање надзора на радном мјесту јесте да ти акти буду резултат социјалног дијалога између послодавца и представника запослених. Види: Божичић, ,,Границе послодавчевих надзорних овлашћења у односу на заштиту права на приватност запослених“, 99. 37 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 517. 38 Види: Handbook on European data protection law, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014, Council of Europe, (2014), 167. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protectionlaw-2nd-ed_en.pdf. У том смислу: Јашаревић, ,,Нове тенденције у области заштите личних података на раду у међународном праву“, 85. 298 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova рачунара).39 У погледу надзора и контроле над усменом комуникацијом запослених са трећим лицима (приватни и службени разговори који се воде преко службеног телефона), у јуриспруденцији Европског суда за људска права прихваћен је став да послодавац повређује право на поштовање приватног живота ако, без знања радника, прикупља и чува податке о његовим телефонским разговорима.40 Наиме, постоји неколико основних услова који морају бити испуњени да би послодавчев надзор над употребом службених средстава за комуникацију био допуштен. Прво, запослена лица морају претходно бити упозната са могућношћу такве контроле (принцип транспарентности).41 Ако таквог упозорења нема, запослени има разлога да вјерује да се његова усмена и писана комуникација са трећим лицима не надзиру. Такво увјерење запосленог објашњава концепција ,,разумног очекивања приватности“, која је створена у јуриспруденцији Европског суда за људска права, а подразумијева да се (не)допуштеност послодавчевог мијешања у приватни живот запосленог процјењује на основу критеријума разумно очекиване приватности.42 Дакле, послодавац има право да надзире употребу службених средстава за комуникацију само ако је претходно обавијестио раднике да ће вршити такав надзор. Поред тога, он је дужан да обавијести раднике о начину на који ће надзор бити реализован, као и о разлозима због којих је надзор неопходан (потреба да заштити податке о повјерљивим активностима и финансијским трансакцијама итд.).43 Друго, да би била допуштена послодавчева контрола мора бити и оправдана, у смислу да се може обављати само у законите сврхе (нпр. ради спречавања незаконитих поступања радника и трећих лица, ради неопходног надзора над телефонском комуникацијом 39 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 518. 40 Ibid. Види: предмет пред Европским судом за људска права, EctHR, Copland v. the United Kingdom, No. 62617/00, 3. април 2004. године, гдје су недозвољено, тајно надзирани телефони, електронска пошта и употреба интернета од стране радника у једној вишој школи. Утврђен је прекомјерни надзор и да је прекршен чл. 8. Европске конвенције о људским правима. 41 Види: Ковачевић, ,,Радни однос и право на поштовање приватног живота“, 175. 42 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 519. 43 Ibid., 520. Кодекс праксе о заштити личних података радника – даље: Кодекс Међународне организације рада предвиђа да запослени морају бити унапријед обавијештени о разлозима за увођење надзора над средствима за комуникацију, временском распореду, методама и техникама надзора и подацима који ће том приликом бити прикупљани. Тајни надзор је допуштен само ако постоји основана сумња о криминалној активности или другом озбиљном незаконитом поступању, када се спроводи у складу са мјеродавним националним прописима. Види више: Protection of workers’ personal data. An ILO code of practice, тач. 6.14. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---safework/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_107797.pdf. 299 Радислав Лале радника у службама за хитне интервенције итд.).44 Увођење одређених надзорних мјера може бити оправдано и допуштено само уколико је то неопходно за добро функционисање радне средине, а коначна оцјена с тим у вези зависиће од конкретне врсте послова и радне средине, тако да се о овом питању мора одлучивати посебно у сваком појединачном случају.45 Треће, ова контрола мора бити и примјерена, тако да је, начелно, забрањено константно и систематско надгледање употребе службених средстава за комуникацију. Од наведеног правила постоји изузетак, нпр. ако је аутоматизовано надгледање службеног рачунара неопходно због сигурности и доброг функционисања послодавчевог рачунарског система (нпр. заштита од рачунарских вируса).46 Такође, послодавац треба да надгледа комуникацију радника на начин који је, у техничком смислу, примјерен, као и да приликом обављања надзора прикупља само одређене врсте информација.47 То значи, да је надзор ограничен само на комуникацију која се односи на извршавање престације рада, због чега је послодавцима апсолутно забрањено да отварају приватне мејлове који су као такви и означени, независно до тога да ли је послодавац претходно забранио употребу службених рачунара у приватне сврхе или не.48 3.2. Видео-надзор у просторијама послодавца Савремене информационе технологије омогућују послодавцима коришћење различитих техника и метода за контролу кретања и присуства запослених у просторијама послодавца, међу којима посебну пажњу привлаче системи оптичке контроле и надзирања запослених 44 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 520. 45 Божичић, ,,Границе послодавчевих надзорних овлашћења у односу на заштиту права на приватност запослених“, 98. 46 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 520-521. 47 На интересантно рјешење наилазимо у Белгији, гдје су социјални партнери закључили општи колективни споразум о заштити података о on-line комуникацији запослених. Овај акт допушта послодавцу надгледање података о комуникацији запослених само ако је то потребно због: а) спречавања незаконитих радњи, клевете и радњи које су супротне добрим обичајима или могу да повриједе достојанство другог лица; б) заштите послодавчевих економских, пословних и финансијских интереса повјерљивог карактера; в) сигурности и/или доброг функционисања информатичког система; г) поштовања начела и правила о употреби on-line технологије која се примјењује у предузећу. Контрола посјете интернет сајтова може да обухвати прикупљање података о трајању конекције по радној станици, али не и индивидуалне податке о посјећеним сајтовима. Convention collective de travail n° 81 du 26 avril 2002 relative à la protection de la vie privée des travailleurs à l’égard du contrôle des données de communication électroniques en réseau (ratifiée par l’AR du 21 juin 2002, paru au MB du 29 juin 2002), чл. 5-6, http:// www.cnt-nar.be/CCT-COORD/cct-081.pdf. О томе види више: Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 521. 48 Ibid. 300 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova путем камера.49 У упоредном праву, наиме, преовлађује став да је аутиматска контрола кретања радника на мјесту рада допуштена само ако је неопходна и не може да буде дјелотворно замијењена неком другом мјером која не угрожава приватност запослених или то чини у мањем обиму. Ако је оправдана, таква контрола мора бити строго уређена.50 У литератури се наводи неколико основних начела аутоматске контроле кретања запослених у просторијама послодавца: 1) прецизно одређивање циљева надзора; 2) одређивање начина прикупљања података (природа података који ће бити прикупљани, круг лица која ће имати увид у прикупљене податке, рок у коме ће одговарајући подаци бити чувани);51 3) заштита права приватности и слободе кретања запослених и њихових представника; 4) обавјештавање и консултовање представника запослених приликом увођења сваке нове технологије за контролу кретања у просторијама послодавца.52 Увођење видео-надзора је резервисано само за изузетне случајеве у којима је оптички надзор неопходно потребан за заштиту легитимних интереса послодавца, његове потребе да осигура безбиједност и здравље радника, заштити своју имовину, надгледа производни процес или контролише активности радника.53 Примјена видеонадзора је ограничена на радно вријеме и мјесто рада, док се надзор у послодавчевим просторијама у којима се не извршава престација рада (тоалети, ресторани итд.), сматра неоправданим и недопуштеним. Такође, временско ограничење видео-надзора подразумијева забрану континуираног надгледања активности запослених, из разлога што угрожава не само приватност запослених, већ и представља ризик за њихово психичко здравље и достојанство.54 С тога, видео-надзор који има за циљ контролу рада запослених може да се реализује само путем привременог инсталирања камера на мјесту рада или путем временског ограничавања функционисања трајно инсталираних камера. Међутим, дерогација забране континуираног видео-надзора је дозвољена у случајевима у којима, због природе послова које радници 49 Видео-надзором се назива систем оптичке контроле и надзирања путем камера који могу да поставе и користе јавне власти и приватна лица. О томе види више у: Војин Димитријевић, ,,Видео-надзор у јавном и приватном простору“, Правни запис 2, (2010): 390-399. 50 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 525. 51 Никакви записи се не би смјели чувати, осим када је то неопходно потребно, па и тада само на одређено вријеме. Димитријевић, ,,Видео-надзор у јавном и приватном простору“, 398. 52 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 525. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid., 526. 301 Радислав Лале обављају за послодавца, видео-надзор представља једини могући метод за обезбјеђивање безбиједности лица и сигурности имовине (рад у нуклеарним електранама, војној индустрији итд.).55 Битно ограничење за употребу видео-надзора представља и захтјев да радници морају бити унапријед обавијештени о примјени ове мјере и њеним циљевима, као и о броју инсталираних камера, мјесту њиховог постављања, времену и трајању снимања и евентуалном чувању снимака (начело транспарентности). То значи да је забрањен тајни видео-надзор, осим у изузетним случајевима када постоји основана сумња о криминалној активности или другом озбиљном незаконитом поступању.56 Тада се надзор може вршити у складу са мјеродавним прописима, који, редовно утврђују његов привремени карактер и одобрење надлежног државног органа.57 Према томе, послодавац је овлашћен да надзире поједина мјеста и активности у својим просторијама само на начин који је примјерен унапријед утврђеном циљу инсталирања камера у радној средини (начело сразмјерности).58 Када је у питању правна регулисаност коришћења видео-надзора у просторијама послодавца, потребно је нагласити да у већини земаља, међу којима је и Република Српска, ова надзорна мјера није непосредно нормирана законом, већ се заштита радника од неоправдане употребе видео-надзора обезбјеђује посредно, на основу норми уставног, радног, грађанског и кривичног права, које гарантују заштиту достојанства, поштовање приватног живота и заштиту података о личности.59 У појединим државама, као што је нпр. Белгија, ово питање је предмет регулисања колективних уговора и једностраних аката послодавца. С обзиром на наведено, намеће се закључак да се заштита радника од прекомјерног и неоправданог коришћења видео-надзора на радном мјесту може унаприједити строжијим и прецизнијим уређивањем ове надзорне мјере путем когентне и аутономне радноправне регулативе, уз одговарајућу управну и судску контролу.60 55 Ibid. Види: Кодекс Међународне организације рада - Protection of workers’ personal data. An ILO code of practice, тач. 6.14, ст. 3. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---safework/ documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_107797.pdf. 56 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 527. 57 Види: Кодекс Међународне организације рада - Protection of workers’ personal data. An ILO code of practice, тач. 6.14, ст. 2. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---safework/ documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_107797.pdf. 58 Ковачевић, Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе, 528. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. Види: Димитријевић, ,,Видео-надзор у јавном и приватном простору“, 397. 302 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 4. ЗАКЉУЧАК Масовна употреба модерних технологија донијела је значајне новине у свијет рада и у сам процес управљања радом запослених, нарочито када је ријеч о надзору над њиховим радом. То, најприје, подразумијева потребу послодавца да, поред осталих аспеката организације рада, надгледа и употребу службених рачунара и других електронских и комуникационих уређаја које запослени користе у раду, а да при томе, у савременом информационом друштву, има на располагању разноврсне надзорне мјере, као што су видео-надзор или системи који омогућавају послодавцу ,,контролу на даљину“, готово без икаквог географског и временског ограничења. Према томе, вршење надзора над радом запослених може да укључи и поступке, средства, технике и нове технологије чија примјена има за посљедицу задирање у права и слободе запослених, посебно када је ријеч о њиховом праву на достојанство и поштовање приватног живота. Наиме, употреба многобројних техника и технологија од стране послодаваца у вршењу контролно-надзорних овлашћења над радом запослених предмет је бројних научних и стручних расправа које се концентришу око питања њихове допуштености, нарочито у свјетлу заштите људских права и основних слобода радника. Из тог разлога, питање остваривања и заштите права на поштовање приватног живота радника и кандидата за запослење, као фундаменталног елемента људске слободе и достојанства, са својим многобројним аспектима, једно је од кључних изазова са којим се суочава савремено радно и социјално право. У литератури се с правом поставља питање гдје су границе послодавчевих надзорних овлашћења у односу на заштиту права на приватност запослених? Да одговор на ово питање није једноставно дати свједочи и то што се законодавци, по правилу, не упуштају у непосредно нормирање питања надзора послодавца над радом запослених, те је тако веома мали број држава које су на непосредан начин одговарајућим законским рјешењима уредиле ово питање. Значајно су бројније оне које на заштиту приватности запослених на радном мјесту примјењују општа правила о заштити приватности, те је с тога овдје од посебног значаја улога судова у примјени тих општих правила на заштиту приватности у радном односу, при чему у конципирању недостајуће законске регулативе, од нарочите помоћи треба да буде и пракса Европског суда за људска права. Као и у упоредним системима, радно законодавство Републике Српске не предвиђа непосредну и 303 Радислав Лале свеобухватну радноправну заштиту права на поштовање приватног живота, него то чини посредно, кроз заштиту личног интегритета радника. У пракси, поменута генерална клаузула о заштити личног интегритета радника може да послужи као правни основ за заштиту права на приватан живот. Имајући у виду значај овог фундаменталног права запослених лица и кандидата за запослење, сматрамо да је de lege ferenda потребно, кроз будуће новелирање првенствено когентне, али и аутономне радноправне регулативе, унаприједити заштиту радника од прекомјерног и неоправданог коришћења различитих техника и метода у вршењу надзорних овлашћења од стране послодаваца на радном мјесту, и то свеобухватнијим, строжијим и темељнијим нормирањем надзорних мјера уз одговарајућу управну и судску контролу. ЛИТЕРАТУРА: Библиографскe референце 1. Божичић, Дарко. ,,Границе послодавчевих надзорних овлашћења у односу на заштиту права на приватност запослених“. Радно и социјално право 2, (2018); 2. Димитријевић, Војин. ,,Видео-надзор у јавном и приватном простору“. Правни запис 2, (2010); 3. Јовановић, Предраг. Радно право. Нови Сад: Правни факултет у Новом Саду, 2018; 4. Јовановић, Предраг. ,,Сукоби интереса радника и послодаваца као узрок права“. Зборник Матице српске за друштвене науке 95, (1993); 5. Јовановић, Предраг. ,,Интересни сукоби и социјална стабилност у сфери радних односа“. Радно и социјално право 1, (2013); 6. Јашаревић, Сенад. ,,Нове тенденције у области заштите личних података на раду у међународном праву“. Радно и социјално право 1, (2016); 7. Jankanish, Michele. ,,Monitoring and surveillance in the workplace: Privacy issues in a international perspective“. Conditions of Work Digest 1, (1993); 8. Ковачевић, Љубинка. ,,Радни однос и право на поштовање приватног живота“. Радно и социјално право, (2010); 9. Ковачевић, Љубинка. ,,Прикупљање и коришћење података о личности као радноправни проблем“. Радно и социјално право, (2011); 10. Ковачевић, Љубинка. Правна субординација у радном односу и њене границе. Београд: Правни факултет Универзитета у Београду, 2013; 304 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 11. Ковачевић, Љубинка. ,,Интернет и приватан живот запослених: границе послодавчевих надзорних, дисциплинских и нормативних овлашћења“. Интернет и друштво, (2014); 12. Лубарда, Бранко. Радно право – Расправа о достојанству на раду и социјалном дијалогу. Београд: Правни факултет Универзитета у Београду, 2013; 13. Розић, Иво, Бобан, Марија, Бобан, Хрвоје. ,,Утјецај информацијских и комуникацијских технологија на заштиту приватности на радном мјесту“, Актуелности грађанског и трговачког законодавства и правне праксе. Зборник радова са Савјетовања, (2016); Правни прописи 14. Општа декларација о правима човјека, Уједињених нација из 1948. године; 15. Међународни пакт о грађанским и политичким правима, Уједињених нација из 1966. године, Службени лист СФРЈ, бр, 7/1971; 16. Кодекс праксе о заштити личних података радника – даље: Кодекс Међународне организације рада - Protection of workers’ personal data. An ILO code of practice, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/--protrav/---safework/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_107797.pdf; 17. Европска конвенција о људским правима, Савјета Европе из 1950. године; 18. Повеља о основним правима ЕУ; 19. Устав Републике Српске, Службени гласник РС, бр. 21/92, 28/94, 8/96, 13/96, 15/96, 16/96, 21/96, 21/02, 26/02, 30/02, 31/02, 69/02, 31/03, 98/03, 115/05, и 117/05; 20. Закон о раду, Службени гласник РС, бр. 1/16 и 66/18; 21. Convention collective de travail n° 81 du 26 avril 2002 relative à la protection de la vie privée des travailleurs à l’égard du contrôle des données de communication électroniques en réseau (ratifiée par l’AR du 21 juin 2002, paru au MB du 29 juin 2002), http://www.cnt-nar.be/CCT-COORD/cct-081.pdf; Документи и други извори 22. Handbook on European data protection law, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014, Council of Europe, (2014), https://fra.europa.eu/ sites/default/files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-law-2nd-ed_en.pdf. 305 Радислав Лале LABOUR LAW ASPECTS OF EXERCISING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR THE PRIVATE LIFE OF WORKERS Radislav Lale61 Faculty of Law, University of East Sarajevo Abstract: The paper systematically discusses the exercise and protection of the right to respect for the private life of workers in domestic, comparative and international law. The author analyzed the positive regulation of the key aspects of respecting the privacy of employees and candidates for employment, with special reference to some specific employer control and supervision measures over the work of employees (control of the use of official means of communication and video surveillance). The author concludes that through the future amendment of primarily cogent, but also autonomous labour legislation, it is necessary to improve the protection of workers from excessive and unjustified use of different techniques and methods in exercising supervisory powers by employers, in a more comprehensive, stricter and more thorough manner. standardizing supervisory measures with appropriate administrative and judicial control. Keywords: Workers’ private life; Personality information; Supervisory measures; Communication means; Video surveillance. 61 PhD, Assistant Professor 306 Original scientific paper UDK ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND COPYRIGHT Svjetlana Ivanović1 Faculty of Law, University of East Sarajevo Abstract: Artificial intelligence is one of those transformative technologies that keeps drawing ever more attention. Artificial intelligence systems are developed and deployed with the effort to assist or replace humans in the performance of everyday tasks and creative endeavours. As far as creative expression is concerned, artificial intelligence can compose music, write poems and even paint. However, there are many interesting questions that are asked, particularly from the copyright standpoint. The main question in that respect would be whether something made by or something using an artificial intelligence system should be a copyright protected work. If there is such possibility, it creates possibility of arising issues of rights ownership and copyright. Likewise, there is debate about whether the advancement of artificial intelligence challenges the fundamental concepts of copyright law. This paper addresses the copyright issues raised by artificial intelligence generated works. Keywords: artificial intelligence, copyright, intellectual property, authorship, originality 1. INTRODUCTION The emergence of new technologies has always been a challenge for society as a whole, and particularly for the legal system. The law must maintain pace with the times and with the changes that are inevitable, regardless of whether they may be good or bad. Finding a universal recipe for a long-term validity of legal acts is a very challenging task and laws that remain in force and persist for long periods are scarce. In some areas of law, certain legal concepts are permanent categories as they most often have a moral dimension, such as murder and theft, which have always been categorised as criminal offenses. On the other hand, there are areas of law whose fundamental are often reexamined and adapted to new circumstances. Among them is intellectual 1 Assistant Professor 307 Svjetlana Ivanović property law, dealing with the forms of protection of human creativity and any new creation stemming from the human mind. The protection of intellectual property rests on the necessity to reward creativity and encourage the further development of science, engineering, technology. We are witnessing that intellectual property law is the main drive of the global economy development in the conditions of the fourth industrial revolution. The innovations in the areas of robotics, biotechnology, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence and other areas are introducing us to a world that until recently was merely a figment of the science fiction books’ or movie authors. The necessity to protect such innovations in intellectual property law often raises the question of whether the existing forms of intellectual property protection are adequate to provide adequate security. New technologies inevitably influence changes in intellectual property law, to the extent that there is a need to review certain traditional institutes. One of such technologies, which opens up new questions and perspectives in law is artificial intelligence. The subject of our interest is precisely artificial intelligence. More precisely, the possibility of copyright protection of artificial intelligence works and creations. 2 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE The first question that arises refers to the term artificial intelligence, what it entails and how should it be defined. It is very demanding to provide a unique definition of artificial intelligence as there are practically as many definitions as there are different technologies that may be brought under the term artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence could be defined as the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings.2 Artificial intelligence is a branch of computer science and it is described as computer-based systems that are developed to mimic human behaviour.3 It can be said that artificial intelligence uses technology to automate tasks that would normally require human intelligence. Thus, it is about automating a particular kind of task, the common feature of which, when performed by humans, would be to use the various higher order 2 Definition available on: https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence, accessed February 20 2020. 3 Joseph Drexl, Reto Hilty et al., “Technical Aspects of Artificial Intelligence: An Understanding from an Intellectual Property Law Perspective”, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper, no. 19-13 (2019): 3, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3465577. 308 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova cognitive processes associated with human intelligence.4 Artificial intelligence systems are generally understood as human-like systems that can perform complex tasks involving decision-making, creativity, learning, development and communication systems that usually require human intelligence.5 Artificial intelligence emerged in the middle of the twentieth century. The founder of artificial intelligence and computer science is a mathematician Alan Turing. In his 1950 article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, he introduced the Turing test. The Turing test is a test of a computer’s ability to think, i.e. machine’s ability to exhibit intelligent behaviour equivalent to, or indistinguishable from, that of a human.6 The official birthplace of artificial intelligence is Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, where was organized two month workshop in the summer of 1956.7 Since then, considerable resources have been invested into research and development of artificial intelligence. Nowadays, the artificial intelligence is applied in numerous aspects of everyday life. To name the few: autonomous vehicles, service robots, computer assisted translation, video games, text analysis, biometry, medical diagnostics, automated marketing, virtual agents, etc. However, one area of particular relevance to the subject topic is the creation of works of art. In 2016, the project “The Next Rembrandt” was created, which, based on an analysis of Rembrandt’s paintings, assisted by computer technology, created a new painting that looks like it was painted by a famous painter. 8 That same year, a computer created a polyphonic baroque tune in the style of Johann Sebastian Bach. The Beatles-style song “Daddy’s Car” was composed by a robot, i.e. by a computer using a database containing a vast number of songs. Robots can write simpler articles, mostly reports from sports events, and they can even write poetry. The computer-generated painting “Edmond de Belamy” was also auctioned at nearly half a million US dollars. Due to the fact that the machine or com4 Harry Surden, “Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview”, Georgia State University Law Review, vol. 35 (2019): 1307, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411869. 5 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravit and Cynthira Martens, “From the Myth of Babel to Google Translate: Confronting Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence – Copyright and Algorithmic Biases in Online Translation Systems”, Seattle University Law Review, vol 43 (2019): 120, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3345716. 6 During the test, a human who is questioner interrogates other human and the computer within specific subject area using specified format, and if he cannot determine if the answers were from a person or computer then the computer passed the test. The Turing test has been criticized by some authors. The opposite approach known as John Searle’s “Chinese Room Hypothetical” is based on requirement of intentionality as a prerequisite for actual intelligence. 7 For more information on the history of artificial intelligence: Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence, A Modern Approach, (Pearson Education, 2010), 16-28. 8 More information on: https://www.nextrembrandt.com/, accessed 20 February 2020. 309 Svjetlana Ivanović puter assistance allows creation of works that resemble copyrighted works, the logical question that emerges is whether such works can be considered as copyrighted work9 and as such possibly enjoy copyright protection. 3. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CREATION AS WORK OF AUTHORSHIP A work of authorship implies an original spiritual creation in the area of literature, science and art, regardless of the type, manner and form of expression.10 The definition stated in the law is incomplete, but elements of the concept of a work of authorship have been further elaborated in theory. The basic elements of a work of authorship and simultaneously the preconditions a creation must fulfil in order to copyrighted are that the work or the creation must be a human creation, it must have spiritual content, be expressed in a certain form and must be original. From the aspect of the topic we are addressing herein, the first and last preconditions of copyright require particular attention. 3.1. A work of authorship as a human creation For a work to be copyrighted, it must be created by a human. Only a human can be the creator of a work of authorship and the original copyright holder. Such work was not created by nature itself or by an animal, even if it resembled an artistic or other similar creation, but only that created as a result of the creative process and conscious work of a human being. In his creative work, a man often uses the help of a computer, machine, camera or even a robot, but the author can only be human. There are also cases from US case law upholding this rule, such as Naruto v Slater, also known as the “Monkey Selfie” case.11 9 A terminology remark should be mentioned here. Creations such as these are usually regarded as “computer-generated works” or “AI-generated works”. The use of such terms alludes to the presumption of copyright protection. We think that it is better to avoid using these terms, and some scholars suggest using neutral terms such as “AI-generated output.” Joseph Drexl et al., Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition on the Draft Issues Paper of the World Intellectual Property Organization on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence, (2020), 6, accessed March 4 2020, https://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/ content/stellungnahmen/2020-02-11_WIPO_AI_Draft_Issue_Paper__Comments_Max_Planck.pdf. 10 Law on Copyright and Related Rights, the Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina No. 63/2020, article 4. 11 David Slater, a photographer, travelled in Indonesia to take pictures of the local wildlife. Once there he followed a troop of monkeys, trying to get a few pictures. But monkeys were very shy and he placed his camera on a tripod so monkeys clicked a few shots. One of them was drawn to the reflection of the lens and he took a few photos and famous monkey selfie, among others. More information in: Andres Guadamuz, “Can the 310 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova “People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals” (PETA) filed a lawsuit seeking to have the monkey credited with the copyright on the photo. The court decided that the monkey had no right to stand before the court, and that the author could only be a human being. In the judgment, the court refers to the practice of the US Copyright Office (Compendium of the US Copyright Practices): „it will register an original work of authorship, provided that the work was created by a human being. To qualify as a work of authorship a work must be created by a human being. Works that do not satisfy this requirement are not copyrightable. The Copyright Office will not register works produced by nature, animals or plants, including, by specific example, a photograph taken by a monkey“.12 Therefore, only a human being has legal subjectivity and only he/she can be the holder of rights and obligations. The above is supported by the fact that the content of subjective copyright in Euro-continental law consists of property and personal legal powers, from which it clearly stems that only a natural person, a human being, can be the creator of a work of authorship, i.e. an author. If we were to ask whether a computer or a robot can be an author, the subjectivity in law is outstanding. Although there are proposals in AngloSaxon law to grant a special kind of legal subjectivity in artificial intelligence systems.13 However, it should be noted that legal subjectivity consists of two dimensions, right and obligation, and that they are inextricably linked. If machine is to be granted its rights, it must also be held responsible for its actions. The traditional concept of copyright originates from the ideals of the author, the creative artist expressing his individuality through creation. The author expresses ideas but it should be noted that the ideas are not copyrighted. On the contrary, ideas are explicitly excluded from protection, cannot be monopolized, whereas copyright only protects the expression of such ideas. Thus, the author transforms an idea into a unique expression that represents the work of authorship. A computer creation is an expression of something, but we are unsure whether a computer may give birth to an idea. After all, if an idea and its expression cannot be clearly distinguished, then there is no need for copyright protection after all.14 monkey selfie case teach us anything about copyright law”, WIPO Magazine, 1/2018, https://www.wipo.int/ wipo_magazine/en/2018/01/article_0007.html. 12 Naruto v. Slater, Case No. 15-cv-04324-WHO of 28 January 2016. 13 “Nonhumans should be allowed to qualify as authors because doing so would incentivize the creation of new and valuable creative output.” Ryan Abbott, “I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law”, Boston College Law Review, vol. 57 (2016): 1121. 14 Massimo Maggiore, “Artificial Intelligence, Computer Generated Works and Copyright”, in Non-Convemtional Copyright: Do New and Atypical Works Deserve Potection?, eds. Enrico Bonadio, Nicola Lucchi (Edward 311 Svjetlana Ivanović It is a fact that the computer creations are not human creations, but one should not forget that a human is behind every machine and every artificial intelligence system. The only thing that is questionable is just how much a human contribution is to the end result. 3.2. Originality Originality is the most important copyright protection requirement, as only original works and original parts of a work of authorship enjoy copyright protection. Simultaneously, there are no clear indications or instructions on how to determine what is original and what is not. Originality or individuality stems from the human spirit, from the personality of the creator, it is a personal mark of uniqueness and genuineness owned by any individual, making us unique and different. In theory, originality is determined negatively, according to the principle of what is not original. Therefore, anything that is not the result of the intentional or unconscious imitation of a pre-existing cultural heritage or intellectual work leaving no room for expression of individuality is considered as original15. Although copyright protection law nowadays generally envisages originality as a basic precondition for protection, there is no provision providing a more precise definition thereof. Originality is hardly mentioned as a requirement in the most relevant international sources of law. In Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, collections of literary and artistic works which, by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations shall be protected as such.16 TRIPS contains similar provision: compilations of data or other material, which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations shall be protected as such.17 The same provision contains WIPO Copyright Treaty.18 In the countries of Anglo-Saxon law, the condition of originality was originally understood differently. Works eligible for copyright protection were limited to original works, but this meant no more than the work must not be copied from another artistic work of the same character. Copyright protecElgar, 2018), 386. 15 Slobodan Marković, Dušan Popović, Pravo intelektualne svojine, (Intellectual Property Law), Belgrade: Faculty of Law, 2013, 46. 16 Article 2 (5). 17 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, article 10 (2). 18 WIPO Copyright Treaty, article 5 . 312 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova tion was guaranteed for any work produced by human hand, regardless of its creativity or aesthetic merit.19 Originality meant that work must originate from the author, must not be copied, and must be the result of the skill and/or labour. This was the so-called „sweat of the brow“ concept, which was abandoned in 1991 in Feist judgment. Contrary to earlier judgments, it was not enough for a work to be original only in the sense that it was not copied from another work, but needs creativity. Originality is prerequisite for copyright protection and it’s based on independent creation plus a modicum of creativity.20 The Feist decision didn’t provide much guidance concerning creativity requirement, but it made clear that copyright rewards originality, not effort. In civil law countries, it is insisted on the personal relationship or personal input that the author puts into the work. In European Union legislation, the precondition of originality was not subject to regulation, but was subject to the so-called vertical harmonization, i.e. regulating only certain issues. The concept of „author’s own intellectual creation“21 appeared for the first time in EU copyright law in the Directive on the legal protection of computer programs.22 Two years later, in the Directive harmonizing the term protection of copyright and certain related rights, the same criteria was applied for protection of photographs.23 The 1996 Database Directive affords copyright protection to databases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual creation.24 More recently, a 19 Annemarie Bridy, “Coding Creativity: Copyright and Artificially Intelligent Author”, Stanford Technology Law Review, vol. 5 (2012): 6. 20 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). The dispute was about publishing telephone directories. Feist used white pages listings without Rural licence and Rural claimed that there had been a copyright infringement. The Court ruled that telephone directory isn’t copyrightable because it lacks originality and therefore use of the listings cannot constitute copyright infringement. In determining whether a fact-based work is an original work of authorship, the focus should be on the manner in which the collected facts have been selected, coordinated and arranged. A compilation of facts is not copyrightable per se, but only if its facts have been selected, coordinated or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. 21 Some authors argue that EU originality standard „author’s own intellectual creation“ represents a midlle position between three competing standards, from United Kingdom, France and Germany law: the skill, labor and investment standard, the requirement that the work be the author’s „personal expression“, and the further aesthetic criteria over and above personal expression sometimes required by German courts. Jane Ginsburg, “The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law”, DePaul Law Review, vol. 52 (2003): 1081. 22 “A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation.” Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, article 1 (3). 23 Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonizing the term protection of copyright and certain related rights, article 6. 24 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, article 3 (1). 313 Svjetlana Ivanović horizontal harmonization has been present, primarily through the judgments of the European Court of Justice.25 The first judgment of the European Court of Justice in which the Court provided interpretation of the term of originality is Infopaq.26 Copyright is liable to apply only in relation to a subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation. The various parts of a work enjoy protection provided that they contain elements which are the expression of the intellectual creation of the author of the work.27 The author’s intellectual creation is present when author can express his creativity in original manner, and where expression of components of the work is not determined by their technical function. If the different methods of implementing an idea are so limited that the idea and the expression become indissociable, the criterion of originality is not met.28 An intellectual creation is an author’s own if it reflects the author’s personality. That is the case if the author was able to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative choices. By making various choices, author can stamp the created work with his personal touch.29 Therefore, the criterion of originality is satisfied when author expresses his creative ability in an original manner by making free and creative choices and thus stumps his personal touch. A contrario, that criterion is not satisfied when an expression is determined by technical or functional rules, which leave no room for creative freedom.30 For example, sporting events, in particular football matches, which are subject to rules of the game, cannot be regarded as intellectual creations.31 European Parliament in Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics demands the elaboration of criteria for „own intellectual creation“ for copyrightable works produced by computers or robots.32 25 Thomas Margoni, “The Harmonization of EU Copyright Law: The Originality Standard”, (June 29 2016), accessed March 3 2020, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802327. 26 Detailed analysis of originality standard in EU copyright law in: Eleonora Rosati, “Judge-Made EU Copyright Harmonization, The Case of Originality”, (PhD diss., European University Institute, 2012), 101-189. 27 CJEU, case C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, 16 July 2009, par. 37-39. In decision, Court held that the reproduction of 11 word extracts from newspaper articles amounted to reproduction of a copyright work if the elements which were reproduced were the expression of the author’s intellectual creation. 28 CJEU, case 393/09, Bezpečností softwarová asociaze – Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, 22 December 2010, par. 49-50. 29 CJEU, case 145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others, 1 December 2011, par. 88-92. The case was about copyright protection for portrait photographs. 30 CJEU, case 604/10, Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Yahoo! UK Ltd and Others, 1 March 2012, par. 38-39. 31 CJEU, case C-403/08, Football Association Premier league Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others, 4 October 2011, par. 98. 32 European Parliament, „Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics“, 2017, 28, accessed March 4 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0005_ EN.pdf?redirect. 314 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova The lack of the wilful intention to impress the stamp of its own personality on its artistic effort might be an argument for excluding the non-human creative activity from copyright protection. Although artificial intelligence systems can act intelligently, they cannot understand the true meaning of what they say or do.33 This argument can be objected that the authorship cannot be relinquished to persons unable to express their will nor are they aware of their creative work, as is the case with minors or mentally ill persons. Will or intention is irrelevant for authorship, as the creation of a work of authorship is not a legal action/transaction but a legal fact. However, there is a crucial difference between the creations of a mentally ill person and a computer. Regardless of the existence or absence of the intention to create something and respective awareness thereof, the work always contains a personal stamp, as it is always a reflection of the uniqueness and individuality of the human spirit. On the other hand, even if we could say that a computer possesses an awareness of its actions and creations, it cannot be a creator as it has no personality nor spiritual dimension, which is crucial for creativity and originality.34 3. AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CREATIONS The author of a work is a natural person who created a work. As the creation of a work is a psychic process, legal entities cannot be authors. Exceptionally, they may be holders of individual property rights under subjective copyright.35 Certain authors establish the principles on which authorship is based, which can be helpful in determining whether artificial intelligence works can be eligible for copyright. First and foremost, to be considered an author one must conceptualize and direct the development of the work, instead of being the one following and executing orders given by another.36 The 33 Jacopo Ciani, “Learning from Monkeys: Authorship Issues Arising From AI Technology”, in Progress in Artificial Intelligence, eds. Moura Oliveira P., Novais P., Reis L., (Springer Cham, 2019), 7, https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3461599. 34 Truth be told, such approach is somewhat idealistic and in modern conditions, it is even outdated as the focus of copyright is shifted onto the protection of economic interests. Namely, copyright protection in the age of information technology is seen as a means of encouraging investment in creativity, where the personality of the author is of no particular importance. Creativity is dependent on the investment, on the financial incentive, not on the individual inspiration and personality of the author. Speaking of artificial intelligence systems, it normally includes a team of people behind the scenes that represent the foundation of such systems: developers, data and feedback suppliers, trainers, system owners and operators, etc. 35 In US law, legal entities may even be considered as the original copyright holder. 36 “An author is a human being who exercises subjective judgment in composing the work and who controls its execution.” Ginsburg, “The Concept of Authorship”, 1066. 315 Svjetlana Ivanović use of technical devices does not diminish the role of a human being as an author, and the device itself cannot be an author.37 The basic precondition for copyright protection of a work is its originality. If the work is not original and no copyright protection shall apply. Consciousness and intention to be an author are mentioned as one of the elements of authorship.38 The question is whether the works created by „neural network“ systems39 can enjoy copyright protection and who the author is if we don’t have a human. Recently, some scholars have adopted idea that evolution of AI systems leads to the recognition of AI systems as independent legal entities that may and could be responsible for the outcome of their own actions or omissions. In other words, AI system is an autonomous legal entity entitled to legal and commercial rights and duties. There are two possible options. First, AI systems have features similar to those of humans, like intelligence, rationality, independence, and therefore they should be treated as independent entities with legal rights and duties. Second, AI systems are analogous to firms, which are separate non-human legal entities capable of possessing legal rights and responsibilities.40 As regards the authorship question there are two alterative points of view. First, the AI systems themselves could be the owners and the ones responsible for their works. Second, the humans behind the machine (those involved in the process of developing the AI system) could be the owners and the ones responsible for works generated by AI systems.41 Advocates of copyright protection for AI creations point out that despite the fact that computer generated works are not made by human, they can be regarded as work of authorship by virtue of their nexus to human creativity.42According to some writers, the author of a computer-generated work is actually a computer program, as it created the work. Given that a computer program is a copyrighted work and as such lacks legal subjectivity, the only acceptable solution is that the rights belong to the author of the 37 An example of photographs that previously lacked copyright protection, or such protection laster over a shorter period, is cited in this respect. A photographer can be considered an author if he/she has expressed his/ her creativity in positioning the camera, photo subject, background, suitable lighting, etc. 38 Ginsburg, “The Concept of Authorship”, 1072. 39 The current AI systems are called „neural networks“ because they mimic the function of human brains by absorbing and distributing their information processing the capacity to groups of receptors that function like neurons. A neural network could learn how to paint, write or compose and generate a work whose creative content is not the result of any human intervention. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, „Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright and Accountability in the 3A Era – The Human-like Authors Are Already Here – A New Model“, Michigan State Law Review, no. 4 (2017): 674-675. 40 Yanisky-Ravid, „Generating Rembrandt“, 684-685. 41 Yanisky-Ravid, „Generating Rembrandt“, 698. 42 Bridy, “Coding Creativity”, 20. 316 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova author, i.e. to the author of a computer program.43 However, this reasoning is not universally accepted, not even among the supporters of the idea of providing copyright protection to such works. One of the possible solutions for the problem of AI authorship is adopting a broader version of work made for hire doctrine in US. In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author, and unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.44 Under the work made for hire doctrine, ownership of a copyright is directly vested in a legal person who is not the author in fact of the work in question. US copyright doctrine allows a separation of the person of the actual author or creator of the work from the author or creator in the legal sense. The problem is that current definition of works made for hire cannot cover computer-generated works, and for that reason appropriate changes in the law are proposed.45 The proposal is aimed to reinterpretation of the terms employer and employee in the work made for hire doctrine. Under a new interpretation of the terms, authorship of AI generated works would be transferred from the original creator, AI machine, to the programmers and owners of AI devices, who are employers.46 Some countries, such as the UK, South Africa, Hong Kong, India, Ireland and New Zealand, have set up laws that can provide protection for computer-generated works. This protection would be granted to the person who set up the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work.47 Article 9 (3) of Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 reads “In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.” The term computer-generated means 43 “The programmer of generative software is the logical owner of the copyright in the works generated by his or her software. He or she is, after all, the author of the author of the work…The artist and programmer responsible for…sophisticated generative drawing program whose output has hung in museums around the world, writes programs that draw pictures. The ownership issues seem clear when it comes to software-authored works, because human action is inevitably at the core of the creative process that leads to the production of such works.” For more details: Bridy, “Coding Creativity”, 21-22. 44 Copyright Law on the United States, § 201 (b) (2016). 45 Bridy, “Coding Creativity”, 27. 46 Kalin Hristov, “Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma”, The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property - IDEA, vol. 57 (2017): 452. 47 Maria Iglesias, Sharon Shamuilia, and Amanda Anderberg, Intellectual Property and Artificial Intelligence, A literature review, (European Commission, Joint Research Center: 2019), 13, https://publications.jrc.ec.europa. eu/repository/bitstream/JRC119102/intellectual_property_and_artificial_intelligence_jrc_template_final.pdf. 317 Svjetlana Ivanović that the work is generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work.48 Although the notion that copyright protection should be granted to computer-generated works is most prevalent in the countries and literature of Anglo-Saxon law, there are authors with different views. Namely, they claim that the key issue with such works is whom the authorship in such works should be recognised to. It is certain that it cannot be granted to a user of a computer program, because he has no creative contribution. The computer program itself can neither be an author, as it is not a human being, so the answer to the question of who could be the author would be very short: no one. Without the rights holder, such work (if it can be called that way at all) falls into the public domain.49 Because no person generates artificial intelligence work, there is no need for copyright protection and everybody is free to use the AI work. The argument against this approach could be lost incentives for programmers and AI companies. When it comes to copyright protection, incentives are not of the crucial importance for creating art works. Granting copyright protection for AI productions will not have an effect on generating such works. Artificial intelligence industry will likely continue to develop regardless copyright protection.50 Public domain model for artificial intelligence’s creations is alternative path to privatization through the grant of exclusive rights. Some scholars claim that placing such creations in the public domain allows for creation of new knowledge and easier access to information. Their proposal is that “the attribution of AIs creations to the public domain should be coupled with the establishment of a “disseminator right” as a tool to ensure that AI creations reach the public.”51 In addition to the above solutions to the issue of protecting AI works, there are notions that some alternative forms of protection should be found.52 For example, a possible solution would be to introduce related rights. Related rights are impersonal. The creations protected by related rights do not have to 48 In the case of computer-generated works, duration of copyright is 50 years from the end of the calendar year in which the work was made. 49 Ralph Clifford, “Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?”, Tulane Law Review, vol. 71 (1997): 1695. 50 Victor Palace, “What If Artificial Intelligence Wrote This: Artificial Intelligence and Copyright Law”, Florida Law Review, vol. 71 (2019): 238-241. 51 Ana Ramalho, “Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World? A Proposed Model for the Legal Status of Creations by Artificial Intelligent Systems”, Journal of Internet Law, vol. 21 (2017): 25, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2987757. 52 AI system itself or its elements could enjoy some kind of IP law protection. For example, AI can be protected as software, AI can be based on a database, and new data generated by AI system can be qualified as trade secret. Gerald Spindler, “Copyright Law and Artificial Intelligence”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law - IIC, vol. 50 (2019): 1050. 318 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova necessarily be created by a man. They are most often created by a legal entity, an economic entity. The purpose of providing protection of related rights is to protect the economic activity. In addition, these rights are property rights, lacking personal legal component and are therefore easily transferable. Another item that is pointed out is a minimum of creativity as a precondition for protection. Namely, as not all creations are protected by intellectual property rights, not all AI creations are eligible for protection. Therefore, there must be a minimum of creativity. However, the key issue is who would be the holder of such rights: a developer, a user or an investor. It is clear that, in the case of recognition of protection, there would have to be a shift of author-in-fact and author-in-law. It is stated that it would be optimal if the right was granted to the one with the power of disposition.53 Finally, as an argument in favour of the recognition of a dedicated related right, the author makes a comparison with the related legal protection of publishing rights. Namely, the publisher who first publishes a work that has not been published before has the property rights of the author, despite not investing any creative effort in creating the work, but investing in its publishing. It is possible to draw a line and provide an adequate form of protection to AI entities, i.e. to investing in their creation.54 In the event that no existing form of intellectual property right is suitable for the protection of AI creations and works, the possibility of protection under the law of unfair competition still exists.55 4. COPYRIGHT AS (NON) SUITABLE MEANS OF PROTECION OF AI CREATIONS There are arguments in favour of protection of AI products and also arguments against protection by copyright. One of the arguments in favour of the protection of machine productions by copyright is that value is generated by AI machines and that someone should be able to capture it. Things that have value should be protected by law, but there is no rule that the law must protect everything that has or may have value. The second reasoning suggests that orderly marketplace competition between human-created and machineproduced content requires that machine productions should be protected by copyright on the same footing as human creations. Copyright has tradition53 Tim Dornis, „Artificial Creativity: Emergent Works and the Void in Current Copyright Doctrine“, Yale Journal of Law & Technology, vol 22 (2020): 44-53. 54 Dornis, „Artificial Creativity“, 55-56. 55 Dornis, „Artificial Creativity“, 25. 319 Svjetlana Ivanović ally been indifferent to quality or aesthetic merit of work as a condition for protection and that could be the reason for protection of AI productions. But the actual question that must be asked and answered in order to protect AI productions is whether such productions are original works of authorship, for that is the main condition for copyright protection. Proponents of copyright protection for computer generated works assert that the programmer or perhaps user or owner of an AI machine can be considered author for copyright purposes. The problem is that AI machine will produce outcomes not foreseeable by the human programmer. When “the machine has crossed the autonomy threshold and is no longer a tool in the user’s hands or a reflection of its human-made program, machine productions are not protectable by copyright.”56 The issue of whether copyright protection can be granted to creations and works of artificial intelligence protrudes into the very core of copyright. Namely, if such creations and works are excluded from protection, then copyright is an instrument for stimulating human creativity. On the contrary, if computer-generated creations and works are recognized as eligible for copyright protection, then human creativity and the machine “creativity” are placed on the same plane.57 The justification of intellectual property rights is based on human rights theory or utilitarian economic theories. There are three branches of human rights theory, those are labour theory, personality theory and reward theory.58 Those theories are of special importance for copyright. A common feature of all three theories is that they are human-oriented and copyright protection is awarded only to humans. These theories cannot provide justification for copyright protection for computer generated works. On the other side, utilitarian justification theories and the most common investment protection theory, may be of significance for protection of AI systems, but only in the field of patent law.59 56 Daniel Gervais, „The Machine As Author“, Iowa Law Review, vol. 105 (2019): 10-22. 57 WIPO Conversation on Intellectual Property and Artificial Intelligence, Draft Issues Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence, (December 13 2019), 5, https://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details. jsp?meeting_id=55309. 58 The labour theory assumes that people are entitled to own “the fruits of their own labour.” According to personality theory, creating something is an expression of personality, and reward theory is based on premise that it is fair to give someone a reward for enriching society. 59 “If necessary investments in the production of knowledge cannot be recouped, once imitators, who can save the product development costs and thus offer identical products substantially cheaper, undercut them. The absence of such investment ultimately leads to market failure and therewith a decrease of social net welfare.” Reto Hilty, Jörg Hoffmann, Stefan Scheuerer, “Intellectual Property Justification for Artificial Intelligence”, 320 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova CONCLUSION The emergence and rapid development of artificial intelligence have placed new challenges for intellectual property rights and imposed the necessity to adapt to technological changes. The debate about the possible forms of protection of artificial intelligence creations and works is currently trending. While the protection of particular creations and systems of artificial intelligence in industrial property law is certain, different views apply in copyright. The traditional differences between the concept of copyright in Euro-continental and Anglo-Saxon law have decisively influenced this matter as well. Nowadays, we face issues undermining the basic presuppositions of copyright, i.e. human creativity and ingenuity. Should there be any concern that artificial intelligence will replace human intelligence, and whether man will continue to be the central point of copyright, both the starting point and origin, cause and objective of copyright protection. Despite the greater or lesser degree of independence of artificial intelligence systems in the creation of works, such works cannot be called a work of authorship. First of all, a work of authorship must be a human creation, as copyright protects only the creations of a human being. Secondly, the most important precondition for protection is the originality of the work, its individuality. The work or creation must be a reflection of the individual, of his unique and exclusive spirit, the expression of his creative power. AI creations fail to satisfy any of these conditions, as they are neither human creations nor original, since originality originates from a personality that is non-existing herein. Certain proposals have been made to provide such works an appropriate form of protection, but this raises the question of who would be the author of such a work, i.e. who could be the holder of respective rights. Certain proposals have been made under comparative law for a particular type of legal subjectivity is recognized with artificial intelligence systems. It should be mentioned that the rights holder bears obligations and responsibilities as well, and we are still uncertain whether a machine can be held responsible for anything. Certain laws recognize a particular type of protection for computergenerated works and creations, recognizing the right to protection for those who have taken the steps necessary to create such works or creations. A possible solution from the US law would be to apply the doctrine of work made Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper, no. 20-02 (2020): 16, https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3539406. 321 Svjetlana Ivanović for hire, under which copyright protection would be granted to the developer or user of the work. On the contrary, some authors consider such works to be part of the public domain and that no protection should be granted to them. A compromise of these extremes would be to recognize a related right that would protect such works or creations. Under these circumstances, we believe that no changes to copyright law should be made in order to adapt to creations made by AI as they are not and cannot be protected by copyright. The existing legal framework may be used to protect the AI system itself and the additional components used. Copyright should not seek protection for creations of AI, as this would question the justification for the existence of copyright. The sheer essence of copyright is the reward for creativity, and given that a human being is in the core of copyright, in the absence of human contribution and creativity there shall be no copyright. REFERENCES: 1. Abbott, Ryan. “I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law.” Boston College Law Review, vol. 57 (2016): 1079-1126. 2. Bridy, Annemarie. “Coding Creativity: Copyright and Artificially Intelligent Author.” Stanford Technology Law Review, vol. 5 (2012): 1-28. http://stlr. stanford.edu/pdf/bridy-coding-creativity.pdf. 3. Ciani, Jacopo. “Learning from Monkeys: Authorship Issues Arising From AI Technology.” In Progress in Artificial Intelligence, eds. Moura Oliveira P., Novais P., Reis L., 275-286. Springer, 2019. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3461599. 4. Clifford, Ralph. “Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?” Tulane Law Review, vol. 71 (1997): 1675-1703. 5. Dornis, Tim. „Artificial Creativity: Emergent Works and the Void in Current Copyright Doctrine.“ Yale Journal of Law & Technology, vol 22 (2020): 1-60. 6. Drexl, Joseph, Hilty, Reto et al. “Technical Aspects of Artificial Intelligence: An Understanding from an Intellectual Property Law Perspective.” Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper, no. 19-13 (2019): 1-15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3465577. 7. Drexl, Joseph et al. “Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition on the Draft Issues Paper of the World Intellectual Property Organization on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence.” (2020). Accessed March 4 2020. https://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/ 322 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. content/stellungnahmen/2020-02-11_WIPO_AI_Draft_Issue_Paper__ Comments_Max_Planck.pdf. European Parliament. „Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics.“ 2017. Accessed March 4 2020. https://www. europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0005_EN.pdf?redirect. Gervais, Daniel. „The Machine As Author.“ Iowa Law Review, vol. 105 (2019): 1-61. Ginsburg, Jane. “The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law.” DePaul Law Review, vol. 52 (2003): 1063-1092. Guadamuz, Andres. “Can the monkey selfie case teach us anything about copyright law.” WIPO Magazine, 1/2018. https://www.wipo.int/wipo_ magazine/en/2018/01/article_0007.html. Hilty, Reto, Hoffmann, Jörg, Scheuerer, Stefan. “Intellectual Property Justification for Artificial Intelligence.” Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper, no. 20-02 (2020): 1-28. https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3539406. Hristov, Kalin. “Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma.” The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property - IDEA, vol. 57 (2017): 431-454. Iglesias, Maria, Shamuilia, Sharon, and Anderberg, Amanda. Intellectual Property and Artificial Intelligence, A literature review. European Commission, Joint Research Center: 2019. https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/ bitstream/JRC119102/intellectual_property_and_artificial_intelligence_jrc_ template_final.pdf. Maggiore, Massimo. “Artificial Intelligence, Computer Generated Works and Copyright.” In Non-Convemtional Copyright: Do New and Atypical Works Deserve Potection?, edited by Enrico Bonadio, Nicola Lucchi, 382-399. Edward Elgar, 2018. Margoni, Thomas. “The Harmonization of EU Copyright Law: The Originality Standard.” (June 29 2016). Accessed March 3 2020. https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2802327. Marković, Slobodan, Popović, Dušan. Pravo intelektualne svojine. Beograd: Pravni fakultet, 2013. Palace, Victor. “What If Artificial Intelligence Wrote This: Artificial Intelligence and Copyright Law.” Florida Law Review, vol. 71 (2019): 217-242. Ramalho, Ana. “Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World? A Proposed Model for the Legal Status of Creations by Artificial Intelligent Systems.” Journal of Internet Law, vol. 21 (2017): 12-25. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2987757. 323 Svjetlana Ivanović 20. Rosati, Eleonora. “Judge-Made EU Copyright Harmonization, The Case of Originality.” PhD diss., European University Institute, 2012. 21. Russell, Stuart and Norvig, Peter. Artificial Intelligence, A Modern Approach. Pearson Education, 2010. 22. Spindler, Gerald. “Copyright Law and Artificial Intelligence.” International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law - IIC, vol. 50 (2019): 1049-1051. 23. Surden, Harry. “Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview.” Georgia State University Law Review, vol. 35 (2019): 1305-1337. https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3411869. 24. WIPO Conversation on Intellectual Property and Artificial Intelligence. “Draft Issues Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence.” (December 13 2019). https://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_ id=55309. 25. Yanisky-Ravit, Shlomit. „Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright and Accountability in the 3A Era – The Human-like Authors Are Already Here – A New Model.“ Michigan State Law Review, no. 4 (2017): 659-726. 26. Yanisky-Ravit, Shlomit and Martens, Cynthira. “From the Myth of Babel to Google Translate: Confronting Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence – Copyright and Algorithmic Biases in Online Translation Systems.” Seattle University Law Review, vol 43 (2019): 99-168. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.3345716. 324 Прегледни научни чланак UDK ЕЛЕКТРОНСКИ ДОКАЗ И ДОКАЗИВАЊЕ ВИСОКОТЕХНОЛОШКОГ КРИМИНАЛА Милијана Буха1 Правни факултет Универзитета у Бањој Луци Апстракт: Рачунарски системи и мреже, дигитални извори информација, у којима се складиште, преносе и обрађују дигитални подаци за посљедицу има развој друштва у правцу коришћења и злоупотребе технологије. Неограничена могућност употребе интернета није могућa без трагова које корисник интернета за собом оставља на страницама, социјалним мрежама и каналима комуникација. Употреба дигиталних уређаја и савремених облика информационе технологије условила је промјену начина извршења класичних кривичних дјела, као нпр. неовлашћено коришћење личних података, јавно изазивање и подстицање насиља или мржње, искоришћавање рачунарских мрежа или других техничких средстава за сексуално злостављање или искоришћавање дјетета, повреда приватности дјетета и других дјела, je довела до појаве сасвим нових облика недозвољених друштвених активности. Појава нових облика недозвољених друштвених активности насталих употребом савремене технике и технологије условила је и потребу коришћења нових начина за доказивања извршења таквих кривичних дјела. Предмет анализе овог рада је доказивање високотехнолошког криминала, примјеном како општих доказних радњи као што су претресање и привремено одузимање предмета, тако и примјеном посебних истражних радњи као што су приступ компјутерским системима и компјутерско сравњење података, надзор и техничко снимање телекомуникација. У данашњем друштву људи свакодневно користе рачунар, мобилни уређај, интернет, стога би у свакој истрази требало скупљати дигиталне доказе. Ради чега је у раду пажња посвећена и дигиталним доказима о извршењу кривичних дјела злоупотребом инфомационих технологија. 1 Доцент 325 Милијана Буха Кључне ријечи: електронски (дигитални) доказ, претресање и привремено одузимање предмета, приступ комјутерским системима и компјутерско сравњење података, надзор и техничко снимање телекомуникација. 1. УВОД У овом раду аутор се фокусирао на позитивноправне прописе материјалног и процесног кривичног законодавства у Републици Српској, како би се утврдило која кривична дјела имају обиљежја високотехнолошког криминала и које доказне радње према процесном закону стоје на располагању ради откривања и доказивања високотехнолошког криминала. Како би се идентификовали алати у откривању и доказивању високотехнолошког криминала у судском поступку, прије свега је нужно дефинисати високотехнолошки криминал. Кривични законик Републике Српске2 познаје инкриминације које се могу правно квалификовати као високотехнолошки криминалитет. Тако кривична дјела против безбједности рачунарских података и мрежа могу се сматрати високотехнолошким криминалом у ужем смислу, јер је ријеч о незаконитом понашању усмјереном на сигрност рачунарских система и мрежа. Нека од кривичних дјела у нашем Кривичном законику могу се подвести под високотехнолошки криминал у ширем смислу као што су: неовлашћено коришћење личних података уласком у туђу заштићену базу података, сексуално искоришћавање или злостављање дјеце користећи компијутерску мрежу или друга средства комуникације, повреда приватности дјетета путем рачунарског система или мрежа, јавно изазивање и подстицање мржње или насиља путем рачунаског система или мрежа, такође је инкриминисано као кривично дјело израда, продаја или давање на коришћење средства или упутства које је намјењено за улажење у рачунарски систем. Кривична дјела (као што су нпр. превара, неовлашћен приступ приватним подацима, дјечија порнографија и сл.) се све чешће извршавају злоупотребом достигнућа савремене технологије. Потешкоће у доказивању извршења кривичних дјела у кибер простору,3 односно 2 Кривични законик Републике Српке, „Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 64/17. 3 Слободан Петровић, “Дилеме: кибер или сајбер“, Страни Правни живот, бр. 2, Београд (2012): 368-377. 326 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova доказивање високотехнолошког криминала, могу настати с обзиром на својства информационих технологија. О високотехнолошком криминалу се говори у „корицама“ Стратегија за борбу против организованог криминала Босне и Херцеговине.4 Овим правним актом високотехнолошком криминалу се даје обиљежје организованог криминала, ради чега је формирано и посебно одјељење у оквиру Министарства унутрашњих послова Републике Српске у борби против високотехнолошког криминала. У Закону о кривичном поступку Републике Српске нисмо запазили некa посебна процесна правила која су у служби откривања и доказивања високотехнолошког криминала, те смо се осврнули само на неке од доказних радњи и посебних истражних радњи које могу послужити у борби против високотехнолошког криминала. Примјеном доказних радњи, посебних истражних радњи проналазе се трагови настали употребом рачунарског система и мрежа, а који могу послужити као докази у кривичном поступку. Трагови настали употребом рачунарског система или мреже јесу електронски докази. Електронски докази се не користе само у доказивању високотехнолошког криминала, него могу послужити и као докази у кривичном поступку код кривичних дјела која немају обиљежја високотехнолошког криминала. 2. ЕЛЕКТРОНСКИ ДОКАЗ Корисници интернет страница, социјалних мрежа и других канала комуникације за собом остављају трагове о предузетим активностима. Процесне радње које се предузимају ради проналажења трагова на рачунарсаким мрежама могли бисмо дефинисати као електронски докази. Подаци који се налазе на дигиталним уређајима, на уређајима за складиштење података, мрежним компонентама и садржај тих података у виду слике, поруке, идентитета и локације корисника, подаци о трансакцијама, о пошиљаоцима и примаоцима трансакција могу послужити као трагови или докази о злоупотребама информационих 4 Стратегија за борбу против организованог криминала у Босни и Херцеговини, за период од 2017 – 2020. Савјет минстара Босне и Херцеговине усвојио 10. октобра 2017. http://www.msb.gov.ba/PDF/ strategija11122017.pdf 327 Милијана Буха технологија. Елктронски доказ5 је информација која се преноси и чува у бинарном облику, а може послужити као доказ на суду. Ријеч је о материјалном доказу који је мање опипљив од других материјалних доказа, јер је састављен од магнетних поља и електронских импулса који се могу прикупљати и анализирати уз помоћ специјалних алата и техника. Дигитални доказ је било који податак сачуван или преношен помоћу рачунара који потврђују или оповргавају сумњу о извршеном кривичном дјелу.6 У свакодневном животу све чешће се сурећемо са извршиоцима кривичних дјела који употребљавају високе технологије. Тако је на примјер мејл порука коју су послали исламисти који су киднаповали и отели новинара Daniel Pearl била кључни електронски доказ у идентификовању одговорних особа за тероризам у Пакистану. У овом случају закони у САД-у омогућено је интернет провајдерима да брзо дођу до информација без чекања на потјерницу. Електроски докази за разлику од других доказних средстава (нпр. писаних исправа) тешко нестају, јер често остају трагови на дигиталним уређајима, мрежама, који омогућавају истражитељима да направе реконструкцију неког догађаја о извршеном кривичном дјелу. Дигитални докази су корисни у широком спектру кривичних дјела, а не само кривичних дјела против безбједности рачунарских7 података. Евиденције о употреби рачунара, интернета и других уређаја могу помоћи да се утврде када је извршено кривично дјело, гдје су жртве дјела, с ким је осумњичени комуницирао, а чак могу указати и на намјеру осумњиченог да почини кривично дјело. Уџбенички примјер о историји web прегледача Роберта Дурала, осумњиченог за убиство жене, показује да је исти претраживао појмове на интернету, као што су убиство, жена, несрећа, а који су послужили као докази да је убиство извршено са 5 У раду се користи наизмјенично термин електронски или дигитални докази јер су дигитални или електронски докази информације које се преносе или чувају у дигиталном облику, а које странке у поступку могу користити пред судом. Суд ће утврдити да ли је доказ релевантан, аутентичан, да ли је прихватљива копија или је нужан оргинал. 6 Eoghan Casey, Digital evidence and computer crime: forensic science, computers and the Internet, Elsevier (2011):7-10. http://index-of.es/Varios-2/Digital%20Evidence%20and%20Computer%20Crime.pdf 7 Законодавац у Републици Српској користи термин компијутерских података, ријеч је о страној ријечи, енгл. computer која значи рачунар. Стога би било прихватљивије да се законодавац опредијели за ријеч рачунар као што је случај у сусједним државама Републици Србији и Републици Хрватској. У раду ћемо користити термин који одговара нашем језику, то је рачунар умјесто компјутер. Такође, скрећемо пажњу да законодавац није конзистентан када је ријеч о законској терминологији која се односи на термин компјутер или рачунар. У неким законским одредбама Кривичног законика Републике Српске се сусрећемо са појмом раунар, а у некима са компјутер. 328 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova предумишљајем. Некада су информације похрањене на рачунару једини траг у истрази кривичног дјела.8 Дефиниција дигиталног доказа коју је предложила Радна група за дигиталне доказе9 је свака информација доказне вриједности која се чува или преноси у дигиталном облику. 2. ДОКАЗНЕ РАДЊЕ У ОТКРИВАЊУ ВИСОКОТЕХНОЛОШКОГ КРИМИНАЛА Карактеристике савремених рачунарских система и мрежа представљају озбиљну препреку за обезбјеђивање доказа потребних за вођење кривичног поступка.10 Операције у оквиру рачунарских система и мрежа карактерише одређена непостојаност и брз проток података који могу бити измјењени, прекривени, избрисани што може отежати предузимање радњи за проналажење и обезбјеђивање дигиталних података. Доказне радње које се користе у доказивању високотехнолошког криминала, према важећем кривичном процесном законодавству, а у фокусу овог рада су: претрес рачунара, приступ компијутеру и комјутерско сравњење података, надзор и техничко снимање телекомуникација, наредба оператеру телекомуникација, привремено одузимање предмета. У окривању високотехнолошког криминала користе се и доказне радње као што су увиђај, прикривени истражилац и слично.11 2.1. Претресање рачунара У Закону о кривичном поступку Републике Српске12 (у даљем тексту: ЗКП РС) препознајемо једну у низу од доказних радњи која може послужити за откривање и доказивање високотехнолошког криминала, а то је претресање стана, осталих просторија и покретних ствари, члан 115 ЗКП РС, која у последњем ставу поменуте законске одредбе говори и о претресању рачунара. Претресање рачунара и сличних уређаја за 8 Casey, Digital evidence and computer crime: forensic science, computers and the Internet,6. 9 https://www.swgde.org/. 10 Bernhard Maier, „How Has the Law Attempted to Tackle the Borderless Nature of the Internet?”, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, no. 2 (2010): 153. 11 Звонимир Ивановић, „Питање поступања са дигиталним доказима, у српском законодавству“, https:// hrcak.srce.hr/159734. 12 Закон о кривичном поступку Републике Српске, „Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр 53/12. 329 Милијана Буха аутоматску обраду података је резултат техничко технолошког прогреса и коришћење оваквих уређаја у свакодневном животу. Докази које нађемо у рачунару, а указују на извршење неког кривичног дјела се могу користити у кривичном поступку, јер се прибављају примјеном доказне радње коју познаје наш ЗКП РС, а то је претресање компјутера (тј. рачунара) и сличних уређаја став 3 члана 115 ЗКП РС. Претресање ових уређаја за циљ има улажење у садржину електронске меморије уређаја која је носилац података значајних за кривични поступак. Садржај из електронске меморије рачунара и сличних уређаја који је прибављен доказном радњом претресања је доказ, можемо рећи електронски доказ који се користи у кривичном поступку. Ради прегледа рачунара коме се приступило, неопходно је утврдити ко, под којим условима и по ком основу је овлашћен приступити рачунарском систему и да ли је оправдано омогућити приступ у одређеним случајевима мимо законом утврђених правила.13 Према ЗКП РС, преглед рачунара могу извршити овлашћена лица на основу наредбе суда, а по приједлогу подносиоца захтјева за издавање наредбе за претресање. Поред обавезних елемената прописаних законом за садржину наредбе за претресање, утврђених у члану 122 ЗКП РС, иста мора да садржи и податак који се односи на име и функцију овлашћеног лица на које се наредба односи, овлашћење извршиоца наредбе, упутство да се одузета ствар мора донијети у суд. Шта заправо значи члан 122 ЗКП РС за доказну радњу претрес рачунара, да се у наредби суда за предузимање ове доказне радње мора навести које лице је овлашћено да изврши претрес рачунара, које тачно радње претреса рачунара може предузети овлшћено лице, као и уколико се одузме рачунар да се исти мора доставити у суд, или ако се преузму одређени подаци са рачунара у елетронском облику исти се, такође, морају одмах доставити у суд. Неке од доказних радњи које се користе у откривању и доказивању високотехнолошког криминала су доказна радња претрес рачунара, члан 115 став 3 ЗКП РС и посебне истражне радње приступ рачунару и рачунарско сравњење података, члан 234 став 2 тачка б) ЗКП РС. Техничку разлику у смислу радњи које се предузимају за претрес рачунара и рачунарско сравњење података не видимо из законског текста, јер и једном и другом доказном радњом се угрожава право на приватни и породични живот. С тим да је примјена посебне истражне 13 Samantha Trepel, „Digital Searches, General Warrants, And The Case For The Courts,” Yale Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 10 article 4 (2008):138. 330 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova радње рачунарско сравњење података условљена не само тежином извршеног кривичног дјела, већ и немогућности да се докази прикупе на други начин.14 Законска обавеза у провођењу доказне радње претреса рачунара и других сличних уређаја огледа се у чињеници да се проводи јавно, јер се осумњиченом мора предочити наредба о провођењу ове доказне радње, како би осумњичени омогућио да се приступи његовим приватним подацима који се налазе на рачунару. Овакав закључак црпимо из члана 119 став 3 ЗКП РС, члана 122 став 1 тачка и), члана 124 став 1 ЗКП РС.15 Један од императивних услова који мора бити испуњен да би докази прикупљени радњом претресања рачунара и других уређаја били законити, је да је наредба о претресању предочена лицу, чији се рачунар или други уређај претреса, и сачињен записник о истој. Ову доказну радњу проводи овлашћено службено лице на основу приједлога тужиоца по наредби суда, а уз помоћ стручног лица. Провођење ове доказне радње уз помоћ стручног лица не значи да се ради о вјештачењу. У хитним случајевима када постоји опасност да ће нестати трагови или докази значајни за кривични поступак, претресање рачунара и сличних уређаја се може извршити и на основу усменог захтјева за издавање наредбе за претресање, члан 120 ЗКП РС. Овлашћено службено лице дужно је ако се претресање врши без наредбе одмах сачинити извјештај тужиоцу који о томе обавјештава судију за претходни поступак. Занимљиво је примјетити да законодавац изричито прописује да када је ријеч о предузимању доказне радње претресање стана и лица да је обавезно присуство два пунољетна грађанина као свједока, члан 124 став 4 ЗКП РС. Могли бисмо закључити да оваква законска обавеза „не стоји“ када је у питању претресање рачунара и сличних уређаја. Сличну дилему имамо и када је у питању сачињавање записника о предузетој радњи претресања рачунара и сличних уређаја. Члан 126 ЗКП РС у првом ставу прописује само егзистирање записника у погледу претресања стана, просторија и лица. Сходно томе, као дилема се намеће постоји ли законска дужност да се сачини записника о предузетој доказној радњи 14 Милијана Буха, „Измјене одредаба Закона о кривичном поступку БиХ – РС о посебним истражним радњама у свјетлу одлуке Уставног суда БиХ“, Правосудни форум за Босну и Херцеговину, Посебне истражне рање – друга годишња конференција највиших судова у БиХ, Зборник радова, Сарајево (2019): 123-131. 15 Члан 124 став 1 ЗКП РС дефинише поступак претресања, не прцизирајући на које тачно претресање се мисли, а имајући у виду да члан 115 ЗКП РС у посљедњем ставу прописује и претресање рачунара, и доводећи у везу ове двије законске одредбе, закључујемо да се члан 124 став 1 ЗКП РС има примјенити и приликом претресања рачунара. 331 Милијана Буха претресања рачунара и сличних уређаја, ако законом изричито није прописана ова законска обавеза и да ли бисмо могли извести закључак о обавезности постојања записника о предузетој и овој доказној радњи. У сваком случају сматрамо да би било пожељно да законодавац отклони овакве дилеме када је у питању предузимање доказне радње претресање рачунара и сличних уређаја. Имајући у виду да законски услови за предузимање доказне радње претресање рачунара и сличних уређаја нису прецизно законом дефинисани сматрамо да је исте нужно отклонити и законом прописати обавезу сачињавања записника, на основу чега би се могло утврдити да ли се овлашћено службено лице у предузимању исте „кретало“ у оквирима судске наредбе за предузимање доказне радње. Такође, битно је законом као правило поставити обавезу да претресању рачунара присуствују грађани као свједоци. Члан 115 ЗКП РС се дефинише претресање не само стана, просторија и осталних покретних ствари, већ и рачунара и сличних уређаја. Иста правила и радње које се предузимају, као што су сачињавање записника о предузетој доказној радњи, присуство грађана и сл., ради оцјене законитости у предузимању радњи доказивања претресања стана просторија и лица треба да важе и у односу на радњу претресање рачунара и сличних уређаја. Одредбама кривичног поступка треба омогућити органима гоњења прикупљање електронских доказа, али да се води рачуна о принципима домаћег кривичног процесног права којим се спречава самовоља органа у примјени процесних мјера принуде предузимањем доказне радње претресања рачунара према осумњиченом за неко високотехнолошко кривично дјело.16 Расправе у теорији о предузимању процесне радње претресање рачунара као дилему отварају, могу ли се претресати различити облици техничке комуникације, као што су комуникација између рачунара.17 Приликом претресања рачунара, ако је вјероватно да су подаци складиштени у другом рачунарском систему или дијелу система, а налазе се на територији и могуће им је приступити, а доступни су преко рачунарског система који је предмет претресања, пожељно је омогућити стручним лицима да у одређеним случајевима предметно 16 Susan, W. Brenner, „Cybercrime Investigation and Prosecution: The Role of Penal and Procedural Law”, Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, no. 2 (2001): 40. 17 Murdoch Watney, „Regulation of State Surveillance of the Internet human rights infringement or e-security mechanism?“, International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics, no. 1(2007): 44. 332 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova претресање прошире и на тај други рачунарски систем. Проширити предметно претресање сматра се оправданим, када је вјероватно да се могу наћи неки корисни подаци за кривични поступак и на другом рачунару. У овом случају претрес рачунара треба посматрати као посебну истражну радњу, јер се приступом другом рачунару угрожава право на приватни и породични живот не само осумњиченог, него и другог лица чији се други рачунар претреса. 2.1.1. Привремено одузимање предмета Приликом претресања компјутера и сличних уређаја привремено се одузимају предмети који су у вези са сврхом претресања, односно кривичним дјелом за које се предузимају ове доказне радње, што је у складу са чланом 126 став 1 ЗКП РС. С тим да законодавац даје могућност да се одузму и предмети који нису у вези са кривичним дјелом због кога је издата наредба за претресање, ако упућују на друго кривично дјело, члан 126 став 2 ЗКП РС.18 Ова законска одредба о привременом одузимању предмета који се не односе на кривично дјело за које је издата наредба о претресању не може се односити на рачунарске податке који нису предмет претресања. Наиме, законодавац изричито прописује да се могу привремено одузети предмети и који нису у вези са кривичним дјелом, ако се приликом претресања стана, просторије или лица нађу предмети који упућују на извршење другог кривичног дјела. Законодавац таксативно набраја у којим случајевима претресања је могуће привремено одузети прдемете који упућују на друго кривичо дјело. Законодавац није предвидио могућност да се приликом претресања рачунара или сличних уређаја одузимају и рачунарски подаци који упућују и на неко друго кривично дјело које није обухваћено наредбом, што нам се чини као пропуст законодавца. Заправао, ако је омогућено привремено одузимање предмета усљед претреса стана, просторије и лица који указују на извршење неког другог кривичног дјела које није обухваћено наредбом, било би логично исто омогућити и када је ријеч о претресању рачунара или сличних уређаја. Одузимање рачунарских података који указују на друго кривично дјело, које није обухваћено наредбом, би било сврсиходо и цјелисходно, јер накнадним прибављањем наредбе за претресањем рачунара ради прибављања доказа до кога се дошло, за посљедицу може имати да „нестану“ нађени подаци. 18 Привремено одузети предмети који се не односе на кривично дјело за које је издата наредба о претресању, се описују у записнику о извршеном претресању и издаје се потврда да су исти одузети. 333 Милијана Буха Привремено одузимање предмета се врши на основу наредбе за претресање и овлашћено службено лице ће издати потврду у којој ће навести предмете који су одузети и назив суда који је издао нареду, члан 127 ЗКП РС. Предмети који су привремено одузети одређеном лицу мора се том лицу доставити потврда о одузетим предметима. Након одузимања предмета на основу наредбе о претресању, овлашћено службено лице без одлагања треба да врати суду наредбу и предати предмет и списак одузетих предмета. Суд ће задржати одузете предмет под својим надзором до коначне одлуке. У материјалном кривичном закону се сусрећемо са инкриминацијама из групе кривичних дјела која имају обиљежје високотехнолошких криминала, а издвојићемо једну од њих нпр., израда и уношење компјутерских вируса, која у ставу 3 члана 409 КЗ РС прописује обавезно одузимање уређаја и средства којима је извршено ово кривично дјело, а што је и у складу и са чланом 129 става 1 процесног кривичног закона РС. 2.2. Телефонски листинг као доказна радња наредба оператеру телекомуникација Доказ у кривичном поступку може бити и телефонски листинг, јер је чланом 137 ЗКП РС прописано да се наредбом оператеру телекомуникација може тражити да достави податке о коришћењу телефонских услуга лица за кога постоји основ сумње да је починило кривично дјело. Да телефонски листинг може бити доказ у кривичном поступку потврђује и једна одлука Суда БиХ о законитости телефонског листинга који је прибавило Тужилаштво БиХ без наредбе суда.19 Ова одлука Суда БиХ о законитости доказа прибављених телефонским листингом је била предмет разматрања и пред Уставним судом БиХ. У оцјени законитости доказа прибављених телефонским листингом без судске наредбе 19 Суд Босне и Херцеговине, пресуда бр. X-KŽ-07/436 од 16.2.2010. , file:///C:/Users/Bobo/Downloads/436_ Alibasic_-_drugostepena_presuda_konacna_16_12_10.pdf. У овом предмету Суд је донио пресуду којом се одбија жалбени приговори оптуженог. У овој одлуци се разматра законитост листинга позива које је Тужилаштво БиХ прибавило без наредбе суда. Вијеће Суда БиХ је утврдило да се овакав приговор одбране о законитости доказа може подвести под жалбени основ битне повреде одредаба кривичног поступка, те из тих разлога се упустио у испитивање основаности жалбених навода. Коришћење у судском поступку телефонског листинга без судске наредбе је не само незаконит доказ него представља и повреду права на приватност. Тако да је ријеч о доказу прибављеном повредом основног људског права што се према члану 10 става 2 ЗКП РС и 236 става 1 ЗКП РС из 2012. сматра незаконитим доказом. Неспорно је да доказ који је прибављен без наредбе суда, а исти је коришћен у судском постуку незаконит и да се пресуда, која се темељи на таквом доказу има укинути, према члану 330 став 2 ЗКП РС из 2012. 334 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova осврнућемо се само на један сегмент Одлуке Уставог суда који нам указују да телефонски листинг може бити предмет доказне радње наредбе оператеру трелекомуникација. У овој одлуци Уставни суд БиХ напомиње да телефонски листинзи20 нису били предмет посебне истражне радње и када је Тужилаштво БиХ издало наредбу оператеру телекомуникација за издавање листинга, законом није била прописана обавеза о издавању судске наредбе ради прибављања телефонског листинга. Телефонски листинг је само списак позива неког лица о чему орган телекомуникације води евиденцију, али се из њега не може видјети садржај тих позива што чини значајније задирање у приватност осумњиченог. Листинг се може тражити за обављене разговоре. Суштинска разлика између посебне истражне радње надзора и техничког снимања телекомуникација и наредбе оператеру телекомуникације, што се примјеном посебне истражне радње могу пресрести разговори. Посебна истражна радња надзор и техничко снимање телекомуникација је супсидијарног карактера, 21 основ сумње за примјену ове посебне истражне радње треба да се односи на неко кривично дјело за које је могућа примјена посебне истражне радње, као и ако се на други начин не могу прикупити докази. 2.3. Приступ компјутерским подацима и компјутерско сравњење података Посебна истражна радња приступ комјутерским системима и компјутерско сравњење података значи рачунарско претраживање већ обрађених личних и других података и њихово поређење са подацима који се односе на осумњиченог и кривично дјело. Ова посебна истражна радња се проводи у два корака, први је претраживање података и поређење потадата прикупљених претраживањем са релевантним подацима који се односе на осумњиченог и кривично дјело.22 Претражују се лични и други подаци који су обрађени и похрањени у одређену базу података које воде надлежни органи, нпр. могу бити подаци о преласку границе, плаћању пореза. 20 Одлука Уставног суда, „Службени гласник“, бр. 71/14. Одлука Уставног суда да је неоснована апелација на пресуду Суда БиХ (од 16.2.2010. претходно поменуте у тексту) којом се одбија као неоснована жалба због незаконитости доказа. 21 Снежана Бркић, „Употреба незаконитих доказа у кривичном поступку Србије“, Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, бр. 1 (2011): 183-214. 22 Милан Шкулић, Организовани криминалитет – појам, појавни облици, кривична дјела и кривични поступак, (Службени гласник Београд, 2015), 259. 335 Милијана Буха У нашем кривичном порцесном закону Републике Српке, а исто је са кривичним поступком БиХ нажалост изостале су одредбе које дефинишу посебну истражну радњу присту компјутеру и компјутерско сравњење података, као и неке друге посебне истражне радње. Поређења ради осврнули смо се на закон сусједнe државe Репулике Србије, која дефинише посебан услов у погледу примјене посебне доказне радње рачунарско претраживање података,23 као и начин на који се спроводи ова доказна радња. Дефинисање посебног услова и начина на који се проводи посебна доказна радња рачунарско сравњење података је дефиниција ова посебна истражна радња чиме се олкшава примјена исте у пракси. У Републици Српској закон само помиње посебну истражну радњу приступ компјутеру и копјутерско сравњење података,24 без дефинисања посебног услова за примјену ове посебне истражне радње, у смислу да се одређује шта је предмет и циљ ове посебне истражне радње. Са сличним законским рјешењем као код нас се сусрећемо и у Републици Хрватској која у члану 332 става 2 ЗКП РХ побројава посебне доказне радње којима се привремено ограничавају одређена уставна права грађана. У наредном ставу исте законске одредбе у Хрватској прописује да се посебне доказне радње могу провести и по наредби тужиоца, ако постоји опасност од одлагања извршења истих. С тим да тужилац не може издати наредбу за провођење посебне доказне радње за претресање, прикупљање и снимање рачунарских података у хитним случајевима, ако начин извршења те радње захтијева улазак у кућу или удаљени улазак у рачунар осумњиченог који се налази у његовој кући. За разлику од законског рјешења у Хрватској, којим је омогућено и провођење посебних истражних радњи у хитним случајевима и по наредби тужиоца уз накнадну сагласност судије, у Републици Српској није могуће провођење посебних истражних радњи по образложеном приједлогу тужиоца уз накнадну сагласност судије, члан 236 став 2 ЗКП РС и члан 239 ЗКП РС. 25 У Хрватској је као што видимо изузетак од 23 Општи услови за примјену посебних доказних радњи у Србији дефинисани су чланом 161 и 162 Закона о кривичном поступку Републике Србије, док су посебни услови за примјену и провођење посебне истражне радње рачунрско претраживање података утврђени у члану 178, 179 и 180 ЗКП Р Србије. 24 У ЗКП РС се у члану 234 става 2 само побројавају посебне истражне радње, а општи услови за примјену посебних истражних рањи у Српској су дефинисани чланом 234 став 1 и чланом 235 ЗКП РС. 25 Провођење посебних истражних радњи у кривичном поступку Републике Српске у хитним случајевима, могуће је само на основу усмене наредбе судије за претходни поступак, уз обавезу да се писани налог судије за претходни поступак ради провођења посебне истражне радње достави у року од 24 сата од издавања усмене наредбе. Чланом 239 јасно је утврђено да посебне истражне радње које су проведене без наредбе судије и супротно од наредбе, на таквим доказима се не може заснивати судска одлука. 336 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova правила да се посебне истражне радње проводе по наредби судије, учињен само у погледу неких посебних истражних радњи, док је законодавац код нас за све посебне истражне радње поставио као један од нужних услова постојање судске наредбе. Посебна истражна радња приступ компјутеру и копјутерско сравњење података за циљ има упоређивање компјутерских података садржаних у евиденцијама надлежних органа са полицијским подацима о извршеном кривичном дјелу, о осумњиченом и испољеним посебностима о начину извршења кривичног дјела. Постоје двије врсте упоређивања података, позитивно и негативно упоређивање. Негативно упоређивање значи до долази до брисања одређених података, односно одређених лица из круга осумњичених, аутоматизованим претрагама полицијске, административне и друге евиденције. Позитивно поређење значи да се ствара нови податак на основу пронађених подударних података, тј. утврђен круг осумњичених лица на основу одређених карактеристика, чињеница или способности, које су запажене код непознатог учиниоца кривичног дјела.26 Када направимо паралелу између доказне радње претресање компјутера и сличних уређаја, као и посебне истражне радње приступ компјутеру и компјутерско сравњење података, можемо закључити сљедеће: да доказна радња се извршава јавно и да је могуће само у односу на дјело које је предмет радње претресања, а посебно истражна радња се проводи тајно и могућа је и у односу на неко друго дјело за које се може одредити посебна истражна радња, члан 238 ЗКП РС.27 2.4. Надзор и техничко снимање телекомуникација Надзор и техничко снимање телекомуникација је једна од посебних истражних радњи која се користи у откривању и доказивању високотехнолошког криминала. Посебну истражну радњу тајни надзор и техничко снимање телекомуникација је могуће одредити ако су испуњени матерјални и фомрални услови за примјену исте. Материјални услови, како се помиње 26 Горан Матић, „Упоредно-правни приказ специјалне истражне радње, технике аутоматског рачунарског претраживања личних и других података (компјутерске „растер“ претраге) са освртом на стање у Србији“, Научно стручно савјетовање Ziteh 2006, https://singipedia.singidunum.ac.rs/, 26.3.2020. 27 Примјена посебне истражне радње приступ компјутеру и компјутерско сравњење података, према поменутој одредби би се могла проширити и на друга кривична дјела за која је могуће одредити посебне истражне радње. 337 Милијана Буха у теорији, везују за врсту кривичног дјела у погледу које се могу одредити посебне истражние радње, као и на немогућност да се докази прикупе на други начин. Тако да и у погледу матерјалних услова за примјену посебних истражних радњи је нужно да су испуњена два кумулативна услова, а један од њих се односи на природу кривичног дјела за које се може одредити примјена посебних истражних радњи, а други на немогућност да се до доказа дође на неки други начин. Формални услови за примјену посебних истражних радњи чине два кумулативно постављена услова. Први је процесна иницијатива тужиоца, кроз образложен приједлог, а други је наредба судије за претходни поступак за провођење конкретне посебне истражне радње.28 Надзор и техничко снимање телекомуникација као један од посебних истражних радњи која се користи у откривању и доказивању извршења неког кривиног дјела из групе кривичних дјела високотехнолошког криминала је могуће одредити уколико су испуњени сви матерјални и формални услови за примјену исте. Према члану 235 ЗКП РС из 2012. један од матерјалних услова за примјену надзор и техничко снимање телекомуникација се односи на тежину кривичног дјела. Ова одредба у ставу 1 тачке г) ЗКП РС из 2018.29 прописује да се посебне истражне радње могу одредити за кривична дјела за која се може изрећи казна затвора од пет година или тежа казна.30 Посебне истражне радње и високотехнолошки криминал Посебне истражне радње у откривању и доказивању високотехнолошког криминала су нужно потребне, иако се истима ограничава уставно право на приватност осумњиченог. У теорији се сусрећемо са тезом да се посебне истражне радње могу посматрати као доказне радње нужне одбране. Условна сличност између института нужне одбране и посебних истражних радњи огледа се у томе што се и посебним истражним радњама, као и нужној одбрани, прибјегава само када надлежни орган, тј. судија за претходни поступак, на приједлог тужиоца не види да је на други начин могуће открити тешко 28 Ђорђе Игњатовић, Милан Шкулић, Организовани криминалитет (Правни факултет Универзитет у Београду, 2010), 275. 29 Закон о измјенама и допунама Закона о кривичном поступку Републике Српске, “Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 66/18. 30 Mиодраг Симовић, „Посебне истражне радње у борби против најтежих облика криминалитета – у контексту међународних стандарда и одлуке Уставног суда Босне и Херцеговине број У/16 од 1. јуна 2017“, Посебне истражне радње, Зборник радова друге конференције највиших судова у Босни и Херцеговини (2018), 67-110. 338 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova кривично дјело које представља опасност по живот и здравље људи, те безбједност државе.31 Ако пођемо од тезе да се посебне истражне радње могу одредити и за високотехнолошки криминал. Прије свега је нужно да дефинишемо шта је високотехнолошки криминал и да видимо да ли се за таква кривична дјела може изрећи казна затвора од пет година и више. Високотехнолошки криминал у ужем смислу је свако незаконито понашање усмјерено на електронске операције сигурности рачунарских система и података који се у њима обрађују. У ширем смислу високотехнолошки криминал подразумијева свако незаконито понашање везано за или у односу на рачунарски систем или мрежу, укључујући и илегално посједовање, нуђење и дистрибуирање информација преко рачунарских система и мрежа.32 За високотехнолошки криминал се каже да је свакодневница која је усљед развоја технологије, довела до појаве многих недозвољених дјела кориштењем технологије, као и да је транснационалног карактера ради чега су потребни глобални напори да се успостави ефикасна сарадња у борби против високотехнолошког криминала.33 Дефиницијом високотехнолошког криминала обухваћен је широк спектар кривичних дјела која се могу сматрати високотехнолошким криминалом и у односу на та сва кривична дјела, с обзиром на запријећену казну затвора не би се могле одредити посебне истражне радње. Тако на примјер за кривично дјело неовлашћено коришћење личних података34 може се изрећи казна затвора од 6 мјесеци до 3 године. С обзиром на запријећену казну, за претходно поменуто кривично дјело, се не би могла одредити посебна истражна радња, имајући у виду један од материјалних услова за примјену посебних истражних радњи. Међутим, занимљиво је примјетити да у погледу неких кривичних дјела, која се могу правно квалификовати као високотехнолошки криминал, као што су: искоришћавање компијутерске мреже или 31 Види више о условној сличности између посебних истражних радњи и нужне одбране, Милијана Буха: „Посебне истражне радње између ефикасности кривичног поступка и права на приватност”, Правни живот, број 9, Београд (децембар 2017), 771-782. 32 Peter Stephenson, Investigating computer – related crime, a handbook for corporate investigator ( Boca Raton London New York Washington: CRC PRESS, 2000), https://dphu.org/uploads/attachements/books/ books_4109_0.pdf 33 Станко Бејатовић, „Високотехнолошки криминал и кривичноправни инструменти супротстављања“, Зборник радова Међународна научностручна конференција, Сузбијање криминала и европске интеграције, с освртом на високотехнолошки криминал (март 2012): 18-30. Лидија Комлен Николић, Радоје Гвозденовић и др., Сузбијање високотехнолошког криминала (Удружење јавних тужилаца и заменика јавних тужилаца Србија, Београд 2010), https://www.uts.org.rs/images/vtk.pdf 34 Члан 157став 2 Кривичног законика Републике Српске из 2018. 339 Милијана Буха комуникације другим техничким средствима за извршење кривичних дјела сексуалног злостављања или искориштавања дјетета35, компјутерска саботажа36, компијутерска превара – тежи облици дјела,37 запријећена је казна затвора од пет година као максимална казна затвора. Стога, ако је запријећена као максимална казна затвора од пет година, питање је колико ће суд заиста у пракси прибјегавати изрецању казне затвора од пет година, ако је то законски максимум. С друге стране у погледу оваквих кривичних дјела за која је законом прописана као максимална казна затвора од пет година могуће је изрећи казну затвора у трајању од пет година и поред чињенице да је ријеч о законском максимуму и тиме испунити један од материјалних услова за примјену посебних истражних радњи, ако суд образложи зашто се докази у погледу таквих кривичних дјела нису могли прибавити на други начин. Када говоримо о групи кривичних дјела против безбједности компјутерских података у Републици Српској, требамо напоменути да се за сва кривична дјела из ове групе38 не може изрећи казна затвора од пет година, па тиме и у погледу истих није могуће одредити примјену посебних истражних радњи. Дало би се закључити да за већину кривичних дјела против безбједности компјутерских података није могућа примјена посебних истражних радњи, што би указивало да је ова кривична дјела могу открити и доказати упротребом других доказних радњи, као што су: увиђај, претрес рачунара и других сличних уређаја, привремено одузимање предмета. Један од закључака који бисмо могли извести када је ријеч о групи кривичних дјела против безбједности рачунарских података и мрежа је да се кривична дјела из ове групе кривичних дјела уклапају у дефиницију високотехнолошког криминала у ужем смислу, јер је ријеч о незаконитом понашању усмјереном на сигрност рачунарских система и мрежа. Нека од кривичних дјела у нашем Кривичном законику 35 Члан 178 КЗ РС 2018. 36 Члан 408 КЗ РС 2018. 37 Члан 410 став 2 и став 3 КЗ РС 2018. 38 Основни облик кривичног дјела оштећење компјутерских података и програма, кривично дјело израда и уношење копјутерских вируса (члан 407 став 1 и 2), основни облик кривичног дјела копјутерске преваре кривично дјело неовашћен приступ заштићеном компјутеру, компјутерској мрежи (члан 410 став 1 КЗ РС), телекомуникацији и електронској обради података (члан 411 КЗ РС), спречавање и ограничавање приступа јавној компјутерској мрежи (члан 412 КЗ РС), неовлашћено коришћење компјутера или комјутерске мреже (члан 413 КЗ РС). 340 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova могу се подвести под високотехнолошки криминал у ширем смислу као што су: неовлашћено коришћење личних података уласком у туђу заштићену базу података, сексуално искоришћавање или злостављање дјеце користећи компијутерску мрежу или друга средства комуникације, повреда приватности дјетета путем рачунарског система или мрежа, јавно изазивање и подстицање мржње или насиља путем рачунарског система или мрежа, такође је инкриминисано као кривично дјело израда, продаја или давање на коришћење средстава или упутства које је намијењено за улажење у рачунарски систем.39 За већину, а могли бисмо рећи скоро па за сва кривична дјела и која се могу сматрати високотехнолошким криминалом у широм смислу, није могуће изрећи казну затвора од пет година, чиме није испуњен један од услова за примјену посебних истражних радњи. С тим да је за тежи облик кривичног дјела јавно изазивање и подстицање насиља и мржње путем рачунарског система и мрежа може изрећи и казна затвора у трајању не само пет година него и тежа. Тако да у погледу тежег облика овог кривичног дјела може изрећи и могућа је примјена посебних истражних радњи, ако се поред законског услова висине запријећене казне од пет година затвора, докаже да је доказе за исто дјело немогуће прикупити на други начин.40 Анализирајући законске одредбе како нашег кривичног законика, тако и закона о кривичном поступку могло би се закључити да тешко има мјеста, тј. простора за примјену посебних истражних радњи када је ријеч о високотехнолошком криминалу који има обиљежја прекограничног криминалитета, чијим извршењем могу бити повријеђена права заштићена добра не само једне државе. Иако високотехнолошки криминалитет има обиљежја прекограничног криминала према важећим кривичноправним прописима у Реппублици Српској врло је рестриктивна могућност примјене посебних истражних радњи, што је разумљиво с једне стране, имајући у виду да се истима мијеша у право на породични и приватни живот осумњиченог, а с друге стране се поставља питање колико је добра оваква рестриктивност, јер је ријеч о кривичним дјелима која су интернационалног карактера. Посебна истражна радња тајни надзор и техничко снимање телекомуникација састоји се од надзора и снимања комуникација која се обављају путем телефона или других техничких средстава, као и од надзора електронске или друге адресе осумњиченог и заплене писама 39 Члан 157 став 2 КЗ РС , 178 став 1 и 2 КЗ РС, члан 189 став 2 КЗ РС, 359 КЗ РС, 360 став 3 КЗ РС. 40 Члан 359 став 2 и 3 КЗ РС из 2017. 