RESEARCH REPORT INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION The Cabo Delgado conflict and its regional implications JULIA STANYARD│ALASTAIR NELSON│GREG ARDÉ│JULIAN RADEMEYER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FEBRUARY 2022 1 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION The Cabo Delgado conflict and its regional implications JULIA STANYARD│ALASTAIR NELSON│GREG ARDÉ│JULIAN RADEMEYER February 2022 The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Hanns Seidel Foundation. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Our thanks go to everybody who participated in this research: Omardine Omar and Arlindo Chissale for their work under difficult conditions in Cabo Delgado, and David Africa for his analysis and insight. Thanks to the German Hanns Seidel Foundation for providing the funding that has made this research possible and to Hanns Bühler and Uta Lehmann for being engaged and committed partners throughout. As ever, our thanks also go to Mark Shaw for his guidance, and to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC’s) design and editorial teams for their support in bringing this paper into its final form. Above all, we thank everyone who agreed to be interviewed for this research, both on and off the record, and shared their insights and expertise on this complex and contested region. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Julia Stanyard is an analyst at the GI-TOC’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa. Her research has focused on drug trafficking, drug policy and illegal trade in cultural property. She currently edits the Risk Bulletin of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa, GI-TOC’s periodical publication of organized crime trends in the region. Alastair Nelson is a senior analyst at the GI-TOC’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa. He also works as a conservationist supporting governments and their partners to tackle wildlife crime, mitigate corruption, strengthen protected area management and build constituencies for conservation. He has led conservation programmes in East and Southern Africa, including for six years in Mozambique. Greg Ardé is a journalist based in South Africa. His book, War Party – How the ANC’s political killings are breaking South Africa, investigates the ANC’s role in political violence in KwaZulu-Natal and how the taxi industry shapes this violence. Julian Rademeyer is director of GI-TOC’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa. He was formerly a project leader at TRAFFIC, the wildlife trade monitoring network, and an investigative journalist. He is author of Killing for Profit – Exposing the Illegal Rhino Horn Trade. © 2022 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Global Initiative. Cover: A destroyed house in a village outside Macomia, Cabo Delgado, 24 August 2019. The village had been attacked by insurgents three weeks before. © Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images Please direct inquiries to: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Avenue de France 23 Geneva, CH-1202 Switzerland www.globalinitiative.net CONTENTS Key takeaways and summary recommendations............................................................................... 1 Key takeaways......................................................................................................................................................... 1 Summary recommendations................................................................................................................................ 2 Executive summary: A localized insurgency with regional implications ............................ 4 The origins and drivers of the conflict ...................................................................................................... 8 Economic exclusion sparks resentment..........................................................................................................16 Ethnic tensions exacerbate divides..................................................................................................................18 Religious extremism provides a powerful narrative .................................................................................... 19 Financial support to the emerging insurgency .............................................................................................20 A composite movement ......................................................................................................................................21 Insurgency and illicit economies in Cabo Delgado ........................................................................ 22 Drugs .......................................................................................................................................................................25 Kidnap for ransom and human trafficking......................................................................................................30 Timber .....................................................................................................................................................................31 Gemstones and gold ............................................................................................................................................32 Far-fetched reports of human organ trade? ..................................................................................................34 The current state of al-Shabaab .................................................................................................................38 Foreign fighters in al-Shabaab...........................................................................................................................45 Islamic State networks in South Africa..................................................................................................50 South Africa: A base for terror networks? ..................................................................................................... 