The Spirit of Tolerance in Islam, by Reza Shah-Kazemi. I. B. Tauris and Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2012. 165 pp., $14.00 ISBN-13: 9781780761312

The Spirit of Tolerance in Islam by Reza Shah-Kazemi (review) Rebecca Masterton Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies, Volume 6, Number 3, Summer 2013, pp. 355-362 (Review) Published by ICAS Press DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/isl.2013.0025 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/517638 Access provided by The Eugene McDermott Library,University Of Texas at Dallas (9 Feb 2019 08:10 GMT) Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Summer 2013 ∙ Vol. VI ∙ No. 3 The Spirit of Tolerance in Islam by Reza Shah-Kazemi, 2012. (Occasional Papers, 4) London & New York: I. B. Tauris in association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, vi + 165 pp., £7.99. isbn: 978-1-78076-131-2 (pbk). reBecca maSterton London, UK The reverse cover of this monograph states that ‘[t]hrough compelling historical illustration and careful theological exposition, [it] mounts a concise but irrefutable argument that the Islamic faith is inherently and emphatically tolerant by nature and disposition.’ To that end, the work consists of an introduction, entitled ‘The Trajectory of Tolerance’, and two parts. The first part, entitled ‘A Glance at the Historical Record’, looks at examples of tolerance in the rulership of the Ottomans, the Mughals, the Fatimids, the Umayyads of Cordoba, and then the real status of ‘Protected Minorities’ or dhimmis, under those rulerships. Part Two, entitled ‘The Spirit of Tolerance’, moves on to the cosmological and theoretical aspects of tolerance within Islam itself. This part consists of six sections, entitled ‘Tolerance and Revealed Knowledge’; ‘Confirmation and Protection’; ‘Plurality of Faiths’; ‘Healthy Competition’; ‘Inevitability of Difference’, and ‘The Prophetic Paradigm: Compassionate Forbearance’. An epilogue concludes the discussion. While the outline sounds promising, however, one issue remains, and that is whether the arguments put forth in the work are sufficient for demonstrating the point that Shah-Kazemi wishes to make. The theme of tolerance in Islam is important, as scepticism towards the idea that Islam could be even remotely tolerant is today almost de rigueur; providing examples of where polities run by Muslims have shown a similar kind of tolerance to contemporary secular democratic societies should offer the general readership (at which the book is aimed) proofs for the said ‘irrefutable argument’; but there are some issues regarding this methodology. Does providing such examples of such tolerance prove that Islam itself is fundamentally tolerant? It has been objected by some neo-Orientalist academics that any tolerance shown by Muslims is actually a departure from the Islamic ethos. In addition, it is open to 355 Book Reviews question whether the examples provided by Shah-Kazemi are universally acceptable even to all Muslims. Cases cited at times omit to mention acts of oppression meted out to minority Muslim groups. This will be discussed below. Opening, in the Introduction, with a historical comparison of Christendom’s intolerance and the Muslim world’s tolerance, ShahKazemi firstly focuses upon a period in history where Christendom was riven with ‘religious intolerance, fanatical inquisitions and bitter internecine wars’ (2) – the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – while the Muslim world was ruled by three large, fairly well organised empires: the Ottomans, the Mughals, and the Safavids, although the Safavids are omitted from this study. He says, ‘Locke was deeply struck by the contrast between the paradoxically tolerant “barbarians” – the Muslim Ottomans – and violently intolerant ostensibly “civilised” Christians.’ (2). While it may ostensibly be reasonable to make such a comparison, it could be argued that this is a selective reading of history and that the comparisons are not always accurate (for instance, on page 5). It would be useful for the reader if these points could be addressed. Another method of comparison is also at risk of not standing up to scrutiny: ‘Locke was, of course, not alone in noticing the embarrassing discrepancy between the undeniably tolerant practice of the Muslims and the increasingly intolerant nature of Christianity’ (3). It is usual academic practice to compare the concrete with the concrete, the abstract with the abstract, but here is a contrast between the concrete (Muslims) and the abstract (Christianity). The author is in danger of following the practice of the current media, where the tolerant practices of some European Christians (or secularists) are compared with the intolerance of ‘Islam’ (a comparison of the local and the specific, with the abstract and monolithic). In order for any potential, parallel rebuttals not to arise, there needs to be greater specificity in the way that such examples and comparisons are presented. There are also general statements which are difficult to support. According to Shah-Kazemi, whether educated or not, Muslims would have found the massacre of native Americans by the Spanish Christians ‘utterly reprehensible’ and been horrified at the ‘wanton disregard for