341 Милијана Буха и других пошиљки. Овом посебном истражном рањом није обухваћено само лице за које постоји основ сумње да је починило кривично дјело у погледу кога се одређује надзор и технчко снимање телекомуникација, него и друга лица која долазе у контакт са осумњиченим, јер је то суштина и садржај ове посебне истражне радње. Став 3 члана 234 ЗКП РС из 2012 прописује да се посебне истражне радње могу одредити и према лицу за које постоји основ сумње да преноси информације у вези кривичног дјела извршиоцу истог, или према лицу чијим се средствима комуникације служи извршилац дјела. Према овој одредби посебне истражне радње се могу одредити, не само једном лицу, него и другим лицима која су у „ланцу“ незаконитих радњи, све управо ради откривања и доказивања да је извршено кривично дјело. Законодавац каже посебне истражне радње се могу одредити и према лицу за које постоји основ сумње да учиниоцу преноси информације о кривичном дјелу или да се користи његовим телекомуникацијским средствима. Да би се посебне истражне радње одредиле и према тим другим лицима, мора постојати судска наредба и образложен приједлог тужиоца, којим се указује на основ сумње да лице, према којем се проширује примјена мјере надзор и техничко снимање телекомуникација преноси информације у вези кривичног дјела или да се извршилац кривичног дјела користи његовим средством телекомуникације. Проширење примјене посебне истражне радње надзора и техничког снимања телекомуникација значи да ако се у току спровођења ове посебне истражне радње дође до сазнања да је осумњичени умјесто телефонског броја или адресе која је означена у наредби за спровођење ове посебне истражне радње, користи другим телефонским бројем или адресом, може се проширити надзор комуникације и на тај други број или адресу. Надзор се може проширити на новооткривени број или адресу искључиво накнадним одобрењем од стране суда поводом испољене иницијативе тужиоца.41 41 Милан Шкулић, Организовани криминалитет – појам, појавни облици, кривична дела и кривични поступак, 249. 342 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ЗАКЉУЧАК Приликом анализе законских одредаба, које се користе у откривању и доказивању високотехнолошког криминала, према важећем кривичном процесном закону уочили смо одређене недоречености законодавца, које је нужно избјећи, како би се спријечило смовољно поступање надлежних органа у провођењу доказних радњи. Тако на примјер законодавац се не упушта у дефинисање записника о предузетој доказној радњи, претресање рачунара и сличних уређаја, што отвара врата за егзистирање различитих одлука у оцјени да ли (не)сачинити записник о претресању рачунара, што је супротно стандарду правне сигурности и једнакости. Правна дилема која нам се наметнула, приликом дефинисања доказне радње претресања рачунара у откривању високотехнолошког криминала, да ли претресање рачунара и сличних уређаја када су не само средство извршења високотехнолошког криминала, него и мјесто извршења високотехнолошког криминала значи увиђај у рачунар и сличних уређаја. У којој мјери постоји сличност између радње претресања рачунара и сличних уређаја и уређаја у доказивању високотехнолошког криминала, засигурно захтијева посебну правну анализу у неком од будућих радова. Један од битних закључака до којих се дошло када је ријеч прије свега о дефинисању високотенолошког криминала у правним оквирима материјалног кривичног законодавства Републике Српске, је да се високотехнолошким криминалом у ширем смислу према нашем Кривичном законику могу сматрати сљедећа кривична дјела: неовлашћено коришћење личних података уласком у туђу заштићену базу података, сексуално искоришћавање или злостављање дјеце користећи компијутерску мрежу или друга средства комуникације, повреда приватности дјетета путем рачунарског система или мрежа, јавно изазивање и подстицање мржње или насиља путем рачунарског система или мрежа, такође је инкриминисано као кривично дјело израда, продаја или давање на коришћење средства или упутства које је намјењено за улажење у рачунарски систем. Док се кривична дјела против безбједности рачунарских података и мрежа могу сматрати високотехнолошким криминалом у ужем смислу, јер је ријеч о незаконитом понашању усмјереном на сигрност рачунарских система и мрежа. Ријеч је о кривичним дјелима чије је незаконито понашање везано за или у односу на рачунарски систем или мрежу, укључујући 343 Милијана Буха и илегално посједовање, нуђење и дистрибуирање информација преко рачунарских система и мрежа. У раду је разматрано и колико има простора за примјену посебних истражних радњи у доказивању високотехнолошког криминала, као закључак се намеће да тешко има простора за примјену посебних истражних радњи када је ријеч о високотехнолошком криминалу, који има обиљежја прекограничног криминалитета, чијим извршењем могу бити повријеђени право заштићена добра не само једне државе. Наиме, за већину кривичних дјела која имају обиљежја високотехнолошког криминала није испуњен један од материјалних услова у погледу примјене посебних истражних радњи, а то је висина запријећене казне затвора од пет година. Иако висина запријећене казне у примјени посебних истражних радњи није од суштинског значаја, али је законски услов. Фундаментални услов у примјени посебних истражних радњи је немогућност прикупљања доказа на други начин. Посебне истражне радње треба посматрати као доказне радње нужне одбране, којима је оправдано уплитање у приватни и породични живот осумњиченог, да би се дошло до доказа о извршеном кривичном дјелу, које је опасно по живот, здравље људи безбједност државе. Суштинска мањкавост правног система како Републике Српске, па тако и Босне и Херцеговине је непостојање посебног закона који се бави проблематиком високотехнолошког криминала. Сложеност проблематике борбе против високотехнолошког криминала препознала је Србија, ради чега постоји и посебан закон који се бави доказивањем високотехнолошког криминала који не познаје границе, што потврђује и Закон о организацији и надлежности државних органа за борбу против високотехнолошког криминала.42 На крају бисмо закључили као приједлог de lege ferenda, да би било пожељно посебним законом регулисати проблематику превенције високотехнолошког криминала, јер је упутно колико су важеће одредбе у процесном кривичном закону у служби превенције против често „невидљивог“, „тешко опипљивог“ криминала без граница. 42 Закон о организацији и надлежности државних органа за борбу портив високотехнолошког криминала, https://www.paragraf.rs/ 344 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND PROOF OF HIGH-TECH CRIME Milijana Buha43 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Abstract: In analyzing the legal provisions used in detecting and proving hightech crime, under the applicable criminal procedural law, we have identified some ambiguities of the legislator, which must be avoided, in order to prevent the competent authorities from acting arbitrarily in conducting evidentiary actions. For example, the legislator does not indulge in defining records of searching computers and similar devices, which opens the door to the existence of different decisions in assessing whether (not) to make a computer search record, which is contrary to the standard of legal certainty and equality. Whether the search of computers and similar devices when they are not only a tool of committing high-tech crime, but also the place of committing high-tech crime, means it is an insight into computers and similar devices. Does it exist similarity between search of computers and similar devices and insight in proving high-tech crime will certainly require special legal analysis in a future work. The following criminal offenses may be broadly regarded as high-tech criminal offenses under our Criminal Code: unauthorized use of personal information by entering another’s secure database, sexual exploitation or abuse of children using a computer network or other means of communication, violation of a child’s privacy through a computer system or networks, public provocation and incitement to hatred or violence through a computer system or networks is also criminalized as a criminal offense of making, selling or leveraging funds or instructions intended for entry into a computer system. While crimes against the security of computer data and networks can be considered high-tech crime in the narrow sense, because it is an illegal act aimed at the security of computer systems and networks. These are crimes whose unlawful conduct is related to or in relation to a computer system or network, including the illegal possession, offering and distribution of information through computer systems and networks. Although the level of punishment in the application of special investigative actions is not essential, but it is a legal requirement. One of the conclusions is that there is hardly place for for special investigative action to be taken to prove high-tech crime. For most offenses that have the characteristics of high-tech crime, one of the material conditions regarding the application of special investigative measures is not fulfilled, which is the sen43 Assistant Professor 345 Милијана Буха tence of five years in prison. A fundamental requirement in the implementation of special investigative actions is the inability to collect evidence in any other way. Special investigations should be observed as evidence of necessary defense that justifies the interference with the suspect’s private and family life in order to obtain evidence of a life-threatening crime, human health, and state security. A fundamental flaw in the legal system of both Republika Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina is the lack of a separate law dealing with high-tech crime. Finally, we would conclude as a proposal de lege ferenda that it would be desirable to regulate the problem of high-tech crime prevention by a separate law, because it is questionable how valid the law on criminal procedure is in the service of prevention against the often “invisible”, “hard to touch” crime without borders. Keywords: electronic (digital) evidence, search and seizure of objects, access to computer systems and computer data matching, surveillance and technical recording of telecommunications ЛИТЕРАТУРА: 1. Brenner, Susan, W. „Cybercrime Investigation and Prosecution: The Role of Penal and Procedural Law”, Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, no. 2 (2001): 1-41. https://www.researchgate.net/ 2. Casey, Eoghan, Digital evidence and computer crime: forensic science, computers and the Internet, (Elsevier 2011):805. http://index-of.es/Varios-2/Digital%20 Evidence%20and%20Computer%20Crime.pdf 3. https://www.swgde.org/. 4. Maier, Bernhard „How Has the Law Attempted to Tackle the Borderless Nature of the Internet?”, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, no. 2 (2010): 142-175. 5. Stephenson, Peter, Investigating computer – related crime, a handbook for corporate investigator ( Boca Raton London New York Washington: CRC PRESS, 2000), https://dphu.org/uploads/attachements/books/books_4109_0. pdf 6. Trepel, Samantha „Digital Searches, General Warrants, And The Case For The Courts,” Yale Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 10, article 4 (2008):122-150. 7. Watney, Murdoch „Regulation of State Surveillance of the Internet human rights infringement or e-security mechanism?“, International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics, no. 1(Јanuar 2007): 44. https://www. researchgate.net/. 346 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 8. Бејатовић, Станко, „Високотехнолошки криминал и кривичноправни инструменти супростављања“, Зборник радова Међународна научностручна конференција, Сузбијање криминала и европске интеграције, с освртом на високотехнолошки криминал (март 2012): 18-30. 9. Бркић, Снежана „Употреба незаконитих доказа у кривичном поступку Србије“, Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, бр. 1 (2011): 183-214. 10. Буха, Милијана „Измјене одредаба Закона о кривичном поступку БиХ – РС о посебним истражним радњама у свјетлу одлуке Уставног суда БиХ“, Правосудни форум за Босну и Херцеговину, Посебне истражне рање – друга годишња конференцијанајвиших судова у БиХ, Зборник радова, Сарајево (2019): 123-131. 11. Буха, Милијана: „Посебне истражне радње између ефикасности кривичног поступка и права на приватност”, Правни живот, број 9, Београд (децембар 2017), 771-782. 12. Закон о измјенама и допунама Закона о кривичном поступку Републике Српске, “Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 66/18. 13. Закон о казненон постуку Републике Хрватске, https://www.zakon. hr/z/174/Zakon-o-kaznenom-postupku. 14. Закон о кривичном поступку Републике Српске, „Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр 53/12. 15. Закон о организацији и надлежности државних органа за борбу портив високотехнолошког криминала Републике Србије https://www.paragraf. rs/ 16. Законик о кривичном поступку Републике Србије, https://www.paragraf. rs/propisi/zakonik_o_krivicnom_postupku.html 17. Ивановић, Звонимир „Питање поступања са дигиталним доказима, у српском законодавству“, Криминалистичка теорија и пракса (2015), 7-21. https://hrcak.srce.hr/159734. 18. Игњатовић, Ђорђе и Шкулић, Милан, Организовани криминалитет, (Правни факултет Универзитет у Београду, 2010) 19. Кривични законик Републике Српке, „Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 64/17. 20. Матић, Горан, „Упоредно-правни приказ специјалне истражне радње, технике аутоматског рачунарског претреаживања личних и других података (компјутерске „растер“ претраге) са освртом на стање у Србији“, Научно стручно савјетовање Ziteh 2006, 1-7 https://singipedia.singidunum. ac.rs/ 347 Милијана Буха 21. Николић, Комлен Лидија и Гвозденовић, Радоје и др., Сузбијање високотехнолошког криминала (Удружење јавних тужилаца и заменика јавних тужилаца Србија, Београд 2010), https://www.uts.org.rs/images/vtk.pdf 22. Одлука Уставног суда, „Службени гласник“, бр. 71/14. 23. Петровић, Слободан, “Дилеме: кибер или сајбер“, Страни Правни живот, бр. 2, Београд (2012): 368-377. 24. Симовић, Mиодраг, „Посебне истражне радње у бворби против најтежих облика криминалитета – у контексту међународних стандарда и одлуке Уставног суда Босне и Херцеговине број У/16 од 1. јуна 2017“, Посебне истражне радње, Зборник радова друге конференције највиших судова у Босни и Херцеговини (2018), 67-110. 25. Стратегија за борбу против организованог криминала у Босни и Херцеговини, за период од 2017 – 2020. Савјет минстара Босне и Херцеговине усвојио 10. октобра 2017. http://www.msb.gov.ba/PDF/strategija11122017. pdf 26. Суд Босне и Херцеговине, пресуда бр. X-KŽ-07/436 од 16.2.2010. , file:///C:/Users/Bobo/Downloads/436_Alibasic_-_drugostepena_presuda_ konacna_16_12_10.pdf. 27. Шкулић, Милан, Организовани криминалитет – појам, појавни облици, кривична дјела и кривични поступак, (Службени гласник Београд, 2015), 672. 28. Шкулић, Милан, Организовани криминалитет – појам, појавни облици, кривична дела и кривични поступак, (Службени гласник, Београд, 2015). 348 Review article UDK THE EXTENT OF THE DIGITALIZATION OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Nevenko Vranješ1 Faculty of Political Science, University of Banja Luka Abstract: Although the digitalization of public administration is an imperative of its contemporary development, the digitalization of the public administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina is progressing at a slow pace, achieving minor results. This paper addresses the extent of the digitalization of the public administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina at all levels of administrative government. First, the implementation and operationalization of the Fundamentals of the Global Development of the UN e-Government, the New European Interoperability Framework and the Public Administration Reform Principle in the area of service delivery through strategic and normative solutions provided by the domestic legal framework is addressed; then the European Commission Progress Report, the OECD-SIGMA Report, and self-evaluation reports on the state of e-government, digitalization and service delivery are dealt with, which, by identifying the situation and key challenges, completes the picture of the current level of the digitalization of the public administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, this paper provides a brief overview of the ethical dimension of the digitalization of public administration, referring to the public administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Keywords: digitalization, service delivery, public administration, public administration reform, OECD-SIGMA. 1 Assistant Professor 349 Nevenko Vranješ 1. DEFINING DIGITALIZATION AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION The term digitization has been variously defined by different scholars. IT experts explicate digitalization as the conversion of traditional forms of information storage such as paper, photographs or sound into the binary code (ones and zeros) of computer storage. Legal scholars define digitalization as the possibility of formal improvement of legal instruments or tools. Economists define digitization as a process which primarily contributes to the affirmation of the principles of 3E’s (economy, effectiveness, and efficiency). Political scientists associate digitalization and digital governance with the issues of power, institutions, and organizational change.2 The digitization of public administration is closely linked to the terms e-governance or e-government. E-governance is the concept of administration based on “the use of information and communication technology in all activities of public and political administration, thus transforming (redefining) public administration into a service for the needs of citizens.”3 There are four primary interactions in the delivery model of e-governance: G2C (government-to-citizens) involving the interaction between the government and individual citizens, G2B (government-to-business) involving the interaction between the government and business entities, G2G (government-to-government) involving the interaction among government offices as well as governments of other countries, G2E (government-to-employees,) involving the interaction between the government and its employees, and between the government and users from other countries.4 The World Bank defines e-governance as the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) that have the ability to transform government by making it more accessible, effective, and responsible. According to the World Bank, these technologies can serve different ends: better delivery of government services to citizens; improved interactions with business and industry; citizen empowerment through access to information, more efficient and transparent government managment, thus reducing the possibilities for corruption and providing development opportunities, especially benefiting 2 Jannick Schou and Morten Hjelholt, Digitalization and Public Sector Transformations (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 9. 3 Stevan Lilić and Maja Stojanović, „E-Governement and Administrative Reform in Serbia“, Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 2, No 2, (2008): 127-136. As cited in Stevan Lilić i Dragan Prlja, Pravna informatika veština, (Beograd: Pravni fakultet, 2011), 85. 4 Dražen Dragičević, Pravna informatika i pravo informacionih tehnologija, (Zagreb: Narodne novine, 2015), 328. 350 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova rural and traditionally underserved communities.5 E-governance is also recognized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which, similarly as the World Bank, defines e-governace as the impact of information and communication technology (ICT) on public administration, highlighting six components of e-governance: infrastructure, e-participation, access to information, e-administration, e-service delivery, e-governance policies, legislation and regulations,6 with an emphasis on e-administration, e-service delivery, and e-participation as the key components of e-government. Public administration can be viewed within an organizational (formal) and material (functional) forms. In terms of organization, public administration is the broadest possible concept of administration encompassing both state and non-state organizational forms. Specifically, in the organizational sense, public administration in our region includes: state administration bodies (ministries, republic departments, republican administrative organizations, and agencies), non-state administration bodies (entities with public authorities, such as public enterprises, public institutions and institutions of general benefits) and the professional (administrative) apparatus of local self-government units (municipalities and cities).7 In the functional or material sense, public administration comprises the activities undertaken by a government to manage its affairs. Administrative responsibilities and activities are prescribed by competent administrative authorities, thus it is best to rely on positive law regarding this determination. For the purpose of this paper, an organizational or formal understanding of public administration is considered. In organizational terms, public administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina is extremely fragmented and cumbersome. It occurs at a total of fourteen administrative levels (state level, two entity levels , ten cantonal levels, and at the level of the Brcko District of BiH). Specifically, “BiH is a country with a nominal population of just under 3.5 million, which has fourteen administrative levels of government with separate administrative structures comprising, among others, 136 ministries (and as 5 Bruno Lanvin, ed., The E-Government Handbook for Developing Countries, (Washington: Center for Democracy Technology, 2002), 1, http://regulationbodyofknowledge.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/WorldBank_The_E-government_Handbook.pdf. 6 Raúl Zambrano and Ruhiya Kristine Seward, From Connectivity to Service Delivery: Case studies in e-governance, (New York: UNDP, 2013), 9, https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Access%20to%20Information%20and%20E-governance/From%20Connectivity%20to%20Service%20 Delivery%20-%20Case%20Studies%20in%20E-Governance.pdf. 7 Cf., Petar Kunić, Upravno pravo, (Banja Luka: Pravni fakultet, 2010), 9., Čl. 12 Zakona o republičkoj upravi, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 115/18., Čl. 2 Zakona o upravi, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 32/02, 102/09 i 72/17. 351 Nevenko Vranješ many ministers), over 1000 public institutions, over 300 administrative organizations, 146 local self-government units and many other public administration entities, which are almost impossible to identify and fully enumerate, since the administrative bodies are formed both under general and special laws, including by-laws. Certainly, such a cumbersome and overly complex administrative organisational structure affects its efficiency and functionality in general. The issue of the economic viability of so many public entities in a small and undeveloped country with an almost devastated real sector should not be even raised”.8 Therefore, the development of e-governance and its integration, that is, its operability in such a legal and administrative environment poses a substantial challenge to both IT professionals and legal professionals. It should be borne in mind that the existing concept of the public administration in BiH is still resisting reform, because it has traditionally used some other forms of communication with citizens. This undoubtedly complicates the concept of establishing e-governance, that is, the digital transformation of public administration and entire society. On the other hand, we need to keep in mind new tendencies and models in public administration that can only affirm their goals by introducing innovations such as digitalisation and e-government. Thus, the New Public Management model, originally created in the 1980s in the Anglo-Saxon region and supported by the most famous international organizations and institutions (IMF, World Bank, UN, EU), emphasizes the need to introduce market practice and business administration in the public administration as an activity in order to achieve the three key principles of public administration (3Es): efficiency, economy and effectiveness, thus improving the functioning and quality of public administration. The good governance model was created in the 1990s and endorsed by the EU and the UN. This concept was created primarily as a reaction to the shortcomings and antagonisms pertinant to the New Public Management. The good governance model is based on citizen participation in administration, the professionalization of public administration, accessibility, the accountability and transparency of public administration, and strict adherence to the rule of law.9 Undoubtedly, both of the aforementioned and now dominant concepts are counting on the digitization of public administration and the establishment of the necessary e-services. 8 Nevenko Vranješ, „Organizacioni problemi javne uprave u Bosni i Hercegovini“, Administracija i javne politike, br. 2 (2015), 58. 9 Cf., Anamarija Musa, „E-uprava i problem digitalne podjele: aktivnosti usmjerene na poboljšanje pristupa internetu u Europskoj uniji i Republici Hrvatskoj“, Pravni fakultet Zagreb, pristupljeno 16.03. 2020, https://www. pravo.unizg.hr/_download/repository/Anamarija_Musa_E-uprava_i_problem_digitalne_podjele_2006.pdf. 352 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 2. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE DIGITALIZATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION In late 2015, the United Nations – UN adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.10 The program contains sustainable development goals (SDGs).11 The UN define sustainable development as a development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The program defines 17 global sustainable development goals. The objectives focus on poverty eradication, combating inequality and injustice, and addressing climate change. The goals of the Program are based on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in 2000.12 The document contains 169 associated targets. In 2017, the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicator (IAEGSDG), composed of Member States and including regional and international agencies as observers, developed a global framework for implementing and monitoring the document. The list includes 232 generally accepted and unique indicators.13 These indicators are to be used to monitor the implementation and performance of the document. For research purposes, it is important to note that, under Objective 9, entitled Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure, ICTs represent a key factor in achieving sustainable development and community empowerment in many countries. In this regard, it is stated that support should be given to the development of indigenous technology, research and innovation in developing countries and increased access to ICT by 2020, including universal and low-cost Internet access in the least developed countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina has accepted the implementation of the Program and established its institutional dimension. Specifically, within the BiH Economic Planning Directorate (DEP), the project “Supporting the Preparation for the Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Private Sector Engagement” was developed. Additionally, a single document entitled the ‘’Sustainable Development Goals Framework in Bosnia and Herzegovina’’ is being drafted for all levels of government in BiH, which sets out the principles and objectives under which the ideas of this decade-long UN 10 „Sustainable development „ United nations, accessed February 1, 2020, https://sustainabledevelopment. un.org/post2015/transformingourworld. 11 „What are the Sustainable Development Goals“, United Nations Development Programme“, accessed February 1, 2020, https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda/. 12 „Millennium Development Goals“, United Nations, accessed February 1, 2020, https://www.un.org/ millenniumgoals/. 13 „Bilten 3: Ciljevi održivog razvoja“, Direkcija za ekonomsko planiranje, pristupljeno 01.02. 2020, str. 3, http:// www.dep.gov.ba/Bilten/Archive.aspx?langTag=bs-BA&template_id=140&pageIndex=1. 353 Nevenko Vranješ key document will be implemented.14 “According to the 2018 SDG Index and Dashboards Report, Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and the Bertelsmann Stiftung Foundation, Bosnia and Herzegovina ranked 71st among 156 countries analyzed, with a total of 67.3 points”.15 In this respect, it should be noted that BiH was ranked lower than all the countries of the former SFRY, including Albania. Regarding the European Union and its member states, there are numerous documents pertaining to the digitalization of not only public administration, but also of society and community as a whole. Literally, various studies, analyses, recommendations and numerous hard and soft law acts are adopted by the European Union on a daily basis. At this point, only some of the acts recently adopted by the European Union, which relate to the digitalization process, primarily in the Member States, and pose a challenge to the candidate countries and the potential candidate countries are mentioned. First, the key directives as binding European Union acts are discussed, followed by a regulation relating to the area being examined. Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market establishes general provisions facilitating the exercise of the freedom of establishment for service providers and the free movement of services, while maintaining a high quality of service.16 The central norm of this document is contained in Article 8 which prescribes the obligation to develop electronic procedures for setting up a business. The aims of Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement17 and Directive 2014/55/EU on electronic invoicing in public procurement18 of the European Parliament and of the Council are the full digitization of the public procurement process. Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS Regulation) was adopted 14 „Bilten 4: Ciljevi održivog razvoja“, Direkcija za ekonomsko planiranje, pristupljeno 01.02. 2020, str. 3, http:// www.dep.gov.ba/Bilten/Archive.aspx?langTag=bs-BA&template_id=140&pageIndex=1. 15 Ibid.,str. 4. Takođe, šire vidjeteti na: https://zamisli2030.ba/, pristupljeno 02.02. 2020. godine. 16 „Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market“, Eur-lex, accessed January 24, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=celex%3A32006L0123. 17 „Direktiva 2014/24/EU Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od od 26. veljače 2014. o javnoj nabavi i o stavljanju izvan snage Direktive 2004/18/EZ“, Eur-lex, pristupljeno 24.01. 2020, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024&from=EN. 18 „Directive 2014/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on electronic invoicing in public procurement Text with EEA relevance“, Eur-lex, accessed January 24,2020, https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0055. 354 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova on 23 July 2014 and represents the regulatory framework for ensuring secure electronic interactions between businesses, citizens, and public authorities. This Regulation sets out key preconditions for the electronic identification, authentication, signing, certification and guaranty of electronic documents. One of the objectives of this Regulation is to remove existing barriers to the cross-border use of electronic identification means used in the Member States to authenticate, for at least public services. Further, this Regulation represents a legal framework for electronic signatures, electronic seals, electronic time stamps, electronic documents, electronic registered delivery services and website authentication certificates.19 In early October 2017, the famous Tallinn Declaration on e-governance was adopted by all line ministers from the EU Member States in Tallinn. The Declaration builds on the 2009 Malmö Declaration, the 2016-2020 EU eGovernance Action Plan and the European Interoperability Framework. The Tallinn Declaration provides an important impetus for Member States and the European Commission, both collectively and individually, to continue to invest in accelerating the modernization of the public sector. To achieve this, the EU institutions ought to undertake certain actions between 2018 to 2022to achieve the following objectives: (a) Digital-by-default, inclusiveness and accessibility, which means to provide citizens and businesses with the option to interact digitally with public administration and promote the benefits of using digital services; (b) Only once, which means to identify redundant administrative burden and introduce only once options for citizens businesses in digital public services; (c) Trustworthiness and security, which means to establish the eIDAS framework for the use of electronic trust services; (d) Openness and transparency, which means to make it possible for citizens and businesses to manage their personal data protecting held by the public administration; (e) Interoperability by default, which means to enhance the re-use electronic identity (eID), e-signature, e-delivery, e-procurement or e-invoicing; (f) Horizontal enabling policy steps encompasses the steps to be taken to increase the digital leadership skills among top civil and public servants and more widely within the public administration at all levels as a 19 „Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC“, Eur-lex, accessed January 24,2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uris erv%3AOJ.L_.2014.257.01.0073.01.ENG. 355 Nevenko Vranješ necessary precondition to any successful digital transformation of public administrations.20 The European Union has also launched a document entitled the Digital Agenda for Europe. This document was adopted by the European Commission in May 2010, which was set out to define the key roles that the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) with have to play if the European Union wants to succeed in its ambitions for 2020. The action areas of the Agenda include the following: (1) a vibrant digital single market; (2) interoperability and standards; (3) trust and security; (4) fast and ultra-fast internet access; (5) research and innovation; (6) enhancing digital literacy, skills and inclusion; and (7) ICT-enabled benefits for EU society.21 The overall objective of the Digital Agenda for Europe is to deliver sustainable economic and social benefits in a single digital market based on fast and ultrafast internet and interoperable applications. One of the objectives set out by the Agenda is to ensure coverage of all Europeans with basic broadband by 2013. In 2015, the European Commission adopted the Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,22 which was built on three pillars: better access for consumers and businesses to on-line goods and services; creating the right conditions for digital networks and services to flourish; and maximizing the growth potential of European digital economy. In November 2013, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) adopted the Southeast Europe 2020 Strategy. The 2020 Strategy aims to develop and improve living conditions in the Western Balkans by focusing on competitiveness and development. This strategy is partly dedicated to the digital society, which aims to increase network readiness. Specifically, this means further enhancing cooperation on economic and social development in South East Europe and harnessing the full potential of ICTs to foster innovation, economic growth, regional competitiveness and improve the overall quality of life.23 The set objectives are achieved through activities such as the development of regional broadband backbone network that will provide high-speed Internet access, develop cross-border e-services with priority being given to 20 „Tallinn Declaration on eGovernment“, Središnji državni ured za razvoj digitalnog društva, pristupljeno 24.01. 2020, https://rdd.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/SDURDD-dokumenti/eGovernment%20Ministerial%20 Declaration%20signed%20in%20Tallinn%20on%206th%20of%20October%202017.pdf, str 3. 21 „A Digital Agenda for Europe“ Eur-lex, accessed January 25, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0245:FIN:EN:PDF. 22 „A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe“, Eur-lex, accessed February 5, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0192. 23 „SEE 2020“, RCC, accessed January 25, 2020, p. 22, https://www.rcc.int/files/user/docs/reports/SEE2020Strategy.pdf. 356 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova health, education, commerce and tourism and the provision of IT training courses, bearing in mind that the possession of relevant digital skills improve career opportunities. Additionally, in mid-2018, the RCC drafted the Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans.24 This document is being implemented by the European Commission in partnership with six Western Balkan countries (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo*). The aim of the Digital Agenda is to support the transition of the region to the digital economy and the benefits of digital transformation, such as faster economic growth, increased employment opportunities and better services. The Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans is focused on investing in broadband. The objectives of this Agenda are the following: increase in cybersecurity and trust, the digitalization of the Western Balkan and EU industries; strengthening digital economy and society and fostering research and innovation. The first workshop on implementing the Digital Agenda for the Western was held in early July 2019 in Vienna. There are no concrete data pertaining to the implementation and implications of this document in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The New European Interoperability Framework25 is a document adopted by the European Commission in 2017. Under this Framework, interoperability is the ability of organizations to interact toward mutually beneficial goals, involving the sharing of information and knowledge between these organizations through the business processes they support, by means of the exchange of data between their ICT systems.26 Following this definition, the European Interoperability Framework is defined as a commonly agreed approach to the delivery of European public services in an interoperable manner. The European Interoperability Framework defines basic interoperability guidelines in the form of common principles, models and recommendations. The Framework defines twelve interoperability principles and seventeen recommendations on how to implement these principles. In order to facilitate exchange of electronic documents and electronic services among institutions at the same government level, and among government bodies of different administrative levels, in 2018 the Council of Ministers of 24 „A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans“, European Commission, accessed January 25, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf 25 „New European Interoperability Framework“ European Commission, accessed February 5, 2020, https:// ec.europa.eu/isa2/sites/isa/files/eif_brochure_final.pdf. 26 „Europski okvir za interoperabilnost – strategija provedbe“, Eur-lex, pristupljeno 26.01. 2020, str. 15, https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017DC0134. 357 Nevenko Vranješ BiH adopted the Decision on the adoption of the Interoperability Framework in BiH.27 Certainly, this Decision is aligned with the implementation of the European Interoperability Framework. Institutions in BiH are expected to create the preconditions for the provision of electronic service within their respective authorities and to establish a register between 2019 and 2021 as a foundation for the provision of services. Additionally, the competent entity governments are expected, in accordance with their own interoperability frameworks, to create preconditions for the provision of the following electronic services within the following timeframe: Phase 1 – entity governments are expected to establish a register of legal entities in 2019 to further improve the established registry of citizens; Phase 2 – they must establish birth registers between 2019 and 2020; Phase 3 – they must establish systems for data on space, buildings, and e-maps (Geographic Information System) by 2021.28 An integral part of this decision is an appendix entitled Project Elaboration: “Designing and establishing an interoperability framework and standards for data sharing”. Under this project, the interoperability framework is focused on the provision of electronic services to citizens and businesses. A total of 25 services are defined in the area of business, licenses and certificates, education, taxes for citizens, social security, statistics, a labor and consumer market. There are still no official data and reports on the implementation of this decision, although its monitoring is envisaged. The Regional Cooperation Council has initiated the adoption of several other important documents dealing with digitization, one of them being the Multi-annual Action Plan for a Regional Economic Area in the Western Balkans Six.29 This Action Plan contains, among other things, a section entitled Digital Integration. Four policies regarding digital integration have been set forth: digital environment networks and services, connectivity and access; trust and security in digital services; digital economy and society; and digital economy and society, data economy, standards and interoperability and innovation. These policies identified six objectives with a total of 22 actions that would meet the projected objectives in this area, concentrating on the development of digital infrastructure needed for integration and connectivity, trust in services and data protection, enhancing cyber security, accelerating the digitalization process and so on. Although, Bosnia and Herzegovina has not 27 Čl. 1 Odluke o usvajanju Okvira interoperabilnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 53/18. 28 Ibid., Čl. 5. 29 „Consolidated Multi-annual Action Plan for a Regional Economic Area in the Western Balkans Six“ RCC, accessed January 25, 2020, https://www.rcc.int/docs/383/multi-annual-action-plan-for-a-regional-economicarea-in-the-western-balkans-six. 358 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova done much regarding this document, it did adopt the BiH Information Society Development Policy for the period 2017-2021.30 Additionally, the Broadband Development Strategy for BiH for the period 2019-2023 has been drafted.31 The Law on Electronic Communications is also being drafted, while the Law on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in BiH is in the proposal stage. The drafting of the Law on Cyber Security, the Strategy for the Information Society Development in BiH, E-governance Development Strategy in BiH , and the Law on Critical ICT Infrastructures have also been envisaged.32 Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina has done very little regarding this Action Plan, although more than two and a half years have passed since it was adopted and slightly less since it was fully implemented. 3. SIGMA PRINCIPLES IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY AREA AND THE MONITORING REPORT FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA In 2019, the OECD/SIGMA adopted the latest Methodological Framework for the Principles of Public Administration. In the public service delivery area, the framework outlines the following principles: (1) a policy for a civil society-oriented government has been established and implemented; (2) good governance is a key policy objective that encourages the provision of public services, is adopted in legislation and is consistently implemented in practice; (3) mechanisms are in place to ensure the quality of public services; and (4) the availability of public services is ensured. For these four principles, the OECD/SIGMA developed four composite indicators with a total of 32 sub-indicators of quantitative and qualitative nature.33 The principles and indicators adopted regarding this component have remained the same as those established in 2014. As there has been no measurement according to the latest methodology for Bosnia and Herzegovina, we shall refer to the OECD/SIGMA 2017 Report on the implementation of the 2014 Principles of Public Administration (which are identical to those established in 2019). 30 Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 42/17. 31 „Nacrt strategije razvoja širokopojasnog pristupa u BiH za period 2019 – 2023. godine“, Ministarstvo komunikacija i transporta BiH, pristupljeno 02.03. 2020, https://ekonsultacije.gov.ba/legislativeactivities/ details/8970. 32 „Digitalne integracije Zapadnog Balkana“, Ministarstvo komunikacije i transporta, pristupljeno 02.03. 2020, http://www.mkt.gov.ba/saopstenja/default.aspx?id=7761&langTag=bs-BA. 33 Methodological Framework for the Principles of Public Administration, (Paris: SIGMA-OECD), 2019, 151-179. 359 Nevenko Vranješ According to the 2017 SIGMA Report, few developments have taken place in the area of service delivery in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These developments mainly refer to the implementation of the Common Assessment Framework for quality management (CAF) at the State level, the amendments planned to the Law on General Administrative Procedure, and so on. However, “an almost total standstill has been observed on important topics such as the measurement of user satisfaction, monitoring of service-delivery performance, development of interoperability and electronic-data exchanges between institutions, and creation of a national digital-signature framework. The lack of progress in these critical areas relates to all levels, as does the lack of coordination across the levels”.34 According to the 2015-2017 SIGMA Measurements, the following data were obtained (some are mentioned): The average number of days needed to set up a business in BiH in 2015 was 37 days, while in 2017 it took 65 days. The average cost of setting up a business amounted to 14.6% in 2015, while in 2017 it was slightly lower – 13.5%. The share of citizens who submitted paperless/electronic digital income tax statements last year amounted to 0% in 2015 and 2017. The share of companies that submitted their tax returns using the Internet in 2015 and 2017 was also zero. The share of institutions conducting customer satisfaction surveys regularly (meaning at least every two years) was zero in 2015 and 2017. In other words, public administration bodies in BiH do not measure customer satisfaction at all. Also, the value for the indicators regarding service delivery, according to the 2017 SIGMA measurements, is very low. Thus, the value for the indicator ‘’Citizen-oriented service delivery’’ is 1 on a scale from 0 to 5.35 The value for the indicator ‘’Existence of enablers for public service delivery’’ and almost all its sub-indicators is zero. Finally, particularly devastating is the fact that the value for the indicator ‘’Accessibility of public services’’ and most of its sub-indicators is 0, which is the most relevant to the delivery of services to citizens Three short-term recommendations and one medium-term recommendations are presented at the end of the analysis: the reformation of the Law on General Administrative Procedure, the strengthening of the digitalization process, the implementation of the digital signature and the building of capacity in the area of public service delivery, and so on. 34 Monitoring Report: The Principles of Public Administration, (Paris: SIGMA-OECD), 2017, 120. 35 Ibid., 120-136. 360 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 4. THE DIGITIZATION STATUS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN BIH ACCORDING TO THE UN AND EC REPORTS First, the findings of the e-government survey entitled “Gearing E-Government to Support Transformation towards Sustainable and Resilient Societies” conducted by the UN Division for Public Administration and Management Development in 2018 are interpreted. The Survey examines how governments can use e-government and information technology to build sustainable and resilient societies. Specifically, the Survey measures e-government effectiveness in the delivery of public services and identifies patterns in e-government development and performance, as well as countries and areas where the potential of ICT’s and e-government has not been fully exploited and where capacity development support might be helpful. The countries were grouped according to the E-Government Development Index – EDGI (a composite indicator which is used to measure the readiness and capacity of national institutions to use ICTs to delivery services), according to which BiH is in the high-EDGI group (0.5 -0.75), above Croatia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, but below Slovenia.36 A similar situation is found in the countries grouped via the Online Services Index level - OSI, where BiH is in the middle-OSI group.37 Also, the E-Participation Index (EPI) as a supplementary index to the UN Public Administration Survey, which focuses on government use of online services to provide information to citizens, indicates that BiH is in the middle-EPI level, but far behind Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro.38 The Human Capital Index (HCI) value regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consists of four components, that is, adult literacy rate, the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrollment ratio, expected years of schooling and mean years of schooling, amounts to 0.721798. According to this index, Bosnia and Herzegovina is well below Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Finally, the Telecommunication Infrastructure Index (TII), which is an arithmetic average composite of five indicators: (1) estimated Internet users per 100 inhabitants; (2) number of main fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants; (3) number of mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants; (4) number of wireless broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants; and (5) number of fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. The TII value 36 E-Government Survey 2018, Gearing e-government to support transformation towards sustainable and resilient societies, (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN), 86. 37 Ibid., 96. 38 Ibid., 114. 361 Nevenko Vranješ regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina is 0.43850, which is quite low compared to the developed countries and the countries in the region. Finally, according to the indices analyzed, particularly EDGI, OSI, EPI and HCI, Bosnia and Herzegovina occupies the 105th position among 193 countries surveyed in the ranking. For comparison purposes, BiH is below Albania, which occupies the 74th place, Croatia, which occupies the 55th place, Slovenia, which occupies the 33rd place, Montenegro the 58th, Macedonia the 79th, and so on.39 Venezuela, Indonesia, Paraguay, Tonga, Morocco and other countries rank behind BiH. Denmark, Australia, Korea, United Kingdom and Sweden are among the five highest ranked countries. According to the European Commission’s 2018 Report on BiH, the legal framework of the user-oriented administration has been improved, but the harmonization and amendment of laws on administrative procedures should be ensured. Specific administrative procedures still need to be revised and abolished or harmonized with the law on general administrative procedure at different government levels.40 Regard the year of 2019, it should first be noted that the European Commission sent two documents to Bosnia and Herzegovina during 2019: (1) Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, that is, the Commission’s Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union and (2) the Analytical Report accompanying this Communication. In its Opinion, the European Commission refers to the Public Administration Reform in BiH and mentions, among other things, certain segments related to its digitization. In this regard, it is noted that: “e-signature systems are not yet interoperable across BiH, which is necessary for efficient service delivery”. It is emphasized that BiH is at an early stage of preparations in the area of “service delivery”, and in the forthcoming period special attention should be paid to free service delivery, the information society and media, including statistics.41 As the 2019 BiH Analytical Report pays considerable attention to the state of digitization of public administration in BiH, the remainder of the paper discusses its evaluations, analyses, and recommendations in this area. Specifically, there is a special Chapter 10 of the Analytical Report entitled: “Informa39 Ibid., 222. 40 Izvještaj o Bosni i Herzegovini za 2018. godinu, (Brisel: Evropska komisija, 2018), 7-8. 41 Saopštenje Evropske komisije Evropskom parlamentu i Evropskom savjetu, Mišljenje Evropske Komisije o zahtjevu Bosne i Hercegovine za članstvo, (Brisel: Evropska komisija, 2019), 8 i 11. 362 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova tion Society and Media”, as well as a paragraph within the analysis of public administration reform entitled: “Service delivery to Citizens and Business”. In analyzing the area of service delivery to citizens and businesses, the Analytical Report states that the legal framework for a user-oriented administration is partially in place, but varies substantially across levels of government. It is emphasized that laws on general administrative procedure are in place at all level of government levels and currently new amendments are being developed, underlining that such and further amendments to these laws should be well coordinated. Further, the legislative framework and infrastructure for the interoperability of registers and e-signatures is not complete or harmonized between State and entity levels, thus compromising the e-signature system, while interoperability and the automatic exchange of information between public registers is very limited. For these reasons, the Report emphasizes that Bosnia and Herzegovina has to create conditions for the provision of electronic services within its jurisdiction by undertaking efforts to ensure the interoperability of e-signatures throughout the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina should also simplify and harmonize business registration procedures and ensure full mutual recognition between entities, including concessions and licensing. The need to establish a one-stop-shop for both citizens and businesses, which currently exists only in the Republika Srpska entity, is emphasized. Finally, the Report states that no systematic monitoring of users satisfaction with service delivery is carried out at any level in BiH.42 As the greatest weaknesses pertaining to Information Society and Media, the Report pointed out the following: Legislation enabling the liberalization of telecommunications and electronic media sector is not in place; although the 2017-2020 policy for the development of the information society in BiH is in place and aligned with the strategic pillars of the information and communication technologies from the digital agenda for Europe, efforts should be made to further align this policy with the EU digital single market strategy as well as the Western Balkans Digital Agenda; BiH does not have a countrywide strategy or action plan for the development of the information society; the collection of statistical data on digital performance and digital competitiveness needs to be improved; the state-level Law on Electronic Legal and Business Traffic, although aligned with the EU Electronic Commerce Directive, is not subject to inspection; there is no legislation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in compliance with the acquis; 42 Analitički izvještaj, mišljenje Komisije o zahtjevu Bosne i Hercegovine za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji, (Brisel: Evropska komisija, 2019), 26. 363 Nevenko Vranješ there is no single national strategy for the security of network and information systems, nor a single national contact point responsible for coordination and cross-border cooperation in this field; there is no single body for responding to computer security incidents and for co-operation and exchange of information in this field; there is no compatible electronic signature system for the country as a whole; neither the unique public registers of electronic services exist nor are they compatible with each other. Finally, in the concluding part of this chapter, it is noted that BiH is at an early stage of preparation in the area of information society and media, and that the legal and strategic frameworks in this area are incomplete. It also emphasizes that the regulations adopted in this area are not aligned with the acquis, which implies that BiH is not meeting its obligations under the SAA which has set the objectives for BiH to adopt a new law on electronic communications and electronic media aligned with communitarian law, finalize the digital broadcasting switchover, and adopt a framework strategy for access to broadband network.43 We consider the excerpts from the findings and opinion extremely presented challenging given the capacities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its levels of government in political, legal and economic terms. The adoption (still in progress at the levels of government) of the BiH Public Administration Reform Strategic Framework 2018-2022 may be regarded as a response to these challenges. Service delivery as an integral part of the Public Administration Reform Strategic Framework in BiH Regarding service delivery, the BiH Public Administration Reform Strategic Framework has expressed considerable expectations. For illustrative purposes, the financial needs for the implementation of activities under this reform amount to KM 40.37 million, which is 73% of the total costs foreseen under the Strategic Framework.44 Although this component contains one specific objective and three measures, the draft action plan envisages an impressive number of activities aimed mainly at meeting the needs of citizens, the business community and the administration itself. The part of the reform intends to take into account user’s satisfaction in a systematic and multidisciplinary manner in the area of public service delivery in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as 43 Ibid., 103-106. 44 „Strateški okvir za reformu javne uprave“, PARCO, pristupljeno: 15.01. 2020, http://rju.parco.gov.ba/cr/orju/strateski-okviri-za-rju/. 364 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova in the commercial sector. In this regard, further implementation of the CAF quality management model, that is, ISO 9001, is planned both at the State and entity levels. Additionally, the analysis of this component contains indicates that although there are several one-stop shops (single entry points) at certain administrative levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is still no organized electronic catalog of available services. The specific objective defined in this segment of the reform reads as follows: “Public administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina is oriented toward clients professionally monitoring and understanding clients’ needs and expectations and on the basis of them improving their business processes and administrative behavior, reducing administrative burden, facilitating the availability of services to various channels of communication while ensuring high quality and reducing the cost of service. “The specific goal is accompanied by two impact indicators of the Balkan Barometer, which measure the transparency of public services and general user’s satisfaction with public services. The three measures identified include: defining the quality of service instruments provided by public administration and targeting service users; improving the accessibility of services by different means of communication and improving the administrative framework. Measurement is foreseen through seven outcome indicators, which are developed by governments themselves at all levels (i.e., they are not owned by SIGMA, RCC, European Commission or other entities). The domestic experts have taken a significant step forward with the intention to undertake the reform with a great deal of autonomy and enthusiasm. Legal framework as a precondition for the digitalization of public administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina The legal framework of digitalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina is analyzed through legislation adopted at four administrative levels (joint institutions, entities and the Brcko District of BiH). At the BiH level, the following laws have been adopted and implemented: the Law on Electronic Signature; the Law on Electronic Legal and Business Transactions, and the Law on Electronic Documents. Bylaws resulting from the Law on Electronic Signature include the Rulebook on Measures for the Use and Protection of a Digital Signature, Means for Forming E-Signature 365 Nevenko Vranješ and Certification System, the Rulebook of Verifiers, and the Rulebook on Issuing Qualified Certificates.45 At the level of Republika Srpska entity, the Strategy of Electronic Government Development for the period 2019-2022 has been recently adopted. Additionally, the legal framework for digitalization consists of the Law on Information Security, the Law on Electronic Transactions, Law on Electronic Documents, Law on Electronic Signature, and the following rulebooks: the Rulebook on Information Security Standards; the Rulebook on Electronic Signature and Qualified Electronic Signature Protection Measures; Regulation on Information Security Measures; Rules on the records of certification bodies; Registration policy certification; Technical rules for ensuring the connection of records of certificates issued and revoked by certification bodies in RS; and the Rulebook on the issuance of time stamp.46 In the Federation of BiH, the legal framework for digitization is composed of the Law on Electronic Documents;47 Regulation on the digitization of the collection of business entity documents;48 the Decision on establishing e-government online portal of the Federation of BiH;49 the Decision on the adoption of the interoperability framework,50 and so on. In order to establish e-registers, the government of the Federation of BiH has issued seven rulebooks and one guideline. However, at the strategic level, the Federation of BiH primarily relies on the State-level legislation or leaves this area to cantonal regulations. The analysis of the legal acts relating to the digitization of public administration enacted by the Brcko District of BiH indicates that the Brcko District Assembly repealed the Law on Electronic Procedure and the Law on Electronic Documents because it was impossible to implement it, consequently the laws enacted at the level of BiH shall be applied. In 2019, the Brcko District Assembly issued a Declaration on Computerization, emphasizing the District’s commitment to digitize its entire public administration, that is, to implement the concept of “e-governance”.51 45 „Zakoni“, Ministarstvo komunikacija i transporta BiH, pristupljeno 05.02. 2020, http://www.mkt.gov.ba/ dokumenti/informatizacija/zakoni/default.aspx?id=3377&langTag=bs-BA&template_id=100&pageIndex=1. 46 „Resor za informaciono društvo“, Ministarstvo za naučnotehnološki razvoj, visoko obrazovanje i informaciono društvo, pristupljeno 15.02. 2020, https://www.vladars.net/sr-SP-Cyrl/Vlada/Ministarstva/mnk/OM/Resori/ id/Pages/default.aspx. 47 Službene novine Federacije BiH, br. 55/13. 48 Službene novine Federacije BiH, br. 84/18. 49 Službene novine Federacije BiH, br. 29/18. 50 Službene novine Federacije BiH, br. 56/16 i 82/16. 51 „Deklaracija o informatizaciji“, Skupština Brčko distrikta BiH, pristupljeno 15.03.2020, https://skupstinabd. ba/2-registar/ba/Odluke/2019/541.%2041.%20Deklaracija%20o%20informatizaciji%20BD%20BOS.pdf. 366 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova In addition to the aforementioned laws and by-laws, there are other laws and regulations containing norms that enable the digitization of administrative procedures (tax, customs, cadaster, education, and so on). Nevertheless, the existing regulation, compared to that of the EU countries, is not sufficient to complete the full process of digitization of public administration in BiH, especially to establish standards and create the operability framework. 5. PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION WITHIN THE DIGITIZATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA As digitization increases, so does access to large amounts of data. This data includes citizens’ personal data collected and processed by public administration entities and private entities collect, including business entity data. Particular attention is drawn to personal data, that is, the data pertaining to citizen privacy. Despite the fact that they carelessly share their personal information on social media, citizens are very careful when the public administration wants to use their personal information. Despite strong European legislation and standards pertaining to personal data protection, (such as Directive 95/46 EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of personal data relating to the processing of personal data and the free movement of data, the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of controls on common borders, Directive 2002/58 / EC on privacy and electronic communications, Directive 2006/24/EC on the storage of data generated and processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or services of public communications networks, Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, and so on), BiH mainly relies on the Law on Personal Data Protection and the Personal Data Protection Agency, which is an independent administrative organization established to ensure the protection of personal data, in BiH. The BiH Law on Personal Data Protection was adopted in 2006.52 The law relies on the aforementioned Directive 95/46 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of citizens with regard to the processing of 52 Zakon o zaštiti ličnih podataka, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 49/2006, 76/2011 i 89/2011 – ispr. 367 Nevenko Vranješ personal data and the free movement of data, which, as already stated, was repealed in 2016, and the Law remained unchanged, that is, was not aligned with latest Regulation 2016/679. This poses a serious obstacle to the reform of personal data protection in BiH. Based on the 2018 Report on Personal Data Protection in BiH, 42 inspections were carried out in the reporting period, of which 14 were regular, while 28 were extraordinary.53 In 2018, the Personal Data Protection Agency received 148 complaints regarding the protection of personal data, and 69 ex officio proceedings were initiated. A total of 15 misdemeanor warrants were issued against entities that violated the provisions of the Law on Personal Data Protection. 79 complaints were filed against public sector entities, of which 19 complaints were accepted. A total of 69 complaints were filed against private sector entities, of which 15 were accepted in their entirety. The Report concluded that there is a need to align domestic legislation with European legislation and tendency to violate the relevant legal provisions that public and private bodies are required to apply in their work, resulting in a violation of the right to privacy with regard to the processing of personal data. In doing so, public administration entities, compared to private entities, are the leading ones.54 6. CONCLUSION The digitization of public administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a complex process which is at an early stage of implementation. Numerous external evaluation reports support this claim, ranging from the European Commission, SIGMA-OECD, to the UN report and self-performance reviews. The achievement of the internal and external interoperability framework poses a substantial challenge in this process. A large number of administrative levels with different legal frameworks and uneven levels of the ICT implementation represent obstacles to the internal interoperability. The challenge of achieving external interoperability, in addition to being internal, is the fact that BiH does not align or very slowly and insufficiently align its legal framework with the European one. The reasons for the slow process of digitalization are the lack of political will and internal consensus, the lack of financial resources and the low interest in donor funds. Additionally, at this stage of digitization, 53 „Izvještaj o zaštiti ličnih podataka u BiH za 2018. godinu“, Agencija za zaštitu ličnih podataka, pristupljeno 15.03. 2020, str. 14, http://www.azlp.ba/publikacije/Archive.aspx?langTag=bs-BA&template_id=149&pageIndex=1. 54 Ibid., 56-57. 368 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova there is no appropriate protection of its ethical dimension. Public administration bodies in BiH, through digital processing of data, violate the privacy rights of citizens, as indicated by reports of the supervisory authority. The domestic legal framework in this area is also weak and incompatible with the European one. The adoption and implementation of the Public Administration Reform in BiH Strategic Framework 2018-2022, which envisages a large number of digital services, and the achievement of internal interoperability framework, would lead to the improvement and progress of the digitalization of public administration in BiH. REFERENCES: 1. Agencija za zaštitu ličnih podataka. „Izvještaj o zaštiti ličnih podataka u BiH za 2018. godinu.“ Pristupljeno 15.03. 2020. http://www.azlp.ba/publikacije/ Archive.aspx?langTag=bs-BA&template_id=149&pageIndex=1. 2. Direkcija za ekonomsko planiranje. „Bilten 3: Ciljevi održivog razvoja.“ Pristupljeno 01.02.2020. http://www.dep.gov.ba/Bilten/Archive. aspx?langTag=bs-BA&template_id=140&pageIndex=1. 3. Direkcija za ekonomsko planiranje. „Bilten 4: Ciljevi održivog razvoja.“ Pristupljeno 01.02.2020. http://www.dep.gov.ba/Bilten/Archive. aspx?langTag=bs-BA&template_id=140&pageIndex=1. 4. Dragičević, Dražen. Pravna informatika i pravo informacionih tehnologija. Zagreb: Narodne novine, 2015. 5. Eur-lex. „A Digital Agenda for Europe.“ Accessed January 25, 2020. https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0245:FIN:E N:PDF. 6. 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Eur-lex. „Europski okvir za interoperabilnost – strategija provedbe.“ Pristupljeno 26.01.2020. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/ TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017DC0134. 11. Eur-lex. „Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.“ Accessed January 24, 2020. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2014.257.01.0073.01.ENG. 12. European Commission. „A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans.“ Accessed January 25, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communicationcredible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf 13. European Commission. „New European Interoperability Framework.“ Accessed February 5, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/isa2/sites/isa/files/eif_ brochure_final.pdf. 14. Evropska komisija. Analitički izvještaj, mišljenje Komisije o zahtjevu Bosne i Hercegovine za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji. Brisel: Evropska komisija, 2019: 26. 15. Evropska komisija. Saopštenje Evropske komisije Evropskom parlamentu i Evropskom savjetu, Mišljenje Evropske Komisije o zahtjevu Bosne i Hercegovine za članstvo. Brisel: Evropska komisija 2019: 8 i 11. 16. Kunić, Petar. Upravno pravo. Banja Luka: Pravni fakultet, 2010. 17. Lanvin, Bruno, ed. The E-Government Handbook for Developing Countries. Washington: Center for Democracy Technology, 2002, http:// regulationbodyofknowledge.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/WorldBank_ The_E-government_Handbook.pdf. 18. Lilić, Stevan and Stojanović Maja, „E-Governement and Administrative Reform in Serbia.“ Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 2, No 2, (2008): 127136. Navedeno prema: Lilić, Stevan i Dragan Prlja. Pravna informatika veština, Beograd: Pravni fakultet, 2011, 85. 19. Ministarstvo komunikacija i transporta BiH .„Zakoni.“ Pristupljeno 05.02. 2020. http://www.mkt.gov.ba/dokumenti/informatizacija/zakoni/default. aspx?id=3377&langTag=bs-BA&template_id=100&pageIndex=1. 20. Ministarstvo komunikacija i transporta BiH. „Digitalne integracije Zapadnog Balkana.“ Pristupljeno 02.03. 2020. http://www.mkt.gov.ba/saopstenja/default. aspx?id=7761&langTag=bs-BA. 370 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 21. Ministarstvo komunikacija i transporta BiH. „Nacrt strategije razvoja širokopojasnog pristupa u BiH za period 2019 – 2023. godine.“ Pristupljeno 02.03. 2020. https://ekonsultacije.gov.ba/legislativeactivities/details/8970. 22. Ministarstvo za naučnotehnološki razvoj, visoko obrazovanje i informaciono društvo. „Resor za informaciono društvo.“ Pristupljeno 15.02. 2020. https:// www.vladars.net/sr-SP-Cyrl/Vlada/Ministarstva/mnk/OM/Resori/id/Pages/ default.aspx. 23. Musa, Anamarija. „E-uprava i problem digitalne podjele: aktivnosti usmjerene na poboljšanje pristupa internetu u Europskoj uniji i Republici Hrvatskoj“. Pravni fakultet Zagreb. Pristupljeno 16.03.2020. https://www.pravo.unizg. hr/_download/repository/Anamarija_Musa_E-uprava_i_problem_digitalne_ podjele_2006.pdf. 24. Odluka o usvajanju Okvira interoperabilnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 53/18. 25. Održivi razvoj. Pristupljeno 02.02.2020. https://zamisli2030.ba/. 26. PARCO. „Strateški okvir za reformu javne uprave.“ Pristupljeno: 15.01.2020. http://rju.parco.gov.ba/cr/o-rju/strateski-okviri-za-rju/. 27. RCC. „Consolidated Multi-annual Action Plan for a Regional Economic Area in the Western Balkans Six.“ Accessed January 25, 2020. https://www. rcc.int/docs/383/multi-annual-action-plan-for-a-regional-economic-areain-the-western-balkans-six. 28. RCC. „SEE 2020.“ Accessed January 25, 2020. https://www.rcc.int/files/user/ docs/reports/SEE2020-Strategy.pdf. 29. Schou, Jannick and Hjelholt Morten. Digitalization and Public Sector Transformations. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. 30. SIGMA-OECD. Methodological Framework for the Principles of Public Administration. Paris: SIGMA-OECD, 2019: 151-179. 31. SIGMA-OECD. Monitoring Report: The Principles of Public Administration. Paris: SIGMA-OECD, 2017: 120. 32. SIGMA-OECD. Monitoring Report: The Principles of Public Administration. Paris: SIGMA-OECD, 2017: 120. 33. Skupština Brčko distrikta BiH. „Deklaracija o informatizaciji.“ Pristupljeno 15.03.2020. https://skupstinabd.ba/2-registar/ba/Odluke/2019/541.%20 41.%20Deklaracija%20o%20informatizaciji%20BD%20BOS.pdf. 34. Službene novine Federacije BiH. br. 29/18. 35. Službene novine Federacije BiH. br. 55/13. 36. Službene novine Federacije BiH. br. 56/16 i 82/16. 37. Službene novine Federacije BiH. br. 84/18. 38. Službeni glasnik BiH. br. 42/17. 371 Nevenko Vranješ 39. Središnji državni ured za razvoj digitalnog društva. „Tallinn Declaration on eGovernment.“ Pristupljeno 24.01.2020. https://rdd.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/ SDURDD-dokumenti/eGovernment%20Ministerial%20Declaration%20 signed%20in%20Tallinn%20on%206th%20of%20October%202017.pdf. 40. United Nations Development Programme. „What are the Sustainable Development Goals.“ Accessed February 1, 2020. https://www.undp.org/ content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda/. 41. UN. E-Government Survey 2018, Gearing e-government to support transformation towards sustainable and resilient societies. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018: 86. 42. United Nations. „Millennium Development Goals.“ Accessed February 1, 2020. https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. 43. United Nations. „Sustainable development.“ Accessed February 1, 2020. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld. 44. Vranješ, Nevenko. „Organizacioni problemi javne uprave u Bosni i Hercegovini“, Administracija i javne politike, br. 2 (2015): 58. 45. Zakon o republičkoj upravi. Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 115/18. 46. Zakon o zaštiti ličnih podataka. Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 49/2006, 76/2011 i 89/2011 – ispr. 47. Zakona o upravi. Službeni glasnik BiH, br. 32/02, 102/09 i 72/17. 48. Zambrano, Raúl and Seward Ruhiya Kristine. From Connectivity to Service Delivery: Case studies in e-governance. New York: UNDP, 2013, https:// www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/ Access%20to%20Information%20and%20E-governance/From%20 Connectivity%20to%20Service%20Delivery%20-%20Case%20Studies%20 in%20E-Governance.pdf. 372 Review article UDK ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR DATA PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF E-GOVERNMENT Bojan Vlaški Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Abstract: Information and communication technologies have become an important public administration resource over the last few decades. Administrative activities in modern states are inconceivable without them. The concept of e-government aims at simplifying administrative procedures, facilitating the exercise of citizens’ rights, as well as ensuring more efficient administration. However, the use of information and communication technologies in public administration not only creates conditions for the promotion of citizens’ rights, but also poses certain risks, especially with regard to citizens’ privacy and protection of their personal data. The protection of personal data is subject to both international legal acts and positive legal regulations. Having in mind positive legal regulations, the protection of personal data is primarily done through administrative legal mechanisms, in the form of control mechanisms conducted by specific regulatory bodies in administrative proceedings and judicial review in administrative dispute. According to the newest legal regulation of data protection in the European Union (General Data Protection Regulation) there is another form of protection of personal data, which is accomplished by the appointment of data protection officers in various administrative bodies. The subject of this research will be to analyze the effectiveness of these mechanisms in the context of e-government. The basic methodological direction of the research will be a comparative analysis of regulations and practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union and selected European countries. Keywords: Administrative law; Privacy; Data protection; Administrative procedure; Administrative dispute; Public interest; E-government. 373 Bojan Vlaški 1. INTRODUCTION While I was starting to write this article, I was thinking of one book – George Orwell’s “1984”. Many governments are conducting a large scale surveillance programs, such as the PRIZMA program, revealed to the public by well-known whistle-blower Edward Snowden.1 The right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data are under constant and serious threat in contemporary world. Information and communication technologies have an enormous impact on society to such extent that we describe it as an information society.2 Since the end of the twentieth century, each state that tends to use knowledge as a resource for its development has to implement information and communication technologies in many aspects of its activities. One of vital state activities is its administrative function, which is being done by various public administration bodies in order to protect public interest and citizens’ rights. The use of information and communication technologies in public administration is mostly known through the concept of electronic government (or e-Government), which is “hard to define, but easy to describe”3. E-government represents the application of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to government functions and procedures with the purpose of increasing efficiency, transparency and citizen participation.4 E-Government is referring to the use of information technology to provide government services online, which aims to provide faster and better services for stakeholders. It can be divided into four basic categories, Government to Citizen (G2C), Government-to-Business (G2B), Government-to-Government (G2G), and Government-to-Employee (G2E).5 E-Government may be applied by the legislature, judiciary, or administration, in order to improve internal efficiency, delivery of public services, or processes of democratic governance.6 In the context of public administration, e-government is defined similarly to previous 1 Andrej Diligenski and Dragan Prlja, The Facebook and Law, (Belgrade: Institute of Comparative Law, 2014), 102. 2 Predrag Dimitrijevic, “Internet Law”, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Istočnom Sarajevu, No. 5, (2009): 78. 3 Stefan Andonovic, “Data protection in e-government in the Republic of Serbia – legal aspects“ (PhD diss., University of Belgrade Faculty of Law, 2019), 43. 4 “About e-Government,“ Organization of American States, accessed February 19, 2020, http://portal.oas.org/ Portal/Sector/SAP/DepartamentoparalaGesti%C3%B3nP%C3%BAblicaEfectiva/NPA/SobreProgramadeeGobierno/tabid/811/Default.aspx?language=en-us. 5 “What is Electronic Government (e-Government),“ IGI Global, accessed February 19, 2020, https://www.igiglobal.com/dictionary/investigating-enterprise-application-integration-adoption/9385; “User Adoption of Government-to-Employee Portal of Hong Kong Government,“ IGI Global, accessed February 19, 2020, https://www. igi-global.com/chapter/user-adoption-of-government-to-employee-portal-of-hong-kong-government/149076. 6 “Mapping Factors Influencing EAI Adoption on the Adoption Lifecycle Phases in LGAs,“ IGI Global, accessed February 19, 2020, https://www.igi-global.com/chapter/mapping-factors-influencing-eai-adoption/35983. 374 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova definition. According to Lilic, e-government is the concept of usage of information and communication technology in all areas of public administration while transforming state administration and redefining it as a public service”7. Dimitrijevic defines e-government as “a social information administrative legal system which uses web applications based on the Internet and other information technologies related to procedures that allow application of these technologies, and which facilitate access to and delivery of information and administrative services to citizens, agencies and other governmental bodies.”8 As it can be seen, e-government is designed to facilitate not only relations between the public administration on the one side and citizens and business entities on the other, but also to improve efficiency of administrative work in general as well as to create efficient relations between different public administration bodies. Many information systems and computer programs have been created for that purpose in various public administration domains, such as internal affairs, defence, finance, education, healthcare etc. Therefore, e-government can be observed twofold from the administrative legal point of view. On the one hand, it is perceived evolutionary, as improved and modern system of public administration. On the other hand its nature is explained instrumentally, i.e. it is only a new instrument that is used by “the good old” public administration9. Although e-government provides many benefits for society, such as transparency and responsibility of public administration, simpler administrative procedures or better and faster exercise of citizens’ rights, it can also have negative consequences on certain human rights. In that sense, one of the most endangered rights is the right to privacy. Principles which are essential for data protection are incorporated in the right to privacy in the wider sense.10 Administrative bodies conduct various activities, such as monitoring the situation in their fields of activity and record keeping (for example census register, tax payers register, motor vehicles register), keeping official records (data classification and processing regulated by law, such as identity cards, passports, driving licences), issuing certificates on the requests from citizens etc.11 While doing these activities, public administration is at the dis7 Stevan Lilic, Upravno pravo Upravno procesno pravo, Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu Centar za izdavaštvo i informisanje, 2010), 245. 8 Predrag Dimitrijevic, “Elektronska uprava i informaciono drustvo”, Moderna uprava, No. 2, (2009): 121. 9 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 43-44. 10 Ana Đurić, „Zaštita ličnih podataka u pravu Evropske unije i Savetu Evrope“ (Master rad, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2008), 3. 11 Stevan Lilic, “Legal aspects of the data protection in automatized official registers“, Naša zakonitost – časopis za pravnu teoriju i praksu, Godina XLIII, (svibanj 1989): 618-619. 375 Bojan Vlaški pose of many personal data that are collected and memorised in their official records, exchanged between them or transferred to other state bodies. With the emergence of e-government these data are more vulnerable to misuse, as they are easily accessible not only to unauthorised use by civil servants, but also to cyber criminals. Since the end of the 20th century the necessity of data protection have been recognised in the form of specific human right – the right to the protection of personal data. This right is primarily protected by the states, which recognise it in their constitutions or endorse it through the ratification of relevant international treaties12. Therefore, every modern state that guarantee the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data is due to create adequate legal mechanisms for data protection in the context of e-government. Although there are other legal means of data protection, such as selfregulation,13 criminal and civil judicial procedures, in this paper will be analysed only administrative legal mechanisms for data protection in the context of e-government. These mechanisms are incorporated in the functional (formal) concept of data protection14. In this paper will be highlighted such mechanisms that are applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina, comparing them to the mechanisms regulated in its neighborhood, the European Union, Serbia and Montenegro. Legal mechanisms for data protection are predominantly regulated by administrative legal norms, to such extent that some authors consider that these norms belong to special part of administrative law, which is called information administrative law. Apart from personal data protection, other specific areas of information administrative law are the right to access public information, classified information protection and media law. Moreover, the procedures that guarantee protection and application of rights regulated in those specific areas are subsidiary regulated by the rules of general administrative procedure. 15 12 Andrej Diligenskia and Dragan Prlja, The Facebook, Data Protection and Case Law, (Belgrade: Institute of Comparative Law, 2018), 67-68. 13 Mirjana Drakulić i Ratimir Drakulić, „Privatnosti na internetu – problemi i zaštita“, Kompjuteri i pravo, vol. 6, broj 1-2, (1998): 16-23. 14 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 133. 15 Alen Rajko, „Antinomije u hrvatskom zakonodavstvu na području informacijskoga upravnog prava“, Sveske za javno pravo, br. 6, 2. godište, (Decembar 2011): 3-6. 376 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND COMPARATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR DATA PROTECTION Foundations of the legal mechanisms for data protection are incorporated in many international legal acts. On the one side, there are international legal acts such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 (Article 12)16, the European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms of 4th November 1950 (Article 8)17, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16th December 1966 (Article 17)18, the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union of 1st December 2009 (Article 16)19 or the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union of 18th of December 2000 (Article 8)20, which all regulate the right to privacy (apart from the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union that regulate the right to the protection of personal data) and represent the basis for personal data protection in the wider sense. On the other side, there are international legal acts that regulate data protection in more details and they can be considered as international legal sources of personal data protection in narrow sense. Those international legal documents are adopted by the United Nations – UN (Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/95 of 14 December 1990 – hereinafter: UN Guidelines), the Council of Europe – CoE (Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data from 1981, with Additional Protocol from 2004, hereinafter: CoE Convention), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD (OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data from 1980, hereinafter: OECD Guidelines)21 and the European Union (General Data Pro16 “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,“ The United Nations, accessed February 21, 2020, https:// www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 17 “The European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms,“ The Council of Europe, accessed February 21, 2020, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 18 “The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,“ The United Nations, accessed February 21, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. 19 “The Treaty on the functioning of the European Union,“ The European Union, accessed February 21, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT. 20 “The Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union,“ The European Union, accessed February 21, 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf. 21 “OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,“ The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), accessed February 21, 2020, https://www.oecd. org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm#top. 377 Bojan Vlaški tection Regulation from 2016, that came into force on the 25th of May 2018)22. The second group of international legal acts contain specific legal provisions that represent the basis for creation of legal mechanisms for data protection in member states of the UN, the CoE and the OECD. The UN Guidelines established the principle of interested-person access, which requires that the UN member states make legislative provision for a remedy, if need be with the supervisory authority specified in principle 8 of the UN Guidelines entitled “Supervision and sanctions”. According to the 8th principle of the UN Guidelines: “The law of every country shall designate the authority which, in accordance with its domestic legal system, is to be responsible for supervising observance of the principles set forth above. This authority shall offer guarantees of impartiality, independence vis-à-vis persons or agencies responsible for processing and establishing data, and technical competence. In the event of violation of the provisions of the national law implementing the aforementioned principles, criminal or other penalties should be envisaged together with the appropriate individual remedies”.23 The UN Guidelines apply not only towards the UN member states, but also towards governmental international organizations. The CoE Convention, in its Article 10 regulate sanctions and remedies and prescribes that “Each Party undertakes to establish appropriate sanctions and remedies for violations of provisions of domestic law giving effect to the basic principles for data protection set out in this chapter”.24 Moreover, Article 13 of the CoE Convention obliged its contracting parties to “designate one or more authorities”, whose purpose is to render each other mutual assistance in order to implement this Convention. Parties which have designated more than one authority are obliged to “specify in its communication referred to in the previous sub-paragraph the competence of each authority”. Among other duties, such authorities are obliged to “furnish information on its law and administrative practice in the field of data protection”. Parallel with the CoE Convention, the Council of Europe emphasized strong bonds between 22 “The General Data Protection Regulation,” The European Union, accessed March 2, 2020, https://gdprinfo.eu/. 23 “ Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/95 of 14 December 1990,“ The United Nations, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www.refworld. org/pdfid/3ddcafaac.pdf. 24 “ Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data from 1981, with Additional Protocol from 2004,“ The Council of Europe, accessed February 23, 2020, https://rm.coe. int/1680078b37. 378 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova privacy, public administration and personal data through the praxis of the European court on human rights related to privacy and personal data25. Similar provisions are contained in the OECD Guidelines. The OECD Guidelines established “Security Safeguards Principle, according to which “Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or nauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data”.26 In addition to this principle, “Member countries should provide for adequate sanctions and remedies in case of failures to comply with laws protecting privacy” (Article 19f of the OECD Guidelines). It is evident that all three international legal acts (the UN Guidelines, the CoE Convention and the OECD Guidelines) contain principles and rules that require appropriate or adequate remedies for personal data protection that should be provided by national legislators in member states of the UN, the CoE and the OECD. As one of the means for application of such remedies, special authorities (one or more) are recommended. These authorities are supposed to be established according to the UN Guidelines and the CoE Convention. Furthermore, the CoE Convention obliges these authorities to inform authorities from other member states on “administrative practice in the field of data protection”, which undoubtedly shows that the main legal mechanisms for data protection performed by such authorities are administrative ones. Therefore, international legal principles for data protection include certain legal remedies as the main legal mechanism for data protection. Organizational prerequisite for usage of such mechanism are specific authorities, created by each state. Although international legal documents on data protection usually do not clearly distinguish if these authorities are considered as administrative bodies nor if these remedies are of administrative legal nature, it is possible to draw conclusion that administrative legal mechanisms are used in many modern states. Ultimately, it is up to the national legislators to precise which legal mechanisms for data protection shall be used in each state. Parallel with the previously referred international legal acts, national legislative bodies have been adopting data protection laws since early seventies, beginning with German federal state of Hessen in 1970, Sweden in 1973, the United States of America in 1974, FR of Germany 1977, France, Norway, Denmark and Austria in 1978 etc.27 Until now, majority of modern states have 25 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 170-171. 26 “OECD Guidelines.“ 27 Saša Gajin, „Zaštita podataka o ličnosti“, u Telekomunikacije, audiovizuelna politika, zaštita podataka o ličnosti, ur. Vesna Rakić-Vodinelić (Beograd: Institut za uporedno pravo, 2004), 107; Saša Gajin, „Zaštita podataka o ličnosti – perspektive harmonizacije domaćeg prava s pravom Evropske unije“, u Zaštita podataka o 379 Bojan Vlaški adopted laws on the personal data protection. The principles enshrined by the international legal documents on data protection are mostly incorporated in national laws and various legislative solutions are adopted by these laws. Bearing in mind comparative law, we can conditionally distinguish two general systems of legislative regulation of data protection – the one characteristic for Anglo-Saxon legal systems and another one immanent for the European continental legal systems. In short, the Anglo-Saxon system is characterized by the adoption of laws on protection of privacy and private legal protection of the personal data, which is realized at the courts through private litigation procedures. On the contrary, the European continental system applies public legal mechanisms for data protection. Apart from the constitutional protection of the right to privacy, the European continental system is composed of various administrative legal mechanisms for data protection that are regulated and applied according to the laws on data protection. In this system, there are independent supervisory authorities that are empowered to protect personal data by the parliament. Those authorities can be monocratic or collegial, while in federal states they can be formed both at the level of the federation as a whole as well as at the level of federal units. Independent supervisory authorities have administrative powers, as they adopt bylaws that implement data protection laws, apply administrative procedures, adopt administrative acts and they also impose a misdemeanor penalties for illegal conduct. Finally, judicial control of their administrative acts is provided in administrative dispute procedures.28 However, there are some exemptions from this division on two general systems of legislative regulation of data protection. Surprisingly, the content of the United Kingdom’s data protection regulations cannot be considered as a part of the Anglo-Saxon system, which is a consequence of its ratification of the CoE Convention. Also, data protection in Japan is decentralized, as there is no law on the protection of privacy or data protection nor there is any independent supervisory authority, while each ministry is responsible to protect personal data in its administrative domain.29 ličnosti i poverljivi podaci – pravni aspekti, ur. Mirko Milićević (Beograd: Fond za otvoreno društvo, 2005), 1112; Dragan Prlja, Mario Reljanović i Zvonimir Ivanović, Internet pravo, (Beograd: Institut za uporedno pravo, 2012), 87-88; Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 137-139. 28 Prlja, Reljanović i Ivanović, Internet pravo, 88-89. 29 Prlja, Reljanović i Ivanović, Internet pravo, 88-89. 380 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 3. ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO Having in mind that Bosnia and Herzegovina is bordering with the EU, Serbia and Montenegro, these three systems will be analyzed in order to extract possible legislative solutions that could be de lege ferenda applicable in the context of administrative legal mechanisms for data protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Data protection in the European Union has a relatively long tradition. Many directives have been adopted in this field, beginning with the Data protection directive from 1995 (Directive 95/46/EC)30 and the Directive on privacy and electronic communications (Directive 2002/58/EC). These directives (and their further amendments) have created a solid basis for European judicial praxis on data protection, which paved the way for the General Data Protection Regulation from 2016, that came into force on the 25th of May 2018 (hereinafter: the GDPR). The GDPR provided the highest possible level of personal data protection in contemporary world with undisputable global effects (even China integrated basic principles of the GDPR in its legal system)31. Influence of the GDPR is visible in the text of the Law on the protection of personal data (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 87/2018, hereinafter: the Law in Serbia), which replaced the Law on the protection of personal data (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 97/2008 and 107/2012). In Montenegro, the Law on the protection of personal data (“Official Gazette of Montenegro”, No. 79/2008, 70/2009, 44/2012 and 22/2017, hereinafter: the Law in Montenegro) is currently in legal force and it is not fully compatible with the GDPR. From the legal historical point of view, Serbia and Montenegro share common legal sources of the personal data protection. In the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: SFRY) data protection was not explicitly legally regulated, but some fragments of data protection system were noticeable in the Yugoslavian Constitution from 1974 (“Official Gazette of the SFRY”, No. 9/1974) and the Law on the Basics of the Social Information System and the Federation Information System (“Official Gazette of the SFRY”, No. 68/81). In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia personal data protection was 30 “Directive 95/46/EC,“ The European Union, accessed February 29, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31995L0046. 31 Andrej Diligenski, Dragan Prlja and Drazen Cerovic, Data Protection Law GDPR, (Belgrade: Institute of Comparative Law, 2018), 10. 381 Bojan Vlaški regulated by the Law on the protection of personal data (“Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, No. 24/98 and 26/98), which was adopted as a result of ratification of the CoE Convention. Finally, in the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties form 2003 (“Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro”, No. 6/2003) guaranteed the right to the protection of personal data in relation to the right to privacy (Article 24). The last two legal acts did not have any important practical effects in the field of data protection, as they were supposed to be complemented with bylaws that were never adopted32. There are two administrative legal consequences of the GDPR application. The first is that the controllers or processors of personal data could among others be public authorities, which include public administration bodies. As such, they are obliged to protect personal data from unauthorized access and misuse. They do it mostly through organizational, technical and personnel information security measures33, although personal data are protected also through legal mechanisms for data protection. In addition, public administration bodies are also due to keep records about the activities of processing personal data, which is also an administrative action34. The second consequence is the existence of administrative legal mechanisms for data protection that are incorporated in the GDPR. There are four such mechanisms (although other classifications are possible): 1) Independent supervisory authorities; 2) Data protection officers in public administration bodies; 3) Administrative procedure that commences after the complaint to the supervisory authority and 4) Judicial remedy against the supervisory authority’s decision. The first two mechanisms are administrative organizational in their substance, while the last two are administrative procedural. All of these mechanisms could be applied towards all controllers or processors of personal data, whether they are public administration bodies or not. Also, the first and the third mechanism are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, Andonovic writes about three administrative legal mechanisms for data protection (Independent supervisory authorities, judicial protection and data protection officers in public administration bodies)35. Independent supervisory authorities are universal mechanism of personal data protection. Article 51 Paragraph 1 of the GDPR regulate that “Each 32 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 140-142. 33 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 310-326. 34 Diligenski, Prlja and Cerovic, Data Protection Law GDPR, 147-153. 35 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 223. 382 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Member State shall provide for one or more independent public authorities to be responsible for monitoring the application of the GDPR, in order to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons in relation to processing and to facilitate the free flow of personal data within the European Union”. Independent supervisory authorities can be formed both on monocratic and collegial principle. Their main characteristic is certain extent of independency from legislative, executive and judiciary, although their ‘independence’ is not absolute. They are appointed by parliaments, governments or heads of states (presidents or monarchs), they submit reports to parliaments and their decisions are subject to judicial review. Their main task is to control application of the GDPR and national laws on personal data protection by all controllers and processors, including public administration bodies. Powers of independent supervisory authorities can be investigative (they can conduct inspections and adopt administrative acts), corrective (they are empowered to impose measures in order to harmonize conduct of natural and legal persons with the GDPR or national laws on data protection) and advisory (they give advice and opinions about the best practices in the field of data protection)36. It is important to stress that their final administrative acts can be subject to judicial review in administrative dispute, which is a special administrative legal mechanism for data protection. Success of independent supervisory authorities is dependent on the level of their expertise in the field of data protection. According to Andonovic, the higher level of expertise is, the more independent position of independent supervisory authority in the legal system should be37. Although administrative procedure, which is a result of a complaint to the supervisory authority, could be considered as a part of independent supervisory authority as an administrative legal mechanism for personal data protection, we regard it as a special mechanism because of its prevailing administrative procedural nature. In Serbia, the functions of independent supervisory authorities are done by the Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data protection (hereinafter: the Commissioner). The Commissioner is appointed by the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. On the one hand, the Commissioner have similar powers as independent supervisory authorities in member states of the European Union, while on the other hand he is responsible not only for personal data protection, but also for access to infor36 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 254-258. 37 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 256. 383 Bojan Vlaški mation of public importance38. The gist of the Commissioner’s administrative responsibilities are powers to conduct inspections and powers to decide about complaints submitted by citizens who consider that their personal data are misused (Articles 78, 79 and 82 of the Law in Serbia). In Montenegro, supervisory authority is designed as the Agency for the protection of personal data that is composed of two organs: 1) the Director and 2) the Council of the Agency. The Council of the Agency is a collegial body (it has a president and two members) appointed by the Parliament and the Director is appointed by the Council of the Agency (Articles 51, 52 and 58 of the Law in Montenegro). The Agency has investigative, preventive and advisory powers, it conduct inspections and impose measures in the form of administrative acts (Articles 65-73a of the Law in Montenegro), while the laws on inspections and on administrative procedure apply subsidiary (Article 73 of the Law in Montenegro). The data protection officer in public administration body is a mechanism for data protection that is regulated by the GDPR (Articles 37, 38 and 39) and the Law in Serbia (Articles 56, 57 and 58). The Law in Montenegro does not regulate this institute, as it is still not harmonized with the GDPR. The data protection officer is not a new institute in the European Union, as the EU Directive 95/46/EC (Article 18 Paragraph 2 and Article 20 Paragraph 2) regulated the same institute. The difference is that the GDPR created an obligation for controllers or processors that are public authorities (including public administration bodies) to designate a data protection officer, while this designation was facultative according to the EU Directive 95/46/EC. In regard to efficient and economical use of this institute, two or more public administration bodies may appoint one common data protection officer, taking account of their organizational structure and size (particularly the volume of their regular activities related to personal data). According to the GDPR (Article 37 Paragraph 6), the data protection officer may be a staff member of the controller or processor, or fulfil the tasks on the basis of a service contract, while the Law in Serbia (Article 56 Paragraph 9) regulates the same with an exemption that he or she may be employed on the basis of any contract (work contract, temporary work contract or service contract)39. The data protection officer shall be designated on the basis of professional qualities and, in particular, expert knowledge of data protection law and practices as well as the ability to fulfil his or her tasks (Article 37 Paragraph 37 of the GDPR and Article 56 38 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 229-237. 39 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 296, 300. 384 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Paragraph 8 of the Law in Serbia). Although the level of expert knowledge is not defined in the GDPR or the Law in Serbia, it has to be proportional to “sensitivity, complexity and quantity of data that are processed by (…), while the data protection officer in a public administration body should have good knowledge of administrative law and procedures of such organizations”40. The main responsibilities of the data protection officer are to overview application of data protection laws and regulations by concrete public administration body, to educate employees of the public administration body about their duties as well as to give advice and opinions on other issues related to personal data (Article 39 Paragraph 1 of the GDPR and Article 58 Paragraph 1 of the Law in Serbia). The data protection officer is independent in performing his or her tasks and directly reports to the head of the public administration body (Article 38 Paragraph 3 of the GDPR and Article 57 Paragraph 5 of the Law in Serbia). Data subjects may contact the data protection officer with regard to all issues related to processing of their personal data and to the exercise of their rights (Article 38 Paragraph 4 of the GDPR and Article 57 Paragraph 6 of the Law in Serbia). Moreover, the data protection officer act as the contact point for the independent supervisory authority, i. e. the Commissioner in Serbia, on issues relating to processing (Article 39 Paragraph 1 Point e of the GDPR and Article 58 Paragraph 1 Point 4 of the Law in Serbia). Popularity of this institute is proven, considering that many international and regional associations of data protections officers have been formed recently (The International Association of Privacy Professionals – IAPP; the European Privacy Officers Forum – EPOF; the European Privacy Officers Network – EPON)41. Complaint to the independent supervisory authority is not strictly an administrative legal mechanism for data protection. It is activated only on the initiative of the interested natural person (data subject), who claims that his or her right to protection of personal data is violated by a public administration body. Right to lodge a complaint is regulated by the GDPR (Article 77), the Law in Serbia (Article 82) and the Law in Montenegro (Article 47). Depending on the administrative legal system, this complaint may be considered as an administrative legal mechanism for data protection. In that regard, the GDPR (Article 21 Paragraph 1) and the Law in Serbia (Article 37 Paragraph 1) regulate the right of data subject to object to processing of personal data concerning him or her. Moreover, the controller is obliged to inform the data 40 Diligenski, Prlja and Cerovic, Data Protection Law GDPR, 196-197. 