51 Islamic State-linked cases since 2015 .............................................................................................................57 The Islamic State threat in South Africa .........................................................................................................60 The risks of overestimating the Islamic State threat ................................................................................... 61 Responses .................................................................................................................................................................63 National security institutions in disarray in South Africa ..........................................................................64 The impact of weak institutions .......................................................................................................................66 Responses to the insurgency in Mozambique ..............................................................................................68 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................ 70 Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................. 73 For the Mozambican government .................................................................................................................... 74 For SADC ................................................................................................................................................................ 74 For the international community .....................................................................................................................75 On behalf of civil society ....................................................................................................................................75 Annex ....................................................................................................................................................................... 76 Notes ..................................................................................................................................................................................87 KEY TAKEAWAYS AND SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS Mozambican soldiers at a building torched by insurgents, Naunde, Cabo Delgado, June 2018. © Joaquim Nhamirre/AFP via Getty Images Key takeaways ■ Trafficking routes through northern Mozambique are resilient and have adapted to the new security situation. This includes routes shifting away from areas where insurgents hold territory and conflict is most intense. For example, drug trafficking routes have moved south through southern Cabo Delgado and Nampula. ■ The main sources of funding for the insurgency are local, primarily obtained from the support of local businesspeople, cash and goods seized during attacks, and looting. Involvement in the illicit economy remains a small proportion of their funding base, mostly through kidnap for ransom. ■ The factors which helped create the insurgency – a breakdown in governance and delivery of government services, socio-economic exclusion, rampant corruption and organized crime, elite capture of resources, and ethnic and religious divides – still remain in Cabo Delgado and throughout northern Mozambique. ■ The insurgency is evolving. While Rwandan and Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention has helped Mozambican forces recapture territory, the conflict continues and has resurged in parts of Cabo Delgado and spread into other provinces. The insurgents have re-established their connection with Islamic State, as suggested by IS propaganda around recent attacks. ■ Islamist extremist networks in South Africa are not widespread and do not appear to have many links to the insurgency in northern Mozambique. However, key institutions to monitor and prosecute extremism in South Africa are weak, which could be a problem if the regional threat changes. ■ The relationship with ADF in Uganda is important to the insurgents for basic training, as a rear base, and more recently for shared specialist training in bomb-making. KEY TAKEAWAYS AND SUMMARYEXECUTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY 1 Summary recommendations For the Mozambican government: ■ Ensure stability of local governance structures and tackle drivers of corruption. ■ Improve trust between state and local populations, for example by bringing local civil society and community leaders into governance roles. ■ Invest in the region to address economic inequality, in a way that is transparent and locally based. ■ Professionalize law enforcement agencies into organizations that protect and serve all citizens of Mozambique. Reforms should focus on improving trust between the local population and the state. ■ Use specialist prosecutorial and police teams in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula to tackle the illicit economies. This can be done with international partners. ■ Report transparently