the intrinsic dignity of the human being’ (12). Again, there seems to be some inaccuracy in the methodological approach: referring to the ideal principles of Islam, that ‘regardless of race, colour, ethnicity and even religion, every human being is endowed with inalienable dignity’ (12) and 356 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Summer 2013 ∙ Vol. VI ∙ No. 3 comparing that to real acts of intolerance among Christians, whereas, quite easily, the ideal principles of Christianity could just as well be compared to real acts of intolerance among Muslims. It is not entirely academically sound, either, to speculate on how Muslims would have reacted. Usually, an historical thesis has to provide evidence. Shah-Kazemi does make a good point about the secular idea of tolerance and its manifestation in society, as something ‘external’ and ‘purely formal’, which ‘can in fact be accorded reluctantly, begrudgingly, or condescendingly’. Furthermore ‘one can be tolerant outwardly and legally, without this being accompanied by sincere respect for the religion of the Other’ (15). Thus, he calls for a revival of a religion-centred tolerance; the practice of tolerance based upon that which is already an inherent and integral part of the structure and ethos of Islam, and which, unlike the form of tolerance often found in secular societies, ‘is not some optional extra, some philosophical or cultural indulgence’ (15). As he says, demanding that Muslims adopt a secular form of tolerance overlooks the rich tradition of tolerance within Islam itself. Moving on to Part One, which begins with the Ottomans as an example of a ‘broad-minded and tolerant polity’, Shah-Kazemi cites Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis’s praise for the Ottoman empire, which encompasses a diverse range of cultures and languages, and which allowed for ‘communal autonomy’.1 It is well known that Jews fleeing from the Spanish Inquisition sought refuge in Anatolia; yet examples of repressive policies cannot be overlooked, if one is to do justice to those who suffered under the Ottomans. For example, its expansion into Sudan, under Muhammad Ali (d. 1849 ce), led to the appropriation and escalation of the slave trade and harsh treatment of ‘fellow’ Sudanese Muslims; Shah-Kazemi shows how Christians preferred to live under the Ottomans because of the ‘tolerant’ millet system that they introduced, which allowed different groups to practice their own religion and to live according to the jurisdiction of their own law; the system was also used in pre-Islamic Iran, so it is not unique to Islam (22). The question may be asked, however, whether this practice of mutual co-operation (various populations recognising Ottoman rule in exchange for being allowed to practice their religion) did not arise more out of political expediency than out of a spirit of tolerance. It is difficult to guess. The millet system did not stop the massacre and deportation of the Armenian Christians towards the end of Ottoman rule, amounting essentially to 357 Book Reviews the permanent destruction of a cohesive Armenian nation. Shah-Kazemi points out that the hierarchical organisation of religious communities did not entail persecution or intolerance, only [!] the relegation of the minorities to what would be called today ‘second-class’ status. The inequalities inherent in such a religious hierarchy are to be evaluated according to the medieval standards of the time. (24) It could be argued, however, that it is precisely this ‘medieval’ culture of relegating citizens to second-class status based upon their religion which contemporary secularists cite as the very reason why such a polity should have been abolished, and why it is not seen today as a relevant example of tolerance. In defending Muslim tolerance, therefore, it would be better not to appear to make light of relegating minorities to secondclass status or to dismiss this as just a reflection of the times, since the previous examples given with regard to the Ottomans, Moghuls, and Umayyads could equally be disputed in a similar fashion; in other words, as having no real basis in the actual teachings of Islam. Again, bearing in mind potentially and often rigorously asserted objections, it would be better to offer an argument that would stand up to scrutiny. As this history is interpreted from a Perennialist perspective, issues which might give cause for concern among some readers are neatly tidied up with the following explanation: ‘These inequalities are of the contingent order, being particular outcomes of a specific historical context; whereas the principle of tolerance, logically implying religious equality, is of the essence, which transcends such contingencies’ (25). Shah-Kazemi advises us not to ‘focus on political contingencies which may have entailed intolerance’ (25). There are problems with such an argument, however. For example, one could use it with regard to the terrorising of Rohingya Muslims in predominantly Buddhist Myanmar, since the essence of Buddhism is tolerance for the Other, while such massacres are of the contingent order. An almost idealistic view of the Sufi orders that existed under the Ottomans is given, where they are said to have ‘aerated the religious ambience of the entire empire