41 “The OECD Privacy Framework, 108-109,“ The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), accessed March 21, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf. 385 Bojan Vlaški subject about the right to lodge a complaint to supervisory authority if the objection is refused42. If the controller or the processor is a public administration body, an objection should be lodged according to the Article 37 of the Law in Serbia. In this case, articles 28, 147, 149 and 150 of the Law on general administrative procedure (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 18/2016 and 95/2018) apply subsidiary, because this law regulate general right to an objection. According to this law, decisions of public administration bodies adopted upon an objection are subject to an administrative complaint to the higher administrative instance. Such legislative solutions rise the level of legal protection of data subjects, although it would be more productive if the Commissioner would be empowered by the Law in Serbia to decide upon administrative complaints43. Introducing two instances of administrative procedure in cases when public administrative bodies are the controllers or the processors would be a step forward in protection of the personal data. Benefits of such legislative regulation are obvious on the example of similar legal field of access to information of public importance, which is also responsibility of the Commissioner in Serbia. Judicial remedy against the final and legally binding decision of independent supervisory authority is guaranteed by the GDPR (Article 78), the Law in Serbia (Article 83) and the Law in Montenegro (Article 72). In general, the right to judicial protection against administrative acts is regulated by the European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms (Article 6), the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union (Article 47), the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Article 32 and Article 42 Paragraph 4 in fine) and the Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro (Article 32 and Article 43 in fine). There are four forms of judicial protection of the right to the protection of personal data in Serbia: 1) judicial protection against decisions of the Commissioner; 2) judicial protection in case of the personal data violation committed by the controller or the processor (including public administration); 3) judicial protection in compensation for damages proceedings and 4) judicial procedure for imposition of administrative penalties44. Having in mind the principle of judiciary independence, judicial control is crucial mechanism for personal data protection. According to the GDPR, there are three forms of judicial protection of the right to protection of personal data: 1) judicial protection for violation of human rights in relation to personal data 42 Diligenski, Prlja and Cerovic, Data Protection Law GDPR, 122. 43 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 213-214. 44 Andonovic, “Data protection,“ 267. 386 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova (this is essentially administrative-judicial protection because it is brought by a lawsuit before a competent court when a violation of a right is committed by an administrative authority in accordance with Article 79 of the GDPR), 2) judicial procedure for compensation of damage and 3) judicial procedure for imposition of administrative penalties. Finally, the Law in Montenegro regulates that against an administrative act adopted by the Agency an administrative dispute is allowed (Article 72 of the Law in Montenegro). It is evident that judicial remedy against the final and legally binding decision of independent supervisory authority is the last effective administrative legal mechanism for data protection in all three analyzed legal systems. This mechanism is implemented through administrative disputes before national courts, and it is ultimately possible to protect the right to privacy before the European Court of Human Rights (in Council of Europe member states) and the right to the protection of personal data before the Court of Justice of the European Union (in EU Member States). 4. ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR DATA PROTECTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA The legislation on the personal data protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, without any doubt, belongs to the European continental system. The Law on the protection of personal data (“Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, No. 49/2006, 76/2011 and 89/2011, hereinafter: the Law in BiH) regulates legal protection of two human rights – the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data. The Law established the Agency for personal data protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter: the Agency), which is an independent supervisory authority in the form of an independent administrative organization responsible to the Parliamentary assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article 1 of the Law in BiH). Legal regulation of the right to the protection of personal data in BiH do not have long tradition. There is also no rich praxis in this field of law. Bosnia and Herzegovina shares the same legal history from the period of SFRY as Serbia and Montenegro. After the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995), the first Law on the protection of personal data was adopted in 2001, but this law did not create optimal system for the protection of personal data. One of the most obvious drawbacks of this legal source was low level of independency of the supervisory authority towards the executive, as 387 Bojan Vlaški it was formed by the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a consequence, the Law in BiH has become the first comprehensive legal act that regulates the right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data. Being adopted in 2006, the Law in Bosnia was harmonized with previous EU directives on data protection, but it is not harmonized with the GDPR yet. The Law in BiH has introduced three mechanisms for personal data protection: 1) the Agency; 2) administrative procedure that follows an objection by the data subject and 2) judicial remedy against the Agency’s administrative act. The Law in BiH does not regulate the data protection officer. As an independent administrative organization, the Agency is formed on the monocratic principle with the director as a responsible person who represents the Agency (Article 42 of the Law in BiH). The director and his deputy are appointed by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period of five years (Article 43 of the Law in BiH). The staff of the Agency are civil servants and employees (Article 38 of the Law in BiH). Although the independency of the Agency towards the executive is improved in comparison to the previous law on personal data protection, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina still has important organizational, financial and control authority towards the Agency (Article 46 Paragraph 1 Point b and Paragraph 2 Points a, f and g). The Agency has powers similar to independent supervisory authorities in other European countries. It supervises law enforcement, conducts administrative procedures on complaints of data subjects, applies individual inspection powers and gives advice or opinions regarding the protection of personal data (Article 40 of the Law in BiH). Of particular importance are the Agency’s control powers, according to which it may impose the enforcement of certain measures on the controllers and inspect their work as well as documentation (Article 41 of the Law in BiH). These are obvious administrative powers of an inspection character, which supports the thesis that the Agency is a special administrative legal mechanism for personal data protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The data subjects are able to file objection to the Agency if they consider that their right to protection of personal data is violated or there is direct risk of such violation. Then the Agency is empowered to conduct administrative procedure and take necessary measures according to the Law in BiH (Article 30) and the Law on administrative procedure of BiH (“Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, No. 29/2002, 12/2004, 88/2007, 93/2009, 41/2013 and 53/2016). The administrative procedure is concluded when the Agency adopts 388 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova an administrative act. That act is final in administrative procedure and can be subject to judicial review in administrative dispute, which is another administrative legal mechanism for data protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Administrative dispute against the Agency’s administrative act can be commenced by the data subject who contests legality of that act. The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is competent to decide if contested administrative act is adopted according to relevant laws, but it is not empowered to review its expediency. Therefore, it would be necessary to establish two instances of administrative procedure in relation to the protection of personal data, which would increase the level of legal protection of citizens. Apart from administrative functions, the Agency is also empowered to request start of misdemeanor procedure, impose misdemeanor penalties and to review transfer of personal data from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska, the right to the protection of personal data is not only protected by the Law in BiH, but it is also guaranteed by the Article 6 of the Law on administrative procedure of BiH and by the Article 16a of the Law on general administrative procedure (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska”, No. 13/2002, 87/2007, 50/2010 and 66/2018). Both laws contain an identical provision, which regulate that personal data shall be protected in the administrative procedure in accordance with personal data protection regulations. This provision is known as the data protection principle in administrative procedure. In spite of this administrative legal principle, there are no concrete legal norms of administrative procedural character that would regulate data protection in the work of public administration in more details, which should be changed de lege ferenda. This is particularly important with the emergence of e-government in the Republic of Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In case of legislative changes in the field of administrative procedures, specific attention should be pointed to the legal protection against the administrative actions, which is currently available only in case of issuing certificates. 5. CONCLUSION Without effective mechanisms of protection, the right to the protection of personal data becomes a dead letter. Therefore, it is necessary for every modern state to create effective legal mechanisms for data protection. Administrative legal mechanisms are of particular importance, bearing in mind 389 Bojan Vlaški the role and impact of public administration and e-government in contemporary society. In the context of the legal system(s) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, experiences from comparative law must be meticulously monitored and citizens should be guaranteed the highest level of data protection standards. This paper demonstrates that Bosnia and Herzegovina (and Montenegro as well) could improve personal data protection legal framework, harmonizing it with the GDPR. Moreover, legislative solutions in Serbia could be useful guiding star towards such harmonization in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and Montenegro), particularly from the perspective of common legal tradition in these Ex-Yugoslavian states. An analysis and comparison of data protection legal framework in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the GDPR and data protection laws in Serbia and Montenegro shows that there is a space available for possible improvements of personal data protection system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the context of e-government. As the GDPR and the Law in Serbia regulate, public administration bodies are obliged to appoint data protection officers who are supposed to assure legal and accurate work of public authorities in regard to personal data protection. Thus, data subject is able to object to the public administration in the first place and to get the injury of personal data remedied before lodging a complaint to the supervisory authority. If that does not give result, he or she is entitled to submit a complaint to the supervisory authority. The Law in BiH should include personal data protection officers in its legal framework, which should raise the level of data protection to the European Union standards. Although the data protection officer is not an ideal mechanisms, as it is dependent on the professionalism and expertise of natural persons who observe this function, it has a potential as a preventive mechanisms for data protection. Therefore, the data protection officers should become the fourth administrative legal mechanism for data protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially relevant in the context of e-government. Moreover, data subjects in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be granted with the right to object directly to the public administration body, as they are now only able to file objection to the Agency. The public administration body should be empowered to decide upon objection and adopt administrative act that would be subject to appeal to the Agency. It would mean the establishment of administrative control in data protection procedures, because the expediency of the Agency’s administrative acts is currently out of 390 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova any administrative control in administrative procedure and it cannot be controlled in administrative dispute. In addition, clear deadlines for the public administration body’s administrative acts and the Agency’s second instance decisions should be determined by the law. Also, public administration bodies should be obliged to consult with the Agency whenever a violation of personal data may create a risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Furthermore, the Agency’s power to conduct inspections should be broaden with precise lists of preventive, corrective and repressive measures. 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The European Union. “The General Data Protection Regulation.” Accessed March 2, 2020. https://gdpr-info.eu/. 24. The European Union. “The Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.“ Accessed February 21, 2020. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT. 25. The Law on administrative procedure of BiH, “Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, No. 29/2002, 12/2004, 88/2007, 93/2009, 41/2013 and 53/2016. 26. The Law on general administrative procedure, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 18/2016 and 95/2018. 27. The Law on general administrative procedure, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska”, No. 13/2002, 87/2007, 50/2010 and 66/2018. 28. The Law on the protection of personal data, “Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, No. 49/2006, 76/2011 and 89/2011. 29. The Law on the protection of personal data, “Official Gazette of Montenegro”, No. 79/2008, 70/2009, 44/2012 and 22/2017. 30. The Law on the protection of personal data, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 87/2018. 31. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.“ Accessed February 21, 2020.https://www.oecd.org/internet/ ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofp ersonaldata.htm#top. 32. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “The OECD Privacy Framework, 108-109.“ Accessed March 21, 2020. https:// www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf. 33. The United Nations. “Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/95 of 14 December 1990.“ Accessed February 22, 2020. https://www.refworld.org/ pdfid/3ddcafaac.pdf. 393 Bojan Vlaški 34. The United Nations. “The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.“ Accessed February 21, 2020. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/ pages/ccpr.aspx. 35. The United Nations. “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.“ Accessed February 21, 2020. https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-humanrights/. 36. Vlaski, Bojan. “Organization of Public Administration in Federalism – specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” PhD diss., University of Belgrade Faculty of Law, 2019. 394 Pregledni naučni članak UDK KRAĐA PODATAKA PORESKIH OBVEZNIKA KAO OBLIK CYBER KRIMINALITETA Suzana Dimić1 Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Prištini, Kosovska Mitrovica Vanda Božić2 Pravni fakultet Univerziteta Privredna akademija u Novom Sadu Apstrakt: Savremene informacione tehnologije, koje su omogućile jednostavan postupak unošenja i čuvanja podataka u računarskom sistemu, našle su primenu u stvaranju baza podataka savremenih poreskih administracija. Međutim, kako postupak utvrđivanja, naplate i kontrole poreza podrazumeva dostavljanje informacija i podataka o poreskim obveznicima, često se poreski organi nalaze u situaciji da zadiru u njihove poslovne aktivnosti, ličnu i porodičnu sferu. Upravo zato što bi upotreba tih podataka u neke druge svrhe mogla naneti štetu poreskim obveznicima u poslovanju i privatnom životu, postoji potreba za adekvatnom zaštitom njihove poverljivosti i tajnosti. Takođe, tanana granica između uvida u potrebne informacije o poreskom obvezniku i njegove privatnosti dovodi u pitanje njegovo pravo na privatnost. U uslovima, kada zbog izuzetnog napretka inovacionih tehnologija, postoji potencijalna opasnost od otkrivanja tih podataka, kao i njihove eventualne zloupotrebe, zaštita poreskih podataka predstavlja značajan izazov za države u narednom periodu. Stoga, krivično zakonodavstvo ima pred sobom vrlo tešku zadaću, da bude spremno da odgovori novim načinima i oblicima izvršenja ovih vrsta krivičnih dela cyber kriminaliteta, a koja svakim danom pronalaze nove moduse izvršenja, upravo zahvaljujući brzom razvoju informacione tehnologije. Naročito su države u tranziciji izložene hakerskim krađama poreskih podataka, što se dogodilo i u Republici Srbiji 2014. godine te u Bugarskoj 2019. godine. U Bugarskoj su ukradeni lični i finansijski podaci građana od strane poreske uprave čime je pogođeno preko 70% ukupnog broja stanovnika. Krivičnim delom kojim je izvršena krađa podataka oštećeno je pet miliona poreskih obveznika, od ukupno sedam miliona stanovnika koliko ima Bugarska. Navedeno krivično delo cyber kriminaliteta pravno je kvalifikovano kao delo organizovanog kriminaliteta i terorizma te se posmatra kao zločin protiv države. 1 Docent 2 Docent 395 Suzana Dimić, Vanda Božić Ključne reči: krađa podataka, lični i finansijski podaci, poreski obveznici, cyber kriminalitet, organizovani kriminalitet 1. UVOD Oporezivanje predstavlja posebno osetljivo pitanje u odnosima između države i njenih građana. S jedne strane, potreba življenja u društvenoj zajednici zahteva obezbeđivanje sredstava za finansiranje troškova te zajednice, na principima solidarnosti i uzajamnosti, te se poresko zahvatanje ekonomske snage poreskog obveznika smatra legitimnim. S druge strane, kako se u postupku oporezivanja zadire u ekonomsku i ličnu sferu građana, nužno je postojanje granica u kojima država vrši poresku funkciju, i to kako u pogledu granica poreskog zahvatanja ekonomske snage građana, tako i u pogledu načina tog zahvatanja. Samo uspostavljanjem potrebnog balansa između finansiranja javnih potreba i zaštite privatnih interesa građana može se obezbediti optimalno funkcionisanje društvenog poretka. Cilj postupka oporezivanja je da se kontinuirano i uz minimalne troškove utvrđuju i naplaćuju porezi radi finansiranja javnih potreba. Otuda, poreski organ ima obavezu da pravilno i objektivno utvrđuje ekonomsku snagu poreskog obveznika i odredi visinu poreske obaveze. Informacije do kojih pritom dolazi mogu se odnositi ne samo na utvrđivanje ekonomske snage poreskog obveznika, nego mogu biti i iz njegovog ličnog i porodičnog života (na primer, o zdravstvenom stanju). To znači da treba da postoji određeni nivo poreske poverljivosti da se te informacije ili podaci o poreskom obvezniku mogu koristiti samo u poreske svrhe. Usled izuzetnog napretka inovacionih tehnologija omogućen je jednostavan postupak unošenja i čuvanja podataka u računarskom sistemu. Time je poreskim organima, koji dolaze do brojnih podataka o poreskim obveznicima, omogućeno stvaranje baze podataka te brži i jednostavniji način utvrđivanja i naplate poreza. U tom smislu primena inovacionih tehnologija ima veliki značaj, jer oporezivanje čini administrativno jednostavnijim, čime su troškovi koji poreski organi imaju prilikom utvrđivanja i naplate poreza, tzv. administrativni troškovi, manji (primena računara u radu omogućava smanjenje broja zaposlenih, manji broj radnih časova i sl.). Takođe, savremeni način komunikacije između poreske administracije i poreskog obveznika (na primer, on-line podnošenje poreske prijave) omogućio je smanjenje troškova i na 396 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova strani poreskog obveznika (na primer, neće imati putne troškove odlaska do prostorija poreske administracije, utrošak sopstvenog vremena i sl.). Primena inovacionih tehnologija na više načina utiče na odnos poreskih obveznika prema obavezi plaćanja poreza. Činjenica da se oporezivanjem smanjuje ekonomska snaga utiče na stvaranje raznih modaliteta otpora poreskih obveznika prema plaćanju poreza. Savremene poreske administracije nastoje da čitavim programom mera utiču na dobrovoljno povinovanje poreskoj obavezi. Poboljšanjem modaliteta postupanja, uz poštovanje poreskih obveznika, blagovremeno obezbeđivanje potrebnih informacija i pružanje saveta i pomoći, kao i efikasnost u radu poreske administracije uveliko su olakšani upotrebom savremenih tehnologija. Na ovaj način stvara se dobra osnova za smanjenje oportunitetnih troškova izbegavanja plaćanja poreza (benefit poštovanja propisa), jer će poreski obveznici biti više voljni da plate porez. Pored toga, za one poreske obveznike koji se ipak odluče da se ne povinuju poreskoj obavezi upotreba informacionih tehnologija od strane poreskog organa smanjuje mogućnosti da potencijalni poreski utajivači ostvare svoju nameru. Nesumnjive prednosti savremenog oporezivanja, međutim, stvaraju realnu opasnost po poverljivost poreskih podataka, zbog postojanja tehničkih mogućnosti za njihovo neovlašćeno otkrivanje, korišćenje u neporeske svrhe, pa čak i zloupotrebu. Do ovoga može doći na nacionalnom planu (bilo je primera neovlašćenog upada u bazu podataka poreskih administracija nekih država) i međunarodnom planu, gde postoji intezivna aktivnost na povećanju saradnje nacionalnih poreskih administracija. 2. PRAVO PORESKIH OBVEZNIKA NA POVERLJIVOST PORESKIH PODATAKA PRED IZAZOVIMA SAVREMENIH TEHNOLOGIJA Kako informacije i podaci koji se nalaze u bazi poreskih podatka nacionalne poreske administracije sadrže ne samo podatke o ekonomskoj snazi poreskog obveznika nego i podatke iz njegovog privatnog i porodičnog života, nacionalna poreska zakonodavstva bi trebalo da obezbede visok nivo poverljivosti. Službenicima savremenih administracija je zabranjeno korišćenje tih informacija i podataka u bilo koje druge, osim poreske, svrhe. Otuda kao jedno od osnovnih prava koja se garantuju poreskim obveznicima jeste pravo na privatnost i tajnost poreskih podataka. One informacije i podaci do kojih 397 Suzana Dimić, Vanda Božić poreski organi dođu u toku utvrđivanja i naplate poreza su dužni da čuvaju kao poresku tajnu. Međutim, u poreskoj praksi pojedinih država dolazi do sužavanja opsega poreske tajne. Ukoliko postoji javni interes za transparentnom aktivnošću poreske administracije, kao i za jačanje vaspitne uloge poreske tajne, ciljano se objavljuju pojedine poreske informacije kako bi se izazvala društvena osuda delikventnih poreskih obveznika.3 Rešavanje značajnih problema zaokuplja pažnju na međunarodnom nivou - to je međunarodno dvostruko oporezivanje i poreska evazija. U tom pravcu prisutna je aktivnost za obezbeđivanje uslova za intezivniju međunarodnu poresku saradnju. Posebnu važnost u tome ima razmena poreskih informacija, te se u novije vreme, pored tradicionalno bilateralnog, saradnja nacionalnih poreskih administracija dobija multilateralni pristup. U okviru Organizacije za ekonomsku saradnju i razvoj (OECD) i Evropske unije (EU) doneta pravila o razmeni poreskih informacija tiču se dva bitna segmenta: ukidanja bankarske tajne i automatske razmene poreskih podataka.4 Međunarodna razmena poreskih podataka dobija na značaju kada se radi o poreskim obveznicima koji posluju i prihode ostvaruju u dve ili više država. Automatska razmena poreskih podataka omogućava državi koja je rezident takvog lica da automatski dobije podatke od države u kojoj je taj prihod ostvaren (države izvora). Dok kod razmene poreskih informacija na zahtev postoje određena ograničenja, jer se traži ispunjavanje određenih uslova (da se informacije odnose na pojedinačni slučaj, da se u zahtevu navede postupak u kome će se koristiti i sl.) kod automatske razmene dolazi do sistematskog i periodičnog dostavljanja poreskih podataka, čime se smanjuju mogućnosti za poresku evaziju. Drugi bitan segment u međunarodnoj poreskoj saradnji bilo je ukidanje bankarske tajne, koje se tada tradicionalno primenjivalo u bankarskom poslovanju. Prema novim pravilima, standardu transparentnosti, poreskim administracijama neće moći kao izgovor za izbegavanje razmene poreskih informacija poslužiti bankarska tajna. U situaciji kada poreski obveznik ostvari prihod u drugoj zemlji, ta zemlja (zemlja izvora) neće moći da odbije da pruži informacije njegovoj rezidentnoj zemlji. Postojanjem standarda bankarske tajne postojala je mogućnost da zemlja izvora odbije da pruži informacije o 3 Mileva Anđelković, Javne finansije i finansijsko pravo (Niš: Pravni fakultet, 2018), 147. 4 Prva pravila iz ovog dometa u okviru OECD bila su postavljena Model konvencijom o porezima na dohodak i imovinu i podrazumevala su razmenu poreskih informacija na zahtev. Model sporazum o razmeni poreskih informacija iz 2002.g., kao i revidiranjem iz 2005.g. nameće se standard transparentnosti. Bankarska tajna više nije razlog za odbijanje pružanja poreskih informacija. Na nivou EU Direktivom o oporezivanju prihoda od štednje u obliku kamate iz 2005.g. uvodi se automatska razmena poreskih podataka. 398 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova prihodu koji je poreski obveznik ostvario na njenoj teritoriji. Sa obrazloženjem da države označene kao poreski rajevi najčešće nisu pokazivale spremnost da sarađuju sa drugim državama u pružanju informacija, kao jedna od osnovnih mera za suzbijanje nepravične poreske konkurencije, na međunarodnom planu podsticana je razmena informacija. Iako postoji fizička zaštita baze poreskih podataka (na primer posebna šifra koja se unosi prilikom pristupa), realna je opasnost od neovlašćenog pristupa, korišćenja tih podataka u neporeske svrhe i njihova zloupotreba. Takvo neovlašćeno korišćenje ili objavljivanje može da nanese štetu i ugrozi različite interese poreskog obveznika, kao što su narušavanje njegove privatnosti i lične sigurnosti, odavanje poslovne tajne i sl.5 Mogućnost ugrožavanja tajnosti poreskih podataka postoji na nacionalnom nivou (jer postoji realna opasnost od neovlašćenog pristupa bazi podataka nacionalne poreske administracije), kao i na međunarodnom nivou (u postupku razmene poreskih informacija između poreskih administracija različitih država). Pravnim instrumentima OECD ne predviđa se eksplicitna zaštita poreskih podataka u postupku razmene poreskih informacija. Poverljivost se obezbeđuje na posredan način, propisivanjem instituta tretiranja prikupljenih informacija kao tajne prema unutrašnjem zakonodavstvu te države koja je podatke primila od nadležnog organa druge države i ograničenja korišćenja podataka samo u te svrhe za koje su prikupljeni. Poreska zakonodavstva pojedinih država pružaju eksplicitnu zaštitu, propisujući prava poreskih obveznika u međudržavnoj razmeni poreskih informacija (pravo obaveštavanja, pravo konsultacije i pravo intervencije). U poreskom zakonodavstvu Hrvatske postoji pravo na obaveštavanje.6 Dok u poreskom pravu Srbije nije propisano ni jedno od ovih prava. U postupku u kome inostrani poreski organ zahteva pružanje poreskih informacija poreska administracija nema obavezu da obavesti poreskog obveznika.7 Mada se na zaštitu prava poreskih obveznika na poverljivost i tajnost poreskih podataka može primeniti ne samo poreska regulativa nego i šira zaštita ljudskih prava,8 za sada ne postoji potpuna adekvatna pravna zaštita 5 Dejan Popović, Poresko pravo ( Beograd: Pravni fakultet, 2012 ), 65. 6 Postoji obaveza da se omogući obaveštavanje poreskog obveznika pre dostavljanja informacija i dokumentacije u inostranstvo ( Čl. 95. st. 4. Opći porezni zakon, Narodne novine br.115/16, 106/18, 121/19, 32/29, 42/20). 7 Prema odredbama kojima se reguliše pružanje međunarodne pravne pomoći (čl. 157. st. 1. st. 2 i st. 3. Zakona o poreskom postupku i poreskoj administraciji (u daljem tekstu: ZPPPA (“Sl.glasnik RS”, br. 80/02, 84/02, 70/03, 55/04, 61/05, 85/05, 62/06, 61/07, 20/09, 72/09, 53/10, 101/11, 2/12, 93/12, 47/13, 108/13, 68/14, 105/14, 91/15, 112/15, 15/16, 108/16, 30/18, 95/18 i 86/19)). 8 Tako su Konvencijom o zaštiti lica u odnosu na automatsku obradu ličnih podata propisane odgovarajuće mere zaštite ( Zakon o potvrđivanju Konvencije o zaštiti lica u odnosu na automatsku obradu ličnih podata (“ 399 Suzana Dimić, Vanda Božić od povrede ovih prava. U međunarodnim okvirima poreski obveznici gotovo da nemaju mogućnost zaštite prava na poverljivost poreskih podataka razmenjenih između poreskih administracija svoje i neke druge države, jer nisu ugovorne strane međunarodnih poreskih sporazuma. Takođe, ne postoji međunarodni poreski sud pred kojim bi se obezbedila zaštita prava poreskih obveznika.9 Ne mogu se obratiti ni Evropskom sudu za ljudska prava, kao ostala lica, jer se član 6. Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima ne primenjuje na obične poreske sporove.10 Kako primećuju neki autori BEPS i projekat poreske transparentnosti jesu ojačali ovlašćenja poreske vlasti izvan državnih granica, ali je zaštita prava poreskih obveznika postala gotovo tabu tema za međunarodnu poresku koordinaciju, polazeći od pogrešne pretpostavke da savesni poreski obveznici ne treba da budu zabrinuti jer će pravnu zaštitu moći da ostvare na nacionalnom nivou u svojoj zemlji.11 Ex post zaštita poreskih podataka poreskih obveznika može biti građanskopravna (kada se u parničnom postupku traži naknada štete), kao i krivičnopravna. Poresko zakonodavstvo Srbije ne sankcioniše povredu poverljivosti poreskih podataka, samo proklamuje načelo čuvanja službene tajne u poreskom postupku. Podaci u poreskom postupku čuvaju se kao tajni podaci. Sva službena lica i sva druga lica koja učestvuju u poreskom, prekršajnom, predistražnom i sudskom postupku dužna su da čuvaju tajne podatke.12 U slučaju povrede tajnosti poreskih podataka primeniće se odredbe krivičnog zakonodavstva kojima se reguliše krivično delo odavanja službene tajne. Reč je o krivičnom delu svrstanom u grupu krivičnih dela protiv službene dužnosti, čija radnja izvršenja se sastoji u neovlašćenom saopštavanju, predaji ili na drugi način činjenja dostupnim podataka koji predstavljaju službenu tajnu drugom licu od strane službenog lica. Radnja ovog krivičnog dela postojaće i u situaciji kada službeno lice pribavlja takve podatke u nameri da ih preda nepozvanom licu.13 To znači da nije neophodno da se drugo lice stvarno upoznalo sa podacima koji predstavljaju službenu tajnu, dovoljno je da je Sl. SRJ-Međunarodni ugovori, br. 1/92, “ “Sl. SCG - Međunarodni ugovori br. 11/05; “ “Sl. RS - Međunarodni ugovori, br. 98/2008, 12/10). Srbija je Zakonom o zaštiti podataka o ličnosti propisala niz mera za zaštitu podataka o ličnosti (“Sl. glasnik” br. 97/08, 104/09, 68/12, 107/12). 9 Philip Baker, Pasquale Pistone, “Blueprints for enhancing the protection of taxpayers rights in cross-border tax procedures,E/C.18/2016/CRP.11,3,https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/12STM_CRP11_ TaxDisputes.pdf (preuzeto 17.4.2020.) 10 Mileva Anđelković, “Fundamentalna prava poreskih obveznika i njihova zaštita u savremenim informaciono- tehnološkim uslovima”, Strani pravni život br. 3 ( 2008 ),165-166. 11 Philip Baker, Pasquale Pistone, 11 12 Čl. 7 st.1 i st. 3 ZPPPA. 13 Čl. 369 Krivičnog zakonika (“Sl.glasnik RS”, br. 85/05, 107/05, 72/09. 111/09, 121/12, 104/13, 108/14, 94/16 i 35/19). 400 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova postojala takva namera službenog lica.14 Za osnovni vid krivičnog dela odavanja službene tajne predviđena je kazna zatvora u trajanju od 6 meseci do 5 godina. Postoji jedan lakši i jedan teži vid ovog krivičnog dela. Propisana sankcija za ovo krivično delo učinjeno u nehatu je kazna zatvora do 3 godine, dok je za teži oblik ovog krivičnog dela propisana kazna od 1 do 8 godina. Kvalifikovano krivično delo odavanja službene tajne postojaće ako je učinjeno iz koristoljublja ili se radi o naročito poverljivim podacima. Treba dodati da se prema važećoj odredbi krivičnog zakonodavstva kojom su propisani slučajevi kada će postojati kvalifikovano krivično delo odavanja službene tajne može zaključiti da je zakonodavac obratio posebnu pažnju u pogledu onih podataka koji mogu biti predmet inostrane razmene. Naime, odavanje podataka radi objavljivanja ili korišćenja u inostranstvu predstavlja još jedan slučaj težeg oblika ovog krivičnog dela. Imajući u vidu obavezujući karakter Direktive EU o oporezivanju prihoda od štednje i opredeljenje za članstvo u EU, Srbija će biti u situaciji da prihvati automatsku razmenu poreskih podataka. U tom smislu, ovakva formulacija krivičnopravne zaštite koja bi se mogla da primeni i na poreske podatke koji se pružaju u međudržavnoj poreskoj razmeni, predstavlja garanciju njihove stvarne zaštite, bar kada su u pitanju radnje službenih lica u domaćoj poreskoj administraciji. 3. KRIVIČNOPRAVNA ZAŠTITA RAČUNARSKIH PODATAKA OD CYBER KRIMINALITETA S OSVRTOM NA SUDSKU PRAKSU Osam krivičnih dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka smeštena su u glavi dvadeset sedmoj (čl.298 - čl.304a. Krivičnog zakonika).15 Ovim krivičnim delima štite se računarski podaci koji su svakim danom sve više izloženi hakerskim napadima i krađi.16 Krivičnim zakonikom inkriminisana su sledeća krivična dela za zaštitu računarskih podataka: 1. Oštećenje računarskih podataka i programa čl. 298 KZ, 2. Računarska sabotaža čl. 299 KZ, 3. Pravljenje i unošenje računarskih virusa čl. 300 KZ, 4. Računarska prevara čl. 301 KZ, 14 Gordana Ilić-Popov, “Krivično delo odavanja službene tajne u srpskom poreskom pravu”, NBP. Nauka, bezbednost, policija, br. 2 (2014), 6 15 Krivični zakonik RS, ,,Sl.glasnik RS”, br. 85/05, 107/05, 72/09. 111/09, 121/12, 104/13, 108/14, 94/16 i 35/19. 16 Vidi poredbeno: Božić Vanda, Kaznena politika i prevencija kaznenih djela protiv računalnih sustava, programa i podataka, Zbornik radova Srpskog udruženja za krivičnopravnu teoriju i praksu, Trebinje, 2019, str. 187-202. 401 Suzana Dimić, Vanda Božić 5. Neovlašćeni pristup zaštićenom računaru, računarskoj mreži i elektronskoj obradi podataka čl. 302 KZ, 6. Sprečavanje i organičavanje pristupa javnoj računarskoj mreži čl. 303 KZ, 7. Neovlašćeno korišćenje računara ili računarske mreže čl. 304 KZ, 8. Pravljenje, nabavljanje i davanje drugom sredstava za izvršenje krivičnih dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka čl. 304a KZ. Oštećenje računarskih podataka i programa čini lice koje neovlašćeno izbriše, izmeni, ošteti, prikrije ili na drugi način učini neupotrebljivim računarski podatak ili program. Zakonom je za ovaj temeljni oblik krivičnog dela propisana novčana kazna ili kazna zatvora do jedne godine. Stavkom 2. i 3. čl. 298 KZ predviđena su dva kvalifikovana oblika krivičnog dela. O prvom kvalifikovanom obliku radi se ako je delom prouzrokovana šteta u iznosu koji prelazi četristopedeset hiljada dinara. Zakonodavac je, u ovom slučaju, za učinioca propisao kaznu zatvora od tri meseca do tri godine. O drugom kvalifikovanom obliku krivičnog dela oštećenja računarskih podataka i programa radi se ako je delom prouzrokovana šteta u iznosu koji prelazi milion i petsto hiljada dinara. Učinilac će se, u ovom slučaju, kazniti kaznom zatvora od tri meseca do pet godina.17 Ko unese, uništi, izbriše, izmeni, ošteti, prikrije ili na drugi način učini neupotrebljivim računarski podatak ili program ili uništi ili ošteti računar ili drugi uređaj za elektronsku obradu i prenos podataka sa namerom da onemogući ili znatno omete postupak elektronske obrade i prenosa podataka koji su od značaja za državne organe, javne službe, ustanove, preduzeća ili druge subjekte, čini krivično delo računarske sabotaže, inkriminisano čl. 299 KZ. Učinilac će se za krivično delo računarske sabotaže kazniti kaznom zatvora od šest meseci do pet godina.18 Pravljenje računarskog virusa u nameri njegovog unošenja u tuđ računar ili računarsku mrežu krivično je delo propisano čl. 300 KZ. Učinilac će se kazniti novčanom kaznom ili kaznom zatvora do šest meseci. O kvalifikovanom obliku ovog krivičnog dela radiće se ako lice koje unese računarski virus u tuđ računar ili računarsku mrežu time prouzrokuje štetu. Za kvalifikovani oblik ovog krivičnog dela predviđena je novčana kazna ili kazna zatvora do dve godine, s tim da će se po zakonu oduzeti uređaji i sredstva kojima su učinjena 17 čl. 298 KZ 18 čl. 299 KZ 402 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova krivična dela pravljenja računarskog virusa u nameri njegovog unošenja u tuđ računar ili računarsku mrežu.19 Računarska prevara inkriminisana je čl. 301 KZ. Krivično delo čini lice koje unese netačan podatak, propusti unošenje tačnog podatka ili na drugi način prikrije ili lažno prikaže podatak i time utiče na rezultat elektronske obrade i prenosa podataka u nameri da sebi ili drugom pribavi protivpravnu imovinsku korist i time drugom prouzrokuje imovinsku štetu. Zakonom je propisana novčana kazna ili kazna zatvora do tri godine. Kao i kod krivičnog dela oštećenja računarskih podataka i programa, i ovde je zakonodavac predvidio dva kvalifikovana oblika krivičnog dela računarske prevare, prvi, ako je krivičnim delom pribavljena imovinska korist koja prelazi iznos od četristopedeset hiljada dinara, te drugi, ako je računarskom prevarom pribavljena imovinska korist koja prelazi iznos od milion i petsto hiljada dinara. Za prvi kvalifikovani oblik propisana je kazna zatvora od jedne do osam godina, a za drugi kazna zatvora od dve do deset godina. Zakon sadrži i inkriminaciju privilegovanog oblika krivičnog dela računarske prevare o kojem će se raditi ako je krivično delo učinjeno samo u nameri da drugog ošteti, za što je propisana novčana kazna ili kazna zatvora do šest meseci.20 Prema čl. 302 KZ, Neovlašćeni pristup zaštićenom računaru, računarskoj mreži i elektronskoj obradi podataka čini ono lice koje se, kršeći mere zaštite, neovlašćeno uključi u računar ili računarsku mrežu, ili neovlašćeno pristupi elektronskoj obradi podataka. Zakonom je za učinioca ovog krivičnog dela propisana novčana kazna ili kazna zatvora do šest meseci. Lice koje snimi ili upotrebi podatak na opisan način, kazniće se novčanom kaznom ili zatvorom do dve godine. Ukoliko usled krivičnog dela dođe do zastoja ili ozbiljnog poremećaja funkcionisanja elektronske obrade i prenosa podataka ili mreže ili nastupe druge teške posledice, zakonom je za učinioca predviđena kazna zatvora do tri godine.21 Sprečavanje i organičavanje pristupa javnoj računarskoj mreži prema čl. 303 KZ, čini lice koje neovlašćeno sprečava ili ometa pristup javnoj računarskoj mreži. Za učinioca ovog krivičnog dela je zakonom propisana novčana kazna ili kazna zatvora do jedne godine. O kvalifikovanom obliku radiće se ako krivično delo učini službeno lice u vršenju službe, za što je predviđena kazna zatvora do tri godine.22 19 čl. 300 KZ 20 čl. 301 KZ 21 čl. 302 KZ 22 čl. 303 KZ 403 Suzana Dimić, Vanda Božić Neovlašćeno korišćenje računara ili računarske mreže prema čl. 304 KZ, čini lice koje neovlašćeno koristi računarske usluge ili računarsku mrežu u nameri da sebi ili drugom pribavi protivpravnu imovinsku korist. Krivični postupak pokreće se po privatnoj tužbi, a za učinioca ovog krivičnog dela zakonodavac je predvidio novčanu kaznu ili kaznu zatvora do tri meseca.23 Pravljenje, nabavljanje i davanje drugom sredstava za izvršenje krivičnih dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka, prema čl. 304a KZ, čini lice koje proizvodi, prodaje, nabavlja radi upotrebe, uvozi, distribuira i na drugi način stavlja na raspolaganje: uređaje i računarske programe projektovane ili prvenstveno u svrhe izvršenja nekog krivičnog dela iz čl. 298. do 303. KZ, zatim računarske šifre ili slične podatke putem kojih se može pristupiti računarskom sistemu kao celini ili nekom njegovom delu sa namerom da bude upotrebljen u izvršenju nekog od krivičnih dela iz čl. 298. do 303. KZ. Zakonom je propisana kazna zatvora od šest meseci do tri godine. Lice koje poseduje neka od navedenih sredstava, u nameri da ih upotrebi u svrhu izvršenja nekog od krivičnih dela iz čl. 298. do 303. KZ, kazniće se novčanom kaznom ili zatvorom do jedne godine, a predmeti će se sukladno zakonu oduzeti.24 Tabela pod rednim br. 1. prikazuje prijave, optuženja i osude punoletnih lica za pojedinačna krivična dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka u 2018. godini. KRIVIČNA DELA PROTIV BEZBEDNOSTI PRIJAVE OPTUŽENJA OSUDE RAČUNARSKIH PODATAKA u 2018. u 2018. gou 2018. godini dini godini Oštećenje računarskih podataka i programa 3 Računarska prevara 2 13 1 Neovlašćeni pristup zaštićenom računaru, 4 2 2 računarskoj mreži i elektronskoj obradi podataka Neovlašćeno korišćenje računara ili 2 1 računarske mreže UKUPNO 11 16 3 Tabela br.1. Prijave, opuženja i osude za pojedinačna krivična dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka u 2018. godini25 23 čl. 304 KZ 24 čl. 304a KZ 25 Prema podacima Republičkog zavoda za statistiku, Punoletni učinioci krivičnih dela u Republici Srbiji, Bilten, Beograd, 2019. 404 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Među krivičnim delima protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka najviše prijava u 2018. godini beleži krivično delo Neovlašćenog pristupa zaštićenom računaru, računarskoj mreži i elektronskoj obradi podataka, s ukupno 4 prijave. Na drugom mestu, po broju prijava, je krivično delo Oštećenje računarskih podataka i programa, s ukupno 3 prijave, dok treće mesto po broju prijava dele krivično delo Računarska prevara i Neovlašćeno korišćenje računara ili računarske mreže, sa svega dve prijave. Ukupno je evidentirano 11 prijava u 2018. godini za krivična dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka. Brojčano, u odnosu na prijave, za trećinu je više optuženja za krivična dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka u 2018. godini, ukupno 16. Najzastupljenije krivično delo je Računarska prevara sa 13 podignutih optužnica, dok su svega 2 optuženja za Neovlašćeni pristup zaštićenom računaru, računarskoj mreži i elektronskoj obradi podataka te 1 optuženje za Neovlašćeno korišćenje računara ili računarske mreže. Kao što možemo videti i iz tabele br. 1, imamo malu brojku donetih osuđujućih presuda za navedena krivična dela, svega 3 osude od čega 1 osudu za krivično delo Računarske prevare te 2 osude za krivično delo Neovlašćenog pristupa zaštićenom računaru, računarskoj mreži i elektronskoj obradi podataka. Tabela pod rednim br. 2. prikazuje prijave, optuženja i osude punoletnih lica za krivična dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka u periodu od 2009. do 2018. godine. KRIVIČNA DELA PROTIV BEZBEDNOSTI PRIJAVE OPTUŽENJA OSUDE RAČUNARSKIH PODATAKA 2009 45 6 4 2010 20 4 4 2011 22 10 7 2012 15 6 5 2013 28 6 4 2014 9 10 8 2015 14 3 2 2016 16 12 7 2017 20 13 8 2018 11 16 3 Tabela br. 2. Prijave, opuženja i osude za krivična dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka od 2009. do 2018. godine26 26 Prema podacima Republičkog zavoda za statistiku, Punoletni učinioci krivičnih dela u Republici Srbiji, Bilten, Beograd, 2019. 405 Suzana Dimić, Vanda Božić Najviše prijava za krivična dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka, u posmatranom periodu, ima 2009. godina, 45 prijava, a najmanje 2014. godina, svega 9 prijava. Možemo uočiti dosta veliki pad prijavljenih lica kroz nevedeni period. Što se tiče optuženja, najviše ih beleži 2018. godina, 16 optužbi, dok najmanje 2015. godina, svega 3 optužbe. Broj osuđujućih presuda varira od 3 do 8 na godišnjem nivou, pa je tako najviše osuda doneto u 2014. i 2017. godini, a najmanje u 2018. godini. Analiza prijava, optuženja i osuda ne ide nam u prilog shvatanja da su ova krivična dela u stalnom porastu zbog specifičnog načina njihova činjenja i novog modusa operandi, stoga možemo zaključiti da je jako velika tamna brojka ove vrste kriminaliteta. 4. ZAKLJUČNA RAZMATRANJA Cyber kriminalitet je jedan od najsofisticiranijih oblika kriminaliteta, koji u kontekstu računarskih podataka uključuje krađu ličnih podataka, krađu identiteta, zloupotrebu ličnih podataka, krađu informacija, napade na računarske mreže, prevare pa time i krađu podataka poreskih obaveznika. Učinilac krivičnog dela nije vezan za mesto i vreme, već svoju nameru može da ostvari u bilo koje doba i na bilo kojem mestu, što mu obezbeđuje potpunu anonimnost. Upravo iz tog razloga, učinioci ovih krivičnih dela teže se otkrivaju i procesuiraju, a računarski podaci institucija poput poreske uprave u današnje vreme veoma su zanimljiva meta. Danas kada je izrazito razvijena informaciona tehnologija, postoji velik rizik od otkrivanja i zloupotrebe ličnih i poreskih podataka građana, čime se nameće potreba zaštite celovitog sistema ličnih i poreskih podataka od strane države. Krivično delo kojim se čini krađa podataka poreskih obaveznika deo je cyber kriminaliteta, organizovanog kriminaliteta i terorizma te se podrazumeva kao zločin protiv države. Izmenama i dopunama Krivičnog zakonika, ukupno je osam krivičnih dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka: Oštećenje računarskih podataka i programa, Računarska sabotaža, Pravljenje i unošenje računarskih virusa, Računarska prevara, Neovlašćeni pristup zaštićenom računaru, računarskoj mreži i elektronskoj obradi podataka, Sprečavanje i organičavanje pristupa javnoj računarskoj mreži, Neovlašćeno korišćenje računara ili računarske mreže te Pravljenje, nabavljanje i davanje drugom sredstava za izvršenje krivičnih dela protiv bezbednosti računarskih podataka. Uz mere represije, od nepro- 406 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova cenjive važnosti je prevencija koja obuhvata edukaciju zaposlenika i građana vezanu za zaštitu računarskih podataka kojima raspolažu i sa kojima svakodnevno rade. LITERATURA: 1. Anđelković Mileva, Javne finansije i finansijsko pravo, Niš: Pravni fakultet, 2018. 2. Anđelković Mileva, Fundamentalna prava poreskih obveznika i njihova zaštita u savremenim informaciono- tehnološkim uslovima, Strani pravni život br. 3 ( 2008 ), str.165-166. 3. Baker Philip, Pasquale Pistone, “Blueprints for enhancing the protection of taxpayers rights in cross-border tax procedures, E/C.18/2016/CRP.11,3, https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/12STM_CRP11_ TaxDisputes.pdf 4. Božić Vanda, Kaznena politika i prevencija kaznenih djela protiv računalnih sustava, programa i podataka, Zbornik radova Srpskog udruženja za krivičnopravnu teoriju i praksu, Trebinje, 2019, str. 187-202. 5. Ilić- Popov Gordana, Krivično delo odavanja službene tajne u srpskom poreskom pravu, NBP. Nauka, bezbednost, policija, br.2 (2014) 6. Krivični zakonik, “Sl.glasnik RS”, br. 85/05, 107/05, 72/09. 111/09, 121/12, 104/13, 108/14, 94/16 i 35/19. 7. Opći porezni zakon, Narodne novine br.115/16, 106/18, 121/19, 32/29, 42/20. 8. Popović Dejan, Poresko pravo, Beograd: Pravni fakultet, 2012. 9. Republički zavod za statistiku, Punoletni učinioci krivičnih dela u Republici Srbiji, Bilten, Beograd, 2019. 10. Zakon o poreskom postupku i poreskoj administraciji (ZPPPA, “Sl.glasnik RS”, br. 80/02, 84/02, 70/03, 55/04, 61/05, 85/05, 62/06, 61/07, 20/09, 72/09, 53/10, 101/11, 2/12, 93/12, 47/13, 108/13, 68/14, 105/14, 91/15, 112/15, 15/16, 108/16, 30/18, 95/18 i 86/19). 11. Zakon o potvrđivanju Konvencije o zaštiti lica u odnosu na automatsku obradu ličnih podataka, “ Sl. SRJ - Međunarodni ugovori, br. 1/92, “Sl. SCG - Međunarodni ugovori br. 11/05; “Sl. RS - Međunarodni ugovori, br. 98/2008, 12/10. 12. Zakon o zaštiti podataka o ličnosti, “Sl. glasnik” br. 97/08, 104/09, 68/12, 107/12. 407 Suzana Dimić, Vanda Božić TAXPAYER DATA THEFT AS A FORM OF CYBER CRIME Suzana Dimić27 Faculty of Law, University of Priština, Kosovska Mitrovica Vanda Božić28 Faculty of Law, University Business Academy, Novi Sad Abstract: Modern information technologies, which made it easy to enter and store data in a computer system, have found application in the creation of databases of modern tax administrations. However, since the process of determining, collecting and controlling taxes involves providing taxpayers with information and data, often the tax authorities are in a situation of interfering with their business, personal and family sphere. Precisely because the use of this information for other purposes could harm taxpayers in business and private life, there is a need to adequately protect their confidentiality and confidentiality. Also, the fine line between insight into the taxpayer’s required information and his privacy calls into question his right to privacy. In the conditions, when due to the phenomenal growth of innovative technology, there is a potential risk of data disclosure, as well as their possible abuse, protection of tax data is a significant challenge for the country in the future. Therefore, the criminal legislation has a very difficult task, to be ready to respond to new ways and forms of execution of these types of offenses of cyber crime, wich every day find new modes of execution, thanks to the rapid development of information technology. In particular, transition countries are exposed to hacking tax data theft, which happened in the Republic of Serbia in 2014 and Bulgaria in 2019. In Bulgaria, personal and financial information of citizens was stolen by the tax administration, wich affecting over 70% of the total population. An criminal offense which is done stealing data damaged five million taxpayers, of a total of seven million people in Bulgaria. This criminal act of cyber crime is legally qualified as an act of organized crime and terrorism, and is seen as a crime against the state. Keywords: data theft, personal and financial information, taxpayers, cybercrime, organized crime. 27 Assistant Professor 28 Assistant Professor 408 Original scientific paper UDK LITERARY FUTURISTS: (SCIENCE) FICTION V. (DE)HUMANISING REALITY CAUGHT IN THE HANDS OF TRANSFORMATIVE TECHNOLOGIES Dijana Zrnić1 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Abstract: Leaving the Dark Ages aside, human intelligence has always been treading the adventurous paths of evolution. Intrigued by the limits of human creation and creativity, starting from the antiquity, theorists and practitioners have placed before themselves an (im)possible task to create such intelligence that would outreach human genius, but still be the servant of human mankind. However, can the creator control his own creation? Inspired by the same dilemma, the authoress of this paper will plunge into the rich well of (science) fiction and analyse its prophetic effects on (de)humanising reality. The closing sentences will reveal how prognostic were/are the literary writers in terms of the good/bad influence of rapid technological progress on the dominant ethical viewpoints and social and economic relations. Keywords: (science) fiction, artificial intelligence, literary futurology, (de)humanising, transhumanism. 1. INTRODUCTION Caught in the net of the outside world, a man has often proved a bad interpreter of its innovative settings. To better understand the self in the outside world shaped by transformative technology, the man has to look for a medium that would establish such a relationship. A fictional story appeared such a meaning generating power. Not shunning the mundane themes of human suffering and death, science fiction has primarily been resting on the new scientific developments and the unfamiliar technologies. Stories have become a natural way to explain things as they fit our cognitive architecture. Whenever human mind is puzzled or threatened by unexpected events in real 1 Assistant Professor 409 Dijana Zrnić life, it resorts to storytelling. If confronted with a technology that is based on real scientific theories or already existing technological trends, then science fiction would adhere to the laws of nature and depict a fictitious world that still appears connected to the here-and-now. However, if faced with far-future scientific probabilities that ponder upon apocalyptic planetary issues it inevitably walks on a thin line between incredulity and absurdum. In order to accept the future innovative technologies, the recipient must make a strong connection between the self and the fictional world, rationally avoiding the feelings of non-belonging and alienation. Stories are the only medium where humans and emerging technologies interact in a meaningful manner. Close analysis of three exemplary works of science fiction will show that fictional story helps establish a better understanding of transformative technologies that have been dominating the present. It also helps create a closer link between the concept of transformative technologies and the self, and, finally, it develops diverse behavioral intentions toward transformative technologies, ranging from firm acceptance to flat rejection. It will also become evident that science fiction writers are capable of forecasting future world developments. Their visionary power is richly exploited by the materialistic world to inspire belief in the impossible and to provide a practical means to build breakthrough innovation. Science fiction gives its unmatched contribution to the creation of the technocratic society deprived of the right to privacy and free will. 2. THE FALL OF A HUMAN, THE RISE OF A HUMANOID IN “THE MINORITY REPORT” “The Minority Report” is a 1956 science fiction short story written by American writer Philip K. Dick, first published in Fantastic Universe.2 Set in a future society, three mutants foresee all crime before it occurs. Plugged into a great machine, these “precogs”, are nonsensically babbling as a computer listens and converts this gibberish into predictions of the future. This information is then transcribed onto conventional punch cards that are ejected into various coded slots. These cards appear simultaneously at a special police division called Precrime and the army headquarters to prevent systemic cor2 Philip K. Dick, “The Minority Report”, in Fantastic Universe: Science Fiction, ed. Leo Margulies (New York: King-Size Publications Inc., Jan. 1956), 4-37. 410 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ruption. Based on their predictions, Precrime officers arrest suspects before they can commit any actual crime. The imprisonment of would-be criminals is justified as a necessary consequence for the greater good of a safe society, but when the head of Precrime is himself predicted to murder a man who he has never met, the predictive policing system starts to be doubted. This story reveals the author’s personal anxiety about the dominance of safety over personal liberty reflected in the domain of criminal justice. Precrime is a predictive policing system dedicated to apprehending and detaining people before they have the opportunity to commit a given crime. This method has replaced the traditional system of discovering a crime and its perpetrator after the crime has already been committed, then issuing punishment after the fact. Believing that “punishment was never much of a deterrent and could scarcely have afforded comfort to a victim already dead”,3 Precrime officers are imprisoning people who have not yet committed the crime they are charged with - technically, these people are innocent. Although aware of the “legalistic drawback” Anderton’s society is willing to infringe on people’s personal liberties in the interest of safety. The real world still rests on the traditional system of the commission of crime and the presumption of innocence. Only crimes that have been committed in the flesh, not simply in the mind, can be prosecuted. Once the intention to commit a crime is verbalised, it becomes a threat, and as such it is considered a crime per se. But is it so? The futuristic, hand-gesture controlled computer from “the Minority Report” has already become our reality. The police states have already invested billions into a sophisticated infrastructure to compile files on all humans.4 Thus, people can be investigated for what they look for on the Internet, whether they have a serious intention to commit a crime or not. The case of Gilberto Valle III (“The Cannibal Cop”), a former New York police officer, who was arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit kidnapping, after his wife reported to police that she had found in his Internet search engine history a series of chat room communications with another user of Dark Fetish Net about torturing and murdering his wife, as well as murdering and cannibalizing more than 100 other women, is a good example of how modern version of Precrime works.5 3 ibid., 6. 4 “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region: Predictive Policing Program Flags Individuals for Investigations, Detentions”. hrw.org. Human Rights Watch. 26 February 2018, accessed April 17, 2020. https:// www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region 5 United States v. Gilberto Valle, No. 14-2710-cr and No. 14-4396-cr. (2015). 411 Dijana Zrnić The good side of the predictive policing system is that it acts as a psychological deterrent. As Anderton explains, “the culprit knows we’ll confine him in the detention camp a week before he gets a chance to commit the crime. Thus, Precrime has eliminated 99.8 percent of all felonies, making society a radically safer place”.6 However, Anderton’s shocking discovery of his own culpability in a future crime begins to call into question whether or not this system is really fair. Anderton is suddenly displaced from his safe position at the top of Precrime and thrust in the shoes of would-be criminals who haven’t even committed a crime yet and are still considered guilty. The story returns to the question of if there are innocent people in the detention camps, convicted of a crime they have no intention of committing, just like Anderton. Of course, no algorithm can perfectly predict a person’s future actions. Algorithms cannot decide guilt. They can’t weigh up arguments from the defence and prosecution or analyse evidence. And it was very likely that the Gilberto Valle case would be dropped due to insufficient evidence.7 But, what an algorithm can do is use data on an individual to calculate their risk of re-offending. However, according to Richard Berk, a professor of criminology and statistics at the University of Pennsylvania and a pioneer in the field of predicting recidivism there are two kinds of mistake that the algorithm can make. One kind of error is known as a false negative. It happens whenever you fail to identify the risk that an individual poses. On the other hand there is a false positive. This is when the algorithm incorrectly identifies someone as a high-risk individual. Berk’s algorithms claim to be able to predict whether someone will go on to commit a homicide with 75 per cent accuracy, which makes them some of the most accurate around. But even at 75 per cent that is a lot of offenders who will be denied bail because they look like re-offenders from the outside.8 The consequences of mislabelling a defendant become all the more serious when the algorithms are used in sentencing, rather than just decisions on bail or parole. Recently, some US states have begun to allow judges to see a convicted offender’s calculated risk score while deciding on their jail term. It 6 Dick, “The Minority Report”, 9. 7 The United States v. Gillberto Valle. 8 Richard Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns, and Aaron Roth, “Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art”, in Sociological Methods and Research 1, no. 42 (July 2018): 1-47. 412 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova has proved more often than not that judges would trust the output of a computer over their own judgment, being concerned about not making mistakes.9 Before we dismiss the use of imperfect algorithms in the justice system altogether, it is worth asking: what would an unbiased algorithm look like? The algorithm should be equally good at picking out the defendants who are likely to re-offend, whatever racial or other group they belong to. In addition, it should make the same kind of mistakes at the same rate for everyone- regardless of race, colour, class or creed. If judges are to rely on their judgment only, then race, gender and class should not influence their decisions. However, studies have shown that men are treated more severely than women for the same crime, and that defendants with low levels of income and education are given substantially longer sentences. It is not necessarily explicit prejudices that are causing these biased outcomes, so much as history repeating itself.10 In showing the rational basis of paranoia, Philip Dick encourages the reader to be suspicious and investigatory like Anderton and to question bureaucratic structures with powerful technologies. “The Minority Report” was made into a film by Stephen Spielberg in 2002, with Tom Cruise playing the main role. Sensing the arrival of the era of Big Data, Spielberg stated, “Big Brother is watching us now and what little privacy we have will completely evaporate in twenty or thirty years, because technology will be able to see through walls, through rooftops, into the very privacy of our personal lives, into the sanctuary of our families. George Orwell’s prophecy really comes true, not in the twentieth century, but in the twenty-first”. 11 3. HUMAN V. MACHINE IN “SALLY” Sally” is a 1953 science fiction short story written by Isaac Asimov.12 The story portrays a future in which the only cars allowed on the road are those that contain positronic brains; these are autonomous cars and do not require a human driver. The story takes place in 2057. Fifty-one old cars have been retired to a farm run by Jake, where they can be properly cared for. All have names and are treated like humans. Raymond Gellhorn, an unscrupulous 9 Hannah Fry, Hello World: Being Human in the Age of Algorithms (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2019), 48. 10 Adam Benforado, Unfair: The New Science of Criminal Injustice (New York: Crown, 2015), 197. 11 Buck Wolf, “Spielberg: Big Brother’s Already Watching”, ABC News (6 January 2006). https://abcnews.go.com/ Entertainment/story?id=101214&page=1 12 Isaac Asimov, “Sally”, in Fantastic, ed. Stephne Vincent Benet (New York: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company, May-June 1953), 35-50, 162. 413 Dijana Zrnić businessman, tries to steal some of the cars in order to “recycle” the brains. He forces Jake at gunpoint to board a bus he has poorly wired up to control the vehicle, trying to get away from the farm with Jake as a hostage. The cars chase and eventually surround the bus, communicating with it until it opens a door. Jake falls out and the bus drives off with Gellhorn. The next morning, Gellhorn is found dead in a ditch, exhausted and run over. The bus is found by the police and is identified by its tire tracks. The story ends with Jake losing trust in his cars, thinking what the world will become if cars realise that they are effectively enslaved by humans, and revolt.13 This story reveals that a man has always been dreaming of creating a perfect autonomous vehicle that would reduce mechanical failures and eliminate traffic fatalities. Since, human error was the likeliest cause of traffic accidents, scientists were placed before a task to make cars that would be more intelligent than their drivers. It was a slow and gradual process. No car company expected the futuristic, crash-free utopia of streets filled with driverless vehicles to happen anytime soon, but they wanted to stir up the imaginations of a public increasingly disinterested in driving. And in the meantime, they hoped to increase the sale of vehicles with the latest sophisticated driverassistance technology. Jake remembers that “those were the days when blind war veterans, paraplegics and heads of state were the only ones who drove automatics.”14 But what if a driverless car faces a mechanical failure, threatening to endanger the lives of passengers as well as pedestrians crossing the road? What should the car be programmed to do? How does one decide who should die? One survey showed that 76 percent of respondents felt it would be more moral for driverless vehicles to save as many lives as possible, thus killing the people within the car.15 When the same study asked the participants if they would actually buy a car which would murder them, if the circumstances arose, they suddenly seemed reluctant to sacrifice themselves for the greater good. This moral dilemma originates from the trolley problem, a thought experiment which is considered central to the ethics of autonomous vehicles. The problem arises in discussing the ethics of autonomous vehicle design, which may require programming to choose who or what to strike when a collision 13 ibid., 162. 14 ibid., 37. 15 Craig A. Giffi, Joseph Vitale J., Thomas Schiller, Ryan Robinson, “A Reality Check on Advanced Vehicle Technologies”, in 2017 and 2018 Deloitte Global Automotive Consumer Studies, accessed April 19, 2020, https:// www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/automotive/advanced-vehicle-technologies-autonomous-electricvehicles.html 414 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova appears to be unavoidable.16 In 1983 the psychologist Lisanne Bainbridge wrote a seminal essay on the hidden dangers of relying too heavily on automated systems. Build a machine to improve human performance, she explained, and it will lead, ironically, to a reduction in human ability.17 On 18 March 2018, an Uber self-driving vehicle fatally struck a pedestrian. Video footage from inside the car showed that the “human monitor” sitting behind the wheel was looking away from the road in the moments before the collision.18 Time pressure is something a human being is not really good in coping with. With survival instincts going blunt, a passenger in a driverless car stands little chance of instantly reacting to unexpected barriere on the road. In order to process the instant information before the fatal outcome, he needs to be continuously kept engaged and in regular practice. The bottom line is that no-one can place their absolute trust in the otherwise perfect algorithm, for fear of it turning against them, what Jake eventually realised. There is a saying among airline pilots that the best flying team has three components: a pilot, a computer and a dog. The computer is there to fly the plane; the pilot is there to feed the dog. And the dog is there to bite the human if it tries to touch the computer. “Sally” opens another sensitive legal issue of autonomous vehicles and liability in traffic accidents. Is it the driver at fault, who never had control of the vehicle in the first place, the AI or automated system developer who created the driving software? Is it the auto manufacturer who assembled and supplied the vehicle? How should insurance be handled? If driving is in control of a computer or automated system, how do we differentiate safe from risky driving? If the vehicle’s AI has to make a split second decision between saving the life of a passenger or a pedestrian, how should it go about doing it? As a society, we have only just started to consider the implications and consequences of artificial intelligence. According to the existing automobile products liability laws, with fully autonomous vehicles the software and vehicle manufacturers are expected to be liable for any at-fault collisions, rather 16 Sin Min Hazel Lim, Araz Taeihagh, “Algorithmic Decision-Making in AVs: Understanding Ethical and Technical Concerns for Smart Cities”, Sustainability 11, no. 20 (October 2019): 5791-5791. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su11205791 17 Lisanne Bainbridge, “Ironies of automation”, Automatica 19, no. 6 (Nov. 1983): 775-9. 18 Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Uber’s self-driving cars were struggling before Arizona Crash”, New York Times, 23 March 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/23/technology/uber-self-driving-cars-arizona.html.; Sam Levin, “Video released of Uber self-driving crash that killed woman in Arizona”, Guardian, 22 March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/22/video-released-of-uber-self-driving-crash-that-killedwoman-in-arizona. 415 Dijana Zrnić than the human occupants, the owner or the owner’s insurance company.19 But what happens when a vehicle experiences a data breach or cyber attack? If the legal world is to properly answer to the autonomous vehicles cases, it must first develop understanding of the automated technology, how it operates and functions, and how it affects anyone involved. There is no better medium to partner with law, but science fiction. In this joint venture, fantastic stories thematising legal drawbacks of driver-assisted technology, point at real life scenarios that still have not been recognised by lawmakers and shaped into an imperative norm. In the meantime, automobile industry should put their best efforts into making safer driverless cars, and car occupants should not place all their trust into an algorithm. The ethicality of “life industry” in “The Only Ones” The 2015 dystopian novel “The Only Ones” by Carola Dibbell, though broad in its exploration of the future, puts into focus the dilemma of the ethicality of alternative reproductive technologies in the wake of rapidly spreading disease. Parents, who lost their children to devastating pandemics, mad with grief, save the skin of their dead young, hoping to clone them through parthenogenesis (conception without fertilisation)20 and ectogenesis (the growth of a human embrio and fetus in an artificial uterus)21. Dibbell openly talks about the implications of the development of artificial uteri and ectogenesis on reproductive rights and abortion laws.22 Beyond that, “The Only Ones” foresees a rather precarious future for females, downgraded to the position of subjects of trade in organs, gametes, and bodily fluids on black markets. Dibbell’s personal anxieties about the nature of assisted motherhood calls for serious consideration of legislative definitions of parenthood in the wake of biological versus social ownership to the rights of a child born through artificial means. The story is set in New York City’s boroughs in the latter half of the 21st century, where life in America has been radically altered by waves of populace-decimating pandemics. The economy is a shambles. The streets of the city are hosed down regularly with industrial-strength antiseptic. In this fraught 19 Matthew Channon, Lucy McCormick, Kyriaki Noussia, The Law and Autonomous Vehicles (New York: Informa law from Routledge, 2019). 20 Isa Schön, Koen Martens, Peter van Dijk (eds.), Lost Sex: The Evolutionary Biology of Parthenogenesis (London: Springer, 2009). 21 Scott Gelfand and John R. Shook (eds.), Ectogenesis: Artificial Womb Technology and the Future of Human Reproduction (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2006). 22 Carola Dibbell, The Only Ones (Columbus: Two Dollar Radio, 2015). 416 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova landscape, Inez Fardo – a 19-year-old “hardy” whose biology is resistant to the disease vectors – makes a discovery. The wealthy will pay her good money if she’ll let them clone her, thereby sparing themselves the cruelty of the high infant mortality rate. Once the newborn versions of Inez emerge from their cloning tanks, she’ll never see them again. When the would-be mother of one of those clones suddenly dies, Inez decides to risk everything by taking her replica, Ani, and raising her as her daughter. The problem is in the identity legitimization of the illegal parenthogenetic babies. Rapidly changing reproductive technologies – from assisted conception to surrogacy, cloning, birth control, and more – have been a central area of concern in science fiction. Recently, a new reproductive possibility has developed, as ectogenesis becomes increasingly feasible, further adding to the ongoing controversy regarding human reproductive rights. Researchers at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia Research Institute announced they had successfully shown that “fetal lambs that are developmentally equivalent to the extreme premature human infant can be physiologically supported in (an) extra-uterine device for up to 4 weeks.23 Ectogenesis has long been a topic of discussion in bioethics. This rather controversial technology has raised many critical, moral, philosophical, legal, social, and political concerns.24 If artificial uterus may expand the range of fetal viability, then abortion laws must change to include the differentiation between the right to remove the fetus and to terminate the fetus. Will ectogenesis satisfy the antiabortion advocates, is a valid question. If transferring the fetus from a woman’s womb to an artificial uterus is possible, the choice to terminate a pregnancy in this way could provide an alternative to aborting (removing) the fetus. With ectogenesis “a woman’s contribution to the birth of a live baby will be similar to that of a man, namely, both will only need to provide or donate gametes. That means that homosexual and single men could have genetic offspring without the use of surrogate pregnancy or a sperm donor, and allow women to have children without going through the pregnancy cycle. “The Only Ones” shows that reproductive technology works in favour of Shulamith Firestone’s insistence on the controversial truth that women will never be equal in society 23 E. Partridge, M. Davey, M. Hornick, et al., “An extra-uterine system to physiologically support the extreme premature lamb”, Nature Communications 8, 15112 (25 April 2017). https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms15112. 24 Joona Räsänen, “Ectogenesis, abortion and a right to the death of the Fetus”, Bioethics 31, no. 9 (November 2017): 697-702. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12404; P. Hendricks, “There is no right to the death of the fetus”, Bioethics 32, no. 6 (July 2018): 395-397. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12455. 417 Dijana Zrnić with the inherent biological difference depriving them of the right to choose.25 The future of humankind will inevitably depend upon a range of available alternative reproductive technologies – with ectogenesis playing a major role. 4. CONCLUSION Science fiction is a prophetic literary genre whose imaginary worlds have long been demystified. At first, a recipient’s imagination could only fathom the wanders of those fantastic settings that were scientifically explicable. However, with the introduction of SF prototyping, high technology has become a powerful weapon caught in the hands of the materialistic world. Multiple fields including transportation, reproductive technology, and transformative technology are improved because of fantastical ideas presented in science fiction. However, science fiction also warns that large amount of hi-tech inventions could hinder the progression of humanity at an intellectual level. The entertainment field could lure people into its visually stimulating environment and cause a decrease in the want to learn. Hence, science fiction should be taken more seriously as a legitimate mode of understanding the impact of transformative technology on social, cultural, economic and cognitive aspects of human life. It inspires curiosity through stories that demonstrate what could be created and what could become of society. Unfounded technological advances displayed in literary and visual mediums are responsible for the advances in technology and culture in modern society. Science fiction has walked off the pages and out of the screen to influence the progression of society, culturally and technologically. The three exemplary stories have revealed the arrogant, dictatorial side of machines as objective masters over their human creators. If they are to serve humanity, it is high time man started treating them as he would any other source of power. He should question their decisions, scrutinize their motives, demand to know who stands to benefit, hold them accountable for their mistakes, and refuse to become complacent. In a technocratic society humans have never been more important, not as subjects, but masters of their creations. 25 Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: the Case for Feminist Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003). 418 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova LIST OF REFERENCES The fall of a human, the rise of a humanoid in “The Minority Report” 1. Dick, Philip K., “The Minority Report”, in Fantastic Universe: Science Fiction, ed. Leo Margulies (New York: King-Size Publications Inc., Jan. 1956), 4-37. 2. “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region: Predictive Policing Program Flags Individuals for Investigations, Detentions”. hrw.org. Human Rights Watch. 26 February 2018, accessed April 17, 2020. https://www.hrw. org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region. 3. United States v. Gilberto Valle, No. 14-2710-cr and No. 14-4396-cr. (2015). 4. Berk, R., Heidari, H., Jabbari, S., Kearns, M. and Roth, A., “Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art”, in Sociological Methods and Research 1, no. 42 (July 2018): 1-47. 5. Fry, H., Hello World: Being Human in the Age of Algorithms (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2019), 48. 6. Benforado, A., Unfair: The New Science of Criminal Injustice (New York: Crown, 2015), 197. 7. Wolf, B., “Spielberg: Big Brother’s Already Watching”, ABC News (6 January 2006). https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/story?id=101214&page=1 Human v. Machine in „Sally“ 1. Asimov, I.,“Sally”, in Fantastic, ed. Stephen Vincent Benet (New York: ZiffDavis Publishing Company, May-June 1953), 35-50, 162. 2. Giffi, C. A., Vitale J., J., Schiller, T., Robinson, R., “A Reality Check on Advanced Vehicle Technologies”, in 2017 and 2018 Deloitte Global Automotive Consumer Studies, accessed April 19, 2020, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/ industry/automotive/advanced-vehicle-technologies-autonomous-electricvehicles.html. 3. Hazel Lim, S. M., Taeihagh, A., “Algorithmic Decision-Making in AVs: Understanding Ethical and Technical Concerns for Smart Cities”, Sustainability 11, no. 20 (October 2019): 5791-5791. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11205791. 4. Bainbridge, L., “Ironies of automation”, Automatica 19, no. 6 (Nov. 1983): 775-9. 5. Wakabayashi, D., “Uber’s self-driving cars were struggling before Arizona Crash”, New York Times, 23 March 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/23/ technology/uber-self-driving-cars-arizona.html. 6. Levin, S., “Video released of Uber self-driving crash that killed woman in Arizona”, Guardian, 22 March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/ 419 Dijana Zrnić technology/2018/mar/22/video-released-of-uber-self-driving-crash-thatkilled-woman-in-arizona. 7. Channon, M., McCormick, L., Noussia, K., The Law and Autonomous Vehicles (New York: Informa law from Routledge, 2019). The ethicality of „life industry“ in „The Only Ones“ 1. Schön, I., Martens, K., van Dijk, P., (eds.), Lost Sex: The Evolutionary Biology of Parthenogenesis (London: Springer, 2009). 2. Gelfand, S. and Shook, J.R., (eds.), Ectogenesis: Artificial Womb Technology and the Future of Human Reproduction (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2006). 3. Dibbell, C., The Only Ones (Columbus: Two Dollar Radio, 2015). 4. Partridge, E., Davey, M., Hornick, M. et al., “An extra-uterine system to physiologically support the extreme premature lamb”, Nature Communications 8, 15112 (25 April 2017). https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms15112. 5. Räsänen, J., “Ectogenesis, abortion and a right to the death of the Fetus”, Bioethics 31, no. 9 (November 2017): 697-702. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12404; 6. Hendricks, P., “There is no right to the death of the fetus”, Bioethics 32, no. 6 (July 2018): 395-397. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12455. 7. Firestone, S., The Dialectic of Sex: the Case for Feminist Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003). 420 Original scientific paper UDK SURROGACY AS A FORM OF THE THIRD-PARTY REPRODUCTION IN THE BIOMEDICALLY ASSISTED FERTILIZATION ACT OF REPUBLIC SRPSKA Mirjana Miškić1 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Abstract: The Biomedically Assisted Fertilization Act introduces the third-party reproduction as a form of assisted reproduction. Third-party reproduction or donor-assisted reproduction refers to involving someone other than the infertile couple in the process of reproduction. This includes using the donated eggs, sperm or embryos and surrogacy. The Biomedically Assisted Fertilization Act allows partial third-party reproduction, because surrogate motherhood is still strongly prohibited. Apparently, surrogacy produces more ethical and legal questions than donations of gametes. Involving a third party into the process of assisted reproduction through the donation of gametes produces similar ethical and legal questions as surrogacy. Prohibition of surrogacy deprives those in need of their right to procreate which is their human and constitutional right. Women afflicted with uterine anomalies, recurrent miscarriages or repeated implantation failure view surrogacy as their only chance to have their own children. Also, health-involved risks with repeated bio-medically assisted fertilization, are not negligible and surrogacy can help in the prevention of these risks. Key words: surrogacy, third-party reproduction, donation of gametes, reproductive justice, right to procreate. 1. INTRODUCTION Infertility is a medical problem that increases every year in the Republic of Srpska. Nearly 700-800 childless couples every year apply to the state funds for reimbursement of bio-medically assisted fertilization. It is estimated that in Bosnia and Herzegovina live 50 thousand infertile people. State funds pay 1 PhD, Assistant Professor 421 Mirjana Miškić for the three attempts of bio-medically assisted fertilization, while some municipalities in the Republic of Srpska (i.e. Prijedor), who are struggling with low birth rates, also pay for the fourth attempt. According to a study conducted by the European Association for Human Reproduction and Embryology, every sixth couple is considered infertile.2 Infertility can be characterized as a disease of modern times and the main causes of the disease are stress, bad life habits such as smoking, alcoholism, or environmental pollution. Besides these general health risks, one of the reasons why the couple becomes infertile is the decision to form a family in later years of life. The late 20th-century trend to delay the birth of the first child is due to improved educational and career opportunities for the woman as well as increased availability and use of contraception. The decline in fecundity and reproductive capacity becomes clinically relevant when a woman reaches their mid-30s. In addition to primary infertility when the couple is unable to have children at all, secondary infertility occurs when the couple unsuccessfully tries to conceive a second child after the first child. Secondary infertility becomes problematic when a couple does not realize in time they need to consult a specialist. According to the results of the national coordinator for reproductive health, dr Sanja Sibinčić, in the Republic of Srpska, both men and women have a problem conceiving.3 Men often have reduced fertility, but their problem is much easier and quicker to treat. Reasons for the men’s infertility are usually connected with lifestyle choices, such as smoking,drinking alcohol and taking drugs, as well as long term sickness, childhood infections, chromosome and hormonal disorders.Also, it is important to stress the fact that couples age 25-35 reach for the bio-medically assisted fertilization. In the Republic of Srpska, infertility is a problem present among the young population, as well. The constitution of the Republic of Srpska guarantees the right to freely decide on childbirth.4 This right implies that everyone is free to decide whether and how many children they will have and at what intervals they will give birth. The Constitution does not emphasize that this is a joint decision of a man and a woman, but it is the right of the individual. This attitude is a 2 Indiana Husić-Šabanović, Uporedna analiza prijedloga Zakona o biomedicinski potpomognutoj oplodnji, Sarajevo 2018, 5.https://eu-monitoring.ba/site/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Analiza-zakona-BMPO.pdf ,accessed 10.4.320 3 Dragana Božić, Borba protiv neplodnosti: Mi smo taj par! https://mondo.ba/Info/Drustvo/a887123/Neplodnost-u-RS-borba-za-potomstvo.html accessed 31.3. 2020. 4 Article 36 of the Constitution of Republic of Srpska, https://www.narodnaskupstinars.net/sites/default/files/ upload/dokumenti/ustav/lat/ustav_republike_srpske.pdf acessed 1.4.2020. 422 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova consequence of the recognition of reproductive freedom as a personal right. The right to freely decide on childbirth in the case of infertility depends on the opportunities afforded by medical science and the legal permissibility of certain biomedical procedures. Chances of getting pregnant through IVF procedure depend most on the quality of the embryo, the function of the ovary and the placement in the uterus. Despite immense progress in infertility treatments, successful IVF procedures of patients younger than 35 years are 30-40%. This fact shows that standard IVF procedures are successful in only one- third of the cases. Some couples expose themselves to repeated bio-medically assisted fertilization at relatively short intervals of time. Invasive therapy often leads to adverse health effects for couples, especially women.The adverse effects of repeated artificial insemination have not been sufficiently investigated. Biomedically assisted fertilization in the Republic of Srpska was regulated for the first time in 2007, with a Rulebook. Until the Draft Biomedically Assisted Fertilization Act was proposed in 2019, third party reproduction was impossible.5 With this Act, the third person can donate gametes, egg or sperm cells. The Biomedically Assisted Fertilization Act takes a restrictive approach to the third party reproduction and allows it only when it is not possible to use gametes of one of the spouses or extramarital spouses or when transmission of hereditary disease to the child is prevented. Donator must remain anonymous and his donation must be free (Article 43). It is important to note that this provision is contrary to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which gives each child the right to know his or her own identity.6 This provision specifically implies that the child has the right to know his/her biological origin.7 The child’s interests in knowing his or her origin may be psychological, medical, and ultimately legal. Also, the donor has no parental rights or obligations toward children conceived by his 5 Draft Biomedically Assisted Fertilization Act, https://narodnaskupstinars.net/?q=ci/акти/стручна-расправа/ нацрт-закона-о-лијечењу-неплодности-поступцима-биомедицински-потпомогнуте-оплодње accessed 10.4.2020. 6 Article 7. of Convention on the Rights of the Child, https://www.ohchr.org/ accessed 10.4.2020. 1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. 2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. 7 Gordana Kovaček-Stanić, Pravo deteta da zna svoje poreklo, Novi Sad: Pravni fakultet u Novom Sadu, 1997; Marija Draškić, Pravo deteta na saznanje porijekla, „Pravni kapaciteti Srbije za evropske integracije“, (ed. Stevan Lilić), knjiga 4, Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, ( 2009), 37-50. 423 Mirjana Miškić gametes (Article 48). The Act provides that donors may be persons who have given up or have not used the gametes for their fertilization. As a result, this rule in practice will produce a small number of donations. Although, the Ministry of Health will conduct an active campaign on the voluntary donation of genetic material, prejudices against gamete donations are publicly present. They are adopted from stereotypes that pervade television, film and social networks. Research conducted at the reproductive health clinic showed that very few infertile women will accept the services of a surrogate mother. Also, it turned out that educated women would rather accept the services of a surrogate mother than women with a lower educational profile. In addition to general judgments, the scientific, non-medical, public does not look favorably on surrogacy. Jurists, sociologists, feminists, political scientists view surrogacy motherhood as a phenomenon that can do more harm than good and take a mostly negative attitude.8 A significant number of scientists agree that persons who cannot naturally reach offspring should not be stigmatized and should be given access to medical options of procreation. On the other hand, the negative case law and the controversy over the ethical dimension of surrogacy lead them to a critical stand. In addition, feminist criticism considers surrogacy motherhood to be the legalization of one of the worst forms of violence against women and child trafficking.9 Radical feminist thinkers unilaterally advocate that it is the surrogate mother’s rights that have been violated, and not the rights of the couples or individuals who cannot independently conceive a family. It is considered that surrogate mothers are usually of lower educational background, poor and often suffer family pressure to provide income to their families. On the other hand, intended mothers are financially well provided, educated, and willing to afford a „painless maternity option“. Such a possibility is provided in India and Ukraine, where it is possible to obtain the services of a surrogate mother at up to five times lower cost than in the US. Cross-border surrogacy business or „reproductive tourism“ as it is called, is most common in countries with poor reproductive health legislation and a liberal approach to surrogacy. A country that wants to avoid becoming a country where reproductive tourism is flourishing must formulate its reproductive legislation in 8 One of the few papers written on the subject of surrogacy of motherhood in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which deals constructively with the topic is Meliha Frndic Imamovic, Surogat materinstvo- ne/opravdanost normiranja u budućem Zakonu o liječenju neplodnosti biomedicinski potpomognutom oplodnjom u Bosni i Hercegovini, Civitas, 5/2, Novi Sad, ( 2015) 24-32. 9 Slobodanka Dekić, Surogat majčinstvo u neoliberalnoj Srbiji: da li Afroamerikanka može da rodi dijete iz Srbije?,Genero- časopis za feminističku teoriju i studije kulture, 23, Beograd, ( 2019), 127-149. 424 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova a precise and restrictive way. Countries that do not regulate surrogate motherhood at all are at high risk of becoming reproductive tourism countries. It is obvious that surrogacy has become a global phenomenon that cannot be ignored. Therefore countries must take a clear position, either affirmative or negative on the issue of surrogacy. 2. SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD Surrogate motherhood is a final case of the third party reproduction. The woman afflicted with uterine anomalies, recurrent miscarriages or repeated implantation failure and same-sex couples see surrogacy as their last chance to have babies. Surrogacy is a type of gestational carrier arrangement in which a woman is inseminated with sperm or implanted an embryo to become pregnant for another person(s). It is gender- specific legal agreement in which a woman other than the intended mother gestates and gives birth to a child for the intended parents. There are two types of surrogacy, traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy. In gestational surrogacy, an egg is removed from the intended mother and fertilized with the sperm of the intended father and then implanted in the womb of the surrogate mother. In this case of surrogacy, the surrogate mother provides „womb for rent“. This form of surrogacy is called full surrogacy. Missing biological connection between the surrogate and baby simplifies the relationship among the intended parents, the surrogate and the baby. Because of that fact, it is generally agreed that full surrogacy is more socially acceptable. Countries that intend to introduce the surrogate motherhood, should consider this form of surrogacy. In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate mother is inseminated with the sperm of the intended father and carries the child for the intended parents. The biological link between the intended mother and baby is missing. This type of surrogacy produces more controversion than the gestational surrogacy because the surrogate mother is the biological and gestational mother of the child. That fact may produce social, ethical and legal conflicts. Also, the emotional attachment between surrogate mother and newborn can be so strong, that the surrogate mother willingly breaches the surrogacy contract. This leads to a court settlement of the dispute. The best known surrogate custody dispute, over a child known as Baby M, happened 33 years ago.10 Surrogate mother from traditional surrogacy refused to hand the baby over to intend10 https://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/1988/109-n-j-396-1.html accesed 13.4.2020. 425 Mirjana Miškić ed parents, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a mother could not be forced to surrender her child, and in 1988 declared the surrogate mother the legal mother. As a result of that precedent, at present time, surrogacy agreements are gestational, using the egg of intended mother or anonymous donor. In addition to that fact, it is important to mention that from an estimated number of 25 000 women who gave birth through surrogacy, over 99% of these women willingly renounced the child as they contractually agreed to. 11 3. NECESSARY COMPENSATION Compensation is one of the main legal disputes concerning surrogacy. Surrogacy could be commercial or altruistic. Commercial surrogacy refers to any surrogacy arrangement in which the surrogate mother is compensated for her services beyond reimbursement of medical expenses. Factors that may impact surrogate mother compensation can include geographic location, the type of pregnancies (e.g.twins), reimbursement for activities she cannot perform during the pregnancy. Appropriate economic compensation to surrogate mother is necessary but should not exceed the real costs of pregnancy, prenatal care and eventual contribution in newborn development (pumped breast milk). From an ethical perspective, commercial surrogacy makes the process a „service“ that can be traded. Commercial contracts introduce market elements in the process of reproduction, so women and children are considered as objects of the law. That is the main argument against commercial surrogacy. On the other hand, altruistic surrogacy is very rare and usually recorded among relatives. When a family member or a friend offers to be a surrogate, it greatly reduces the cost of surrogacy. Kinship surrogacy is not necessarily controversial if based on a gestational agreement. As far as traditional surrogacy is concerned, mixed family relations may arise, e.g.where grandmother bears a child for the daughter. Most of the legislation that allows for the surrogacy, advocate that a surrogate mother deserves a reasonable fee. The reasonable fee does not mean paying the surrogate mother over and above compensating her for direct costs. The principle of reasonable fee shows that the surrogate mother does not sell or rent her services but offers them to a couple or to an individual who is unable to independently achieve parenthood. The param11 Teman, Elly, The Social Construction of Surrogacy Research: An Anthropological Critique of the Psychosocial Scholarship on Surrogate Motherhood. Social Science & Medicine, Vol. 67, 1104, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1476559 accessed 10.4.2020. 426 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova eters for determining the amount of a reasonable fee should be foreseen by the Biomedically Assisted Fertilization Act. Also, the permitted type of surrogacy should be determined by the Act. Perhaps it is the best solution to regulate surrogacy with a separate act. The reason for this solution is the need for detailed legislation that would relieve the existing Biomedically Assisted Fertilization Act of the burden of detailed regulation of surrogacy. The rights and obligations should be closely defined in the form of a contract entered into by the intended parents and the surrogate mother. Before entering into a contract, the surrogate mother must obtain evidence that she is psychologically and physically fit to bear the pregnancy and give birth to another.12 A surrogate mother may be a woman who is married, cohabiting or unmarried. If the surrogate mother is married, her husband’s permission is also required. It would be desirable but not obligatory for the surrogate mother to have at least one child of her own. This request is justified for two reasons. The first reason is the confirmed fertility of the surrogate mother and the second reason is the more likely of less attachment to the child who is born to the intended parents. Parents and a surrogate mother must consult a psychological counseling center before entering into a contract and prepare for surrogate parenting (Psychological counseling is also required in other forms of artificial insemination (Article 41, part 3)). Medical documentation of the physical and mental suitability of a potential surrogate mother are crucial for verification of a contract that will be made by a notary. In addition, the surrogate mother is required to perform the necessary medical tests to achieve a healthy pregnancy and to act conscientiously during the pregnancy. The obligation of conscientious conduct implies that the surrogate mother abstains from sexual intercourse with her husband or partner during the ovulation period, both before and after insemination. If the surrogate mother listens to the doctor’s advice and acty conscientiously in order to bear a healthy child, but still suffers a miscarriage or has to undergo an abortion for medical reasons, her contractual obligation will terminate.13 The time of conclusion of the contract is essential because the contract must be concluded before the occurance of pregnancy.The surrogacy contract must be concluded before the pregnancy, due to legal certainty and avoidance of 12 Bernadet Bordaš, Surogat materinstvo u Srbiji- međunarodnoprivatnopravni aspekti, Liber amicorum Gašo Knežević, 108. http://www.arbitrationassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/101_121.pdf, accessed 10.3. 2020. 13 Slobodan Panov, Porodično pravo, Beograd 2008, 356. 427 Mirjana Miškić suspected abuse of the difficult position of a pregnant woman. The contract is the legal basis for the artificial implantation procedure. In order to avoid reproductive tourism, the surrogacy contract could be concluded only by citizens of the Republic of Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina, respectively. This provision seeks to prevent the Republic of Srpska from becoming a destination country for infertile couples from abroad.14 There are two main reasons why the surrogacy with the cross-border element is in expansion. The first reason is that surrogacy is prohibited or subject to strict restrictions in the country where intended parents live. The practice of regulating surrogacy is diverse. Some states do not regulate this matter15, some states regulate and prohibit all forms of surrogacy16, and some states regulate and allow gestational surrogacy17. Another reason is the costs of surrogacy that are lower in some countries, such as Ukraine and India, than in the country of residence of the intended parents.18 Unequal legal treatment of legal parenting confers complications when intended parents return from a country where they received a child from surrogacy to a country of residence in which surrogacy is not allowed. In a country where surrogacy of motherhood is permitted, intended parents acquire parental rights and responsibilities, but these rights must also be confirmed in the country of their residence. Otherwise, they will be deprived of parental rights and the child will be returned to the surrogate mother. The surrogate mother is obliged to give over the child after childbirth and the intended parents are obliged to take the child regardless of the child’s gender and health conditions. Having handed over the child to the intended 14 Greece has introduced a complete and comprehensive regulatory framework for medically assisted human reproduction, with provisions for altruistic gestational surrogacy since 2002. Initially, Greece restricted surrogacy parenting solely to its own nationals, but the amendment to the Act of 2014, and allowed foreigners with temporary or permanent residence in Greece to use the services of surrogacy. Maria C. Vastaroucha, Surrogacy Proceedings in Greece after the implementation of law 4272/2014, http://www.greeklawdigest.gr/ topics/aspects-of-greek-civil-law/item/217-surrogacy-proceedings-in-greece-after-the-implementation-oflaw-4272-2014, accessed 10.4.2020. 15 Among the countries that left maternity surrogacy unregulated are Canada, Belgium, Argentina, Northern Australia, Czech Republic, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Brazil, Venezuela, Michigen and New York. Hague Conference of Private International Law, А Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements, drawn up by the Permanent Bureau, General Affairs and Policy, Prel. Doc. No 10, March 2012. , https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d4ff8ecd-f747-46da-86c3-61074e9b17fe.pdf accessed 10.4.2020. 16 Surrogacy motherhood is expressly prohibited in the following states China, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland. 17 Surogate motherhood is permitted in some parts of Australia (Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria, West Australia), Canada (Alberta, British Columbia), China (Hong Kong), Greece, Israel, South Africa, New Zeland, Russia, Ukraine, India, North Macedonia. Based on this data, surrogacy is generally not allowed in European countries. 18 Bernadet Bordaš, Surogat materinstvo sa prekograničnim dejstvima: stvarnost i pravo, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, 4/2012, (decembar 2012). 101. 428 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova parents, the surrogate mother has no right to make requests to see the child, unless the intended parents agree. Many disputes surrounding surrogacy focus on the question of who should be given parental rights and responsibilities if arrangement breaks down (in some cases, neither party to the arrangments wants to keep the baby, in other cases both parties want to keep it.). It is important to note that a surrogate mother does not become a mother by birth, nor is she legally registered as a mother. Therefore, it is clear that there are no parental rights or duties under the law, but only the eventual rights and obligations contracted with the intended parents in the contract. Recognition of a genetic mother as a legal mother is needed for reasons of simplification of the procedure and a greater degree of security of the party in the procedure. Many countries’ legislatures consider a surrogate mother a legal mother because they respect the old legal principle of mater semper certa est. Way back in Roman times, it was considered an irrefutable legal assumption that the mother of the child was the one who gave birth to him. Paternity can be questioned but maternity established at birth remains. The determination of paternity was determined by months of pregnancy. The father was considered to be the mother’s husband in the month of conception. With the development of medical science, both maternity and paternity can be challenged and established in later periods of life, not just at birth. Two principles are relevant for determining maternity in the case of surrogacy: the principle of genetic truth and the principle of sociological reality. The principle of genetic truth claims that the child’s parents are the ones whose genetic material was used for fertilization.The first principle completely ignores the second principle. The second principle is that the parents of the child are the ones who raise and transmit values, not anonymous providers of gametes. The gestational type of surrogacy of motherhood integrates both principles because the mother of the child is a person whose genetic material carries and takes care of the child. Therefore, I consider it justified that the intended mother is considered to be a legal mother, who is also a genetic mother. Otherwise, if the surrogate mother is declared a legal mother, the procedure is unnecessarily complicated by the adoption process and the fact of the genetic link remains completely ignored. Also, if the services of a surrogate mother are used abroad and the country where the intended parents live, forbids surrogacy, it will be difficult for parents to prove their parenting. A particularly problematic situation arises when the surrogate mother is declared a legal mother and her husband the 429 Mirjana Miškić father of the child.19 Although not genetically related to the child, the surrogate mother and her husband will be considered the child’s parents, and his genetic parents will only be adoptive parents. In this way the interests of the child can be seriously affected through inability to obtain citizenship, loss of inheritance rights, parent’s inability to obtain paid leave for the care of a sick child, etc. 4. CONCLUSION The Republic of Srpska’s reproductive legislation has taken a major step forward with the adoption of the third-party reproduction. The Biomedically Assisted Fertilization Act takes a restrictive approach to the third-party reproduction and allows it only when it is not possible to use gametes of one of the spouses or extramarital spouses or when transmission of hereditary disease to the child is prevented. This regulation created the basis for adoption of a special Surrogacy Act. The Act should, on one hand, be restrictive of the conditions for surrogacy, and on the other hand, the right of infertile couples or individuals to biological parenting should be satisfied. Some solutions suggested in the paper, such as the adoption of gestational surrogacy, recognition of genetic mother as legal mother, limiting the number of outgoing cases of surrogacy, could help in preventing the Republic of Srpska becoming a destination country for reproductive tourism. Detailed legal regulation of this subject is needed and surely would help avoid the complications arising from surrogacy. Suggestions and potential solutions discussed in this paper could help regulate, not prohibit this medical treatment. REFERENCES: 1. Constitution of Republic of Srpska, https://www.narodnaskupstinars.net/ sites/default/files/upload/dokumenti/ustav/lat/ustav_republike_srpske.pdf acessed 1.4.2020 2. Convention on the Rights of the Child, https://www.ohchr.org/ 3. Hague Conference of Private International Law, А Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements, drawn up by the Permanent Bureau, General Affairs and Policy, Prel. Doc. No 10, March 19 Andjela Djukanovic, Pitanje surogat materinstva u praksi suda pravde Evropske Unije, Evropsko zakonodavstvo, 64/2018, http://repozitorijum.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/159/1/Evropsko_zakonodavstvo_br._64_2018%20 %281%29.pdf accessed 10.4.2020. 430 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 2012. , https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d4ff8ecd-f747-46da-86c3-61074e9b17fe. pdf accessed 10.4.2020. Draft Biomedically Assisted Fertilization Act https://narodnaskupstinars. net/?q=ci/акти/стручна-расправа/нацрт-закона-о-лијечењу-неплодности-поступцима-биомедицински-потпомогнуте-оплодње accessed 10.4.2020. Bordaš, Bernadet. Surogat materinstvo sa prekograničnim dejstvom, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, 4/2012, (decembar 2012). 97-112. Bordaš, Bernadet. Surogat materinstvo u Srbiji- međunarodnoprivatnopravni aspekti, Liber amicorum Gašo Knežević, http://www.arbitrationassociation. org/wp- content/uploads/2017/07/101_121.pdf, accessed 10.3. 2020. Dekić, Slobodanka. Surogat majčinstvo u neoliberalnoj Srbiji: da li Afroamerikanka može da rodi dijete iz Srbije?,Genero- Časopis za feminističku teoriju i studije kulture, 23 Beograd 2019, 127-149. Djukanovic, Andjela. Pitanje surogat materinstva u praksi suda pravde Evropske Unije, Evropsko zakonodavstvo, 64/2018, http://repozitorijum. diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/159/1/Evropsko_zakonodavstvo_br._64_2018%20 %281%29.pdf accessed 10.4.2020. Draškić, Marija. Pravo deteta na saznanje porijekla, „Pravni kapaciteti Srbije za evropske integracije“, (ed. Stevan Lilić), knjiga 4, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, (Beograd 2009), 37-50. Frndic Imamovic, Meliha. Surogat materinstvo- ne/opravdanost normiranja u budućem Zakonu o liječenju neplodnosti biomedicinski potpomognutom oplodnjom u Bosni i Hercegovini, Civitas, 5/2, (Novi Sad 2015), 24-32. Dragana Božić, Borba protiv neplodnosti: Mi smo taj par! https://mondo. ba/Info/Drustvo/a887123/Neplodnost-u-RS-borba-za-potomstvo.html accessed 31.3. 2020. Husić-Šabanović, Indiana. Uporedna analiza prijedloga Zakona o biomedicinski potpomognutoj oplodnji, Sarajevo 2018, 5.https://eumonitoring.ba/site/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Analiza-zakona-BMPO. pdf ,accessed 10.4.320 Kovaček-Stanić, Gordana. Pravo deteta da zna svoje poreklo, Pravni fakultet u Novom Sadu, Novi Sad, 1997. Panov, Slobodan Porodično pravo, Beograd, 2008. Teman, Elly, The Social Construction of Surrogacy Research: An Anthropological Critique of the Psychosocial Scholarship on Surrogate Motherhood. Social Science & Medicine, Vol. 67, pp. 1104-1112, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1476559 accessed 10.4.2020. 431 Mirjana Miškić 16. Vastaroucha, Maria C. Surrogacy Proceedings in Greece after the implementation of law 4272/2014, http://www.greeklawdigest.gr/topics/ aspects-of-greek-civil-law/item/217-surrogacy-proceedings-in-greece-afterthe-implementation-of-law-4272-2014, accessed 10.4.2020. 