about developments in Cabo Delgado and other provinces. Allow national, regional, and international press free and easy access. For SADC: ■ Support key member states to collaborate on regional threats and improve intelligence-sharing. ■ Support Mozambique to address the humanitarian crisis in the north and to promote transparency and unimpeded press access to the region. ■ Support Mozambique to create the changes in security force culture and management recommended above, in order to improve security force relationships with local people. ■ 2 Act as a regional watchdog for human rights abuses, transparency and corruption. INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS For the international community: ■ Focus on supporting processes that strengthen local governance systems and build institutions that are more resilient to corruption, more transparent, and expose and prosecute all human rights abuses. ■ As far as possible, provide direct international development support to northern Mozambique at the provincial and district level, rather than providing support via the federal government. ■ Provide direct support to local non-government organizations and civil society groups. ■ Embed bilateral and multilateral support to military and police training missions in a joint strategy with preconditions that the Mozambican security cluster is reformed to be more professional, effective and service oriented. On behalf of civil society: ■ The critical role in conflict resolution and monitoring that Mozambican civil society organizations play should be recognized and supported by the Mozambican government and international community. ■ The international community should provide direct support to Mozambican civil society. ■ The Mozambican government should allow civil society organizations the freedom to operate. KEY TAKEAWAYS AND SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: A localized insurgency with regional implications Food packages are distributed by the World Food Programme to internally displaced persons fleeing violence in Cabo Delgado, February 2021. © Alfredo Zuniga/AFP via Getty Images 4 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS T he northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado has been dubbed Cabo Esquecido or the ‘forgotten cape’ because it has long been Mozambique’s poorest and most politically marginalized region despite its wealth of natural resources in rubies and natural gas.1 The rise of an insurgent group, which has terrorized the population since 2017, means that eyes around the world are now focused on this formerly ‘forgotten’ region. Yet the region has always been a key economic corridor in one sense, namely for illicit trafficking flows that traverse the East African coast. Drug trafficking (chiefly of heroin and, more recently, methamphetamines and cocaine), human smuggling, illicitly exported timber, illegal wildlife products, and smuggled gems and gold all pass from or through Cabo Delgado. The prevalence of organized crime has shaped the region’s political economy and contributed to the breakdown of governance in which the insurgency emerged. As the conflict has worn on, the question of the insurgent group’s – known locally as al-Shabaab (though unrelated to al-Shabaab in Somalia) – involvement in or control of illicit economies has been the subject of intense speculation, politically driven allegations and, at times, outright disinformation. This report aims to cut through this noise and provide the most detailed analysis available on al-Shabaab’s relationship to the illicit economy. The report draws on fieldwork the GI-TOC has been conducting in northern Mozambique since 2018 and finds that the involvement of the insurgent group in the illicit economy remains a small proportion of their funding base, mostly through kidnap for ransom. The main sources of funding for the insurgency are local, primarily through support from local businesspeople, and cash, weapons and goods seized during attacks. Trafficking routes through northern Mozambique have been disrupted as criminal networks have sought alternative, more secure routes. These networks are, however, highly resilient and have adapted to the new security situation. For example, drug trafficking routes have moved south through southern Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces. Many of the illicit flows through Mozambique, such as drug trafficking, have not slowed. On the contrary, drug trafficking has grown and diversified while the insurgency has worn on. This means northern Mozambique continues to be a key illicit economic corridor to the wider region. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 Mtwara TANZANIA Palma Negomano Mocímboa da Praia Mueda Muidumbe Ibo Island CABO Macomia a vum Ro Lake Malawi Niassa Special Reserve a Msawize NIASSA MALAWI Namanhumbir Montepuez Balama Marrupa ZAMBIA Fingoé Pemba io Lúr Mandimba Cahora Bassa Dam Quissanga DELGADO lo ssa Me Lu ge nd Lichinga Mecula Nacala TETE Nampula NAMPULA MOZAMBIQUE Magué Angoche Milange Tete ZAMBEZIA Changara Mocuba Pebane ezi mb Za ZIMBABWE MANICA I N D I A N Quelimane O C E A N Inhaminga Gorongosa Main road SOFALA International boundary Provincial boundary Chimoio Provincial capital Dondo N Towns Beira FIGURE 1 Northern Mozambique. The Cabo Delgado conflict has implications across based on an analysis of the global Islamist group’s the region. As international forces from Rwanda propaganda channels. A spate of propaganda and the SADC have made inroads in recapturing