with a spiritual fragrance, affording greater access to the core values of love, respect, tolerance’ (29). No mention is made of the miserable fate of the Bektashi Sufi order, which was initially conscripted into the Janissary armies and then forced en masse into exile once the Janissaries were broken up. Due to their Shi‘a tendencies, the formerly trusted Bektashis became a virtual ‘fifth column’ in Ottoman 358 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Summer 2013 ∙ Vol. VI ∙ No. 3 society once the Safavids came to power. Their properties were confiscated and handed over to the resolutely Sunni Naqshbandis. With regard to Shah-Kazemi’s selection of the Mughal Empire, Emperor Akbar’s famous ‘ibadat khanah (house of worship) is cited, along with his invention of a new ‘universalist’ religion, which he called din-i ilahi (way of God), where he invited scholars of different religions to come together for discussions. Coincidentally, this example is also cited by the post-modern philosopher, Fred Dallmayr,2 as an example of how Muslims could be (or should be) ‘pluralist’. What is not mentioned is Akbar’s massacre of 30,000 mostly unarmed Rajputs after the siege of Chittor in 1568 ce. Shah-Kazemi says that ‘liberal Muslims see [Akbar’s] rule as a forerunner to modern cosmopolitan culture and liberalism’ (35), and we know what wars have been waged in the name of liberalism in the last ten years. He says that Akbar was inspired by the Qur’anic idea that ‘no one religion has a monopoly on the sacred’, yet the Qur’an is also clear that there are degrees of belief, knowledge and understanding, an idea which challenges the particular concept of pluralism suggested here. The sections covering the Fatimid and Umayyad caliphates are somewhat shorter. A brief overview is made about the early Fatimid policy of not compelling Sunni Muslims to become Isma‘ili. Undoubtedly the Fatimid rulers do not appear to have discriminated against anyone based upon their race or religion. Cairo under Fatimid rule became a society of diverse cultures, consisting of Africans, Slavs, Turks, Berbers, Iraqis, and Syrians. Jews and Christians were allowed to practice their religion unhindered. The Fatimid caliphate is known for its ‘liberalism’ up to the point of al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (d. 1021 ce), who sought to impose laws dictating that Jews and Christians should wear specific clothing to identify them, but again, such policies are deemed ‘contingent and somewhat artificial creations of the jurists’ (45). In fact, the ordering of Jews and Christians to wear specific clothing goes back to a document entitled ‘al-Uhdah al-‘Umariyyah’ (the Pact of ‘Umar), attributed ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, although most likely compiled by the Muslim law-makers of his era, or slightly later. Turning to the caliphate of the last Umayyad, ‘Abd al-Rahman (d. 788 ce), set in Spain, Shah-Kazemi mentions the mass of converts to Islam and grief of Christians who lamented ‘living under pagans’, who nevertheless let them practice their religion. This period is also acknowledged, even by Jewish scholars, as being a time that revived an 359 Book Reviews ailing Jewish tradition. Shah-Kazemi cites Ibn ‘Arabi’s famous poetic lines (‘My heart has become capable of every form […] a convent for Christian monks and a temple for idols’) as offering an example of the ‘essential teachings’ of the Qur’an, as outlined in 3:84, although whether Ibn ‘Arabi’s definition of ‘universality’ and ‘plurality’ is the same as that which is outlined in this verse would require a detailed discussion, and to what extent his philosophy had any effect in promoting tolerance in the period of civil war in which he lived will never be known. The section on the meaning and status of the dhimmah under an Islamic state is of great importance in clarifying a much misunderstood institution. It is not completely clear why one of the cruellest administrators of the first Umayyad caliphate, Hajjaj, is used as an example of tolerance. It is generally agreed that, with the invasion of India, Hajjaj wrote, in his letter to Muhammad ibn Qasim, that the Hindus and Buddhists of Brahmanabad: have paid homage to us and have undertaken to pay the fixed tribute [jizyah] to the caliph. Because they have become dhimmis we have no right whatsoever to interfere in their lives and property. Do permit them to follow their own religion.3 However, nothing is mentioned about Hajjaj’s savage execution of some of the most prominent companions of the Holy Prophet, and his terrorising of Muslims who dared to defy the imposition of Umayyad rule, amounting to some 125,000 deaths. In any case, Shah-Kazemi explains the institution of the dhimmah as an ‘anachronism’ which is no longer relevant to today: ‘for intelligent contemporary Muslims, the dhimma is a medieval socio-religious construct’ (63), although who should be classed as an ‘intelligent’ contemporary Muslim is left open to speculation. The institution of dhimmah should not be taken seriously: it is ‘a historically conditioned contingency’ (73). Moving on to Part Two, which intends to explain the theological foundations for the ethic of tolerance in Islam, Shah-Kazemi notes the link between knowledge and tolerance in Islam; the more knowledge that someone has of other religions, the more tolerant of them they are: ‘Sincere and respectful tolerance – as opposed to formal, begrudging tolerance – of the Other flows forth in the measure that the Muslim knows that the religions of the Other are also divinely revealed’ (76). 