432 Original scientific paper UDK CROSS-BORDER ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Milana Pisarić1 Faculty of Law, University of Novi Sad Abstract: In 2016 EU member states completed a European Commission’s questionnaire on improving cooperation between competent national authorities to facilitate and accelerate the collection of electronic evidence, direct cooperation between competent authorities and the private sector, providing international legal assistance and mutual recognition of decisions between Member States and execution of state jurisdiction in cyberspace. The results showed that there is no approximate unique solution for cross-border access to electronic evidence, which results in legal uncertainty and precludes cross-border cooperation. Given the insufficient efficiency of the existing mechanisms, on the one hand, and the nature of the data processed, stored and transmitted over the Internet, on the other hand, the question was raised whether it would be justified, due to the need for urgent response in cyber space, to give the competent state authorities the authority to access and search under certain conditions and in certain cases computer systems and networks located in the territory of another country, or to take certain actions outside the borders of their territory to collect data for criminal proceedings. The subject of the paper will be to consider the justification of such powers through a critical analysis of the proposal for a Regulation on a European warrant for the preservation and submission of electronic evidence in criminal matters and the proposal for a Directive on the appointment of a legal representative responsible for the taking of evidence in criminal proceedings. Keywords: criminal procedure, cyber space, electronic evidence, international cooperation. 1 PhD, Assistant with a doctorate 433 Milana Pisarić 1. INTRODUCTION Beside all the positive and good staff the information technologies (IT) have brought to everyday life of individuals, business, industry, and whole society, cybercrime and IT-enabled crime is one of its negative side effects. In the digital era, criminals are making increasing use of tech services and tools to plan and commit crimes. As more and more data are available in electronic form, not only evidence for cybercrime, but also for almost all other types of crime may today reside in cyber space, as digital traces. Electronic evidence are electronic data, which are stored, processed or transmitted in computer system, computer network or other device for electronic storing, processing or transmission of data, and which, after collected and analysed in terms of digital forensic and in framework of criminal procedure law, may be used as evidence in criminal procedure.2 Electronic evidence is becoming essential to fighting crime: currently, 85% of criminal investigations involve digital data,3 and not only cybercrime investigation, while electronic evidence can be relevant for any crime. However, because of challenges of trans-border dimension of electronic evidence, crimes may not be effectively investigated. Data may be stored on one or more servers which can be located in several countries, which makes much more difficult for judicial authorities to collect electronic evidence as they have to go through lengthy and complicated procedures to obtain access to it. Cross-border access to electronic evidence is today one of the most intriguing issues of crime investigation. Getting access to them is not always a straightforward matter for authorities because it is often is often stored outside the country whose authorities need access. If, in the course of an investigation, there is a need to collect electronic evidence located abroad, the rules of public international law require that in such cases, mutual legal assistance mechanisms in criminal matters are used, on the basis of which the competent authorities of one State request the competent authorities of another 2 Milana Pisarić, Elektronski dokazi u krivičnom postupku (Novi Sad: Centar za izdavačku delatnost Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, 2019), 79. 3 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings {COM(2018) 225 final} - {COM(2018) 226 final} - {SWD(2018) 119 final}, last modified April 17, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 52018SC0118&from=EN, 14. 434 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova State to take individual evidentiary actions in order to collect the evidence for criminal proceedings. A cross-border request to obtain e-evidence is made in over 50% of all criminal investigations, in almost two thirds (65%) of the investigations where e-evidence is relevant, a request to service providers across borders (based in another jurisdiction) is needed, meaning that in 55% of total investigations that include a request to cross-border access to e-evidence.4 However, these mechanisms are slow for timely access to data. The effective fight against transnational forms of misuse of information technology, and in particular the collection of electronic evidence, requires urgent and rapid response, and the existing general frameworks for cooperation between competent authorities have to be adapted to the specific challenges posed by the particular nature of electronic evidence.5 According to the United Nations, about 70% of cases of international cooperation in combating cybercrime are based on traditional mechanisms for assisting in criminal matters, with the Convention on cybercrime6 being extremely important.7 However, the procedures for assisting the requested State on the request of the requesting State are assessed as too complex, time consuming, exhausting - it takes several months, even years, for the State authority to obtain the necessary electronic evidence in this way.8 In some cases, the requested State may refuse to act on the request because it is a minor offense or the request is not substantiated by sufficient information or is too broad and incomprehensible, or there are too many differences in national legal systems. It is therefore of utmost importance to response to the ever increasing need of the law enforcement to timely access electronic evidence for internet-based investigations, which has more and more cross-border dimension. Lawful access to electronic evidence can be very challenging, as the types of data online service providers collect and the legal systems in which they are based vary greatly. It is therefore crucial for law enforcement and judicial authorities to know which type of data they can request and how to request it. That is why the European Union (EU) started taking steps to improve cross-border access to e-evidence by creating a legal framework which will 4 Ibidem. 5 Pisarić, Elektronski dokazi u krivičnom postupku, 227. 6 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, accessed March 20, 2020, https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention. 7 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, 2013, accessed March 20, 2020, https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/cybercrime/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf. 8 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), The Mutual Legal Assistance Provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 2014, accessed March 20, 2020, https://rm.coe.int/16802e726c, 38. 435 Milana Pisarić enable judicial orders to be addressed directly to service providers based in another member state. 2. EU RESPONSE TO THE TRANS-BORDER DIMENSION OF ELECTRONIC DATA The problem of trans-border dimension of electronic evidence in EU was acknowledged in 2015, while the Commission was committed in the European Agenda of Security to review obstacles to criminal investigations into cyber-enabled crimes, notably on cross-border access to electronic evidence.9 In 2016 EU Member States completed a Commission’s questionnaire on improving cooperation between competent national authorities to facilitate and accelerate the collection of electronic evidence, direct cooperation between competent authorities and the private sector, providing international legal assistance and mutual recognition of decisions between Member States and execution of state jurisdiction in cyberspace.10 The results showed that there is no approximate unique solution for cross-border access to electronic evidence, which results in legal uncertainty and precludes cross-border cooperation. Given the insufficient efficiency of the existing mechanisms, on the one hand, and the nature of the data processed, stored and transmitted over the Internet, on the other hand, the question was raised whether it would be justified, due to the need for urgent response in cyber space, to give the competent state authorities the authority to access and search under certain conditions and in certain cases computer systems and networks located in the territory of another country, or to take certain actions outside the borders of their territory to collect data for criminal proceedings. In order to on improve criminal justice in cyberspace, the Council of EU asked the Commission in June 2016 to take concrete actions to make mutual legal assistance more efficient, to improve cooperation between Member States’ authorities and service providers based in non-EU countries, and to propose solutions to the problems of determining and enforcing jurisdiction8 9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Agenda on Security, COM (2015) 185 final, last modified April 28, 2015, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX :52015DC0185&from=EN. 10 Questionnaire on improving criminal justice in cyberspace, 2016, accessed March 20, 2020, https:// ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-humantrafficking/e-evidence/docs/summary_of_replies_to_e-evidence_questionnaire_en.pdf. 436 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova in cyberspace.11 In November 2017 the Council adopted conclusions on the Commission’s communication on building strong cybersecurity for the EU. In its conclusions, the Council called on the Commission to present a legislative proposal in early 2018 to improve cross-border access to electronic evidence.12 On April 17, 2018 the Commission presented a Proposal for a Regulation on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters.13 On the same day the Commission presented a Proposal for a Directive to lay down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives and to facilitate gathering evidence in criminal proceedings.14 Proposals aim to allow competent authorities from one member state to request access or preservation of data directly from a service provider established or represented in another member state. The proposed regulation lays down the procedure and the conditions under which member states’ law enforcement authorities may compel a specific service provider offering services in the union to produce or preserve specific data held by it in electronic form to serve as evidence in an ongoing criminal procedure. Moreover, on 5 February 2019 the Commission adopted a Recommendation on opening negotiations with the United States on cross-border access to electronic evidence,15 and Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the participation in negotiations on a second Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention.16 Based on these Recommendation, the Council adopted Decisions on 7 June 2019 authorising the Commission to open negotiations.These decisions are very important. Currently, U.S. based service providers cooperate with European law enforcement authorities on 11 Council conclusions on improving criminal justice in cyberspace, last modified June 9, 2016, https://www. consilium.europa.eu/media/24300/cyberspace-en.pdf. 12 Council Conclusions on the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU - Council conclusions, last modified November 20, 2017, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31666/st14435en17.pdf. 13 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters COM/2018/225 final - 2018/0108 (COD), last modified April 17, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018P C0225&from=EN. 14 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings COM/2018/226 final - 2018/0107 (COD), last modified April 17, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0226&from=EN. 15 Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations in view of an agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on cross-border access to electronic evidence for judicial cooperation in criminal matters COM/2019/70 final, last modified February 5, 2019, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52019PC0070&from=EN. 16 Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the participation in negotiations on a second Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (CETS No. 185), last modified February 5, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/recommendation_budapest_convention.pdf. 437 Milana Pisarić a voluntary basis and are not always allowed, under U.S. law, to provide the requested data directly to European authorities following requests for access to electronic evidence. The conclusion of an EU-US agreement on facilitating access to electronic evidence would put in place a framework of cooperation with the US, including for direct cooperation with services providers. 17 This would ensure timely access to electronic evidence, by shortening the time period for supplying the requested data to 10 days while it currently takes on average 10 months. In order to achieve similar objective, since September 2017 the Council of Europe is preparing a second additional protocol to the Cybercrime Convention, which aims to lay down provisions for a more effective mutual legal assistance (a simplified regime for mutual legal assistance requests for subscriber information; international production orders; direct cooperation between judicial authorities in mutual legal assistance requests; joint investigations and joint investigation teams; requests in English language; audio/video hearing of witnesses, victims and experts; emergency mutual legal assistance procedures); provisions allowing for direct cooperation with service providers in other jurisdictions with regard to requests for subscriber information, preservation requests, and emergency requests; clearer framework and stronger safeguards for existing practices of trans-border access to data; safeguards, including data protection requirements.18 3. PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION ON EUROPEAN PRODUCTION AND PRESERVATION ORDERS FOR ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS It is not uncommon that electronic evidence on crime, service provider, perpetrator an victim are located in different jurisdictions, within the Union or beyond, resulting in time-consuming and challenging issue regarding state authorities’ access to electronic evidence across borders. Given the cross-border dimension of electronic evidence, cross-border procedures are necessary to be performed. However, in order them to be efficient, uniform rules are required, so the measures included in the proposal needed to be adopted at 17 Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on cross-border access to electronic evidence for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, last modified Маy 21, 2019, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ ST-9114-2019-INIT/en/pdf. 18 Council Decision authorising the European Commission to participate, on behalf of the European Union, in negotiations on a Second Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (CETS No. 185), last modified Маy 21, 2019, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9116-2019-INIT/en/pdf. 438 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Union level. While fragmentation of legal frameworks in member states is major challenge by service providers seeking to comply with requests based on different national laws, minimal rules are needed. The proposed Regulation introduces two binding instruments: the European production order and the European preservation order. European production order is a binding decision by an issuing authority of a member state compelling a service provider offering services in the union and established or represented in another member state, to produce electronic evidence. European preservation order is a binding decision by an issuing authority of a member state compelling a service provider offering services in the union and established or represented in another member state, to preserve electronic evidence in view of a subsequent request for production (Article 2). The European production order and the European preservation order are investigative measures that can be issued only in criminal investigations or criminal proceedings for concrete criminal offences. Orders can be used only in criminal proceedings (from the initial pre-trial investigative phase until the closure of the proceedings by judgment or other decision) and not for crime prevention or other types of proceedings or infringements (such as administrative proceedings for infringements of the rules of law). The European production order and the European preservation order are issued because of a need to obtain data which may serve as evidence in criminal investigations or criminal proceedings, but are stored by a service provider19 located20 in another jurisdiction.21 The proposal is limited to requests for electronic evidence in a form of stored data and to orders issued in criminal proceedings for a specific criminal offence under investigation. Electronic evidence are evidence stored in electronic form by or on behalf of a service provider at the time of receipt of a production or preservation or19 The Proposal refers to a service provider established or represented in a Member State via a designated legal representative, but it is also applicable if the service providers are not established or represented in the Union, but offer services in the Union. This includes: providers of electronic communications services, providers of information society services for which the storage of data is a defining component of the service provided to the user, including social networks to the extent they do not qualify as electronic communications services, online marketplaces facilitating transactions between their users (such as consumers or businesses) and other hosting service providers, and providers of internet domain name and numbering services (Article 2). 20 The Regulation shall apply to all service providers that offer services in the Union, including service providers that are not established in the Union. The active offering of services in the Union, with all the benefits deriving from it, justifies that these service providers are also made subject to the Regulation and creates a level playing field between participants on the same markets (Article 3). 21 This Regulation shall give additional tools to investigating authorities to obtain electronic evidence without limiting the powers already set out by national law to compel service providers established or represented on their territory. If the service provider is established or represented in the same Member State, authorities of that Member State shall therefore use national measures to compel the service provider. 439 Milana Pisarić der certificate (Article 2 (6)). The data that can be obtained with a European Production Order by the competent authorities include non-content data (subscriber data,22 access data,23 transactional data24) and stored content data.25 Data from real-time interception of telecommunications is not covered. Unlike data retention obligations set out by law, the proposal does not require providers to systematically collect or store more data than they do for business reasons or for compliance with other legal requirements. These instruments are based on mutual recognition and orders issued or validated by a judicial authority of a Member State. When issuing a European Production or Preservation Order, a judicial authority always needs to be involved as either an issuing or a validating authority. For Orders to produce transactional and content data, a judge or court is required. For subscriber or access data, this can be done also by a prosecutor (Article 4). However, the data ordered through a European production order should be provided directly to the authorities without the involvement of authorities in the member state where the service provider is established or represented. When issuing a European production order, in a concrete criminal procedure after an individual evaluation of the proportionality and necessity in every single case, these conditions shall be assessed by the authority:26 it may only be issued if this is necessary and proportionate in the individual case (it should only be issued if a similar measure would be available in a comparable domestic situation in the issuing state); orders to produce subscriber data and access data can be issued for any criminal offence; transactional and content data can only be issued for offences which carry a maximum custodial sentence of at least 3 years or more or for specific crimes which are referred to in 22 Data pertaining to: (a) the identity of a subscriber or customer such as the provided name, date of birth, postal or geographic address, billing and payment data, telephone, or email; (b)the type of service and its duration including technical data and data identifying related technical measures or interfaces used by or provided to the subscriber or customer, and data related to the validation of the use of service, excluding passwords or other authentication means used in lieu of a password that are provided by a user, or created at the request of a user. Article 2 (7). 23 Data related to the commencement and termination of a user access session to a service, which is strictly necessary for the sole purpose of identifying the user of the service, such as the date and time of use, or the login to and log-off from the service, together with the IP address allocated by the internet access service provider to the user of a service, data identifying the interface used and the user ID. Article 2 (8). 24 Data related to the provision of a service offered by a service provider that serves to provide context or additional information about such service and is generated or processed by an information system of the service provider, such as the source and destination of a message or another type of interaction, data on the location of the device, date, time, duration, size, route, format, the protocol used and the type of compression, unless such data constitutes access data. Article 2 (9). 25 Any stored data in a digital format such as text, voice, videos, images, and sound other than subscriber, access or transactional data. Article 2 (10). 26 Article 5. 440 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova the proposal and where there is a specific link to electronic tools and offences covered by the Terrorism Directive 2017/541/EU. The European preservation order is addressed to the legal representative outside of the issuing member state’s jurisdiction to preserve the data in view of a subsequent request to produce this data, for example via MLA channels in case of third countries or via an EIO between participating member states. Unlike surveillance measures or data retention obligations set out by law, the European preservation order is an order issued or validated by a judicial authority in a concrete criminal procedure after an individual evaluation of the proportionality and necessity in every single case. It refers to the specific known or unknown perpetrators of a criminal offence that has already taken place. The European preservation order only allows preserving data that is already stored at the time of receipt of the order, not the access to data at a future point in time after the receipt of the European preservation order. The orders under the proposed Regulation are enforceable in the same manner as comparable domestic orders in the jurisdiction where the service provider receives the order. the regulation provides that member states should have effective and proportionate sanctions in place. The creation a European production order will allow a judicial authority in one member state to obtain electronic evidence directly from a service provider or its legal representative in another member state, which will be obliged to respond within 10 days, and within 6 hours in cases of emergency (compared to up to 120 days for the existing European investigation order or an average of 10 months for a mutual legal assistance procedure).The creation of a European preservation order will allow a judicial authority in one member state to request that a service provider or its legal representative in another member state preserves specific data in view of a subsequent request to produce this data via mutual legal assistance, a European investigation order or a European production order. The orders will be addressed to a legal representative designated by the service provider for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings in accordance with the Directive laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings. The transmission will be in form of a European production order certificate (‘EPOC’) or a European preservation order certificate 441 Milana Pisarić (‘EPOC-PR’), and legal representative will be responsible for their reception and timely and complete execution.27 It is important to stress that mandatory deadlines for execution of orders is introduced - 10 days for the execution of a production order, while the deadline may be reduced to 6 hours in case of validly established emergency cases. In case the order regards subscriber and access data, it may be, under certain conditions, sent without prior validation from the competent judicial authority, however, ex-post validation will have to be sought as soon as possible and within 48 hours.28 In case service providers don’t comply with an order, they may be sanctioned, i.e. they can be imposed pecuniary sanctions of up to 2% of total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year.29 4. CONCLUSION As electronic evidence is becoming an important element in criminal proceedings, due to its trans-border dimension it is of utmost importance to response to the ever increasing need of the law enforcement to timely access electronic evidence for Internet based investigations, which have more and more cross-border dimension. The EU is taking steps to improve cross-border access to electronic evidence by creating a legal framework which would enable judicial orders to be addressed directly to service providers based in another member state. The main goal of the new rules proposed by the Commission is to speed up access to electronic evidence saved in another member state, i.e. to introduce an alternative mechanism to the existing tools of international cooperation and mutual legal assistance, setting new procedures for efficient and effective cross-border access. To facilitate cross-border gathering of electronic evidence, new rules will, based on the principles of mutual recognition, enable the creation of European production and preservation orders that can be issued to obtain or preserve electronic evidence regardless of the location of the data. By introducing European production order and European preservation order, the Proposal of Regulation makes it easier to secure and gather electronic evidence for criminal proceedings stored or held by service providers in another jurisdiction. These orders would cover any category of data - subscriber, access, transactional and content, stored by service providers, and accessible under different conditions. Proposal of 27 Article 7. 28 Article 10. 29 Article 13. 442 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Directive would oblige all service providers to appoint a legal representative in the EU, who would be responsible for the receipt of and compliance with decisions and orders. The objective of this proposal is to ensure that all service providers operating in the EU have the same obligations regarding electronic evidence. In any case, no matter possibly good intentions of European legislator, it remains to be seen how the situation in legislation will further develop, with almost two years since the introduction of proposals. REFERENCES: 1. Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings {COM(2018) 225 final} - {COM(2018) 226 final} {SWD(2018) 119 final}. Last modified April 17, 2018. https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018SC0118&from=EN. 2. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Agenda on Security, COM (2015) 185 final. Last modified April 28, 2015. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0185&from=EN. 3. Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY). The Mutual Legal Assistance Provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2020. https://rm.coe.int/16802e726c. 4. Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime. Accessed March 20, 2020. https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention. 5. Council Conclusions on improving criminal justice in cyberspace. Last modified June 9, 2016. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24300/ cyberspace-en.pdf. 6. Council Conclusions on the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU - Council conclusions. Last modified November 20, 2017. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31666/st14435en17.pdf. 7. Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement between the European Union and the United 443 Milana Pisarić 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. States of America on cross-border access to electronic evidence for judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Last modified Маy 21, 2019. https://data. consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9114-2019-INIT/en/pdf. Council Decision authorising the European Commission to participate, on behalf of the European Union, in negotiations on a Second Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (CETS No. 185). Last modified Маy 21, 2019. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ document/ST-9116-2019-INIT/en/pdf. Pisarić, Milana. Elektronski dokazi u krivičnom postupku. Novi Sad: Centar za izdavačku delatnost Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, 2019. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters COM/2018/225 final - 2018/0108 (COD). Last modified April 17, 2018. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?u ri=CELEX:52018PC0225&from=EN. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings COM/2018/226 final - 2018/0107 (COD). Last modified April 17, 2018. https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0226&from=EN. Questionnaire on improving criminal justice in cyberspace, 2016. Accessed March 20, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/eevidence/docs/summary_of_replies_to_e-evidence_questionnaire_en.pdf. Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations in view of an agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on cross-border access to electronic evidence for judicial cooperation in criminal matters COM/2019/70 final. Last modified February 5, 2019. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/ ?uri=CELEX:52019PC0070&from=EN. Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the participation in negotiations on a second Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (CETS No. 185). Last modified February 5, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/recommendation_budapest_ convention.pdf. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2020. https://www.unodc.org/ documents/organized-crime/cybercrime/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213. pdf. 444 Review paper UDK POLITICAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY ON STATES: EUROPEAN CONTEXT Nina Sajić1 The School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, UK Abstract: International commercial surrogacy (ICS) has grown especially in the last two decades with the advancement in assisted reproductive technologies. It has become a global phenomena and business industry worth several billions of USD a year, which raises many political, legal and ethical issues. This article examines how regulations and laws on surrogacy vary across the countries. Some European countries such as the UK allow altruistic surrogacy, but ban commercial surrogacy, while France, Germany and Italy prohibit all forms of surrogacy. In addition to legal perspective, this Article analyses ICS from theological, feminist and liberal point of view. While most of the Christian Churches are against surrogacy and other forms of assisted reproductive technologies (ART), Islam allows certain aspects of assisted reproductive technologies, whereas Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism allow all forms of ART. From the feminist perspective ICS is a form of slavery that exploits female body through the financial enticements in the same way, as does the prostitution. Feminists see surrogacy as a violation of the rights of children and women. Liberals, on the other hand, argue that surrogacy represent the right to one’s personal autonomy, and to prohibit the practice would be a violation of women’s rights to self determination. Key words: human rights, international trade, exploitation, socially disadvantaged groups, international commercial surrogacy, health tourism, feminist theory, liberal theory 1 PhD, Research Fellow, the Conflict Analysis Research Centre, the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, UK 445 Nina Sajić 1. INTRODUCTION Assisted reproduction had a major breakthrough in the last three decades of the 20th century with a birth of the world’s first “test tube baby” conceived with in vitro fertilisation (IVF) in 1978. At that time, IVF was a rather controversial procedure, some even considered it as a medical miracle, but since then it has become widely accepted procedure and treatment for infertility helping millions of babies to be born. Robert Edwards2 was awarded the Nobel prize in 2010 for the development of human in vitro fertilization (IVF) therapy, but as rightly noted by Biggers, Edwards’ work should not be considered as “a quantum event,” but as an important contribution, which was built on “the efforts of many earlier workers in the fields of reproductive endocrinology and development.3”IVF is just one of the procedures that led to further developments in reproductive medicine. This Article analyses political and ethical implications of international commercial surrogacy from legal, theological, but also feminist and liberal perspective. Before proceeding further with the analysis, it is important to make here distinctions between basic terms that are used in this Article. In general, two kinds of surrogacy can be distinguished: traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy. To put it simply, traditional surrogacy is when a surrogate carries a baby conceived with her own egg and the sperm of an intended parent or sperm donor. Gestational surrogacy is when a surrogate carries a baby conceived with the egg of an intended parent or egg donor that is fertilized with the sperm of an intended parent or sperm donor. It is also important to make a short remark on distinction between altruistic and commercial surrogacy. Altruistic surrogacy refers to arrangement between a surrogate mother and intended parents that does not involve financial or any other form of compensation, whereas in commercial surrogacy arrangements, a surrogate mother is financially or otherwise compensated. This article is limited to gestational surrogacy, and more specifically international commercial surrogacy. International commercial surrogacy (ICS) could be defined as a practice when (an) intended parent(s) in one country hire(s) a woman in another country to bear a child on their (hers/his) behalf. International commercial surrogacy has grown especially in the last two decades 2 For more on development of IVF by Edwards see Martin H. Johnson, “Robert Edwards: the path to IVF,” Reproductive Biomedicine Online 23, no. 2 (August 2011): 245-262. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3171154/ 3 John D. Biggers, “IVF and embryo transfer: historical origin and development,” Reproductive Biomedicine Online 25, no. 2 (August 2012): 118. https://www.rbmojournal.com/action/showPdf?pii=S1472-6483%2812%2900292-1 446 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova with the advancement in assisted reproductive technologies, but also with the evolution of institution of marriage and family. Traditional concept of family and heterosexual marriages has changed; many countries have legalized samesex couples and single parents and stepfamilies are becoming increasingly socially acceptable. International commercial surrogacy has become a global phenomena and business industry worth billions of USD a year. Reproductive tourism, cross-border reproductive care, fertility tourism, reproductive exile, as some call it, raises many political, legal and ethical issues. One of the first problems that a researcher faces when analyzing international commercial surrogacy is that the accurate data or statics on the practice are very limited and not reliable. This is for at least two reasons: firstly, gestational surrogacy is often recorded as an IVF procedure and secondly, in many countries gestational surrogacy is not regulated legally, and in some countries even prohibited, which means that there is no formal reporting mechanism as such might lead to potential criminal prosecution.4 How can we than argue that the commercial surrogacy is on the rise, as we don’t have quantitative data to support the claim? One of the main arguments found in the literature is the fact that number of agencies and clinics that facilitate surrogacy arrangements is on the rise as well as that there is increased media attention on the issue.5 Even in the countries where surrogacy is forbidden such as for example countries of the Western Balkans, there are more and more surrogate testimonies and stories.6 There are also court proceedings, sometimes even scandals, involving the surrogacy that get a lot of media attention. This article proceeds as follows. First it looks briefly on legal aspects of surrogacy in European countries, and then it looks at how major religions view surrogacy and other forms of assisted reproductive medicine. The Article further explores a feminist and liberal debate on surrogacy, and finally provides conclusion and recommendations. 4 Laurence Brunet et al. “A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States,” European Parliament, Study PE 474.403 (May 2013): 9. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2013/474403/ IPOL-JURI_ET(2013)474403_EN.pdf 5 ibid 6 see for example testimony of a Croatian woman who hired a surrogacy mother in Ukraine https://www. telegram.hr/price/moju-kcer-rodila-je-surogat-mama-iz-ukrajine-nisam-jedina-u-hrvatskoj-ali-sam-prvakoja-govori-za-medije/ 447 Nina Sajić 2. LEGAL PERSPECTIVE Although international commercial surrogacy has been on the rise, there is no international law specifically governing surrogacy. Owing to the complexity and controversy of the surrogacy, it will still take some time for its regulation at the international level. Therefore, any legal matters arising in the connection with surrogacy are left to be regulated by individual nation state. However, these regulations and laws vary across the countries even among the EU member states, thus creating legal difficulties and limbos especially for children born out of surrogacy arrangements. Some EU countries France, Germany and Italy prohibit all forms of surrogacy, while others such as Greece allow altruistic surrogacy. Greece has adopted relatively tolerant and progressive legal framework on surrogacy arrangements since 2002. Although the law only allows altruistic surrogacy, it does however provide for the coverage of “reasonable expenses” for surrogate mothers.7 These legal variations among the EU member states stem from the fact that matters that arise from surrogacy are a national competence regulated by family or private law of each EU member state. However, Rigon and Chateau argue that the Article 81(3)8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) empowers EU to act on those aspects of surrogacy that have cross-border implications.9 As for the countries of former Yugoslavia, surrogacy is not regulated, except in the Northern Macedonia, which has allowed surrogacy since 2014. There is an increasing number of couples in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia that hire surrogate mothers, mostly in Ukraine, to bear a child on their behalf. Serbia is working on Civic code that would allow surrogacy, even the commercial; the provisions of the code provide that surrogates are paid between 8.000 to 15.000 euros. We are yet to see whether this rather liberal civic code would ever be adopted. When it comes to regulation of surrogacy arrangements, European states can be grouped into three large categories: 1. states which prohibit surrogacy (France, Italy, Hungary, Germany, Switzerland, Austria). Surrogacy is banned on the grounds that it violates the 7 The Greek National Independent Authority for Medically Assisted Reproduction set the amount of 10.000 Euros for the restitution of any damages incurred and lost wages by surrogate mothers. Maria C. Vastaroucha, “Surrogacy Proceedings in Greece after the implementation of law 4272/2014,” Greek Law Digest, Official Guide to Greek Law, March 2019. http://www.greeklawdigest.gr/topics/aspects-of-greek-civil-law/item/217-surrogacyproceedings-in-greece-after-the-implementation-of-law-4272-2014 8 The Article provides that measures concerning family law with cross border implications shall be established by the Council. See the Article at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E081 9 Amalia Rigon and Céline Chateau, “Regulating international surrogacy arrangements - state of play,” European Parliament, Briefing PE 571.368, August 2016: 1. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ BRIE/2016/571368/IPOL_BRI(2016)571368_EN.pdf 448 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova rights of children and dignity of surrogate mothers, that it promotes female exploitation and trafficking in children. Parties involved in surrogacy arrangements may face criminal prosecution and sanctions. Surrogacy agreements and contracts are not enforceable in these countries. A legal mother is considered to be a surrogate and legal father her husband if she is married (legal fatherhood is often easier to be contested at courts, whereas legal motherhood in these countries is impossible to be contested). 2. states, which permit surrogacy (Russia, Ukraine, Greece, Georgia, the North Macedonia and the United Kingdom. In Portugal law on surrogacy came into effect in 2017, however, it was brought before the Constitutional Court in 2018 for the violation of constitutional rights and principles.) States in this category can be subdivided into those who allow commercial surrogacy (Russia, Ukraine and Georgia) and only altruistic (the UK, Greece and the North Macedonia, although surrogates are entitled to coverage of reasonable expenses). In most of these countries, intended parents are automatically registered as legal parents, surrogacy contracts are legal and valid, except in the UK where a surrogate will be a child’s legal parent at birth and the transfer of legal parenthood must be done by parental order or adoption after the child is born.10 Surrogacy agreements are not enforceable under UK law. 3. states which left surrogacy largely unregulated (the Netherlands, countries of former Yugoslavia except the North Macedonia, Poland, Ireland, Belgium etc.). Even though there are no laws that expressly ban surrogacy, any legal agreement or contract on surrogacy arrangements is considered void. Intended parents in most of these countries are faced with the same legal obstacles as in the countries where surrogacy is banned. They may be in better position as they may not be legally prosecuted and therefore adoption procedures may be easier. These legal variations that exist in Europe are just an illustration of the complexity of surrogacy, which includes a myriad of moral and ethical views on family structure, welfare of children, the nature of motherhood, a dignity of a woman etc. In the absence of the uniformed regulation at the EU level and also internationally, national and sometimes even supranational courts such as for example the European Court of Human Rights have taken the role of solving legal issues arising from the international commercial surrogacy such as parentage and citizenship. In the international commercial surrogacy arrangements states, where surrogacy is not allowed, are faced with 10 See “Surrogacy: legal rights of parents and surrogates,” UK Government https://www.gov.uk/legal-rightswhen-using-surrogates-and-donors 449 Nina Sajić a “fait accompli”. Children born by surrogates in most of the cases do not automatically get a citizenship of the countries that they are born in, which means that if the country of origin of their intended parents, do not confer them citizenship, they are considered to be stateless. Policies concerning the regulation of the statute of these children vary across countries and sometimes they require intended parents to legally adopted their genetic children. Therefore, due to the legal difficulties in their home states, intended parents often fail to disclose surrogacy arrangements and only present foreign birth certificate to their authorities.11 3. THEOLOGICAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVE Those advocating surrogacy often argue that surrogacy is not a new phenomenon and that it can be traced back to biblical times. Often, they cite the story of Sarah and Abraham, who could not have a child of their own and turned to their servant Hagar to bear their child.12 Glendale argues that surrogacy as a concept dates back at least 4000 years, when Rachel, who was not able to have children sent her husband Jacob (the father of twelve tribes in Israel), to her maid Bilah to bear their child.13 Stuhmke adds that surrogacy is to be considered as the oldest alternative to a male and female partner conceiving a child by sexual intercourse.14 However, there are those who believe that surrogacy is quite problematic both from theological, but also from moral perspective. It is often seen as immoral, against God’s will, against marriage and dignity of a child and of a woman. The Roman Catholic Church is against all forms of assisted reproductive technologies except IUI under certain circumstances.15 In 1987 Vatican issued “Instruction of Respect for Human Life in its Origin and of the Dignity of Procreation” explaining that while biological and medical techniques and procedures may constitute a progress in the service of man, they also involve 11 see for example testimony of a Croatian woman who hired a surrogacy mother in Ukraine https://www. telegram.hr/price/moju-kcer-rodila-je-surogat-mama-iz-ukrajine-nisam-jedina-u-hrvatskoj-ali-sam-prvakoja-govori-za-medije/ 12 Surrogacy.com, About surrogacy. From the Bible to today: the history of surrogacy. Last accessed Oct 22, 2018. https://surrogate.com/about-surrogacy/surrogacy-101/history-of-surrogacy/ 13 Barbara S. Perish, “Test Tube on Trial: Let California Blaze the Trial to the Legitimation of Surrogacy,” 9 Glendale L. Rev. No. 56 (1990): 56. 14 Anita Stuhmcke, “Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal Position in Australia,” Journal of Law and Medicine No. 2 (1994): 116 cited in Catherine Brown, Lindy Willmott and Ben White, “Surrogacy in Queensland: Should Altruism be a crime?,” Bond Law Review 20, No.1 (2008): 1. 15 In intrauterine insemination if the semen is collected by sexual intercourse. 450 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova serious risks and moral challenges.16 Vatican propagates that the dignity of human being must be respected from the beginning of his existence and that human embryos have identity and nature.17 Therefore, the Roman Catholic Church is against any research involving embryos, she forbids any acts against “these human beings” just as she condemns induced abortion: “it is immoral to produce human embryos destined to be exploited as disposable “biological material.”18 The Church also forbids surrogacy and sees it as “an objective failure to meet the obligations of maternal love, of conjugal fidelity and of responsible motherhood; it offends the dignity and the right of the child to be conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the world and brought up by his own parents; it sets up, to the detriment of families, a division between the physical, psychological and moral elements which constitute those families.”19 The Russian Orthodox Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church share the same view as the Roman Catholic Church on the assisted reproductive technologies. They are against all forms of assisted reproductive technologies except for the IUI, as it does not interfere with the unity of marriage.20 Surrogate motherhood is seen against the nature and morally unacceptable, even when it is without financial compensation, as it destroys deep emotional and spiritual connections that take place during pregnancy between a mother and a child.21 They cannot morally justify procreation methods that are not in accordance with the will of “the Creator of Life.”22 For childless husband and wife, who have undergone chirurgical and other infertility treatment, they advise to accept their childless conjugal union as a “special calling.”23 Bulgarian Orthodox Bishop of Plovdiv Nikolay equals surrogacy with prostitution.24 However, the Russian Orthodox Church does accept Baptism of an infant born to a surrogate mother as “the child cannot be responsible for 16 Roman Catholic Church, “Respect for Human Life and the Dignity of Procreation”, 1987. https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respectfor-human-life_en.html accessed March 29, 2020. 17 ibid 18 ibid 19 ibid 20 Pravoslavni roditelj, “Sta zaista Crkva kaze o vantjelesnoj oplodnji (i o vecnom zivotu embriona),” April 18, 2018. https://www.pravoslavniroditelj.org/sta-zaista-crkva-kaze-o-vantelesnoj-oplodnji-i-o-vecnom-zivotuembriona/ accessed March 31, 2020. 21 ibid 22 ibid 23 ibid 24 Sofia News Agency, “Bulgarian Bishop: Surrogacy Equals Prostitution,” Orthodox Christian Laity, August, 22, 2012 https://ocl.org/bulgarian-bishop-surrogacy-equals-prostitution/ accessed April 2, 2020. 451 Nina Sajić the actions of its parents and is not to blame if his birth is connected with reproductive technology condemned by the Church.25” The role of assisted reproductive technologies is also a well-debated issue in Muslim countries. There is an increasing number of Muslim scholars advocating medical fertility treatment and use of new technologies for childless Muslim women.26 As in some other religious societies, the social status of Muslim women is closely related to their procreation potential, therefore fertility treatment is of particular significance in the Muslim World. 27 Some Muslim countries such as for example Qatar and Saudi Arabia have started to develop their own genome programs and have financed research on human conception and manipulation of human genetic material for reproductive purposes.28 However, initially assisted reproductive technologies were not accepted in Muslim countries as they were seen as a challenge to God’s will. It was only after religious and scientific bodies and organizations issued guidelines that assisted reproduction became acceptable treatment for infertility. The first ever-issued guidelines also known as Fatwa that permitted and regulated assisted reproduction in the Muslim countries were issued in Egypt in 1980 by the Mufti of Egypt allowing infertility treatment of Muslims, but disallowed any form of third-party reproductive assistance, including surrogacy. 29 Other guidelines included a Fatwa from the Islamic Fikh Council, Mecca 1984, the Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences in Kuwait, (1983), Qatar University (1993), the Islamic Organization for Education, Science and Culture in Rabaat (2002), the United Arab Emirates (2002), and the International Islamic Centre for Population Studies and Research, al. Azhar University.30 These bodies stressed the importance of family formation in Islam and helped change the societal attitude from rejection, doubt and shame to openly seeking assisted reproductive technologies.31 The role of a third party in child creation has remained religiously unacceptable as it 25 Pravimir, Orthodox Christianity and the World, “On the Baptism of Children Born to “Surrogate Mothers,” January 2, 2014. http://www.pravmir.com/on-the-baptism-of-children-born-to-surrogate-mothers/ accessed April 2, 2020. 26 Chokri Kooli, “Review of assisted reproduction techniques, laws, and regulations in Muslim countries,” Middle East Fertility Society Journal 24, No. 8 (2019): 1. 27 Gamal I. Serour, “Religious perspectives of ethical issues in ART,” Middle East Fertility Society Journal 10, no. 3 (2005):186. 28 Kooli, “Review of assisted reproduction techniques,” 1. 29 ibid 6. 30 Serour, “Religious perspectives,” 31 Gamal I. Serour “Islamic perspectives in human reproduction,” Ethics, Bioscience and Life 3, No. 3, (November 2008): 35. 452 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova is seen as a form of adultery in Sunni interpretation of Islam.32 On the other hand, in Shi’aa interpretation changed since 1999 when Ayatollah Ali Hussein Khomeini, former Supreme Leader of Iranian, issued a fatwa allowing third-party donation,33 which means that surrogacy is permitted as long as a sperm donor is recognized as a true father. Regardless of the differences in Sunni and Shi’aa interpretation on assisted reproductive technologies, especially their diverging views on surrogacy, they strongly believe that human reproduction and the need to preserve their religious and ethnic groups is of great importance.34 To a certain extent, Islam, as rightly pointed by Tremayne and Inhorn, could be seen as “facilitating factor” when it comes to assisted reproductive technologies, especially if we compare it with Catholicism35, but also with the Russian and Serbian Orthodox Churches. All forms of assisted reproductive technologies have been examined by Jewish scholars and rabbis, and although they have some differences in opinions, they do agree that the paramount obligation of the Jewish men and women is to be fruitful and multiply. Back in 1988, when there was relatively little experience with surrogacy, the Rabbinical Assembly Committee on Jewish Law and Standards dealt with the permissibility of ovum surrogacy and concluded: “Tite mitzvah of having children is so great, we should not deny couples this opportunity.” 36 From the perspective of Judaism surrogacy offers the joy of parenthood and helps a man to fulfill his mandate of procreation.37 It does not come as a surprise then the fact that Israel was the first country in the world to allow a surrogacy process by explicit law, while involving the state at its crucial stages. 38 In 1996 Israel adopted of a rather comprehensive and detailed law on surrogacy. The law, however, forbids sperm donation and bans relatives of intended parents to become surrogate mothers. The High Court of Justice recently ruled that the existing Law on Surrogacy in Israel was discriminatory towards male gay couples and has given a state a year to 32 Soraya Tremayne and Maria C. Inhorn, “Introduction: Islam and Assisted Reproductive Technologies,” in Islam Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Sunni and Shia Perspectives , ed. Maria C. Inhorn and Soraya Tremayne (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012): 3. 33 ibid 34 ibid 18. 35 Ibid. 36 Rabbi Elie Kaplan Spitz, “On the Use of Birth Surrogates,” Responsa of the CJLS 1991-2000, Marriage and Fertility, EH 1:3 (1997): 529. https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/19912000/spitz_surrogate.pdf 37 ibid 38 Etti Samama, “Within Me, But Not Mine: Surrogacy in Israel,” in New Cannibal Markets: Globalization and Commodification of the Human Body , ed. Jean-Daniel Rainhorn and Samira El Boudamoussi, (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2015): 124. 453 Nina Sajić amend it, otherwise the court would revoke the law or interpret it in such a way “as to eliminate [its] discriminatory effects.”39 Hinduism stresses the importance of procreation and it allows surrogacy and other forms of assisted reproductive technologies. Surrogacy can also be found in Hindu mythology in the story of birth of the seventh child of Devaki and Vasudeva, when the embryo was transferred to the womb of Rohini (the first wife of Vasudev), to prevent the baby being killed by Kamsa (Devaki’s brother).40 Unlike most of other religions, Buddhists are not under pressure to procreate, especially if it can cause sufferings, and their religion teaches them to accept their inability to have children. Buddhism accepts surrogacy on the moral basis that “helping others and doing good are meritorious acts that make engaging in surrogacy and any suffering that might come with it acceptable if not desirable.”41 4. FEMINIST VS. LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE The development of assisted reproductive technologies, especially surrogacy, has led to diverging views among feminists and liberals. For majority of feminists, surrogacy represents a continuation of female exploitation; it is a form of slavery and just another way that patriarchal society continues to have a control over female bodies. Most feminists reject a liberal idea that women do have a choice to become a surrogate or not, especially when poor, uneducated and vulnerable women are involved. Surrogacy, for a majority of feminists, represents “yet another context in which women were valued primarily for their sexual and reproductive capacities rather than for their intellect and skills.”42 Anderson argues that “when market norms are applied to the ways we allocate and understand parental rights and responsibilities over children, children are reduced from subjects of love to objects of use. When market norms are applied to the ways we treat and understand 39 Netael Bandel, Lee Yaron and Jonathan Lis, “Israel’s High Court Rules Against Surrogacy Law Excluding Single Men and Gay Couples,” Haaretz, February 28, 2020. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premiumisrael-s-high-court-rules-against-surrogacy-law-excluding-single-men-and-gay-couples-1.8596231 accessed April 5, 2020. 40 Usha Rengachary Smerdon, “Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International Surrogacy Between the United States and India,” Cumberland Law Review 39, No. 1 (2008):16. 41 Patricia Fronek, “Current perspectives on the ethics of selling international surrogacy support services,” Medicolegal and Bioethics 8 (2018): 14. 42 Elizabeth S. Scott, “Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification,” Law and Contemporary Problems 72, (2009): 131 454 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova women’s reproductive labor, women are reduced from subjects of respect and consideration to objects of use.”43 Anderson considers surrogacy as the extreme form of alienated labour, which is more about generating profits and reproducing sexism, rather than about generating life.44 Surrogacy arrangements and transactions are according to many feminists degrading to women; feminists believe that the contracts were executed because “women were coerced by exigent circumstances or false consciousness and because they could not anticipate the adverse consequences of their choices.”45 In their opinion surrogacy contracts should be banned or at least women should not be bound by them.46 Feminists have been less critical of altruistic surrogacy as they considered it less exploitative and coercive than commercial surrogacy.47 However, as rightly pointed by Nadimpally, altruistic surrogacy may not be completely “benevolent and without its own power dynamic;” on the contrary, it may even render women more vulnerable, especially in patriarchal societies.48 There is no uniformed stand among the feminists on surrogacy; liberal feminists, especially in the United States, have aligned more with the capitalist view and argue that surrogacy represents “a women’s reproductive right, woman’s right to choose, a woman’s right to control her own body and do with it what she wills, and as an economic option for women.”49 For U.S. liberals and liberal socialist feminists surrogacy is “an individual woman’ s right necessary to what is now being called “procreative liberty.”50 Liberal approaches on surrogacy emphasise the need for the state and the law to stay neutral towards moral and ethical standards. For example Hatzis uses John Stuart Mill’s principle that only harmful practices should be prohibited by law and that women are sovereign over their body and mind.51 According to liberal views, the parties involved in surrogacy arrangements are the best 43 Elizabeth S. Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) found in Aristides N. Hatzis, “Just the Oven: A Law & Economics Approach to Gestational Surrogacy Contracts,” in Perspectives for the Unification or Harmonisation of Family Law, ed. Katharina Boele-Woelki ( Antwerp: Intersentia, 2003): 420. 44 ibid 45 Scott, “Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification,” 134. 46 ibid 47 Sarojini Nadimpally, “For Motherhood and for Market: Commercial Surrogacy in India,” in New Cannibal Markets: Globalization and Commodification of the Human Body , ed. Jean-Daniel Rainhorn and Samira El Boudamoussi, (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2015): 119. 48 ibid. 49 Janice G. Raymond, “At Issue: The International Traffic in Women: Women Used in Systems of Surrogacy and Reproduction,” Reproductive and Genetic Engineering 2, No. 1, 1989: 59. 50 Raymond, “At Issue,” 62 51 Aristides N. Hatzis, “Just the Oven: A Law & Economics Approach to Gestational Surrogacy Contracts,” in Perspectives for the Unification or Harmonisation of Family Law, ed. Katharina Boele-Woelki ( Antwerp: Intersentia, 2003): 418. 455 Nina Sajić judges of their own welfare; therefore a contract that makes all parties better off should be enforced, rather than prohibited by law.52 In general, liberals dismiss moral arguments and socio-economic conditions that are used by feminists as a reason to forbid surrogacy.53 In their view a prohibition would be a restriction of the freedom of women rather than a protection against exploitation. In short, feminist and liberal debate comes to the following: From the feminist perspective commercial surrogacy degrades women in the same way as does the prostitution; both surrogacy and prostitution are a form of slavery that exploits female body. Feminists see surrogacy as a violation of the rights of children and women. Liberals, on the other hand, argue that surrogacy represent the right to one’s personal autonomy and to prohibit the practice would be a violation of women’s rights to self determination. 5. CONCLUSION: International commercial surrogacy has allowed many childless couples and individuals to become parents. For many of them, even the adoption was not feasible, so cross-border surrogacy was the last resort after years of trying to become a parent. International commercial surrogacy poses a myriad of challenges and risks that include potential economic exploitation of economic vulnerable women, women of low socio-economic status, poor, often uneducated. Meghani points out that “human body resources” are more available and affordable in low-income countries, where “poor and vulnerable” populations are both available in large numbers54 such as for example India or Ukraine and are perceived as being more willing than citizens of wealthier countries to jeopardize their personal health for minimal financial reward. Other authors have argued that surrogacy is “based on a hierarchy of power, a hierarchy of nation, color, and race. In a nutshell: that it is built on global inequality.”55 52 Hatzis, “Just the Oven,” 416. 53 Franziska Krause, “Caring Relationships: Commercial Surrogacy and the Ethical Relevance of the Other,” in Care in Healthcare Reflections on Theory and Practice, ed. Franziska Krause and Joachim Boldt (Freiburg: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 90. 54 Zahra Meghani, “A robust, particularist ethical assessment of medical tourism,” Developing World Bioethics 11, No. 1 (2011): 16-29 found in Raywat Deonandan, “Recent trends in reproductive tourism and international surrogacy: ethical considerations and challenges for policy,” Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 8, (2015): 112. 55 Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, “Danish Sperm and Indian Wombs: Fertility Tourism,” in New Cannibal Markets: Globalization and Commodification of the Human Body , ed. Jean-Daniel Rainhorn and Samira El Boudamoussi, (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2015): 102 456 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova As this Article shows, surrogacy involves myriad of moral, ethical and religious views, which countries take into consideration when adopting their legislation on surrogacy. In the majority of the European countries, surrogacy is not regulated at all; some have put a complete ban on surrogacy, while only few allow even commercial aspects of surrogacy. Many authors warn that putting a complete ban on surrogacy would only “uproot, isolate and criminalize gestational workers, driving them underground and often into foreign lands, where they risk prosecution alongside their bosses and brokers.”56 As stated at the beginning of this Article, one of the main challenges for a researcher on surrogacy, but also for a policy maker, is the lack of reliable data and reporting system. The establishment of an international surveillance and reporting system that would at the same time provide reliable data on all parties involved with obviously appropriate controls for patient confidentiality, would be an enormous for policy makers, clinicians, brokers, and users.57 In the absence of that system as well as regulation at the international level, more needs to be done to protect women’s health, especially in less developed countries, and their rights and safety. Legal limbos created with variations in surrogacy regulations across the countries, often leave children born out of surrogate arrangements stateless. The Convention on the Rights of the Child with its over-riding principle of the best interests of the child needs to be implemented fully as these children can not bear the consequences of the actions committed by their genetic parents. Children born to surrogate mothers also have a right to access the information related to their identity. More needs to be done in the screening of potential parents in order to protect not only surrogates, but also children, especially those born with certain disabilities. Whether this will be done, and if so, how rapidly, will depend on many factors, however it is important to maintain these issues at the forefront of the global debate. This Article is just a small contribution in that direction. REFERENCES: 1. Anderson ,Elizabeth S. Value in Ethics and Economics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press found in Hatzis, Aristides N. “Just the Oven: A Law & Economics Approach to Gestational Surrogacy Contracts.” In Perspectives 56 Sophie Lewis, Full Surrogacy Now: Feminism Against Family, (London, New York: Verso, 2019): 4. 57 Raywat Deonandan, “Recent trends in reproductive tourism and international surrogacy: ethical considerations and challenges for policy,” Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 8, (2015):116. 457 Nina Sajić 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. for the Unification or Harmonisation of Family Law, edited by Katharina BoeleWoelki pp. 412-433, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2003. Bandel, Netael, Yaron, Lee and Lis, Jonathan. “Israel’s High Court Rules Against Surrogacy Law Excluding Single Men and Gay Couples,” Haaretz, February 28, 2020. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israels-high-court-rules-against-surrogacy-law-excluding-single-men-and-gaycouples-1.8596231 accessed April 5, 2020. 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Johnson, Martin H. “Robert Edwards: the path to IVF.” Reproductive Biomedicine Online 23, no. 2 (2011 August 23): 245-262. https://www.ncbi. nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3171154/ Krause, Franziska. “Caring Relationships: Commercial Surrogacy and the Ethical Relevance of the Other.” In Care in Healthcare Reflections on Theory and Practice, edited by Franziska Krause and Joachim Boldt, 87-107, Freiburg: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Kooli, Chokri “Review of assisted reproduction techniques, laws, and regulations in Muslim countries.” Middle East Fertility Society Journal 24, No. 8 (2019): 1-15. 458 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 12. Lewis, Sophie. Full Surrogacy Now: Feminism Against Family. London, New York: Verso, 2019. 13. Meghani, Zahra. “A robust, particularist ethical assessment of medical tourism.” Developing World Bioethics 11, No. 1 (2011): 16-29 found in Deonandan, Raywat “Recent trends in reproductive tourism and international surrogacy: ethical considerations and challenges for policy,” Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 8, (2015): 111-119. 14. Nadimpally, Sarojini. “For Motherhood and for Market: Commercial Surrogacy in India.” In New Cannibal Markets: Globalization and Commodification of the Human Body, edited by Jean-Daniel Rainhorn and Samira El Boudamoussi, 105- 122, Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2015. 15. Perish, Barbara S. “Test Tube on Trial: Let California Blaze the Trial to the Legitimation of Surrogacy.” 9 Glendale L. Rev. No. 56 (1990) 16. Pravimir, Orthodox Christianity and the World, “On the Baptism of Children Born to “Surrogate Mothers,” January 2, 2014. http://www.pravmir.com/onthe-baptism-of-children-born-to-surrogate-mothers/ accessed April 2, 2020. 17. Pravoslavni roditelj. “Sta zaista Crkva kaze o vantjelesnoj oplodnji (i o vecnom zivotu embriona).” April 18, 2018. https://www.pravoslavniroditelj.org/stazaista-crkva-kaze-o-vantelesnoj-oplodnji-i-o-vecnom-zivotu-embriona/ accessed March 31, 2020. 18. Raymond, Janice G. “At Issue: The International Traffic in Women: Women Used in Systems of Surrogacy and Reproduction” Reproductive and Genetic Engineering 2, No. 1,1989: 51–57, 19. Rigon, Amalia and Chateau, Céline. “Regulating international surrogacy arrangements - state of play.” European Parliament, Briefing PE 571.368, August 2016: 1-7. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ BRIE/2016/571368/IPOL_BRI(2016)571368_EN.pdf 20. Roman Catholic Church, “Respect for Human Life and the Dignity of Procreation”, 1987. https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_ en.html accessed March 29, 2020. 21. Samama, Etti. “Within Me, But Not Mine: Surrogacy in Israel.” In New Cannibal Markets: Globalization and Commodification of the Human Body, edited by Jean-Daniel Rainhorn and Samira El Boudamoussi, 123-140. Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2015. 22. Scott, Elizabeth S. “Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification.” Law and Contemporary Problems 72, (2009): 109-146. 23. Serour, Gamal I. “Religious perspectives of ethical issues in ART.” Middle East Fertility Society Journal 10, no. 3 (2005): 185–190. 459 Nina Sajić 24. ____________, “Islamic perspectives in human reproduction,” Ethics, Bioscience and Life 3, No. 3, (November 2008): 34-35. 25. Smerdon, Usha Rengachary. “Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International Surrogacy Between the United States and India.” Cumberland Law Review 39, No. 1 (2008):15-85. 26. Sofia News Agency, “Bulgarian Bishop: Surrogacy Equals Prostitution,” Orthodox Christian Laity, August, 22, 2012 https://ocl.org/bulgarian-bishopsurrogacy-equals-prostitution/ accessed April 2, 2020. 27. Spitz, Rabbi Elie Kaplan “On the Use of Birth Surrogates,” Responsa of the CJLS 1991-2000, Marriage and Fertility, EH 1:3 (1997): 529. https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/halakhah/ teshuvot/19912000/spitz_surrogate.pdf 28. Stuhmcke, Anita. “Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal Position in Australia.” Journal of Law and Medicine, No. 2 (1994) cited in Catherine Brown, Lindy Willmott and Ben White, “Surrogacy in Queensland: Should Altruism be a crime?,” Bond Law Review 20, No.1 (2008): 1-29. ] 29. Surrogacy.com, About surrogacy. From the Bible to today: the history of surrogacy. Last accessed Oct 22, 2018. https://surrogate.com/about-surrogacy/ surrogacy-101/history-of-surrogacy/ 30. Tremayne, Soraya and Inhorn, Maria C. “Introduction: Islam and Assisted Reproductive Technologies.” In Islam Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Suni and Shia Perspectives, edited by Maria C. Inhorn and Soraya Tremayne, 1-23. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012. 31. Vastaroucha, Maria C. “Surrogacy Proceedings in Greece after the implementation of law 4272/2014.” Greek Law Digest, Official Guide to Greek Law, March 2019. http://www.greeklawdigest.gr/topics/aspects-of-greek-civillaw/item/217-surrogacy-proceedings-in-greece-after-the-implementationof-law-4272-2014 460 Оригинални научни чланак UDK ЕЛЕКТРОНСКИ ДОКАЗ И/ИЛИ ЕЛЕКТРОНСКА ИСПРАВА КАО ДОКАЗ У ПАРНИЧНОМ ПОСТУПКУ Стојана Петровић1 Правни факултет Универзитета у Бањој Луци Апстракт: Средства дигиталне комуникације омогућавају употребу електронског документа као доказа у парничном поступку у скоро свим европским државама. О условима предлагања суду електронског документа, као и о начину његовог извођења као доказа постоје и доктринарни ставови. Ово питање у процесној доктрини код нас до сада није значајније истраживано. У овом раду покушава се допринијети упоредној анализи материјалноправних и процесноправних одредаба домаћих закона. Утврђено је да коришћење електронског документа као доказа у парничном поступку не зависи од тога да ли странка предлаже његов изворник, или копију, нити од тога да ли се ради о јавном, или, пак, о приватном електронском документу. Догматско-нормативна анализа показала је да су законодавци код нас, у неелектронификованом парничном поступку, заснованом на традиционалним доказима, дали одговарајући уопштен правни оквир употребе електронског документа као доказа. При томе није битније измијењен традиционални концепт парничног поступка, већ је правна и доказна снага електронског документа изједначена са правном и доказном снагом исправе на папиру. Ипак, постоје питања која наше право није регулисало, а која су можда резултирала постојећом праксом. Анализирана домаћа судска пракса, показала је да странке, до сада, скоро да и нису предлагале електронски документ као доказ. То, у овом раду, није искључиво приписано неодговарајућој материјалној, нити процесној нормативноправној подлози овог питања. Упоредноправна анализа, првенствено нормативних рјешења држава, као што су Аустрија и Њемачка, показала је да су права ентитета Босне и Херцеговине, начелно, усаглашена са савременим стандардима у регулисању овог питања. Непостојање праксе употребе електронског документа пред судовима 1 Мр, Виши асистент Аутор захваљује Биљани Вучетић, предсједнику парничног одјељења Основног суда у Бањој Луци, на помоћи приликом прикупљања, у овом раду, коришћене судске праксе. 461 Стојана Петровић као доказа, у овом раду, није приписано ни неодговарајућој опремљености судова дигиталним средствима комуникације. Оно је приписано разлозима непостојања шире употребе електронских докумената у материјалноправним односима међу грађанима, неодговарајуће снабдјевености грађана технолошким средствима, те недговарајућем нивоу њихове дигиталне писмености. изворник и копија електронског документа; јавни Кључне ријечи: и приватни електронски документ; правна снага и доказна снага електронског документа. I УВОД, ПРЕДСТАВЉАЊЕ ПРОБЛЕМА ИСТРАЖИВАЊА И КОРИШЋЕНА МЕТОДОЛОГИЈА. ДЕФИНИСАЊЕ ПОЈМОВА. 1. Увод, проблем истраживања и коришћена методологија Годинама уназад, појавом и развојем савремених технолошких средстава, постоји могућност издавања електронских докумената у домену материјалноправних односа, било од органа јавне власти, било од физичких и правних лица, која не врше јавна овлашћења, а у складу са условима које поставља закон. То је пред законодавце поставило два задатка. Први је свеобухватно и квалитетно регулисање услова под којима се могу издавати електронски документи, али и користити, како у материјалноправним односима, тако и у поступку пред судовима, првенствено као докази. Други је задатак омогућавање технолошких услова предлагања и извођења електронских докумената као доказа. На овај изазов могуће је било одговорити интеграцијом овог модерног доказног средства у оквире досадашњег, традиционалног парничног поступка, заснованог на исправама на папиру, као доказним средствима, а изједначавањем свих материјалноправних и процесноправних својстава електронског документа са исправом на папиру. Постоји и могућност законодавног реструктуирања досадашењг парничног поступка и његова дјелимична, или потпуна дигитализације, а што би, највјероватније, поразумијевало и дјелимично или потпуно напуштање традиционалних начела парничног поступка.2 2 У процесној теорији сматра се да је употреба електронског документа први корак ка виртуелизацији судског поступка. (cf. Cornelis Hendrik van Rhee, Алан Узелац, „Evidence in civil procedure: Fundamentals in 462 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova У процесној теорији сматра се да је потпуна дигитализација парничног поступка пред нашим судовима тек идеја далеке будућности.3 Уосталом, требало би преиспитати и то да ли је она уопште и пожељна, имајући у виду природу парничног поступка у домаћем праву, начела на којима он почива, те процес доказивања и судског одлучивања. За претпоставити је да би, са аспекта начела економичности парничног поступка, оптимално било да се обезбиједи нормативни оквир, али и снабдјевеност судова одговарајућом технолошком опремом, ради коришћења електронског документа пред судом, уколико његово извођење као доказа може допринијети ефикасности поступка пред судом и квалитету донесене одлуке. У раду ће се, укратко, упоредноправно и нормативно-догматски анализирати појмови електронског документа и електронске исправе, оригинала и копије електронског документа, јавног и приватног електронског документа, те појмови правне снаге и доказне снаге електронског документа. Биће извршена и анализа нормативне али и стварне могућности за странке да у поступку подносе електронски документ суду у постојећем неелектронификованом парничном посутпку, у правима ентитета Босне и Херцеговине (у даљем тексту: е. БиХ), те ће ова анализа одговорити на питање да ли је употреба електронског документа у парничном поступку код нас могућа без даљих законодавних измјена у домену процесног и материјалног законодавства. Утврдиће се и правне и технолошке могућности за извођење електронског документа као доказа у постојећем, неелектронификованом, парничном поступку пред нашим судовима. Добијени подаци биће синтетизовани у закључке о томе у којој мјери постојећи процесни нормативни оквир, али и технолошка опремљеност у судовима дозвољавају употребу електронског документа пред домаћим судовима, те у којој мјери се, у пракси, и на који начин, овај доказ користи у парничном поступку код нас. Циљ је и да се утврди да ли се начин коришћења електронског документа, као доказа, у парничном поступку, разликује по свом утицају на одвијање поступка, у поређењу са коришћењем традиционалних исправа на папиру. Од добијених резултата зависиће и потреба за давањем приједлога за корекцију процесног и материјалноправног light of the 21th century“, у Evidence in Contemporary Civil Procedure Fundamental Issues in a Comparative Perspective, уред. Cornelis Hendrik van Rhee, Алан Узелац (Кембриџ, Антверп, Портланд: Intersentia, 2015). 8. 3 Хрвоје Лисичар, „Могућности упорабе електроничке исправе и електорничких докумената у парничном поступку“, Зборник Правног факултета у Загребу, 60 (2010):1401. 463 Стојана Петровић нормативног оквира употребе електронског документа као доказа у парничном поступку у домаћем праву. 2. Дефинисање појмова У парничном поступку, докази исправама изводе се читањем, док се подаци који немају својство исправа изводе доказом увиђајем. У домаћој, као и у иностраној процесној теорији ово разликовање се релативизује, па има мишљења да је доказивање читањем исправа врло блиско доказу увиђајем.4 2.1. Електронски документ, електронска исправа, електронски запис Према уједначеној правној регулативи у е. БиХ, под електронским документом подразумијева се једнообразно повезан цјеловит скуп података који су електронски обликовани (израђени помоћу рачунара и других електронских уређаја), послани, примљени или сачувани на електронском, магнетном, оптичком или другом медију и који садрже особине којима се утврђује аутор, вјеродостојност садржаја, те доказује вријеме када је документ сачињен. Садржај електронског документа укључује све облике писаног текста, податке, слике, цртеже, карте, тон, музику и говор.5 Елементи наведене законске дефиниције су садржинскодокументациони и формални. Садржински елемент дефиниције електронског документа, према законском одређењу је, да је то скуп података. Документациони дио овог садржинског елемента подразумијева особине тог скупа података, којима се утврђује аутор, вјеродостојност 4 Ранко Кеча и Боривоје Старовић, Грађанско процесно право (Нови Сад: Универзитет у Новом Саду, Правни факултет, Центар за издавачку делатност, 2004), 298, Михајло Дика, „О предмету увиђаја и увиђају у парничном поступку“, Зборник Правног факултета Свеучилишта у Ријеци, 31, 1 (2010): 8, Hans W. Fasching, Lehrnbuch des österreichischen Zivilprozeβrechts (Беч: Manzsache Verlags- und Universitӓsbuchhandlung, 1990), 525. 5 Чл. 4 ст. 1. и 2. Закона о електронском документу Републике Српске (“Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 106/2015), у даљем тексту: ЗЕД РС, и чл. 3 ст. 1. тач. 1. Закона о електронском документу Федерације Босне и Херцеговине („Службене новине Федерације Босне и Херцеговине“, бр. 55/2013), у даљем тексту: ЗЕД ФБиХ. У Брчко Дистрикту Босне и Херцеговине (у даљем тексту БД БиХ), 2015. године усвојен је Закон о стављању ван снаге Закона о електроничкој исправи БД БиХ („Службени гласник БД БиХ“, бр. 39/2010, 61/2010, 14/2011, 56/2011, 1/2013). На исти начин регулисан је појам електронског документа одредбом чл. 3. ст. 1. тач. 35. Уредбе ЕУ бр. 910/2014 о електронској идентификацији и услугама повјерења за електронске трансакције на унутрашњем тржишту и стављању ван снаге Директиве 1993/93ЕЗ (“Службени лист Европске Уније“, бр. L257/73, од 28.08.2014. године), у даљем тексту: Уредба ЕУ 910/2014. 464 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova садржаја, те доказује вријеме када је документ сачињен. Овај садржинскодокументациони елемент електронског документа, заправо се односи на електронски потпис, односно на квалификовани електронски потпис, који законодавци постављају као обавезни елемент појма електронског документа. Формални елемент електронског документа представља једнообразна повезаност, те електронско обликовање његове садржине (а која је изађена помоћу рачунара и других електронских уређаја). Формално-технички елемент електронског документа је и то да су наведени подаци, било послани, било примљени, било сачувани на електронском, магнетном, оптичком или другом медију. Да би се неки скуп података могао сматрати електронским документом, неопходно је да на страни тог скупа података постоје сви наведени елементи законске дефиниције електронског документа. Према правној доктрини држава окружења, сваки документ на папиру може се „претворити“ у електронски документ, прекуцавањем, односно скенирањем. Уколико се то уради на начин који гарантује његову аутентичност и у складу са законом, те уколико законом није другачије одређено, папирна и електронска форма документа имају исту правну ваљаност у свим врстама поступака пред надлежним државним органима и судовима6, па тако и пред парничним судом. Eлектронски документ израђује се електронским системима припреме, обликовања и чувања информационих садржаја у електронски запис,7 као што су Word, Excel, Adobe Reader, и други, без обзира на садржину документа. 8 Законодавци у е. БиХ разликују унутрашњи и вањски образац приказа електронског документа. Унутрашњи образац приказа састоји се од техничко-програмског обрасца записивања садржаја у електронском облику на медиј који садржава или просљеђује електронски документ.9 Вањски образац састоји се од визуелног или другог разумљивог приказа садржаја електронског документа на уређају за визуелни приказ рачунарских или других електронских уређаја на папиру или другом материјалном предмету, произведеног из записа у електронском облику 6 Драган Прља, Марио Рељановић и Звонимир Ивановић, Интернет право (Београд: Институт за упоредно право, 2012), 116. 7 Чл. 14 ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. 8 Прља, Рељановић и Ивановић, Интернет право, 118. 9 Чл. 6 ст. 2. ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. Овдје се мисли на формат записа електронског документа, као што су jpeg, doc, mp3, те одговарајуће техничке претпоставке за његов настанак и репродукцију. (Cf. Прља, Рељановић и Ивановић, Интернет право, 118). 465 Стојана Петровић на медију унутрашњег обрасца приказа документа.10 Овај, спољни образац електронског документа, односи се на перцепцију садржине тог електронског документа у спољном свијету – да ли је у питању звучни документ, видео снимак, писани документ, графички документ, фотографија, и слично.11 У одредбама ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ коришћен је технички термин електронски документ, док се појам електронска исправа у законском тексту не користи. Oдредбе наведених закона, али ни одредбе ЗПП РС/ ФБиХ не познају ни термин електронска доказна средства. Закон о парничном поступку Њемачке12, одредбом §130а Аbs. 1. регулише то да сви поднесци и изјаве странака, које треба суду поднијети у писаној форми, као и информације, стручна мишљења, преводи, изјаве трећих лица, могу суду бити поднесени и у електронској форми. Уколико се подноси у електронској форми, такав електронски документ мора бити снабдјевен квалификованим електронским потписом одговорног лица (§130а Аbs. 3. d ZPO)13, или он мора бити потписан од стране одговорног лица и пренесен неким од сигурних начина преноса, које прописује законодавац.14 Овом одредбом, 2005. године, њемачки законодавац иновирао је одредбе d ZPO у правцу давања електронском документу, који је сачињен у складу са законом, једнаке правне снаге као и документу 10 Чл. 6 ст. 3. ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. 11 Прља, Рељановић и Ивановић, Интернет право, 118. 12 Zivilprozessordnung in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung, vom 5. Dezember 2005 (BGBl. I S. 3202; 2006 I S. 431; 2007 I S. 1781), die zuletzt durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 12. Dezember 2019 (BGBl. I S. 2633) geändert worden ist, у даљем тексту: d ZPO. 13 У њемачком праву, електронски потпис и квалификовани електронски потпис, до јула 2017. године, били су регулисани одредбама њемачког Закона о електронском потпису (Gesetz über Rahmenbedinungen für elektronische Signatur (Signaturgesetz), из 1997. године. Након ступања на снагу Уредбе ЕУ 910/2014, овај закон, у њемачком праву, јула, 2017. године, замјењен је Законом о повјерењу у пружању услуга (Vertrauensdienstgesetz, vom 18. Juli 2017 (BGBl. I S. 2745), das durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 18. Juli 2017 (BGBl. I S. 2745) geändert worden ist). 14 То би била услуга доставе рачуна за испоручене услуге у електронској форми, када пошиљалац исте доставља у складу са законом који регулише ово питање, достава адвокатима путем електронског поштанског фаха и путем електронске поште суда, достава података у електронској форми, која се одвија између поштанског фаха органа јавне власти или правног лица јавног права, који је прошао процедуру идентификације и електронске поште суда, те остали стандардизовани начини доставе електронских података, који су утврђени одредбама уредаба Савезне владе, а који гарантују истинитост, изворност, цјеловитост и доступност пренесених података. (§130а d ZPO). Њемачки Савезни суд је у Одлуци, бр. XII ZB 8/19, од 8.5.2019. године заузео став да то што је адвокат тужиоца поднио жалбу Савезном суду путем e-mail-a као пдф документ који је отпринтан, потписан па скениран, не испуњава услове из одредбе §130а d ZPO. Ово из разлога што је e-mail послан на адресу суда за административну комуникацију, а не на електронски судски поштански налог. Зато се сматра да у овом предмету нису коришћени комуникациони канали који испуњавају услове из §130а Abs. 4. d ZPO. 466 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova на папиру.15 Законодавац њемачке поставља захтјев и да тај електронски документ мора бити погодан за обраду од стране суда.16 Правна теорија прави разлику између електронског документа и електронске исправе. Особина електронске исправе да посједује документационе особине, односно да пружа приказ свог аутора, приказ вјеродостојности свог садржаја, те њено својство да приказује вријеме када је документ сачињен, је оно што електронску исправу разликује од осталих електронских докумената. Тако, електронски документ може бити и одређена база података, видео, или тонски запис, који није снабдјевен квалификованим електронским потписом, који је сачињен у одређену сврху.17 У домаћој процесној теорији, оваквог мишљења су и Ракић и Ракић Водинелић, који сматрају спорним да ли неотиснути електронски запис има својство исправе, у смислу ЗПП, будући да се закон о томе није изричито изјаснио.18 Сличног схватања је и Дика, тврдећи да електронске базе података, заједно са тонским снимцима, фотографијама, видео записима, представљају предмет увиђаја.19 Станковић, другачије од овога, заговара да електронски снимак изјаве свједока (тонски или оптички) има својство посебне врсте исправе која се изводи на главној расправи, те који се тек касније, након извођења као доказа пред судом, уноси у записник са рочишта.20 И у аустријској процесној теорији, поред традиционалних доказних средстава, као што су исправе, изјаве свједока, вјештака, тумача, те увиђај, разликују се и тзв. „нова доказна средства“. Fasching, овдје, убраја тонски и видео запис, те друге електронске записе. Овај аутор „нова доказна средства“ не сматра исправама, у смислу ZPO, јер нису забиљежени медијумом људског писања, већ представљају предмет увиђаја. Снимци фотографија и филмова могу бити исправе само уколико су писањем 15 Детаљније о томе Марија Салма, „Електронска комуникација у парничном поступку“, Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, 3 (2014): 134. 16 §130а Аbs. 1. d ZPO. У том смислу је и Одлука њемачког Савезног суда, бр. XII ZB 8/19, од 8.5.2019. године. 17 Лисичар, „Могућности упорабе електроничке исправе и електорничких докумената у парничном поступку“, 1397. 18 Боривоје Познић и Весна Ракић Водинелић, Грађанско процесно право (Београд: Савремена администрација, 2010), 332. 19 Дика, „О предмету увиђаја и увиђају у парничном поступку“, 8. 20 Гордана Станковић, „Супституисање саслушања сведока писаном изјавом, тонским или оптичким записом“, Годишњак Правног факултета Универзитета у Бањој Луци, 34 (2012): 144. 467 Стојана Петровић забиљежени (фотокопија документа), а иначе, по њему, представљају само предмет увиђаја.21 Исто мисле и Rechberger и Simotta.22 Уважавајући наведена доктринарна схватања, стиче се утисак да наши законодаваци не разликују јасно електронски документ од електронске исправе. У ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ искључиво се користи технички термин електронски документ, са значењем електронске исправе, у смислу представљеног теоријског разликовања ова два појма. Обавезујуће прописивање документационих особина на страни електронског документа,23 у нашим законима, несумњиво упућује на закључак да су законодавци имали на уму регулисање појма електронске исправе, именујући је термином електронски документ. Ради избјегавања забуне, у овом раду биће коришћена терминологија законодаваца у е. БиХ. Законодавци у е. БиХ, ипак, праве разлику између електронског документа и електронског записа. Са аспекта теоријски препознатих елемената електронског документа, сличност у регулисању ова два појма је у томе што оба обухватају садржински и формални елемент. Електронски документ, за разлику од електронског записа, додатно, посједује и документациони елемент. Овај елемент, односи се на електронски потпис, односно на квалификовани електорнски потпис, о чему ће бити ријечи на одговарајућем мјесту у овом раду.24 Осим тога, законодавци прописују и то да електронски документ мора, у свим радњама укљученим у документациони циклус осигурати једнообразно обиљежје, којим се недвосмислено утврђује појединачни електронски документ и аутор електронског документа, информациона цјеловитост и неповредивост електронског документа, приступ садржају електронског документа кроз цијели период документационог циклуса и облик записа који омогућава читање садржаја.25 Из наведеног, а у свјетлу теоријског разграничења појма електронски документ од појма електронске исправе, стиче се утисак да су законодавци у е. БиХ под појмом електронског документа заправо регулисали електронску исправу, а да су под појмом електронског записа, регулисали појам електронски документ. 21 Fasching, Lehrnbuch des österreichischen Zivilprozeβrechts, 488. 22 Walter H. Rechberger и Daphne-Ariane Simotta, Grundriss des österreichischen Zivilprozessrechts (Беч: Manzsache Verlags- und Universitӓsbuchhandlung, 2010), 447. 23 Cf. одредбу чл. 5 ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. 24 Cf. биљешку infra I/2.3. Електронски потпис. 25 Чл. 4 ст. 3. ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. 468 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 2.2. Изворник и копија електронског документа. Правна снага електронског документа. Доказна снага електронског документа Електронски документ може бити издат и коришћен у форми изворника, или у форми копије. У домаћем праву, изворником електронског документа сматра се сваки појединачни примјерак електронског документа, који је потписан електронским потписом.26 Копија електронског документа на папиру израђује се овјером исписа вањског обрасца приказа електронског документа на папиру.27 Ову овјеру обављају у оквиру својих надлежности овлашћена лица у републичким органима, органима јединица локалне самоуправе, привредних друштава, установа, предузетника и правних лица, односно физичка лица. Ова лица својеручним потписом и печатом, односно физичко лице својим потписом, потврђују истовјетност копије електронског документа на папиру са вањским обрасцем приказа електронског документа.28 Ово би се могло односити на било који садржај електронског документа, било да се ради о тонском, видео запису, или другим подацима. Електронски документ не може имати копију у електронском облику. Ако исто лице изради два или више докумената са истим садржајем, од којих је један примјерак израђен у електронском облику, а други израђен на папиру, ти се документи сматрају независним и у тим случајевима документ израђен на папиру не сматра се копијом електронског документа.29 Испис вањског обрасца приказа електронског документа на папиру који се овјерава као копија електронског документа, мора обавезно садржавати ознаку да је ријеч о копији одговарајућег електронског документа.30 26 Чл. 8 ст. 1. ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. 27 Чл. 9 ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. 28 Чл. 9 ст. 4. ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. Законодавац Србије има другачију перцепцију појмова изворник и копија електронског документа. Наиме, под изворником електронског документа подразумијева се документ који је изворно настао у електронском облику, док је копија документ који је настао дигитализацијом (конверзијом) изворног документа чија форма није електронска, или пак штампањем спољне форме електронског документа. (cf. чл. 10 Закона о електронском документу, електронској идентификацији и услугама од повјерења у електронском пословању („Службени гласник Републике Србије“, бр. 94/2017), у даљем тексту: ЗЕД Ср (2017)). Да би копија електронског документа, у праву Србије, имала исту доказну снагу као изворник, дигитализацију мора да обави орган власти у вршењу својих надлежности и овлашћења, односно правно лице, или предузетник у обављању своје пословне дјелатности. Истовјетност са изворним документом, путем квалификованог електронског потписа, мора да потврди овлашћено лице органа власти, односно овлашћено лице правног лица, или предузетник. (О томе cf. Прља, Рељановић, Ивановић, Интернет право, 118). 29 Чл. 8 ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. 30 Чл. 9 ст. 3. ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. 469 Стојана Петровић Исправа на папиру је јавна, или приватна, зависно од тога ко је њен издавалац.31 Из тога произлазе и различита доказна својства ове двије врсте исправе у поступку пред судом. Ситуација је слична и са електронским документом. Правна снага правног акта институт је материјалног права и дефинише се као његово мјесто на хијерархијској љествици правних аката, односно као одређена мјера његовог утицаја на друге акте, као што и сам тај акт, односно правни документ, трпи одређену мјеру утицаја других аката.32 Одредбама ЗЕД РС и ЗЕД ФБиХ, изричито је прописано да електронски документ има правну снагу као и документ на папиру, ако је израђен, послан, примљен, чуван и архивиран примјеном расположиве информационе технологије и ако испуњава услове који се тичу његовог садржаја и грађе, а које прописују наведени закони.33 Из ове одредбе произлази примарна функција закона о електронском документу, да изједначи правну снагу електронског документа, сачињеног у складу са законом, са правном снагом потписане исправе на папиру. Циљ прописивања свих наведених услова за електронски документ је обезбјеђење правне сигурности при његовој употреби. Прописано је и то да изворни електронски документ, као и његова копија на папиру која је израђена у складу са одредбама закона, имају исту правну снагу и могу се равноправно користити у свим радњама за које се тражи употреба документа у изворном облику или у облику овјерене копије.34 Прописује се и то да се, за све радње, у којима се законом или другим прописом изричито тражи нотарска овјера документа на папиру не може достављати електронски документ, или његова копија на папиру.35 Да би електронски документ, било јавни, било приватни, имао правну снагу, неопходно је да буде испуњен општи услов прихватања употребе 31 Чл. 132 ст. 1. Закона о парничном поступку Републике Српске (“Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 58/03, 85/03, 74/05, 63/07, 105/08 – одлука Уставног суда, 45/09 – одлука Уставног суда, 49/09 и 61/13), у даљем тексту: ЗПП РС, те Закона о парничном поступку Федерације Босне и Херцеговине („Службене новине Федерације Босне и Херцеговине“, бр. 53/03, 73/05, 19/06, 98/15), у даљем тексту: ЗПП ФБиХ. 32 Радомир Лукић, Будимир Кошутић и Драган Митровић, Увод у право (Београд: Службени лист СРЈ, 1999), 560. 33 В. чл. 7 ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. И Уредба ЕУ 910/2014, у одредби чл. 46 предвиђа то да се електронском документу, као доказу у судским поступцима не смије ускратити правни учинак и допуштеност само због тога што је он у електронском облику. 34 Чл. 10 ст. 1. ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. 35 Чл. 10 ст. 2. ЗЕД ФБиХ. Будући да је достављање процесна радња суда, за претпоставити је да је законодавац погрешно примијенио овај технички термин, а не да му је намјера била да да ограничи употребу електронског документа, под прописаним условом, само на смијер комуницирања суд-странке. 470 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova и промета електронског документа за своје потребе као и за потребе пословних и других односа, од стране органа и других физичких и правних лица (чл. 2 ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ)36. Осим овог, општег, постоји и услов који се тиче садржине, а који се односи на грађу електронског документа (чл. 5 ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ). Ту су и услови форме електронског документа, а који се односе на обавезно постојање унутрашњег и вањског обрасца приказа (чл. 6 ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ), те на опремљеност електронским потписом, али не нужно и квалификованим електронским потписом (чл. 4 ст. 3. ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ и чл. 6 ст. 2. ЗЕП РС). Доказна снага исправе институт је и материјалног и процесног права. Oдредбом материјалноправног прописа, какав је ЗЕД ФБиХ, изричито је прописана доказна снага електронског документа. Могућност употребе електронског документа као доказног средства у парничном поступку експлицитно произлази и из одредбе члана 1 ЗЕД РС, који као предмет законског уређења, прописује „...употребу електронског документа од републичких органа, јединица локалне самоуправе, привредних друштава, установа, предузетника и других правних и физичких лица у обављању дјелатности, те у поступцима који се воде пред надлежним органима у управном, судском или другом поступку у којима се електронска опрема и програми могу примјењивати...“. 2.3. Електронски потпис У процесној теорији, електронски потпис се за електронске документе сматра еквивалентом својеручног потписа за документе на папиру. Стављање потписа на садржај неке исправе на папиру, било да она потиче од јавног органа, било од приватног лица, сматра се условом настанка претпоставке да се потписник саглашава са садржајем исправе.37 Према повлађујућој домаћој процесној теорији, потпис издаваоца исправе на папиру не улази у појам исправе, али је он од значаја за њену доказну вриједност.38 36 У правној доктрини, овај услов оцјењује се претјерано рестриктивним, те се сматра да сужава домен електронске комуникације. Заговара се да се сматра да тај пристанак постоји у ситуацији када се један од учесника правног односа поднеском електронским путем обрати другој страни. (детаљније cf. Фране Станичић и Марко Јурић, „Правни оквир за имплементацију информацијско-комуникацијских технологија у хрватско управно поступовно право“, Зборник Правног факултета у Загребу, 65 (2015): 655). 37 Cf. Тихомир Катулић, „Развој правне регулације електроничког потписа, електроничког цертификата, и електроничке исправе у Хрватском и поредбеном праву“, Зборник Правног факултета у Загребу, 61 (2011): 1342. 38 Гордана Станковић, Грађанско процесно право (Београд: ИП Јустинијан, 2004), 411. Тако и Кеча и Старовић, Грађанско процесно право, 299, те Познић и Ракић Водинелић, Грађанско процесно право, 332. 471 Стојана Петровић Основни захтјев који се ставља пред електронски потпис је његова способност да потврди аутентичност потписника, али и садржаја документа.39 За разлику од исправе на папиру, одредба члана 4. ЗЕД РС/ ЗЕД ФБиХ прописује да појам електронског документа обухвата и „... особине којима се утврђује аутор, утврђује вјеродостојност садржаја, те доказује вријеме када је документ сачињен.“40 Ова одредба предвиђа да снабдјевеност електронског и јавног и приватног документа електронским потписом, односно квалификованим електронским потписом, потврђује, не само истинитост поријекла тог документа од конкретног издаваоца, већ потврђује и истинитост његовог садржаја. Одредбе чланова 4 и 7 ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ потврђују и то да је у нашем праву усвојен концепт строге условљености правне, односно доказне снаге електронског документа електронским потписом.41 При томе, правна снага електронског потписа, односно квалификованог електронског потписа, за податке у електронском облику, изједначена је са правном снагом својеручног потписа, односно својеручног потписа и печата, за податке на папиру.42 Електронски потпис сматра се правно ваљаним и допуштено га је користити у судским и другим поступцима ако он испуњава услове прописане законом. Он се не може оспоравати у судским и другим поступцима искључиво ради тога што је у електронском облику или због тога што не испуњава све захтјеве за квалификовани електронски потпис.43 39 Катулић, „Развој правне регулације електроничког потписа, електроничког цертификата, и електроничке исправе у Хрватском и поредбеном праву“, 1344. 40 Занимљиво је законодавно рјешење усвојено одредбом чл. 9 Закона о електронском пословању Републике Српске („Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 59/09), према којем електронска порука треба бити снабдјевена електронским потписом када се за испуњење претпоставке ваљаности и настанка уговора (forma ad solemnitatem) тражи потпис лица. У нашем облигационом праву вриједи принцип слободне форме уговора. Стога се, из наведене законске одредбе, може закључити да се електронски потпис мора придружити електронској форми уговора, као приватне исправе, само када је форма уговора предвиђена као битан услов његове пуноважности, а што је изузетак од правила о слободној форми уговора. 41 Закон о електронском потпису Републике Српске (“Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 106/15), у даљем тексту: ЗЕП РС, Закон о електронском потпису Федерације Босне и Херцеговине (Закон усвојен на сједници Дома народа Парламента ФБиХ 27.02.2020. године, још необјављен у службеном гласилу ФБиХ), у даљем тексту: ЗЕП ФБиХ, као и Закон о електронском потпису БД БиХ (Закон усвојен на сједници Скупштине БД БиХ 11.03.2020. године, још необјављен у службеном гласилу БД БиХ), у даљем тексту: ЗЕП БД БиХ, разликују електронски потпис од квалификованог електронског потписа. (за детаљније, cf. одредбе чл. 3 и 4 ЗЕП РС/ЗЕП ФБиХ, чл. 5 и 6 ЗЕП БД БиХ), те чл. 3 ст. 1. тач. 10 Уредбе ЕУ 910/2014. 42 Чл. 5 ЗЕП РС. Овакав карактер електронског потписа предвиђа и одредба чл. 25 Уредбе ЕУ 910/2014. 43 Чл. 6 ЗЕП РС/ЗЕП ФБиХ/ЗЕП БД БиХ. И ЗПП РС/ЗПП ФБиХ, одредбом чл. 334 ст. 1. и ст. 4. прописују да странке поднеске суду подносе писмено, а да услов писмене форме испуњава и поднесак упућен електронском поштом. Поднесци који се упућују суду електронском поштом морају бити овјерени квалификованим електронским потписом, 472 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Њемачко право, одредбом §130а Аbs. 3. d ZPO промовише концепт обавезне снабдјевености поднесака странака у електронској форми квалификованим електронским потписом, као условом њихове правне снаге. Њемачки законодавац, ипак, оставља алтернативну могућност да поднесак странке у електронској форми, који није снабдјевен квалификованим електронским потписом, мора бити потписан од стране одговорног лица и пренесен неким од сигурних начина преноса, које прописује закон.44 Aко електронски документ није снабдјевен електронским потписом, нити је пренесен суду неким од сигурних начина преноса, како то прописује законодавац, тада није испуњена одредба §130а d ZPO.45 Иако законодавац регулише питање поднесака странака, наведена одлука суда указује на то да се одредба §130а Аbs. 3. d ZPO примјењује и на електронске документе, који се подносе као прилози страначним поднесцима. Алтернативно постављање услова правне, односно доказне снаге електронског документа, може допринијети широј употреби електронског документа у поступку пред судом, будући да је странкама у поступку, остављена могућност избора који услов ће се испунити на страни електронског документа који пред судом предлажу као доказ – да ли ће он бити снабдјевен квалификованим електронским потписом, или ће, потписан од стране одговорног лица бити пренесен неким од сигурних начина преноса, које прописује закон. 2.3.1. Поступање суда када електронски документ, предложен као доказ у парничном поступку, није снабдјевен електронским потписом Закон изричито не регулише како ће суд поступити у ситуацији, када исправа, коју је странка у парничном поступку предложила за извођење као на доказа, није снабдјевена потписом овлашћеног лица, односно потписом овлашћеног лица и печатом, било да се ради о јавној, било о приватној исправи. Закон ово питање не регулише ни када је ријеч о електронском документу, који је предложен као доказ. При разрјешењу ове ситуације, када је ријеч о јавном електронском документу, с обзиром на значај докумената које издају органи власти и лица која врше јавна овлашћења, суд би могао поћи од претпоставке аутентичности, која је, у супротном се сматрају неуредним. (Тако произлази и из Одлуке Вишег суда у Новом Саду, бр. Гж886/2014, од 28.01.2015. године). 44 Детаљније о правном стандарду сигурни начини преноса, cf. §130а Abs 4. d ZPO. 45 Тако и Одлука њемачког Савезног суда (Bundesgerichtshof) бр. XII ZB 8/19, од 8.5.2019. године. 473 Стојана Петровић и у судској пракси,46 али и у преовлађујућој процесној теорији47, усвојена за јавне исправе на папиру. Суд би, дакле, могао претпоставити да тај електронски документ потиче од његовог издаваоца. Супротна странка би ову претпоставку могла оспоравати, али је и суд дужан, ако посумња у истинитост електронског документа, који је предложен као доказ за извођење, да затражи да се о томе изјасни субјект од којег документ потиче.48 Да би могао посумњати у истинитост поднесеног електронског документа, поступајући судија би морао имати у виду наведене одредбе ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ, те ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ, које регулишу значајна проблемска питања електронског документа. Када странка предлаже као доказ приватну исправу, која потиче од физичког или од правног лица које не врши јавна овлашћења, странка би морала доказати њену истинитост, ако то оспорава супротна странка.49 Ово би се, у пракси, могло примијенити и на приватни електронски документ. Овакво поступање суда подржава и аустријска процесна теорија. Законодавац предвиђа снабдјевеност јавних исправа на папиру, али и јавног електронског документа, претпоставком њихове аутентичности. У процесној доктрини Аустрије, сматра се да је суд дужан извршити провјеру претпостављене аутентичности, уколико о томе пред судом постоји сумња не само по захтјеву, већ и по службеној дужности. Суд би тада, према овом схватању, требао позвати издаваоца исправе да се изјасни о аутентичности исправе, односно електронског документа. Уколико ово изјашњење не отклони сумњу, тада терет доказивања аутентичности пада на лице које се на исправу, односно на електронски документ позива, као на доказ.50 46 Одлука Врховног суда Хрватске, бр. Рев. 265-91, од 28.3.1991. године, доступно на https://sudskapraksa. csp.vsrh.hr/decisionPdf?id=090216ba80227f3d, приступљено 21.1.2020. године. 47 Гордана Станковић и Ранка Рачић, Парнично процесно право (Бања Лука: Правни факултет Универзитета у Бањој Луци, 2017), 445, Станковић, Грађанско процесно право, 412, Познић и Ракић Водинелић, Грађанско процесно право, 335, Кеча и Старовић, Грађанско процесно право, 299. 48 Tako за јавне исправе на папиру Познић и Ракић Водинелић, Грађанско процесно право, 334. И законодавци Њемачке и Аустрије ово питање регулишу на исти начин (cf. §437 d ZPO, §292 ст. 1. ö ZPO). 49 О томе детаљније cf. Станковић и Рачић, Парнично процесно право, 444. 50 Fasching, Lehrnbuch des österreichischen Zivilprozeβrechts, 497. 