around recent attacks in Mozambique suggests the insurgent-held territory since August 2021, there are insurgents have re-established these connections fears that fighters could scatter to other regions of National Park Mozambique and internationally. This is particularly recently. The loose affiliation is mutually opportunis- because foreign fighters make up a significant publicity platform and foreign fighters, and offering proportion of al-Shabaab’s fighting force, though Islamic State a new frontier on which to fight the the group remains majority Mozambican, and Islamist cause. Mozambican led. Attacks in the Niassa province – 2 the first of the conflict – suggest this is already happening.3 Niassa Province and Nampula Province, which borders Cabo Delgado to the south, have been key recruiting grounds the insurgent group. Game for Reserve 6 tic, offering the Cabo Delgado insurgents a global Islamic State issued a direct warning that if South Africa were to intervene militarily in Cabo Delgado, (as it has now done as part of the SADC force), it would retaliate with attacks in South Africa.4 There are fears that insurgents linked to Islamic State in The insurgency’s connections to Islamic State have Mozambique could inspire Islamic State adherents waxed and waned over the course of the conflict, elsewhere in the region to either stage attacks or INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS support the Mozambican group through manpower the benefits of the region’s natural resources and and finances. Our analysis of this regional threat profiteering from criminal markets. These inequalities therefore focused specifically on South Africa. have been drawn over ethnic and religious lines, The country has seen several Islamic State-linked between the politically dominant Christian-majority incidents since 2015. There are interconnections Makonde and the Muslim-majority Mwani and Makua between the individuals involved in these cases and ethnic groups. These political grievances have been jihadists in other countries, including some connec- channelled through religious extremism. 5 tions to Mozambique. However, close analysis of these cases suggests Islamist extremist networks in South Africa are not widespread and links to the insurgency in northern Mozambique are infrequent. The drivers of extremism still remain in Cabo Delgado and throughout northern Mozambique. To create a sustainable peace in the region, the government needs to invest in local development and ensure that In spite of the weak connections to insurgency in such investment is transparent to local communities, South Africa, key institutions to monitor and establish service-oriented and transparent local prosecute extremism in the country are weak, as governance and address the drivers of corruption. evidenced by frequent delays and derailments of Civil society must be afforded the freedom to play a terrorism prosecutions. This is part of the wider meaningful role in conflict resolution, the press must deterioration of South Africa’s security institutions in be given unimpeded access to report openly and the recent years due to widespread corruption, mal- international community must provide direct support administration and the ‘state capture’ scandals that to the region and play a watchdog role over human have dominated South Africa’s political sphere. If the rights abuses perpetrated by police and military. regional terrorism threat worsens, these institutions are not well prepared to respond. Currently, the prevailing view in Mozambique is that the government will prioritize security for gas The insurgency in Mozambique has been born out of developments in Cabo Delgado, rather than deep-seated grievances over economic inequality sustainable development for the local population and political exclusion. While local people in Cabo and improved governance. This would create the risk Delgado have borne decades of government neglect, of a resurgence of violence, making northern extreme poverty and widespread corruption, they Mozambique a source of continuing instability that have seen elite politically connected groups seizing could have knock-on effects regionally. Methodology This report draws on research conducted from September to November 2021. A team comprising researchers specializing in organized crime, investigative journalists and counterterrorism experts conducted over 100 interviews over three months in Cabo Delgado and Maputo in Mozambique, and Durban and Cape Town in South Africa. Interviewees included individuals involved in illicit economies in Cabo Delgado, people connected to the insurgency, other individuals working in business and security in Cabo Delgado, members of extremist networks in South Africa, prosecutors, security sources, government officials and regional security experts. We analyzed media and information released by the insurgents and by central Islamic State media via encrypted channels and court documents relating to counterterrorism prosecutions in South Africa. This study builds on extensive research into the illicit economies of northern Mozambique that the GI-TOC has been conducting since 2018.6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 THE ORIGINS AND DRIVERS OF THE CONFLICT Artisanal miners search for rubies near Montepuez. © Matthew Hill/Bloomberg via Getty Images 8 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS T he first inklings of sectarian strife in Mozambique, and the genesis of the group which would become al-Shabaab, were years in the