360 Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Summer 2013 ∙ Vol. VI ∙ No. 3 In fact, that needs some qualification, since the Qur’an accepts other monotheistic religions, but clearly condemns polytheistic religions, and religious beliefs that humankind has invented with their own imaginations. The rest of this section outlines Islamic beliefs in a way that is easy to understand for those exploring them for the first time. In the subsection entitled ‘Confirmation and Protection’, which outlines how the religion of Islam both confirms and protects previous religions, Shah-Kazemi mentions Amir ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri (d. 1883 ce) as an example of a Muslim who protected Christians that were under attack. After al-Jaza’iri’s failed jihad against the French, he is known to have turned to Ibn ‘Arabi in search of a solution for living with the onslaught of colonialism and modernity. His approach did not find fertile ground, giving way to the Islamist movement initiated by Rashid Rida, and although Shah-Kazemi refers to al-Jaza’iri as an exemplar of Islamic tolerance, he does affirm that al-Jaza’iri’s ‘highly mystical view of the principles of transcendence […] is only going to make sense to a minority of like-minded Sufis’ (93), which raises the question: if this highly mystical view is so obscure, does that really demonstrate its effectiveness in the Muslim world? Discussing the primordial origins of all religions, in the section entitled ‘Plurality of Faiths’, Shah-Kazemi quotes another Sufi, ‘Aziz alDin Nasafi (d. 13th century ce), who refers to the signs in the universe, the universe being the cosmic Qur’an. The quotation is followed by the statement ‘Such a view is clearly in harmony with the cosmological spirit underlying the shamanistic traditions’ (100). It would be interesting to know which shamanistic traditions are being referred to here. In the section entitled ‘Healthy Competition’, Shah-Kazemi reasons that God created different religions in order that believers would compete with one another in good works. He highlights the Qur’anic verse that warns Muslims not to fall into religious arrogance, deeming themselves the only ones who will enter Paradise (Qur’an 2:111-112). A number of hadiths are mentioned throughout the book, although from secondary sources, so it would be helpful to have the primary source; in addition, some hadith which have alternative interpretations are also cited; for example, in the section entitled ‘Inevitability of Difference’, the hadith ‘Differences [ikhtilaf] within my umma constitute a mercy (rahma)’4 is mentioned as a means of demonstrating the acceptance of freedom of conscience; the meaning of ikhtilaf was actually corrected by Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq to mean 361 Book Reviews ‘frequenting’ (the Prophet in order to gain knowledge), not ‘differences’.5 There is in the section entitled ‘The Prophetic Paradigm: Compassionate Forbearance’ an excellent discussion on the concept of hilm, from which one of the Names of God is derived: al-Halim. This linguistic analysis helps to enlighten the reader with regard to a key term utilised in the Islamic tradition and an entire ethos which is founded upon that: ‘forbearance, wisdom, patience, composure, self-mastery, imperturbability, together with the qualities of kindness, mildness, and gentleness’ (114). The book’s epilogue concludes by highlighting a ruling which was drawn up by the participants of 50 Muslim countries at an interfaith event in ‘Amman in 2005, which held that the main Islamic schools of thought, Sunni and Shi‘a, were valid and should be recognised. Although such an agreement is perhaps coming a little late in the day, it is viewed by Shah-Kazemi as a decisive moment in putting an end to the intolerance of different Muslim groups towards one another at least. (It may be worth mentioning that many of those participants no longer adhere to the paper that they signed). Even though undoubtedly many examples of religious tolerance within Islamic ethics and practice can be found in the monograph, at the end, there remains the question of whether the attendant complexities and contradictions of the matter are being taken into consideration in order to offer a case that is sound, both academically and politically. Notes 1 Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society I (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), 1 in Shah-Kazemi, The Spirit of Tolerance in Islam, 22. 2 See Fred Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism (New York: SUNY Press, 1990). 3 Gobind Khusalani, Chachnamah Retold: An Account of the Arab Conquest of Sindh (New Delhi: Promilla & Co., 2006), 156, in Shah-Kazemi, The Spirit of Tolerance in Islam, 60. 4 Thomas Arnold, Preaching of Islam (London: Luzac & Co., 1935), 81-82, in ShahKazemi, The Spirit of Tolerance in Islam, 107. 5 al-Shaykh al-Saduq, Ma‘ani al-Akhbar (Qum: n.p., 1361 ah (solar)), 157. 362