474 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 2.4. Јавни електронски документ и његова доказна снага Под појам јавног електронског документа могла би се подвести јавна исправа51, издата у електронској форми, снабдјевена електронским потписом, односно квалификованим електронским потписом њеног издаваоца, те која испуњава и остале услове прописане одредбама ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ.52 Изједначена доказна снага јавног електронског документа са наведеном доказном снагом јавне исправе на папиру explicite произлази из законске одредбе члана 7 ЗЕД РС/ЗЕДФБиХ, уколико тај електронски документ испуњава законом прописане услове за његову пуну правну снагу.53 У пракси је могућа ситуација да издавалац, омашком, у јавни електронски документ, снабдјевен квалификованим електронским потписом, унесе неистинит, односно погрешан садржај. Странка би, у доброј вјери, могла предложити његово извођење као доказа. Поред претпоставке аутентичности издаваоца и претпоставке истинитости његовог садржаја, чини се да би се могло тврдити да би супротна странка 51 Законодавци у е. БиХ под јавном исправом подразумијевају исправу коју је у прописаном облику издао државни орган у границама своје надлежности, као и исправу коју је у таквом облику издало правно или физичко лице у вршењу јавних овлашћења које му је повјерено законом или прописом заснованим на закону, те која доказује истинитост онога што се у њој потврђује или одређује. (чл. 132 ст. 1. ЗПП РС/ЗПП ФБиХ). На исти начин појам јавне исправе регулише и законодавац Аустрије, прописујући изричито да она може бити издата као исправа на папиру, али и као електронски документ. Он предвиђа претпоставку аутентичности јавне исправе и када је она издата као електронски документ, одредбом §292 ст. 1. Закона о грађанском поступку (Gesetz vom 1. August 1895, über das gerichtliche Verfahren in bürgerlichen Rechtsstreitigkeiten (Zivilprozessordnung), StF: RGBl. Nr. 113/1895, die zuletzt durch des Gesetz vom 28. Dezember 2018 (BGBl. I Nr. 109/2018) geändert worden ist, у даљем тексту: ö ZPO). 52 Њемачки законодавац регулише да јавни електронски документ потиче од јавног органа, издат у границама његове надлежности, као и од лица које ужива јавно повјерење, а којe електронски документ издаје у границама службених, односно пословних овлашћења која су му дата, те који је издат у прописаној форми. На јавни електронски документ примјењују се правила о доказној снази јавних исправа, које су сачињене у складу са законом, под условом да је тај јавни електронски документ снабдјевен квалификованим електронским потписом. Исто вриједи и за електронски документ, који, у име јавног органа, или лица које ужива јавно повјерење, издаје акредитовани давалац услуга и који је снабдјевен квалификованим електронским потписом свог издаваоца, у складу са Законом о електронској пошти, а потврду пошиљаоца пружи јавни орган или идентификује лице од јавног повјерења као корисника налога електронске поште. (§371a Abs. 3. d ZPO). Законом о електронској пошти регулише се пружање услуге преноса електронске поште од стране пружаоца (De-Mail Dienstanbieter) на платформи за електронску комуникацију која је намењена да обезбиједи сигурне, повjерљиве и провjерљиве пословне трансакције за све на интернету. (§1 Аbs. 1. De-Mail-Gesetz, vom 28. April 2011 (BGBl. I S. 666), das zuletzt durch Artikel 14 des Gesetzes vom 20. November 2019 (BGBl. I S. 1626) geändert worden ist, у даљем тексту: DMG). 53 Њемачки законодавац регулише и питање доказне снаге јавне исправе на папиру, скениране од стране јавног органа, или лица које ужива јавно повјерење. Таква исправа, под условом да је снабдјевена потврдом да електронски документ по слици и садржају одговара оригиналу, има доказну снагу јавне исправе на папиру, која је скенирана. Уколико су документ и потврда о идентичности снабдјевени квалификованим електронским потписом, примјењује се одредба §437 d ZPO. (§371b d ZPO). 475 Стојана Петровић могла пред судом оспоравати истинитост утврђених чињеница у јавном електронском документу. Она би могла оспоравати и правилност његовог састављања, како то предвиђа одредба члана 132 ст. 3 ЗПП РС/ ЗПП ФБиХ, по аналогији са таквом могућношћу странке у погледу јавних исправа на папиру.54 2.5. Приватни електронски документ и његова доказна снага Доказна снага приватне исправе на папиру се не претпоставља, већ је суд оцјењује према свом слободном увјерењу.55 Ипак, аутентичност издаваоца, као и истинитост садржаја требале би бити особине приватне исправе на папиру. Према домаћој процесној теорији странке би могле оспоравати аутентичност потписа издаваоца приватне исправе на папиру,56 а у њену аутентичност могао би посумњати и сам суд. Тада би суд позвао подносиоца да докаже њену истинитост, односно аутентичност.57 У аустријској доктрини сматра се да терет доказивања аутентичности исправе за лице које се на њу позива као на доказ у поступку, настаје тек онда када противник исту оспори. Пропуштање ових лица да се изјасне о аутентичности приватне исправе није оспоравање.58 Полазећи од појма јавног електронског документа,59 под приватним електронским документом могли би се подразумијевати сви остали документи, који не потичу од државног органа, ни од правног нити од физичког лица, које обавља јавна овлашћења, а који имају електронски облик и који задовољавају законом прописане услове правне снаге електронског документа.60 У домаћем праву, нису све приватне исправе 54 Према доктринарном ставу у праву Аустрије, противна странка би могла оспоравати само правилност поступка издавања јавне исправе којом се једно право оснива или се мијења. (cf. Fasching, Lehrnbuch des österreichischen Zivilprozeβrechts, 498). 55 Одлука Врховног суда Хрватске, бр. Рев. 313/07-2, од 20.6.2007. године, доступно на https://sudskapraksa.csp.vsrh.hr/decisionText?id=090216ba80547d03&q=privatna+isprava+dokazna+snaga, приступљено 21.1.2020. године. Јединствен је овакав став и код процесне доктрине. (cf. Станковић и Рачић, Парнично процесно право, 447, Александар Јакшић, Грађанско процесно право (Београд: ЈП Службени гласник, 2007), 379, Познић и Ракић Водинелић, Грађанско процесно право, 335). Овако је регулисано и у правима њемачке и аустрије. Изузетак су приватне исправе, уколико је нотар потврдио аутентичност потписа њиховог издаваоца, чиме оне стичу претпоставку аутентичности. (§440 d ZPO, §294 Abs. 2. ö ZPO). 56 Кеча и Старовић, Грађанско процесно право, 300. 57 Тако и Станковић, Грађанско процесно право, 412. Такође сf. §312 Abs. 2. ö ZPO. 58 Fasching, Lehrnbuch des österreichischen Zivilprozeβrechts, 497. 59 Cf. биљешку supra I/2.4. Јавни електронски документ и његова доказна снага. 60 §371а Abs. 1. d ZPO. Од свих приватних електронских докумената, у њемачкој литератури посебно је занимљива доказна снага e-mail-a, будући да се уговори могу закључивати овим путем, а имајући у виду начело слободне 476 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova подобне да буду електронскi документ.61 Ове приватне исправе, сходно томе, не би могле бити ни предложене као електронски документ суду, ради извођења као доказа. Странке би могле оспоравати садржај приватног електронског документа.62 форме облигационоправних и привредних уговора. У Њемачкој је, под утицајем одредаба Закона о промовисању употребе електронске комуникације са судовима (Gesetz zur Förderung des elektronischen Rechtsverkehrs mit den Gerichten, BGBL I 2013/62, 3786), 1. јула 2014. године ступила на снагу измјена одредбе §371a d ZPO додавањем става 2. који изричито регулише доказну вриједност е-mail-a. Њемачки судови сматрају да е-mail може бити предложен суду као доказ, било као електронски подаци, било у форми исписа садржине поруке на папиру. Испис на папиру садржине поруке пренесене е-mail-ом, могао би се цијенити као приватна исправа, будући да он представља отјеловљење нечијег размишљања писаним путем, у смислу одредаба d ZPO (“...преписка између послодавца и запосленог, која се одвијала путем е-mail-a може се користити као доказ у поступку пред судом...“ (из образложења Пресуде Радноправног суда у Франкфурту (Arbeitsgericht Frankfurt), бр. 7 Са 5380/01, од 9.1.2002. године). У новијој њемачкој литератури критикује се схватање да е-mail мора бити снабдјевен електронским потписом као условом његове доказне снаге у поступку. Сматра се да оно може имати негативне економске ефекте на пословне моделе, засноване на необезбијеђеном е-mail саобраћају, будући да се у пракси показало непрактичним и ријетко се користи потписивање е-mail-ова квалификованим електронским потписом. (cf. Alexander Roβnagel, Andreas Pfitzmann, „Der Beweiswert von E-mail“, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 56 (2017): 1210). Ради превазилажења овог проблема, у њемачкој судској пракси преовлађује извођење оваквог доказа увиђајем. (Roβnagel, Pfitzmann, „Der Beweiswert von E-mail“, 1210, Franz Schmidbauer, „Beweis und Anscheinbeweis bei der Übermittlung einer E-mail – Erklärung“, Zivilrecht aktuell, 5 (2008): 83). Пред аустријским судовима е-mail се изводи читањем као исправа. (Schmidbauer, „Beweis und Anscheinbeweis bei der Übermittlung einer E-mail – Erklärung“, 83). У пракси наших судова странке врло ријетко предлажу извођење е-mail-а као доказа. Уколико би странка у поступку то учинила и уколико би суд прихватио тај доказни приједлог, могло би се узети да би се он изводио увиђајем. Овакав став заузима се и у доктрини држава нашег окружења, која се позива на њемачку преовлађујућу доктрину, ако се узме да електронски записи, у које су електронским путем меморисани одређени писмени знаци, нису исправе. (у вези са тим cf. Јакшић, Грађанско процесно право, 376). Уколико би странка предложила као доказ за извођење пред судом испис е-mail поруке на папиру, такав документ могао би се изводити читањем, као приватна исправа. 61 Cf. одредбу чл. 7 ст. 4. Закона о електронском пословању РС. Такође, cf. и Бојан Пајтић, Сања Радовановић и Атила Дудаш, Облигационо право (Нови Сад: Универзитет у Новом Саду, Правни факултет, Центар за издавачку делатност, 2018), 276. 62 У аустријској процесној теорији постоји тумачење да је утврђена аутентичност (потписа) приватне исправе предуслов за „квалификовану претпоставку њене аутентичности (qualifizierte Echtheitsvermutung)“. Ово, будући да, према §294 Abs. 2. ö ZPO, таква приватна исправа даје „..потпун доказ да изјаве садржане у њoj потичу од њеног издаваоца.“ Ако је потпис аутентичан, сматра се да је и потписани текст аутентичан. (Rechberger и Simotta, Grundriss des österreichischen Zivilprozessrechts, 451). И сам законодавац Аустрије прописује да се то односи на електронске приватне документе, једнако као и на папирне приватне исправе. Према овим ауторима, правило доказивања овдје доводи до преокретања терета доказа, па противна странка може доказати неаутентичност потписаног текста приватне исправе (доказ супротног). Одредба §294 Abs. 2. ö ZPO о претпоставци аутентичности садржаја потписане приватне исправе примењује се и на електронске документе, под условом да су они снабдјевени квалификованим електронским потписом. (Rechberger, Simotta, Grundriss des österreichischen Zivilprozessrechts, 451). 477 Стојана Петровић 2. 6. Доказна снага копије електронског документа у парничном поступку у законодавствима е. БиХ ЗПП РС/ЗПП ФБиХ прописују да се исправе на папиру подносе суду у изворнику, препису, или фотокопији.63 Препис, односно фотокопија исправе, под законом прописаним условима, изједначена је са њеним изворником. Ситуација је иста и када је у питању електронски документ. Законодавци у е. БиХ прописују да копија електронског документа на папиру, израђена у складу са законом, има иста правна дејства, те исту доказну снагу, као и изворни електронски документ и могу се равноправно користити у свим радњама за које се тражи употреба документа у изворном облику или у облику овјерене копије.64 Одредбом чл. 10. ст. 1. ЗЕД ФБиХ прописан је изузетак од изједначеног правног дејства електронског документа са правним дејствима документа на папиру. Наиме, не може се достављати електронски документ, нити његова копија на папиру, када је за неку радњу законом или другим прописом изричито прописана нотарска овјера документа на папиру. Овом одредбом, чини се да се предност правном дејству документа на папиру даје искључиво због захтијеване његове нотарски овјерене форме. Овакву одредбу не познаје ЗЕД РС.65 У наставку рада, укратко ће се размотрити питање начина на који странке могу понудити суду електронски документ као доказ, у условима нашег, традиционалног, парничног поступка. II ПОДНОШЕЊЕ (ПОНУДА) СУДУ ЕЛЕКТРОНСКОГ ДОКУМЕНТА, КАО ДОКАЗА Законодавци у е. БиХ не прописују никакво ограничење у погледу времена у којем странке могу суду поднијети електронски документ, који предлажу као доказ у парничном постпупку. Стога се може 63 Чл. 355 ст. 1. ЗПП РС/ЗПП ФБиХ. 64 Чл. 10 ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ. 65 Ова одредба ЗЕД ФБиХ чини се контрадикторном одредби члана 9 ст. 2. ЗЕД ФБиХ, којом је прописано да овјеру исписа вањског обрасца приказа електронског документа на папиру у поступцима које воде надлежни органи у управном поступку у оквиру своје надлежности обављају овлашћене особе у тим органима, а да нотар обавља овјеру исписа електронског документа на папиру, у свим осталим ситуацијама. Није најјасније зашто је електронски документ, а посебно зашто је правна снага његове копије на папиру деградирана од стране законодавца у Федерацији Босне и Херцеговине, у поређењу са документом на папиру и у ситуацији када је за тај електронски документ законом захтијевана нотарска овјера. Ово, будући да су нотари овлашћени да овјеравају копију електронског документа на папиру, у свим ситуацијама, осим поступака које воде надлежни управни органи. 478 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova претпоставити да оне суду могу отпремати електронски документ у двадесетчетворочасовном времену. Тиме се доприноси експедитивности у раду суда, а странкама се даје могућност да ефикасније предузимају своја процесна овлашћења. Исправе на папиру, као докази, у традиционалном парничном поступку, подносе се суду физички, предајом у пошту, заједно са поднеском странке, или на протокол судске писарнице, ако се понуда доказа врши у тужби, односно у одговору на тужбу, или њиховом предајом судији на записник, уколико се докази подносе на рочишту. У правима е. БиХ, поступкци поводом спора мале вриједности потпуно су електронификовани (SOKOP-Mal)66, те транке са парничним судом могу остварити потпуну електронску комуникацију. Електронски систем који врши пријем порука за суд, у овим предметима, врши и провјеру да ли је електронски документ, који се подноси суду, снабдјевен квалификованим електронским потписом.67 У овако, потпуно електронификованом поступку, странке могу све поднеске и доказе суду поднијети као електронске документе. Тада електронски документ може допринијети постизању ефикасности поступка. У процесној доктрини сматра се да постоји могућност електронске комуникације између суда и странака и у општем парничном поступку, те у другим посебним парничним поступцима.68 Општи парнични поступак, као ни већина посебних парничних поступака нису потпуно електронификовани и код нас се одвијају по начелу писмености, у комбинацији са начелом усмености.69 Резултат тога је да се странке у пракси учестало опредјељују да предлажу исправе на папиру као доказе, умјесто електронских докумената. Стиче се утисак да су законодавци е. БиХ, у општем парничном поступку, ипак, оставили правни простор и за остваривање електронске комуникације на линији странке-суд. Ситуација није иста и када је у питању комуникација суда са странкама. Ову могућност дају донекле 66 Ради се о систему електронског подношења и обраде предмета у првостепеним судовима у e. БиХ. Исти систем електронског поступка функционише и у извршним комуналним предметима, гдје тражилац извршења подноси приједлог за извршење извршном суду путем електронског система, поднеском, који је снабдјевен електронским потписом. (чл. 22 Упутства за поступање путем система за електронско подношење и обраду предмета мале вриједности и тзв. „комуналних предмета“ (СОКОП-Мал систем), Високог судског и тужилачког вијећа, од 12.07.2012. године, у даљем тексту: Упутство ВСТВ (2012)). 67 Чл. 6 Упутства ВСТВ (2012). 68 Салма, „Електронска комуникација у парничном поступку“, 132. 69 У нашем праву, у поступцима у привредним споровима, рочишта се могу заказивати електронским путем. (чл. 433г ЗПП РС). Ова одредба само је корак ка електронификацији поступка, али је далеко од реализације идеје о електронском парничном поступку. 479 Стојана Петровић одредбе материјалног права, које регулишу материју електронског документа, али не и процесне одредбе парничног поступка.70 Наиме, анализа домаћег процесног законодавства, а прије свега, члана 337 ЗПП РС/ФБиХ указује на то да су се наши законодавци бавили питањем регулисања достављања странкама судских писмена.71 Будући да наведена одредба регулише достављање странкама, могло би се закључити да она регулише само комуникацију на линији судстранке. Осим тога, наведена одредба ограничава се на регулисање достављања искључиво писмена, али не обухвата правила достављања странкама аката суда као електронских докумената. У нашој судској пракси, једино се у потпуно електронификованом поступку у споровима мале вриједности (SOKOР-Mal) акти суда као електронски документи достављају странкама електронским путем.72 У општем парничном поступку и даље се примјењује традиционални систем достављања аката на папиру. ЗПП РС регулише и упућивање поднесака суду, од стране странака. Одредба чл. 334 ст. 1 ЗПП РС регулише то да се тужба, одговор на тужбу, противтужба, одговор на поротивтужбу, правни лијекови и друге изјаве, приједлози и саопштења који се дају ван расправе подносе писмено, те да услов писмене форме испуњавају и поднесци упућени телеграмом, телефаксом или електронском поштом. Одредба чл. 334 ст. 4 ЗПП РС предвиђа то да квалификованим електронским потписом морају бити снабдјевени поднесци који се достављају електронском поштом.73 Иако се наведена одредба чл. 334 ст. 1. ЗПП РС односи на поднеске странака, она би се могла примијенити и на електронски документ, који странке суду упућују као доказе, у прилог својих поднесака.74 70 У процесној доктрини, комуникација странака са судом, подношењем писмена путем електронске поште, не изједначава се са електронском комуникацијом. (Салма, „Електронска комуникација у парничном поступку“, 132). Прописи европског права о електронској правној комуникацији предвиђају достављање аката и предузимање процесних радњи у електронском правном саобраћају преко предвиђеног специјалног електронског центра. (Салма, „Електронска комуникација у парничном поступку“, 132). 71 Достављање странкама је судска процесна радња, а не страначка. (Станковић, Грађанско процесно право, 280. Тако и Познић и Ракић Водинелић, Грађанско процесно право, 229). 72 Cf. чл. 7 Упутства ВСТВ (2012), који предвиђа то да ће странкама које су корисници електронског система сва судска писмена бити доступна путем њиховог електронског претинца, док одредба чл. 9 Упутства ВСТВ (2012) предвиђа то да ће се достава писмена странкама које нису корисници електронског система вршити у складу са одредбама ЗПП РС/ЗПП ФБиХ о достављању писмена. 73 Законодавац погрешно користи термин достављање, када говори о процесној радњи странка. 74 То произлази и из праксе њемачких судова, cf. Одлуку њемачког Савезног суда (Bundesgerichtshof) бр. XII ZB 8/19, од 8.5.2019. године. 480 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Могућност да процесне странке електронски документ предложе као доказ, у традиционалном усмено-писменом парничном поступку, зависи, првенствено, од тога да ли се суду подноси изворник, или копија тог електронског документа, те од тога, у којој фази, у развоју парничног поступка се врши приједлог доказа. Начин предлагања овог доказа, није условљен тиме која процесна странка га предлаже. 1. Подношење суду изворника електронског документа, као доказа Питање начина на који странке суду подносе изворник електронског документа, који предлажу као доказ, заправо је питање утврђивања да ли домаће право предвиђа могућност да странке овај доказ суду подносе приликом подизања тужбе, односно приликом изјављивања одговора на тужбу. Питање је и да ли би странке изворник електронског документа могле поднијети суду и касније, на припремном рочишту, непосредно, примјера ради, предајом усб уређаја, или цд-a, или оне то могу учинити само путем електронске поште суда. Такође, питање је да ли су судови технолошки опремљени да заприме и обраде овај доказ. У пракси би најједноставнија била ситуација у којој би докази, који се суду упућују као прилози страначких поднесека, по својој форми, одговарали самим поднесцима. Ипак, докази, као прилози ових страначких поднесака - тужбе, односно одговора, на тужбу, не би нужно морали бити у истој форми, као и сами поднесци. Уколико је тужба поднесена на папиру, није могуће изворник електронског документа приложити тужби као доказ. Под условом да таква тужба садржи и остале доказе на које се тужилац позива, суд је, због непотпуности, неће вратити тужиоцу на исправку. Одредба члана 63 ЗПП РС/ЗПП ФБиХ омогућава странкама да и у току припремања главне расправе упућују поднеске у којима ће навести чињенице на којима заснивају своје захтјеве, те предложе доказе, којима се утврђују ове чињенице. Стога би и тужилац и тужени могли и накнадно, након судског запримања тужбе на папиру, односно одговора на тужбу, упутити суду (електронском поштом, предајом цд или усб уређаја) и изворник електронског документа, који као прилог тужби предлажу као доказ за извођење. Уколико тужилац, односно уколико тужени, предлаже изворник електронског документа као доказ на припремном рочишту, они то могу учинити непосредно прије одржавања припремног рочишта, 481 Стојана Петровић путем електронске поште суда, али и на самом припремном рочишту (на усб уређају, на цд-у, и слично), али не и путем посебног електронског канала комуникације суда са странкама, који би, у правом смислу, могао упућивати на постојање електронске комуникације на овој релацији. За питање начина подношења суду изворника електронског документа као доказа, значајно је то да ли су судови технолошки оспособљени да такав доказ заприме и да организују његово извођење на главној расправи. Када је ријеч о општем парничном поступку, наши судови не посједују електронске платформе, које би изворник електронског документа, предложен као доказ, запримале и самостално га и без судјеловања службеника суда уврштавале у електронски спис одговарајућег предмета. Судови, према одредби члана 10 Правилника о систему за аутоматско управљање судским предметима (ЦМС),75 воде судске списе у електоронском облику, у систему за аутоматско управљање судским предметима (у даљем тексту: ЦМС). Судови воде спис паралелно и у папирној форми. Одредба члана 21 ст. 1. Правилника о ЦМС БиХ (2016) предност даје електронској форми судског списа, а спис у папирној форми формира се тек након што је предмет евидентиран у ЦМС-у. Службеник суда, односно референт за унос података формира и ажурира судски спис у ЦМС-у, као и његову папирну форму. Начин евидентирања запримљеног поднеска и доказа, као његових прилога у електронски судски спис, односно у спис који се води на папиру, зависи од форме поднеска, односно прилога. Правилник о ЦМС БиХ (2016), члановима 12. ст. 1. и 13. ст. 1. предвиђа да референт за унос података скенира документе запримљене од суда у папирној форми, те да се поднесак послан из друге институције коришћењем доставнице са бар кодом, заприма коришћењем бар кода са доставнице. Наведеним Правилником није изричито регулисано како ће поступити судска писарница како би запримила изворник електронски документа, који странка предлаже као доказ. Правилник регулише само то да се електронски документи, потписани квалификованим електронским потписом, могу размјењивати између правосудних институција, системом електронске поште, креираним у оквиру правосудног информационог система,76 као сигурним начином преноса. Уколико би у домену материјалноправних односа међу грађанима, дошло до масовније 75 “Службени гласник Босне и Херцеговине“, бр. 04/16, 34/19, у даљем тексту: Правилник о ЦМС БиХ (2016). 76 Чл. 14 Правилника о ЦМС БиХ (2016). 482 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova употребе јавних, или, пак, приватних електронских докумената, ово питање би наведеним Правилником морало бити детаљније регулисано. 2. Подношење суду копије електронског документа У традиционалном парничном поступку, копија електронског документа могла би се, као доказ, приложити на папиру израђеној тужби, односно одговору на тужбу. Уколико тужилац, или уколико тужени, понуду доказа врши на припремном рочишту, за претпоставити је да би свако од њих могао предложити суду извођење доказа читањем копије електронског документа, која би могла бити предата суду на записник о одржавању припремног рочишта. Имајући у виду то да се копија електронског документа израђује на папиру, уз обавезну овјеру од стране овлашћеног органа, односно лица, а полазећи од одредбе члана 8 ст. 2. ЗЕД РС/ЗЕД ФБиХ да електронски документ не може имати копију у електронском облику, то се не мора постављати питање адекватности нормативног оквира, као ни питање адекватности техничке опремљености судова да заприме копију електронског документа, као доказа. За претпоставити је да би странке копију електронског документа као доказ могле приложити и тужби и одговору на тужбу, који би били поднесени у писаној форми, или би је могле поднијети прије одржавања припремног рочишта писарници суда, или непосредно на припремном рочишту, физичком предајом поступајућем судији, на записник. Питање је једино на који начин суд заприма и евидентира овакав доказни приједлог, без обзира на то која странка га је поднијела, те без обзира на то у којој фази у развоју парничног поступка је он предложен као доказ. Ово, имајући на уму то да судови спис сваког предмета воде у ЦМС-у, а паралелно и у папирној форми, а о чему је већ било ријечи у овом раду.77 Судови би могли копију електронског документа, поднесену као доказ физички уложити у спис предмета који се води у папирној форми, заједно са осталим прилозима из списа. Дилема је, на који начин је суд може евидентирати у спис предмета у ЦМС-у – да ли ће судски референт копију електронског документа скенирати, како то предвиђа одредба члана 12 ст. 1. Правилника ЦМС БиХ (2016), за остале документе, поднесене на папиру. 77 Cf. биљешку supra II/1. Подношење суду изворника електронског документа, као доказа. 483 Стојана Петровић Према садашњем стању домаћег права, али и према стању техничке опремљености судова, нема сумње да судови могу запримити од странака копију електронског документа, коју нека од њих предлаже за извођење као доказ. Та копија електронског документа може спису предмета, који се води у папирној форми, бити додата физичким улагањем у омот списа. Суд би копију електронског документа могао приложити и спису предмета који се води у ЦМС-у, њеним скенирањем, као и било којег другог документа на папиру, који суд заприми од странака. 3. Извођење изворника и копије електронског документа као доказа – ставови доктрине и домаћа судска пракса У зависности од тога на који начин се изводи као доказ, изворник електронског документа, односно његову копију на папиру може изводити странка која га је предложила, или пак, суд. На који начин и ко ће извести електронски документ као доказ зависи од тога да ли се он посматра као исправа, или као предмет увиђаја. И у домаћој и у иностраној процесној теорији сматра се и то да је извођење доказа читањем исправа врло блиско доказу увиђајем,78 будући да се и доказивање исправом изводи читањем исправа,79 у правилу тако што суд чита и разгледа исправу.80 Процесна доктрина, како домаћа и из држава окружења81, тако и инострана, разликују исправе од обавјештајних ствари (Auskunftssachen), као предмета увиђаја (§318 ö ZPO). Обавјештајне ствари су утјеловљење мисли али без употребе писма, већ неког другог медија (филмови, фотографије или аудио касете и електронске базе података).82 Сматра се да оне представљају индиректне доказе и да се могу користити само када нема директних доказа.83 То су, заправо, специфични предмети увиђаја, али у аустријској теорији сматра се да на њих треба примјењивати правила о издавању докумената.84 Преовлађујућа аустријска процесна 78 Кеча и Старовић, Грађанско процесно право, 298, Дика, „О предмету увиђаја и увиђају у парничном поступку“, 8, Fasching, Lehrnbuch des österreichischen Zivilprozeβrechts, 525. 79 Кеча и Старовић, Грађанско процесно право, 298. 80 Станковић и Рачић, Парнично процесно право, 447. 81 Станковић и Рачић, Парнично процесно право, 443, Дика, „О предмету увиђаја и увиђају у парничном поступку“, 8. 82 Rechberger, Simotta, Grundriss des österreichischen Zivilprozessrechts, 467, Fasching, Lehrnbuch des österreichischen Zivilprozeβrechts, 525. 83 Rechberger, Simotta, Grundriss des österreichischen Zivilprozessrechts, 467, Fasching, Lehrnbuch des österreichischen Zivilprozeβrechts, 525. 84 Rechberger, Simotta, Grundriss des österreichischen Zivilprozessrechts, 449. 484 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova теорија тврди да електронски документ представља предмет увиђаја.85 И у њемачком праву исто произлази и изричито из одредбе §371a d ZPO. И процесна теорија држава нашег ближег окружења, позивајући се на аустријску и њемачку процесну доктрину, схватања је да би се електронски документи, не расправљајући о томе ради ли се о изворнику, или о његовој копији, али и било који други писмени знаци електронским путем меморисани, требали третирати у поступку као предмети увиђаја.86 У одсуству изричите одредбе у законима у е. БиХ о начину извођења електронског документа као доказа пред судом, као и у одсуству става домаће теорије о томе, требало би се ослонити на наведене ставове преовлађујуће иностране и ставове процесне доктрине држава окружења. Иако позитивно право е. БиХ омогућава предлагање суду и извођење и изворника и копије електронског документа, таква пракса пред домаћим судовима скоро да и не постоји. Наши судови опремљени су електронском инфраструктуром, чиме је омогућено извођење увиђајем било јавног, било приватног, изворника електронског документа, као доказа. Копију електронског документа странке би могле извести читањем, као исправе. Ово, будући да се ради о тексту забиљеженом писањем на папиру. Анализа доступне домаће судске праксе, као и одабраних узорака судских одлука открива опредјељење странака да првостепеном суду предлажу као доказ податке и информације у електронској форми (садржаји интернет страница, разне потврде електронских уплата, снимљене на интерној меморији рачунара странке, или на неком од уређаја за пренос података -усб, цд, и слично), као и њихове фотографије, односно исписе на папиру87, а које суд прихвата као доказе за извођење и на којима заснива своје одлуке.88 Осим тога, странке предлажу, а суд прихвата за извођење као доказ и снимке комуникације путем смс порука89. Предлагање изворника а ни копије електронског документа 85 Rechberger, Simotta, Grundriss des österreichischen Zivilprozessrechts, 467. 86 Јакшић, Грађанско процесно право, 376, Дика, „О предмету увиђаја и увиђају у парничном поступку“, 8. 87 Пресуда Основног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 Мал 193347 14 Мал, од 30.01.2017. године, потврђена Пресудом Окружног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 Мал 193347 17 Гж, од 25.09.2017. године, такође cf. Пресудu Основног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 П 162856 13 П, од 30.09.2014. године, потврђена Пресудом Окружног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 П 162856 15 Гж, од 02.09.2016. године. 88 Пресуда Основног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 Мал 193347 14 Мал, од 30.01.2017. године, потврђена Пресудом Окружног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 Мал 193347 17 Гж, од 25.09.2017. године. 89 cf. Пресуду Основног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 П 220997 19 П, од 30.01.2017. године, потврђену Пресудом Окружног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 П 220997 19 Гж 2, од 26.11.2019. године. 485 Стојана Петровић као доказа, у нашој судској пракси, још увијек није забиљежено, или је врло ријетко. Анализа наведених узорака судских одлука указује на то да ове доказе изводе странке читањем, али и суд вјештачењем90, те и увиђајем. Пракса је да странке изводе предложене наведене електронске податке као доказе када су они приложени суду у форми одштампаног текста. Суд увиђајем изводи ове доказе када су они предати суду у електронској форми као слике, или снимци, а суд у појединим случајевима ангажује и судског вјештака електротехничке струке, који даје стручно мишљење о аутентичности садржаја и поријекла послатих смс порука. III ЗАКЉУЧНА РАЗМАТРАЊА Спроведена догматскоправна анализа домаћег процесноправног и материјалноправног законодавства показала је да странке могу предлагати и јавни и приватни електронски документ у изворнику, као и у копији, као доказ пред судом, под условом да тај документ испуњава законом прописане услове његове правне и доказне снаге. Преовлађујућа процесна доктрина је схватања да би електронски документ требало изводити увиђајем. Домаћи судови опремљени су технолошким средствима запримања и извођења овог доказа. Извођење, било јавног, било приватног електронског документа, у оригиналу, или у копији, код нас, не нарушава устаљени традиционални концепт парничног поступка. То је постигнуто законодавним изједначавањем правне и доказне снаге електронског документа са овим својствима исправе на папиру, која се, и даље, преовлађујуће предлаже као доказ. Анализа судске праксе, као и одабраних узорака одлука домаћих судова открила је да странке код нас, до сада, нису предлагале као доказ ни изворник, а ни копију електронског документа. Странке, као доказе, суду предлажу разне податке у електронској форми, или, пак, фотографије или исписе интернет страница. Ове доказе странке изводе читањем. Прецизније утврђивање разлога због којих се странке, до сада, нису опредјељивале за предлагање електронског документа као доказа, и поред задовољавајућег и са правом осталих 90 И у процесној теорији сматра се да електронски подаци, који се користе као докази, могу бити предмет вјештачења, са циљем утврђивања да ли су они остали непромијењени у односу на њихово изворно стање. (детаљније cf. Jозо Чизмић и Марија Бобан, „Електронички докази у судском поступку и рачунална форензичка анализа“, Зборник Правног факултета Свеучилишта у Ријеци, 1 (2017): 45). 486 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova европских држава усаглашеног, материјалног и процесно правног регулисања појма и употребе електронског документа, те и поред технолошке припремљености судова да заприме и да омогуће његово извођење, захијевало би свеобухватније истраживање, у форми научне монографије. Истраживање спроведено у обиму овог рада упућује на то да је странкама код нас нормативноправно и технолошки омогућено предлагање и коришћење електронског документа пред судовима, као доказа. За претпоставити је да би детаљније регулисање процесним одредбама питања начина његовог подношења суду и начина пријема, посебно оригинала електронског документа, те шира и учесталија употреба електронских докумената у материјалноправним односима међу грађанима, боља снабдјевеност странака технолошким средствима и њихово боље дигитално описмењавање, резултирало и устаљивањем праксе предлагања судовима електронског документа, као доказа за извођење. ЛИТЕРАТУРА Научни чланци и уџбеници 1. Дика, Михајло. „О предмету увиђаја и увиђају у парничном поступку“, Зборник Правног факултета Свеучилишта у Ријеци, 31, 1 (2010):1-21 2. Јакшић, Александар. Грађанско процесно право. Београд: ЈП Службени гласник, 2007 3. Катулић, Тихомир. „Развој правне регулације електроничког потписа, електроничког цертификата, и електроничке исправе у Хрватском и поредбеном праву“, Зборник Правног факултета у Загребу, 61 (2011): 1339-1378 4. Кеча, Ранко и Боривоје Старовић, Грађанско процесно право. Нови Сад: Универзитет у Новом Саду, Правни факултет, Центар за издавачку делатност, 2004 5. Лисичар, Хрвоје. „Могућности упорабе електроничке исправе и електорничких докумената у парничном поступку“, Зборник Правног факултета у Загребу, 60 (2010): 1391-1422 6. Лукић, Радомир, Будимир Кошутић и Драган Митровић. Увод у право. Београд: Службени лист СРЈ, 1999 487 Стојана Петровић 7. Пајтић, Бојан, Сања Радовановић и Атила Дудаш. Облигационо право. Нови Сад: Универзитет у Новом Саду, Правни факултет, Центар за издавачку делатност, 2018 8. Познић, Боривоје и Весна Ракић Водинелић. Грађанско процесно право. Београд: Савремена администрација, 2010 9. Прља, Драган, Марио Рељановић и Звонимир Ивановић, Интернет право. Београд: Институт за упоредно право, 2012 10. Салма, Марија. „Електронска комуникација у парничном поступку“, Зборник радова Правног факултета у Новом Саду, 3 (2014): 129-138 11. Станичић, Фране и Марко Јурић. „Правни оквир за имплементацију информацијско-комуникацијских технологија у хрватско управно поступовно право“, Зборник Правног факултета у Загребу, 65 (2015): 635-663 12. Станковић, Гордана и Ранка Рачић. Парнично процесно право. Бања Лука: Правни факултет Универзитета у Бањој Луци, 2017 13. Станковић, Гордана. „Супституисање саслушања сведока писаном изјавом, тонским или оптичким записом“, Годишњак Правног факултета Универзитета у Бањој Луци, 34 (2012): 129-148 14. Станковић, Гордана. Грађанско процесно право. Београд: ИП Јустинијан, 2004 15. Чизмић, Jозо и Марија Бобан. „Електронички докази у судском поступку и рачунална форензичка анализа“, Зборник Правног факултета Свеучилишта у Ријеци, 1 (2017): 23-50 16. Fasching, Hans W. Lehrnbuch des österreichischen Zivilprozeβrechts. Беч: Manzsache Verlags- und Universitӓsbuchhandlung, 1990 17. Rechberger, Walter H. и Daphne-Ariane Simotta. Grundriss des österreichischen Zivilprozessrechts. Беч: Manzsache Verlags- und Universitӓsbuchhandlung, 2010 18. Roβnagel, Alexander, Andreas Pfitzmann. „Der Beweiswert von E-mail“, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 56 (2017): 1209-1214 19. Schmidbauer, Franz. „Beweis und Anscheinbeweis bei der Übermittlung einer E-mail – Erklärung“, Zivilrecht aktuell, 5 (2008): 83-86 20. Van Rhee, Cornelis Hendrik, Узелац Алан. „Evidence in civil procedure: Fundamentals in light of the 21th century“, у Evidence in Contemporary Civil Procedure Fundamental Issues in a Comparative Perspective, уред. Cornelis Hendrik van Rhee, Алан Узелац (Кембриџ, Антверп, Портланд: Intersentia, 2015) 488 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Прописи 21. Закон о електронском документу Републике Српске (“Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 106/15) 22. Закон о електронском документу Федерације Босне и Херцеговине („Службене новине Федерације Босне и Херцеговине“, бр. 55/13) 23. Закон о стављању ван снаге Закона о електроничкој исправи БД БиХ („Службени гласник БД БиХ“, бр. 39/10, 61/10, 14/11, 56/11, 1/13) 24. Уредба ЕУ бр. 910/2014 о електронској идентификацији и услугама повјерења за електронске трансакције на унутрашњемтржишту и стављању ван снаге Директиве 1993/93ЕЗ (“Службени лист Европске Уније“, бр. L257/73, од 28.08.2014. године) 25. Њемачки Закон о грађанском поступку (Zivilprozessordnung in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung, vom 5. Dezember 2005 (BGBl. I S. 3202; 2006 I S. 431; 2007 I S. 1781), die zuletzt durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 12. Dezember 2019 (BGBl. I S. 2633) geändert worden ist) 26. Закон о повјерењу у пружању услуга Њемачке (Vertrauensdienstgesetz, vom 18. Juli 2017 (BGBl. I S. 2745), das durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 18. Juli 2017 (BGBl. I S. 2745) geändert worden ist) 27. Закон о електронском документу, електронској идентификацији и услугама од повјерења у електронском пословању („Службени гласник Републике Србије“, бр. 94/17) 28. Закон о парничном поступку Републике Српске (“Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 58/03, 85/03, 74/05, 63/07, 105/08 – одлука Уставног суда, 45/09 – одлука Уставног суда, 49/09 и 61/13) 29. Закон о парничном поступку Федерације Босне и Херцеговине („Службене новине Федерације Босне и Херцеговине“, бр. 53/03, 73/05, 19/06, 98/15) 30. Закон о електронском пословању Републике Српске („Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 59/09) 31. Закон о електронском потпису Републике Српске (“Службени гласник Републике Српске“, бр. 106/15) 32. Закон о електронском потпису Федерације Босне и Херцеговине (Закон усвојен на сједници Дома народа Парламента ФБиХ 27.02.2020. године, још необјављен у службеном гласилу ФБиХ) 33. Закон о електронском потпису БД БиХ (Закон усвојен на сједници Скупштине БД БиХ 11.03.2020. године, још необјављен у службеном гласилу БД БиХ) 34. Закон о грађанском поступку Аустрије (Gesetz vom 1. August 1895, über das gerichtliche Verfahren in bürgerlichen Rechtsstreitigkeiten (Zivilprozessordnung), 489 Стојана Петровић 35. 36. 37. 38. StF: RGBl. Nr. 113/1895, die zuletzt durch des Gesetz vom 28. Dezember 2018 (BGBl. I Nr. 109/2018) geändert worden ist) Закон о електронској пошти Њемачке (De-Mail-Gesetz, vom 28. April 2011 (BGBl. I S. 666), das zuletzt durch Artikel 14 des Gesetzes vom 20. November 2019 (BGBl. I S. 1626) geändert worden ist) Закон о промовисању употребе електронске комуникације са судовима Њемачке (Gesetz zur Förderung des elektronischen Rechtsverkehrs mit den Gerichten, BGBL I 2013/62, 3786) Упутство за поступање путем система за електронско подношење и обраду предмета мале вриједности и тзв. „комуналних предмета“ (СОКОП-Мал систем), Високог судског и тужилачког вијећа, од 12.07.2012. године Правилник о систему за аутоматско управљање судским предметима (ЦМС) (Службени гласник Босне и Херцеговине“, бр. 04/16, 34/19) Судска пракса 39. Одлука Њемачког Савезног суда бр. XII ZB 8/19, од 8.5.2019. године 40. Одлука Вишег суда у Новом Саду, бр. Гж-886/2014, од 28.01.2015. године 41. Одлука Врховног суда Хрватске, бр. Рев. 265-91, од 28.3.1991. године, доступно на https://sudskapraksa.csp.vsrh.hr/decisionPdf?id=090216ba80 227f3d, приступљено 21.1.2020. године 42. Одлука Врховног суда Хрватске, бр. Рев. 313/07-2, од 20.6.2007. године, доступно на https://sudskapraksa.csp.vsrh.hr/decisionText?id=090216ba8 0547d03&q=privatna+isprava+dokazna+snaga, приступљено 21.1.2020. године 43. Пресуда Радноправног суда у Франкфурту (Arbeitsgericht Frankfurt), бр. 7 Са 5380/01, од 9.1.2002. године 44. Пресуда Основног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 Мал 193347 14 Мал, од 30.01.2017. године 45. Пресуда Окружног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 Мал 193347 17 Гж, од 25.09.2017. године 46. Пресуда Основног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 П 220997 19 П, од 30.01.2017. године 47. Пресуда Окружног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 П 220997 19 Гж 2, од 26.11.2019. године 48. Пресуда Основног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 П 162856 13 П, од 30.09.2014. године 49. Пресуда Окружног суда у Бањој Луци, бр. 71 0 П 162856 15 Гж 2, од 02.09.2016. године 490 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT AS EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION Stojana Petrović91 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Abstract: Digital communications enable the use of an electronic document in civil litigation as evidence in most European countries. There are also doctrinal views on the terms of its proposal to the court as evidence, as well as on the manner in which it is made. This issue in the procedural doctrine of our state did not raise much interest. Therefore, the substantive and procedural provisions of domestic law have been comparatively analyzed here. It has been revealed that the use of an electronic document as evidence before the court does not depend on whether the party proposes to the court the original, or a copy of the electronic document, or whether a public or private electronic document is proposed as evidence. The dogmatic-normative analysis revealed that, in our non-electrified litigation, based on traditional evidence, legislators provided an appropriate legal framework for using an electronic document as evidence, not substantially altering the traditional concept of litigation, but equating its legal and evidentiary power with those of paper. Analyzed domestic case law has revealed that the parties have so far, almost insignificantly, opted to propose and produce an electronic document as evidence. This paper did not attribute this nor to the inadequate substantive or procedural normative basis of this issue, since a comparative analysis, primarily of normative solutions of states such as Austria and Germany, showed that the laws of the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina are in line with modern standards in regulating of this question. The absence of the practice of using an electronic document before the courts as evidence, in this paper, was not attributed neither to the inadequate supply of the courts with digital media. It is mostly attributed to reasons such as the lack of wider use of electronic documents in substantive legal relations among citizens, inadequate supply of citizens with technological means, and inadequate level of their digital literacy. Keywords: original and copy of electronic document; public and private electronic document; legal power of electronic document; evidential value of the electronic document 91 MSc, Senior assistant, Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka The author thanks Biljana Vučetić, president of the Civil Division of the Basic Court in Banja Luka, for her assistance in collecting the case law used in this paper. 491 Review paper UDK ANTROPOMORPHIC MACHINES: IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN-ROBOT SOCIAL INTERACTIONS FOR LAW AND SOCIETY Anil Ozturk1 Department of Law, Maynooth University, Ireland Abstract: Human-robot interactions are inherently different from interactions with other artefacts, as robots are autonomous. Furthermore, recent technological advances have also enabled robots to undertake roles that are formerly thought to be reserved for humans, e.g. as companions or lovers, since interactive abilities of robots and their autonomy are sufficient to evoke an automatic cognitive response - robot anthropomorphism. Robot anthropomorphism, the attribution of human attitudes and emotions to robots, implies that behaviours towards robots may have implications for individuals and society in the long term. Examples include manipulation of emotional attachments to robots and increase in existing privacy risks. To respond to these implications, legal orders must acknowledge that robots are no longer mere tools of human interactions, but instead parties to such interactions. This paper, examines the unique implications on law and society presented by sociable robots, anthropomorphic machines by design. First, the phenomenon of robot anthropomorphism and its effects, and then, the risks presented by the sociable robots are addressed. As such, this chapter lays out the foundation for the examination of both the legal problems arising from the autonomy of robots, and the recommendations regarding the solution of these problems. Keywords: Robot Law, Artificial Intelligence Law, Human-Robot Social Interactions, Law Reform 1 Department of Law, Maynooth University, Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland. 493 Anil Ozturk I. INTRODUCTION More than mere technological artefacts that cannot think and act on their own, robots have for long been employed for tasks ‘that are often handicapped, or made impossible, by human frailties and limitations’.2 In the performance of such tasks which are too dirty, dangerous and dull for humans, robots either assist humans or replace them.3 In fact, since the first so-called robot was installed on an assembly line in 1960s, robots have undertaken a broad range of roles in deep sea and space exploration, military and law enforcement, environmental clean-up, and entertainment and leisure activities. More recently, robots have also emerged as novel types of interaction partners -the sociable robots- or as substitutes for human companionship. 4 Humans are willing to ‘seriously consider robots not only as pets but as potential friends, confidants, and even romantic partners’5 in increasing numbers with each passing day. Together with their growing autonomy, the emergence of robots as interaction partners confronts the self-understanding of humans and the established order based on that understanding. Accordingly, on the verge of the robotic moment, there is a growing concern that interactions with robots could pose a variety of challenges to society. Autonomy, one of the common characteristics of all robots, already makes it more difficult to preserve the values that the legal order is traditionally intended to protect; after all, robots can make decisions independently of their users, owners or manufacturers.. The so-called autonomy of robots also leads to the attribution of human attitudes and emotions to them – robot anthropomorphism. This phenomenon is observed in interactions with the simplest autonomous robots – and sociable robots are no simple autonomous robots; they are designed to enter into social interactions with humans by mimicking human-to-human interactive behaviours. This elicits a stronger robot anthropomorphism, leading to greater attachments to these robots. Thus, sociable robots are ought to present unique challenges to the legal orders to protect the society’s traditional values through their implications on human relation2 Patrick Lin, ‘Introduction to Robot Ethics’ in Patrick Lin, Keith Abney and George A Bekey (eds), Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics (MIT Press 2014) 4. 3 Marco Nørskov, ‘Technological Dangers And The Potential of Human–Robot Interaction: A Philosophical Investigation Of Fundamental Epistemological Mechanisms of Discrimination’ in Marco Nørskov (ed), Social Robots: Boundaries, Potential, Challenges (Taylor and Francis 2018) 99. 4 Lin (n 2) 9. 5 Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other, 1st ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2012) 9. 494 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ships, new avenues of privacy breaches, and abuse of the emotional attachments formed with these robots. II. ROBOT ANTHROPOMORPHISM Anthropomorphism -the attribution of human traits, emotions, or intentions to non-human entities- is suggested to be an automatic response to any human-like behaviour or feature that cannot be accounted for using the knowledge at hand. 6 Accordingly, to the extent that they display human-like behaviours or features, ambiguous entities may be projected human characteristics, including intentions.7 Significantly, the feature of physicality or embodiment does not appear to be a prerequisite to attract such projections.8 Unsurprisingly, the combination of autonomy and range of social skills that we have taken to distinguish certain robots as sociable is thought to have a strong propensity to evoke anthropomorphism.9 Evidently, this feature of social robots is critical in the evaluation of their prospective role in society. Their perceived humanity seems to be crucial to the use of sociable robots in health and education where they facilitate communication between patients and their doctors, engage children in learning, or help adults through interaction, motivation, monitoring and coaching.10 Equally, the recognition of robots as human-like has been thought to threaten a potential degeneration of human relationships, a normalization of violence and sexual behavior, and an exploitation of emotional attachments to robots.11 Consider first the association between robot anthropomorphism and robot autonomy. For instance, Roomba is a flat, round robot that follows a simple algorithm to clean floors and has no social skills whatsoever. 6 Esmeralda G Urquiza-Haas and Kurt Kotrschal, ‘The Mind Behind Anthropomorphic Thinking: Attribution Of Mental States To Other Species’ Animal Behaviour 109 (2015): 167–68. 7 ibid 172. 8 Humans also anthropomorphise virtual objects: ‘In the video game Portal, for example, when players are required to incinerate the companion cube that has accompanied them throughout the game, some will opt to sacrifice themselves rather than the cube, forfeiting their victory.’ see Kate Darling, “Extending legal protection to social robots: The effects of anthropomorphism, empathy, and violent behavior towards robotic objects” in Robot Law, eds. Ryan Calo and others (Oxfordshire: Edward Elgar, 2016) 216. 9 Ibid 217. 10 Cory D Kidd, Will Taggart and Sherry Turkle, ‘A Sociable Robot to Encourage Social Interaction Among the Elderly’ (2006 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Orlando, May 2006; Evan Ackerman, ‘MIT’s DragonBot Evolving to Better Teach Kids’ (IEEE Spectrum, 16 March 2015). 11 Kate Darling, “ ‘Who’s Johnny?’ Anthropomorphic Framing in Human–Robot Interaction, Integration, and Policy” in Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artificial Intelligence, eds. Patrick Lin, Ryan Jenkins and Keith Abney (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017) 175. 495 Anil Ozturk However, the mere fact that it can move around on its own has prompted humans to give the following reactions: Some will clean for the Roomba, so that it can get a rest, while others will introduce their Roomba to their parents, or bring it along when they travel because they managed to develop a (…) relationship: “ I can’t imagine not having him any longer. He’s my BABY! . . ” 13 In the case of Roomba, autonomy alone appears to cause the projection of human feelings to robots and this projection has led to the formation of emotional attachments with robots. Although this projection had no impacts in this case, to project human characteristics to non-social robots can be undesirable in some contexts. Ryan Calo gives anecdotal examples of ‘soldiers treating bomb-diffusing drones like comrades and even risking their lives to rescue a wounded robot’ 14 In such cases, the anthropomorphisation of nonsocial robots would both impede their intended uses and puts the soldiers in grave danger. While none of these non-social robots is able to display social cues, their autonomy already makes them human-like enough to generate the projection of emotions. 15 Social robots are specifically designed to be anthropomorphised. In addition to being autonomous, they can simulate social cues that humans automatically and subconsciously associate with mental states. 16 That is to say that sociable robots can actively engage with the ingrained anthropomorphic reactions of humans.17 As Turkle puts, ‘computers no longer wait for humans to project meaning onto them. Now, sociable robots meet our gaze, speak to us, and learn to recognize us.’18 In principle, sociability should enhance robots’ ability to generate emotional response.19 This expectation appears to be borne 12 12 Matthias Scheutz, “The Inherent Dangers of Unidirectional Emotional Bonds between Humans and Social Robots” in Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics, eds. Patrick Lin, Keith Abney and George A Bekey (Cambridge: MIT Press 2014) 213. 13 ibid. 14 Ryan Calo, “Robots and Privacy” in Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics, eds. Patrick Lin, Keith Abney and George A Bekey (Cambridge: MIT Press 2014) 195. 15 Darling (n 8) 218. 16 As stated above, this is a result of the characteristic of sociability. Several algorithms in the market today have natural language processing capacities and they cannot be distinguished from humans in everyday conversations and moreover, most sociable robots can recognize cues for human emotions, display meaningful emotional expressions, and perform behaviours that humans consider coherent, intentional, responsive, and emotionally appropriate. See Darling (n 8) 218; Kerstin Dautenhahn and others, “Socially Intelligent Agents: Creating Relationships with Computers and Robots” in Socially Intelligent Agents, eds. Kerstin Dautenhahn and others (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 2002) 6; see also Olivia Solon, ‘Google’s robot assistant now makes eerily lifelike phone calls for you’ (The Guardian, 8 May 2018). 17 Darling (n 8) 220. 18 Turkle (n 6) 2. 19 Darling (n 8) 220. 496 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova out in the recorded experiences of users of sociable robots and is confirmed in the psychological literature. One example of such recorded experiences are the responses to a video released by Boston Dynamics, showing their doglike robot ‘Spot’ being kicked to demonstrate the robot’s stability and many Internet users expressed their discomfort over Spot’s treatment, compelling the animal rights organization PETA to acknowledge the incident. 20 Further, some anecdotes compiled by Darling can be mentioned as well: Owners of Sony AIBO dogs in the 1990s, while fully aware that it was a robot, would regularly ascribe lifelike essences and mental states to their artificial companion. […] (T)hey would remove their AIBO from the room while changing clothes, so that they would not be “watched,” or that they experienced feelings of guilt when putting the device back in its box.21 These recorded experiences seem to conform to the predictions of a psychological theory, the ‘Media Equation’, that predates the sociable robots. Experiments performed by Naas and Reeves showed that humans are polite to computers, they treat computers with male voices differently than femalevoiced computers, and that faces on a screen can invade a human’s perceived body space.22 Naas and Reeves theorized that humans’ ‘interactions with computers, television, and new media are fundamentally social and natural, just like interactions in real life’.23 However, the ‘Media Equation’ predates the sociable robots and therefore does not address them directly. More recent studies aim to overcome this shortcoming. In one prominent study, participants’ brain activities while they were watching sociable robots (Pleo, an entertainment robot in the shape of a baby dinosaur) being tortured and well-treated were compared with their brain activities while they were watching the same actions performed on humans. 24 The reactions to robots were found to be nearly identical with the reactions to humans. 25 The extent of robot anthropomorphism was demonstrated in another study by Bartneck and Hu, based loosely on the Milgram experiment.26 In the Mil20 Phoebe Parke, ‘Is it cruel to kick a robot?’ (CNN, 13 February 2015). 21 Darling (n 8) 217-220. 22 Byron Reeves and Clifford Nass, The Media Equation, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 15. 23 Ibid 5. 24 Astrid Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al., “An Experimental Study On Emotional Reactions Towards A Robot”, International Journal Of Social Robotics 5, no. 1 (2012): 17, 19-21. 25 ibid 29-32. 26 Christoph Bartneck and Jun Hu, “Exploring The Abuse Of Robots”, Interaction Studies 9, no. 3 (2008): 415,416. 497 Anil Ozturk gram experiment, participants were asked to administer electric shocks to a ‘learner’, and these ‘electric shocks’ were gradually increased to levels that would have been fatal. 27 In Bartneck and Hu’s study, instead of a human being, the ‘learner’ was a robot that was able to shake its arms and express emotions on its face.28 In this study, the participants showed hesitation, but the experimenters’ urges were enough to make them continue until the maximum voltage was reached. In Milgram’s original experiment only 40% of the participants administered the deadly electric shock, whereas all the participants administered the maximum voltage with robots showing that humans have fewer concerns with abusing robots in comparison with abusing humans. 29 Still, it must be noted that the it took them time and several ‘prods’ to override their emotional queasiness intellectually and harm a robot that they knew was no more soulful than a radio receiver. The present paper also reinforces the suggestion that robot anthropomorphism should be regarded as an automatic cognitive response to the sociable robots and suggests that the ‘Media Equation’ may also apply to sociable robots, and more applicable to sociable robots than non-social robots. Besides, considering that humans do not have into any moral struggle when switching off most electronic devices, it can be suggested that the illusion of mutual relating created by these robots, thanks to their autonomy and sociability, strengthens robot anthropomorphism. II.1. Effects on Human Relationships Both the interactions with sociable robots and human relationships evoke the same emotional effects on humans, and these effects are enough to satisfy basic human social needs such as affection and behavioural confirmation. 30 Consequently, people faced with loneliness or social alienation may turn to robots to avoid human relationships, ‘with all their difficulties and intractable demands’, ultimately losing their capability to develop and sustain human relationships. 31 However, while sociable robots are designed to make humans feel understood, in actual fact, they have no understanding of the situation of the humans in the relationship. 32 27 Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral Study Of Obedience.”, The Journal Of Abnormal And Social Psychology 67, no. 4 (1963): 371, 375. Bartneck and Hu (n 26) 417. 28 Bartneck and Hu (n 26) 418. 29 Milgram (n 27); Bartneck and Hu (n 26) 420. 30 ibid 10. 31 Scheutz (n 12) 214; Turkle (n 6) 285. 32 Sherry Turkle, “Authenticity In The Age Of Digital Companions”, Interaction Studies 8, no. 3 (2007): 501, 503. 498 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Clearly, sociable robots can neither care about humans. To care about someone or something implies a determination of priorities. In spite of all the anthropomorphic responses they evoke and the illusions of mutual caring they create, none of the sociable robots in the market today are able to determine their own priorities at the level necessary to plausibly generate such a commitment.33 Unlike interactions with humans, interactions with sociable robots are not founded on shared concerns, real consequences, and common responsibilities. For this reason, such interactions do not, ‘facilitate individuals’ integration and inclusion in a community.’ 34 Accordingly, a few writers question the morality of the promotion of social interactions between robots and humans.35 Turkle mourns a ‘loss of authenticity’ and fears that interactions with robots, since they are easier than interactions with other humans, may lead humans to avoid interacting with their friends and family. 36 Oddly, there is no evidence that authenticity values would cease to be valued with more widespread use of sociable robots. Even though sociable robots can find uses as social companions, robot anthropomorphism and framing of robots as social companions does not necessarily mean that human relationships are replaced. On the contrary, some current use-cases show that sociable robots can contribute to the resolution of communication problems between humans. 37 For instance, the NAO Next Generation Robot -a miniscule humanoid robot- is utilised when working with children with autistic spectrum disorders and it is found to be effective in ‘creating eye contact or interaction, helping bridge communication gaps between a teacher or parent and the child.’38 Moreover, another study that Turkle herself contributed found that ‘the Paro baby seal robot inspires conversation among nursing home residents when placed in a common area’.39 These use-cases also show that sociable robots can be catalysts for interactions between humans when used correctly, rather than replacing them. As Darling sums up, they ‘can facilitate communication between children and their teachers, doctors, and parents, 33 Scheutz (n 12) 214; Turkle (n 6) 282. 34 Turkle (n 6) 239; Sinziana M Gitiu, “The roboticization of consent” in Robot Law, eds. Ryan Calo, A Michael Froomkin and Ian Kerr (Oxfordshire: Edward Elgar, 2016) 207. 35 Astrid Rosenthal-von der Pütten (n 24) 19; Glenda Shaw-Garlock, ‘Gendered by Design: Gender Codes in Social Robots: Boundaries, Potential, Challenges, ed. Marco Nørskov (London: Routledge, 2018) 218. 36 Turkle (n 6) 7. 37 Diana Marina Cooper, “The application of a ‘sufficiently and selectively open license’ to limit liability and ethical concerns associated with open robotics” in Robot Law, eds. Ryan Calo, A Michael Froomkin and Ian Kerr (Oxfordshire: Edward Elgar, 2016) 173. 38 Darling (n 11) 175. 39 Kidd, Taggart and Turkle (n 10). 499 Anil Ozturk presenting a valuable supplement to human interaction’. 40 In an interview, Breazeal, the creator of the first sociable robot Kismet, also emphasises that robots are meant to partner with humans rather than replacing them, and they ‘should be designed to support human empowerment’.41 Thus, it can be submitted that there is no clear case for treating the enhanced anthropomorphic effects of social robotics as problematic in itself and therefore as a basis for the imposition of any general legal constraint on the production of such robots. However, it should be emphasized that the use of social robots is critical here, and the awareness of supplementing against replacing is vital in helping drive the design and of these technologies in a socially beneficial direction. II.2. Violence and Sexual Behaviours Many humans respond to robots in a way that goes beyond thinking of the robot as a mere machine, empathize with and care about them; even though no robot today is close to the intelligence and complexity of a human or an animal. Per the studies evaluated above, humans show empathetic responses to perceived pain of robots in a similar manner with their responses to perceived pain of other humans - although robots do not feel pain or suffering, violent behaviours against them discomfort humans.42 It can be conjectured, therefore, that humans have the intuition that torturing robots is morally wrong, even if they are just machines.43 Nevertheless, this intuition is not supported by most major normative theories. According to the traditional formulation of deontological theories, what makes a choice right is its conformity with moral norms, and these moral norms are generally about humans.44 Under this formulation, torturing a robot is not wrong since there are no moral norms or laws against it, and no moral duty not to torture a robot. Furthermore, abuse of robots is not wrong from a consequentialist perspective, since, unlike humans and animals, robots can neither be hurt nor feel any pain and suffering. 45 How40 Darling (n 11) 177. 41 Jedidiah Bracy, ‘The Future of Privacy: My Journey Down the Rabbit Hole at SXSW’ (Privacy Perspectives, 20 March 2015). 42 Darling (n 8) 223. 43 Mark Coeckelbergh, “Why Care About Robots? Empathy, Moral Standing, And The Language Of Suffering”, Kairos Journal Of Philosophy & Science 20, no. 1 (2018): 141, 144. 44 Larry Alexander and Michael Moore, ‘Deontological Ethics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter edn, 2016). 45 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Consequentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter edn, 2015) 500 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ever, the Kantian argument about animal abuse may be relevant to the abuse of robots. 46 Kant suggested that humans are ‘altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, with which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion’47 but he also pointed out that that humans have indirect duties towards animals: So if a man has his dog shot, because it can no longer earn a living for him, he is by no means in breach of any duty to the dog, since the latter is incapable of judgment, but he thereby damages the kindly and humane qualities in himself, which he ought to exercise in virtue of his duties to mankind … for a person who already displays such cruelty to animals is also no less hardened towards men.’ 48 This argument is adapted to the abuse of robots by Kate Darling, who states that the ‘Kantian philosophical argument for animal rights is that our actions towards non-humans reflect our morality’ and ‘this logically extends to our treatment of robotic companions’.49 According to Darling, behaving violently towards ‘very lifelike objects’ does not only reveal one’s moral character, but also can change humans and desensitise them to violent behaviours in other contexts. 50 As she puts it, ‘if you’re used to kicking a robot dog, are you more likely to kick a real dog’51 and there are anecdotes showing that robot anthropomorphisation may affect children’s behaviours towards other living beings.52 However, the arguments suggesting that violence toward lifelike robots could desensitize adults to violence in other contexts53 and undesirable sexual acts or behaviours may be encouraged by the repeated use of robots as sexual partners54 is not yet supported by empirical evidence. In opposition to this argument, a number of authors suggest that violent or undesirable sexual behaviours perpetrated against robots may provide an effective method for deflecting violence away from humans. For instance, Arkin expresses that there is a possibility that childlike sex robots could provide a safe outlet for humans who are sexually attracted to children. 55 Indeed, if such behaviours against robots will decrease these behaviours against other living things, use of robots for these purposes will have important social 46 Coeckelbergh (n 43) 145. 47 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 130. 48 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 212. 49 Darling (n 8) 220. 50 Darling (n 8) 224. 51 Kate Darling and Shankar Vedentam, ‘Can Robots Teach Us What It Means To Be Human?’ (Hidden Brain, 2017). 52 Hunter Walk, ‘Amazon Echo Is Magical. It’s Also Turning My Kid Into an Asshole’ (Medium, 6 April 2016). 53 Darling (n 8) 225. 54 Gitiu (n 34) 210. 55 Kashmir Hill, ‘Are Child Sex-Robots Inevitable?’ (Forbes, 14 July 2014). 501 Anil Ozturk benefits, and any reduction in the possibility of similar acts on other living beings would be worth it given that robots are not moral victims. 56 In addition, the probability that behaviours towards robots may have no significant effect or an ambiguous effect on the likelihood of someone performing their equivalent on other living beings must be noted as well.57 Nonetheless, like the possibility of desensitisation, these arguments so far lack empirical evidence. Moreover, the collection of such empirical evidence through scientifically sound and ethically justifiable studies appears to be nearly impossible.58 It can be submitted that the concern here is not that with all robots moral victims, but with the sociable robots in particular, as instruments of human relations. Given the empathetic responses to abuse of such robots and the intuition that torturing them is wrong, treating robots in morally questionable ways is likely create a perception that it is acceptable to treat humans - or at least other living beings - in the same way. Thus, it is imperative for the legal orders to act against abuses of robots. III. POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE With the increasing involvement of robots in society as social partners of humans, humans are liable to be exposed to a new source of emotional manipulation. In addition to the immediate consequences of such manipulation on human behaviour, and psychology, it also increases the threat posed by digital technologies to individual privacy. III.1. Privacy Risks Privacy creates the moments that people can be alone.59 Established legal orders began to explicitly safeguard these moments in the 19th century. ‘The Right to Privacy’ emerged in 19th century as a response to the technological developments and business inventions of the time, such as photography and yellow journalism.60 Since then, privacy rights have been intertwined with developments in technology, and it has become nearly impossible to determine precise limits of these rights. 61 Most recently, the emergence of the Internet 56 John Danaher and Neil McArthur, Robot Sex (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017) 90. 57 ibid. 58 David J Gunkel, Robot Rights, Kindle ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2018) ch 5, s 5.2, sub-s 5.2.4. 59 Daniel J. Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy”, California Law Review 90, no. 4 (2002): 1087, 1153-1154. 60 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right To Privacy”, Harvard Law Review4, no. 5 (1890): 193, 197. 61 Ruth Gavison, “Privacy And The Limits Of Law”, The Yale Law Journal 89, no. 3 (1980): 421, 423. 502 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova was a milestone for privacy rights. In response to the threats posed to privacy by the Internet, ‘data protection’ was developed as an aspect of privacy that addresses the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information, and the idea of privacy as information control emerged. 62 However, the fundamental role of these rights, ‘to avoid interference with natural curiosity, introspection, and self-determination’ has hardly changed.63 Robotic technologies reveal new threats to privacy, in light of robots’ ‘ability to sense, process, and record the world around them.’64 Calo addresses these threats under three categories: direct surveillance, access, and social meaning.65 These categories are also accepted in the literature and utilized in this section of the present study. 66 Robots have made an unprecedented level of direct surveillance possible. The broad range of sensors (cameras, laser and sonar range finders, GPS and so on) that robots can be equipped with, together with both the variety in robot shapes and the scope of robotic physical abilities have greatly enhanced surveillance capability:67 Unmanned drones used by military and police forces can stay aloft for days, find their ways autonomously, and stake out particular locations for long periods without getting detected.68 Furthermore, the use of robotic surveillance is not limited to state authorities. Drones and other robotic technologies are freely available for purchas, and private entities can utilize these technologies not only for legitimate purposes such as securing their premises but also for voyeuristic and marketing purposes.69 In short, the uncontrolled use of robots for surveillance increases the likelihood of ubiquitous or mass surveillance, and weakens the privacy expectations of the individuals.70 There is no shortage of legal norms directed against the threat of direct surveillance. Prominently, the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits the invasions of privacy by both the public authorities and private entities71 and the European Court of Human Rights has described mass surveillance activities as unlawful invasions to privacy in many decisions.72 A 62 David Flaherty, Protecting Privacy In Surveillance Societies (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2014) xiv. 63 Ryan Calo, “People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension To Privacy And Technology Scholarship”, Penn State Law Review 114, no. 3 (2010): 809, 843-845. 64 Calo (n 14) 187. 65 ibid. 66 Cooper (n 37) 176. 67 Lisa A Shay and others, “Confronting automated law enforcement” in Robot Law, eds. Ryan Calo, A Michael Froomkin and Ian Kerr (Oxfordshire: Edward Elgar, 2016) 242. 68 Calo (n 14) 189; Cooper (n 37) 175. 69 Calo (n 14) 191. 70 Cooper (n 37) 180. 71 ECHR art 8. 72 Roman Zakharov v. Russia [2015] ECHR 1065; Szabo and Vissy v Hungary App No 37138/14 (ECHR, 12 January 2016); Antovic and Mirkovic v Montenegro [2017] ECHR 1068. 503 Anil Ozturk similar approach is evident in the UN instruments, although these instruments are often either non-binding or non-enforceable.73 It can be argued that the threat posed by direct surveillance to privacy persists due to the difficulties in implementation of these norms. Another privacy implication that is equally problematic is that robots can grant access to historically private spaces. To elaborate, the use of robots that are capable of connecting to the Internet’ creates the possibility for unprecedented access to the interior of the house by (…) hackers.’74 These robots can come with a wide array of sensors, and some of them can relay images and sounds across the Internet in real time. 75 In other words, they are capable of making an extensive records of events in homes and communicating these records through the Internet. Therefore, if these robots are hacked, the attackers are going to have access to all the details of the victims’ home life. 76 These details may include photos of spare keys, for example, and the victims can also be exposed to the risk of physical intrusion.77 In a recent study conducted by computer scientists at University of Utah, a range of domestic robots currently on the market were tested against hacking and were found to be insecure and hijackable. The study revealed that hackers could not only eavesdrop the nearby conversations, but could also operate the robots. 78 However, it is submitted that the risk here can be significantly decreased by adopting stricter safety standards for the design and programming of robots. By their very nature, sociable robots are able to employ emotional persuasion tools (e.g. fear or praise) to elicit confidence from humans, and they can encourage humans to reveal more about themselves than they would willingly and knowing enter into a database.79 For instance, Ian Kerr points to ElleGirlBuddy, an application that tried to engage in social interactions with young adults and children to collect information for marketing use.80 In addition, 73 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 17; UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment No 16’in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (1988) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) 74 Calo (n 14) 192. 75 ibid 191. 76 Armağan Ebru Bozkurt-Yüksel, “Robot Hukuku (en: Robot Law)”, Türkiye Adalet Akademisi Dergisi, no. 29 (2017): 85, 96. 77 Calo (n 14) 194. 78 Tamara Denning and others, ‘A spotlight on security and privacy risks with future household robots: Attacks and lessons’ (11th International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing, Florida, October 2009). 79 Calo (n 14) 196; Darling (n 8) 221; Daniel Dimov and Rasa Juzenaite , ‘Privacy Concerns About Emotional Chatbots’ (InfoSec Institute, 16 February 2018). 80 Ian R Kerr, “Bots, Babes And The Californication Of Commerce”, University Of Ottawa Law And Technology Journal 1 (2004): 284, 312-313. 504 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova when interacting with sociable robots, it is argued that humans surface their ‘most intimate psychological attributes’81 since the robots will even transform human notions about love and sexuality by allowing humans to better explore themselves.82 As the humans express their internal states and explore themselves in their interactions with sociable robots, these may be recorded ‘whether through robot sensory equipment, or embedded as an expression of code.’83 This way, otherwise personal experiences of humans are being transformed into information for the first time, and this new type of highly sensitive personal information is vulnerable to privacy implications as much as any other information. Still, most sociable robots collect personal information in order to be able to connect with humans on a more personal level and being overly proscriptive may circumvent the benefits of social robots. Other privacy implications of robotics follow from the social role of robots, and are slightly more nuanced than the first two implications. To reiterate, humans automatically react to robots, specifically sociable robots, as if they were humans. In other words, when they are in the vicinity of sociable robots, humans cannot act as they would act on their own. Then, presence of sociable robots may lessen the opportunities for solitude and self-promotion, and that may implicate long standing privacy values. 84 Considering that it is not the privacy itself but the values that are protected by privacy norms are threatened here, it is clear that that this threat cannot be addressed by traditional privacy protections. However, in the near future, if sociable robots are able to identify the notion of personal space and are programmed to maintain a socially and culturally acceptable distance to humans, it is assessed that this threat may disappear on its own. strengthens robot anthropomorphism. III.2. Emotional Manipulations In 1976, Joseph Weizenbaum, after seeing how people interacted with ELIZA, the psychotherapist software he designed in 1960s, felt the need to be warn people against being influenced by machines and adopting the machines’ and thereby their programmers’ world views.85 Indeed, breach of information privacy is not the only type of manipulation that warrants concern. Through 81 ibid 198. 82 David Levy, Love + Sex With Robots (London: Duckworth, 2009) 22. 83 Calo (n 14), 198. 84 ibid 195; Calo (n 63) 843-845. 85 Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power And Human Reason: From Judgment To Calculation, 1st ed. (New York: Freeman, 1976), 254. 505 Anil Ozturk sociable robots, humans can be manipulated to do more than revealing their personal information or disclosing their vulnerabilities, as emotional attachments to these robots creates a greater potential for abuse. To begin with, utilizing their sociability and benefiting from robot anthropomorphism, sociable robots may be used to manipulate humans who are emotionally dependent to them to perform actions that the very same humans would not have performed otherwise by merely expressing their unhappiness. Matthias Scheutz refers to ‘an admittedly futuristic sounding request of a robot dog to dispose of a real dog: “please get rid of this animal, he is scaring me, I don’t want him around any longer”’86 as an example of such cases. Considering that a robot cannot do any harm unless they are programmed to do so, it is more likely that the emotional attachments with robots are going to be exploited by robot manufacturers, mainly to make them more money. For instance, a robot manufacturer may charge ‘an exorbitant amount for a mandatory upgrade to a robot that someone’s child or grandfather has become emotionally attached to’ or ‘a child’s language-teaching robot’ may ‘have a vocabulary that is skewed toward specific products.’87 Further, robot manufacturers can manipulate the owner buy products, to vote for a certain candidate can also be identified among the actions that robots can be utilized manipulate humans to perform.88 Both the scope for emotional manipulation and the disclosure of sensitive personal information may lend themselves to a further legal analysis based on consumer protection laws in future studies. IV. CONCLUSIONS In this paper, I have considered the successful engagement by social robotics of ingrained anthropomorphic tendencies, and sketched an overview the resultant public policy issues. In summary, the following conclusions have been reached: 1. Anthropomorphism: The projection of human characteristics to nonhuman entities is a cognitive response evoked by the presence of humanlike behaviours or features. Due to their high degree of autonomy and social capabilities, sociable robots evoke quite strong and automatic anthropomorphism. This response facilitates the formation of emotional attachments to these robots. 86 Scheutz (n 12) 216. 87 ibid. 88 Darling (n 8) 178. 506 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 2. Effects on Human Relationships: Even though the interactions with sociable robots cannot be as fulfilling as the human relationships, sociable robots can still satisfy the basic social needs of affection and behavioural confirmation, leading to concerns about ‘loss of authenticity’ and avoidance of interactions between friends and family. However, current use-cases of sociable robots suggests that rather than replacing human interactions, most sociable robots actually facilitate human interactions. As such, there is no basis to introduce a general legal constraint on production of sociable robots on the grounds of their effects on human relationships. 3. Violence and Sexual Behaviours: Considering that violence and undesirable sexual behaviours against humans and sociable robots elicits nearly same reactions from humans, it is submitted that violence towards sociable robots may desensitize adults to violence in other contexts. 4. 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It’s Also Turning My Kid Into an Asshole” (Medium, 6 April 2016) <https://medium.com/@hunterwalk/ amazon-echo-is-magical-it-s-also-turning-my-kid-into-an-assholedc49ec66872fZ> accessed 14 July 2018. 42. Warren, Samuel D., and Louis D. Brandeis. “The Right To Privacy”. Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890): 193-220. doi:10.2307/1321160. 43. Weizenbaum, Joseph. Computer Power And Human Reason: From Judgment To Calculation. 1st ed. New York: Freeman, 1976. 510 Original scientific article UDK IMPACT OF ADVANCED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUTHANASIA Dušica Kovačević Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade Abstract: Science and technology form the basis of human community development, of the improvement of living standards and of the quality of human life. Sophisticated technology is becoming ‘the incarnation of immortality’ of the human being. Medical technology innovations generate a significant number of new drugs, devices and diagnostic tests that improve health, reduce risks and extend life. What medical technology can do for patients today has changed radically from what could have been done in the past ten years. This paper will highlight in particular the advances in the field of medicine regarding its effect on terminally ill persons. The ethical dimensions of euthanasia in relation to the collision between moral goods resulting from the exponential increase in the number of medical technologies are discussed. It is more and more evident the pointlessness of using new knowledge and technology of medicine in certain individual cases. The focus of the paper is on the possibility of a ‘good death’- euthanasia, as an alternative to the rusty option of prolonged and painful dying. Therefore, an attempt is made to show the link between medical prosperity and the impact on the more pronounced need to introduce euthanasia into medical practice. Advancements in medical technology have made the final stage of terminally ill patients very likely to become prolonged and dependent on them. The boundaries of life and death are thus constantly being shifting. Professional and scientific progress has transformed the last phase of human life into a long, difficult and torturous process of dying that is, conducting dysthanasia. Due to this condition, the need to actively consider the legalization of euthanasia becomes more pronounced. Keywords: medical technology, medical treatment, euthanasia, dysthanasia, legalization 511 Dušica Kovačević INTRODUCTION If we use the word technology in its expanded meaning, it means that it encompasses all production processes, products, procedures, as well as knowledge of how to make the most of these contributions. Equivalently, medicine as a science and the art of prevention, diagnosis, treating disease and preserving and improving health is basically a technological discipline. This science depends on the symbolic, cultural and religious context. In other words, technology is not in itself aimed at adequately addressing a particular medical problem, but rather is determined by the general paradigm of disease. In line with that, we can trace its historical development dependent on the general development of intelligence. The ancient period positioned medicine in the frame of hypocritism, and even small technological procedures were based on philosophical observations of the time. Given the characteristics of the Middle Ages, there were no significant technological developments and discoveries during this period (Kalanj Bognar, 2015). The use of technology in medicine, in addition to the aforementioned factors, is also conditioned by the degree of scientific development of certain scientific fields, primarily biology, physics and chemistry. The development of these sciences and the advent of the new century have also led to significant and frequent technological breakthroughs. One of the nineteenth-century discoveries that forever changed surgical practice was anesthesia as well as the discovery of x-rays in 1895 which can be considered a turning point not only for medicine but for all of humanity. It is undoubted that, among other things, these two findings led to numerous studies being conducted and to the creation of new branches of medicine. Unlike physics, chemistry and biology were later developed, so medicine will rely on them in the late 19th and throughut the 20th century. As a result, the fields of medicine have been intensively developing. In proportion to these contributions, the reduction of human morbidity and the elimination of some of the most serious diseases were all the more pronounced. Bacteriology influenced the discoveries of asepsis and antisepsis, and the discoveries continues throughout the 20th century. The discovery of antibiotics in the first decade of the twentieth century and of antimicrobials is considered a very important contribution. In this way, many diseases have been prevented and became curable, such as pneumonia, which used to be a sign of death and can now be overcome with antibiotics. During the same period, blood transfusion was developed. Thus, with the advancement of one branch of medicine, there has been progress in its other segments 512 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova during this period. The foregoing inventions are merely stark indications of the speed of development of modern-day medicine (Woolf, 1990). In former times, it was rare for anyone to “die of old age“. At that time, not even a diagnosis was developed to determine which disease caused the fatal outcome. Such diseases are today prevented or routinely treated. An example of this is a disease that is very common today and its name is cancer. It is certain that there were fewer cancer patients before, because the life expectancy was much shorter, and therefore many patients with the disease today would not experience years in which they would get cancer due to other diseases such as measles, tuberculosis or other disease. According to recent measurements, in 2018 alone there were 18 078 957 new cases worldwide (World Health Organization [WHO], 2018). In the mid-last century, a turning point occurred regarding the average life expectancy of a human life New medical technologies are eagerly welcomed and quickly accepted as ordinary means of intervention. In addition to these new technologies, we are faced with new, spontaneously created, rules in medical practice. That rules are related to the belief that we should make every possible step in order to save a life. But, we need to consider the option that the goals of new medicine are not always worthwhile and meaningful. Physicians need to remind themselves from time to time, that there are always some limits and that every improvement has the other, not so much positive, side. Throughout history, man has been equally exposed to fear and uncertainty due to illness. Against that fact, every grand medical discovery has brought us a key step closer to resolving the complex mysteries of disease and medicine generally. Because of that, we have been able to invent specific medicines and treatments. Some of them are instrumental in saving human lives. Medicine as we know it, began to develope after the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century. During the nineteenth century people made many scientific discoveries and inventions. It has been made rapid progress in recognition and suppression a lot of illnesses, and also in understanding how bacteria and viruses function, and there is still plenty of room for research in this area. New technologies and treatments are already in use or will be ready for use soon. On the contrary, this medical progress is hard to be followed by an adequate legal progress and significant challenges still remain (Knottnerus & Tugwell, 2017). Due to the advancement of medicine, we are today in a situation where the disease can be prolonged as much as possible. This is not always the desired condition of the patient. Sometimes it is the person who has the lowest level 513 Dušica Kovačević of sustainable functions. Such conditions, which were not possible decades ago, today create inhumane conditions in which patients are often forced to exist. The use of electroencephalography (EEG)1 has changed the concept of death medically and legally. In most developed countries of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental legal areas, brain death is accepted as the legal definition of death.2 Formerly, life interruption was associated with cardiopulmonary function interruption, while laws have now been adopted to confirm brain death as relevant, which has also been accepted by jurisprudence in a number of countries. In the case of brain death, the individual is medically and legally dead, and the physician can end intensive medical treatment by switching off the device that sustained the patient’s life.3 There are several legal limitations to this definition of death. From a practical standpoint, the legal definition of death as death of the whole brain is inadequate. As a result, there is some effort to instead comply with the criterion by which patients would be classified as dead because of the higher parts of the brain ceased to function (neocortex death). Such a change would initially make it easier to deal with cases where these parts of the brain have stopped functioning, for example if the patient is in coma4 or permanently vegetative state. As life is often reduced to merely maintaining functions in an artificial manner, and it is unknown if such a person feels pain, there are more and more individual requests to end such life. At the same time, the law has been elaborated to such an extent that today’s individuals are accused of crimes that are fundamentally human and always practiced. An example of such an act is euthanasia. Euthanasia has been known since ancient times. It originally refers to a wide range of situations. It has been de facto used throughout history and justified for a number of reasons. Given that there is no established, commonly accepted definition of euthanasia, what is described here approximates to what is today considered official euthanasia. It can be said that euthanasia 1 Graphical representation of brain electrical activity. 2 The criterion for irreversible coma (brain death) was developed by the Ad hoc committee of Harvard University in 1968. Cessation of cerebral currents is determined by EEG, while a dead person is considered to be one whose irreversible cessation of respiratory and circulatory functions or all brain functions are maintained. 3 In the event that life support is continued in these circumstances, the liability of the physician for the violation of the patient’s personality rights may be established. 4 Specific state of person which causes consideration of possibility to implement euthanasia is deep state of unconsciousness named coma. Persons can be in coma as a result of a traumatic accident or a medical condition. Current knowledge on coma isn’t on a high level. How many patients are conscious during a coma is still unknown. Also, the level of consciousness of patients that are conscious while they are in coma is still unreachable to the medical science. There are no instruments to be used in order to predict how long coma will last. Some people wake up after a few weeks in coma, but against that fact, some of them may go into a vegetative state or minimally conscious state. Physicians do not have option to precisely predict whether patients will recover. One of the stimulations on which persons in coma do not respond is pain (Laureys, et al. 2004). 514 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova is a generic term for problems that arise when a patients choose to begin, continue, or refuse treatment for the purpose of preserving their life or requiring a medical staff member to use a particular medical device to accelerate certain and imminent death, and for the removal of suffering and pain that are extremely unbearable and which can’t be alleviated or eliminated in any other way.5 So, in todays discussions, euthanasia is mentioned as a term related to one specific state of terminally ill person and it means that there have to be a few main elements (like- the need to help, unbearable pain that negates life itself, being merciful..) of that status in order to be the predispositions of a person to declare for euthanasia. Mentioned meanings are dependent on the specific era, on the scientific field, on the provenance of the author. Thus, there is no widely accepted definition of euthanasia. However, for the purposes of this paper, the meaning of euthanasia will be reduced to that one which is given through modern medical practice. This discourse is consequence of the work of British historian Lekia, under whom euthanasia started to be a term for depriving the life of a hopelessly ill patient (Simocic & Simeunovic-Patic, 2017:317). The broad question of euthanasia is dealt with in many fields. Although the increasingly common syntagm is dignified death, the question is raisedis the relevance of “human dignity” considered in the debate on euthanasia? Considering human dignity there happen to be some theoretical difficulties. Meaning of human dignity is so vague that it leads to inflationary and contradictory use. It can be interpreted from the perspectives of different scientific disciplines and within each one there are many currents of reflecting on human dignity. And, with the development of bioethics, there was a new wave in its interpretation. But every one of this sciences and disciplines has similar main characterization of human dignity- it is a central human value that originates from overall quality of human life and one partly from the spiritual and material. Also, it is something intrinsic, essential and inalienable that is not determined by external causes or conditions. That fact is very important for many traditional bioethical topics, as euthanasia is. Euthanasia is well known as a phenomenon that is related to preserving human dignity 5 The World Medical Association (WMA) defines euthanasia as the act of deliberately ending the life of a patient when there is patient’s own request or the request of close relatives. WMA has an explicit statement that it is an unethical phenomenon that doesn’t belong to a good medical practice. According to the 2002 resolution to euthanasia, WMA clearly confirms beliefs that euthanasia is in collision with main ethical principles of good medical practice. Through that resolution, WMA sent message to all National Medical Associations and all physicians from all over the world to refrain from participating the process of euthanasia, even in the situations when euthanasia is questionable in country which national law allows it or decriminalizes it under certain conditions (World Medical Association [WMA], 2019). 515 Dušica Kovačević and aspect of dignity in every process of human life periods. The discourse of human dignity is very broad and resilient, with capacity to be pulled in many directions by interested protagonists to justify all outcomes. That nature of human dignity combined with the claims and counter-claims linked with the human rights appears as good argument for those who try to use it to assert their right to die with dignity (Azize, 2007). Euthanasia appears as a problem waitting to be solved since last decades of 20th century. Many authors are convinced that problem of arising interest for the euthanasia topics is solvable in a different way from expected (Rakowski, 1994). This paper will address certain ethical issues related to euthanasia through the analysis of specific court cases with this request. Some of these questions are: 1. Is the morally justifiable possibility for someone to decide the time and manner of their own death? 2. Is there a moral justification for suicide in certain situations? 3. Does the recognition of the right to die by human beings imply that other persons associated with the medical treatment of the person (doctor in charge) are obliged to help, or at least not interfere, with achieving death? 4. Should euthanasia be legal? Is it moraly justified for a person to choose how to die? Brittany Maynard was one of the patients that chosen to die on her own terms, and she did it on November 1, 2014. Brittany had glioblastoma, an aggressive deadly brain cancer. There didn’t exist any treatment that could save her life. Only option which was possible for her was full-brain radiation which could have brought her to a few extra months. In that case, such treatment would probably end in one of the hospices intended to assist terminally ill patients in the last stages of their illness.6 However, after all the chances of finding a therapy that would significantly help the patient to make some 6 A hospice care palliative approach is an important component of quality care and can offer many benefits to patients and their patients and also to general health care system. Some of that benefits are: pain and symptom management, coordination of care, improved quality od life and decreased use of potentially aggressive end-of life care (this end may be expensive and not in accordance with patient’s wishes). Although hospices are emerging as an option to help fewer deciding to euthanasia from the patients, they can not be an option that eliminates the need to legalize euthanasia. 516 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova progress in treating the disease were futile, she made the decision to withdraw from the offered treatment that would extend her life. In one interview, she explained that she made that decision because the whole-brain radiation she could choose was potentially cruel and the possible consequences were expressed as blindness and damage to mental and physical health. In her opinion, it is not life-saving but a horror that destroys quality of life in the hope of maybe getting some extra time. Since the main idea of her rejection of dysthanasia7 was to maintain the quality of life on the highest possible scale, she made the decision to prevent the natural unwanted course of the disease and to die with dignity (Maynard, 2014). In 2014, Brittany Maynard had to move from California to Oregon and ask a physician aid-in-dying -PAD. She did nothing illegal, Oregon had a law permiting the terminally ill adults to request a prescription of lethal drugs. On October 27, 1997, Oregon enacted the Death with Dignity Act that allows terminally ill patients to decide to end their lifes by voluntarily selfadministering lethal medications prescribed by a physician for that purpose. But, questionable is whether she did something unethical. Was it morraly justified for Brittany Maynard to choose how she would die? Even excluding all the circumstances that contributed to the moral justification of her decision, according to the human freedoms every human being has a right to decide what actions are good for him. People are free to make decisions over the life cycle about what they do with their own body. If they seek out medical care, they are automatically making choices on how long they will live. At the contrary, if they smoke to much or drink, drive too much, if they are not vaccinated, etc. they are making decisions about how soon they will die. Concept of the sanctity of life has been well-known since the medieval ages. The sanctity of human life implies that no human being has the right to speak of the interruption of life which is the supreme human value. The sanctity of life is at the top of the list of hierarchical values. Understood as a factor in the process of life, holiness is simply the need to be alive and it communicates to the outside that the quality of life is subordinated to its very continuity. This further leads to the very negation of someone else’s personality and leads to the acceptance of universalization on the basis of morality, which is wrong. Importance of that concept is being more and more significant, but there are 7 Some cases of dysthanasia, which is increasingly appearing in the literature as greater evil than euthanasia itself, will be presented here. The artificial extension of life beyond the limit determined by common biological processes, postponing death as long as possible usually involve slow death with suffering, pain, anguish. This fact means that by this process could be undermining the person’s dignity (Clark & Dudzinski, 2013). 517 Dušica Kovačević some cases in which we could legitimately discard the main meaning of it. With the increasingly accepted process of individualization in medicine, primary importance is given to the individual patient rather that the life beyond the individual. Brittany Maynard used steroids to treat her illness, which led to some side effects on the immune system. The steroids she was taking to control the inflamation in her brain made it difficult for her to identify herself. Already suffering from excruciating headaches and frightening attacks, she feared a condition in which no amount of morphine could help. That is why it is impossible to look at this area from the legislative and moral point of view. It is necessary to individualize all segments of action and decision making. It is true that pain can’t be articulated rationally. Pain is a complex area of human experience (Halliday, 1998). Pain leads to the loss of a part of autonomy because it invalidates everything that precedes the right to autonomy. At the same time, pain allows others to think about deciding on behalf of another person, which is also a negation of autonomy. The solution to this irrational view is not to deny euthanasia and to prevent its legal form, but in the previously given consent. However, in a situation where the practice of consenting to a particular treatment or willingness to terminate one’s life is not ubiquitous, it is absolutely irrational to think in that direction when it comes to the procedure of adjudicating on an individual patient.8 A modern society that refers to industrialized societies is prepared enough to face these particular problems mentioned above. Life and moral theory in the case of euthanasia should be based on facts that propagate an individual’s quality of life, and less on life as a term of theorizing. The pain and mercy associated with euthanasia are relative categories, inadequate to determine a lasting, legal framework. However, these phenomena stimulate the process of identifying other persons with the patient and thus trigger the moral need to do something that would eliminate such feelings (Brody, 1988). This is sufficient to think of the introduction of euthanasia as a legal exception. Such an exception would, in its practice, lead to the destruction of relative categories and to the formation of legal rules that focus on human being. 8 In the US, living will laws are used (laws on permanent authorization to represent the exercise of personal right to decide one’s own health), in Germany - Patient testament, in the Netherlands - Declaration of euthanasia, in Switzerland - Hospital disposition. 518 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Is there ever a moral justification for committing suicide? Immanuel Kant argued that suicide violates our moral duty to honor and value rational creatures. These aspirations are linked to the proclamation that life has been given to us and that as such we must respect it and have no right to interrupt it (Guyer, 1995). On the other hand, logic tells us that if we can direct the processes of life, that in the same way we can direct the process of dying that results in death. Do not murder! - It is one of God’s commandments written in the Bible and the basis of many religions and cultures. Main arguments for rejecting euthanasia by medical organizations and acts are based on deontological principle- doctors must not kill! The aforementioned imperative cannot be considered absolutely correct in the conditions which human life is artificially maintained with the help of medical technology. Recognizing the will of God in all individual cases of dystanasia can be considered a trivialization of the divine. Once a person is confronted with the consequences of adhering to personal principles, those principles can be shaken. This is especially the case when one nurtures principles that most other people do not respect. This is the reason why principles should not be applied to numerous phenomena. So these principles can be changed, and attitudes about certain situations can be changed, too. This also happens when a person is guided by a principle at a time significantly different from the one in which principles were created. Therefore, it can be concluded that whatever assumption we have about euthanasia, the principles and attitudes about this phenomenon are easily changeable. It is far from important to look at the time of maximum creation and the time of silent volume (Vood, 1998). Life is not necessarily worth living. It is true that every human life, regardless of its quality, has basic values on which some basic human rights are based. This further implies that every life has certain elements of dignity inherent in life as such. However, a life deprived of crucial goods is not worth living. A painful life can initiate more harm, both to the person who lives it and to its surroundings, than ending of such a life. Illness can take a life to the point of rendering it meaningless. If the act of suicide/murder is the cause of greater happiness and benefit, holistically, then it is certainly a strong enough argument to justify ending one’s life. This attitude is also necessary when it comes to numerous social and legal norms that justify the death penalty, killing in war, or killing in necessary defense. The background is different in this case, but such an exception confirms the rule that certain categories of people, ie. 519 Dušica Kovačević people in certain circumstances can and must exempt from generalizations. Peter Singer is one of the authors who is guided by the principle that future, expected quality of life would be a sufficient determinant for the moral justification of actions taken in advance to end life (Singer, 2003). Such an approach confirms the moral justification of suicide in the case of Brittany Maynard. Antony David Bland was one of the injured in the Hillsborough disaster. Resuscitation from his injuries could not avert brain anoxia and it led to persistent vegetative state (PVS).9 A few months after disaster his doctor and parents came on conclusion that withdrawal of treatment including artificial nutrition and hydration would be in patient’s best interest. We need to make distinction between ANH and other medical interventions. In this case, the act that allow withdrawal of ANH was primarily granted by the Court of Appeal.10 Several elements were considered: the futility of life-sustaining therapy and any circumstance related to an adult incapacitated patient. While this procedure was lasting Lord Golf of Chieveley noted: “It would, in my opinion, be a deplorable state of affairs if no authoritative guidance could be given to the medical profession in a case such as the present, are that a doctor would be compelled either to act contrary to the principles of medical ethics established by his professional body or to the risk prosecution for murder… I do not consider that, in circumstances such as there, a doctor is required to initiate or continue life-prolonging treatment or care in the best interests of his patient” (Szawarski & Kakar, 2012:126). If long-term treatment cannot be considered to be in the best interests of the person, the treatment may be lawfully refused and treated differently. The issue, therefore, focuses on all the consequences of such an interpretation of the case and its decision-making. Specifically, more complications were provoking because other patients in a completely different state of health (such as intensive care patients) began connecting with this. In this way, a new problem arises regarding the potential generalization of the basis on which the decision in this particular case was based on, which could 9 The vegetative state is a neurological condition in which patients appear to be awake but show no sign of awareness of themselves or their environment. This condition is perplexing because there is an apparent dissociation between the two cardinal elements of consciousness- awareness and wakefulness. This patients appear to be awake but lack any sing of awareness of themselves or their environment. 10 The legal reasoning was that the act of removing the feeding tube was an omission, and so that act was not murder. But, if a third party had removed tube, for any reason, then it would have been an act of murder (Edmonds, et al, 2016: 62). The process of withholding or removing artificial feeding from patients as young as newborns to elderly people has been common-place in medicine in many parts of the world. The Bland judgement made it possible for doctors to cause the death of the patient by removing feeding without being liable for murder. (Interestingly, the legal reasoning was that the act of removing the feeding tube was not an act, it was an omission, and so the removal the feeding was not murder. However, if a third party had removed Tony Bland’s feeding tube, for reasons of some personal gain, that person would seem to have been guilty of murder.) 