making. Violence first emerged in October 2017 when insurgents led attacks on three police stations, resulting in 20 deaths, which were mostly members of the attacking group but also police officers and a civilian. Since these first attacks, al-Shabaab has evolved. Their attacks have grown in scale and sophistication, from early attacks on villages by small groups primarily armed with machetes, to more tactically complex attacks against larger targets with sophisticated weaponry. They have claimed allegiance to Islamic State since 2019. In March 2021, al-Shabaab captured and held the regional port of Mocímboa da Praia for a year and launched a major attack on the town of Palma, the site of a large natural gas development project of the French energy giant Total Energies. The project was suspended in light of the security situation, though Total have stated they aim to restart work in 2022. Al-Shabaab have committed grave human rights abuses against the civilian population, including beheadings, kidnappings of young women and forcing recruits to join their ranks, and have caused more than 800 000 people to flee the area. The genesis of the conflict, rooted as it is in the complex political landscape of Cabo Delgado, has been the subject of a great deal of analysis from academics and researchers as the conflict has worn on.7 Three interlinked themes emerge as key to understanding what sparked and continues to drive the insurgency, namely socio-economic exclusion driven by political elites linked to the national government, the emergence of religious extremism, and tensions between Cabo Delgado’s main ethnic groups. Experts disagree as to which of these is the most important factor, yet they are best understood as mutually reinforcing considering that economic, religious and ethnic divides have fractured communities along the same fault lines. THE ORIGINS AND DRIVERS OF CONFLICT 9 Key developments in the insurgency in Cabo Delgado 2017 Montepuez Thousands of artisanal miners are expelled from mine sites by security forces for unlicensed mining. Many were forced to return to home districts in Mozambique and southern Tanzania. Some of these miners reportedly join the growing extremist group, who are protesting corrupt governance and elite control of resources.26 Early 2007 Mocímboa da Praia An emerging Islamist sect in Cabo Delgado is first reported, as some youth groups begin to challenge established Muslim religious authorities and espouse a more conservative form of Islam.8 This sect is understood to have been the forerunner of the insurgent group. May 2009 Montepuez Large ruby deposit discovered in the region of Montepuez.9 Today, Mozambique produces as much as 80% of the world’s ruby supply.10 Images circulated in 2016 allegedly show fighters loyal to Islamic State training in caves in north-east Tanzania. A crackdown by Tanzanian security forces is said to have caused fighters to flee into neighbouring Mozambique, joining the growing Islamist movement. 18 February 2010 Rovuma Basin Huge reserves of natural gas discovered off the coast of northern Mozambique by Anadarko.11 Other large-scale reserves in the same area were discovered in the following years. 2015 2016 2012 Mombasa, Kenya Radical Islamist cleric Aboud Rogo is shot and killed in Mombasa, Kenya, in a hit widely believed to have been carried out by Kenyan security forces.17 Rogo was a hugely influential preacher and allegedly the key leader of Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab’s operations in Kenya. His fundamentalist teachings, which called for the rejection of the state and the embrace of armed jihad, were influential on the emerging extremist movement in Mozambique.18 10 May 2017 Quissanga, Macomia Police make arrests of ‘al-Shabaab’ members in the Quissanga and Macomia districts.25 2018 • 25 April 2019 DRC The first Islamic State publication on ISCAP, the Islamic State Central Africa Province, which would later come to include operations in both the DRC and Mozambique, is published.37 A few days previously, Islamic State claimed its first attack in DRC. 4 June 2019 Metobi Islamic State claims its first attack in Mozambique in the village of Metobi, where insurgents attacked Mozambican forces.38 Since this attack Islamic State has claimed over 50 attacks in Mozambique, a small fraction of the total violence carried out by al-Shabaab in Cabo Delgado.39 2019 3 ‫االفتتاحية‬ Ivory that was being smuggled from Zanzibar to Pemba (en route to Asia) on a dhow that docked into Mocímboa da Praia late at night on 4 October 2017. The dhow was also carrying migrants from Somalia and Ethiopia en route to South Africa. The facilitator who arranged the transport was known to be a jihadist sympathizer. These illicit flows through Mocímboa da Praia have been disrupted during the conflict. 2015–2016 Mocímboa da Praia Followers of the conservative Islamist group clash with police and mainstream Muslim groups in a series of incidents in 2015 and 2016.19 The group was making demands for a more conservative social order, such as calling for alcohol bans and for children to be educated in madrasas, not secular schools. INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION 25 April 2019 Pemba Cyclone Kenneth makes landfall, causing an estimated US$100m in damage to homes, crops, infrastructure, boats and equipment,36 worsening the humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado. Insurgents pose around an Islamic State flag in an image shared on social media channels in June 2018. Two are allegedly South African nationals Renaldo Smith (second left, back row) and Mohammed Suliman (second right, back row). One of the earliest known images of the al-Shabaab fighters, from Mocímboa da Praia in October 2017. Early attacks generally targeted government buildings and police stations. 