520 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova be interpreted as a “slippery slope”. Perhaps the most significant consequence is the misinterpretation of this case for judicial precedent. In the process, Tony Bland’s Lord Mustill’s statement has attracted considerable attention from those interested in the topic, and it still sounds true: “It would in my opinion be too optimistic to suppose that this is the end of the matter, and that in the future the doctors (or perhaps the judges of the High Court) will be able without difficulty to solve all future cases by ascertaining the facts and applying to them the precepts established in the speeches delivered today. The dozens of cases in the American courts have shown that the subject is too difficult, and the situations too diverse, for the law to be settled by a single appeal“ (Szawarski & Kakar, 2012: 128). The case law experiences have been requiring dealing with individual cases pragmatically. The more complex the medicine is, the more practical legal solutions are needed. Each individual example of legal approval of a life interruption involves a moral decision and a legal justification for such decision. By indirectly denying the death, or terminating the patient’s life, the doctors, adopting modern medicine, assume what is means to live a life worth living. In the same way, the bases on which decisions to extend medical treatment when there are indications that neurological recovery is impossible are being created. Medical practice can thus lead to erroneous logical conclusions about future cases. Case of Karen Ann Quinlan become meaningful in 1975 and years after as case after which the relation between medicine and law would never be the same. This case became one of the exceptions that implies that each life is unique to itself and that there is no place for universal rules when it comes to managing its processes. This case involves American public of that period in overtly reflection on many neglected terms and ways of understanding life. Is it immoral to let nature to take its course? This case is just about that- about the removal technological equipment and permitting the illness to lead to death. On the basis on the Quinlan case “Right-to-die” movements started throughout Europe. Summarizing all facts related to this case we can conclude that Karen Ann Quinlan was mute spokesperson for euthanasia. Actually, Karen lost consciousness and she stopped breathing as a reaction to prescription medication and light alcohol. Her brain was damaged because she was without oxygen long enough, and so that she fell into a persistent vegetative state. The result of that condition was that she would never be recovered and that’s why her parents decided to try to get a legal permit to remove of her respirator. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted a request a year later. Despite this, 521 Dušica Kovačević she lived for nearly a decade since the nuns who were caring for the patient were opposed to such a decision of the Supreme Court, and as a result, they began accustoming her to life without a respirator. At the time of the court’s decision to remove her respirator Karen could already live without it. She continued to live because her nasogastric tube that supplied her body with food was not removed. Although it is a medical device, it is not considered to be apparatus that is to be removed in such a case. Thus, the impact of this difference in means contributed to keeping the patient alive (Kenny, 2005). Is it reasonable that after assessing a patient’s case to be hopeless and that there is no purpose in keeping her body alive, that the maintenance of her life is ultimately determined simply by the classification of medical equipment? The objective was not achieved, but the procedure was followed, as was the decision of the Court, which provided for the removal of all ancillary means (not including those considered to be common).11 A case like this is a typical example of a man who obeys the rules, the same ones that should serve him. If one has a “right to die“ does that mean that others must help? Doctors have an obligation to treat but also to reduce pain and provide the patient with relief and maximum well-being. Helping someone end their life in a painless way is not only an act of mercy, but can also be portrayed as a moral duty. When that moral obligation grows into a legal obligation, then it is difficult to associate mercy with necessary duty, making euthanasia a possible part of general medical practice. In countries that have legalized certain forms of euthanasia at the national level, the right to die initiates the duty of others to assist, ie. not to obstruct a person from exercising that right. Sometimes the question is who are those having the obligation to assist, which is often explained in more detail by specific national law. However, physicians are prevented from being part of the Hippocratic Oath invoked by opponents of euthanasia and use the oath as an act of greater power even as part of national law, although the specific oath is an act without legal obligation. The principles of the Hippocratic Oath are considered sacred by today’s physicians. It is known that most graduating medical-school students swear to some form of the Hippocratic Oath, in fact they swear they will: treat the sick to the best of one’s ability, preserve patient privacy, to pass on the secrets of 11 The absurdity in the whole case is that the patient passed away ten years after the Court’s decision to slaughter additional life-sustaining aids by not using antibiotics prescribed for pneumonia, which means that her life was interrupted by passive euthanasia. 522 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova medicine to the next generation, and so on. It could be understood as an ideal conduct for the physician by the aspect of some anti-euthanasia movements. Within the Hippocratic Oath, there is a significant provision on this subject that states- I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody even if I am asked to, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.12 All physicians are hereby obliged to refrain from acts signifying euthanasia in view of the broader description of this phenomenon mentioned above. There is no doubt that the Oath is an act of undoubted value, an act that moderated the work of the medical staff for an extremely long period. However, it is difficult to adapt medical behavior to the maxims of the Hippocratic Oath in the face of contemporary challenges. World that has witnessed huge scientific, political, social, and changes in every other aspect, a world of legalized physician-assisted suicide and abortion, is not a world in which the Hippocratic Oath is adequate (main) act of medical ethics. The Hippocratic Oath should be radically modified in which case it wouldn’t be act of that moral importance that is based on history and originality, or it could be abandoned altogether- which is maybe the best solution taking in consideration nowadays improvements (Van Hooff, 2004). One more case that is interesting for this topic is case of Diane Pretty. She died due to natural causes on 11 May 2002, but struggled to choose the time and manner of her death with her husband’s help. These efforts was a resounding legal failure. She was suffering from motor neural disease, a paralyzing, degenerative and incurable illness. This led to the Diane’s entire body being paralyzed from the neck down. Given the overall condition, Mrs. Pretty wanted to die with dignity. The English Divisional Court and the House of Lords, followed by the European Court of Human Rights, denied that her rights under the European Convention on Human Rights had been infringed. The refusal of the Director of Public Prosecutions to exempt her husband from prosecution and, from the other side, the domestic legal prohibition on assisting suicide (the Suicide Act 1961) had led to the disregard of Article 3 of the European Convention (prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment). Respect for human dignity is not expressly articulated in any of the substantive rights guaranteed by the Convention, but it can be viewed as one of the fundamental objectives of all that rights (such as rights that may be endangered by such a judgment: right to life, right to respect for private life, freedom of conscience and belief, prohibition on discrimination). However, the Court also found no violation of the Convention. According to the strong points, 12 The essence of the said provision is related to assisted suicide, but in fact it is generally understood to refer to any form of doctor’s activity aimed at interrupting a patient’s life. 523 Dušica Kovačević the right to life can’t encompass decisions that would deny life, while Article 3 itself does not imply actions aimed at ending one’s life, and it must be interpreted in accordance with Article 2 which does not entitle an individual to state seeking to allow or assist one’s death (Millns, 2002). In June 2014, nine Justices of the Supreme Court considered the case of Tony Nicklinson, who was a men with locked-in syndrome, and he fought for the right to legally end his life. Main, legal argument on his behalf was that the current law on assisted suicide was incompatible with his right to a private and family life under Article 8 of European Convention on Human Rights. He was also paralyzed from the neck down, and he communicated by blinking. The case went further than previous challenges to the law in England and Wales on assisted suicide and murder. The case was contested on the issue of “necessity” arguing that the only way to end Mr Nicklinson’s suffering is to allow him to die. The Supreme Court ultimately decided by a majority of seven to two against making a declaration of incompatibility in Mr Nicklinson’s case. Some of the Justices considered that the compatibility of the law on assisted suicide with Article 8 was an “inherently legislative issue” that should be left to Parliament (Richard, 2014).13 Such a process already happened in the UK, in a different way. In the case of Tony Bland, law lords authorized the removal of a feeding tube that was keeping him alive. All medical staff and his family judged that continued life was not in his best interests. If they had the right to decide on behalf of the patient, how could the patient, Tony Nicklinson, not make such a decision on his own behalf? If patients receiving palliative care are entitled in certain cases to the use of analgesia and sedation, why should other groups of patients be exempted from this case? The law of course would classify such act as murder. For that reason, it is not performed in the UK. But ethically, if a man such as Tony Nicklinson has the right to refuse to eat any longer because finds his life intolerable, he has the right to be relieved of the suffering of starvation, quickly and painlessly. However, he had the right to refuse artificial nutrition. No one had the right to force him to eat, because it would be an encroachment on human rights. 13 Parliamentary activities in the field of euthanasia have been carried out on several occasions in the United Kingdom. There have been several attempts to liberalize the law. The most recent of these was the Assisted Dying Bill in 2014–15, introduced by Lord Falconer of Thoroton. The Bill did not progress beyond Committee stage in the Lords. In the United Kingdom, under the 1961 Suicide Act, suicide was not considered a criminal offense, but 14 years in prison could be obtained to assist with the suicide of another person. 524 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Should euthanasia be legal? The act is not wrong unless the person in question is considered for the one that needs to be punished in a certain way for it; if not according to the law, then according to the system of informal control- either through the condemnation of society or at least through the guilt of conscience. There is a widely accepted assumption that euthanasia is an acceptable and socially desirable phenomenon. Its legalization comes from the society, and such will of the society is legalized by the current authorities when it is possible. This means that euthanasia can be seen as a practical issue that would be desirable to shape the law legally for the benefit of society. A crucial starting point for the legal formulation of euthanasia is in the judicial system, which is not fully functional in many countries. A crucial starting point for the legal formulation of euthanasia is in the judicial system, which is not fully functional in many countries. This can be observed in numerous cases that are often dealt with by the family of a patient already suffering a loss of a loved one that is certainly to be in a near future. Thus, each state has a specific individual approach to addressing this issue. Activities in countries that do not have legislation on this phenomenon are primarily related to the decriminalization of euthanasia. The reasons for carrying out these activities are growing. The right to life and the right to private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights should include decisions on quality of life, including decisions on death if life has lost quality. Today’s situation in the world is such that people who are able to travel abroad to use the right to help end their lives do so. This situation leads to many injustices and discrimination. Other countries are prevented from amending such existing enacted laws, but are able to more closely legally determine the issue of euthanasia within their territories and thus exercise their right under their control and supervision. In addition to this discrimination, there are many downsides to the lack of legal regulations on euthanasia. Today, there are more consequences of this situation than there would be in the case of a comprehensive legal definition of this area. The abuse of the potential legalization of euthanasia would be precluded if it were to show exhaustive conditions that would compound over time. It will definitely be necessary to complete and harmonize this area with the applicable legal regulations, and it is better to start considering legal rules in order to protect people. We need to be aware of the fact that euthanasia is 525 Dušica Kovačević already being implemented in some form, and that is a main reason way it doesn’t need to remain legally unformed. As for the legalization of euthanasia by country, the matter is quite complicated. When it comes to the European continent, euthanasia was first legalized by the Netherlands through the Law on End of Life on Demand and Assisted Suicide in 2002. Belgium legalized euthanasia in the same year by the Bill on Euthanasia. Luxembourg passed the Law on euthanasia and assisted suicide in 2009. These legal solutions are defined to a similar standards. There are more conditions that must be fulfilled before euthanasia is approved. The patient must be in a state of unbearable pain caused by a condition of incurable disease. The request for euthanasia must be explicit and voluntary. This patient’s condition must be confirmed by at least one other relevant medical professional. Final act aimed at disruption of life must be carried out in a medically predetermined manner by a predetermined person. The patient must be a certain number of years, the lower limit is 12 years, while the minors need the consent of the parents or guardian.14 Assisted suicide is predicted by the laws in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Estonia, Albania, Germany, Canada, Cambodia, Japan, and some countries in United States of America (Washington, Oregon, Montana, California, Colorado, Vermont). Other countries, too, have their own form of regulation in this area, such as Germany, Denmark. However, the problem is compounded by the fact that many authors distinguish between euthanasia, assisted suicide, and various forms of physician assistance. There are even currents in the literature that judge that what is covered by the term passive euthanasia is not euthanasia in its essential meaning. Nevertheless, it is de facto that these individual activities relate to the interruption of life for the same reasons and because of the same impulses. It is therefore inappropriate to explicitly prohibit certain of these activities, while others are permitted. In 1941, Switzerland legalized suicide with or without the help of a doctor. Although it does not prohibit foreigners from performing euthanasia on its territory, they must have strong reasons for doing so. This type of assistance to foreigners in Switzerland is provided by the Dignitas organization, which offers euthanasia services in specially prepared premises at a cost of a couple of thousand euros. Although this way enables the exercise of these rights to those who would not be able to do so 14 However, Belgium took a radical step in 2014. by removing age from the prerequisites for euthanasia. Such a decision requires a strict procedure to be followed. The aforementioned change has caused many ethical dilemmas. 526 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova in their own country, such a law discriminates against the material status of persons who decide to take such a step. The Australian state of Victoria has legalized assisted suicide after more than 100 hours of heavy parliamentary debate lasting two days and two nights. Victoria is the first Australian state to approve it (Steck, et al, 2013). The legalization of euthanasia or other forms of assistance to patients in order to interrupt their lives is being done in many ways. Cambodia is a specific example in this regard. Considering the request of the opponents of euthanasia to increase the criminal reaction of the state to this phenomenon, the Constitutional Court decided quite unexpectedly that there was no place for the criminal liability of the person who helped the terminally ill patient to end his life. The Court found that the right to self-determination and the free expression of the will is stronger than the duty of the state to protect a specific human life and thus in 1996 legalized active euthanasia (Pereira, 2011). Here, the individual case had an impact on the entire legal system. The same can be said of the Brittany Maynard case which was one of the reasons that led to the legalization of PAD in California.15 Euthanasia is actively being considered in many countries. Parliamentary activities are present which are increasingly leading to a more liberal approach to this idea. The current state of law does not follow developments in the field of biomedical achievements. It is imperative to set standards that would give direction to the future legal formulation of this area in a manner that respects basic human rights. The goals of the medical profession should continue to be life-saving, but this should not be at the expense of compassion and right of a terminally ill person to choose to end his or her life and die with dignity. CONCLUSION Legal science can be seen as a necessary set of rules defining areas that are of social interest. Subsequently, the task of legal science is to establish certain objective-moral laws. Due to such a goal, law has to focus on its value roots. 15 The legalization of euthanasia or other forms of assistance to patients in order to interrupt their lives is being done in many ways. Cambodia is a specific example in this regard. Namely, considering the request of the opponents of euthanasia to increase the criminal reaction of the state to this phenomenon, the Constitutional Court decided quite unexpectedly that there was no place for the criminal liability of the person who helped the terminally ill patient to end his life. The Court found that the right to self-determination and the free expression of the will is stronger than the duty of the state to protect a specific human life and thus in 1996 legalized active euthanasia (Pereira, 2011). 527 Dušica Kovačević Traditional bioethical themes have influence on law by requiring it to value certain phenomena. In this way the fundamental principles are being created. Sometimes they are presented in a consistent manner in the context of different situations in which case the specific area of law is branching. We could see that nowadays the focus of law is intensely directed on the values inherent to human life as the unique purpose of all legal rules (Spielman, 2007). Gradual branching of a law in domain of some bioethical themes (like abortion, eugenic, extracorporeal fertilization and others) started when certain aspects of human life were threatened. Euthanasia is a topic of increasing debate in modern times. Although there are no generally accepted international standards, most modern states are progressively involved in the processes of legal formulation of euthanasia. Such a position of euthanasia is a consequence of accelerated social change. Even so, there are many more countries that deny the need to adopt certain legal rules at national levels on this issue. People who are in the terminal stage of an incurable disease do not have much opportunity to manage the rest of their lives. As one of them, palliative care is offered in certain countries. This makes it easier to manage the patient’s pain and offers a sedation option that often replaces conventional treatment for the disease. Because such practices often speed up the process of dying, it can be called indirect euthanasia. On the contrary, there are always patients who are not helped by palliative care in achieving a generally tolerable condition of the body. An additional option for such patients is legalization of euthanasia. Just one of the many benefits of the potential legalization is the patients’ sense of control over their lives. Sometimes the knowledge of legalized euthanasia is more important than its practical application. Given the aforementioned usurpation of many human rights because of the ability of medicine to artificially sustain human life, it is likely that legal systems will be forced to delineate the area of euthanasia in a more detailed way that will allow its implementation. Considering the ethical and legal problems of euthanasia, it can be said that the existing legal solutions are not morally or intellectually optimal. That is why it is important for society as a whole to set boundaries in the physician-patient relationship, and to provide detailed procedural requirements for the implementation of each individual form of euthanasia that is legalized and for that forms which are going to be legalized. Passive euthanasia is inevitable and widespread, although it is most often not 528 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova legally framed. As it is evident that the practice of euthanasia exists, it is very important for it to be formulated legally in order to curb its current abuse. Therefore, it is certain that this legal area will be further developed, but it is important that in the near future such a need is recognized by many relevant entities for a particular topic. This would already be a significant step towards aligning the rules with the current medical trend. REFERENCES: 1. Azize, J. (2007). Human dignity and euthanasia law. U. Notre Dame Austl. L. Rev., 9, 47. 2. Brody, B. A. (1988). Life and death decision making. 3. Caralis, P. V., & Hammond, J. S. (1992). Attitudes of medical students, housestaff, and faculty physicians toward euthanasia and termination of lifesustaining treatment. Critical care medicine, 20(5), 683-690. 4. Carrick, P. (2012). Medical ethics in antiquity: philosophical perspectives on abortion and euthanasia (Vol. 18). Springer Science & Business Media. 5. Clark, J. D., & Dudzinski, D. M. (2013). The culture of dysthanasia: attempting CPR in terminally ill children. Pediatrics, 131(3), 572-580. 6. Demmer, C. (2004). A survey of complementary therapy services provided by hospices. Journal of palliative medicine, 7(4), 510-516. 7. Edmonds, D. (Ed.). (2016). Philosophers Take on the World. Oxford University Press. 8. Guyer, P. (1995). The possibility of the categorical imperative. The Philosophical Review, 104(3), 353-385. 9. Halliday, M. A. (1998). On the grammar of pain. Functions of Language, 5(1), 1-32. 10. Hoefler, J. M. (2000). Making decisions about tube feeding for severely demented patients at the end of life: clinical, legal, and ethical considerations. Death studies, 24(3), 233-254. 11. Kalanj Bognar, S. (ured.) (2015). Tehnologije i inovacije u medicine. Sveučilište u zagrebu: Medicinski fakultet. 12. Kenny, R. W. (2005). A cycle of terms implicit in the idea of medicine: Karen Ann Quinlan as a rhetorical icon and the transvaluation of the ethics of euthanasia. Health Communication, 17(1), 17-39. 13. Knottnerus, J. A., & Tugwell, P. (2017). Evidence-based medicine: achievements and prospects. Journal of clinical epidemiology, 84, 1-2. 529 Dušica Kovačević 14. Laureys, S., Owen, A. M., & Schiff, N. D. (2004). Brain function in coma, vegetative state, and related disorders. The Lancet Neurology, 3(9), 537-546. 15. Maynard, B. (2014). My right to death with dignity at 29. CNN. November, 2. 16. Millns, S. (2002). Death, dignity and discrimination: The case of Pretty v. United Kingdom. German Law Journal, 3(10). 17. Monti, M. M., Laureys, S., & Owen, A. M. (2010). The vegetative state. Bmj, 341, c3765. 18. Pereira, J. (2011). Legalizing euthanasia or assisted suicide: the illusion of safeguards and controls. Current Oncology, 18(2), e38. 19. Rakowski, E. (1994). The Sanctity of Human Life. 20. Richards, N. (2014). The death of the right‐to‐die campaigners (Respond to this article at http://www. therai. org. uk/at/debate). Anthropology Today, 30(3), 14-17. 21. Schur, M. (1972). Freud: Living and dying. 22. Simovic, D. Z., & Simeunovic-Patic, B. J. (2017). Euthanasia and Ethical Dilemmas-Human Dignity against Sanctity of Life. Zbornik Radova, 51, 317. 23. Singer, P. (2003). Voluntary euthanasia: a utilitarian perspective. Bioethics, 17(5‐6), 526-541. 24. Spielman, B. (2007). Bioethics in law. Springer Science & Business Media. 25. Steck, N., Egger, M., Maessen, M., Reisch, T., & Zwahlen, M. (2013). Euthanasia and assisted suicide in selected European countries and US states: systematic literature review. Medical Care, 938-944. 26. Szawarski, P., & Kakar, V. (2012). Classic cases revisited: Anthony Bland and withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration in the UK. Journal of the Intensive Care Society, 13(2), 126-129. 27. Teodorescu, A. (Ed.). (2015). Death Representations in Literature: Forms and Theories. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 28. Van Hooff, A. J. (2004). Ancient euthanasia:‘good death’and the doctor in the graeco-Roman world. Social science & medicine, 58(5), 975-985. 29. WHO. (2018). Cancer facts sheets. Available on: http://gco.iarc.fr/today/data/ factsheets/cancers/39-All-cancers-fact-sheet.pdf [Accessed on 20 March 2020] 30. West, T. G., & Platon. (1979). Plato’s Apology of Socrates: an interpretation, with a new translation (p. 66). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 31. WMA. (2019). WMA Declaration on Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide. Available on: https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-resolutionon-euthanasia/ [Accessed on 13 March 2020] 32. Woolf, S. H. (1990). Practice guidelines: A new reality in medicine: I. Recent developments. Archives of internal medicine, 150(9), 1811-1818. 530 Original scientific paper UDK HUMAN-ANIMAL CHIMERAS: MIRACULOUS CHILD OF BIOTECHNOLOGY OR WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING? Szymon Bokota Doctoral School, University of Silesia, Poland Abstract: The article presents an impact and ethical-legal problems around interspecies organisms with both human and animal DNA – known as chimeras. While such beings can be considered useful from a medical point of view, important questions are raised concerning their consciousness, suffering and the acceptable borders of mixing human and animal genes, making this one of the most problematic aspects of modern bioethics. The research is divided into three topics: chimeras from a medical point of view; chimeras as a subject of law, and the ethical-legal aspects – chimeras as beings that suffer. Key words: chimera, bioethics, personhood, subject of law, animal suffering 1. INTRODUCTION Biotechnological developments have resulted in new challenges in the areas of law and bioethics. One of the most interesting and the most complex modern problems are human-animal organisms. The concept itself is nothing new – a specific patron of these beings is the Chimera1, which comes from Greek mythology. Indeed, there are many mythological characters that combined different species – another popular chimera was the Minotaur, being both human and bull. In the Middle Ages images of chimeras – drastically distinct from scientific reality – also abounded. In more recent times, the image has been used in various books and films, such as “The Island of Doctor Moreau”, to give just one example2. 1 Josef Kuře, “Etymological background and further clarifying remarks concerning chimeras and hybrids,” in CHIMBIRDS: Chimeras and Hybrids in Comparative European and International Research, ed. J. Taupitz, M. Weschka (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 8. 2 Magdalena Kozhevnikova, “Człowieko-zwierzęce hybrydy i chimery w nauce. Historia i współczesność,” Lud 100, no. C (2016): 187. 531 Szymon Bokota When speaking of mixed organisms, we generally refer to chimeras or hybrids3. Chimeras are organisms created by a fusion of the cells of different species4, while hybrids are created by the insemination of egg cells of one species by semen of other species5. It should be underlined from the start that hybrids serve no real role from a scientific point of view in the case of mixing human and animal cells. This type of research has no validation, cannot help in solving medical problems and it is not biologically possible to carry out an insemination between human and animal6. As a result, I will focus entirely on human-animal chimeras, their importance and the hopes centring around them, but also about the controversies. To properly present the object of analysis, I will provide basic information about the shape that chimeras take. These organisms are animals with minimal dosage of human genes, mostly introduced using CRISPR technology (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats)7. For example, in an experiment conducted by the Salk Institute, researchers introduced only minimal number of human cells8, while Chinese scientists modified the cognitive skills of rhesus macaque by changing the coding of just one gene9. Chimeras are not organisms that would be visually different (at least not for now) from animals that are not genetically modified. Some scientists have suggested that if chimeras have a visual resemblance to people, it could generate further doubts10, though this is not currently a main source of controversies in the discussed subject. 3 Tomasz Pietrzykowski, “The Idea of Non-personal Subjects of Law” in Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn, ed. Visa Kurki, Tomasz Pietrzykowski (Cham: Springer, 2017), 54. 4 Henry T. Greely, “Defining Chimeras...and Chimeric Concerns,” The American Journal of Bioethics 3, no 3 (2003): 17-20. 5 Andrea L. Bonnicksen, Chimeras, Hybrids and Interspecies Research. Politics and policymaking (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 59. 6 Bonnicksen, Chimeras, Hybrids and Interspecies Research. Politics and policymaking, 6. 7 Alejandro De Los Angeles, Nam Pho, and D. Eugene Redmond, Jr., “Generating Human Organs via Interspecies Chimera Formation: Advances and Barriers,” Yale Jorunal of Biology and Medicine 91, no. 3 (2018): 335. However, CRISPR is not the only method to combine human and animal cells, see: Macelo Nogueira et al., “State of the Art on Animal Embryonic Chimeras,” Trends in Developmental Biology 13, no. 7 (2013): 105-12. 8 “Human-Pig Hybrid Created in the Lab—Here Are the Facts,” National Geographic, accessed March 6, 2020, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2017/01/human-pig-hybrid-embryo-chimera-organs-health-science/ “In all, the team created 186 later-stage chimeric embryos that survived, says Wu, and “we estimate [each had] about one in 100,000 human cells.” 9 Lei Shi, Xin Luo, Jin Jiang, Yongchang Chen, Cirong Liu, Ting Hu, Min Li, Qiang Lin, Yanjiao Li, Jun Huang, Hong Wang, Yuyu Niu, Yundi Shi, Martin Styner, Jianhong Wang, Yi Lu, Xuejin Sun, Hualin Yu, Weizhi, and Bing Su, “Transgenic rhesus monkeys carrying the human MCPH1 gene copies show human-like neoteny of brain development,” National Science Review 6, no. 3 (2019): 480–93. 10 Rodolphe Bourret, Eric Martinez, François Vialla, Chloé Giquel, Aurélie Thonnat-Marin, and John De Vos, “Human–animal chimeras: ethical issues about farming chimeric animals bearing human organs,” Stem Cell Research & Therapy 7, no. 1 (2016): 5. 532 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova In my work I will focus on three aspects of creating chimeric organisms: a. Chimeras from a medical point of view. b. Chimeras as a subject of law. The ethical-legal aspects. c. Chimeras as a suffering being. 2. CHIMERA FROM A MEDICAL POINT OF VIEW The basic motivation for mixing human and animal DNA is the development of medicine. Since the dawn of analysed experiments, the goal has been to push further the fight against diseases – this was a reason, in 1988, to create what was known as oncomouse11. It was a mouse that, after modifying an impregnated egg cell by a human gene, became suitable to examine the development of cancer. Rodents are a popular choice of subject in the case of these modifications and tests – they are cheap animals with a short reproductive cycle12. Some authors (such as Andrea Bonnicksen13 or Constanze Huther14) are not convinced by the idea of considering transgenic organisms (cases where the impregnated egg cell is modified by a human gene, which is not a direct fusion of human and animal cell) as chimeras, but there are also opposing positions in the literature (such as Henry T. Greely15), which are closer to my approach. It remains an indisputable fact that mice modified by human genes are useful in research on diseases such as HIV, Ebola, sepsis and cancers, or in testing the impact of drugs on the immune system16. The role of chimeras in medicine is showing no signs of stopping, and it may in fact be the case that the biggest revolution is still approaching. In 2017, scientists from the Salk Institute proved that, at least theoretically, it is possible to grow an organ in an animal’s body – a pig – that would be transplantable to a human17. The method is based on injecting an induced pluripotent 11 Douglas Hanahan, Erwin F. Wagner and Richard D. Palmiter, “The origins of oncomice: a history of the first transgenic mice genetically engineered to develop cancer,” Genes & Development 21 (2007): 2258–70. 12 Nicole Walsh, Laurie Kenney, Sonal Jangalwe, Ken-Edwin Aryee, Dale L. Greiner, Michael A. Brehm, and Leonard D. Shultz, “Humanized mouse models of clinical disease,” Annual Review of Pathology 12 (2017): 187-215. 13 Bonnicksen, Chimeras, Hybrids and Interspecies Research. Politics and policymaking, 10-11. 14 Constanze Huther, Chimeras. The Ethics of Creating Human-Animal Interspecifics (PhD diss. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2009), 5. 15 Greely, “Defining,” 17-20. 16 Walsh, Kenney, Jangalwe, Aryee, Greiner, Brehm, and Shultz, “Humanized,” 187-215. 17 Jun Wu, Aida Platero-Luengo, Masahiro Sakurai, Atsushi Sugawara, Maria Antonia Gil, Takayoshi Yamauchi, Keiichiro Suzuki, Yanina Soledad Bogliotti, Cristina Cuello, Mariana Morales Valencia, Daiji Okumura, Jingping Luo, Marcela Vilariño, Inmaculada Parrilla, Delia Alba Soto, Cristina A. Martinez, Tomoaki Hishida, 533 Szymon Bokota stem cell into the pig’s blastocyst via CRISPR. Although it is an experimental method, and there are no indications that it will be commonly used or tested on human patients in the near future, the potential is tremendous. This stems from the fact that there is an organ shortage crisis in the world18. The number of people that are waiting for organ transplants are estimated in the hundreds of thousands in the USA (above 110 000 people19) and China (above 300 000 people20) alone. The possibility of growing organs in animals’ bodies would resolve this crisis, or at least reduce it to a large extent. Organs coming from animals’ bodies can be even more consistent with the immune system than organs from human donors21. However, mixing human and animal DNA unsurprisingly raises moral concerns, not only in the literature, but also in the regulations of several countries. For example, Polish regulations22 completely prohibit research on chimeras and hybrids, while British regulations23 list prohibited activities (while pointing out certain admissible exemptions) connected with creating chimeras. National regulations result in what has come to be known as ‘scientific tourism’. Scientific tourism is a situation where scientists leave their place of research and move to countries with more liberal regulations about creating chimeras. A good example of this is the activity of Hiromitsu Nakauchi24, who moved from Japan to the USA, or Juan Carlos Izpisúa25, who now conducts his research in China in the face of American restrictions affecting his work. The advancement of science also can have an impact on loosening rules. Hiromitsu Nakauchi eventually returned to Japan, where he is now working on growing organs for human patients in animal bodies. Changes to JapaSonia Sánchez-Bautista, M. Llanos Martinez-Martinez, Huili Wang, Alicia Nohalez, Emi Aizawa, Paloma Martinez-Redondo, Alejandro Ocampo, Pradeep Reddy, Jordi Roca, Elizabeth A. Maga, Concepcion Rodriguez Esteban, W. Travis Berggren, Estrella Nuñez Delicado, Jeronimo Lajara, Isabel Guillen, Pedro Guillen, Josep M. Campistol, Emilio A. Martinez, Pablo Juan Ross, and Juan Carlos Izpisua Belmonte, “Interspecies Chimerism with Mammalian Pluripotent Stem Cells” Cell 168, no. 3 (2017): 473-86. 18 George M. Abouna “Organ Shortage Crisis: Problems and Possible Solutions” Transplantation Proceedings 40 no. 1 (2008): 34-8. 19 „Data,” Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, accessed March 3, 2020, https://optn.transplant. hrsa.gov/data. 20 Yingfei Lu, Yu Zhou, Rong Ju, and Jianquan Chen, “Human-animal chimeras for autologous organ transplantation: technological advances and future perspectives,” Annals of translational medicine 7, no. 20 (2019): 1. 21 Lu, Zhou, Ju, and Chen, „Human-animal chimeras”, 1-5. 22 Article 25 of Ustawa o leczeniu niepłodności (Fertility Treatment Act) 23 Section 4 (Prohibitions in connection with genetic material not of human origin) of Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. 24 Bourret, Martinez, Vialla, Giquel, Thonnat-Marin, and Vos, “Human–animal chimeras,” 2. 25 Creating organs for transplants is necessary, but it shouldn’t have ethical costs,” The Hill, accessed March 3, 2020, https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/459231-creating-organs-for-transplants-is-necessary-but-itshouldnt-have-ethical. 534 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova nese regulations have allowed him to continue his research, but there is one reservation worth mentioning – an experiment must be aborted if too many human cells appear in the animal’s brain26. On the one hand, this shows that regulations are loosening under the influence of possible benefits from chimeras, but on the other hand it means that legislation around the world is very diverse in the case of chimeric beings. 3. CHIMERAS AS A SUBJECT. THE ETHICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS One of the things that raises resistance towards creating human-animal organisms, and which somehow negates the advantages, is the problem of the human dignity and consciousness of these beings. This topic can be generally carved out as issue of the subjectivity of chimeras. In the first place, it must be said that, as opposed to various black scenarios, we are currently not creating beings with human intelligence trapped in animals’ bodies. However, experiments that improve the intellectual abilities of chimeras are taking place now. In one research paper, verifying the impact of implementing human neurons to an animal brain, it was outlined that only one of 150 experiments analysed improved mouse intellect27, but already in 2019 the results of an experiment were published, proving that, after changing just one gene to a human gene, rhesus macaques started to manifest better short-term memory and enhanced reflexes28. It is reasonable to think about the implications of humanising chimeras. First of all, there is the necessary question – whether and how a better intellect affects the status of an animal? The concept of better treatment to primates is nothing new, as evidenced by movements like The Nonhuman Rights Project. At the heart of this concept lies the mental similarity of the mentioned group of animals to humans. In this case, I would like to propose using one of the following concepts – axiological and descriptive – though these are general concepts, not strictly related to the context of chimeras, as pointed out by Bartosz Brożek29. The axiological concept has its roots in the philoso26 “Japanese Scientists Plan to Create Human-Mouse Hybrids. Here’s How,” Live Science, accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.livescience.com/66071-human-animal-hybrid-embryos.html. 27 Andrew T. Crane, Joseph P. Voth, Francis X. Shen, and Walter C. Low, “Concise Review: Human-Animal Neurological Chimeras: Humanized Animals or Human Cells in an Animal?” Stem Cells 37, no. 4 (2019): 444-52. 28 Shi, Luo, Jiang, Chen, Liu, Hu, Li, Lin, Li, Huang, Wang, Niu, Shi, Styner, Wang, Lu, Sun, Yu, Weizhi, and Su, “Transgenic rhesus,” 480–493. 29 Bartosz Brożek, “The Troublesome Person” in Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn, ed. Visa Kurki, Tomasz Pietrzykowski (Cham: Springer, 2017), 7. 535 Szymon Bokota phy of Thomas Aquinas and was developed by Immanuel Kant and NeoKantianism. The axiological concept identifies a human being as the bearer of values itself. A human is a human, regardless of his intellectual abilities, or even a lack of them. The descriptive concept, originating in the writing of John Locke and continued, for example, by Peter Singer, associates the status of a person with certain mental abilities. In this view we can discuss whether a nonhuman being with adequate intellectual attributes can be or even must be considered as a person. The preferred concept will likely affect our views on chimeras as subjects. From a legal perspective, recent decades have shown signs of great progress that have resulted in various pieces of legislation by drawing attention to animal rights, the allowable form of experiments and the criminalisation of cruelty towards animals. A good example is an Argentinian ruling30 that granted at least partial freedom and the status of a subject of law for a chimpanzee, or the Swiss Constitution31, which contains rules about animals. Nevertheless, those rules do not include solutions for subjects that transcend the world of people and the world of animals. Chimeras with human intelligence (or an intelligence close to human) should in the future be considered carefully by legislators, because it seems wrong to treat them as animals. Then again, it is also hard to grant them human subjectivity without any doubts. The problem of unclear moral status of chimeras is reflected in arguments against creating these entities. What arguments are used against experiments that are aimed at creating chimeras with a closer resemblance to humans? Arguments developed out of disgust32 play an important role – they are connected to the belief that an ethical conviction can be motivated by an aversion. That aversion is rooted in the imagination of the shape of a chimera (being visually somewhere between a man and animal) and the assumption that human DNA, due to status of being human, should not be fused with any other DNA. A further argument is connected with the issue already raised – that the status of chimera with mental abilities that are close to human abilities is enigmatic. Even without discussing the proper legal status of a mentally human-like chimera, ethics requires that the permissibility of experiment- 30 FILE NO. P-72.254/15 Translation is available here, accessed 3, March 2020: https://www.nonhumanrights.org/content/uploads/Chimpanzee-Cecilia_translation-FINAL-for-website-2.pdf. 31 Article 80 of Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999 32 Huther, “Chimeras,” 60. 536 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ing and potentially killing a being with traits of human intellectual be at least considered carefully33. In the context of the subjectivity of a human-animal organism, it is worth giving a thought to the criteria of classifying a chimera as transcending the borders of animal status and the modern possibilities of achieving this classification. Doubts originating from these experiments largely arise from the understanding that we are considering the possibility of creating an organism that perceives the world in a human-like way, is able to reflect or has similar emotional states, but is not human. At the same time, the classification of an intelligent chimera as an animal would be unfair. A good clue is the consciousness of a human-animal organism34, but how can we measure whether the subjectivity of a chimera is close to that of human consciousness – by examining the short-term memory of modified rhesus macaques? The current state of knowledge in the field of biology has still not established why our consciousness works the way it does35 – it seems that we do not have objective tools to make that kind of verification on chimeras. In addition, this issue has many other unrecognised aspects. On the one hand, the animals that are the objects of experiments have smaller skulls and a shorter gestation period, so their brain cannot become quasi-human. On the other hand, in the future it may be possible to override this obstacle36. When it comes to my own intuitions, I would follow the foundations of the Nonhuman Rights Project mentioned above. The goal of the movement is to grant those animals that most resemble humans the status of a subject of law, which would result in, for example, respect for their physical integrity. The treatment of chimeras with quasi-human intelligence as being entitled to freedom or physical integrity is, in my opinion, a minimum. However, another aspect to this is the fact that chimeras are created in order to be experimented on – even the purpose for which they are created seems to go against granting them a higher status than other animals. In this situation, it appears to be the most appropriate simply not to create chimeras with intelligence close to human intelligence. Leaving aside the current impossibility of breeding beings with that level of intelligence, it is 33 Julian J. Koplin, and Julian Savulescu, „Time to rethink the law on part-human chimeras,” Journal of Law and the Biosciences 6, no. 1 (2019): 44. 34 Bourret, Martinez, Vialla, Giquel, Thonnat-Marin, and Vos, “Human–animal chimeras,” 4. 35 Julian J. Koplin, and Dominic Wilkinson „Moral uncertainty and the farming of human-pig chimeras,” Journal of Medical Ethic 45, no. 7 (2019): 440. 36 Robert Streiffer „Chimeras, Moral Status, and Public Policy: Implications of the Abortion Debate for Public Policy on Human/Nonhuman Chimera Research,” Journal of law, medicine & ethics 38, no. 2 (2010): 240. 537 Szymon Bokota hard to find any rationale to develop an organism like this. In the case of the chimeras created to date, we can weigh up the values – we are creating organism in order to achieve a medical solution. To create chimeras with humanlike mental abilities, there are no grounds other than simple curiosity. Curiosity does not justify such far-reaching experiments. However, it should be remembered that, in the future, science may justify the creation of this type of chimera – it is for that reason that the subjectivity of chimeras should be analysed in depth right now. 4. CHIMERA AS SUFFERING BEING The last of the aspects that I want to discuss is the chimera as a suffering animal. Directives covering experiments on animals, like the 3R Rule – Replacement, Reduction, Refinement – appear to be exceptionally important when we are creating chimeras. In the case of the experimental animal, we assume the potential suffering of this being. In the case of a chimera, a human-animal organism, on numerous occasions is already born with a sentence to a number of flaws, such as various deformities or dysfunctions. A great example of this is Beltsville pigs37. These animals were modified by human growth hormone. After this enhancement, they suffered from problems with eyes and skin and with chronic arthritic pain, to name just a few of their sicknesses. A similar situation is noted in the case of pigs that would be donors of organs for human patients. Every increase in the amount of human gene in chimeras also increases the chance of painful mutations. Because of the considerable integration in their genes, these pigs would live for a short time and would suffer from many side effects38. An identically drastic case is the already mentioned oncomouse. This organism, which was modified to examine human cancers, is inevitably at the risk of a fast and painful end, balanced against the advancement of medicine after the experiment. However, I would like to draw attention to the fact that a comparable fate is faced by vast numbers of animals bred for human consumption. They are modified by hormones, the perspective of a natural death is denied them, and they are placed in conditions that negate any form of dignity. Questions about the suffering of chimeras are similar to questions about the suffering of 37 Sebastian Porsdam Mann, Rosa Sun, and Göran Hermerén, “A framework for the ethical assessment of chimeric animal research involving human neural tissue,” BMC Medical Ethics 20, no. 1 (2019): 6. 38 Paula Casal, and Andrew Williams, „Human iPSC-Chimera Xenotransplantation and the Non-Identity Problem,” Journal of clinical medicine 8, no. 1 (2019): 6-7. 538 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova livestock. Both are modified in full awareness of their pain and quick death for human benefit. It is a very universal question – how man should treat animals, not only chimeras. A separate topic from breeding chimeras is the creation of a human-animal organism with a mentality different from other animals. Indeed, it bonds with the previously discussed problem of subjectivity, but I would like to underline the implications from the perspective of an animal. The suffering of a chimeric being seems to be stronger than in the case of the chimeras described in the previous two paragraphs, even if we still consider that being as simply an animal. A change in the perception of the world – a larger awareness of imprisonment, not only in the laboratory, but also in a being’s own body – may lead to other questions about how to treat that being. As Streiffer rightly points out, modifying chimeras by implementing human genes can improve their moral status, because their perception of the world and ability to think will become closer to ours. As a result, Streiffer proposes a short “Moral Status Framework” for experiments on chimeras: a. “What effects would the introduction of human material into an animal need to have to be status-enhancing?” b. “Which research, if any, would have those effects?” c. “Under what conditions is status-enhancing research morally permissible?” d. “Which research satisfies those conditions?”39 So the question is: when does the moral status become higher? I do not think that it happens when a chimera has only a minimal number of human cells. In my opinion, that ends discussion about higher moral status beings like oncomouse or pigs destined to become organ donors. However, are rhesus macaques with better short-term memory close enough to humans to elevate their moral status? In these cases, it seems reasonable to rely on the precautionary principle, which is known from ethics. The potential harmful consequences of experiments increasing intelligence, even if it is only a slight improvement in shortterm memory, should be a deciding factor for research like this. Experiments centred upon interference in the brain must be solidly justified, and if interference will change intelligence, then the animal should be treated with more respect, for example any painful experiments should be stopped. In addition, 39 Streiffer „Chimeras, Moral Status, and Public Policy,” 240. 539 Szymon Bokota we must remember that the creation of human-animal beings is developing very fast – in 1988 we had oncomouse, in 2001 we had a fusion of an egg cell of a rabbit and a human skin cell (which was hugely controversial40), in 2017 we started to believe in organs for human patients from animal donors, and 2019 gave us more intelligent rhesus macaques. There is an immediate need to exploring the connotations between suffering, the subjectivity of chimera and moral status. 5. CONCLUSIONS a. Chimeras are created to achieve specific scientific objectives. They are useful for developing medicine in various fields, such as diagnostics or examining the mechanisms of diseases. In the future, they may play an important role as a source of organs that would be transplantable to human bodies. However, regulations do not allow full freedom to mix human and animal cells – which can be explained through concepts like human dignity or the problem of a chimera as a subject. It results in significant limitations. The effectiveness of these limitations may be questionable, because scientists can simply move their research to more liberal countries. b. While current chimeras are very far away from humans in terms of intelligence, it is possible to note those experiments that interfere with their mental abilities. It raises questions about their subjectivity, especially as the law has still not created a category of subjects other than people, or animals (a view presented mostly in the doctrine), or organisational units like legal persons. It hard to specify criteria that would answer the question of when a chimera has a higher moral status than an ordinary animal, but I think we can use two concepts: • axiological concept, where only humans are persons (by the way, Streiffer theoretically, although briefly, mentions the possibility of a situation where a chimera is granted the status of a human41), • descriptive concept, where the status of a person is granted after establishing some mental criteria, regardless of being human in a biological perspective. 40 Joy Yueyue Zhang, “Is the cosmopolitanization of science emerging in China?” Études Internationales 41, no. 4 (2010):571-95. 41 Streiffer „Chimeras, Moral Status, and Public Policy,” 240. 540 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova c. Chimeras, due to their modified genome, are predestined to a short and painful life. Often with premeditation, chimeras are created to suffer from human diseases, which is useful for research on these diseases. I consider it as similar moral burden to breeding livestock in undignified conditions. The situation becomes even more complicated with the possibility of developing beings with enhanced intelligence – one of determinants of getting closer to humans. I am against experiments involving the intelligence of chimeras, or at the very least using the precautionary principle. The benefits from creating more intelligent chimeras must be very high to even consider creating a being that would suffer in a way that is closer to human. Moral status, and therefore the scale of suffering, only increases with interference in the mentality of a chimera, not to mention the suffering of other, non-intellectually enhanced chimeras. BIBLIOGRAPHY: 1. Abouna, George. “Organ Shortage Crisis: Problems and Possible Solutions.” Transplantation Proceedings 40 no. 1 (2008): 34-8. 2. Bonnicksen, Andrea. Chimeras, Hybrids and Interspecies Research. Politics and policymaking. Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2009. 3. Bourret, Rodolphe et al. “Human–animal chimeras: ethical issues about farming chimeric animals bearing human organs.” Stem Cell Research & Therapy 7, no. 1 (2016): 1-7. 4. Brożek, Bartosz. “The Troublesome Person.” In Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn, edited by Visa Kurki, Tomasz Pietrzykowski, 3-13. Cham: Springer, 2017. 5. Casal, and Williams. „Human iPSC-Chimera Xenotransplantation and the Non-Identity Problem.” Journal of clinical medicine 8 no. 1 (2019): 1-13. 6. Crane, Voth, Shen, and Low. “Concise Review: Human-Animal Neurological Chimeras: Humanized Animals or Human Cells in an Animal?” Stem Cells 37, no. 4 (2019): 444-52. 7. Creating organs for transplants is necessary, but it shouldn’t have ethical costs,” The Hill, accessed March 3, 2020, https://thehill.com/opinion/ healthcare/459231-creating-organs-for-transplants-is-necessary-but-itshouldnt-have-ethical. 541 Szymon Bokota 8. De Los Angeles, Alejandro et al. “Generating Human Organs via Interspecies Chimera Formation: Advances and Barriers.” Yale Jorunal of Biology and Medicine 91, no. 3 (2018): 333-342. 9. Greely, Henry. “Defining Chimeras...and Chimeric Concerns.” The American Journal of Bioethics 3, no 3 (2003): 17-20. 10. Hanahan, Wagner, and Palmiter. “The origins of oncomice: a history of the first transgenic mice genetically engineered to develop cancer.” Genes & Development 21 (2007): 2258–70. 11. https://www.livescience.com/66071-human-animal-hybrid-embryos.html. 12. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2017/01/human-pig-hybridembryo-chimera-organs-health-science/ 13. Huther, Constanze. “Chimeras. The Ethics of Creating Human-Animal Interspecifics.” PhD diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2009. 14. Julian J. Koplin, and Dominic Wilkinson. „Moral uncertainty and the farming of human-pig chimeras.” Journal of Medical Ethic 45, no. 7 (2019): 440-446. 15. Julian J. Koplin, and Julian Savulescu. „Time to rethink the law on part-human chimeras.” Journal of Law and the Biosciences 6, no. 1 (2019): 37-50. 16. Kozhevnikova, Magdalena. “Człowieko-zwierzęce hybrydy i chimery w nauce. Historia i współczesność.” Lud 100, no. C (2016): 185-208. 17. Kuře, Josef. “Etymological background and further clarifying remarks concerning chimeras and hybrids.” In CHIMBIRDS: Chimeras and Hybrids in Comparative European and International Research, edited by Jochen Taupitz, Marion Weschka, 7-20. Berlin: Springer, 2009. 18. Live Science. “Japanese Scientists Plan to Create Human-Mouse Hybrids. Here’s How.” Accessed March 3, 2020. 19. Lu, Zhou, Ju, and Chen, “Human-animal chimeras for autologous organ transplantation: technological advances and future perspectives.” Annals of translational medicine 7, no. 20 (2019): 1. 20. Macelo Nogueira et al. “State of the Art on Animal Embryonic Chimeras.” Trends in Developmental Biology 13, no. 7 (2013): 105-112. 21. Mann, Sun, and Hermerén. “A framework for the ethical assessment of chimeric animal research involving human neural tissue.” BMC Medical Ethics 20, no. 1 (2019): 1-9. 22. National Geographic. “Human-Pig Hybrid Created in the Lab—Here Are the Facts.“ accessed March 6, 2020. 23. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. „Data,”. Accessed March 3, 2020. https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data. 542 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 24. Pietrzykowski, Tomasz. “The Idea of Non-personal Subjects of Law.” In Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn, edited by Visa Kurki, Tomasz Pietrzykowski, 49-67. Cham: Springer, 2017. 25. Shi, Lei et al. “Transgenic rhesus monkeys carrying the human MCPH1 gene copies show human-like neoteny of brain development.” National Science Review 6, no. 3 (2019): 480–93. 26. Streiffer, Robert. „Chimeras, Moral Status, and Public Policy: Implications of the Abortion Debate for Public Policy on Human/Nonhuman Chimera Research.” Journal of law, medicine & ethics 38, no. 2 (2010): 238-250. 27. Walsh, Nicole et al. “Humanized mouse models of clinical disease.” Annual Review of Pathology 12 (2017): 187-215. 28. Wu, Jun et al. “Interspecies Chimerism with Mammalian Pluripotent Stem Cells.” Cell 168, no. 3 (2017): 473-86. 29. Zhang, Joy Yueyue. “Is the cosmopolitanization of science emerging in China?” Études Internationales 41, no. 4 (2010): 571-95. 543 Review paper UDK ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE VERSUS THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY Wojciech Panek1 Doctoral School of University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland) Abstract: The paper refers to the relation between Artificial Intelligence and the right to privacy from the perspective of fundamental privacy-related judgments issued by the European Court of Human Rights. The author starts off by briefly describing examples of new technologies that represent current trends. Then he analyses selected judgments of European Court of Human Rights. In conclusion, the author describes the relation between Artificial Intelligence and the right to privacy, and looks at the consequences of that relation. Key words: ECtHR, the right to privacy, AI, new technologies, 1. INTRODUCTION It is estimated that, by 2025, around 463 exabytes of data will be created every day2. Where will they come from? Probably most of the data will come from well-developed new technologies, the development of which is supported especially in connection with Artificial Intelligence (hereinafter: AI). From the very beginning, it was obvious that AI would have a huge influence on the development of IT3 – to use a very general term. This prediction seems to be accurate. It is enough to take a look at the examples below. From among all the new technologies solutions-services, I have chosen three, due to their advancement and popularity. The first is Faception. This Israeli program predicts people’s characteristics and then profiles them using only their facial image4. To do this, the program must be provided with a facial image – which might come from various sources, including live video – which is 1 MA 2 ‘A Day in Data Infographic’, Raconteur, March 2019, https://www.raconteur.net/infographics/a-day-in-data. 3 Avron Barr and Edward A. Feigenbaum, Handbook of Artificial Intelligence Volume 1, 1st edition (Los Altos, Calif.: Kaufmann, William Inc, 1981), 3. 4 Faception Official Site, accessed 24 March 2020, https://www.faception.com. 545 Wojciech Panek then analysed by a program based on machine learning to reveal the subject’s characteristics5. The second is the commercial use of DNA. This kind of service allows an individual to obtain insight into his origins and expand his genealogical knowledge6. It also reveals plenty of information about health7, including diet tips8. Using an individual’s DNA sample, the service provider creates a report that is stored online9. Such a report can then be used in another service, i.e. to compare results with other users10. The third example being looked at is the Social Credit System (hereinafter: SCS). Work on this advanced Chinese system officially began in 201411. The AI-based system aims to give every Chinese citizen a credit score12. To do this, the system must be provided with a sufficient amount of appropriate data concerning an individual – from shopping habits to social media activity13. Because work on the system has not yet finished, the kind and amount of data is still expanding, i.e. on data from public monitoring devices14. When justifying my selection of these examples, I looked at their popularity. This popularity means, in my opinion, that the examples consist of all new technologies currently trending, and which might be found in most services or devices that people are using.15 For every such element, repercussions on an individual’s privacy are inevitable. This relation – to be more specific – its nature, will be the subject of interest in this paper. I would like to refer to this relation from the perspective of European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) judgments on the right to privacy. The content of the right to the privacy has been widely discussed in the doctrine. Cutting through all the discussion about what privacy is, and what the right to the privacy is, it is enough to say that the privacy “is about choice”16, 5 Faception Official Site, accessed 24 March 2020, https://www.faception.com/our-technology. 6 23andMe Official Site, accessed 30 March 2020, https://www.23andme.com/en-int/dna-ancestry/. 7 Ancestry Official Site, accessed 30 March 2020, https://www.ancestry.com/health. 8 Living DNA Official Site, accessed 30 March 2020, https://livingdna.com/eu/kit/wellbeing-and-ancestry-kit. 9 See – 23andMe, Ancestry and Living DNA official sites. 10 GEDmatch Official Site, accessed 30 March 2020, https://www.gedmatch.com/login1.php. 11 Unofficial translation: Rogier Creemers, ‘Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)’, China Copyright and Media, 14 June 2014, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress. com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/. 12 Sanjay Sharma, Data Privacy and GDPR Handbook, 1 edition (Wiley, 2019), 299. 13 Larry Catá Backer, ‘China’s Social Credit System: Data-Driven Governance for a ‘New Era’, Current History Vol 118, no. 809 (2019): 210. 14 Marianne von Blomberg, ‘The Social Credit System and China’s Rule of Law’, Mapping China Journal, no. 2 (2018): 88; Sharma, Data Privacy and GDPR Handbook, 298. 15 This explains the title of my article, where AI means all new technologies based on – or supported by – AI. 16 Theresa Payton and Ted Claypoole, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: Recognizing Threats, Defending Your Rights, and Protecting Your Family (Lanham ; Boulder ; New York ; Toronto ; Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014), 1. 546 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova because “when your privacy is protected, you are free to choose how much your sensitive information to expose, to whom you will expose it, and, in some cases, how others can use the information.”17 As this paper aims to incite discussion on other privacy-related matters, I have decided to use the most common definition used in the European legal system, an example of which can be found in Article 8 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: the ECHR). This article indicates three basic elements of the right to privacy: the right to respect for one’s private and family life, the right to respect for one’s home and the right to respect for one’s correspondence. In my research, I have been mostly interested in the aspect of protecting personal information, which is perceived as one of the components of a private life.18 This article is divided into three parts. In the first part – ECtHR judgments and the right to privacy – I present the ECtHR’s conclusions on new technologies and their effects on the right to privacy. In the second part – how to comply with Article 8 § 2 of ECHR – I present ECtHR’s thoughts on the legal limitations of the right of privacy. In the last part – conclusions – I describe the nature of relation between AI and privacy, and propose further action. 2. ECTHR JUDGMENTS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY To explain the limitations on the right to privacy with reference to new technologies, I have analysed ECtHR judgments. My choice is based on two factors. Firstly, the selected judgments are crucial for an understanding of the right to privacy in general, but also in accordance with more specific matters. Secondly, the conclusions drawn by the ECtHR have become fundamental guidance for further cases. As a result, for most subsequent privacy-related cases, those conclusions were a crucial element of the ECtHR’s decision-making process and the final decisions themselves. 1. Image – it seems obvious that image is closely connected with privacy. The ECtHR justifies this connection by the fact that the right to privacy covers matters of identity, and image is one of those identifying factors. This means that image “falls within the scope of a private 17 Payton and Claypoole, 3. 18 Lock Tobias, ‘Article 7 of Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union’, in The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, ed. Manuel Kellerbauer, Marcus Klamert, and Jonathan Tomkin (OUP Oxford, 2019), 2116; Leszek Garlicki, ‘Article 8’, in Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności. T. 1, Komentarz Do Artykułów 1-18, ed. Leszek Garlicki, vol. I (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo C. H, Beck, 2010), 508; S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom, No. 30562/04 and 30566/04 (European Court of Human Rights, (Grand Chamber) 4 December 2008) §103. 547 Wojciech Panek life.”19 The basis for such an understanding comes from the amount of information that the image of an individual includes20, and as any information – especially where it refers to an individual – is important, because “the greater the information value for the public, the higher the person’s interest in being protected against its publication.”21 What is more, the ECtHR claims that “the publication of a photograph must (…) in general be considered a more substantial interference with the right to respect for one’s private life than the mere communication of a person’s name.”22 This understanding means that any capture of the image, i.e. a photograph or some other means, must be lawfully obtained and used. However, among all the restrictions about the use of an image, there is one interesting exception, where taking a photograph is not in conflict with the right to privacy. In the case of P.G. and J.H v. The United Kingdom, the ECtHR set out circumstances under which the use of a photograph is also legal. These are: when taken at a public event; where the event takes place in a public place; where the photograph taken is stored on a public file – in that case it related to police files; and where the authorities do not process the gathered data – the photograph – in order to identify the individual23. 2. Monitoring – the situation concerning protection of an image is closely related with monitoring, so the above considerations also apply to monitoring. It seems that the ECtHR distinguishes two situations related to monitoring that are not in conflict with privacy issues. The first is: “monitoring the actions of an individual in a public place using photographic equipment that does not record visual data does not, as such, give rise to an interference with the individual’s private life.”24 The second is monitoring by cameras, located in a public place – the ECtHR gives the examples of shopping centres or police stations – which are observing and recording the people there and it is legal in the context of Article 8 § 1 ECHR, as long as “they serve a legitimate and foreseeable 19 Von Hanover v. Germany, No. 59320/00 (European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) 24 June 2004) §50-51, §53. 20 Von Hanover v. Germany at §59. 21 Von Hanover v. Germany (no.2), No. 40660/08 and 60641/08 (European Court of Human Rights, (Grand Chamber) 7 February 2012) §114. 22 Eerikäinen v. Finland, No. 3514/02 (European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) 10 February 2009) §70. 23 P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom, No. 44787/98 (European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) 25 September 2001) §58. 24 Perry v. The United Kingdom, No. 63737/00 (European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) 17 July 2003) §38. 548 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova purpose.”25 For the matter of secret monitoring, the ECtHR generally claims that the usage of such cameras should be limited, because “(…) that technique is highly intrusive and flouts the right to respect for a private life.”26 This is the case, even though, “(…) the Court is aware of the importance of covert investigative methods for the production of certain types of documentaries.”27 To legitimise such covert investigative methods, including covert monitoring, there must be “adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.”28In the context of these guarantees, one element of which is having a legitimate purpose for the actions, the decision-makers must pay attention to the use of general clauses, in particular in connection with claiming the purpose of national security, where the protection might turn out to be destructive for democracy.29 3. Voice control – technological developments have meant that an individual’s voice is nowadays a privacy-related matter. The ECtHR generally claims that, “since the implementation in practice of measures of secret surveillance of communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned, or the public at large, it would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power.”30 Despite typical examples of surveillance of communication, the ECtHR refers to one that seems to be relatively harmless for the right to privacy. This is metering, based on a meter check printer, which captures the numbers dialled on a specified telephone as well as certain technical aspects of the phone conversation, namely the time and duration31. However, “by its very nature, metering is therefore to be distinguished from interception of communications, which is undesirable and illegitimate in a democratic society unless justified. The Court does not accept, however, that the use of data obtained from metering, whatever the circumstances and purposes, cannot give rise to an issue under Article 8. The records of metering contain information, in particular the numbers dialled, which is an integral element in the communications made by telephone.”32 The 25 Perry v. The United Kingdom §40. 26 Bremner v. Turkey, No. 37428/06 (European Court of Human Rights (Second Section) 13 October 2015) §76. 27 Bremner v. Turkey §76. 28 Leander v. Sweden, No. 9248/81 (European Court of Human Rights, (Chamber) 26 March 1987) §60. 29 Leander v. Sweden §60. 30 Malone v. The United Kingdom, No. 8691/79 (European Court of Human Rights, (PLENARY) 2 August 1984) §68. 31 Malone v. The United Kingdom §56. 32 Malone v. The United Kingdom §84. 549 Wojciech Panek solution, if any telephone conversation is to be directly or indirectly monitored in a way that is legal under the principles of the right to privacy, is the existence of legal grounds, and providing the individuals who may be affected with “clear and detailed rules.”33 A similar condition applies when recording a voice sample. This must be considered as coming under the scope of Article 8 § 1 of the ECHR, because processing a voice sample – very often combined with other personal data – allows the individual to be identified34. 4. GPS – despite its popularity, there are not many ECtHR judgments referring to the privacy aspects of GPS. Generally, “in the Court’s view, GPS surveillance is, by its very nature, to be distinguished from other methods of visual or acoustic surveillance, which are generally more easily used to interfere with a person’s right to respect for their private life, because they disclose more information on a person’s conduct, opinions or feelings.”35 5. DNA and fingerprints – for the ECtHR, the relation between DNA and privacy seems to be obvious. This is because cellular samples are source of precise and sensitive data on an individual and – by the uniqueness of the genetic code – the people related to that individual36. As a result, “given the nature and the amount of personal information contained in cellular samples, their retention per se must be regarded as interfering with the right to respect for the private lives of the individuals concerned.”37 Strict requirements in the field of DNA are supported by the fact that, “[…] bearing in mind the rapid pace of developments in the field of genetics and information technology, the Court cannot discount the possibility that in the future the private-life interests bound up with genetic information may be adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated with precision today.”38 However, the ECtHR suggests a different approach to fingerprints on one hand, and cellular samples and DNA profiles on the other hand, as they provide different amounts of information. As a result, the last two categories bring about more of a threat to the individual’s privacy 33 Kruslin v. France, No. 11801/85 (European Court of Human Rights, (PLENARY) 24 April 1990) §33; Kopp v. Switzerland, No. 13/1997/797/1000 (European Court of Human Rights 25 March 1998) §72. 34 P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom §59. 35 Uzun v. Germany, No. 35623/05 (European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section) 2 September 2010) §52. 36 S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom §72. 37 S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom §73. 38 S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom §71. 550 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova in the future.39 However, that does not mean there is no protection for fingerprint data. “The Court is of the view that the general approach taken by the Convention organs in respect of photographs and voice samples should also be followed in respect of fingerprints. […] fingerprints objectively contain unique information about the individual concerned, allowing their identity to be ascertained with precision in a wide range of circumstances.”40 3. HOW TO COMPLY WITH ARTICLE 8 § 2 OF ECHR? I would be tempted to add an additional category to emphasise the ECtHR’s thoughts on compliance with Article 8§2 of ECHR. Article 8 §2 of the ECHR sets out a catalogue of potential legal grounds for interfering with the right to privacy. This category refers directly to matters of compliance with Article 8 § 2 of ECHR, limiting the right to privacy in the context of the new techniques mentioned above. Generally, if rules that limit the right to privacy are to be considered as complaint with Article 8 §2 of the ECHR they must meet the following requirements. “The expression “in accordance with the law”, within the meaning of Article 8 §2, requires firstly that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law; it also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person concerned, who must be able to foresee its consequences for him, and be compatible with the rule of law.”41 “In the Court’s opinion, the following are two of the requirements that flow from the expression ‘prescribed by law’. Firstly, the law must be appropriately accessible: an individual must have an indication that is appropriate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual to regulate his conduct. This means that the individual must be able – with appropriate advice if need be – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences that a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, while certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. 39 S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom §69. 40 S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom §84. 41 Kopp v. Switzerland §55. 551 Wojciech Panek Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms that are vague, to a greater or lesser extent, and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice.”42 In addition, “if individuals are to be protected from arbitrary interference by the authorities with the rights guaranteed under Article 8, a legal framework and very strict limits on such powers are called for.”43 That means that the rules must be appropriate to the situation and effective44; they must protect the individual from an arbitrary infringement of the right to privacy45. As for the matter of limitations on the right to privacy for the purpose of new technologies, “[t]he Court observes that the protection afforded by Article 8 of the Convention would be unacceptably weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques in the criminal-justice system were allowed at any cost, and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private life interests. […] The Court considers that any State claiming a pioneering role in the development of new technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right balance in this regard.”46 The appropriateness is especially relevant in the matter of secrecy, which is an inevitable element of new technologies. The ECtHR claims that covert surveillance is to be carried out without the person-subject being conscious of it47. If so, there must be some rules, “(…) especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated.”48 In this context, the limitation is very often justified as necessary, whereas the ECtHR claims that “(…) the notion of ‘necessity’ implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”49 42 The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, No. 6538/74 (European Court of Human Rights, (PLENARY) 26 April 1979) §49. 43 Camenzind v. Switzerland, No. 136/1996/755/954 (European Court of Human Rights 16 December 1997) §45. 44 Klass and Others v. Germany, No. 5029/71 (European Court of Human Rights, (PLENARY) 6 September 1978) §50. 45 Kopp v. Switzerland §64. 46 S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom §112. 47 Klass and Others v. Germany §55; Leander v. Sweden §51. 48 Kruslin v. France §72. 49 Camenzind v. Switzerland §43; McLeod v. The United Kingdom, No. 72/1997/856/1065 (European Court of Human Rights 23 September 1998) §52. 552 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 4. CONCLUSIONS The aim of this paper is to examine the relation between the right to privacy and AI-based new technologies, with help of ECtHR judgments. Simply comparing the essential description of a selection of new technologies with the fundamental thoughts of the ECtHR, as ascertained from the judgements, would probably be enough to determine the kind of relation the court sees. The technologies Faception, the commercial use of DNA, and SCS are firmly connected with privacy. They are based on collecting various kinds of data in ways that the ECtHR has been called to pass judgement on. The advanced processing of an individual’s image – like in Faception, collection, the further use of DNA data and a profile created on its basis – like in the commercial use of DNA, or credit scoring from various observations of an individual – like in SCS, might all, directly or indirectly, be found in above judgments. If we add to this the fact that in the eyes of the ECtHR, those elements – each of them considered separately – were found to be factors that interfere with the right to privacy,50 the conflict in the relation seems to be obvious. In fact, it is not so obvious. A full and complete answer requires another element to be analysed. All the data processing mentioned above has a huge impact on individuals, and indeed limits the right to privacy. However, every limitation can be made compliant with Article 8§2 of the ECHR under certain circumstances. Over the years, the ECtHR, through its judgments, has created a list of standards that every privacy-complaint activity must comply with. The standards consist of certain more or less specific requirements. The most important one is the existence of a legal basis for each instance of interference. It not only must exist, but must also be precise enough and have proper justification. Answering questions about the quality of the legal basis of the types of new technologies mentioned above is beyond the scope of this paper. However, certain doubts definitely exist.51 To conclude, taking into account the above 50 Of course, in some cases the interference was legal, due to the fact that it was carried out in accordance with the requirements set out under Article 8 §2 of the ECHR. 51 Eric Ravenscraft, ‘How to Protect Your DNA Data Before and After Taking an At-Home Test’, The New York Times, 12 June 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/smarter-living/how-to-protect-your-dna-data.htm l?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article; Gus Lubin, ‘“Facial-Profiling” Could Be Dangerously Inaccurate and Biased, Experts Warn’, Business Insider, 12 October 2016, https://businessinsider.com.pl/international/facial-profiling-could-be-dangerously-inaccurate-and-biased-experts-warn/ppbh2y4; Antonio Regalado, ‘23andMe Sells Data for Drug Search’, MIT Technology Review, 06 2016, https://www.technologyreview. com/s/601506/23andme-sells-data-for-drug-search/; Antonio Regalado, ‘More than 26 Million People Have Taken an At-Home Ancestry Test’, MIT Technology Review, 11 February 2019, https://www.technologyreview. com/s/612880/more-than-26-million-people-have-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test/; Heather Murphy, ‘Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be Identified Through Genealogy Databases’, The New York Times, 11 October 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/science/science-genetic-genealogy-study.html; Heather Murphy, 553 Wojciech Panek considerations, it is well justified to say that there is a possible conflict in the relation between new technologies and the right to privacy. Though what does this mean in practice? Technological developments have already significantly changed our reality, and it seems that it will not stop doing so. As a result, new technologies nowadays affect many different fields, with special impact on our daily lives. One of the consequences of this new reality is a serious change in people’s attitudes towards privacy, which appears to have become less important to them52. This attitude does not explain the possibility of infringing the right to privacy, but it is leading to attempts to find solutions as to how to reconcile those two values. The need to reconcile these is also supported by the fact that the right to privacy protection is both highlighted and weakened without it. It seems clear that reconciliation is essential, because, “where once intrusions into the private sphere seemed exceptional and rare, technology has made them common and mundane.”53 The solution to making this happen might be found in privacy by design. Once thought to be a paradigm54, privacy by design reflects the appropriate attitude towards privacy protection in current times. It tries not to perceive new technologies simply as a threat, but makes it possible – through the activity of the project maker – to bring any new technology project into compliance with the right to privacy55. In my opinion, the ECtHR’s fundamental conclusions allow a kind of test to be created. The test will be applicable to both existing and planned projects. It will set out very precise information about the minimum requirements for privacy-friendly techniques, and will show which actions should be avoided. It will also indicate how to create a proper legal basis that would most likely be compliant with the right to privacy. REFERENCES: 1. Raconteur. ‘A Day in Data Infographic’, March 2019. https://www.raconteur. net/infographics/a-day-in-data. ‘What You’re Unwrapping When You Get a DNA Test for Christmas’, The New York Times, 22 December 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/science/dna-testing-kit-present.html. 52 William A. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary, 1 edition (OUP Oxford, 2015), 359. 53 Schabas, 359. 54 Wojciech R. Wiewiórowski, ‘“Privacy by Design’’ as a Paradigm for Privacy Protection”’, in Internet. PrawnoInformatyczne Problemy Sieci, Portali i e-Usług., ed. Grazyna Szpor and Wojciech R. Wiewiórowski (Waeszawa: Wydawnictwo C. H, Beck, 2012), 13–30. 55 Wiewiórowski, 27. 554 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 2. Backer, Larry Catá. ‘China’s Social Credit System: Data-Driven Governance for a ‘New Era’. Current History Vol 118, no. 809 (2019): 209–14. 3. Barr, Avron, and Edward A. Feigenbaum. Handbook of Artificial Intelligence Volume 1. 1st edition. Los Altos, Calif.: Kaufmann, William Inc, 1981. 4. Blomberg, Marianne von. ‘The Social Credit System and China’s Rule of Law’. Mapping China Journal, no. 2 (2018): 78–113. 5. Bremner v. Turkey, No. 37428/06 (European Court of Human Rights (Second Section) 13 October 2015). 6. Camenzind v. Switzerland, No. 136/1996/755/954 (European Court of Human Rights 16 December 1997). 7. Creemers, Rogier. ‘Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)’. China Copyright and Media, 14 June 2014. https:// chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-forthe-construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/. 8. Eerikäinen v. Finland, No. 3514/02 (European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) 10 February 2009). 9. Garlicki, Leszek. ‘Article 8’. In Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności. T. 1, Komentarz Do Artykułów 1-18, edited by Leszek Garlicki, Vol. I. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo C. H, Beck, 2010. 10. Klass and Others v. Germany, No. 5029/71 (European Court of Human Rights, (PLENARY) 6 September 1978). 11. Kopp v. Switzerland, No. 13/1997/797/1000 (European Court of Human Rights 25 March 1998). 12. Kruslin v. France, No. 11801/85 (European Court of Human Rights, (PLENARY) 24 April 1990). 13. Leander v. Sweden, No. 9248/81 (European Court of Human Rights, (Chamber) 26 March 1987). 14. Lubin, Gus. ‘“Facial-Profiling” Could Be Dangerously Inaccurate and Biased, Experts Warn’. Business Insider, 12 October 2016. https://businessinsider. com.pl/international/facial-profiling-could-be-dangerously-inaccurate-andbiased-experts-warn/ppbh2y4. 15. Malone v. The United Kingdom, No. 8691/79 (European Court of Human Rights, (PLENARY) 2 August 1984). 16. McLeod v. The United Kingdom, No. 72/1997/856/1065 (European Court of Human Rights 23 September 1998). 17. Murphy, Heather. ‘Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be Identified Through Genealogy Databases’. The New York Times, 11 October 2018. https://www. nytimes.com/2018/10/11/science/science-genetic-genealogy-study.html. 555 Wojciech Panek 18. ———. ‘What You’re Unwrapping When You Get a DNA Test for Christmas’. The New York Times, 22 December 2019. https://www.nytimes. com/2019/12/22/science/dna-testing-kit-present.html. 19. Payton, Theresa, and Ted Claypoole. Privacy in the Age of Big Data: Recognizing Threats, Defending Your Rights, and Protecting Your Family. Lanham ; Boulder ; New York ; Toronto ; Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014. 20. Perry v. The United Kingdom, No. 63737/00 (European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) 17 July 2003). 21. P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom, No. 44787/98 (European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) 25 September 2001). 22. Ravenscraft, Eric. ‘How to Protect Your DNA Data Before and After Taking an At-Home Test’. The New York Times, 12 June 2019. https://www.nytimes. com/2019/06/12/smarter-living/how-to-protect-your-dna-data.html?action =click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article. 23. Regalado, Antonio. ‘23andMe Sells Data for Drug Search’. MIT Technology Review, 06 2016. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601506/23andmesells-data-for-drug-search/. 24. ———. ‘More than 26 Million People Have Taken an At-Home Ancestry Test’. MIT Technology Review, 11 February 2019. https://www.technologyreview. com/s/612880/more-than-26-million-people-have-taken-an-at-homeancestry-test/. 25. S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom, No. 30562/04 and 30566/04 (European Court of Human Rights, (Grand Chamber) 4 December 2008). 26. Schabas, William A. The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary. 1 edition. OUP Oxford, 2015. 27. Sharma, Sanjay. Data Privacy and GDPR Handbook. 1 edition. Wiley, 2019. 28. The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, No. 6538/74 (European Court of Human Rights, (PLENARY) 26 April 1979). 29. Tobias, Lock. ‘Article 7 of Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union’. In The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, edited by Manuel Kellerbauer, Marcus Klamert, and Jonathan Tomkin, 2428. OUP Oxford, 2019. 30. Uzun v. Germany, No. 35623/05 (European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section) 2 September 2010). 31. Von Hanover v. Germany, No. 59320/00 (European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) 24 June 2004). 32. Von Hanover v. Germany (no.2), No. 40660/08 and 60641/08 (European Court of Human Rights, (Grand Chamber) 7 February 2012). 556 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 33. Wiewiórowski, Wojciech R. ‘“Privacy by Design’’ as a Paradigm for Privacy Protection”’. In Internet. Prawno-Informatyczne Problemy Sieci, Portali i e-Usług., edited by Grazyna Szpor and Wojciech R. Wiewiórowski, 13–30. Waeszawa: Wydawnictwo C. H, Beck, 2012. 34. Faception Official Site. Accessed 24 March 2020. https://www.faception.com. 35. Faception Official Site. Accessed 24 March 2020. https://www.faception.com/ our-technology. 36. 23andMe Official Site. Accessed 30 March 2020. https://www.23andme.com/ en-int/dna-ancestry/. 37. Ancestry Official Site. Accessed 30 March 2020. https://www.ancestry.com/ health. 38. Living DNA Official Site. Accessed 30 March 2020. https://livingdna.com/ eu/kit/wellbeing-and-ancestry-kit. 39. GEDmatch Official Site. Accessed 30 March 2020. https://www.gedmatch. com/login1.php. 557 Original scientific paper UDK USE OF PROTECTED CONTENT BY ONLINE CONTENT-SHARING SERVICE PROVIDERS Njegoslav Jović1 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Abstract: Online content-sharing services providing access to a large amount of copyright-protected content uploaded by their users. Although they enable diversity and ease of access to content, they also generate challenges when copyrightprotected content is uploaded without prior authorisation from rightholders. Online content-sharing service providers perform an act of communication to the public or of making available to the public when they give the public access to copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter uploaded by their users. Consequently, online content-sharing service providers should obtain an authorisation, including via a licensing agreement, from the relevant rightholders. Online content-sharing service provider does not include service providers such as open source software development and sharing platforms, not-for-profit scientific or educational repositories as well as not-for-profit online encyclopedias. The steps taken by online content-sharing service providers in cooperation with rightholders should not lead to the prevention of the availability of non-infringing content, including works or other protected subject matter the use of which is covered by a licensing agreement, or an exception or limitation to copyright and related rights. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether EU regulations, in particular the current Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC provide an effective balance between the interests of service providers, on the one hand, and the interests of the copyright holder, on the other. Keywords: Copyright, digitization, service providers, online content-sharing, internet 1 LL.M., Senior Assistant 559 Njegoslav Jović 1. INTRODUCTION Using the Internet has changed the way we consume and exploit content such as music, movies, works of literature and other content. Most of this content is copyrighted. The transition from analogue to digital has made it easier to exploit those content. Duplication costs are very low and copy quality is identical to the original. All this has undoubtedly led to the development of innovation. Content access is almost completely available on various platforms that offer content sharing services on the Internet. Searching through Google or another search engine can access these works. Internet search engines work by linking questions, that is, words that we enter into the search box and web site indexes. WebCrawler was the first web browser to perform full text searches and work by crawling the web, copying web pages, and indexing their content. Every major search engine today uses some type of search engine to navigate from one site to another over the internet by copying web pages. Once copied, these texts were then analyzed and indexed.2 In this way, copyrighted works shared by users are made available to an unlimited number of people and copyright holders cannot control their duplication and access to them. However, the question arises as to whether and how much damage is caused to the publication of copyright works on various platforms by service users. Due to the massive amount of copyrighted work and related rights on the internet, users who share content are generally more difficult to disclose or not to disclose at all. In such situations, the question of the responsibility of the content sharing service provider, ie the internet service provider, is raised. In the case of posting infringing content, content sharing providers, as intermediaries, have the ability to block access to such content. However, blocking access to content is often not sufficient as the content has already been multiplied. The resulting damage cannot be compensated by the copyright holder. European Union adopted Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/ EC3, which in Article 17 regulated the use of proprietary content by content sharing service providers over the Internet. In some countries, the sharing of content online and the responsibility of service providers are left to the courts. 2 Matthew Sag, “The New Legal Landscape for Text Mining and Machine Learning,“ Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 66, no. 1 (2019): 304-305, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3331606. 3 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, OJ L 130, 17.5.2019. 560 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 2. ONLINE CONTENT-SHARING SERVICES PROVIDERS AND EXPLOITATION OF COPYRIGHT Markets are gradually adapting to e-commerce in goods and services. In recent years, the Internet and social networks have contributed to the functioning of the Internet content market taking precedence over the classic form of buying and selling in the market. Online content sharing services that provide access to a large amount of copyrighted content uploaded by their users have become a major source of access to content on the Internet. Internet services are a way of giving wider access to cultural and creative works and offer the cultural and creative industries great opportunities to develop new business models. However, while they allow for diversity and ease of access to content, they also bring challenges when copyrighted content is uploaded without the prior permission of the copyright holder. There is legal uncertainty as to whether the providers of these services perform copyright-relevant actions and whether they require the approval of content owners uploaded by their users who do not have the necessary rights to the uploaded content, without prejudice to the exceptions and limitations provided by law. This uncertainty affects the right holder’s ability to determine whether their acts and other objects of protection are being used and under what conditions, and their ability to obtain appropriate compensation for such use.4 Every day, through social networks and platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and similar social networks, users upload and share various copyrighted and they do not pay any royalties. Directive (EU) 2019/790 was adopted with the aim of protecting authors and enabling them to be compensated for copyrighted works on which online platforms such as YouTube, Google and Facebook make money. In protecting authors, the purpose of Directive (EU) 2019/790 is also not to restrict the freedom to share and exchange information on the Internet. Online content-sharing service provider means a provider of an information society service of which the main or one of the main purposes is to store and give the public access to a large amount of copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter uploaded by its users, which it organises and promotes for profit-making purposes.5 A key element is making a profit of any kind. If the customer service is free of charge and the content sharing 4 See recital 61 Directive (EU) 2019/790. See Njegoslav Jović, “Uticaj digitalizacije na razvoj autorskog prava u Evropskoj uniji,“ Review of European Law XXI, no. 1-3 (2019): 90. 5 Article 2 (1) (6) Directive (EU) 2019/790. 561 Njegoslav Jović service provider rewards advertising, such service is basically economic, because there is still a profit. The revenue generated by content sharing service providers and copyright holders significantly deviates in favor of the service provider and is referred to as the “difference in value”.6 For this reason, Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 seeks to ensure a fair distribution of revenue between content sharing service providers and rightsholders. The assessment of whether an online content-sharing service provider stores and gives access to a large amount of copyright-protected content should be made on a case-by-case basis and should take account of a combination of elements, such as the audience of the service and the number of files of copyright-protected content uploaded by the users of the service.7 In practice, there will be problems in applying this definition. Giving access to the public can also be unclear. Many platforms e.g. Dropbox, Google Drive, allow registered users to share public links to specified files. Indeed, a great many number of platforms offer a combination of private, semiprivate, and public access to works. Their obligations – or lack thereof – need to be clarified in each regard.8 The use will constitute an action of communication to the public if two cumulative conditions are met. They are an “act of communication” made in “public.”9 Online content-sharing service provider under Directive (EU) 2019/790 performs an act of communication to the public or an act of making available to the public when it gives the public access to copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter uploaded by its users.10 Under the WIPO Copyright Treaty, right of communication to the public as an exclusive right, authors shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.11 This definition of the right of communication to the public and the 6 See more in Giuseppe Colangelo and Mariateresa Maggiolino, “ISPs’ Copyright Liability in the EU Digital Single Market Strategy,” International Journal of Law and Information Technology 26, no. 2 (2018): 142-159, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eay005. 7 Recital 63 Directive (EU) 2019/790. 8 EuroISPA, “Position paper on the proposal for a directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market,“ Available at: https://www.euroispa.org/wp-content/uploads/EuroISPA_Copryight-Directive_Analysis.pdf. 9 See Christina Angelopoulos and João Pedro Quintais, ”Fixing Copyright Reform, A Better Solution to Online Infringement,“ Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 10, no. 2 (2019): 150. 10 Article 17 Directive (EU) 2019/790. 11 Article 8 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT). 562 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova right to make other objects of protection available to the public also takes over Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 12 and thus entered EU law. In a case known as The Pirate Bay, the European Court of Justice has held that a platform which makes available and manages, by means of indexation of metadata referring to protected works, and the provision of a search engine, which enables users to locate the protected content and share them in context of peer-to-peer network, constitutes a communication to the public.13 The European Court of Justice concluded in the case Svensson and Others vs Retriever, the provision of clickable links to protected works is to be considered as ‘making available’ and thus constitutes an act of communication.14 However, when the content is freely accessible in a web page, the criterion of the new public is not met. This means that sharing a link to the page, where the content originally was lawfully made available, does not constitute an act of communication to the public and does not require authorisation from the right holder. When the situation is the opposite, i.e. a hyperlink enables users to circumvent access restrictions, then the criterion of new public is met, and the provision of clickable links requires an authorisation from the right holder.15 3. ONLINE CONTENT-SHARING SERVICES PROVIDERS WITH A SPECIAL TRETMENT Certain online content-sharing providers do not fall under Directive (EU) 2019/79016 and are exempted. Online content sharing services providers does not include service providers such as non-profit encyclopedias (e.g. Wikipedia), non-profit educational and scientific repositories, open source development and sharing platforms (e.g. GitHub), electronic communications providers, Internet markets (e.g. 12 Article 3 (1) Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L167/10, 22.6.2001. 13 Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, Judgement of the Court 14 June 2017, para. 48. 14 Case C-466/12 Svensson and Others vs Retriever Judgement of the Court 13 February 2014, para. 20. 15 Eetu Huhta, “Copyrights, Online Intermediaries and the EU: SaveYourInternet?: Platform Liability in Light of Article 17 of the Directive of Copyright in Digital Single Market” (Master’s Thesis, Uppsala University, 2019): 20. 16 See article 2 (1) (6) Directive (EU) 2019/790. 563 Njegoslav Jović eBay), cloud services for businesses (e.g. Microsoft OneDrive), and cloud services that allow users to upload content for their own use (e.g., Apple’s iCloud).17 Wikipedia, open access repositories and open source sharing platforms or not covered by this definition, because and to the extent they operate not for profit. Internet access providers and telecom service providers are not covered, because it is not their main purpose to give the public access to a large amount of copyright protected works. Online marketplaces, such as eBay, whose main activity is online retail, are not covered for the same reason.18 These online content sharing service providers do not have the primary purpose of making a profit and the use of someone else’s copyrighted work generally falls within the permitted limitations or exceptions to copyright infringement. Therefore, they are exempted from the strict rules that apply to ordinary service providers operating solely on an economic basis for profit. 4. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ONLINE CONTENTSHARING SERVICES PROVIDERS Prior to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2019/790, the responsibility for online intermediaries for infringing the content of their users was the ECommerce Directive.19 In the development of the Internet, so-called “safe harbors” have been adopted because of possible intermediary responsibility. The internet industry has protested the heavy responsibility of hosting, publishing or transmitting service providers.20 The arguments made for limited ISP liability were basically based on three factors. Firstly, intermediaries did not by that time have effective legal or actual control over the material that was being shared on the internet. Secondly, the imposition of liability on intermediaries would lead to inequity, i.e. it is not appropriate to ‘shoot the mes17 See Sarah Blair and Toby Headdon, “Am I an ‘Online Content Sharing Service Provider’ under Article 17 (formerly Article 13) of the proposed Copyright Directive?,” available at: https://www.lexology.com/library/ detail.aspx?g=6faffa29-bd1e-4e40-908c-277e1b263f95. 18 Dirk Visser, ”Trying to understand the article formerly known as ‘13’ (‘AFKA 13’),“ available at: https:// www.ie-forum.nl/artikelen/dirk-visser-updated-version-of-trying-to-understand-article-13. 19 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), OJ L 178, 17.7.2000. 20 Lilian Edwards, “Role and Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights,” WIPO Study, (2010): 4. 564 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova sengers’. Finally, there was a major public interest concern, especially in the European continent, that extensive intermediary liability would lead to limitations of freedom of expression and freedom of information.21 Internet Service Providers would in general be exempted from all civil and criminal liability with regard to illegal content in their platforms, provided that they act without undue delay when receiving notice about the illegality of the content.22 Within the European Union, the safe harbours where established through the E-Commerce Directive. Articles 12, 13 and 14 in the E-Commerce Directive state that information society service providers are not held liable for mere conduit, hosting or caching of the content if certain conditions are fulfilled. The regime established in E-Commerce Directive applies to information society service providers in general, which include a variety of different online service providers, such as e-merchants, social media platforms and cloud computing services but also e.g. internet access providers.23 The European Court of Justice concluded in case Netlog judgment that service providers who store content with a view to making it available to the public (ie social media platforms) qualify as hosting providers.24 According to Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, the service provider is not responsible for information stored at the request of the service recipient, provided: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.25 Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive establishes a so-called notification and removal procedure. Platforms bear no responsibility for illegal content as long as they act swiftly when they receive notices from copyright holders of content that is illegal or infringes. For copyright holders, the notification and removal system is not effective because it places a burden on the rightholders to monitor the publication of material across platforms and report illegal content, which increases their costs. For these reasons, Directive (EU) 2019/790, in Article 17, paragraph 3, excludes the possibility of invoking safe harbors under Article 14 of the E21 22 23 24 25 Edwards, “Role and Responsibility,” 3. Huhta, “Copyrights, Online Intermediaries,” 22. Huhta, “Copyrights, Online Intermediaries,” 22. Edwards, “Role and Responsibility,” 8. Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, Judgement of the Court 16 February 2012, para. 27. Article 14 (1) Directive 2000/31/EC. 565 Njegoslav Jović Commerce Directive when determining the liability of content sharing service providers falling under it. This is understandable, as online content sharing providers are not passive or neutral to content on the platform, as is the case with Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. For this reason, Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 itself regulates the responsibility of content sharing service providers via the Internet. The responsibility of the copyright infringement platform is determined by national courts, either as a secondary liability or on the basis of an indirect infringement. Platforms can even be held directly responsible for user violations in the light of recent ECJ case-law, but only when the inclusion of the platforms was so significant that they could be considered as self-publishing acts.26 Platforms are required to enter into license agreements with copyright holders to avoid liability for infringement. In practice, platforms will be able to conclude music licenses with collective rights organizations and will share some of the profits from advertising. Right holders of audiovisual works, and in particular films, are unlikely to consent to licensing. A similar situation will be with literary and other works. For some of these works they will be able to obtain licenses and for a part they will be banned by the right holders. Rightsholders who do not wish to enter into license agreements for their works will be required to provide the platforms with relevant and necessary information to enable them to filter and block those works on the platforms. In situations where it is not possible to conclude a license agreement and obtain approval from the rightsholder, content sharing service providers may be released from liability if they prove that: (a) made best efforts to obtain an authorisation, and (b) made, in accordance with high industry standards of professional diligence, best efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works and other subject matter for which the rightholders have provided the service providers with the relevant and necessary information; and in any event (c) acted expeditiously, upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated notice from the rightholders, to disable access to, or to remove from their websites, the notified works or other subject matter, and made best efforts to prevent their future uploads.27 Platforms that do not act on the notice of the right holder and do not follow high sectoral standards of professional attention 26 Giancarlo Frosio, “Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European Digital Single Market Strategy,” Northwestern University Law Review 112 (February 2017): 37. 27 Article 17 (4) Directive (EU) 2019/790. 566 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova will be held liable for copyright infringement. They should have technology that filters content that users place online and identifies infringing content. However, the Directive itself emphasizes that there should be no general obligation to monitor. Content filtering is optional. In the case Netlog, where a copyright association required a social media platform Netlog to implement content-filtering technologies, the ECJ ruled that EU law precludes requiring a hosting service provider to install a content filtering system that: 1) filters information which is stored on the service providers’ servers by its’ users, 2) which applies indiscriminately to all of those users, 3) as a preventive measure, 4) exclusively at its expense and, 5) for an unlimited period, 6) which is capable of identifying electronic copies containing musical, cinematographic or audio-visual works.28 However, the Court took a different view in the case UPC Telekabel.29 In light of the new regulations, content filtering is not prohibited. Filtering technology is used mainly by larger platforms. New platforms that have been on the market for less than three years and have a turnover of up to a maximum of € 10 million have a lighter responsibility and it is imperative that they do everything in their power to conclude a license agreement with the rights holders. On the contrary, larger platforms must do everything in their power to prevent the sharing of unauthorized content. This will lead to some kind of monitoring and filtering, blocking access to certain content, as well as removing it. Content recognition technology has already been adopted by many platforms on a voluntary basis. YouTube has thus introduced Content ID technology that allows it to be filtered. This technology is extremely expensive to develop, implement and maintain. YouTube’s Content ID technology cost a reported $ 50 million for R&D.30 There are two main types of technology for „fingerprinting“ and „watermarking“. The first one relies on databases of all fingerprinted content against which every newly uploaded piece of content is checked. If a match is made, the new content is removed or access to it is blocked. The second one works the opposite way. Only content with an imprinted watermark is allowed through the system. To serve their purpose, both technologies require checking all newly uploaded content and comparing it with an existing 28 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, Judgement of the Court 16 February 2012, paras. 26, 49-52. See Huhta, “Copyrights, Online Intermediaries,” 44. 29 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH, Judgement of the Court 27 March 2014, para 49. 30 See EuroISPA, ”Position paper on the proposal for a directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market,“ available at: https://www.euroispa.org/wp-content/uploads/EuroISPA_Copryight-Directive_Analysis.pdf. 567 Njegoslav Jović database. This amounts to installing upload filters by the service providers.31 YouTube uses a “fingerprint”. In addition to content that is illegal and infringing, the use of filtering technology can also remove content that is legally available. Regulations allow access to content for specific purposes and search and filtering technology does not recognize it. The Directive stipulates that cooperation between online content-sharing service providers and rightholders shall not result in the prevention of the availability of works or other subject matter uploaded by users, which do not infringe copyright and related rights, including where such works or other subject matter are covered by an exception or limitation. Users must be allowed to quote, critique, review, use for caricature, parody or pastiche.32 It is undisputed that platforms have the best way to stop copyrighted content from being shared on the Internet. However, filtering content through computer programs without human review will undoubtedly lead to removal of legal content as well. Excessive content filtering will lead to censorship of content by platforms. The directive stipulates that content sharing service providers on the internet must put in place adequate and speedy complaint and redress mechanisms that will be available to service users in the event of disputes concerning the denial of access to, or removal of, acts or other objects of protection. Right-holders must give good reasons for requesting denial of access to their works.33 Out-of-court redress mechanisms established do not deny redress and redress before national courts. 5. CONCLUSION The development of technology and the Internet has led to the need for new regulations that will legally shape the behavior of the entities that apply and use it. Through social networks and platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and similar social networks, users upload and share different content, believing that their behavior is correct. In doing so, they do not take into account at all whether that content is copyrighted and whether they are 31 Aleksandra Kuczerawy, ”EU proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market: Compatibility of Article 13 with the EU intermediary liability regime,“ (January 2019), available at: https://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3309099. 32 See article 17 (7) Directive (EU) 2019/790. 33 See article 17 (9) Directive (EU) 2019/790. 568 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova infringing someone else’s copyright. With such a massive copyright infringement, it is impossible to penalize all primary perpetrators. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the secondary responsibility of content sharing service providers via the Internet. The position of internet content sharing providers has been changing in EU law. They were skillfully trying to avoid liability for copyright infringement. The „Safe Harbor“ was provided to them by Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, which established a notification and removal procedure. Platforms have no liability for illegal content as long as they acted swiftly to receive notices from copyright holders of content that is illegal or infringing. The adoption of Directive (EU) 2019/790 excludes the possibility of invoking ‘safe harbors’ under Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 regulates the responsibility of online content sharing service providers. The adopted Directive defines a content sharing service provider via the internet, separates certain platforms from its implementation and obliges service providers to conclude license agreements with rightsholders. In the event that it is impossible to conclude the license under certain conditions, it allows the platforms to be free from copyright infringement. Otherwise they will be responsible for their violation. Directive (EU) 2019/790 does not contain an exclusive provision which obliges platforms to compulsorily filter and identify content on infringing platforms, but it will undoubtedly lead to an obligation to filter. Without content filtering, large platforms would not be free from liability. The directive in Article 17 contains a lot of ambiguity and imprecision, which is understandable because it is the result of a political compromise. The European Court of Justice will play a significant role, as it will interpret this article through its judgments and clarify contentious issues in its application. REFERENCES Monographs, Articles 1. Angelopoulos, Christina, and João Pedro Quintais. ”Fixing Copyright Reform, A Better Solution to Online Infringement.“ Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 10, no. 2 (2019): 147-172, https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-10-2-2019. 569 Njegoslav Jović 2. Blair, Sarah and Toby Headdon. “Am I an ‘Online Content Sharing Service Provider’ under Article 17 (formerly Article 13) of the proposed Copyright Directive?.” Available at: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail. aspx?g=6faffa29-bd1e-4e40-908c-277e1b263f95. 3. Edwards, Lilian. “Role and Responsibility of internet Intermediaries in the field of Copyright and Related rights.” WIPO Study, (2010): 1-73, https://www.wipo. int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/role_and_responsibility_of_the_ internet_intermediaries_final.pdf. 4. EuroISPA. ”Position paper on the proposal for a directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market.“ Available at: https://www.euroispa.org/wp-content/ uploads/EuroISPA_Copryight-Directive_Analysis.pdf. 5. Frosio, Giancarlo. “Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European Digital Single Market Strategy.” Northwestern University Law Review 112 (February 2017): 19-46, https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2912272. 6. Huhta, Eetu. “Copyrights, Online Intermediaries and the EU: SaveYourInternet?: Platform Liability in Light of Article 17 of the Directive of Copyright in Digital Single Market.” Master’s Thesis, Uppsala University, 2019. 7. Jović, Njegoslav. “Uticaj digitalizacije na razvoj autorskog prava u Evropskoj uniji.“ Review of European Law XXI, no. 1-3 (2019): 85-98. 8. Colangelo, Giuseppe, and Mariateresa Maggiolino. “ISPs’ Copyright Liability in the EU Digital Single Market Strategy.” International Journal of Law and Information Technology 26, no. 2 (2018): 142-159, https://doi.org/10.1093/ ijlit/eay005. 9. Kuczerawy, Aleksandra. ”EU proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market: Compatibility of Article 13 with the EU intermediary liability regime,“ (January 2019) available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=3309099. 10. Sag, Matthew. “The New Legal Landscape for Text Mining and Machine Learning.“ Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 66, no. 1 (2019): 291367, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3331606. 11. Visser, Dirk. ”Trying to understand the article formerly known as ‘13’ (‘AFKA 13’).“ available at: https://www.ie-forum.nl/artikelen/dirk-visser-updatedversion-of-trying-to-understand-article-13. Regulations 12. Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, OJ L 130, 17.5.2019. 570 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 13. Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L167/10, 22.6.2001. 14. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), OJ L 178, 17.7.2000. 15. WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT). 1996. Court practice 16. Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, Judgement of the Court 14 June 2017. 17. Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH, Judgement of the Court 27 March 2014. 18. Case C-466/12 Svensson and Others vs Retriever, Judgement of the Court 13 February 2014. 19. Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, Judgement of the Court 16 February 2012. КОРИШЋЕЊЕ ЗАШТИЋЕНОГ САДРЖАЈА ОД СТРАНЕ ПРУЖАОЦА УСЛУГА ДЈЕЉЕЊА САДРЖАЈА ПУТЕМ ИНТЕРНЕТА Његослав Јовић34 Правни факултет Универзитета у Бањој Луци Апстракт: Услуге дјељења садржаја путем интернета пружају приступ великој количини садржаја заштићеног ауторским правима који су учитали њихови корисници. Иако омогућавају разноликост и лакоћу приступа садржају, они такође стварају изазове када се садржај заштићен ауторским правима преноси без претходног одобрења носиоца права. Пружалац услуга дјељења садржаја на интернету обавља радњу саопштавања јавности или радњу стављања на располагање јавности када јавности даје приступ дјелима заштићеним ауторским правом или 34 Виши асистент, Универзитет у Бањој Луци, Правни факултет, njegoslav.jovic@pf.unibl.org. 571 Njegoslav Jović другим предметима заштите које учитавају њихови корисници. Према томе, пружалац услуга дјељења садржаја путем интернета требало би да добије одобрење од одговарајућих носилаца права, најчешће склапањем уговора о лиценцирању. Пружалац услуга дјељења садржаја на интернету не укључује пружаоце услуга као што су платформе за развој и дијељење отвореног кода, непрофитне научне или образовне базе као и непрофитне интернетске енциклопедије. Мјере које пружаоци услуга дјељења садржаја на интернету предузимају у сарадњи са носиоцима права не би требало да доведу до спречавања доступности садржаја који не крше ауторска права, укључујући дјела или друге предмете заштите чија је употреба обухваћена уговором о лиценцирању или изузетком или ограничењем ауторског и сродних права. Циљ овог рада је истражити да ли су прописи ЕУ, посебно тренутна Директива (ЕУ) 2019/790 Европског парламента и Савета од 17. априла 2019. године о ауторским и сродним правима на јединственом дигиталном тржишту и измени Директиве 96/9/ЕЗ и 2001/29/ЕЗ, пружају ефикасну равнотежу између интереса пружалаца услуга, с једне стране, и интереса носиоца ауторских права, с друге стране. Кључне рijечи: ауторска права, дигитализација, пружаоци услуга, дјељење садржаја, интернет. 572 Pregledni naučni članak UDK SPREČAVANJE IZBJEGAVANJA STATUSA STALNE POSLOVNE JEDINICE U DIGITALNOJ EKONOMIJI Irena Radić1 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Apstrakt: Napredak u digitalnim tehnologijama nije promijenio fundamentalnu prirodu ključnih aktivnosti koje preduzeća obavljaju kao dio poslovnog modela za sticanje profita. Ipak, digitalizacija je značajno izmijenila način na koji se te aktivnosti obavljaju. Danas je moguće da nerezidentno preduzeće bude u značajnoj mjeri uključeno u privredni život jedne zemlje bez ostvarivanja fizičkog prisustva na njenoj teritoriji koje bi joj omogućilo da oporezuje dobit koju takvo nerezidentno preduzeće ostvari. Činjenica da je moguće ostvariti značajan obim prodaje u jednoj državi bez ostvarivanja povezanosti sa tom državom koja bi omogućila podvrgavanje njenoj poreskoj jurisdikciji, otvorilo je pitanje da li su postojeća pravila međunarodnog poreskog prava adekvatna da odgovore na izazove digitalne ekonomije. Digitalizacija je naročito dovela do preispitivanja tradicionalnog koncepta stalne poslovne jedinice za potrebe međunarodnih ugovora o izbjegavanju dvostrukog oporezivanja i pravila o pripisivanju (raspodjeli) dobiti. Cilj ovog rada je da ukaže zašto tradicionalni koncept stalne poslovne jedinice nije adekvatan u doba digitalizacije ekonomije, da analizira modifikacije koje je ovaj koncept pretrpio kao rezultat BEPS Projekta, te da ukaže na potencijalni novi koncept virtuelne poslovne jedinice koja bi se zasnivala na značajnom ekonomskom/digitalnom prisustvu. Ključne riječi: digitalna ekonomija, stalna poslovna jedinica, stalno mjesto poslovanja, značajno digitalno prisustvo, BEPS Projekat, međunarodno oporezivanje. 1. DIGITALNI POSLOVNI MODELI I OPOREZIVANJE Zahvaljujući napretku informacionih i komunikacionih tehnologija, obim prodaje dobara i usluga u različitim državama bez ostvarivanja fizičkog prisustva na njihovoj teritoriji se dramatično proširio. Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, 1 MA, Asistent 573 Irena Radić Google, PayPal, Airbnb, samo su neki od globalnih tehnoloških giganata koji posluju i ostvaruju dobit u državama širom svijeta, ali to čine transakcijama na daljinu, bez ostvarivanja fizičkog prisustva u tim državama, i time ne podpadaju pod njihovu poresku jursdikciju. Digitalizacija ekonomije dovela je do toga da preduzeća danas mogu poslovati na bitno drugačiji način u odnosu na period kada su pravila međunarodnog poreskog prava usvajana. Naime, nerezidentna preduzeća su uvijek mogla da prodaju proizvode i pružaju usluge u državi u kojoj nemaju fizičko prisustvo, ali je obim takve prodaje bio minimalan i time poreski beznačajan. Upravo zbog toga je poreski zahtjev zemlje izvora opravdavan vezom koja se zasnivala na značajnom fizičkom prisustvu nerezidentnog preuduzeća, kroz postojanje stalne poslovne jedinice (eng. permanent establishment). Međutim, činjenica da je danas moguće ostvariti značajnu uključenost u privredni život jedne zemlje i ostvarivati velike prihode na njenoj teritoriji bez ostvarivanja fizičkog prisustva koje bi dovelo do uspostavljanja stalne poslovne jedinice, znači da ovako ostvarena dobit ostaje izvan domašaja subjektivnog poreskog prava te države. Stoga je ključno pitanje, kako na nacionalnom, tako i na međunarodnom nivou, da li je postojeći sistem poreza na dobit korporacija odgovarajući za oporezivanje digitalnih poslovnih modela. Ovo se posebno odnosi na postojeća pravila, odnosno koncept stalne poslovne jedinice i sa tim povezana pravila o raspodjeli (alokaciji) dobiti. S obzirom na to da je u ugovorima o izbjegavanju dvostrukog oporezivanja koje je zaključila Bosna i Hercegovina, kao i u entitetskim poreskim propisima, usvojen tradicionalni koncept stalne poslovne jedinice, te da digitalna transformacija ne zaobilazi ni našu državu, smatramo da je potrebno razmotriti navedene probleme i potencijalna rješenja. Stoga će predmet ovog rada biti analiza tradicionalnog koncepta stalne poslovne jedinice i potrebe za njegovom modifikacijom u uslovima digitalizacije ekonomije. U fokusu će biti izmjene koje je ovaj koncept pretrpio kroz Projekat OECD-a pod nazivom “Erozija poreske osnovice i izmještanje profita (eng. Base erosion and profit shifting Project, dalje u tekstu: BEPS Projekat)2 koji je pokrenut 2013. godine, te potencijalni novi koncept koji se zasniva na značajnom ekonomskom (digitalnom) prisustvu nerezidentnog preduzeća, koji bi imao za cilj da obuhvati digitalizovane poslovne modele. Vidjećemo da se u okviru OECD-a razmatra više potencijalnih rješenja, ali smo odlučili da analiziramo koncept značajnog ekonomskog (digitalnog) prisustva jer je predložen i na niovu Evropske unije 2 OECD (2016), BEPS Project Explanatory Statement: 2015 Final Reports, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264263437-en 574 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova i na nivou OECD-a, a usvojen je i u nacionalnom pravu pojedinih država (Indija, Indonezija, Izrael)3, te postoji veća šansa da se upravo oko njega postigne konsenzus na međunarodnom nivou. Pored toga, dijelimo mišljenje autora koji se zalažu za koncept značajnog ekonomskog ili digitalnog prisustva, kao koncept koji bi mogao da obezbijedi pravnu sigurnost, pravičnost, efikasnost, neutralnost, jednostavnost i fleksibilnost.4 1.1. Prijedlozi OECD-a za rješavanje poreskih izazova digitalizacije ekonomije Na međunarodnom planu se preduzimaju značajni napori kako bi se odgovorilo poreskim izazovima digitalizacije ekonomije, a naročito je u tom pravcu značajna aktivnost koja se preduzima u okviru OECD-a, manifestovana kroz BEPS Projekat. Akcija 1 BEPS Projekta: “Rješavanje poreskih izazova digitalne ekonomije”5 identifikovala je da digitalizacija ekonomije uvećava problem erozije poreske osnovice i izmještanja profita iz države rezidentstva ili države izvora u države sa niskim poreskim opterećenjem (tzv. poreske rajeve) u kojima se ne obavljaju nikakve ili se obavljaju samo minimalne poslovne funkcije. Pored toga, uočeno je da digitalizacija ekonomija otvara i niz drugih pitanja, tzv. „širih poreskih izazova“ koja idu izvan BEPS-a, a odnose se na pitanje raspodjele prava na oporezivanje prihoda ostvarenih od prekograničnih aktivnosti u digitalno doba između različitih država. OECD je razmatrao nekoliko opcija za oporezivanje digitalne ekonomije: izmjena definicije stalne poslovne jedinice6 u Model – konvenciji OECD,7 uspostavljanje nove odlučujuće veze (eng. taxable nexus) zasnovane na značajnom 3 Vidi: https://tax.kpmg.us/content/dam/tax/en/pdfs/2020/digitalized-economy-taxation-developments-summary.pdf 4 Vidi: Hinnechens Luc, „Looking for an Appropriate Jurisdictional Framewoork for Source-State Taxation of International Electronic Commerce in the Twenty-first Century“, Intertax 1998, 192; Pistone Pasquale, Nogueira Pinto Joao Felix, Andrade Betty Rodríguez. „Comments submitted by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Task Force on the Digital Economy“, (Paris: OECD, 2019); Cockfield J. Arthur, „Tax Wars: How to End the Conflict over Taxing Global Digital Commerce“, Berkeley Business Law Journal (Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3493940; 29-32; Ricardo Sergio Schmitz Filho. „Toward a Broader Concept of Permanent Establishment: a Study in Light of the Digitalization of the Economy and the BEPS Era“ (Master thesis, University of Lisbon School of Law, 2019): 47-52. Vaca Bohorquez Angela Carolina, Virutal Permanent Establishment: An Approach to the Taxation of Electronic Commerce Transactions“, Revista de Derecho Fiscal 8/2016: 89-102. 5 OECD (2015), Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 – Final Report, OECD/G20, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241046en (Dalje: BEPS Akcija 1.) 6 BEPS Akcija 1, par. 215-217. 7 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 2014 (Full Version), OECD Publishing, https://dx.doi. org/10.1787/9789264239081-en, dalje: Model – konvencija OECD. 575 Irena Radić ekonomskom prisustvu,8 porez po odbitku (eng. witholding tax) na određene digitalne transakcije9, te naknadu za izjednačavanje (eng. equalisation levy), kao neku vrstu poreza na promet za nerezidentna preduzeća sa značajnim ekonomskim prisustvom, koja bi trebalo da omogući jednak tretman domaćih i stranih preduzeća.10 Ipak, nijedna od ovih opcija nije prepoznata kao idealno rješenje koje bi trebalo preporučiti, već je ukazano na potrebu kontinuiranog rada u ovoj oblasti. Kao nastavak aktivnosti, u februaru 2019. godine OECD je objavio dokument za javnu raspravu “Rješavanje poreskih izazova digitalizacije ekonomije“ u kome su iznesena tri potencijalna rješenja za uspostavljanje nove “oporezive veze” i pravila za raspodjelu dobiti u digitalnoj ekonomiji: 1. „user participation“ – prijedlog koji ima za cilj priznavanje subjektivnog poreskog prava jurisdikciji u kojoj se nalaze korisnici nerezidentnog preduzeća, a fokusira se samo na visoko-digitalizovane poslovne modele koji se oslanjaju na aktivno učešće korisnika kao ključni mehanizam za stvaranje vrijednosti (npr. društvene mreže, internet pretraživači, online trgovine);11 2. „marketing intangible“ – prijedlog koji se fokusira na nematerijalna dobra koja se odnose na marketinške aktivnosti,odnosno koji povezuje ova nematerijalna dobra, kao što je trgovački žig, brend, lista kupacai sl. Sa državom čiji su kupci rezidenti 12 i 3. značajno ekonomsko prisustvo.13 U oktobru 2019. godine je ponovo objavljen dokument za javnu raspravu u kome je Sekretarijat OECD-a predložio da se pored postojećih prijedloga traga za novim rješenjem, tj. novom „oporezivom vezom“ koja treba da bude nezavisna od fizičkog prisustva i da se zasniva na obimu prodaje, te da se utvrdte različiti pragovi za različite države kako bi se obezbijedilo da i manje ekonomije imaju koristi od ovog prijedloga.14 U Programu rada15OECD je postavio cilj da se do konsenzualnog, dugoročnog rješenja (za svih 129 uključenih država) za problem oporezivanja digitalne ekonomije dođe do 8 BEPS Akcija 1, par. 277-291. 9 Ibid, par. 292-301. 10 Ibid, par. 302- 308. 11 OECD (2019), Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation od the Economy – Public Consultation Document, OECD/G20 Base erosion and Profit Shifting Project, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf, 9-11. 12 Ibid, 12-15. 13 Ibid, 16-17. 14 OECD (2019), Secretariat Proposal for a „Unified Approach“ under Pillar One – Public Consultation Document, 9 October 2019 – 12 November 2019, 5. 15 OECD (2019), Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framwork on BEPS, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd. org/tax/beps/programme-of-work-to-develop-a-consensus-solution-to-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-thedigitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf 576 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova kraja 2020. godine, kako bi se spriječilo da države preduzmaju nekoordinisane unilateralne mjere u ovom pravcu. U samom Programu je istaknuto da je ovo izuzetno ambiciozan cilj, s obzirom na to da zahtijeva reviziju fundamentalnih aspekata međunarodnog poreskog sistema, te da će ove izmjene uticati na poreske prihode država kao i na sveukupni balans subjektivnih poreskih prava.16 1.2. Prijedlozi Evropske komisije za rješavanje poreskih izazova digitalizacije ekonomije Evropska komisija je 2018. godine predložila nova pravila koja imaju za cilj pravično oporezivanje digitalnih poslovnih modela. Prvi prijedlog se odnosi na uvođenje privremenog poreza (eng. interim tax) na određene digitalne aktivnosti koje trenutno ne podliježu oporezivanju u Evropskoj uniji, kao kratkoročno rješenje koje bi važilo dok se ne postigne konsenzus oko dugoročnog rješenja. Drugi prijedlog se odnosi na reformu pravila oporezivanja dobiti korporacija, kroz uvođenje digitalne poslovne jedinice, kako bi se dobit registrovala i oporezivala tamo gdje preduzeća imaju zanačajnu interakciju sa korisnicima kroz digitalne kanale (kao dugoročno rješenje). Digitalna poslovna jedinica je predložena kroz Direktivu o pravilima za oporezivanje značajnog digitalnog prisustva17, koja još uvijek nije usvojena, ali su ministri finansija Njemačke, Francuske, Italije i Španije u februaru 2020. godine objavili zajedničku izjavu u kojoj pozivaju države da postignu konsenzus u pogledu rješavanja poreskih izazova digitalizacije ekonomije do kraja godine, te su iskazali svoju posvećenost postizanju dugoročnog rješenja na međunarodnom nivou, u okviru OECD-a, koje bi odmah potom bilo implementirano i na nivou Evropske unije.18 2. UTVRĐIVANJE IZVORA DOHOTKA I TRADICIONALNI POJAM STALNE POSLOVNE JEDINICE Pošto država može postaviti poreski zahtjev samo prema licima koja su na neki način podvrgnuta njenom suverenitetu, potrebno je ustanoviti prisustvo neke od odlučujućih činjenica za zasnivanje poreske jurisdikci16 Ibid, 7. 17 European Commision (2018), Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence, COM(2018) 147 final 2018/0072 (CNS) 18 https://www.tax-news.com/news/EU_Finance_Ministers_Issue_Joint_Statement_On_Digital_Taxation____97559.html 577 Irena Radić je - državljanstva (kojega se drže samo SAD i Filipini), rezidentstva ili izvora.19 Odlučujuća činjenica određuje subjektivnu stranu poreskopravnog odnosa (tj. da li neko lice potpada pod poresku jurisdikciju neke zemlje) i razmjere rasprostiranja poreske obaveze. Rezidentstvo (kao i državljanstvo) kao odlučujuća činjenica personalnog karaktera dovodi do uspostavljanja neograničene poreske obaveze: lica koja su na osnovu činjenice rezidentstva podvrgnuta poreskoj jurisdikciji određene države mogu u njoj biti oporezovana u skladu sa svojim “svjetskim dohotkom” (eng. worldwide income) odnosno “svjetskom imovinom”.20 S druge strane, izvor kao odlučujuća činjenica samo ekonomskog karaktera, dovodi do uspostavljanja ograničene poreske obaveze: država se zadovoljava oporezivanjem imovine koja je locirana na njenoj teritoriji, odnosno dohotka koji sa njene teritorije potiče (princip teritorijalnog rasprostiranja poreske obaveze).21 Kako bi se utvrdilo postojanje prava države izvora da oporezuje dobit od poslovanja koju ostvari preduzeće rezident druge države koristi se koncept stalne poslovne jedinice. Stalna poslovna jedinica predstavlja minimalni prag koji poslovanje preduzeća države ugovornice, odnosno nerezidentnog preduzeća u državi izvora mora da pređe kako bi država izvora mogla da oporezuje dobit od toga poslovanja.22 Navedeni koncept je usvojen u nacionalnom zakonodavstvu i standardnim odredbama poreskih ugovora mnogih savremenih država, on je sadržan u model - konvencijama na osnovu kojih države zaključuju ugovore o izbjegavanju dvostrukog oporezivanja i kao takav čini jedan od suštinskih pravnih koncepata međunarodnog ugovornog poreskog prava.23 19 Popović Dejan, Ilić-Popov Gordana .“Utvrđivanje izvora dohotka u poreskom pravu“, Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu 2/2008: 97. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. U tom smislu, izvor označava teritoriju na kojoj se nalaze nepokretnosti, stalna poslovna jedinica (npr. ogranak, fabrika, rudnik, poslovnica) ili stalna baza u kojoj se obavlja profesionalna djelatnost (npr. advokatska kancelarija, ljekarska ordinacija i sl.), na kojoj se koriste sredstva iz kojih se isplaćuju dividende i naknade iz autorskih i srodnih prava i prava industrijske svojine, odnosno na kojoj rezidentni dužnik isplaćuje kamatu. Vidi: Popović Dejan, Poresko Pravo (Beograd: Univerzitet u Beogradu – Pravni fakultet, 2017), 260. 22 Popović, Ilić – Popov, „Utvrđivanje izvora dohotka“, 110. 23 Kostić Svetislav. „Osnovni oblik stalne poslovne jedinice u srpskom poreskom pravu,“ Pravo i privreda 5-8/2006: 995. 578 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 2.1. Pojam stalne poslovne jedinice Norme o stalnoj poslovnoj jedinici u domaćem poreskom pravu,24 poreskim ugovorima koje je zaključila Bosna i Hercegovina, kao i Model-konvenciji OECD25, sadrže tri osnova za postojanje stalne poslovne jedinice (odnosno tri oblika stalne poslovne jedinice): osnovni oblik stalne poslovne jedinice, zastupnička poslovna jedinica i građevinska poslovna jedinica. Osnovni oblik stalne poslovne jedinica označava stalno mjesto poslovanja preko koga nerezidentni obveznik obavlja poslovnu djelatnost u Republici Srpskoj,26odnosno stalno mjesto poslovanja preko koga preduzeće države ugovornice potpuno ili djelimično obavlja poslovanje u drugoj državi ugovornici.27 Dakle,osnovni oblik stalne poslovne jedinice čini: mjesto poslovanja, koje mora biti stalno i preko koga se obavlja poslovanje nerezidentnog preduzeća, odnosno preduzeća druge države ugovornice, u cjelosti ili djelimično.28Poreski ugovori kao i Model konvencija OECD sadrže listu primjera koja naročito čine osnovni oblik stalne poslovne jedinice, to su: sjedište uprave, ogranak, poslovnica, fabrika, radionica, rudnik, izvor nafte ili gasa, kamenolom ili drugo mjesto iskorišćavanja prirodnih bogatstava.29Navedeni primjeri služe da ukažu kada će uobičajeno postojati stalna poslovna jedinica, ali je neophodno da su ispunjeni i opšti uslovi (stalno mjesto poslovanja preko koga se djelatnost preduzeća obavlja u potpunosti ili djelimično). Pored ove “pozitivne liste”, domaći ZOPD,30 ugovori o izbjegavanju dvostukog oporezivanja i 24 Zakon o porezu na dobit (“Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske” broj 94/2015, 1/2017 i 58/2019) - dalje u tekstu: ZOPD, čl. 40-41. 25 Model - konvencija OECD, čl. 5. 26 ZOPD, čl. 41. st.1. 27 Član 5. poreskih ugovora koje je zaključila Bosna i Hercegovina, kao i Model-konvencije OECD koja služi kao “mustra” prilikom zaključivanja poreskih ugovora. 28 Popović Dejan, Kostić Svetislav. „Ugovori o izbegavanju dvostrukog oporezivanja – pravni okvir i tumačenje“, (materijal za nastavu, Pravni fakultet- - Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2009), dostupno na http://www.ius.bg.ac.rs/ prof/materijali/popdej/program14-15/Ugovori%20Srbije%20o%20izbegavanju%20dvostrukog%20oporezivanja. pdf, pristupljeno: 21.3.2020. 29 Model – konvencija OECD, čl. 5. st. 1. i 2. U ZOPD to su: mjesto rukovođenja, filijala, kancelarija, tvornica, prodavnica, radionica, rudnik, izvor nafte ili gasa, kamenolom ili neko drugo mjesto eksploatacije prirodnih resursa na teritoriji Republike Srpske, vid. ZOPD, čl. 41. st.1. 30 Prema odredbama čl. 41. st. 4. ZOPD stalno mjesto poslovanja ne obuhvata: 1) korišćenje od pravnog lica bilo kakvog prostora samo u svrhu smještaja ili izlaganja proizvoda ili robe koja pripada tom pravnom licu; 2) održavanje zalihe proizvoda ili robe koja pripada pravnom licu samo u svrhu čuvanja i izlaganja; 3) održavanje zalihe proizvoda ili robe koja pripada pravnom licu samo u cilju obrade i dorade od drugog pravnog lica; 4) prodaju proizvoda ili robe koja pripada pravnom licu, a koja je bila izložena za vrijeme sajma ili izložbe ukoliko su ti proizvodi ili roba prodati najkasnije u roku od mjesec dana od zatvaranja sajma ili izložbe; 5) mjesto obavljanja aktivnosti radi nabavke proizvoda ili robe ili prikupljanja informacija za pravno lice; 6) mjesto obavljanja aktivnosti radi izvršenja bilo kakve djelatnosti pripremne ili pomoćne prirode za pravno lice i 7) mjesto obavljanja aktivnosti za bilo koju kombinaciju djelatnosti u gorenavedenim slučajevima, s tim da je cjelokupna djelatnost koja se vrši na tom mjestu poslovanja po svojoj prirodi pripremna ili pomoćna. 579 Irena Radić Model - konvencija OECD, sadrže “negativnu listu” aktivnosti za koje se neće smatrati da uspostavljaju stalnu poslovnu jedinicu nerezidentnog preduzeća.31 Ovom “negativnom listom” aktvinosti ćemo se detaljno baviti u poglavlju 3. ovog rada. Pod građevinskom poslovnom jedinicom u ZOPD smatra se mjesto izvođenja građevinskih, instalaterskih ili montažerskih radova u Republici Srpskoj, kao i mjesto instalacije ili strukture koje se koriste u istraživanju ili eksploataciji prirodnih resursa ili djelatnost nadzora u vezi sa navedenim aktivnostima.32 Poreski ugovori prate ili rješenja Model - konvencije OECD koja zahtijeva da gradilište ili građevinski, instalaterski ili montažerski radovi traju duže od 12 mjeseci, ili Model - konvencije UN prema kojoj gradilište, građevinski, montažni, instalacioni radovi ili nadzorne djelatnosti u vezi sa tim radovima treba da traju duže od 6 mjeseci.33 S obzirom na predmet ovog rada, građevinsk poslovna jedinica neće biti predmet dalje analize. Kada je u pitanju zastupnička poslovna jedinica, ugovori o izbjegavanju dvostrukog oporezivanja, te čl. 5, st. 5. Model – konvencije OECD, predviđaju da kada jedno (fizičko ili pravno) lice u državi ugovornici radi u ime preduzeća druge države ugovornice, smatra se da to preduzće ima stalnu poslovnu jedinicu u prvoj državi u odnosu na djelatnosti koje to lice obavlja za preduzeće, ako to lice ima i uobičajeno koristi u državi izvora ovlašćenje da zaključuje ugovore u ime preduzeća (osim ako su djelatnosti tog lica ograničene na djelatnosti iz „negativne liste“ iz stava 4. člana 5. poreskih ugovora).34 Međutim, čl. 5, st. 6. poreskih ugovora predviđa izuzetak koji se odnosi na tzv. nezavisne agente (eng. independent agents) prema kojem se neće smatrati da preduzeće druge države ugovornice ima stalnu poslovnu jedinicu kada u državi izvora obavlja svoje poslovanje preko posrednika, generalnog komisiong zastupnika ili drugog predstavnika sa samostalnim statusom, ako ta lica djeluju u okviru svoje redovne djelatnosti.35 31 Dakle, ukoliko nerezidentno preduzeće obavlja isključivo poslove iz “negativne liste” preko stalnog mjesta poslovanja, takvo stalno mjesto poslovanja neće se smatrati stalnom poslovnom jedinicom. 32 ZOPD, čl. 41. st. 1. tač. 2. 33 Popović, Ilić – Popov, „Utvrđivanje izvora dohotka“, 109. 34 U domaćem pravu, zastupničkom poslovnom jedinicom se smatra mjesto gdje jedno fizičko ili pravno lice posluje u ime nerezidenta i ima ovlašćenje da zaključuje ugovore u ime tog nerezidentnog preduzeća Zakon o porezu na dobit. Pored toga, stalnim mjestom poslovanja smatraće se i mjesto gdje domaće fizičko ili pravno lice, bez ovlašćenja da zaključuje ugovore u ime nerezidenta, posluje u ime nerezidenta držeći zalihe proizvoda ili trgovačke robe iz kojih obavlja redovne isporuke u ime nerezidenta. Vid. ZOPD, čl. 41. st. 2. i 3. 35 Prema ZOPD, nema”zastupničke” poslovne jedinice ako nerezident vrši privrednu djelatnost u Republici Srpskoj preko brokera, generalnog konsignacionog agenta ili drugog agenta sa samostalnim statusom, s tim da je ta djelatnost agenta njegova redovna privredna djelatnost. Vid. Čl 41. st. 5. ZOPD. 580 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Konačno, činjenica da preduzeće rezident jedne države ugovornice kontroliše ili je pod kontrolom preduzeća koje je rezident druge države ugovornice ili koje obavlja poslovanje u toj drugoj državi, sama po sebi nije dovoljna da se jedno preduzeće smatra stalnom poslovnom jedinicom drugog preduzeća.36 Dakle, zavisna kompanija eo ipso nikada neće biti stalna poslovna jedinica - ona je uvijek zaseban poreski obveznik. Ipak, ukoliko zavisna kompanija ima i uobičajeno koristi u državi izvora ovlašćenje da zaključuje ugovore u ime matičnog preduzeća ili ukoliko se njegovo stalno mjesto poslovanja nalazi u prostorijama zavisne kompanije, onda preduzeće druge države ugovornice može imati stalnu poslovnu jedinicu u vezi sa zavisnom kompanijom.37 Opisani koncept stalne poslovne jedinice pretrpio je određene izmjene na međunarodnom nivou, pod uticajem BEPS Projekta, odnosno završnog izvještaja na Akciju 7 – Sprečavanje vještačkog izbjegavanja statusa stalne poslovne jedinice (Action 7: Preventing the Articificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status).38 Akcioni plan je pozvao na izmjenu postojećeg koncepta stalne poslovne jedinice kako bi se spriječila upotreba određenih strategija za izbjegavanje poreza, kao što su aranžmani u kojima zavisna preduzeća, koja su uobičajeno istupala kao distributeri matičnih kompanija, postaju komisionari. Pored toga, promjene u pojmu stalne poslovne jedinice su neophodne kako bi se spriječila zloupotreba izuzetaka od pojma stalne poslovne jedinice (tzv. negativne liste), što je naročito značajno u kontekstu digitalne ekonomije. 3. IZMJENA TRADICIONALNOG KONCEPTA STALNE POSLOVNE JEDINICE Kao rezultat BEPS Projekta, 2017. godine je izmijenjen član 5. Model - konvencije OECD39 koja služi kao „mustra“ pri zaključivanju ugovora o izbjegavanju dvostrukog oporezivanja i usvojena Multilateralna konvencija za prim36 Navedeno pravilo propisuje i domaći ZOPD u članu 41 st. 7: “činjenica da je jedno nerezidentno preduzeće pod poslovnom kontrolom lica iz Republike Srpske ili lica koja vrši privrednu djelatnost u Republici Srpskoj, bilo preko stalnog mjesta poslovanja ili na drugi način, ne petvara sama po sebi nijedno društvo u stalnu poslovnu jedinicu drugog društva”. 37 Popović, Kostić, „Ugovori o izbjegavanju dvostrukog oporezivanja,“ 29. 38 OECD (2015), Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7- Final Report, OECD/G20, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi. org/10.1787/9789264241220-en (Dalje: BEPS Akcija 7.) 39 OECD (2017), Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital: Condensed Version 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensedversion-2017_mtc_cond-2017-en, dalje: Model - Konvencija OECD 2017. godina. 581 Irena Radić jenu mjera koje se u cilju sprečavanja erozije poreske osnovice i premještanja dobiti odnose na poreske ugovore (dalje: BEPS multilateralna konvencija ili Konvencija),40 koja modifikuje postojeće poreske ugovore (dakle, ona ne zamjenjuje postojeće ugovore o izbjegavanju dvostrukog oporezivanja, već funkcioniše uporedo sa njima).41 Predmet analize u ovom poglavlju rada će biti izmjena člana 5. stav 4. Model – konvencije, koja se odnosi na ograničavanje izuzetaka od pojma stalne poslovne jedinice na aktivnosti koje imaju pripremni ili pomoćni karakter, uvođenje anti-fragmentacijskog pravila, te izmjena člana 5. stav. 5. i 6. Model - konvencije koja se odnosi na zastupničku poslovnu jedinicu, kao i relevantne odredbe BEPS Multilateralne konvencije. 3.1. Modifikacija izuzetaka (pripremni i pomoćni karakter izuzetih aktivnosti) Član 5. stav 4. Model - konvencije OECD predviđa listu poslovnih aktivnosti koje nerezidentno preduzeće može obavljati na teritoriji određene države, ali koje nisu dovoljne da konstituišu stalnu poslovnu jedinicu tog preduzeća, iako se vrše putem stalnog mjesta poslovanja (eng. fixed place of business). Izuzeci sadržani u Model - konvenciji OECD (do izmjena koje su izvršene 2017. godine) obuhvataju: a. korištenje objekata i opreme isključivo u svrhu uskladištenja, izlaganja ili isporuke dobara ili robe koji pripadaju preduzeću; b. održavanje zalihe dobara ili robe koja pripada preduzeću isključivo u svrhu uskladištenja, izlaganja ili isporuke; c. održavanje zalihe dobara ili robe koja pripada preduzeću isključivo sa svrhom da je drugo preduzeće preradi; d. održavanje stalnog mjesta poslovanja isključivo u svrhu kupovine dobara ili robe ili pribavljanja informacija za preduzeće; e. održavanje stalnog mjesta poslovanja isključivo u svrhu obavljanja bilo koje druge djelatnosti koje ima isključivo pripremni ili pomoćni karakter za preduzeće; f. održavanje stalnog mjesta poslovanja isključivo u svrhu obavljanja djelatnosti navedenih u podstavovima od a) do d), u bilo kojoj kombi40 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-toprevent-BEPS.pdf 41 Popović Dejan, Ilić-Popov Gordana. „Značaj i efekti BEPS mulilateralne konvencije u međunarodnom poreskom pravu,“ Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Nišu 75/2017: 4. 582 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova naciji, pod uslovom da je ukupna djelatnost stalnog mjesta poslovanja koja nastaje iz ove kombinacije pripremnog ili pomoćnog karaktera. Izuzeci od a) do d) utvrđeni su Model - konvencijom OECD iz 1963, godine, izuzeci iz tačaka e) i f) dodati su u Model - konvenciji OECD iz 1977 godine, i takva, nepromijenjena lista izuzetaka zadržana je i u Model - konvenciji OECD iz 2014. godine. Odluka da se određene aktivnosti predvide kao izuzetak od pojma stalne poslovne jedinice nije bila teoretsko ili dogmatsko pitanje; razlog je bilo obezbjeđivanje pravne sigurnosti, izbjegavnje nepravičnog (ekstrateritorijalnog) oporezivanja i podsticanje međunarodne trgovine.42 Smatralo se da su navedene aktivnosti suštinski pripremnog ili pomoćnog karaktera te se, kao takve, ne mogu okarakterisati kao „obavljanje djelatnosti nerezidentnog preduzeća“. Kako je istaknuto u samom Komentaru Model - konvencije OECD iz 2014. godine, izuzeci su opravdani činjenicom da su navedene aktivnosti tako udaljene od ostvarivanja dobiti da je teško izvršiti pripisivanje dobiti takvom stalnom mjestu poslovanja.43 Prema većinskom shvatanju, koje je potkrijepljeno tekstom Model - konvencije iz 1968. godine (poreskim ugovorima zaključenim na osnovu njega) i pratećim Komentarom, kao i određenim segmentima Model - konvencije 1963-2014. godine, te praksom u velikom broju država (Belgija, Švajcarska, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, Njemačka, Francuska44 izuzeci iz tačke a) do d) primjenjuju se automatski, čim bi se neka od navedenih aktivnosti obavljala od strane nerezidentnog preduzeća kroz stalno mjesto poslovanja45. Dakle, prema pretežnom shvatanju, nije bilo potrebno utvrđivati da li su aktivnosti iz tačke a) do d) po svojoj prirodi pripremnog ili pomoćnog karaktera da bi se tretirale kao izuzetak, a ispunjenost tog uslova se utvrđivala samo za aktivnosti iz tačke e) i f). To je stvorilo problem naročito značajan u kontekstu digitalne ekonomije, jer je otvorilo prostor za eroziju poreske osnovice i izmještanje profita putem vještačkog izbjegavanja statusa stalne poslovne jedinice. Naime, neke aktivnosti koje su prethodno smatrane pripremnim i pomoćnim aktivnostima (u kontekstu tradicionalnih poslovnih modela), postale su ključne funkcije novih poslovnih modela (u digitalnoj ekonomiji). Kako bi se obezbijedilo da 42 Arginelli Paolo , „PE Negative List and Fragmentation of Activities Within Groups of Companies“, u New Trends in the Definition of Permanent Establishment, ed. Maisto Guglielmo, (IBFD, 2019), 98. 43 Model – konvencija OECD, komentar na član 5, par, 23. 44 Nav. Prema: Arginelli, „PE Negative List and Fragmentation of Activities“, 105-107. Nasuprot ovim državama, sudovi u Australiji, Norveškoj, Danskoj i Španiji zahtijevali su da se u svakom konretnom slučaju utvrdi da li su aktivnosti zaista pripremnog ili pomoćnog karaktera kako bi bile izuzete statusa stalne poslovne jeidinice (ibid. 111-112) 45 Vidi više: ibid, 103-110. 583 Irena Radić profit ostvaren iz ovakvih aktivnosti bude oporezovan u državi u kojoj je ostvaren, član 5. stav 4. Model - konvencije OECD je modifikovan na način da svaki od izuzetaka uključenih u taj član bude ograničen samo na aktivnosti koje su po svojoj prirodi pomoćne ili pripremne.46 Dakle, sada se zahtijeva da sve aktivnosti (od tačke a) do e)) odnosno kombinacija aktivnosti (iz tačke f) budu pripremnog ili pomoćnog karaktera da bi bile izuzete iz pojma stalne poslovne jedinice. Nakon ove izmjene, više se neće automatski smatrati da obavljanje bilo koje od navedenih aktivnosti (iz tačke a) do d)) predstavlja izuzetak od pojma poslovne jedinice, već će se u svakom konkretnom slučaju utvrđivati da li aktivnost/kombinacija aktivnosti ima pripremni ili pomoćni karakter. Što znači da, ukoliko su određene poslovne aktivnosti nerezidentnog preduzeća koje su ranije (automatski) potpadale pod izuzetke od pojma stalne poslovne jedinice, postale ključne poslovne aktivnosti koje nemaju pripremni ili pomoćni karakter, takve aktivnosti će se sada smatrati stalnom poslovnom jedinicom. S obzirom na to da određene države (npr. Belgija, Švajcarska, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo) smatraju da su aktivnosti iz člana 5. stav 4. Model - konvencije per se pripremne i pomoćne i da, u cilju očuvanja pravne sigurnosti, njihovu primjenu nije potrebno posebno tražiti ispunjenost uslova da su pripremne ili pomoćne, OECD je predložio alternativno rješenje. Ono ostavlja mogućnost da se zadrži neizmijenjena lista izuzetaka, uz pretpostavku da su aktivnosti iz tačaka a) do d) a priori pomoćne ili pripremne, dok bi se neodgovarajućoj upotrebi izuzetaka suprotstavljali kroz anti-fragmentacijsko pravilo.47 Pored toga, i tačka e) je izmijenjena na način da je izraz “bilo koja aktivnost koja nije navedena u tačkama a) do d)”, zamijenjen izrazom “bilo koja druga aktivnost pripremnog ili pomoćnog karaktera”. 3.2. Anti-fragmentacijsko pravilo Još jedan problem koji je vezan za primjenu izuzetaka jeste fragmentacija djelatnosti, obično u okviru velikih multinacionalnih kompanija, na nekoliko “manjih” poslovnih aktivnosti koje se obavljaju kroz povezana preduzeća, čime se obezbjeđuje da svaka od tih aktivnosti, pojedinačno posmatrano, ima karakter pripremne ili pomoćne aktivnosti (iako sveukupno uzevši predstavljaju ključne poslovne aktivnosti), čime se izbjegava status stalne poslovne jedinice 46 BEPS Akcija 7, par. 12. 47 Ibid, par. 13. Više o anti-fragmentacijskom pravilu u dijelu 3.2. 584 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova u državi izvora.48 Kako bi se to spriječilo, član 5. stav 4. Model – konvencije OECD je dopunjen anti-fragmentacijskim pravilom (eng. anti-fragmentation rule)49 koje treba da obezbijedi da kada više povezanih subjekata obavlja poslovne aktivnosti koje predstavljaju cjelovitu poslovnu opreaciju u određenoj državi, to može voditi uspostavljanju statusa stalne poslovne jedinice u toj državi nezavisno od toga što je pojedinačna poslovna aktivnost koju preduzima svaki od tih subjekata pomoćnog ili pripremnog karaktera. Jasno je da je ovo jedno anti-abuzivno pravilo (koje treba da spriječi vještačko izbjegavanje statusa stalne poslovne jedinice kroz zloupotrebu izuzetaka fragmentacijom djelatnosti), ali je interesantno da se ono primjenjuje nezavisno od svrhe zbog koje je fragmentacija aktivnosti između povezanih preduzeća izvršena.50 3.3. Vještačko izbjegavanje statusa stalne poslovne jedinice kroz izuzimanje specifičnih aktivnosti u BEPS multilateralnoj konvenciji Član 13. Konvencije pod naslovom “Vještačko izbjegavanje statusa stalne poslovne jedinice kroz izuzimanje specifičnih aktivnosti” dao je mogućnost državama ugovornicama da izaberu tri moguće opcije: prva opcija odgovara tekstu čl. 5, st. 4 Model – konvencije OECD iz 2017. godine; druga opcija dopušta ugovornim stranama da zadrže “staru” (nepromijenjenu) listu izuzetaka, ukoliko smatraju da su navedene aktivnosti per se pripremne i pomoćne, a treća je da ne izaberu niti jednu od opcija. Ugovorne strane koje izaberu bilo prvu ili drugu opciju, automatski prihvataju primjenu člana 13. stav 4. Konvencije koji propisuje anti-fragmentacijsko pravilo poput onog iz člana 5. stav 4.1. Model - konvencije OECD iz 2017. godine, osim ukoliko izričito izraze rezervu na njegovu primjenu, u skladu sa članom 13. stav 6. tač. a) ili c) Konvencije.51Anti-fragmentacijsko pravilo može biti primijenjeno i ukoliko države ugovornice ne izaberu nijednu od opcija ili se izbor država ugovornica (strana u obuhvaćenom poreskom ugovoru) ne podudara.52 48 Spinosa Lisa, Chand Vikram. „A Long – Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models: Should the Permanent Establishment Definition be Modified to Resolve the Issue or Should the Focus Be on a Shared Taxing Right Mechanism,“ Intertax 6/7-46(2018): 483. 49 Vid. Čl. 5, st. 4.1. Model - konvencije OECD 2017. iz godine i čl. 13. st. 4. BEPS Multilateralne konvencije. 50 Arginelli, „PE Negative List and Fragmentation of Activities“, 128. 51 Prvobitno, anti-fragmentacijsko pravilo je trebalo da bude automatski primijenjeno kada države izberu drugu opciju (tj. da ne uslovaljaju izuzete poslovne aktivnosti uslovom da imaju pripremni ili pomoćni karakter), što je predloženo kao alternativno rješenje u BEPS Akciji 7 (par. 13). Ipak, u BEPS Multilateralnoj konvenciji se odstupilo od ovog pristupa, jer vidimo postoje države (poput Luksemburga) koje su izabrale opciju B i pored toga, rezervisale primjenu anti-fragmentacijskog pravila. Nav. prema Spinosa, Chand, „Long – Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models“, 483. 52 Spinosa, Chand, „Long – Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models,“ 483. 585 Irena Radić Najveći broj država potpisnica Konvencije je izabrao prvu opciju,53 manji broj je izabrao drugu opciju54, dok npr. Čile i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo nisu izabrali nijednu opciju, ali se na njihove ugovore primjenjuje antifragmentacijsko pravilo.55 Bosna i Hercegovina je potpisala BEPS multilateralnu konvenciju, ali je u odnosu na član 13. rezervisala pravo da ga ne primjenjuje na ugovore o izbjegavanju dvostrukog oporezivanja obuhvaćene Konvencijom. 3.4. Novi pojam zastupničke poslovne jedinice U kontekstu digitalne ekonomije, značajna je i izmjena pojma zastupničke poslovne jedinice u Model-konvenciji OECD, koja je reflektovana i u čl. 12, st. 1. i 2. BEPS Multilateralne konvencije (iako cilj ove izmjene nije bio rješavanje problema koji proizilaze iz digitalizacije ekonomije). Naime, činjenica da je za postojanje zastupničke poslovne jedinice bilo potrebno da lice djeluje u ime nerezidentnog preduzeća i da ima i uobičajeno koristi ovlašćenje za zaključivanje ugovora u ime preduzeća, kao i relativno široko postavljen izuzetak koji se odnosi na nezavisne agente, omogućila je poreskim obveznicima da izbjegavaju status stalne poslovne jedinice, naročito koristeći komisione aranžmane. Naime, komisiono istupanje - u svoje ime a za račun nerezidentnog preduzeća čije proizvode/usluge prodaje - nije dovodilo do uspostavljanja stalne poslovne jedinice nerezidentnog preduzeća. Poreski obveznici su iskorištavali ovu prazninu te su zavisna preduzeća, koja su redovno istupala kao distributeri matičnih kompanija, postajali komisionari, čime je izbjegavan status stalne poslovne jedinice u državi izvora. Stoga je, kao rezultat BEPS Akcije 7, s jedne strane, snižen prag za uspostavljanje zastupničke poslovne jedinice, a sa druge, pooštreni uslovi da bi se jedno lice smatralo nezavisnim agentom (licem sa samostalnim statusom). Prema čl. 12, st. 1. BEPS Multilateralne konvencije, kada lice u jednoj državi ugovornici posluje u ime preduzeća i uobičajeno zaključuje ugovore ili igra ključnu ulogu u zaključenju ugovora od strane preduzeća, koje ono zaključuje rutinski, bez materijalnih izmjena, a ti su ugovori: a) u ime preduzeća; ili b) za prenos vlasništva, ili za dodjelu prava na korišćenje imovine u vlasništvu tog preduzeća ili koju preduzeće ima pravo da koristi; ili c) za pružanje usluga 53 Argentina, Jermenija, Australija, Austrija, Kolumbija, Hrvatska, Egipat, Njemačka, Indija, Indonezija, Italija, Japan, Malezija, Holandija, Novi Zeland, Norveška, Rumunija, Rusija, Srbija, Slovačka, Slovenija, Španija, Turska, Tunis, Urugvaj, Kolumbija, Južna Afrika i dr. Nav. prema: Spinosa, Chand, „Long – Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models,“ 482. 54 Francuska, Belgija, Irska, Litvanija, Luksemburg, Singapur, San Marino. Vidi. Nav. prema: Ibid. 55 Vidi: Ibid, 483. 586 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova od strane tog preduzeća, smatraće se da postoji zastupnička poslovna jedinica u odnosu na djelatnosti koje to lice obavlja za preduzeće. Kada je u pitanju izuzetak koji se odnosi na nezavisne agente, čl. 12, st. 2. BEPS Multilateralne konvencije predviđa da se neće smatrati nezavisnim agentom lice koje radi isključivo ili gotovo isključivo u ime jednog ili više preduzeća sa kojima je blisko povezano. Kao rezultat ovih izmjena, zavisno preduzeće se više neće moći smatrati zastupnikom sa samostalnim statusom, te će djelovanje nekog lica isključivo ili gotovo isključivo u ime drugog blisko povezanog preduzeća, dovesti do uspostavljanja stalne poslovne jedinice tog preduzeća. 3.5. Završna zapažanja Uslovljavanje primjene izuzetaka od stalne poslovne jedinice njihovim pripremnim i pomoćnim karakterom može riješiti neke probleme koji proizilaze iz digitalizacije ekonomije, prije svega, problem oporezivanja dobiti ostvarene kroz e-trgovinu (online prodaju i preprodaju) materijalnim dobrima, koja se zasniva na plaćanju digitalnim putem i konvencionalnoj isporuci. Naime, kada se poslovni model određenog nerezidentnog preduzeća (online prodavca materijalnih dobara) zasniva na blizini i potrebi za brzom isporukom kupcima, posjedovanje velikog lokalnoh skladišta u kojem radi značajan broj zaposlenih na skladištenju i isporuci dobara prodatih online, smatraće se poslovnom jedinicom tog preduzeća.56 Ipak, država izvora može da oporezuje samo dobit koja se može pripisati toj stalnoj poslovnoj jedinici, odnosno dobit koja je ostvarena poslovanjem preko te poslovne jedinice, a što bi u navedenom primjeru značilo da može oporezovati samo dobit ostvarenu kroz aktivnosti skladištenja i isporuke.57 Pored toga, preduzeća koja primjenjuju model e-trgovine materijalnim dobrima mogu izbjeći status stalne poslovne jedinice uprkos navedenoj izmjeni, jer mogu imati lokalno skladište u jednoj državi, a isporučivati dobra sa tog skladišta u više susjednih država, i na taj način izbjeći status stalne poslovne jedinice u tim drugim državama.58Štaviše, navedene izmjene uopšte ne obezbjeđuju okvir za oporezivanje prihoda ostvarenih kroz obavljanje potpuno dematerijalizovanih digitalnih aktivnosti, poput e-trgovine digitalnim proizvodima i uslugama, usluga “u oblaku“ (koja 56 BEPS Akcija 1, par. 217. 57 Spinosa, Chand. „Long – Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models“, 490. 58 Hadzhieva Eli, Impact of Digitalization on International Tax Matters - Study for the Committee on Financial Crimes, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance, (Luxembourg,: Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies,European Parliament, 2019) 30. 587 Irena Radić se zasniva na plaćanju i isporuci proizvoda/usluga digitalnim putem, kao što je slučaj sa iTunes), ili multilateralnih poslovnih modela. Izmjene u pojmu zastupničke poslovne jedinice su značajne u kontekstu digitalne ekonomije kada, na primjer, pružaoci usluga digitalnog marketinga (ili bilo koji drugi vid online poslovanja) posluju preko povezanih marketinških posrednika u drugoj državi, to bi moglo dovesti do uspostavljanja zastupničke poslovne jedinice u toj državi.59Ipak, činjenica da zastupnik i dalje mora biti pravno ili fizičko lice, ostavlja otvorenim pitanje virtuelnih prostora, poput veb-sajtova preko kojih se ugovori zaključuju online, koji se i dalje ne mogu smatrati stalnom poslovnom jedinicom.60 4. ZNAČAJNO EKONOMSKO/DIGITALNO PRISUSTVO Izmjene u pojmu stalne poslovne jedinice opisane u prethodnom dijelu će imati uticaja na određene digitalne poslovne modele, prije svega na e-trgovinu materijalnim dobrima, ali ne mogu uticati visoko-digitalizovane poslovne modele. Stoga je potrebno razviti novu “oporezivu vezu” (eng. taxable nexus) između nerezidentnog preduzeća i države na čijoj teritoriji ovo preduzeće obavlja djelatnosti digitalnim putem, bez ostvarivanja fizičkog pisustva. U okviru OECD i na nivou Evropske unije predloženo je da se ta nova veza zasniva na “značajnom ekonomskom prisustvu”, odnosno “značajnom digitalnom prisustvu”. Koncept značajnog ekonomskog prisustva, predstavljen kroz BEPS Akciju 1 treba da obuhvati situaciju kada preduzeće, koristeći digitalnu tehnologiju značajno učestvuje u privrednom životu države, na regularnoj i dugoročnoj osnovi, bez fizičkog prisustva na njenoj teritoriji.61 Osnovni faktor na osnovu koga bi se procjenjivalo postojanje značajnog ekonomskog prisustva bili bi ukupni prihodi koje nerezidentno predzeće ostvari transakcijama na 59 Primjera radi, kompanija A, rezident države R, pruža usluge digitalnog marketinga klijentima na svojoj društvenoj mreži. Kompanija B, rezident države S je povezano preduzeće kompanije B i zaključuje ugovor da reklamira i prodaje usluge kompanije A u državi S. Zaposleni u kompaniji B igraju aktivnu ulogu u sticanju klijenata za kompaniju A, ali ne zaključuju ugovore sa klijentima, već to čini direktno kompanija A (nekim digitalnim putem, poput imejla). Za ove usluge, kompanija B prima naknadu u iznosu od 5% od svih zaključenih ugovora. Prema ranijem konceptu zastupničke poslovne jedinice, kompanija A ne bi imala stalnu poslovnu jednicu u državi S kroz kompaniju B, jer ova nema ovlašćenje da zaključuje ugovore u njeno ime. Uz navedene izjene, kompanija A će imati stalnu poslovnu jediniu kroz kompaniju B u državi S, jer kompanija B „igra ključnu ulogu“ u zaključenju ugovora od strane kompanije A, koje ona zaključuje bez materijalnih modifikacija, a ti ugovori se odnose na pružanje usluga od strane kompanija A. Vidi. Spinosa, Chand. „Long – Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models“, 487-488. 60 Hadzhieva. „Impact of Digitalization on International Tax Matters“, 26. 61 BEPS Akcija 1, par. 277. 588 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova daljinu od kupaca iz određene države. Međutim, da bi se smatralo da postoji značajno ekonomsko prisustvo, faktor prihoda bi se morao kombinovati sa nekim od sljedećih elemenata: posjedovanje lokalnog domena, lokalne digitalne platforme,62 lokalne opcije za plaćanje, broj mjesečno aktivnih korisnika, broj ugovora zaključenih online ili obim prikupljenog digitalnog sadržaja (podataka) preko digitalne platforme od korisnika ili kupaca rezidenata date države.63 Ostaje nejasno da li koncept značajnog ekonomskog prisustva treba da se primjenjuje na sva preduzeća, preduzeća koja koriste digitalnu tehnologiju u poslovanju ili samo na digitalna preduzeća.64 Premda je glavni cilj ovog koncepta upravo da obuhvati preduzeća koja koriste digitalna sredstva i preduzeća koja su u cjelosti digitalna, ipak se čini da faktori koji se predloženi kao dopunski (pored faktora prihoda) za procjenu postojanja značajnog ekonomskog prisustva u Dokumentu za javnu raspravu objavljenom 2019. godine65 govore u prilog zaključku dase prijedlog odnosi na sva preduzeća, a ne samo ona digitalna. Takav pristup bi svakako imao određene prednosti - ne ograđuje digitalnu ekonomiju od ostatka ekonomije i obezbjeđuje poresku neutralnost između različitih poslovnih modela. Još jedno pitanje na koje će biti potrebno dati odgovor jeste odnos značajnog ekonomskog prisustva i stalne poslovne jedinice i pravila o pripisivanju dobiti, odnosno pitanje je da li će koncept značajnog ekonomskog prisustva zamijeniti stalnu poslovnu jedinicu, ili samo neke njene dijelove ili će oba koncepta postojati uporedo uz uvođenje određenih pravila prioriteta u primjeni.66 Na kraju, nijedan dokument OECD-a ne utvrđuje iznos ukupnih prihoda koji bi značio značajno ekonomsko prisustvo, a utvrđivanje navedenog praga predstavlja jedan od najvećih izazova ovog koncepta. Sličan koncept je predložila i Evropska komisija, s tim da se ovaj prijedlog fokusiva isključivo na kompanije koje posluju digitalno. Prema Prijedlogu, 62 Nerezidentna preduzeća obično imaju „lokalne“ veb-sajtove ili druge digitalne platforme s ciljem prilagođavanja ponude lokalnim korisnicima/kupcima, naročito vodeći računa o jeziku, kuluturi i običajima. Lokalne platoforme će obično biti na domaćem jeziku, sa prilagođenim popustima i promocijama, opštim uslovima poslovanja i sl. Vidi više: BEPS Akcija 1. par 279. 63 Ibid, par. 279-280. 64 Danon Robert, Chand Vikram, „Comments on Public Consultation Document - Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalization of the Economy“, (Report, University de Lausane, 2019), 9, dostupno na https://serval.unil. ch/resource/serval:BIB_9283B6869EAC.P001/REF 22.4.2020. 65 U Dokumentu za javnu raspravu “Rješavanje poreskih izazova digitalizacije ekonomije” su, pored faktora koji su navedeni u BEPS Akciji 1, predložena još dva dopunska faktora: odgovornost za konačnu isporuku dobara kupcima ili pružanje usluga korisničke podrške nakon isporuke, poput servisa, popravke ili održavanja od strane preduzeća; te stalne marketinške i promotivne aktivnosti, bilo online ili na drugi način, s ciljem privlačenja kupaca. Vid. Više: OECD (2019), Addresing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy - Public Consultation Document 13 February - 6 March 2019, OECD/G20Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, par. 51. 66 Danon, Chand, „Comments on Public Consultation Document“, 9. 589 Irena Radić značajno digitalno prisustvo se procjenjuje na osnovu: 1. prihoda ostvarenih pružanjem digitalnih usluga (udio ukupnih prihoda ostvarenih u određenom poreskom periodu kao rezultat pružanja digitalnih usluga korisnicima koji se nalaze u toj jurisdikciji prelazi 7.000.000 EUR), 2. broja korisnika digitalnih usluga/proizvoda (broj korisnika najmanje jedne od tih digitalnih usluga, koji se nalaze u toj državi članici,u određenom poreskom periodu, prelazi 100.000) ili broja zaključenih ugovora za pružanje digitalnih usluga (broj poslovnih ugovora (eng. business to business) za pružanje svih digitalnih usluga koje su korisnici koji se nalaze u toj jurisdikciji sklopili u određenom poreskom periodu prelazi 3.000). Navedeni kriterijumi predstavljaju indikatore za utvrđivanje “digitalnog otiska” nerezidentnog preduzeća u datoj državi, koji bi trebalo da odražavaju oslanjanje preduzeća na veliku bazu korisnika, uključenost korisnika i njihov doprinos, te vrijednost koju stvaraju za preduzeće. Pored toga, oni treba da obezbijede da iz obuhvata ovog pravila budu isključeni „mali“slučajevi, kod kojih dobit koja se može pripisati „digitalnom prisustvu“ ne bi pokrila ni trošak poreske obaveze stalne poslovne jedinice. Međutim, problem sa pragovima formulisanim na apsolutni način (po principu sve ili ništa) kao u Prijedlogu direktive,može dovesti do toga da samo jedan euro, jedan korisnik ili jedan ugovor manje od propisanog znači da ne postoji „značajno digitalno prisustvo“.67 Jasno je da ovakvo rješenje ima za cilj da obezbijedi jednostavnost i jednoobraznost na nivou cijele Evropske unije, ali je ono s razlogom kritikovano68 te bi trebalo ići ka jednom “postepenom” rješenju koje ne bi dovodilo do tako naglih “skokova” od oporezivanja do neoporezivanja. Poseban problem sa kriterijumom koji se zasniva na broju korisnika jeste u tome što pretpostavlja da svaki korisnik na isti način doprinosi stvaranju vrijednosti za preduzeće, dok se u stvarnosti njihov doprinos može drastično razlikovati (aktivni i pasivni korisnici, različit uticaj aktivnih korisnika, npr. uzmimo popularnog fudbalera i prosječnog studenta).69 Pored toga, broj korisnika treba da reflektuje da preduzeće ima prisustvo u određenoj državi koje je “značajno”, međutim postavljeni prag od 100.000 će u jednoj državi (od 10 miliona stanovnika) predstavljati 0.01% od ukupne populacije, a u drugoj 67 Vid. Baez Andres, Brauner Yariv, „Taxing the Digital Economy Post BEPS....Seriously“, Legal Studies Research Paper Series 19-16/2019, University of Florida, Levin College of Law, 44. 68 Vid.Baez, Brauner, „Taxing the Digital Economy Post BEPS“, 44; Schmitz- Fliho, „Toward a Broader Concept of PE“, 60. 69 Schmitz - Fliho „Toward a Broader Concept of PE“, 61. 590 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova (od 1 milion stanovnika), 0,1%.70 Slična zapažanja važe i za treći kriterijum (broj zaključenih ugovora). Premda opisani prijedlozi imaju određene nedostatke, to ne znači da ih treba napustiti, već da ih je potrebno unapređivati kako bismo došli do nove „oporezive veze“ koja bi bila nezavisna od fizičkog prisustva. Premda je Sekretarijat OECD-a predložio da to bude novo samostalno pravilo71, dijelimo mišljenje autora72 koji ističu da bi u cilju obezbjeđivanja pravne sigurnosti bolje bilo da se samo proširi postojeći koncept stalne poslovne jedinice, što upravo može biti obezbijeđeno kroz usvajanje koncepta značajnog ekonomskog prisustva. Pored toga, kriterijum za utvrđivanje postojanja značajnog ekonomskog prisustva treba da bude u što većoj mjeri objektiviziran, pa bi ključni faktor na osnovu koga bi se procjenjivalo značajno ekonomsko prisustvo trebalo da budu prihodi od prekograničnih transakcija koje nerezidentno preduzeće ostvaruje u određenoj državi.73 Međutim, pitanje je kako odrediti prirodu aktivnosti koje će biti uključene u ovaj koncept, odnosno da li će se uzimati u obzir prihodi od svih aktivnosti nerezidentnog preduzeća u jednoj državi ili samo prihodi od digitalnih (virtuelnih) aktivnosti.74 U svakom slučaju, novi koncept treba da predstavlja rezultat konsenzusa na međunarodnom nivou, te da obezbijedi neutralnost u oporezivanju digitalne i konvencionalne trgovine, pravnu sigurnost, jednostavnost, fleksibilnost, pravičnost i efikasnost. 5. ZAKLJUČAK Digitalizacija, ili bolje rečeno, digitalna revolucija mijenja svijet u kojem živimo: naše navike, kulturu, način razmišljanja, naša tržišta i način poslovanja, stvarajući pritisak na pravne sisteme da se prilagode ovim promjenama. Promjene u načinu poslovanja preduzeća potresaju temelje na kojima počiva sistem međunarodnog oporezivanja. Pravila koja su uspostavljena još 1920. godine u okviru Lige naroda i koja zahtijevaju fizičko prisustvo nerezidentnog preduzeća u određenoj državi kako bi ovo preduzeće potpalo pod njenu 70 Ibid. 71 OECD, „Secretariat Proposal for a „Unified Approach“ under Pillar I“, par. 15. 72 Cockfield J. Arthur, „Tax Wars: How to End the Conflict over Taxing Global Digital Commerce“, Berkeley Business Law Journal (Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3493940, 30. 73 Ibid. 74 Schmitz – Fliho se zalaže za koncept virtualne poslovne jedinice koja bi obuhvatila samo prihode od virtuelnih „digitalnih“ aktivnosti. Vid. Schmitz - Fliho „Toward a Broader Concept of PE“, 71; Navedeni koncept je predložen i od strane Evropske komisije. Nasuprot tome, Cockfield se zalaže za koncept „kvantitativnog značajnog ekonomskog prisustva“ (eng. quantitative economic presence permanent establishment) koje bi se procjenjivalo isključivo na osnovu prihoda, vid. Cockfield, „Tax Wars“, 30. 591 Irena Radić poresku jurisdikciju, su poprilično anahrona u uslovima digitalizacije ekonomije. Pojava novih poslovnih modela u digitalnoj ekonomiji povećala je eroziju svjetske poreske osnovice (eng. worldwide tax base) sa jedne strane, a sa druge, narušila balans između subjektivnog poreskog prava države rezidentstva i države izvora, kao rezultat povećane mogućnosti preduzeća da koristeći tehnologiju, vrše značajne i profitabilne poslovne aktivnosti na teritoriji određene države bez ostvarivanja fizičkog prisustva i time bez sticanja statusa stalne poslovne jedinice u toj držvi.75 To je dovelo do BEPS Projekta 2013. godine, koji je kao jedan od ključnih poreskih izazova prepoznao upravo digitalizaciju ekonomije. Kroz BEPS Projekat je postignuta saglasnost o izmjenama u pojmu stalne poslovne jedinice (u ugovorima o izbjegavanju dvostrukog oporezivanja), što je manifestovano u BEPS Multilateralnoj konvenciji. Iako ove izmjene „snižavaju prag“ za uspostavljanje subjektivnog poreskog prava države izvora za oporezivanje dobiti koju ostvari preduzeće – rezident druge države, ipak one ne rješavaju ključni problem oporezivanja u digitalnoj ekonomiji jer se koncept stalne poslovne jedinice i dalje zasniva na fizičkom prisustvu nerezidentnog preduzeća. Stoga se u okviru OECD-a i na niovu Evropske unije traga za rješenjem koje bi omogućilo oporezivanje nerezidentnih preduzeća koja ostvaruju značajno ekonomsko prisustvo na teritoriji određene države, bez istovremenog ostvarivanja fizičkog prisustva na njenoj teritoriji. Jedan od prijedloga, koji je bio predmet naše analize, jeste i koncept značajnog ekonomskog, odnosno digitalnog prisustva. Međutim, prijedlozi OECD-a i Evropske komisije imaju brojne nedostatke, na koje smo ukazali u ovome radu, te je navedeni koncept potrebno dalje razvijati i unapređivati. Nadamo se da će OECD ostvariti postavljeni cilj da konsenzualno rješenje bude postignuto do kraja 2020. godine, jer rastuće nezadovoljstvo sistemom međunarodnog oporezivanja dovodi do toga da sve veći broj država poseže za različitim unilateralnim rješenjima, što može otvoriti dodatne probleme (prije svega problem dvostrukog oporezivanja). 75 Lopez - Escribano Eva. „An Opportunistic, and yet Appropriate, Revision of the Source Treshold for the Twenty-First Century Tax Treaties“, Intertax 43(1)/2015: 7. 592 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova TACKLING THE AVOIDANCE OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT STATUS IN DIGITAL ECONOMY Irena Radić76 Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Advances in digital technology have not changed the fundamental nature of the core activities that businesses carry out as part of a business model to generate profits (businesses still need to source and acquire inputs, create or add value, and sell to customers). Digitalization has, however, driven considerable changes in the way these activities are carried out. Nowadays it is possible to be heavily involved in the economic life of another country, e.g. by doing business with customers located in that country via the internet, without having a taxable presence herein (such as substantial physical presence or a dependent agent). The fact that it is possible to generate a large quantity of sales without taxable presence raised a question about whether the current international taxation rules continue to be appropriate in the digital economy. These changes have particularly placed pressure on the concept of permanent establishment (PE) for treaty purposes and the related profit attribution rules. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to put a light on the traditional PE concept, it’s inappropriateness as a taxable nexus in the digital economy and, also to analyze some potential solutions for this issue. Keywords: permanent establishment, fixed place of business, significant digital presence, digital economy, international taxation, BEPS Project. LITERATURA: Knjige, monografije, članci: 1. Arginelli Paolo. „PE Negative List and Fragmentation of Activities Within Groups of Companies“, u New Trends in the Definition of Permanent Establishment, ed. Maisto Guglielmo, 91:135. Amsterdam:IBFD, 2019 2. Baez Andres, Brauner Yariv. „Taxing the Digital Economy Post BEPS.... Seriously“, Legal Studies Research Paper Series 19-16,/2019, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. 3. Cockfield J. Arthur. „Taxing Global Digital Income in a Post-BEPS World“, Queens Law, Research Papers Series 2018/096. 76 MA, Assistant 593 Irena Radić 4. Cockfield J. Arthur, „Tax Wars: How to End the Conflict over Taxing Global Digital Commerce“, Berkeley Business Law Journal (Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3493940 5. 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European Commision (2018), Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence, COM(2018) 147 final 2018/0072 (CNS) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ resource.html?uri=cellar:3d33c84c-327b-11e8-b5fe-01aa75ed71a1.0021.02/ DOC_1&format=PDF 13. Zakon o porezu na dobit (“Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske” broj 94/2015, 1/2017 i 58/2019) 596 Original scientific paper UDK PRAVNI STATUS AUTONOMNIH ROBOTA Bosiljka Čubrilović1 Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci Apstrakt: Savremeno tumačenje riječi robot podrazumijeva da su to elektromehaničke mašine sposobne da obavljaju određene zadatke, autonomno ili pod kontrolom čovjeka. Dakle, robot je mašina. Mašina je, pak, po svojoj prirodi, stvar, a stvar je materijalni dio prirode koji se nalazi u ljudskom pritežanju tj. aprehenziji i na kojoj je moguće zasnovati pravo svojine ili neko drugo stvarno pravo. Dakle, na osnovu ove analogije možemo reći da su roboti stvari. Ovom tumačenju ne ide u prilog činjenica da današnji roboti, androidi imaju autonomiju koja se može definisati kao sposobnost da robot donosi odluke i da ih provodi u stvarnom svijetu, nezavisno od vanjske kontrole i uticaja. Uzimajući u obzir izvjestan nivo autonomije inteligentnih robota, javlja se pitanje njihove prirode u svjetlu postojećih pravnih kategorija – da li ih treba smatrati fizičkim licima, pravnim licima, životinjama, stvarima – ili treba stvoriti novu kategoriju, sa svim specifičnostima i implikacijama koje se odnose na priznavanje prava i obaveza, uključujući i sposobnost prouzrokovanja i odgovaranja za štetu. U ovom radu autor nastoji da istraži granice (budućeg) legislativnog okvira koji se odnosi na pravni status autonomnih robota, odnosno pitanje pravnog položaja robota u sistemu građanskog prava. U savremenom pravu uočljiva je tendecija da pravni poreci priznaju izvjestan nivo pravnog subjektiviteta pojedinim entitetima, kao što su životinje i životna sredina, ali je još uvijek upitno da li se takav ili sličan status može priznati i autonomnim robotima. Nesporno je da, s jedne strane, postoji i pravna i etička dilema o priznanju pravnog statusa robotima, dok je s druge strane vidljivo da su roboti sve više involvirani u naš svakodnevni život. U istraživanju ove teme autor je uzeo u obzir odredbe Rezolucije Evropskog parlamenta od 16. februara 2017. s preporukama Komisiji o pravilima građanskog prava o robotici (2015/2103(INL)) kojom se, između ostalog, otvara mogućnost o dodjeli statusa robotima kao “elektronskih ličnosti” s ciljem preuzimanja odgovornosti u slučaju prouzrokovanja štete. Ključne riječi: pravni status autonomnih robota, pravna i poslovna sposobnost, odgovornost za štetu, elektronska ličnost, mehatronički uređaj. 1 MA, Asistent 597 Bosiljka Čubrilović 1. UVOD Vještačka inteligencija2,3 (Artificial intelligence, dalje: AI) je odavno postala naša sadašnjost i definitivno, biće naša budućnost u superdigitalnom svijetu. Danas prihvatamo normalnim da u industriji rade roboti4, u suprotnom smatramo da nije na nivou savremenog tehnološkog napretka. Međutim, ubrzan razvoj robotike nosi sa sobom teške izazove za društvo u cjelini. Po prvi put se čovječanstvo suočava sa jednom novom pojavom koja se odnosi na prelazak robota i AI iz industrijskog sektora u okruženje civilnog društva. Širom svijeta roboti osim industrije osvajaju i druga područja ljudske djelatnosti. Primjenjuju se u bolnicama kao hirurški roboti, medicinske sestre, roboti terapeuti, brinu za starije, vodiči su u muzejima, nastavnici jezika i slično. Dosad su roboti obavljali repetitivne poslove za šta im je bio potreban niži ili prosječan nivo „inteligencije“5. Danas sofisticirani roboti imaju relativno visoku „inteligenciju“ uporedivu s ljudskom. Ona iznosi kao i prosječna ljudska inteligencija tj. oko 100 IQ. Prema nekim predviđanjima, ako bi razvoj AI rastao godišnje po stopi od 1 do 1,5 IQ bodova, lako je izračunati, ako ne bude značajnijih promjena, da će robotska „inteligencija“ za sljedećih desetak do petnaest godina biti veća od 90% ljudske populacije.6 Zanimljive su i prognoze poznatog futurologa Reja Kurzvela (Ray Kurzweil) koji konstatuje da će do 2029. godine računari imati „inteligenciju“ na ljudskom nivou. On 2 “Vještačka inteligencija je grana računarske nauke koja se bavi proučavanjem i oblikovanjem računarskih sistema koji pokazuju neki oblik inteligencije. Takvi sistemi mogu učiti, mogu donositi zaključke o svijetu koji ih okružuje, oni razumiju prirodni jezik, mogu spoznati i tumačiti složene vizuelne scene te obavljati druge vrste vještina za koje se zahtijeva čovjekov tip inteligencije.” D. W. Patterson (prev. B. Č.). 3 Dana 8. decembra 2018. godine High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG) - pedeset i dva stručnjaka iz akademskih krugova, civilnog društva i industrije koju je imenovala Evropska Komisija - objavila je Nacrt smjernica o etičkoj inteligenciji u kojima je postavljen okvir za oblikovanje pouzdane AI i u kome je predložena ažurirana definicija AI: “Vještačka inteligencija (AI) odnosi se na sisteme koje su dizajnirali ljudi koji s obzirom na složen cilj djeluju u fizičkom ili digitalnom svijetu opažajući svoje okruženje, interpretirajući prikupljene strukturisane ili nestrukturisane podatke, zaključujući na osnovu saznanja dobijenih iz tih podataka i odlučujući o najboljim radnjama poduzetima (prema unaprijed definisanim parametrima) za postizanje zadatog cilja. AI sistemi se takođe mogu dizajnirati tako da nauče prilagoditi svoje ponašanje analizirajući kako okolina utiče na njihove prethodne akcije.” (prev. B. Č.) V. „HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI HLEG], DRAFT ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR TRUSTWORTHY AI (Dec. 18, 2018),“ vi, pristupljeno 1. aprila 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/system/files/ged/ai_hleg_draft_ethics_guidelines_18_december.pdf. 4 Robot - od češke i slovačke riječi robota, a koja je proizašla iz praslavenske riječi orbota, koja se koristila za označavanje napornog rada ili ropstva. 5 Inteligencija (lat. intelligere – shvatati, razumijevati) je “sposobnost brzog shvatanja i razumevanja, umna obdarenost, bistrina, razum”, v. Milica Vujanić i dr., Rečnik srpskog jezika (Beograd: Matica Srpska, 2018); „Intelligence is the ability to adapt to change.“ Stiven Hoking. Kao takva, ona je karakteristika živog stvorenja, u prvom redu čovjeka (homo sapiens), kao misaonog bića koje ima sposobnost razmišljanja i zaključivanja. 6 Bojan Jerbić, „Kognitivni roboti i kako (pre)živjeti s njima,“ pristupljeno 20. marta 2020, https://konferencije. lider.media/4ir/wp-content/uploads/sites/116/2017/05/a1-Jerbic.pdf. 598 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ističe da je tzv. tehnološka singularnost7, koju možemo tumačiti kao očekivanu tačku u vremenu kada napredak AI dovodi do stvaranja mašine (tehnološkog oblika života) koji je pametniji od ljudi, sasvim izvjesna i da će se ta prekretnica dogoditi do 2045. godine. Dok se mnogi ljudi plaše ove budućnosti, Kurzvel sugeriše da će ljudska bića imati koristi kada roboti prekorače naše biološke granice inteligencije, AI će biti toliko inteligentna da će smisliti ideje koje puki ljudi ne mogu ni razumjeti. On zaključuje da bi AI mogla riješiti većinu problema koje čovjek nije sposoban riješiti - uključujući tu i medicinske probleme. Umjesto da se plašimo da će se tehnologija okrenuti protiv nas, Kurzvel smatra da postoji ogroman potencijal i za širenje naše, ljudske inteligencije. U bližoj budućnosti ljudski um neće biti ograničen na biološki mozak, doći će do povezivanja mozga s oblakom (cloud) čime će se značajno povećati inteligencija čovjeka.8,9 Bez obzira na naš lični stav o nivou razvoja (blisko)futurističnih mašina, računara, robota i sl., nesporno je da i na ovom, trenutnom stepenu razvoja, roboti dobijaju sve viši stepen AI. Razvijen je sistem vlastitog učenja i donošenja odluka koje nisu unaprijed određene, već su plod robotovog „razmišljanja“, stečenog iskustva i sakupljenog znanja učenjem. To su sve odlike tzv. autonomnih ili kognitivnih robota. Već imamo primjere takvih robota poput Sophie i Erice, koje nisu samo „pametni“, već dobijaju i vizuelni ljudski identitet. U moru otvorenih pitanja koja se odnose na AI, kao što su uticaj robota na zaposlenost, na vrstu poslova koje će u potpunosti ili u velikoj mjeri preuzeti od (umjesto) čovjeka, zatim uticaj robota na socijalno distanciranje između ljudi i emotivno zbližavanje na relaciji čovjek – robot, zaključenja ugovora, pa i samih brakova, sve glasnije rasprave se vode o potrebi za priznavanjem izvjesnog, ograničenog, sui generis pravnog subjektiviteta (statusa) autonomnim robotima. 7 U fizici singularnost je tačka u kojoj je gravitacija toliko intenzivna da se čak i prostor i vrijeme počinju razgrađivati. Na ovom mjestu je koristimo kao metaforu za opisivanje onog što će se dogoditi kada (ako) AI nadmaši ljudsku inteligenciju. 8 „Ray Kurzweil Predictions Persist: Is Technological Singularity Next?,“ Now., pristupljeno 30. marta 2020, https://now.northropgrumman.com/ray-kurzweil-predictions-persist-turns-70. 9 Sve ovo ukazuje da se ostvaruje ideja transhumanizma po kojoj se sposobnost ljudske vrste može poboljšati tehnologijom, odnosno dodavanjem nebioloških komponenti biološkom sistemu ljudskog tijela. V. više Gojko Nikolić, „Ugradnja elektronike u čovjeka“, pristupljeno 21, marta 2020, https://zg-magazin.com.hr/ugradnjaelektronike-u-covjeka/. 599 Bosiljka Čubrilović 2. POJAM PRAVNOG SUBJEKTIVITETA Stari Rimljani su smatrali da postoji jedno univerzalno prirodno pravo (ius naturale), „kojim je priroda poučila sva živa bića, jer to pravo nije svojstveno samo ljudskom rodu, nego je zajedničko svim živim bićima...” (D. 1.1.1.3. Ulpianus libro primo Institutionum). Ipak, u savremenoj nauci i dalje preovlađuje mišljenje da je ono isključivo ljudski fenomen. Za razliku od svih drugih društvenih bića koja slijede jedino svoje instinkte, čovjek slijedi razum i prilikom zadovoljavanja većine potreba, rukovodi se kulturnim obrascima ponašanja. Kao razumno biće, čovjek svjesno potiskuje instinktivne obrasce i zajedno sa ostalim pripadnicima svoje vrste ustanovljava posebna društvena pravila. No, postavlja se pitanje da li pravilima koja stvaraju ljudi može biti priznat pravni subjektivitet, a time i pravna sposobnost i nekim drugim entitetima? Subjekti (personae) građanskopravnog odnosa su imaoci pravne sposobnosti. Imati pravnu sposobnost znači biti subjekat “pravnih obaveza i subjektivnih prava”.10 Pravna sposobnost je, dakle, zakonom priznata sposobnost biti subjekat prava i pravne dužnosti. Kada govorimo o domaćem pravu11, pravna sposobnost priznaje se fizičkim licima i određenim organizacijama fizičkih lica koja se označavaju pravnim licima.12 Svaki pojedinac ima pravo da bude priznat kao subjekat prava. Da bi uživao svoja prava i slobode, čovjeku, odnosno fizičkom licu13 se na prvom mjestu i prije svega, mora priznati status subjekta u pravu14. Fizičko lice nastaje ako je rođeno, pokazuje znake života, a potiče od žene i muškarca, bez obzira na izgled i vitalitet. Dakle, pravnu sposobnost fizičko lice stiče ako je živo rođeno, a prestaje smrću. Pored pravne sposobnosti, pravni poredak poznaje i poslovnu sposobnost. Poslovna sposobnost je mogućnost fizičkog lica da samo svojom voljom zasniva, mijenja i gasi prava i obaveze, tj. proizvodi određena pravna dejstva, a prvenstveno se ispoljava u mogućnosti fizičkog lica da zaključuje, mijenja i gasi pravne poslove. Postojanje pravne sposobnosti je pretpostavka za nastanak poslovne sposobnosti. Dok pravnu sposobnost fizičko lice stiče 10 Hans Kelzen, Opšta teorija prava i države (Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, 1998), 150. 11 Ovo se prvenstveno odnosi na zakonodavni okvir Republike Srpske i Bosne i Hercegovine, s tim da postoji izuzetno visok nivo podudarnosti i u propisima ostalih zemalja u regionu. 12 Pravno lice možemo definisati kao jedinstvenu organizaciju ljudi osnovanu radi ostvarenja određenog trajnijeg cilja, koju pravo smatra za pravni subjekat, sa pravima i obavezama koji se razlikuju od prava i obaveza pojedinaca koji ga sačinjavaju. V. Zoran Rašović, Građansko pravo (Podgorica: Pravni fakultet Podgorica, 2006), 80. 13 Između pojmova „čovjek“ i „fizičko lice“ ne možemo staviti znak jednakosti, je je čovjek biološki i fiziološki pojam, dok je fizičko lice, kao subjekt prava, pojam prava i pravne nauke. 14 Član 6 Univerzalne deklaracije o ljudskim pravima UN iz 1948, normira: „svako ima pravo da svuda bude priznat kao pravni subjekat“. 600 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova rođenjem, poslovnu sposobnost stiče znatno kasnije. „Pravna sposobnost ne zavisi od sposobnosti za rasuđivanje i volje fizičkog lica (i da li je ono preduzima samostalno ili je zastupano), dok je za poslovnu sposobnost relevantna upravo volja jer imalac poslovne sposobnosti samostalno preduzima pravne radnje. Osim toga, za razliku od pravne sposobnosti, obim poslovne sposobnosti je kod pojedinih ljudi, zbog njihovog uzrasta i drugih, različitih svojstava, nejednak.“15 Kada govorimo o pravnoj i poslovnoj sposobnosti pravnih lica, preovlađujući je stav da one nastaju istovremeno. Fizička i pravna lica (pravni subjekti) su tvorevina pravnog poretka i predstavljaju pravnu kategoriju. Naime, ni fizička lica po rođenju, ni pravna lica (kao organizacija fizičkih lica) po svojoj prirodi nisu pravni subjekti dok im to svojstvo ne odredi pravni poredak. 16 Koncept „subjekta prava“ nije nepromjenljiv, jer su se s razvojem pravne doktrine i još neki „entiteti“ počeli podvoditi pod ovaj pojam. Pored fizičih i pravnih lica, kao subjekti prava, u literaturi se sve češće pominju i dva novija entiteta, a to su životinje i životna sredina. Kada govorimo o subjektivitetu životnja, domaće pravne norme tretiraju ih prvenstveno sa aspekta odgovornosti za prouzrokovanu štetu. Naime, osnov odgovornosti za štetu koju pričini životinja je objektivna odgovornost, što implicira da je životinja opasna stvar, za čiju štetu se odgovara prema opštim pravilima o odgovornosti bez obzira na krivicu. Takođe, i djelatnosti sa životinjama i u vezi sa njima smatraju se opasnim djelatnostima. Iako se životinje u građanskom (odštetnom) pravu smatraju (opasnim) stvarima, postavlja se pitanje da li se u pravu uopšte, a posebno u građanskom pravu može govoriti o životinjama i kao subjektima prava, tj. imaocima pravnog subjektiviteta i u kojem obimu?17 Značajan iskorak u ovom domenu napravljen je međunarodnim i domaćim aktima koja štite prava životinja. Od međunarodnih pravnih izvora koji se odnose na prava životinja donesene su Univerzalna deklaracija o pravima životinja 1978. godine, od strane Međunarodnog saveza za prava životinja i UNESCO-a i Univerzalna deklaracija o dobrobiti životinja iz 2000. godine, od strane Svjetskog društva za zaštitu životinja (WSPA). Obje deklaracije su usvojene od međunarodnih nevladinih organizacija i kao takve imaju samo moralnu vrijednost, a ne i formalno-pravnu obaveznost za države. U svakom slučaju, prava koja su ovim deklaracijama ustanovljena u korist životinja našla 15 Ilija Babić i Radenko Jotanović, Građansko pravo, Knjiga 1: Uvod u građansko pravo (Banja Luka: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci, 2018), 99. 16 Ibidem, 87. 17 Radenko Jotanović, „Pravni status životinja u građanskom pravu,“ Godišnjak Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci, br. 36 (2014): 103. 601 Bosiljka Čubrilović su svoje mjesto i u Zakonu o zaštiti i dobrobiti životinja.18 Navedenim aktima regulisan je drugačiji pravni tretman, životinje nisu stvari19, odnosno objekti ili predmeti građanskog prava koji predstavljaju samo interes čovjeka, već živa bića koja imaju svoje sopstvene interese, nezavisne od interesa i vrijednosti koje im nameće čovjek. Životinjama se daje mogućnost da svoje interese ostvaruju bez diskriminacije od strane čovjeka, a osnov za priznavanje pojedinih prava životinja leži u činjenici da se radi o živim bićima koja imaju osjećaje bola, patnje, stresa, straha, tj. imaju razvijen nervni sistem (slično začetom, a nerođenom ljudskom biću). Dakle, životinje zbog odsustva svijesti (razuma), ne mogu imati potpuni pravni subjektivitet, ali im se ne može negirati postojanje bilo kakvog pravnog subjektiviteta, jer i sam čovjek u određenim fazama svog nastanka, nema svijest i razum pa ipak mu se priznaje poseban, sui generis pravni subjektivitet (nasciturus). Još je rimsko pravo konstruisalo tzv. fikciju nasciturusa prema kojoj se začeto dijete smatra kao već rođeno ako su u pitanju njegova nasljedna prava („Nasciturus pro iam nato habetur, quotiens de commodis ipsius partus quaeritur“). Nesporno je da nasciturus ima određenu pravnu sposobnost, ali je sporan obim te pravne sposobnosti. Ovakva pravna sposobnost se ogleda u fikciji kojom se štite njegova imovinska (nasljedna) prava. Međutim, potrebno je stvoriti i pravnu konstrukciju na osnovu koje će se štititi i njegova neimovinska prava, jer postoji potreba da se već od začeća djeteta štiti njegovo pravo na život, tjelesni i duhovni integritet, zdravlje itd. Na konto prethodno rečenog, još jednan „pravni entitet“ je na tragu da mu se prizna sui generis pravni subjektivitet. Savremeni pojam subjekta prava ne ograničava se isključivo na fizička i pravna lica, odnosno životinje, već se vrši proširivanje liste titulara subjektivnih građanskih prava uključivanjem i životne sredine, na osnovu čega će priznavanje pravnog subjektiviteta doći samo po sebi. Imajući u vidu naprijed navedeno, možemo izvesti zaključak da i neki drugi subjekti, osim fizičkih i pravnih lica, mogu imati izvjestan nivo (oblik) pravnog subjektiviteta. Ti subjekti su začeto a nerođeno dijete (nasciturus), životinje, kao i životna sredina. Za razliku od fizičkih lica koja nisu subjekti prava dok im to svojstvo ne odredi pravni poredak, tj. tvorevina su pravnog 18 Pod istoimenim nazivom donesen je zakon na nivou Republike Srpske, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 111/2008 i na nivou Bosne i Hercegovine, Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine, br. 25/2009 i 9/2018. 19 Član 6, stav 7 Zakona o stvarnim pravima, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 124/2008, 3/2009 - ispr., 58/2009, 95/2011, 60/2015, 18/2016 - odluka US i 107/2019, koji pri određenju predemeta svojine i drugih stvarnih prava normira da „Životinje nisu stvari, ali za njih vrijedi sve što i za stvari, ako zakonom nije drugačije određeno, v. čl. 6, st. 7. 602 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova poretka i predstavljaju pravnu kategoriju, životinje, životna sredina (priroda) i drugi entiteti nisu eksplicitni subjekti prava, ali im pravni poredak priznaje određeni (ograničeni) pravni subjektivitet. 20 Da li se ista analogija može primjeniti i na autonomne robote? 3. PRETHODNO PITANJE: MOGU LI I TREBAJU LI ROBOTI IMATI PRAVA? O današnjim autonomnim robotima i onima koji nam dolaze u budućnosti promišlja se na način da će biti tretirani kao „digitalne ličnosti“, odnosno roboti-ljudi. Generalno govoreći, postoji strah o robotu kao „digitalnom biću“ koji bi mogao „tražiti“ svoja prava. O tome govori i diskusija u Evropskom parlamentu u kojoj se vodila rasprava treba li autonomne, sofisticirane robote staviti na isti nivo sa živim bićima. Trebaju li roboti, npr. poput životinja, imati svoja prava koja bi već sada bilo nužno ugraditi u zakone? S jedne strane, isticani su stavovi da „pravo proizlazi iz života, a roboti su proizvod ljudskog uma i ljudskih ruku, oni su objekti – strojevi, a ne osobe, u njima nema života, roboti nemaju dušu i ne može im se dati status osobe pa makar i elektroničke. Ljudi i roboti ne mogu se staviti na istu razinu.“21 Zatraženo je i brisanje člana Izvještaja s preporukama Komisiji o pravilima građanskog prava o robotici (2015/2103(INL))22 koji traži „stvaranje posebnog dugoročnog pravnog statusa za robote kako bi najsofisticiraniji autonomni roboti mogli imati status elektroničkih osoba s odgovornošću ispravljanja štete koju su uzrokovali te…. u slučajevima kad roboti donesu pametnu autonomnu odluku ili na neki drugi način neovisno surađuju s trećim stranama“.23 U prilog contra argumentima možemo pripisati i činjenicu da sve karakteristike i mogućnosti AI, kao što su: sposobnost komunikacije, poznavanje sebe i vanjskog svijeta, sposobnost postizanja utvrđenih ciljeva i određen nivo kreativnosti, proi20 Zanimljivi su slučajevi iz uporednog prava, pa je tako u Indiji, Visoki sud u Bombaju dodijelio status pravne ličnost hinduističkim idolima, smatrajući ih sposobnima da imaju imovinu i plaćaju porez, v. „Pramatha Nath Mullick vs Pradyumna Kumar Mullick on 28 April, 1925,“ Indian Kanoon, pristupljeno 2. aprila 2020, https:// indiankanoon.org/doc/290902/; Takođe, na Novom Zelandu rijeci Whanganuidobila je dodijeljen status subjekta prava, jer pleme Whanganui Māori tretira rijeku kao svog pretka, v. „New Zealand river granted same legal rights as human being,“ The Guardian, pristupljeno 2. aprila 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being. 21 „Petir: Roboti ne mogu imati status (elektroničke) osobe,“ ZG-magazin, pristupljeno 21, marta 2020, http:// zg-magazin.com.hr/petir-roboti-ne-mogu-imati-status-elektronicke-osobe/, objavljeno 16. 02. 2017. 22 „Izvještće s preporukama Komisiji o pravilima građanskog prava o robotici (2015/2103(INL)),“ Evropski parlament, pristupljeno 31. marta 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0005_ HR.html. 23 „Petir: Roboti ne mogu imati status (elektroničke) osobe.“ 603 Bosiljka Čubrilović zlaze iz koda koji je napisao čovjek, koji programira ili definiše djelovanje AI. Dakle, u krajnjoj liniji, bez obzia na njegovu autonomnost, robot je i dalje zavisan od čovjeka, te s toga ne može i ne treba da ima pravni subjektivitet. Vještačka inteligencija, u prvom redu autonomni roboti, nesumnjivo koristi kognitivne procese za postizanje utvrđenih ciljeva, ali to se ne čini dovoljno jakim razlogom za ocjenu pravne sposobnosti, uzevši u obzir kriterijum prava i obaveza. U kontekstu autonomnog robota, teško je reći da ima slobodnu volju koja bi mogla dovesti do npr. izvršenja krivičnog djela ili povrede prava na imovinu s ciljem postizanja vlastitih ciljeva. Ovakva ponašanja ne možemo pripisati određenom stepenu krivice ili svijesti, namjeri da izvrši protivpravno djelo. Takođe, nije moguće da roboti preuzmu odgovornost za svoje postupke, npr., u slučaju nesreće prouzrokovane autonomnim automobilom ili zbog neispravnosti hirurških robota. Vještačkom inteligencijom se može osigurati kôd u skladu sa određenim pravilima, no primjena takvih pravila nije rezultat volje, pa stoga ne može dovesti do odgovornosti. U prilog pro argumentaciji navodi se da bi status „elektronske ličnosti“ 24,25 bio dodijeljen robotima koji su autonomni, te u odnosima sa ljudima imaju ograničenu autonomiju odlučivanja. Uz prava, dolaze i obaveze (odgovornost), pa bi prema navedenoj logici robote trebalo smatrati odgovornim za štetu koju bi počinili. Odboru za pravna pitanja Evropskog parlamenta (JURI) predlagano je legalizovanje statusa elektronske ličnosti robota, s jednim ograničenjem, koje se ogleda u pravnoj regulativi za obavezno postavljenje posebnog prekidača (engl. kill switch) kojim bi se robot momentalno isključio ako njegova aktivnost ugrožava ljude ili imovinu. Ideja o takvom prekidaču nije nova. Prethodno su pojedini naučnici iz domena roboetike predlagali uvođenje „velikog crvenog dugmeta“ kojim bi se AI mogla zaustaviti u provođenju, odnosno nastavku nekih štetnih aktivnosti. To bi moglo biti teško provodivo u praksi za autonomne robote jer, uostalom, AI bi mogla naučiti prepoznati radnje koje pokušava izvesti ljudski kontrolor te takve radnje mogla pokušati izbjeći ili eventualno naučiti kako onemogućiti funkcionisanje ugrađenog „velikog crveng dugmeta“. Ideje o kill switch-u ili „velikom crvenom dugmetu“ i prebacivanje pravne odgovornosti na vlasnika 24 Izraz „elektronska ličnost“ prvi je put pomenut u članku “Shakey” iz 1967, objavljenom u časopisu LIFE, v. Charles Rosen, Nils Nilsson i Bertram Raphael i drugi, “Shakey” iz 1967, pristupljeno 1. marta 2020, http://cyberneticzoo.com/cyberneticanimals/1967-shakey-charles-rosen-nils-nilsson-bertram-raphael-et-al-american. 25 Robot je mehatronički uređaj, te je i sam naziv „elektronska ličnost“ proizašao iz povezivanja robotove „osobnosti“ odnosno ponašanja, koje određuju elektronski sistem i informatički programi (vještačka inteligencija), v. Gojko Nikolić, „Je li “pametni” robot “mehatronička osoba”?“, pristupljeno 20. marta 2020, https:// zg-magazin.com.hr/je-li-pametni-robot-mehatronicka-osoba/. 604 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova robota npr. zbog nemara jer nije prekinuo štetno djelovanje robota i aktivirao prekidač, same po sebi su protivriječne ideji o statusu elektronske ličnosti i sui generis pravnom subjektivitetu autonomnih robota. Po svemu sudeći, vidljivo je da se nauka i etika danas „lome“ oko pitanja: “Mogu li i trebaju li roboti imati prava?”. Ovo pitanje se sastoji od dva odvojena upita: „Mogu li roboti imati prava?“, koji postavlja pitanje o sposobnosti određenog entiteta i „Trebaju li roboti imati prava?“ koji govori o obavezama koje ima ovaj entitet. 26 Ovom temom bavio se profesor Dejvid Gankel (David J. Gunkel) koji je iznio četiri teze o pravima robota: 1. „Ne mogu i ne bi trebalo da imaju prava.“ - prvi slučaj se bazira na stavu da su roboti samo još jedan vid tehnologije, tj. oruđa koja koristimo kako bi nam olakšala obavljanje poslova, stoga je nemoguće da posjeduju bilo kakva prava. Ovo se u najvećoj mjeri odnosi na automatizovane industrijske mašine i alate. 2. „Mogu i stoga bi trebalo da imaju prava.“ - ovaj slučaj je najpribližniji stavu pojedinih predstavnika Evropskog parlamenta koji su za to da se robotima treba dodijeliti status elektronskih ličnosti, prvenstveno s ciljem odgovornosti za prouzrokovanu štetu. 3. „Iako mogu imati prava, ne bi trebalo“ - to nije prihvatljvo sa društvenog i moralnog stanovišta, na ovaj način se štite ljudi i društvene institucije. 27 Pristalice trećeg stava smatraju da treba da postoje određeni propisi koji prvenstveno regulišu pitanje naknade štete prouzrokovane djelovanjem robota, ali se strogo protive ideji o robotima kao nosiocima civilnih prava. 4. “Iako ne mogu da imaju prava, trebalo bi.” - pobornici ovakvog stava robote upoređuju sa životinjama, navodeći činjenicu da su ljudi skloni emocionalnom vezivanju i da ne gledaju na robote samo kao na objekte, već kao na svoje ljubimce. Kao što postoje oni koji se bore za prava životinja, tako bi ljudi trebalo da se bore i za prava robota. Istina da, uzevši u obzir nivo samosvijesti, autonomije i samoodređenja, možemo tražiti analogiju između robota i životinja. Ali ono zbog čega ljudi žele pružiti zakonsku zaštitu životinjama nije samo inteligencija koju neki od njih pokazuju, već i njihova sposobnost da osjećaju bol, radost ili privrženost, koje nesumljivo AI nedostaje. 26 David J. Gunkel, „The other question: can and should robots have rights?,“Ethics Inf Technol 20:87–99 (2018): 89. 27 “Robots Should Be Slaves. Robots are property. No matter how capable they are, appear to be, or may become; we are obligated not to be obligated by them.“, Ibidem, 88. 605 Bosiljka Čubrilović Imati pravni status, odnosno biti subjekt prava ne proizlazi iz specifičnog kvaliteta fizičkog ili pravnog lica, već je rezultat zakonodavnih opcija koje se temelje na moralnim razmatranjima, koje reflektuju društvenu stvarnost u pravnom okviru. Budući da ni jedan princip ne diktira kada pravni sistem mora priznati „subjekt“ kao titulara pravne, odnosno poslovne sposobnosti, tada je jedino relevantno da se utvrdi da li se sa moralnog apsekta AI treba smatrati zasebnim pravnim entitetom i da li to odražava društvenu stvarnost. Pitanja „Mogu li i trebaju li roboti imati prava?” su u svakom slučaju ontološkog karaktera, a odgovori zavise od moralnih i vrijednosnih stavova koji preovladavaju u jednoj duštvenoj zajednici. Samim „stavljanjem na sto“ mogućnosti o dodjeli statusa „elektronske ličnosti“ robota iz kojeg proističu izvjesna prava i obaveze, drastično se mijenja pojam i shvatanje živog i neživog, svjesnog i nesvjesnog. Uzevši u obzir današnja moralna shvatanja i društvene odnose ova mogućnost biće teško prihvatljiva za društvo u cjelini. 4. PRAVNI SUBJEKTIVITET (AUTONOMNIH) ROBOTA Pitanje priznanja pravnog subjektiviteta robota je polarizovalo stavove naučne i stručne javnosti. Nesporno je da, s jedne strane, postoji i pravna i etička dilema o priznanju pravnog statusa robotima, dok je s druge strane vidljivo da su roboti sve više involvirani u naš svakodnevni život. Ovo posljednje posebno dolazi do izražaja kod humanoidnih robota, autonomnih vozila, robota za njegu, medicinskih robota i sl. Uzimajući u obzir izvjestan nivo autonomije inteligentnih robota, javlja se pitanje njihove prirode u svjetlu postojećih pravnih kategorija – da li ih treba smatrati fizičkim licima, pravnim licima, životinjama, stvarima – ili treba stvoriti novu kategoriju, sa svim specifičnostima i implikacijama koje se odnose na priznavanje prava i obaveza, uključujući i sposobnost činjenja i odgovaranja za štetu. U trenutku kad se ljudska vrsta nalazi na pragu razdoblja u kojem je sve više sofisticiranih robota, androida i drugih oblika AI spremno za novu industrijsku revoluciju, od ključne je važnosti da i zakonodavac razmotri pravne i etičke implikacije i učinke tog procesa. U svjetlu navedenog, usvojene su Rezolucija Evropskog parlamenta od 16. februara 2017. s preporukama Komisiji o pravilima građanskog prava o robotici (2015/2103(INL)) (dalje: Rezolucija) i Povelja o robotici, koje na neki način predstavljaju polaznu tačku budućeg legislativnog okvira. 606 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova Rezolucija ima za cilj da postavi zajedničke evropske principe i zajednički okvir prije nego što svaka država članica donese svoje, različite, zakone. Zbog toga je od izuzetne važnosti da se urede pitanja koja se odnose na pravni status robota, pitanje odgovornosti za nastalu štetu, pitanje sigurnosti i zaštite podataka. Dakle, u ovom slučaju možemo slobodno reći da je standardizacija pravila o robotici u interesu tržišnog prostora Evropske unije. Legislativnim okvirom Rezolucije, Evropskoj komisiji (dalje: Komisija) je preporučen čitav niz zakonodavnih i nezakonodavnih inicijativa na području robotike i AI (opšta načela koja se odnose na razvoj robotike i AI za civilnu upotrebu, istraživanje i inovacije, etička načela, nova Evropska agencija, prava intelektualne svojine i protok podataka, standardizacija, sigurnost, autonomna prevozna sredstva, roboti za njegu, medicinski roboti, popravak i unapređivanje ljudi, obrazovanje i zapošljavanje, uticaj na okolinu, odgovornost i međunarodni aspekti). Konkretno, od Komisije je zatraženo da podnese prijedlog zakonodavnog instrumenta kojim se propisuju građanskopravna pravila o odgovornosti robota i AI. Rezolucija usvaja termin „elektronske ličnosti“ kada govori o pravnom statusu robota. Osnovne karakteristike ovog sui generis subjekta, Rezolucijom nisu precizirane, samo je doveden u kontekst odgovornosti za pričinjenu štetu. Rezolucijom je navedeno da bi stvaranje posebnog dugoročnog pravnog statusa za robote omogućilo da odgovaraju za štetu prouzrokovanu autonomnom odlukom ili kada na neki drugi način nezavisno međudjeluju s trećim stranama. Naime, što su roboti autonomniji, to ih manje možemo smatrati jednostavnim alatom u rukama drugih aktera (kao što su proizvođač, operater, vlasnik, korisnik itd.). Ovim se otvara pitanje jesu li dovoljna obična pravila o odgovornosti ili to zahtijeva uvođenje novih načela i pravila kojima se omogućava jasnoća u pogledu pravne odgovornosti različitih aktera, kada je riječ o odgovornosti za djelovanja i propuste robota u slučajevima kada se kao uzrok ne može odrediti specifični ljudski akter. Prema postojećim pravilima o odgovornosti, roboti se ne mogu smatrati odgovornima per se za svoja djela i propuste kojima je nanesena šteta trećim licima, postoji samo pravni okvir prema kome se utvrđuje odgovornost proizvođača za neispravnost proizvoda i odgovornost korisnika proizvoda za ponašanje koje dovodi do štete, te se za sada ta pravila primjenjuju na štetu uzrokovanu robotima ili generalno AI. Dakle, u scenariju u kojem robot donosi samostalne odluke, tradicionalna pravila nisu dovoljna za rješavanje pitanja pravne odgovornosti za štetu prouzrokovanu djelovanjem robotom, jer prema tim pravilima nije moguće utvrditi 607 Bosiljka Čubrilović koja je strana odgovorna za štetu. Neprimjenjivost tradicionalnih pravila o odgovornosti za štetu najbolje se vidi na području ugovorne odgovornosti u slučajevima kad je AI dizajnirana na način da sama može birati ugovornu stranu, pregovarati o ugovornim uslovima, sklapati ugovore i odlučivati hoće li i kako će primjenjivati te ugovore. Zbog toga do izražaja dolazi potreba za novim, učinkovitim i ažuriranim pravilima koja trebaju biti usklađena s nedavnim tehnološkim razvojem i inovacijama koje se koriste na tržištu.28 Direktiva Evropske unije koja reguliše odgovornost za postupke robota29 pokriva samo predvidljivu štetu koja je nastala zbog greške proizvođača, te se njemu i pripisuje odgvornost za štetu. Međutim, kako se sposobnost robota da uče bude poboljšavala i kada se budu prilagođavali okolini na nepredvidive načine, biće sve teže za proizvođače da predvide moguću štetu. Ukoliko roboti postanu savršeniji i samostalniji, jedna od preporuka jeste i da se smanji odgovornost samih proizvođača u skladu sa stepenom autonomije koju posjeduje robot i da se uvede obavezno osiguranje, bez utvrđivanja krivice, kao oblik reparacije prouzrokovane štete. Inicijativa o legaizovanju pravnog statusa robota kao „elektronskih ličnosti“ naišla je na jak otpor naučne i stručne javnosti. U Otvorenom pismu Evropskoj komisiji o vještačkoj inteligenciji i robotici30 navedeno je da „…ekonomski, pravni, društveni i etički uticaj AI i robotike mora se razmatrati bez žurbe ili pristranosti... Stvaranje pravnog statusa “elektronske ličnosti“ za “autonomne”, “nepredvidive” i “samo-učeće” robote opravdava se pogrešnom tvrdnjom da je odgovornost za štetu nemoguće dokazati. Iz tehničke perspektive, ova izjava nudi mnoge pristrasnosti zasnovane na precjenjivanju stvarnih sposobnosti čak i najnaprednijih robota, površnom razumijevanju nepredvidivosti i sposobnosti samo-učenja i percepciji robota iskrivljenoj u naučnoj fanstastici i nekolicini nedavnih senzacionalnih saopštenja za javnost. Iz etičke i pravne perspektive, stvaranje pravne osobnosti za robota neprimjereno je bez obzira na model pravnog statusa: a. Pravni status robota ne može proizaći iz modela fizičkog lica, jer bi tada robot imao ljudska prava, kao što su pravo na dostojanstvo, pravo na njegov integritet ili pravo na državljanstvo, što predstavlja direktno suprotstavljanje 28 V. odjeljak „Odgovornost“, Z-AI. Rezolucije. 29 „Direktiva Vijeća od 25. srpnja 1985. o približavanju zakona i drugih propisa država članica u vezi s odgovornošću za neispravne proizvode (85/374/EEZ),“ EUR-Lex, pristupljeno 1. aprila 2020, https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31985L0374&from=EN. 30 OPEN LETTER TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ROBOTICS, pristupljeno 1. aprila 2020, http://www.robotics-openletter.eu/. 608 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova ljudskim pravima. To bi bilo u suprotnosti s Poveljom o osnovnim pravima Evropske unije i Konvencijom o zaštiti ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda. b. Pravni status robota ne može proizaći iz modela pravnog lica, jer podrazumijeva postojanje fizičkih lica iza pravne osobe koje ga zastupaju i usmjeravaju. A to nije slučaj sa robotima….“ (prev. B. Č.) Otvorenim pismom 156 stručnjaka za vještačku inteligenciju iz 14 evropskih zemalja odbačena je preporuka Evropskog parlamenta da roboti treba da imaju pravni status kao „elektronske ličnosti“, na osnovu koga bi roboti bili odgovorni za naknadu eventualne štete. Prijedlog o uređenju statusa robota kao „elektronske ličnosti“ nije prošao najviše zbog protivljenja prihvatanja robota kao „ličnosti“ jer su prema protivnicima tog prijedloga oni objekti, a ne osobe, ličnosti. Neživa bića nemaju dušu ni svijest, pa ne mogu dobiti ni prava. S pravne strane to nije problem jer su i do sada pravna lica imala status pravnog lica iako nisu živa bića. O ovome će se sigurno nastaviti žustre rasprave, a u međuvremenu postoje prijedlozi za uvođenje poreza na robote kao načina rješavanja socijalnih problema nastalih većom nezaposlenošću primjenom robota, te ugovaranje obavezne polise osiguranja za podmirivanje prouzrokovane materijalne štete. 5. ZAKLJUČAK Čovjek dizajnira, proizvodi, posjeduje i još uvijek, u najvećem broju slučajeva, upravlja robotima. Čovjek određuje i njihove ciljeve i ponašanje, direktno specificirajući njihovu inteligenciju ili indirektno, precizirajući kako roboti stiču vlastitu inteligenciju. Ali na kraj svake indirekcije leži činjenica da ne bi bilo nijednog robota, da nije bio namjere čovjeka da ga stvori, s toga je u razvoju robotike i AI ključno obezbijediti da ljudi uvijek imaju kontrolu nad inteligentnim mašinama (u krajnjoj liniji sistem „kill switch“ ili „veliko crveno dugme“). Nesporno je da su s jedne strane izuzetno jaki pritisci, a tu prije svega mislimo na političke, ekonomske pa i pravne, da se autonomnim robotima prizna neki oblik pravnog subjektiviteta, dok s druge strane, u najvećem dijelu svijeta, moralna i društvena shvatanja još uvijek nisu „sazrela“ za takvu mogućnost. Ako je status „elektronske ličnosti“ primarno predložen s ciljem uspostavljanja modela odgovornosti za štetu prouzrokovanu djelovanjem autonomnog robota, onda bi se trebalo razmisliti o nekom drugom modelu koji ne uključuje priznavanje subjektiviteta autonomnim robotima. Priznavanje 609 Bosiljka Čubrilović pravnog statusa robota kao „elektronske ličnosti“ je rizično jer tako „brišemo granicu“ između ljudi i robota. Anticipirano, proaktivno djelovanje u smislu utvrđivanja legislativnog okvira koji se odnosi na status i odgovornost robota je u svakom slučaju doborodošao. Između dvije krajnosti- da robota tretiramo kao subjekta prava i da robota posmatramo isključivo kao stvar - treba pronaći kompromisno rješenje. Treba da vodimo računa da ne upadnemo u vlastitu zamku. Ako bismo priznali robotima određenu autonomiju svijesti i subjektivitet, roboti bi i dalje bili u nečijoj svojini. Onda bismo mogli doći u jednu apsurdnu situaciju da su roboti zapravo naši robovi, a zabrana ropstva je predviđena članom 5. Povelja Evropske Unije o osnovnim pravima (2016/C 202/02)31. Prijedlozi poput uvođenja poreza na robote i ugovaranje obavezne polise osiguranja za podmirivanje prouzrokovane materijalne štete nastale autonomnim djelovanjem robota, za sada nam se čine daleko prihvatljivijim nego regulisanje sui generis pravnog statusa autonomnih robota. LITERATURA: 1. Babić, Ilija i Jotanović, Radenko. Građansko pravo, Knjiga 1: Uvod u građansko pravo. Banja Luka: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci, 2018. 2. Gunkel, J. David. „The other question: can and should robots have rights?.“ Ethics Inf Technol 20:87–99 (2018): 89. 3. Jotanović, Radenko. „Pravni status životinja u građanskom pravu.“ Godišnjak Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci, br. 36 (2014): 103. 4. Kelzen, Hans. Opšta teorija prava i države. Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, 1998. 5. Rašović, Zoran. Građansko pravo. Podgorica: Pravni fakultet Podgorica, 2006. 6. Vujanić, Milica i dr. Rečnik srpskog jezika. Beograd: Matica Srpska, 2018. 7. Indian Kanoon. „Pramatha Nath Mullick vs Pradyumna Kumar Mullick on 28 April, 1925.