2017 15 April 2016 The Mozambican government admits to more than US$1bn of previously undisclosed debt.23 The scandal grows to include nearly US$2bn worth of hidden debts. The largest corruption scandal in Mozambique’s history, it plunged the country into financial crisis and exposed corruption at multiple levels, including allegations that point to the previous and current political leadership.24 2012 Montepuez Allegations of human rights abuses and violence towards artisanal miners are levelled against security forces at the Montepuez Ruby Mining (MRM) concession, from 2012 over several years.14 In 2019, Gemfields (which part-owns MRM) agrees to pay US$7.6 million compensation to a group of artisanal miners and residents.15 The abuses fuel discontent in local communities.16 April 2018 Images are circulated online that show al-Shabaab members pledging allegiance to Islamic State.29 2017 Southern Tanzania Splinter groups of other extremists move south from Tanzania, following a state crackdown on their activities. This helps shape the Cabo Delgado Islamist sect into a militarized group with an extremist ideology.27 8 November 2016 Palma The Mozambican government approves a community resettlement plan to make way for gas development near Palma.20 A report from Anadarko said over 550 families would have to be relocated, 952 would lose access to farmland and 3000 would also lose access to fishing grounds.21 Communities were angered at the reportedly insufficient compensation agreed.22 March 2012 Montepuez Montepuez Ruby Mining is granted a 25-year concession for ruby mining and prospecting in the region.12 The company was formed in June 2011.13 December 2017 The Mozambican government carries out a naval bombardment and helicopter raid on the village of Mitumbate in the Mocímboa de Praia district, believed to be al-Shabaab’s stronghold, killing 50 people, including children, and detaining 200.30 December 2018 Human Rights Watch estimates that by December 2018, about 300 suspected al-Shabaab members had been arrested by the defence and security forces, more than 400 houses had been burned, and about 10 000 people had been displaced and were receiving food aid from the World Food Programme.32 5 October 2017 Mocímboa da Praia The insurgency begins. Attacks on three police stations by insurgents claim 20 lives, mostly members of the attacking group, two police officers and one civilian.28 March 2018 Three Mozambican nationals are arrested in eastern DRC. They were reportedly receiving training at a jihadist base.31 THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS January 2019 Residents in Palma protest increasing insurgent attacks and violent military responses. Among other grievances, protesters allege that the insurgents are funded by powerful political figures in Mozambique to get control of their land, which has been increasing in value due to foreign investment in Cabo Delgado for its resources.33 29 January 2019 Three Ugandan nationals arrested in Cabo Delgado on suspicion of being involved in al-Shabaab attacks and leading ‘training camps’ for jihadists.34 185 ‫العدد‬ ‫ هـ‬1440 ‫ شوال‬3 ‫الخميس‬ ‫بسم هللا الرحمن الرحيم‬ ‫يحزنك قولهم‬ ُ ‫فال‬ ‫ يبتىل أتباعهم‬،‫مثلما ابتيل األنبياء عليهم السالم باتهام املرشكني لهم بالكذب والسحر والجنون‬ ‫ ويربروا حربهم‬،‫ ليصدوا عن سبيل الله تعاىل‬،‫عىل أيدي الكفار واملرتدين باتهامهم بكل نقيصة‬ .‫ منذ قيامها‬-‫أعزها الله تعاىل‬- ‫ وهو ما تعرض له جنود الدولة اإلسالمية‬،‫للمهتدين‬ ‫ ليقنع قادة‬،‫وبدأ األمر يف العراق باتهام الدولة اإلسالمية بالغلو يف الدين والبغي عىل الفصائل‬ ٰ‫ { َف َقا ِتلُوا ا َّلتِي تَبْغِ ي حَ تَّى‬:‫فصائل الصحوات أتباعهم أن قتالهم لها مندرج تحت قوله تعاىل‬ ،‫ ال ضمن االتفاقيات التي عقدوها يف السجون مع الصليبيني‬،]9 :‫تَفِ ي َء إ َِىل ٰ أَمْ رِ اللَّهِ } [الحجرات‬ .‫ومع الطواغيت يف دول الجوار بوساطة من علماء السوء ودعاة الفتنة‬ ‫ والدعوة بذلك إىل قتالها ابتدا ًء‬،‫ثم تطور األمر يف الشام إىل اتهام الدولة اإلسالمية بالخارجيّة‬ ‫ مسقطني ظلما وعدوانا كل اآلثار التي وردت يف الخوارج األوائل‬،‫واستباحة دماء جنودها كلهم‬ ‫ (لنئ أدركتهم‬:‫ وقوله‬،)‫ (طوبى ملن قتلهم وقتلوه‬:‫ كقوله عليه الصالة والسالم‬،‫وحكمهم عليهم‬ ‫ رغم علمهم اليقيني أن الدولة اإلسالمية ال تشابه الخوارج إال فيما شابههم‬،)‫ألقتلنهم قتل عاد‬ ‫ وعلمهم أن أكثر ما ألصقوه بها‬،‫فيه أهل السنة والجماعة من أمور مشرتكات بني الطائفتني‬ .‫من أخبار استدلوا بها عىل أحكامهم إنما هي محض أكاذيب ليس لهم عليها دليل‬ ،‫واليوم ومع يأس مرتدي الصحوات ومن واالهم من القضاء عىل الدولة اإلسالمية بمفردهم‬ ‫ فإن‬،‫وحاجتهم يف الوقت نفسه إىل تقديم املزيد من فروض الطاعة للطواغيت والصليبيني‬ ‫إعالنهم التحالف الرصيح مع املرشكني يف قتال الدولة اإلسالمية يف كل من خراسان والشام‬ ‫ يفرض عليهم تغيري أحكامهم بحق الدولة‬،‫ وربما مناطق أخرى بات أمرا ملحا‬،‫وليبيا واليمن‬ ‫ مع عجزهم منذ سنوات عىل إثبات جواز إعانة الكافر املحارب عىل املسلم ولو كان‬،‫اإلسالمية‬ .‫باغيا أو مبتدعا‬ ‫وهذا التغيري يف الحكم يتجه اآلن صوب الحكم عىل الدولة اإلسالمية بأنها طائفة كفر وردّة‬ ‫ وهو مناسب لهم ليعلنوا أن تحالفهم‬،‫ال طائفة بغي وبدعة كما كانوا يفرتون من قبل عليها‬ ‫ وتكون هذه‬،‫مع الطواغيت والصليبيني ضد الدولة اإلسالمية إنما هو إعانة لكافر عىل كافر‬ ‫ جهادا يف سبيل الله يف دينهم البدعي الذي‬،‫املظاهرة الرصيحة منهم للمرشكني عىل املسلمني‬ ‫ وذلك بعد سنني من التحالفات غري املعلنة‬،‫ لعنهم الله وإياهم أجمعني‬،‫يلفقه لهم علماء السوء‬ .‫ لكي ال ينفضح أمرهم وينفض عنهم أتباعهم وأولياؤهم‬،‫التي كانوا يلبسونها أغطية شتى‬ ‫كما أن االتجاه نحو إعالن تكفري الدولة اإلسالمية يهدف من خالله الطواغيت وأذنابهم من‬ ‫مرتدي الصحوات ومن واالهم إىل شق صف الدولة اإلسالمية وذلك بعد فشل كل محاوالتهم‬ ‫ والتي استعملوا فيها االتهامات الظاملة بالظلم والغلو والبدعة‬،‫ بحمد الله ومنه‬،‫السابقة‬ ‫ إذ كلها تصطدم بأمر النبي عليه الصالة والسالم بالصرب عىل األئمة ما لم يطرأ عليهم‬،‫وغريها‬ .‫ والتمسك بجماعة املسلمني ما دام لها إمام مسلم‬،‫كفر‬ ‫ فكما نجد مرتدي الصحوات ومن واالهم يغالون يف أسلمة‬،‫وهكذا يفعل دين التجهم بأتباعه‬ ،‫الطواغيت كاملرشعني من دون الله والحاكمني بغري ما أنزل الله واملمتنعني عن أحكام رشعه‬ ّ ‫سنجدهم باملثل يغالون يف أحكامهم عىل من‬ ،‫ فيتهمونهم بالخارجيّة‬،‫يكفر أولئك املرشكني‬ ‫ حتى يصلوا يف النهاية إىل تكفري‬،‫ثم يزدادون غلوا كلما اشتدت وطأة املسلمني عىل املرشكني‬ .‫املوحدين مثلما أسلموا املرشكني‬ ‫ كما خاب من‬-‫بإذن الله تعاىل‬- ‫ونبرش الكفار واملرتدين من كل طائفة أن سعيهم سيخيب‬ ‫ وإن كان اتهامهم للدولة اإلسالمية يف العراق بالبغي والغلو ظلما وعداونا أعقبه تمدد‬،‫قبل‬ ‫ واتهامهم لها بالبدعة والخارجية ظلما وعدوانا أعقبه فتح وتمكني ورفع لرايتها يف‬،‫إىل الشام‬ ‫ فتح أعظم‬-‫بإذن الله تعاىل‬- ‫ فإن تكفريهم لها ظلما وعدوانا سيعقبه‬،‫كثري من أقطار األرض‬ ‫ وإنا نحسب أن هذا من أعظم ما يدافع به الله‬،‫وتمكني أرسخ وانتشار أكرب يف كل بقاع الدنيا‬ ‫ {إ ِنَّ ال َّل َه يُدَافِ ُع عَ ِن ا َّل ِذينَ آمَ ن ُوا‬:‫ كما قال تعاىل‬،‫سبحانه عن هذه الطائفة املظلومة من املؤمنني‬ .]38 :‫َّان ك َُفورٍ } [الحج‬ ٍ ‫إ ِنَّ ال َّل َه َال يُحِ بُّ ُك َّل َخو‬ ‫ فما هي إال ابتالءات لهم‬،‫ونويص املؤمنني بأن ال تحزنهم هذه االفرتاءات التي يرمون بها‬ ‫ وحسبهم أن الله‬،‫ ورفعا لقدرهم يف الدارين‬،‫ نسأل الله أن يجعلها كفارات لذنوبهم‬،‫ولغريهم‬ ‫ { َف َال يَحْ زُن َك‬:‫ كما قال تعاىل لنبيهم‬،‫ هو موالهم ونعم النصري‬،‫تعاىل يعلم أنهم أبرياء منها‬ .]76 :‫ُسونَ وَمَ ا يُعْ ِلن ُونَ } [يس‬ ُّ ِ ‫َق ْولُهُ ْم إِن َّا ن َعْ َل ُم مَ ا ي‬ ‫عشرات القتلى والجرحى‬ ‫من جيشي الكونغو‬ ‫وموزمبيق‬ "‫وقوات "األمم المتحدة‬ ‫غنائم املجاهدين إثر هجومهم عىل جيش موزمبيق‬ ‫والية وسط إفريقية‬ ‫سقط عرشات القتىل والجرحى من القوات املشرتكة لجييش‬ ‫ إثر الهجمات‬،‫الكونغو وموزمبيق وقوات األمم املتحدة الصليبية‬ ‫ إضافة إىل‬،‫التي شنها عليهم جنود الخالفة يف والية وسط إفريقية‬ .‫اغتنام أسلحة وذخائر متنوعة‬ /25( ‫ هاجم جنود الخالفة الخميس‬،‫فبعد التوكّل عىل الله تعاىل‬ ‫ ثكنات مشرتكة لجيش الكونغو وقوات من (األمم‬3 )‫رمضان‬ ،‫ كانوا يتجهّ زون ملهاجمة مواقع املجاهدين‬،‫املتحدة) الصليبية‬ ‫ حيث اشتبكوا معهم‬،)‫بالقرب من قرية (مفيفي) بمنطقة (بيني‬ ،‫ ما أدى لهالك وجرح العرشات منهم‬،‫بمختلف أنواع األسلحة‬ .‫ ولله الحمد واملن ّة‬،‫وعاد املجاهدون إىل مواقعهم ساملني‬ )‫ رمضان‬/26( ‫ هاجم جنود الخالفة الجمعة‬،‫ويف عملية أخرى‬ ،‫ثكنة لجيش الكونغو الصليبي يف قرية (ماكيكي) بمنطقة بيني‬ ‫ واغتنم املجاهدون أسلحة وذخائر‬،‫فالذ الصليبيون بالفرار‬ ‫ كما اشتبكوا مع عنارص من جيش الكونغو الصليبي‬،‫متنوعة‬ ‫ والذ‬،‫ ما أدى إلصابة عدد منهم‬،‫يف قرية (موسو) بمنطقة بيني‬ .‫الصليبييون بالفرار‬ ‫ صال جنود الخالفة‬،‫ وضمن غزوة االستنزاف‬،‫من جهة أخرى‬ ‫ شوال) عىل تجمّ ع لعنارص من جيش الكونغو‬/1( ‫الثالثاء‬ ‫ واشتبكوا معهم‬،‫الصليبي يف قرية (روانغوا) بمنطقة بيني‬ ‫ منهم والذ بقيتهم‬25 ‫ ما أدى لهالك وإصابة‬،‫بمختلف األسلحة‬ ‫ كما تمكّنوا من صد هجوم لعنارص من جيش موزمبيق‬،‫بالفرار‬ ‫ حيث اشتبكوا‬،)‫الصليبي يف قرية (ميتوبي) بمنطقة (ماسيمبووا‬ ‫ ورد‬،‫ فقتلوا وأصابوا عددا منهم‬،‫معهم بمختلف أنواع األسلحة‬ ‫ واغتنم املجاهدون أسلحة وذخائر‬،‫الله كيدهم مدحورين خائبني‬ .‫ ولله الحمد واملنة‬،‫وصواريخ‬ ‫ نرش املكتب اإلعالمي صورا لغنائم مَ نّ الله بها‬،‫وعىل صعيد آخر‬ ‫عىل جنود الخالفة بعد صدهم هجوم عنارص من جيش موزمبيق‬ .‫ ولله الحمد‬،)‫يف قرية (ميتوبي‬ ‫وكان جنود الخالفة يف وسط إفريقية قد شن ّوا خالل األسبوع‬ ‫املايض هجوما عىل ثكنة لجيش الكونغو الصليبي فقتلوا وأصابوا‬ .‫ واغتنموا أسلحة وذخائر متنوعة‬،‫عددا من جنودهم‬ The first Islamic State publication referring to attacks in Mozambique, 6 June 2019. 23 March, 2019 Syria Baghouz, the last remaining territory of Islamic State in Syria, is recaptured by Syrian government forces.35 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11 ‫‪April 2020‬‬ ‫‪South African private military company‬‬ ‫‪Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) deploys‬‬ ‫‪troops and helicopters in Cabo‬‬ ‫‪Delgado.47 Insurgents shot down one of‬‬ ‫‪the DAG helicopters on 8 April 2020.48‬‬ ‫‪Al-Shabaab insurgents make a statement warning the‬‬ ‫‪Tanzanian government of their intention to overthrow the‬‬ ‫‪political order, before their first attack on Tanzanian soil in‬‬ ‫‪October 2020.‬‬ ‫‪23 November 2020‬‬ ‫‪Maputo‬‬ ‫‪Governments of Mozam‬‬‫‪bique and Tanzania agree to‬‬ ‫‪joint operations against‬‬ ‫‪insurgents, with efforts to‬‬ ‫‪be focused on the Rovuma‬‬ ‫‪border.58 Tanzania also‬‬ ‫‪deports 516 suspected‬‬ ‫‪insurgents to Mozambique‬‬ ‫‪from its custody.‬‬ ‫‪8–12 August 2020‬‬ ‫‪Mocímboa da Praia‬‬ ‫‪The port town of Mocímboa da Praia is‬‬ ‫‪captured by insurgents in a major attack,‬‬ ‫‪which marks the group’s growing strength.51‬‬ ‫‪The insurgents drive out security forces and‬‬ ‫‪cause much of the population to flee. In the‬‬ ‫‪days following, Islamic State publication‬‬ ‫‪Al Nabā features a long article on the‬‬ ‫‪capture of Mocímboa da Praia.52‬‬ ‫‪October 2020‬‬ ‫‪The number of people internally‬‬ ‫‪displaced by the insurgency‬‬ ‫‪reaches 500 000, according to‬‬ ‫‪UN estimates.53‬‬ ‫‪An issue of Islamic State publication Al Nabā‬‬ ‫‪from 16 April 2020, in which they report‬‬ ‫‪attacking two towns in Cabo Delgado. The‬‬ ‫‪other branch of Islamic State Central Africa‬‬ ‫‪Province reports attacks in eastern DRC.‬‬ ‫‪30 January 2020‬‬ ‫‪Islamic State claims the deaths of‬‬ ‫‪22 Mozambican soldiers along with‬‬ ‫‪an attack in DRC.