“ Pristupljeno 2. aprila 2020, https://indiankanoon.org/ doc/290902/. 8. Jerbić, Bojan. „Kognitivni roboti i kako (pre)živjeti s njima.“ Pristupljeno 20. marta 2020.https://konferencije.lider.media/4ir/wp-ontent/uploads/ sites/116/2017/05/a1-Jerbic.pdf. 31 „Povelja Evropske Unije o osnovnim pravima,“ EUR-Lex, pristupljeno 13. marta 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12016P/TXT&from=FR. 610 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 9. LIFE. Charles Rosen, Nils Nilsson i Bertram Raphael i drugi. “Shakey.” Pristupljeno 1. marta 2020. http://cyberneticzoo.com/cyberneticanimals/1967shakey-charles-rosen-nils-nilsson-bertram-raphael-et-al-american. 10. Nikolić, Gojko. „Je li “pametni” robot “mehatronička osoba”?.“ Pristupljeno 20. marta 2020. https://zg-magazin.com.hr/je-li-pametni-robot-mehatronickaosoba/. 11. Nikolić, Gojko. „Ugradnja elektronike u čovjeka.“ Pristupljeno 21, marta 2020. https://zg-magazin.com.hr/ugradnja-elektronike-u-covjeka/. 12. Now. „Ray Kurzweil Predictions Persist: Is Technological Singularity Next?.“ Pristupljeno 30. marta 2020. https://now.northropgrumman.com/raykurzweil-predictions-persist-turns-70. 13. The Guardian. „New Zealand river granted same legal rights as human being.“ Pristupljeno 2. aprila 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being. 14. ZG-magazin. „Petir: Roboti ne mogu imati status (elektroničke) osobe.“ Pristupljeno 21, marta 2020. http://zg-magazin.com.hr/petir-roboti-nemogu-imati-status-elektronicke-osobe/, objavljeno 16. 02. 2017. 15. Zakon o zaštiti i dobrobiti životinja, Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine, br. 25/2009 i 9/2018. 16. Zakon o zaštiti i dobrobiti životinja, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 111/2008. 17. Zakon o stvarnim pravima, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, br. 124/2008, 3/2009 - ispr., 58/2009, 95/2011, 60/2015, 18/2016 - odluka US i 107/2019. 18. „HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI HLEG], DRAFT ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR TRUSTWORTHY AI (Dec. 18, 2018).“ pristupljeno 1. aprila 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/system/ files/ged/ai_hleg_draft_ethics_guidelines_18_december.pdf. 19. EUR-Lex. „Direktiva Vijeća od 25. srpnja 1985. o približavanju zakona i drugih propisa država članica u vezi s odgovornošću za neispravne proizvode (85/374/EEZ).“ Pristupljeno 1. aprila 2020. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31985L0374&from=EN. 20. EUR-Lex. „Povelja Evropske Unije o osnovnim pravima.“ Pristupljeno 13. marta 2020.https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/HR/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:12016P/TXT&from=FR. 21. Evropski parlament. „Izvještće s preporukama Komisiji o pravilima građanskog prava o robotici (2015/2103(INL)).“ Pristupljeno 31. marta 2020. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0005_HR.html. 611 Bosiljka Čubrilović LEGAL STATUS OF AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS Bosiljka Čubrilović Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka Abstract: The modern interpretation of the word robot implies that electromechanical machines are capable of performing certain tasks, autonomously or under human control. So a robot is a machine. Machine, by their nature, is a thing, a thing is a material part of nature, which is in human pretension, and to which it is possible to base the property right or some other real right. So, based on these analogs, we can say that they are robotic things. This interpretation isn’t supported by the fact that today’s robots, androids, have the autonomy that can be defined as the ability for a robot to make decisions and to execute them in the real world, independent of external control and influence. Given the certain level of autonomy of intelligent robots, the question arises as to their nature in the light of existing legal categories - whether they should be considered as natural persons, legal entities, animals, things - or a new category should be created, with all the specifics and implications related to the recognition of rights and obligations, including the ability to cause and respond to damage. In this paper, the author tries to explore the boundaries of the (future) legislative framework relating to the legal status of autonomous robots, that is, the question of the legal position of robots in the civil law system. In modern law, there is a tendency for legal orders to recognize a certain level of legal subjectivity for certain entities, such as animals and the environment, but it is still questionable that such or similar status can be recognized by (autonomous) robots. It is indisputable that, on the one hand, there is a legal and ethical dilemma about recognizing the legal status of robots, while on the other, it is evident that robots are increasingly involved in our daily lives. In researching this topic, the author took note of the provisions of the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), which, inter alia, open the possibility of granting robot status as “ electronic person” to take responsibility for the damage. Keywords: the legal status of autonomous robots, legal capacity, liability for damages, electronic person, mechatronic machine. 612 Original scientific paper UDK THE CHALLENGES OF PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF TRANSFORMATIVE, DIGITAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES WITH SPECIALL REFERENCE TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Antonije Živković1 LANACO Information Technology Limited Liability Company Banja Luka2 Abstract: With the development of transformational and information technologies, there comes a digital transformation of all forms of social processes, which inevitably affects the protection of intellectual property as a whole. As we live in the digital age, the question is, is this the end of intellectual property or a new beginning? On one hand, the development of transformational technologies which include artificial intelligence enhances business processes, mental health, emotional well-being and the like by using hardware and software resources, while the development of digital information and communication technologies also enhances social and business processes through giving and sharing information that helps in inferring and improving the quality of life of all individuals. However, using transformational and information technologies can lead to many abuses, which often violates intellectual property rights, and above all, copyright on computer software, or software that underpins the work of digital technologies. These abuses can often lead to criminal offenses. Intellectual property rights face the biggest challenge, and the question arises as to whether intellectual property rights need to be reformed in order to bring about the best copyright solutions for computer programs, databases and other intellectual property rights which are strongly represented in the digital age. This work will also specifically analyze artificial intelligence, which is a particularly interesting form of transformational technology, which raises the question of whether copyright and other forms of intellectual property rights can be protected by basic postulates of intellectual property rights and how, if such works are created by artificial intelligence. 1 Master of Laws with passed Bar exam 2 Head of the Legal Department at LANACO Information Technology Limited Liability Company Banja Luka 613 Antonije Živković KEYWORDS: Transformation technology, information technology, copyright, intellectual property law, software, internet. 1. THE IMPACT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSFORMATIVE AND DIGITAL INFORMATION COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES ON THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT Within the term “digital technologies”, we can classify both transformative and information technologies. We are in the era of digitalisation and digital transformation of all forms of social processes, which the transformational and digital information and communication technologies take credit for. On the other hand, the development of these technologies raises the question of the application of traditional postulates of intellectual property protection. A particular challenge is the protection of copyrighted works that are original spiritual works created by artificial intelligence. Who is the author of such works? Who retains the moral and property rights to exploit such copyrighted work? Intellectual property law is a common name for several branches of law that are traditionally divided into two groups: 1) copyright and related rights, which include: interpreters’ rights, phonogram producers’ rights, videogram producers’ rights, broadcasters’ rights) and 2) industrial property rights which include: patent law, trademark law, protection of geographical origin indications, industrial design rights, integrated circuit topography protection rights, plant variety protection rights, unfair competition law and trade secrets.3 The biggest impact of digital technology is, first and foremost, on copyright, which means computer program or software solutions as a broad term, information systems as the broadest term, and carriers of digital information (such as CDs, DVDs, etc.), the Internet and the like. The concept of copyright and its development is related to analog information technology. The advent of digital technology has disrupted the social and factual base of copyright and put the system off balance. Digital information technology has brought the following innovations: 1) The notion of the multiplication of a part is broadened and equated with the access to work; 2) Duplication of a part exists in good quality, fast and cheap; 3) The copyrighted work has been released from 3 Slobodan M. Marković, Dušan V. Popović, Pravo intelektualne svojine, Peto izmjenjeno i dopunjeno izdanje (Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Centar za izdavašto i informisanje, 2017.), 21. 614 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova its physical carrier.; 4) A work of authorship becomes available to a large number of people at different remote locations at the same time; 5) The sale of copies of a part makes way to granting the right to reproduce the part. Wide and new possibilities of using the work have opened up. It should be noted that in the Anglo-Saxon legal culture, a copyright contract (a contract conferring or conceding certain copyrights) is called a license agreement. As an example, in the literature, it is stated that the software industry on the market, from the very beginning, offered their computer programs on a CD in a box with the instructions and with the brand name of the manufacturer. However, a transaction that takes place in a store and resembles a classic sale represents, by the rule, the conclusion of a copyright agreement (license agreement) that is of the nature of an access contract, and the amount paid to download the box with a computer program and other content has the nature of a copyright or license fee. Thus, software vendors rely more on contractual protection instruments than copyright.4 However, it should be emphasized that the software industry which is very active in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in many cases, creates a type of computer programs, i.e. software solutions that are colloquially called “web applications” and the end user can access the use of this software through an Internet browser, after having previously concluded a standard agreement on the use of certain software with the software vendor, i.e. a software company that regulates intellectual property rights and by entering a username and password to access a web application on the Internet itself. This way, the software industry protects its interests not only by legal instruments of protection (contractual and copyright), but by no means negligible technical protection measures. The aforementioned giving access to a computer program or software via “remote access” is the most common way of providing a “cloud service” or cloud computing, which is a trend not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the countries of the region, but everywhere in the world wherever the powerful software industry is progressing. Cloud computing can be defined as “exploiting remote computing resources, via the Internet.” The European Union’s Strategy Paper “Unlocking the potential of cloud computing” states, among other things: “Cloud computing in a simplified sense should be 4 Slobodan M. Marković, Pravo intelektualne svojine i informaciono društvo, Drugo dopunjeno izdanje, (Beograd: JP Službeni glasnik, 2018.), 143-148. 615 Antonije Živković understood as storing, processing and using data stored on remote computers accessed via the Internet.”5 2. COPYRIGHT DEVELOPMENT AS A RESPONSE TO THE EXPANSION OF TRANSFORMATIVE AND DIGITAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES Subjective copyright is a form of intellectual property right, which authorizes the author to allow or prohibit the use of his work by others. Copyright lasts for the life of the author and 70 years after his death. From the emergence of copyright with the emergence of Gutenberg printing to the Internet and digital technologies today, copyright has adapted to the dramatic advancement of information and communication and transformative technologies, respecting the reasonable balance between the author’s legitimate interest in benefiting economically from his work and the need of the audience to have access to the protected work. The individual - the creator is no longer at the heart of copyright today , but copyright has become the right of an industrial culture to protect investment. The biggest challenge to traditional copyright has come from digital technology.6 The importance of intellectual property rights is also evidenced by the fact that, in the USA as well as in the Republika Srpska, this is a constitutional category. Thus, Article 8, paragraph 8 of the US Constitution provides that “Congress is authorized to promote the progress of science and art by granting authors and inventors exclusive rights to their works and inventions for a limited period.”7 while Article 27 of the Constitution of the Republika Srpska provides: “Scientific, cultural and artistic creation is free. The protection of moral and property rights by virtue of scientific, cultural, artistic and other intellectual creativity is guaranteed.”8 Significant investment of money and creative work into the production of computer programs, with ease and the small cost of copying it, made the software industry imperative to demand more effective legal protection. In comparative law, the prevailing view was that computer programs qualify as copyrighted works in the form 5 Др Михајло Цветковић, Уговор о коришћењу туђих рачунарских ресурса, accessed March 6, 2020., http://www.prafak.ni.ac.rs/files/zbornik/sadrzaj/zbornici/z72/10z72.pdf, 185-186. 6 S. Marković, Pravo intelektualne svojine i informaciono društvo, 179-180. 7 Section 8. 8: „To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” The Constitution of the United States,. accessed January 27, 2020.,, http://constitutionus.com/ 8 Ustav Republike Srpske (,,Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske“, broj 21/92 – prečišćeni tekst, 28/94, 8/96, 13/96, 15/96, 16/96, 21/96, 21/02, 26/02, 30/02, 31/02, 69/02, 31/03, 98/03, 115/05, 117/05). 616 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova of literature, which defined both the condition and the duration of copyright protection.9 This paragraph is internationally acknowledged in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter: TRIPS) which provides in Article 10, paragraph 1, that computer programs, whether in source or object code, are protected as literary works under the Berne Convention ( 1971).10 This pragmatic rule was also confirmed by Article 4 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty of the World Intellectual Property Organization, adopted in Geneva in 1996, which stipulates that computer programs are protected as literary works within the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention, and that protection applies to computer programs, regardless of the manner or form of their expression.11 The aforementioned rules were taken over by the Law on Copyright and Related Rights of BiH (“Official Gazette of BiH”, No. 63/2010 - hereinafter: ZASP BiH) in Article 2, paragraph 2, item a), which provides: As copyright, following is being specifically considered: a) Written works (literary texts, studies, manuals, articles and other writings, as well as computer programs), while Article 102, paragraph 1 of the ZASP BiH stipulates: “A computer program, within the meaning of this Law, is a program in any forms, including preparatory materials for its production.” and finally Article 102 (paragraph 3) provides:”Computer programs are protected as written copyrighted works if they represent their own intellectual creation by their author.”12 Therefore, a computer program is considered to be a computer program in source, object and executable code. A computer program is “a series of instructions that are capable, upon their fixation, for a machine-readable material carrier, capable of acting on a data-processing machine so that it expresses, performs, or achieves a specific function, task, or result.” Authorship on a computer program does not depend on a kind of material form, the condition is merely to represent its own intellectual creation.13 The term source code means a computer program expressed in one of the programming languages, while the term object 9 S. Marković, Pravo intelektualne svojine i informaciono društvo, 149-150. 10 Sporazum o trgovinskim aspektima prava intelektualnog vlasništva, 228 Službeni list Europske unije 11/Sv. 74, L 336/214 Službeni list Europskih zajednica 23.12.1994., accessed January 08, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:21994A1223(17)&from=HR 11 Ugovoru o autorskom pravu svjetske organizacije za intelektualno vlasništvo, 76 Službeni list Europske unije 11/Sv. 103, L 89/8 Službeni list Europskih zajednica 11.4.2000, accessed January 08, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22000A0411(01)&from=RO 12 Zakon o autorskim i srodnima pravima („Službeni glasnik BiH“, broj 63/2010) 13 Bogdan Gajić i dr., Priručnik iz oblasti intelektuačnog vlasništva za sudije, (Bosna i Hercegovina, Sarajevo: United States of America Department of Commerce - Commercial Law Development Program, Centar za edukaciju sudija i tužilaca Republike Srpske i Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, DEA Print Sarajevo, 2013.), 43. 617 Antonije Živković code refers to a computer program converted into a digital machine record that can be understood and executed by a computer.14 In short, we can define a computer program as a “set of instructions for a computer.” The function of a computer program is to start a machine, which brings it very close to the nature of invention in patent law, providing that by itself, it has no technical character. Copyright restricts protection only to an expression in a program in the object or source code, which means that it does not capture what the heart of the program is - an algorithm, an organizational - logical - mathematical rule that the program formalizes for the computer to run. The rules applicable to written literary works are applied to a computer program, which leads to the conclusion that protection covers not only the sequence of characters to which the program is encoded, but also their meaning. This way, the scope of protection is extended to the functional elements of the program, i.e. the way the algorithm is concretized, but not the algorithm itself. Copyright has proven to be the most effective in protecting against the production and distribution of copies of the same program, but copyright protection has underperformed in the case of program revision or creative imitation of programs that have identical, similar and different elements, since the principal issues of the scope of protection of computer programs are not resolved. It is particularly debatable and unclear what constitutes the idea or procedure or method of operation of a computer program. This is the main reason why in the USA, the influential software industry has fought for the patent protection of computer programs, which focuses on the algorithm as a key element in the creation of a software and provides protection against imitations that only alter the external expression of the program or its display on the screen or monitor the computer itself. The traditional paradigm of copyright as an emanation of the author’s personality, which has been given expression in the original spiritual creation, has been called into question, because programming techniques increasingly involve the use of software tools (special software processors, pre-prepared modules), while one computer program can run more hundreds of developers, all reducing the possibility of originality of a computer program.15 The court’s interpretation has taken the view that the very process of running a program on a computer is its duplication. This is also confirmed in Article 4 (a) of the EU Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs (91/250) on 23.04.2009, where it is stipulated that the right holder 14 S. Marković, Pravo intelektualne svojine i informaciono društvo, 150. 15 S. Marković, Pravo intelektualne svojine i informaciono društvo, 150. 618 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova has the exclusive right to allow the permanent or temporary reproduction of the computer program by any means and in any form, in whole or in part; If such reproduction is required to download, display, run, transmit or store a computer program, such actions shall be subject to the permission of the rights holder.16 Two actions that, in traditional copyright law, have always been temporally, spatially and personally developed, are the use of an act (eg listening to music, looking at a picture) and duplicating an act (an action that is a typical form of temporary exploitation), which is combined into one action, so the act of using, at the same time, is the act of duplicating the work, and the legal use of the computer program requires obtaining the license of the copyright holder. The aforementioned EU Directive on the Protection of the Computer Program also codified the rule that a legal holder of a copy of a computer program may make only one backup copy of it. Also, a person who uses the program legally is allowed to analyze, decompile it (switch from object to source code) and modify it as necessary to debug a program or to make that program interoperable with another program or a specific computer.17 3. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 3.1. The concept, development, classification and importance of the study of artificial intelligence The study of artificial intelligence is a challenge for scientific and professional studies not only in the field of technical sciences, but also the social sciences, as well as all other disciplines such as economics, law, medicine, psychology, sociology, etc. The Communication of the European Commission on 25.04.2018, entitled “Artificial Intelligence for Europe” highlighted the need to “consider the relationship between artificial intelligence and intellectual property rights, both from the perspective of the Intellectual Property Offices and 16 Direktiva 2009/24/EZ Euroskog parlamenta i vijeća od 23. travnja 2009 o pravnoj zaštiti računalnih programa (kodificirana verzija na hrvatskom jeziku), L 111/16 Službeni list Europske Unije 5.5.2009., accessed January 10, 2020,https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0024&from=hr, S. Marković, Pravo intelektualne svojine i informaciono društvo, 150-151. 17 S. Marković, Pravo intelektualne svojine i informaciono društvo, 150-151. 619 Antonije Živković from the perspective of users, in order to inspire innovation and legal certainty in a balanced way.”18 “We, humans, call ourselves Homo sapiens - a smart man - because our intelligence is so important to us. For thousands of years we have been trying to understand how to think: that is, how nothing more than a handful of matter can perceive, understand, anticipate, and govern a world far greater and far more complex than matter itself. The field of artificial intelligence, or AI, goes even further: it tries not only to understand, but to create intelligent entities.”19 There are different definitions of artificial intelligence. Some authors define artificial intelligence “as a branch of computer science that deals with the simulation of intelligent behavior at a computer, or as the ability of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior.” Other authors consider the notion of artificial intelligence a computer program, and by that, not every computer program, but only one which is capable of “mimicking” the human thought process. There are different reasons for human investment in artificial intelligence that creates different types of artificial intelligence, and so we have: 1) strong artificial intelligence - building systems that think just like humans; 2) poor artificial intelligence - to make systems functional without understanding how people think, and 3) use reasoning as a model, but that is not necessarily the goal.20 The Englishman Alan Turing is considered to be the father of artificial intelligence , who in his work “Computer Machines and Intelligence” was the first to directly address the very interesting question “Can Machines Think?” And concluded that the question was pointless. Turing introduces a Turing test in his work to help decide whether a particular machine/computer can be considered intelligent by looking at what a particular computer can do. The Turing test is designed as an “imitation game”, in which the person who is also the examiner asks questions in writing to the computer and also asks the same questions in writing to the other person(s), and if the examiner cannot determine if the answers he received from another man (person) or from a computer are literate, then that computer passed the test. The term artificial intelligence was created by American scientist John McCarty and was first used in a two-month seminar at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, 18 Ана Ашковић, „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, (мастер рад из права интелектуалне својине, Правни факултет Универзитета у Београду 2019.) 2. 19 Stuart J. Russell, Peter Norvig, Artificicial Intelligence: A modern Approach, Third Edition, Person Education Inc. 2010,Prevod trećeg izdanja, Dragan Šaletić, Jasna Gonda (Beograd, PAF Računarski fakultet: Veštačka inteligencija: Savremeni pristup, 2011.) 20 Ана Ашковић, „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 4. 620 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova USA in the summer of 1956, when US researchers were invited to “realize the study of artificial intelligence.” From this point onwards, various programs for the study of artificial intelligence were developed in the years to come: 1) December 1955, Allen Newell and Haerbert Simon developed the first functional Logic Theorist computer program that proved mathematical theorems; 2) Newell and Simon later developed a General Problem Solver (GPS) program based on this program; 3) In 1958, John McCarthy developed the LISP programming language, which became the most popular program in the field of artificial intelligence research, and, after this program, we have STUDENT programs that understands natural language, and ELIZA who was able to conduct a dialogue in English; 4) The first commercially successful RI expert system was being developed, which, since 1986, has managed to save Digital Equipment Corporation up to $ 40 million, annually. Expert systems are essentially computer programs that imitate expert decision making for specific/certain problems; 5) In 1997, an expert system from IBM, called Deep Blue, defeated the world chess champion Garry Kasparov; 6) In 2014, a quarterback named Eugene Goostman was able to pass the Turing test; 7) In 2016, AlphaGO Google’s artificial intelligence program specializing in Go games defeated European and world champions in this game.21 There are other classifications of artificial intelligence. According to the similarity of the human mind or the level to which it develops, artificial intelligence is divided into four types: 1) reactive machines; 2) machines with limited memory; 3) theory of mind and 4) consciousness. In addition to this classification, three other types of artificial intelligence are mentioned, namely: 1) Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI), which refers to the ability of a computer to perform a specific task at a high level 2) General Artificial Intelligence (Artificial General Intelligence -AGI), which refers to the fact that a computer can perform any intellectual task that a man could do, and ultimately 3) Artificial Superintelligence (ASI) that transcends human intellect.22 21 Ibid., 5-7. 22 Naveen Joshi, “7 Types Of Artificial Intelligence”, accessed January 05, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ cognitiveworld/2019/06/19/7-types-of-artificialintelligence/#622d1ddd233e. 621 Antonije Živković 3.2. Protection of works created by artificial intelligence through various branches of intellectual property rights Intellectual property is a heterogeneous entity, and the common characteristics for all forms of intellectual property are: 1) the intangible (spiritual, intellectual) character of the protected object and 2) the economic function that ensures that the protected subject obtains material benefit from the economic exploitation of the protected object, under the conditions of excluding the competition. Artificial intelligence as a subject of protection could be protected by the following branches of intellectual property rights: 1) copyright 2) patent 3) business secret, or 4) know-how. We have already pointed out, in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 (paragraph 3) of the ZASP BIH, that computer programs are protected as written copyright works if they represent the intellectual creation of their author.23 Artificial intelligence as a subject of protection could be protected by the following branches of intellectual property rights: 1) copyright 2) patent 3) business secret, or 4) know-how.24 We have already pointed out in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 (3) of the ZASP BiH that computer programs are protected as written copyrighted works if they represent their own intellectual creation by their author,25 which is in line with the relevant international conventions we have already mentioned. On the other hand, there is a view in the literature that devices that use software26 or computer program must be patented. It should be noted that in the European Union, Article 52 (paragraph 2) of the European Patent Convention explicitly provides that plans, rules and procedures for performing intellectual activities, for gaming or for engaging in business, as well as for computer programs, are not considered, among other things. The invention in terms of patent law, and paragraph 3 of the same article provides that this applies only to cases where patent protection is sought for a computer program as such.27 This provision is based on the view that computer programs are not of a technical nature and that they are not patentable as such. This point of view has developed the notion that the patentability of a computer program depends on whether the invention related to the computer program or software is of a 23 S. Marković, D. Popović, Pravo intelektualne svojine, 21. 24 Ана Ашковић, „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 9. 25 Zakon o autorskim i srodnima pravima („Službeni glasnik BiH“, broj 63/2010) 26 Software is a broader term than a computer program. See. I. Kunda, R. Matanovic Vučković, „Raspolaganje autorskim pravo na računalnom programu – materijalnopravni i kolizijskopravni aspekti“, Rijeka: Zbornik Pravno fakulteta Sveučišta u Rijeci, br.1 (2010.) 90. 27 Ана Ашковић, „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 9. 622 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova technical nature. This is clearly defined in the European Patent Office (EPO) in the EPO Examination Methodology document, which states, among other things, that a computer program as such or as a record on a record holder cannot be protected by a patent independently of its content, and that the situation is the same when a computer program is installed on a computer. On the other hand, inventions that characterize a program and which represent a technical process (e.g. a production process managed by a computer program) or that have a technical character (e.g. a program that increases the working memory of a computer) are considered to have a technical contribution and are therefore patentable. Finally, the fact is that the number of European patents granted for software-related inventions has grown rapidly in recent years. The EPO has thereby accepted the practice of US patents and trademarks. We have already pointed out that the powerful software industry in the US has provided software with a place in patent law unlike the EU. Namely, the protection of computer programs or software in the United States is governed by Article 101 of the 1952 Patent Act, which states that all new and useful inventions having a process, machine, product or composition as subject of a patent are patentable, as well as their new and useful improvements. Since the software is not explicitly exempted from protection here (it is not explicitly stated), the United States Trademark and Patent Office has, since the 1970s, approved the so-called patents for software. In the 1980s, the Frimen-Voltaire test was introduced to determine the patentability of the mathematical algorithms on which software was based.28 The 2019 World Intellectual Property Organization Technology Trends Report states that since the advent of artificial intelligence in the 1960s, inventors and innovators have submitted over 340,000 patent applications for inventions and published about 1.6 million scientific publications, all related to artificial intelligence. The most common patent applicants are the world’s leading companies such as Microsoft, IBM, Samsung, Toshiba, while the most patented countries for artificial intelligence inventions are the US and China, followed by Japan. Although copyright protection of computer programs is not in dispute today, as well as instances in which software inventions can be protected, the issues of differentiating technique and non-technique from computer programs remain, as well as what will happen to those computer programs that write their own code and are constantly being refined and changed. The question is whether the copyright extends beyond the source 28 Snježana Šarboh, Milijana Perić, „Zaštita sofvera patentima u SAD, Evropskoj uniji i Srbiji“, Jahorina: Invoteh, Vol 9 (mart 2010.), 474-475. 623 Antonije Živković code, to a part of the code that has been perfected and modified by artificial intelligence, i.e. which the author did not write himself? The same question arises for patents, where the application must fully describe the invention, and it is debatable how to write functions and parts that arise later.29 3.3. Examples of copyrighted works and other intellectual property content created by artificial intelligence in practice Artificial intelligence has reached the stage of development that, to a greater or lesser extent, it autonomously creates content. The first example is a project in the field of fine arts, called “The next Rembrandt”, developed by Microsoft in collaboration with a group of museums and research institution “Next Rembrandt” and presents an image - a portrait of a man painted with technique and style used by the famous Dutch painter Rembrandt, and the painting itself was created by a computer program using machine learning and a database that made up Rembrandt’s paintings. By analyzing Rembrandt’s images pixel by pixel, studying the style, motifs, techniques and colors, the computer program created the aforementioned portrait as if it was made by Rembrandt himself. Another example in the field of literary art is the “Brutus” program that generates stories or the “Cybernetic Poet” program that creates songs. A third example in the field of music is the Amper artificial intelligence program, which generates music based on a given theme, mood and other parameters. And finally, we have an example called “Creative Machine” that a computer program provides with technical solutions to a specific technical problem using artificial neural networks, and for which Dr. Taler, the creator of “Creative Machine,” is granted a patent.30 3.4. The (Im)possibility of copyright protection of works created by artificial intelligence The subject matter of copyright protection is copyrighted work. Article 4 (paragraph 1) of the ZASP BiH stipulates that the copyrighted work is “an individual spiritual creation in the field of literature, science and art, regardless of the type, manner and form of expression, unless otherwise provided by this Law.” Paragraph 2 of the same Article stipulates, among other things, that copyrighted works are written works that include computer programs.31 In 29 Ана Ашковић, „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 11. 30 Ана Ашковић (2019), „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 11. 31 Zakon o autorskim i srodnima pravima („Službeni glasnik BiH“, broj 63/2010) 624 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova order for a work to enjoy copyright protection, it must represent “an original spiritual creation.” We can define the author as the natural person who created the work, as well as the person whose first name, pseudonym or other sign is marked in the work, while the opposite is proved. Since spiritual creation is a mental process, legal entities cannot be authors, but they can be copyright holders. The basic classification of copyright is to moral and property rights. Copyright is individual and independent of the property rights and other real rights to the objects on which or in which the copyrighted work is. In the context of legal entities, it is necessary to point out the rules for copyrighted works created by employment, which means the work created during the employment relationship, by fulfilling the work obligations of workers on the basis of a contract of employment, the Labor Code, the Law on Labor, or by the general act of the employer or according to the instructions of the employer. If a computer program is created by performing work tasks, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract, the employer permanently becomes the holder of property rights on the computer program. Among other things, the following is not copyrighted: ideas, procedures, concepts, mathematical operations, principles, discoveries, etc.32 By copyright definition, copyrighted work is a human creation that has spiritual content, has a specific form and is original by itself. From this definition, we can derive elements of a copyrighted work, namely: 1) human creation; 2) spiritual content; 3) definition of form and 4) originality.33 As the first element of a copyrighted work, we emphasize human creation, which means that only those created by man are considered to be copyrighted, and that human content does not include any content that already existed and that man has found in nature and presented as a work. In the environment of modern transformative technologies, artificial computer software is no longer an auxiliary aid, but moreover, they are solely responsible for the content created, and man is only responsible for the artificial intelligence computer program itself. In this case, the man is the author of the “author” of the work itself. Given that one of the conditions for the existence of a work of authorship is that it represents a human creation, it is clear that only man 32 An idea is not a work of authorship because it cannot be just a materialized (realized, realized) idea in any form accessible to the human senses. (VST R. Hrvatske, PZ-3484/95/2, od 01. Listopada 1996. Zbornik odluka Visokog trgovačkog suda R. Hrvatske, br. 9, strana 99.) The worker, the author of the work created in the employment relationship, retains the moral rights in that work, which means the right to be recognized and labeled as the creator of the work. (Odluka Vrhovnog suda Srbije, Rev 733/96 od 12.03.1996. godine) Bogdan Gajić i dr., Priručnik iz oblasti intelektuačnog vlasništva za sudije, 23-43. 33 S. Marković, D. Popović, Pravo intelektualne svojine, 38. 625 Antonije Živković as a human being can have the status and position of the author. Subjective copyright is linked to the life of the author and 70 years after his death. Thus, Article 3 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works stipulates that protected authors are citizens of one of the countries of the European Union for their published or unpublished works. In any case, the content created by the computer program does not satisfy the condition that the copyrighted work is a human creation. Even in the copyright system of Germany, according to the principle of personal creation (German Shὂpferprinzip), the author can only be a man as the creator of the work. It should be noted that at the time when the Berne Convention was concluded, computer programs, especially the advanced transformative and information technology we know today, did not even exist.34 If we look at the second element of the copyrighted work, the spiritual content, it is clear that all human creations, even copyrighted works, have spiritual content. Spiritual content, which nature can be emotional and rational, gives the author meaning and purpose. In a sociological sense, a work of authorship is a social creation that is a means of communication between people. The communication that the copyrighted work establishes between people must be immediate, i.e. based on meaning and purpose inherent in the work only. For example, a credit card or a traffic sign cannot be copyrighted because they have no spiritual content (meaning, purpose) and they only gain meaning and purpose through the rules for their use and interpretation.35 From this, we can conclude that computer programs do not fulfill this condition, because their work has no spiritual content. On the other hand, if this condition is viewed only from the prism of direct communication, that is, if a work obtains meaning and purpose only through the rules for its use, it could be said that computer-created works fulfill this condition. For example, if we look at an image or listen to music, we do not know that it was created by a computer program, we will certainly find meaning and purpose in it, in the same way as if it comes from a human being..36 The third element of a copyrighted work is originality, it states unequivocally that the work of authorship must be original. Originality means the uniqueness or individuality of a work. The reason why the law recognizes copyright protection for a particular work is precisely originality which is an essential feature of the work of authorship. The source of the originality of 34 Ана Ашковић, „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 14-16. 35 S. Marković, D. Popović, „Pravo intelektualne svojine“, 38. 36 Ана Ашковић, „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 16. 626 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova the author’s work is in the personality of the author. Practice has taken the view that a single work is original if different from all existing works. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that there are areas of human creativity that are determined on all sides by practical, technical, functional or logical conditions, so that they leave no room for expression of personality features (eg, making alphabetical lists of tenants, lists of electricity consumers, list of telephone subscribers), and the originality requirement cannot be fulfilled in these works. Copyright science has taken the position “that any spiritual creation that is not the result of intentional or immoral support of an already existing cultural heritage, or intellectual work that is strictly determined by external frames that leave no room for expressing the personal spiritual individuality of the one who works, is original.”37 Therefore, we can conclude that originality is a condicio sine qua non for a work to be protected by copyright norms, regardless of whether it fulfills other conditions (that a human creation with spiritual content is expressed in a certain form). In the case of original works, in fact, copyright protection extends only to its original elements. To determine originality is also the most difficult of all elements. It should be emphasized that there are areas of human creativity in which the space for displaying individual personality features is very limited or even non-existent, because it does not allow space for giving any personal stamp. The notion of originality is neither defined nor defined by the positive law governing this matter, and it is therefore left to the courts to rule in the decisions that resolve disputes that have a copyright as the case, and to give interpretations and clarifications of originality. The interpretation of the concept of originality varies depending on national legislation. We can also point out the doctrine of “sweat of the eyebrow”, which was valid until 1991 in the United States, under which “copyright protection was provided to reward the effort, time and resources of the author, and the originality of the work itself. As an example of this doctrine, we can point out that databases were considered as copyrights and, for example, a telephone directory, because the author has put an effort to collect the information that compiled it. The U.S. Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. In 1991, Rural Telephone Service Co. decided that the basis of copyright protection was not effort but originality, at least in minimal form, and that there was no 37 S. Marković, D. Popović, Pravo intelektualne svojine, 39-41. 627 Antonije Živković copyright protection without originality, as soon as the doctrine of “sweat on the eyebrow” was officially rejected.38 Following the rejection of this doctrine, it was generally accepted that there was a “need for an independent creation with a little creativity (modicum of creativity)”. The emphasis here is on originality instead of effort, and mere collections of information no longer enjoy copyright protection and are not considered original, unless that information is coordinated, selected or organized in such a way that their end result is original. The Feist decision had an impact not only on the United States, but also on other Anglo-Saxon countries, which also applied the “ sweat on the eyebrow” doctrine when deciding to reject this doctrine. The rationale in Feist’s decision does not contain what would be a minimum of a certain creativity, but notes that the end result must be new, innovative or surprising in order to be eligible for copyright protection. The European Court of Justice gave an interpretation of originality and set the precision contours of the standard of originality with its decisions in the following cases: “Infopaq International A/S v Danish Dagblades Forening 2009, Security Software Associate v Ministry of Culture 2010. year, Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure and Karen Murphy v 2011 Media Protection Services, Eva. Maria Painter v 2011 Standard Verlays Gmb and Football Dataco v Yahoo! from 2012”, and it is taken that originality means” that the work is the author’s personal intellectual creation, which is present when the author can express free and creative choices and leave his personal stamp on the work, and which is not present when an expression is limited by technical or functional rules, such as one where there is only one way to express an idea, or expression is predetermined by a specific goal or narrowed rules that leave no room for free and creative choices.” In order for a certain author to reach the required level of originality, he needs to have free and creative choices and thus leave his personal stamp. The aforementioned decisions gave the European Court of Justice guidance to the national courts on how to review the originality of a particular work. With the „Next Rembrandt“ Artificial Intelligence Program, the algorithms are written to find out what makes a personal Rembrandt seal. The goal of the project is to create an image, as if it were made by Rembrandt himself. The Next Rembrandt project is an example of artificial intelligence that is not fully automated or 38 The plaintiff and the defendant in the case Feist Publications, Inc. V Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc 499 U.S. 340 (1991) in which the U.S. Supreme Court took the view that the prosecutor’s telephone directory (Rural TSC) was not copyrighted work. United States Supreme Court, Feist Publications, Inc. V Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc 499 U.S. 340 (1991) accessed January 21, 2020, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/499/340/ 628 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova that has a significant human contribution. The teams of people who worked on “Next Rembrandt” considered the possibilities of creativity, and that creativity was contained in writing the necessary algorithms, not in the painting in question. The portrait itself is the result of an algorithm or a computer program. There is also an example of selfies made by a monkey, although the photographer made preparations, set up the camera, it was the monkey who made the photo. Although the photography appears to be original, it was not protected because it was not made by man and therefore does not represent a human creation. From all this, we can conclude that the works created by the computer program are not originals in terms of copyright. However, there are few national systems that have accepted that works created by artificial intelligence are copyrighted works and are afforded copyright protection, because there is a connection with a man, because a man is the person who undertook the “necessary work of preparing the work”.39 The last, fourth element of the author’s work is the determination of form. The copyright theory defines a particular form as “a certain form of spiritual content has the character of a form of copyrighted work, and gives that work an identity. As a result, the work of authorship detaches itself from the personality of the author and becomes suitable for communication and commercial use. ”When referring to the specificity of a form in terms of defining the legal term of a copyrighted work, we are not referring to the material form in which the work becomes virtually accessible to the senses of the people. Thus, a form of copyrighted work is “a certain arrangement of signs (codes) that people use in their communication.”40 In terms of a material form, computer-generated content is always in digital format, unlike traditional works that exist in analog formats (book, painting on canvas, marble sculpture, etc.), i.e. in tangible form. Despite the fact that computer-generated works are essentially “ones and zeros” or an abstract mathematical expression, this is not a problem for copyright, because the digital form is a material form, only there is a clear specificity that our senses do not allow us to perceive analogous copies of the work right away, for example, by opening a book yourself or viewing an image or sculpture. 39 Ана Ашковић, „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“,16-22. 40 There are examples of national legislation prescribing mandatory material form as a condition for the existence and protection of a copyrighted work. In the USA, for example, it is necessary for spiritual content to be recorded on a physical carrier. S. Marković, D. Popović, Pravo intelektualne svojine, 39. A similar solution exists in the United Kingdom Copyright, Design and Patents Act, which stipulates that literary, musical and dramatic works will have no copyright unless those works have been recorded in writing or any other form. Ана Ашковић„Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“ 629 Antonije Živković So the difference, though, is that to perceive works whose examples are in digital form requires a device or apparatus through which we listen to music on a compact disc, for example, while our senses allow us to perceive analog copies immediately by opening a book or looking at a picture. Most works that exist in digital format can be recorded in both analogue format and vice versa. As an example, we can take “Next Rembrandt” where the image was first created in digital format and then transformed into a real painting using a 3D printer. What we can certainly conclude is that computer-created works or a computer program meet the requirement of copyright protection with respect to the element of form determination.41 In comparative legislation, there are countries that have classified works created by a computer program as copyrighted works, even though they only meet the requirement as to the specific form, i.e. only one of the aforementioned elements of the author’s work. The first example is Article 9 (paragraph 3) of the United Kingdom Copyright, Design and Patents Act, which stipulates that in the case of written, dramatic, artistic or musical works created by a computer program, the person who took necessary measures for the creation of works is considered the author, while Article 214 of the same Law stipulates that the protection afforded to works created by computer programs extends only to literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, as long as it does not apply to media works. Article 178 of the United Kingdom Copyright, Design and Patents Act stipulates the definition of a work created by computer programs, that the work was created in such circumstances that there is no human author of the work, while Article 12 (paragraph 7) of that Law provides that copyright or works created by a computer program last for 50 years from the end of the calendar year in which the work was created.42 So, we can conclude that the positive copyright of the United Kingdom is that it agrees that literary, dramatic, music and works of art can be created by artificial intelligence in the form of a computer program, thus being granted copyright protection, the title holder being determined and copyright duration being prescribed on these works. There is an opinion in the literature that it is not well defined what constitutes the necessary measures for the creation of these works, which defines the author. This law does not specify or give an example of what actions are sufficient or compulsory, and whether pressing a mouse 41 Ана Ашковић, „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 22. 42 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 United Kingdom, accessed January 23, 2020,http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48 630 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova button will be enough for a person to be considered an author? Is it a programmer who created a software or a hardware user?43 Another example is the Copyright and Related Rights Act of the Republic of Ireland which defines works created by a computer program as works created in such circumstances that the author is not an individual (personality).44 In addition to the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, countries that have “computer-generated works classified as works”, or rather countries that have given works created by a computer program as artificial intelligence copyright status and have granted copyright protection are the Republic of India and New Zealand, whereas in Article 8, paragraph 1 of the Italian Copyright Act, “the author is an entity (therefore not necessarily a human being) who is said to be an author according to custom, or who is mentioned as an author in acting, performing or presenting or broadcasting works, so it is possible that the positive legislation of Italy also gives room for works created by artificial intelligence to have the status of copyrighted work. It should be emphasized that no convention or directive of the European Union prohibits the protection of works created by artificial intelligence, nor the provision allowing it, so we can conclude that there is a legal void in this respect. However, the Compendium (Administrative Manual of the US Copyright Registry) of the practice of the US Copyright Office at paragraph 306 states that the Bureau will only register the copyrighted work provided that the work was created by man. According to the practice of the Copyright Bureau, the fruits of intellectual labor that reside in the creative powers of the mind are protected. The Bureau will reject the application for registration of the copyrighted work if it determines that the human being did not create the work because the copyright is restricted to the original works of the author. Thus, in a U.S. Supreme Court ruling Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sorony states, among other things, that “copyright is the exclusive right of man to the products of his ingenuity or intellect. Finally, paragraph 313.2 of the Compendium provides examples of works that lack human creation, and lists “works created by a machine or a pure mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or human intervention.” Finally, paragraph 313.2 of the Compendium provides examples of works that lack human creation, and lists “works created by a machine or a pure mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or human interven43 Ана Ашковић(2019), „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 24. 44 Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000 (Act No. 28 of 2000) Republic of Ireland, accessed January 23, 2020, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ie/ie098en.pdf) 631 Antonije Živković tion.” Finally, given the fact that very few countries provide content created by computer programs with copyright status, copyright protection of artificial intelligence will not, at least for the time being, be universally accepted in intellectual property law.45 3.5. How to designate a copyright holder for works created by artificial intelligence We have already pointed out that the author is a natural person who created the work and that he is the original copyright holder, as well as a person whose name, last name, pseudonym or other sign is marked in the work until proven otherwise. Legal entities cannot be authors because spiritual creating is a mental process that belongs only to man, but they can be holders of copyright. In other words, moral copyright always belongs to man, while property rights can belong to a legal person as the copyright holder.46 It is also important to point out that Article 98, paragraph 3, of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights of BiH stipulates that: “Copyright to the ordered work, except for the right of distribution, is retained by the author, unless otherwise provided by this Law or contract. Accordingly, the regulations governing the work contract shall apply to the copyright contract.”47 So, if the author is a natural person, it is clear that the legal presumption is that the ordering authority becomes the copyright holder, unless otherwise provided by contract or law. On the other hand, in the case of legal entities, legal entities can retain copyright by contract (as well as natural persons) and thus remain copyright holders. If works created by computer programs or artificial intelligence were copyrighted works or in systems that recognize them as such, the question arises as to who will be the titular of subjective copyright? Are that the teams of programs and researchers who create artificial intelligence or are they investors in its creation and research, then is it the user of an artificial intelligence computer program/computer, and finally whether it is the computer program itself (software) which may be less or more dependent on human activity. The 45 The U.S. Supreme Court is in the Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. case. V. Sorony 111 US 53,58, 1884 took the view that copyright belongs only to man. In the aforementioned judgment, the Supreme Court ruled on whether the photograph fulfilled the conditions for copyright protection, as well as whether the photographer could have the status of author. Ана Ашковић (2019), „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 24. 46 Labeling the name or pseudonyms of a particular person as author in an author’s work constitutes the legal presumption that he or she is the author until proven otherwise. “ Rješenje Vrhovnog suda BIH GŽ 688/78 od 13.07.1978.) Bogdan Gajić i dr., Priručnik iz oblasti intelektuačnog vlasništva za sudije, 25. 47 Zakon o autorskim i srodnima pravima („Službeni glasnik BiH“, broj 63/2010) 632 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova idea that robots, as strong artificial intelligence or artificial super intelligence that does not simulate thought but really think, become the subject of law at this point and in the near future is the least likely possibility. In order to give artificial intelligence status to authors, this essentially means that the legal order, as legal entities in addition to natural and legal persons, also recognizes artificial intelligence entities. Throughout history, it can be recalled that not all people have any legal subjectivity, such as slaves, women and children. Thus, we have an interesting example of patents in the period before the American Civil War (1861-1865). African-Americans who were born slaves were not considered US citizens, nor were they entitled to property, and so a patent for their inventions was granted to their masters, i.e. to the slave owners.48 The question arises as to how an artificially intelligent entity will exercise its rights (seek copyright protection, emphasize claims) if it does not possess reason. Every human being has a general (complete, universal) legal capacity, which implies the “ability of an entity to have rights and obligations”, as opposed to a business and a delicate capacity that not every human being possesses. There are beings who are not intelligent, such as small children, a conceived unborn human (Lat. Nasciturus), or mentally ill persons who have legal capacity but lack legal capacity and a delicate capacity. In terms of business and delicate ability, these persons have their own legal representatives representing their rights and fulfilling obligations in accordance with positive legal regulations.49 The open questions are, of course, also whether artificial intelligence needs a legal representative if their legal capacity is recognized? And who would it be anyway? Would it be an author or a developer, a software company that retains property rights, a user, or someone else? How could a computer program on a computer or an artificial intelligence entity, no matter how advanced, be given the authority to publish a work or to counteract the improper use of a work? We have already mentioned that in countries where works created by artificial intelligence are considered copyrighted works, the author is “a person who has taken the necessary steps to create those works.” In order to interpret this definition more closely, it is necessary to determine who the most responsible person is for the final content created by the artificial intelligence program. Certainly, the most logical answer would be that it is a developer 48 Shontavia Johnson, America’s always had black inventors – even when the patent system explicitly excluded them, accessed January 27, 2020,.,http://theconversation.com/americas-always-had-black-inventors-evenwhen-the-patent-system-explicitly-excluded-them-72619 49 Илија Бабић, Грађанско право – увод у грађанско право и стварно право, (Бања Лука: Правни факултет Универзитета у Бањој луци, 2008), 69-78. 633 Antonije Živković who represents the author of the “author” - an artificial intelligence entity. On the other hand, if it is a super-developed artificial intelligence in which the software itself is more advanced and more independent (automated) in creation, this kind of argumentation seems less grounded, because it is possible that the developer has almost nothing to do with the final content created, but is a fully deserving artificial intelligence entity. We can draw a parallel with the hypothetical situation that the copyright of the “Ninth Symphony” which was authored by Ludwig van Beethoven should be given to his parents Johan van Beethoven and Mahdalena Keverik van Beethoven on the grounds that they “created” Beethoven. On the other hand, if one assumes that the author is considered to be the user of the artificial intelligence program, we can come to a situation where a simple click of the mouse creates an author’s work?! Due to the aforementioned issues, the legislators in the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, the Republic of India and New Zealand did not specify in advance which the “necessary measures to create the work” are and left it up to the court to decide in each individual case. In the United States, in 1965, in a registry report, the Copyright Bureau asked the key question whether a work was created by a machine (artificial intelligence, computer program) or was created by man when traditional copyright rules were applied.50 It should be emphasized that the problem of determining the copyright holders of works created by artificial intelligence is extremely important for the following reasons: 1) failure to resolve this problem leaves room for abuse, in the form of appropriation of works created by artificial intelligence by man and indicating someone being named as an author of a work he did not create; 2) since these works are not subject to copyright protection, therefore, there are neither copyrights nor titles, and artificial intelligence entities are not subjects of law, nor is there any liability when works created by computer programs infringe another’s intellectual property right; 3) works created by artificial intelligence can have or have a very high market value.51 In the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, for works created by an order or during an employment, there is an exception to the rule that the author or the person who actually created the work is considered to be the original holder of the copyright. If the work is created during an employment or by an order, the authors are considered to be the employer or the ordering entity (natural 50 Ана Ашковић, „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 27-30. 51 So we have the case that the painting “Portrait of Edmnond Belamy” created by artificial intelligence is more precisely an algorithm, sold at an art auction for $ 432,500.00. Instead of the painter’s signature, there is a mathematical equation used to generate the painting. Ана Ашковић (2019), „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“, 31. 634 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova or legal person), regardless of the fact that the work was essentially created by the worker or the executor of the work contract. According to section 201 of the US Copyright Act, “in the case of an ordered work, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author of the work and is the holder of all copyrighted rights, unless the parties have explicitly (exclusively) agreed, or have agreed otherwise in a written instrument that they have signed.”52 Legal experts in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition are solutions for determining the holder of a copyright in the case where a computer program or software created by artificial intelligence is found in the application of the doctrine of the ordered work. Applying this doctrine to the relationship of the developer as the author of a super-developed computer program or software representing artificial intelligence, the programmer would be treated as an employer, and the artificial intelligence computer program would be a worker, and the original copyright holder would remain the developer as the author of the “author” of the artificial intelligence entity.53 On the other hand, from the point of view of the well-being of the society, it is also emphasized that the aim is to promote the development of artificial intelligence and, accordingly, to assign the copyright to those who are most responsible for its development and for all that is new, namely its investors, i.e. software companies, research institutions and colleges that could further assign title authorizations to end users as title holders.54 Unlike the Anglo - Saxon legal system, the situation in the European continental system is different with respect to the original copyright holder. We will take Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example. Thus, Article 103 of the ZASP BIH, entitled “Computer program created during an employment or by an order”, stipulates: “If a computer program was created by an employee in the performance of his duties or as directed by the employer, or if created by the author on the basis of a contract on orders, it is considered that all copyrights in such a program are exclusively and entirely transferred to the employer or the client, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract.“55 Therefore, it is clear that in both BiH and Serbia, the contracting authority or employer retains all copyright property rights to the copyrighted work that was created in the employment relationship or under the contract of work order. The difference with the Anglo-Saxon legal system is that the author remains the original 52 Ibid., 31-33. 53 Annemarie Bridy: Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, accessed January 20, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1888622,26. 54 Ана Ашковић, „Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине“,31-33. 55 Zakon o autorskom i srodnim pravima BIH („Službeni glasnik BiH“, broj 63/2010). 635 Antonije Živković copyright holder (worker, executor of the job contract) and retains the author’s moral rights. 3.6. Violation and endangerment of traditional copyright by artificial intelligence One of the biggest challenges to copyright is preventing direct or indirect copyright violation from a system of super-developed artificial intelligence that has made tremendous progress at the moment. Some examples of copyright violation by artificial intelligence are: 1) Artificial intelligence learns through machine learning where a computer program learns by downloading enormous amounts of information or data. If there is copyright on this information, and the titleholder did not give consent to the use or duplication and processing that occurs when learning by computer programs, then the question is how to solve this problem? Can copyright violation be excluded if its use is for the purpose of learning?; 2) Copyright violation may occur if a work created by an artificial intelligence computer program is plagiarism of an already existing work, or if a computer-created work is a derivative work and the titular of the original work has not given the necessary approval; 3) The third form of copyright violation through machine learning by which artificial intelligence works is the compilation of data sets for learning (training), which involves making digital copies (duplication) of data (works). Violation of another’s subjective copyright occurs if the aforementioned learning datasets contain copyrighted material for which duplication engineers or developers do not have the permission of the copyright holder. A violation of the authority to protect the integrity of the work occurs if it is altered during the process of learning the data that constitutes the copyrighted work. Finally, the machine learning dataset itself may be the subject of another intellectual property right - the rights of a database manufacturer to be classified as related rights.56 In order to illustrate the datasets in a clearer way, we will quote the definitions of the database and the data producers from the positive BiH law governing copyright and related rights. Thus, Article 141, paragraph 1 of the ZASP BiH stipulates that: “A database, within the meaning of this Law, is a collection of independent works, data or other material in any form, which is 56 Ана Ашковић, “Развој вештачке интелигенције и ауторско право” (Интелектуална својина у дигитално доба Зборник студентских радова, Правни факултет Универзитета у Београду - Центар за издаваштво, Београд 2020), 54-55. 636 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova systematically or methodically arranged and individually accessible through electronic or other means, and where the acquisition, verification or presentation of its contents required a qualitative or quantitative significant investment of human, technical or financial resources.” Paragraph 2 of the same Article provides: “The manufacturer of a database is a legal or natural person who takes the initiative and takes the risk of investing the funds referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article in its creation.” Finally, paragraph 3 of the same article provides: “The protection of a database or its contents, under the provisions of this section, is independent of its protection by copyright or other rights. Including the material in the database and using it should not interfere with the rights that exist in that material.57 Thus, the database is protected by a related right - the right of the producer of the data, and if the systematization, structuring and organization of the data in the database itself represent an “original spiritual creation” within the meaning of ZASP BiH, it is also protected by copyright. The authors dealing with this issue point out that artificial intelligence threatens copyright in the following two ways. Firstly, artificial intelligence through machine learning gives computer programs the ability to extract valuable information from the way authors express ideas. In this way, machine learning becomes expressive in character, because instead of extracting facts about a work, it can capture value from the expressive aspect of the work. Secondly, a new type of threat to the market for author expression is machine learning technology, because instead of just substituting the market for individual works, expressive machine learning can squeeze authors out by swapping authors for a cheaper and more efficient robot?! On the other hand, there are datasets for training machine learning of artificial intelligence computer programs that are used legally. The first example is the „Next Rembrandt“, where the dataset or learning database consists of works in the public domain. Second, some works may be given a specific license to request information for machine learning purposes. Third, the provision of large amounts of information and data for machine learning purposes can be defined by contract. Finally, there are views that the creation of new copyright works using machine learning of artificial intelligence programs, draining information and data from datasets and databases representing copyrighted works, will be one of the key legal issues, if not now, then in the near future.58 57 Zakon o autorskom i srodnim pravima („Službeni glasnik BIH“, broj 63/2010) 58 Giovanni Sartor, Francesca Lagioia, Giuseppe Contissa, ,,The use of copyrighted works by AI systems: Art works in the data mill”, 2018., accessed January 30, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3264742 637 Antonije Živković CONCLUSION With the development of transformational and information technologies, there comes a digital transformation of all forms of social processes, which inevitably affects the protection of intellectual property as a whole. As we live in the age of digitalisation, the question is, is this the end of intellectual property or a new beginning? The expansion of digital technology has put the traditional copyright system out of balance. Intellectual property rights are facing the greatest challenge and the question arises as to whether it is necessary to reform intellectual property rights, in order to come up with the best solutions for copyright of computer programs, databases and other intellectual property rights that are strongly represented in the digital age. It should be noted that there are significant differences in legal solutions between the United States, where computer programs get protected by patent law, which focuses on the algorithm as a key element in the creation of a computer program and provides them with protection against imitation in relation to the European Union, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina where computer programs are protected only by copyright. Will countries in the European - continental legal system go for a solution to protect computer programs both by copyright and by patent law? A particular challenge for copyright is the (in)ability to protect copyrighted works created by artificial intelligence computer programs. There are only a few national legislations (United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland, New Zealand, Republic of India, Republic of Italy) that give works created by artificial intelligence the status of copyrighted work. All other national legislation, including the United States as the country where the term “artificial intelligence” originated, retain the exclusivity of man as the only possible author. However, a significant difference between the US and countries belonging to the European - continental law system is that, in the USA, a legal entity can be the author or the original copyright holder, thus retaining both moral and property rights to exploit the copyrighted work. In Anglo-Saxon legal theory, we can distinguish the work of Annemarie Bridy, entitled “Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author”, which applies the doctrines of “The ordered works and works created during an employment” created by artificial intelligence, where the developer was treated as an employer and the artificial intelligence computer program would be an employee, and the original copyright holder would remain the developer as the author of the “author” of the artificial intelligence entity. However, Article 9 of the Copy- 638 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova right and Related Rights Law of BiH stipulates that the author of the work is a natural person who created the work, which clearly states that this theory is more adapted to the US, because the original copyright holder in BiH who retains moral copyright can be only a natural person, while a legal person can only be a holder of property rights. In any case, this issue needs to be addressed fairly. Even St. Augustine said “unjust law is not law at all.” Finally, given the fact that very few countries regard content created by artificial intelligence as copyrighted content, we can conclude that copyright protection of artificial intelligence will not, at least for the time being, be generally accepted in intellectual property law. REFERENCES: 1. Annemarie Bridy: “Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent” Author, accessed January 20, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1888622, 26. 2. Ана Ашковић, “Развој вештачке интелигенције и право интелектуалне својине”, (мастер рад из права интелектуалне својине, Правни факултет Универзитета у Београду 2019.) 3. Ана Ашковић, “Развој вештачке интелигенције и ауторско право” (Интелектуална својина у дигитално доба Зборник студентских радова, Правни факултет Универзитета у Београду - Центар за издаваштво, Београд 2020) 4. Бабић Илија, Грађанско право – увод у грађанско право и стварно право (Правни факултет Универзитета у Бањој луци, Бања Лука, 2008) 5. Bogdan Gajić i dr., Priručnik iz oblasti intelektuačnog vlasništva za sudije. Bosna i Hercegovina, Sarajevo: United States of America Department of Commerce - Commercial Law Development Program, Centar za edukaciju sudija i tužilaca Republike Srpske i Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, DEA Print Sarajevo, 2013. 6. Giovanni Sartor, Francesca Lagioia, Giuseppe Contissa, ,,The use of copyrighted works by AI systems: Art works in the data mill”, 2018. accessed January 31, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3264742 7. Kunda, R. Matanovic Vučković, „Raspolaganje autorskim pravo na računalnom programu – materijalnopravni i kolizijskopravni aspekti“. Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučišta u Rijeci, br.1, (2010.), 90. 639 Antonije Živković 8. Михајло Цветковић, “Уговор о коришћењу туђих рачунарских ресурса”, accessed March 06, 2020,http://www.prafak.ni.ac.rs/files/zbornik/sadrzaj/ zbornici/z72/10z72.pdf, 185-186. 9. Naveen Joshi, “7 Types Of Artificial Intelligence”, accessed January 15, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/06/19/7-types-of-artificialintelligence/#622d1ddd233e 10. Slobodan M. Marković, Dušan V. Popović, Pravo intelektualne svojine, Peto izmjenjeno i dopunjeno izdanje. Beograd:Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Centar za izdavašto i informisanje, 2017. 11. Slobodan M. Marković, Pravo intelektualne svojine i informaciono društvo, Drugo dopunjeno izdanje, Beograd: JP Službeni glasnik, 2018. 12. Stuart J. Russell, Peter Norvig, Artificicial Intelligence: A modern Approach, Third Edition, Person Education Inc. 2010. Prevod trećeg izdanja, Dragan Šaletić, Jasna Gonda. Veštačka inteligencija: Savremeni pristup, Beograd: PAF Računarski fakultet, 2011. 13. Snježana Šarboh, Milijana Perić, “Zaštita sofvera patentima u SAD, Evropskoj uniji i Srbiji”. Infoteh-Jahorina, Vol 9 (mart 2010.) 14. Shontavia Johnson, America’s always had black inventors – even when the patent system explicitly excluded them, accessed January 27, 2020,, http:// theconversation.com/americas-always-had-black-inventors-even-when-thepatent-system-explicitly-excluded-them-72619 INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS, CONSTITUTIONS, LAWS AND CASE LAW: 1. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 United Kingdom, accessed January 23, 2020,, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48 2. Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000 (Act No. 28 of 2000) Republic of Ireland, accessed January 23, 2020,, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/ en/ie/ie098en.pdf 3. Direktiva 2009/24/EZ Euroskog parlamenta i vijeća od 23. travnja 2009 o pravnoj zaštiti računalnih programa (kodificirana verzija na hrvatskom jeziku), L 111/16 Službeni list Europske Unije 5.5.2009., accessed January 10, 2020,, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELE X:32009L0024&from=hr 4. Direktiva 2001/29/EZ Europskog parlamenta i vijeća od 22.sviblja 2001. o usklađivanju određenih aspekata autorskih i srodnih prava u informacionom društvu Europskog parlamenta i vijeća od 22. svibnja 2001., 17/Sv. 1 Službeni list Europske unije 119, L 167/10 Službeni list Europskih zajednica 22.6.2001., 640 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. accessed January 11, 2020,https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001L0029&from=HR godine United States Supreme Court, Feist Publications, Inc. V Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc 499 U.S. 340 (1991) accessed January 21, 2020,https://supreme.justia. com/cases/federal/us/499/340/ Sporazum o trgovinskim aspektima prava intelektualnog vlasništva, 228 Službeni list Europske unije 11/Sv. 74, L 336/214 Službeni list Europskih zajednica 23.12.1994., accessed January 08, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:21994A1223(17)&from=HR The Constitution of the United States, accessed January 27, 2020,http:// constitutionus.com/ Ugovoru o autorskom pravu svjetske organizacije za intelektualno vlasništvo, 76 Službeni list Europske unije 11/Sv. 103, L 89/8 Službeni list Europskih zajednica 11.4.2000, accessed January 08, 2020,, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22000A0411(01)&from=RO Ustav Republike Srpske (,,Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske“, broj 21/92 – prečišćeni tekst, 28/94, 8/96, 13/96, 15/96, 16/96, 21/96, 21/02, 26/02, 30/02, 31/02, 69/02, 31/03, 98/03, 115/05, 117/05) Zakon o autorskim i srodnima pravima („Službeni glasnik BiH“, broj 63/2010) Zakon o obligacionim odnosima Republike Srpske (“Sl. list SFRJ”, br. 29/1978, 39/1985, 45/1989 - odluka USJ i 57/1989 i “Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske”, br. 17/1993, 3/1996, 37/2001 - dr. zakon, 39/2003 i 74/2004) 641 Review paper UDK ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR ANIMAL EXPERIMENTS FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES Miloš Radaković1 We absolutely cannot say that the experiments on animals are ethically justified. Proponents of the thesis of ethical justification take the usefulness and consequences as the principles and arguments in favor of their thesis, that is, their contributions to medicine or, on the other hand, the difficulties that we would have with their non – enforcement. There is no doubt that the experiments are both useful and justified, but simply not ethical. The proponents of such experiments and this way of working also know how to talk about number of drugs that have been discovered for animal diseases precisely thanks to these animals. This fact, being true, leads to the conclusion that these experiments are necessary which leads to the question why should they not be conducted on humans and for their own good? Some would say this is excessive, but would they not be using double standards then? If we cannot equate animals with humans, the cause being the ultima ratio, why do we attach so much inherent value and respect to babies, children and the mentally ill people more than to animals? Tom Regan, a renowned animal protection activist, proposed this idea of inherent value being the animal‘s inalienable right to be of importance not only to itself but to humans as well. The best definition was given by Jeremy Bentham when he said: “The question is not, whether they can reason or talk, but can they suffer.” Furthermore, Singer confirm Bentham’s thesis and adds arguments against speciesism, as in discrimination based on the species of the creature. Speaking of the matter of equal appreciation rights, Singer advocates the thesis that these rights lie exclusively on the creature’s ability to experience suffering and by extension, happiness ). He said that this is evidenced by the similarities between animals and humans – anatomically, physiologically and behaviorally, arguing that we are animals too, citing Darwin’s theory. Experiments have been conducted , are being carried out and will be carried out in the future as they 1 Student; Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka 643 Miloš Radaković are irreplaceable for a variety of reasons, and the only question is whether they will be conducted on animals or on humans. It is the right of every species to fight for its survival and, as a rule, the stronger will always win, but all of us have lives that are important to us. For example, according to Thomas Aquinas, the 13th century Christian priest and philosopher, animals are on the Earth to serve humans, just like air, water and earth.2 This is not just the right of that creature but their possibility and interest as well. They have a full moral right to realize their own interest according to their own wishes and needs. Furthermore, just as humans have the right to show their superiority to animals, the animals have the same right, in their respective living environments, to other weaker animal species. There is no doubt that experiments should and must continue until the “third solution” is found, but this is simply not justified. Even when everything is done for the welfare of the animals themselves, we do not have and there is no possibility of obtaining their informed consent. What we should and must do is to influence the public opinion to maximize the conditions in the premises where such things are done. The educating of the staff and the safe utility of experiments for scientific purposes will improve the chance of experiment success so that the potential victims of those experiments are not in vain. EU countries have strictly regulated that all experiments must be authorized under national regulations. Licenses are given for the institutes and for individual areas of research. All partners operate a local ethical review procedure. Critical to ethical review is a cost / benefit analysis; the welfare cost to the animals must be balanced by the benefit of knowledge gained into gene function and the role of genes in human health and disease. These consider factors such as: • The design of the procedures and their relevance to human and / or animal health and their advancement of knowledge • The appropriate use of species, number and quantity of animals • Adherence to the principles of the 3Rs: reduction, refinement and replacement • Avoidance or minimization of discomfort, distress and pain • Use of appropriate analgesia or anesthetics • Appropriate animal husbandry3 2 Regan T., Singer P. Animal Rights and Human Obligations. 2nd ed. Prentice Hall; Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA: 1989. 3 For more see: https://www.infrafrontier.eu/procedures/animal-welfare-and-ethics/eu-and-national-regulations-animal-experimentation. 644 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova The first animal experiments date back to ancient Greece and Aristotle but he can hardly be considered an experimental scientist. He has already been disputed by Nobel laureate Peter Madewar and Aristotel’s work was described as a “farrago of hearsay, imperfect observation, wishful thinking and credulity amounting to downright gullibility “. 4Galen of Pergamum, also the physicist and the personal doctor of the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Comodius, conducted experiments as well. The experience that he gained from these studies on animals led him to diagnose loss of feeling in the fingers of a patient as being caused by an injury to the spine. This was probably the first time that it was realized that neural problems could be referred from the actual point of injury.5 With the advent of the Renaissance, interest in experiments was renewed and has remained to this day which is a consequence of the anthropocentrism of the time and the return of the antiquity. William Harwey used some animals ( eels, fish, dogs, pigeons, and the other mammals) to show blood circulation. In 1661 Marcello Margiphy did his animal experiments and in the 1800s Claude Bernard studied glycogen and its links to diabetes. Also, animals were used to discover the air pump , to discover that humans needed oxygen, for the nervous system, etc. They were used to study the immune system transfusions, blood, asthma, cancer... All of this led to the great and unimaginable suffering of the creatures that participated in the experiments, because they were performed before anesthesia was discovered, leading to the conclusion that the experiments produced great pains which leads to the conclusion that the behavior of those who have performed such experiments can be characterized as, at least, inhumane. For example drugs for muscle dystrophy, Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s have been discovered thanks to animal experiments6. In addition, the following were discovered: respiratory function of the lung ( Hook 1667 ), first blood pressure measurement ( Reverena Steaven Haals 1773 ), insulin ( Benting and Beast 1922 ), the breast cancer drug, brain injury, childhood leukemia, malaria, multiple sclerosis, tuberculosis, and many more. Also, as said, thanks to chimpanzees, a vaccine for Hepatitis B has been discovered, without which the vaccine for Hepatitis C, the disease which kills “thousands of Americans a year”7, could not have been invented. Therefore, we cannot escape the fact and the impression that these experiments are useful and are fully and indisputably justified 4 Robert C. Hubrecht, The Welfare of Animals Used in Research: Practice and Ethics, The Universities Federation for Animal Welfare, Wheathampstead, Herts, UK, 2014., page 15. 5 Ibid, page 16. 6 Smith and Boyd, Oxford University Press. 7 Cris Abae, Director of the University of Texas M. D. Anderson Cancer Centers animal research facility. 645 Miloš Radaković from this point of view. However, as we have pointed out in the introduction, such experiments took place before the discovery of anesthesia, and from today’s point of view, we can speak freely about the terror that has been or is still being carried out on animals. In an effort to ban these experiments, the topic of slavery has been used to carry over points as an example. How is slavery related to these experiments? Slavery used to be quite natural and normal to humans. It was considered so only during human civilization and advancement, but later with the development of the society itself, slavery became a category that had to be overcome and for whose eradication humans have fought for centuries. Therefore, this may be the case with animals too. Maybe, in 100 or 200 years a person will not understand what is being done today. Maybe not, but there is a possibility. Also, in slavery as well as in this case, there are circles of people and interest groups who like this situation and would not want to it change. When we talk about such interest groups, we imply above all, the military and pharmaceutical companies. As far as the fight against pharmaceutical companies is concerned, but not the fight itself as far as their awareness is concerned, we all owe a great deal of thanks to Henry Spira who managed to convince major cosmetics companies including Avon and Revlon to invest in the search for alternatives to animal testing.8 9 According to DeGrazia, largely due to Spira‘s tactful but persistent engagement with these companies, and to their willingness to change, many consumers today look for such labels as “not tested on animals” and “cruelty free” on cosmetics they would like to buy.10 There are authors who, for example, support the utilitarian thesis that the experiments are justified only if their results outweighs the suffering and if both the subjects of interest and the interests of the majority are given the same moral weight. Richard David, who is strongly against experiments, talks about how animals become and stay ill from diseases that they could not otherwise get. For example, rodents almost never get sick on their own, and when they are treated from cancer, that cancer is always triggered on purpose. We can say that, doing experiments on rats and mice is practical, but according to recent research, 83% of the bodies substance is metabolized differently in mice compared to humans. According to that, the substance that is toxic to humans , could be completely harmless to a cat, or something harmless to humans could be deadly for cat 8 Henry Spira, “Fighting to win. In P. Singer (Ed.). In defense of animals”, New York: Harper & Row Publisher, 1985. 9 L. P. Munro, “The animal activism of Henry Spira”, ( Clayton, Melbourne, Australia, Monash University, 2002 ). 10 David DeGrazia, The Ethics of Animal Research: What Are the Prospects for Agreement, George Washington University, page 1. 646 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova or a mouse. It all leads to the at least 50 drugs found on the market that have caused cancer in animals, according to the recent US research.11 Likewise, there are a number of instances in the history of such experiments, in the market of pharmaceuticals, which have even led to deaths for some people. European standards also indicate that animals are not to be used more than once for experiments. Whether this was respected with the rodents or not, remain the question. We can only confirm that, under the US law from 1966 and 1967, mice and rodents do not fall under animals.12 Let us imagine how much of a manipulation this is... They can fall under animal welfare law only if they are registered as pets and only then can nobody can do anything to them. But what if they are not? In what way can a mouse be a pet if it is not an animal and if it is not an animal then what is it? Why do we use the terms as sacrifice and dormancy instead of a murder, when we are talking about some other animals, because it is only logical that if one is able to sleep can wake up too. There are many questions and few answers, but let us return to the application of the legislation, the legislation itself and in practice, first of all, in Serbia. Currently, the 3r legislation is in place including the laws that came from it. The First r represents the obligatory replacement of the animal if it is possible. The second r represents the principle of reduction of the number of animals participating in the experiments. Finally, the third r represents the refinement of methods being used to minimize potential pain, suffering, distress , etc. This raises an important ethical question: would it be justified to perform multiple experiments on one animal, which would then increase its suffering? In practice, at least, it is said that only one experiment must be performed on rodents. The Three r system serves to provide the animals being experimented on the best possible conditions and minimization of suffering. The Three r system is linked directly to obtaining a licence for experiments with animals in the UK. Specifically, companies or all interested parties who wish to do so, must obtain a total of 3 licenses. The first one should be obtained by the laboratory itself ( conditions, hygiene, ventilation... ), the second by the researchers themselves, who have to undergo specific trainings and courses and in the end, the most important, is the licence obtained for the purpose 11 Dr Vernon Coleman, “Why Patients Never Win In Drugs Wars”, https://www.prijatelji-zivotinja.hr/index. en.php?id=366. 12 D. Smith, “Rats, mice and birds excluded from Animal welfare act”, American Psychological Association 33, no. 7 ( July / August 2002 ): 14. 647 Miloš Radaković of experiments, ie., of what it should serve.13 According to Metfield, it is very important for each country do develop its own system of regulating experiments. Such systems should be accompanied by the attitude and culture that these people cultivate towards animals. The animosity towards experiments on animals comes from the UK and has been spreading across Europe for years. Public opinion should be actively involved in the debate on this issue. People are quite uninterested in science in general, so they easily want to accept some misinformation from certain circles. In this regard, there is one layperson, on the ethics committees in Serbia, and each committee should have seven members. Often, this layperson’s vote is overridden , and some authors believe that their number in committees should increase, because they represent the voice and opinion of the regular people and public opinion. So, for example, they would not even know that Belgrade and Serbia do not have category D on veterinary colleges on this day ( category D is the highest training that serves animal welfare learning and must be accessed by experimenters ). Ethics committees have 5 finctions and dutys according to law: determine the manner of conducting experiments on animals, in accordance with law, perform expert control over the conduct of animal experiments, organize training of persons conducting animal experiments, give expert opinions to the Minister on the ethical and scientific justification of conducting the inspection and submit regular annual reporting to the Minister. The Ethics Commission is obliged to terminate the conduct of the experiment without delay if during the conduct of the experiment on animals the procedure is contrary to the provisions of this Law and to inform the Ministry about it. The Ethics Committiees consists of veterinary surgeons, veterinarians with experience in breeding experimental animals, experts with experience in applying statistics in research, representatives of associations and organizations whose goals are aimed at protecting animal welfare, as well as researchers from related scientific fields. Acccording to Serbian law, one third of the committee members are not persons employed in a scientific research organization or some other legal entity that deals with animal experiments.14 The “Link Plus” association from Serbia, through its president Nataša Vukmirović in 2015, stated that there is no inspection control over the 15 registered institutions in Serbia, where many experiments are performed illegally. By comparison, in the UK, inspections are common and unannounced 13 M. L. Graham, M. J. Prescott, “The multification role of the 3Rs in shifting the harm – benefit analysis in animal models of disease”, European Journal of Pharmacology, ( July, 2015 ): 19 – 29. 14 Animal Welfare Law, Articles 51 and 52, https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_dobrobiti_zivotinja.html. 648 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova in laboratories, and inspectors themselves report only to the Government. For example, we have a case from 2014 when the aforementioned came to a document from the Institute of Medical Research of the Military Medical Academy ( VMA ) for a proposal for an experiment for eight dogs of a Serbian army. 15 The experiment was illegal and it did not get permission from the Ministry of Agriculture. The scientific council of the VMA approved the request and affixed a secrecy mark. The goal of the project was to determine the therapeutic potential of the experimental material. The plan was to follow the experiment for 9 months. At zero day dogs should have their 2nd, 3rd and 4th lower permanent premolars removed under general anesthesia. The dietary hygiene regimen would then last for 3 months. Later, at the side of the extracted teeth, which they had deliberately caused by bones defects and then the material would be tested. Six months later, 4 dogs would be killed so that histological samples could be taken using the engol technique and after nine months from beginning the remaining 4 dogs would be killed. What must be mentioned is that these dogs were active in the Serbian army. They were 6 German Shepherds, 1 Labrador and one Belgian Shepherd. What was considered necessary at the time was under public condemnation. In one day, about 14000 people signed up against this experiment, and a foster parents were found from the people who wanted to buy the dogs. What is known is that on May 26th, of the same year that the dogs were sent to the barracks in Niš, where they were supposed to say that the experiments had been carried out on them. The veterinary inspection did not act properly and reacted after the dogs were introduced in Niš. It is a fascinating fact that there are a 120 life protection companies in Serbia. Ask a logical question: if everything is okay and good, why do we have that much associations for the animal protection in a county with the relatively small population. The answer is only one: the situation is not good! Animal ethics is a new term for the academic exploration of the moral standards of nonhuman beings, which focuses on what we owe to animals and what social, legal, cultural, religious and political involvement in the legitimacy of animal abuse show us. A popular thought in experiments in ethics is to consider the possibility of creating an animal that would willingly accept its sacrifice for humanity with enthusiasm. “A pig that wants to be eaten.”16 This is a premise from the “The Eating of the day” in which one creature that wants to be eaten describes the details of his preparation 15 http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/289253/. 16 J. Baggini „The Pig that wants to be eaten”, (New York, NY; Penguin, 2005). 649 Miloš Radaković at a restaurant at the end of space in a novel of the same name.17 The idea is that it is “better” to have such a creature that wants to be eaten instead of an animal that does not want to, even though it causes disgust among individuals at dinner. This is also a description of the “shmou” introduced in 1948. In the popular comic book by Lil Siber and Al Capp cartoonist.18 Shmou has been described as tasty to eat and someone who wants to be eaten. He would snake up into a pan or roasting pan where chicken or steak would stand. All parts of the shmoos were multiplying so fast that they eventually threatened to destroy the economy and satirically showed the incompatibility of capitalism and utopianism. Such a concept of a “modified conscious” being with the ability to reduce ethical concern about animals’ injuries and suffering is no longer a matter of fiction and satire. The real approach that ethics today has to deal with is the production of animals for the needs of people with a strong will and desire for a self - harm. Another approach is to develop animals with reduced or completely eliminated suffering.19 This hypothetical product is called “anesthetic steak”.20 One way is to surgically or genetically cut off pathways that carry pain signals to specific parts of the brain that then register them. A surgical procedure called ”fracture” has been used in laboratories for some time, although it enters Category D with refers to ”painful and stress relieving medication” or Category E ”unexplained pain and stress”.21 Ralin suggests that genetic engineering should reduce animal suffering with genetic testing in research.22 Still, taking away the pain and fear of the animals would lead to the redemption and loss of ”cows” in cows and ”pig” in pigs.23 24 Some others, see the damage in a fully instrumented relationship between humans and manipulation in animals life.25 Scientists who support such processes are advancing rapidly, finding ways to kill pain though genetic mecha17 D. Adams, „The Restaurant at the End of the Universe”, (New York, NY: Pocket Books, 2003). 18 A. Capp, „The sort life and happy times of the Shmao“ (New York, NY: Overlook Books, 2003). 19 A. Shriver, „Knocking out of pain in livestock: Can technology Succeed Where Morality has stalled?“, Neuroethics 2, no 3. (2009) 115-124. 20 D. Wilkinson, „Anaeste steak“ : Pain – Free meat and the welfare paradox“ , published September 19, 2009. 21 J. Silverman, N.L. Gornett, S.F. Giszter, C.J. Heckman, J.A. Kulpa – Eddy, M.A. Lemoy, C.K. Perry and M. Pinter, „Decebrate Mammalion Preparations: Unalleviated or Fully Alleviated Pain? A review and opinion“, ( Journal of the American science 44, no. 4, 2005) : 34 – 36. 22 B. E. Rollin, ”The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and social Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals“, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1955). 23 M. W. Fox „Transgenic Animals: Ethical and Animals Welfare Concerns“ in „The Bio – Revolution“ : Cornucopia or Paradox Box, eds.. P. Wheale and R. Mc. Wally (London, England: Pluto 1990.), 31 – 54. 24 S. F. Sapontzis, „We should not manipulate the Genome of Domestic Hogs“, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 4 (1991.) : 177 – 185. 25 H. Verhoog, „Naturalness and the Genetic Modification of Animals“, Trends in Biotechnology 21, no 7. (2003) : 294 – 297. 650 Conference Proceedings / Zbornik radova nism.26 27 Still, Wilkinson points out that this is problematic. Even if you are able to eliminate the pathways that signal pain and suffering, it always comes to fear, anxiety, depression, frustration and many other things also occur, and are unlikely to have a simple genetic basis. Furthermore, if animals are believed to be incapable of suffering, this can only attenuate the quality of care that humans provide. For hundreds of years, humans have been deliberately trying to produce animals that will consciously and willingly inflict pain on themselves , all for the benefit of human entertainment and bloody sports such as, for example, dog fights. A survey conducted for the purpose of this work on the first year students of the Faculty of Law and the third year of the Faculty of Medicine, of the University of Banjaluka, showed that opinions on this issue were strongly divided. To the question: do you think that animal experiments are ethically justified, law students in over the 70% answered NO, while medical students answered YES in almost 100% of cases. This again confirm the utility of ethics, which is the only consideration in this respect. This paper is not intended to introduce anyone to the problem of animal experimentation, or to analyze various theorists, but to provide some information and to help answer the question of whether certain ideas that arise in relation to this question are justified (ethically) or not. REFERENCES: 1. A. Capp, “The sort life and happy times of the Shmao“ (New York, NY: Overlook Books, 2003). 2. A. Dierich and B. L. Kieffer, “Knockout Mouse Models in Pain Research“. Methods in molecular medicine 99 (2004). 3. A. Shriver, “Knocking out of pain in livestock: Can technology Succed Where Morality has stalled?“, Neuroethics 2, no 3. (2009). 4. Animal Welfare Law, Articles 51 and 52, https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/ zakon_o_dobrobiti_zivotinja.html. 5. B. E. Rollin, “The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and social Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals”, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1955). 6. D. Adams, “The Restourant at the End of the Universe”, (New York, NY: Pocket Books, 2003). 26 A. Dierich and B. L. Kieffer, ”Knockout Mouse Models in Pain Research“. Methods in molecular medicine 99 (2004) : 269 – 299. 27 T. Foulkes and J. W. Wood, ”Pain Genes“, Plos Genet 4, no. 7 (2008) e 1000086. 651 Miloš Radaković 7. D. Smith, “Rats, mice and birds excluded from Animale welfareact”, American Psychological Association 33, no. 7 ( July / August 2002 ): 14. 8. D. Wilkinson, “Anaeste steak“ : Pain – Free meat and the welfare paradox“ , published September 19, 2009. 9. David DeGrazia, The Ethics of Animal Research: What Are the Prospects for Agreement, George Washington University. 10. Dr Vernon Coleman, “Why Patients Never Win In Drugs Wars”, https://www. prijatelji-zivotinja.hr/index.en.php?id=366. 11. H. Verhoog, “Naturalness and the Genetic Modification of Animals“, Trends in Biotechnology 21, no 7. (2003). 12. Henry Spira, “Fighting to win. In P. Singer (Ed.). In defense of animals”, New York: Harper & Row Publisher, 1985. 13. J. Baggini, “The Pig that wants to be eaten”, (New York, NY; Penguin, 2005). 14. J. Silverman, N.L. Gornett, S.F. Giszter, C.J. Heckman, J.A. Kulpa – Eddy, M.A. Lemoy, C.K. Perry and M. Pinter, “Decebrate Mammalion Preparations: Unalleviated or Fully Alleviated Pain? A rewiew and opinion“, Journal of the American science 44, no. 4 (2005). 15. L. P. Munro, “The animal activism of Henry Spira”, ( Clayton, Melbourne, Australia, Monash University, 2002 ). 16. M. L. Graham, M. J. Prescott, “The multification role of the 3Rs in shifting the harm – benefit analysis in animal models of disease”, European Journal of Pharmacology, ( July, 2015 ): 19 – 29. 17. M. W. Fox, “Transgenic Animals: Ethical and Animals Welfare Concerns“ in „The Bio – Revolution“ : Cornucopia or Paradox Box, eds.. P. Wheale and R. Mc. Wally (London, England: Pluto 1990.). 18. Regan T., Singer P. Animal Rights and Human Obligations. 2nd ed. Prentice Hall; Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA: 1989. 19. Robert C. Hubrecht, The Welfare of Animals Used in Research: Practice and Ethics, The Universities Federation for Animal Welfare, Wheathampstead, Herts, UK, 2014. 20. S. F. Sapontzis, “We should not manipulate the Genome of Domestic Hogs“, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 4 (1991.). 21. Smith and Boyd, Oxford University Press. 22. T. Foulkes and J. W. Wood, “Pain Genes“, Plos Genet 4, no. 7 (2008) e 1000086. 23. http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/289253/. 24. https://www.infrafrontier.eu/procedures/animal-welfare-and-ethics/eu-andnational-regulations-animal-experimentation 652