‬‬ ‫‪Insurgents surround a downed helicopter‬‬ ‫‪belonging to private military company DAG‬‬ ‫‪on Quirimbas island, 8 April 2020.‬‬ ‫‪The footage was later shared via‬‬ ‫‪Islamic State channels.‬‬ ‫‪28 May 2020‬‬ ‫‪Macomia Town‬‬ ‫‪A group of 120–150 insurgents attack‬‬ ‫‪Macomia Town.49 Government troops‬‬ ‫‪are forced out. Government buildings‬‬ ‫‪are targeted and the black Islamic‬‬ ‫‪State flag is hoisted over the town‬‬ ‫‪centre, before insurgents withdraw.50‬‬ ‫‪7 April 2020‬‬ ‫‪Al-Shabaab allegedly‬‬ ‫‪massacre 52 people‬‬ ‫‪who refuse to join the‬‬ ‫‪insurgency, beheading‬‬ ‫‪many victims.46‬‬ ‫‪An al-Shabaab leader makes a speech during‬‬ ‫‪an attack in Quissanga, 26 March 2020,‬‬ ‫‪brandishing an Islamic State flag.‬‬ ‫‪13 November 2019‬‬ ‫‪Ngongo, Rovuma River‬‬ ‫‪First reported attack in‬‬ ‫‪Tanzania by insurgents‬‬ ‫‪based in Mozambique‬‬ ‫‪takes place,41 leaving six‬‬ ‫‪dead and seven injured.42‬‬ ‫‪2020‬‬ ‫بسم هللا الرحمن الرحيم‬ ‫–‪November 2020‬‬ ‫‪May 2021‬‬ ‫‪During this period‬‬ ‫‪there is almost no‬‬ ‫‪communication‬‬ ‫‪from Islamic State‬‬ ‫‪regarding‬‬ ‫‪operations in‬‬ ‫‪Mozambique,‬‬ ‫‪leading specula‬‬‫‪tion that the‬‬ ‫‪Mozambican‬‬ ‫‪insurgents are no‬‬ ‫‪longer affiliated to‬‬ ‫‪Islamic State.57‬‬ ‫‪14 October 2020‬‬ ‫‪Kitaya, Mtwara Region,‬‬ ‫‪Tanzania‬‬ ‫‪The second reported‬‬ ‫‪cross-border attack by‬‬ ‫‪insurgents from‬‬ ‫‪Mozambique,54 leaving‬‬ ‫‪20 reported killed.55‬‬ ‫‪Video surfaced of‬‬ ‫‪insurgents claiming that‬‬ ‫‪they intend to bring‬‬ ‫‪down Tanzanian‬‬ ‫‪president John‬‬ ‫‪Magufuli.56 Islamic State‬‬ ‫‪claims the attack.‬‬ ‫‪13‬‬ ‫‪EXECUTIVE SUMMARY‬‬ ‫من يتابع تغطية وسائل اإلعالم املختلفة‬ ‫ألخبار معارك جنود الخالفة ضد‬ ‫الجيش املوزمبيقي الصليبي‪ ،‬يجد أن‬ ‫الرتكيز يكاد ينحرص بأهمية مواقع هذه‬ ‫املعارك قرب حقول الغاز الضخمة التي‬ ‫استثمرت فيها رشكاتُ النفط الصليبية‬ ‫مليارات الدوالرات‪ ،‬وما سوى ذلك ليس‬ ‫مهما ً للدول الكافرة وال إلعالمها‪.‬‬ ‫فهذه املنطقة التي كانت وال تزال‬ ‫تحت نفوذ دولة الربتغال الصليبية‬ ‫التي خرجت منها قبل نصف قرن‪،‬‬ ‫وتحكمها اليوم عصاب ٌة متجرب ٌة من‬ ‫مالحدة الشيوعية؛ ليس فيها ما يه ّم‬ ‫الصليبيني غري احتياطاتها الكبرية‬ ‫من الثروات الباطنية املختلفة والتي‬ ‫تتشارك االستثمار فيها رشكاتٌ‬ ‫أمريكية وفرنسية وجنوب إفريقية‪،‬‬ ‫وتطمح رشكاتٌ روسية وصينية ألن‬ ‫قدم فيها أيضا ً‪.‬‬ ‫تجد لنفسها موطئ ٍ‬ ‫وعىل مدى قرون من الزمان‪ ،‬سام‬ ‫الصليبيون واملالحدة الشيوعيون‬ ‫املسلمني يف تلك الديار سوء العذاب‪،‬‬ ‫وأكرهوا قسما ً كبريا ً عىل ترك دينهم‪،‬‬ ‫ولم يتوقف ذلك اإلجرام حتى بعد نهاية‬ ‫الحكم الربتغايل واستيالء العصابة‬ ‫الشيوعية عىل الحكم‪ ،‬وكحال املسلمني‬ ‫يف كل مكان كانت جرائم الكافرين يف‬ ‫موزمبيق بحقهم نسيا ً منسيا ً؛ حتى‬ ‫أعلنت ثل ٌة من املجاهدين فيها انضمامها‬ ‫إىل جماعة املسلمني‪ ،‬ورفعت راية الدولة‬ ‫اإلسالمية يف تلك البقاع‪ ،‬ورأى العال ُم‬ ‫فرحة الناس هناك بتنكيل املجاهدين‬ ‫يف أعداء اإلسالم‪ ،‬عندها فقط انتبه‬ ‫‪27 August 2020‬‬ ‫‪Islamic State claims the capture of Mocímboa‬‬ ‫‪da Praia in their publication Al Nabā.‬‬ ‫الصليبيون‬ ‫يخاطرون‬ ‫باستثماراتهم‬ ‫في‬ ‫موزمبيق!‬ ‫الصليبيون أن استمرار جرائم الحكومة‬ ‫الشيوعية بحق املسلمني قد فتح الباب‬ ‫أمام انتقام جنود الخالفة من جيش‬ ‫موزمبيق الصليبي ومَ ن عاونه من‬ ‫الكفار واملرتدين‪.‬‬ ‫وخاصة أن من سياسة هذا الجيش‬ ‫الجبان أنه بعد ك ّل هزيمةٍ منكر ٍة‬ ‫يتلقاها عىل أيدي جنود الخالفة يزيد‬ ‫من عدوانه عىل األهايل يف املنطقة‬ ‫التي يُهزم فيها‪ ،‬أمالً منه يف استعادة‬ ‫هيبةٍ مزعومةٍ يحاول فرضها عىل‬ ‫املستضعفني بالبطش واإلرهاب‪ ،‬األمر‬ ‫الذي يؤدي بدوره إىل زيادة التحاق‬ ‫املسلمني بجنود الدولة اإلسالمية‪ ،‬كما‬ ‫أن هذه الدول الكافرة تسعى ألن تبقى‬ ‫الحرب مع جنود الخالفة داخل حدود‬ ‫موزمبيق فقط‪ ،‬ال سيما وأن مناطق‬ ‫انتشارهم وعملياتهم تقع قريبا ً من‬ ‫حدود (تنزانيا)‪.‬‬ ‫وبعد فشل هذا الجيش املتهالك يف‬ ‫تحقيق وعوده لألمريكيني والفرنسيني‬ ‫بالنرص عىل جنود الخالفة وتكبّده‬ ‫الخسائر الفادحة يف تلك الحرب‪ ،‬بادر‬ ‫إىل االستعانة بمرتزقة االستخبارات‬ ‫الصليبية الروسية العاملني تحت‬ ‫غطاء رشكة "فاغنر" والذين نكّل بهم‬ ‫العدد ‪٢41‬‬ ‫الخميس ‪ 11‬ذو القعدة ‪ 1441‬هـ‬ ‫جنود الخالفة أيضا ً وأجربوهم عىل‬ ‫إخراج اسمهم من املعركة التي افتضح‬ ‫حجم خسائرهم الكبرية فيها‪ ،‬فانتقلت‬ ‫الحكومة املوزمبيقية الكافرة إىل طلب‬ ‫الدعم واإلسناد من الدول الصليبية‬ ‫املجاورة والبعيدة‪.‬‬ ‫وقبل أن تقرر الدول الصليبية يف أوربا‬ ‫وأمريكا إرسال قواتها هناك وجعل‬ ‫تلك املنطقة ساحة جديدة للحرب عىل‬ ‫الدولة اإلسالمية‪ ،‬وما يتعلق بذلك من‬ ‫مصاعب مشابهة ملا تواجهه يف حربها‬ ‫الغري منتهية بغرب إفريقية؛ فإنها اليوم‬ ‫تسعى لتوريط حكومة "جنوب إفريقية"‬ ‫وجيشها يف قيادة الحرب هناك‪ ،‬لقربها‬ ‫املكاني ولعالقاتها القوية مع حكومة‬ ‫موزمبيق‪ ،‬ولكن لدى "جنوب إفريقية"‬ ‫ما يكفي من املشكالت الداخلية ليدفعها‬ ‫نحو تجنب التورط يف هذه الحرب التي‬ ‫ستوقعها يف مأزق مايل وعسكري وأمني‬ ‫كبري‪ ،‬وقد تعود عليها بتعجيل جنود‬ ‫الدولة اإلسالمية فتح جبهة قتال داخل‬ ‫حدودها! بإذن الله تعاىل‪.‬‬ ‫ولم يكن دعم تحالف "دول جنوب‬ ‫إفريقية" للجيش املوزمبيقي باملستوى‬ ‫الذي يريده‪ ،‬إذْ اقترص حتى اآلن عىل عدد‬ ‫قليل من الجنود املدرّبني واملزوّ دين بكم‬ ‫قليل من السالح‪ ،‬وذلك ألن بعض هذه‬ ‫الدول تعاني أصالً من نزاعات داخلية‬ ‫أو تورطت يف حرب الصومال التي‬ ‫استنزفتهم طويالً‪ ،‬أو أنها تخىش من‬ ‫تورط طويل األمد يف ساحة القتال هذه‪،‬‬ ‫ٍ‬ ‫كما تورطت قبلها الجيوش اإلفريقية‬ ‫األخرى يف حرب الدولة اإلسالمية‪،‬‬ ‫االفتتاحية ‪3‬‬ ‫‪March 2020‬‬ ‫‪The number of people‬‬ ‫‪internally displaced by‬‬ ‫‪the insurgency reaches‬‬ ‫‪100 000, according to‬‬ ‫‪UN estimates.45‬‬ ‫كحال الكامريون ونيجرييا وتشاد‬ ‫والنيجر وبنني ومايل وبوركينا فاسو‬ ‫والكونغو‪ ،‬واحتمال تورط جيوش‬ ‫موريتانيا والجزائر وساحل العاج فيها‬ ‫ً‬ ‫مرعبة‬ ‫أيضا ً‪ ،‬األمر الذي يشكل صور ًة‬ ‫ألي جيش يفكر بإغراق نفسه يف حرب‬ ‫طويلة يف املوزمبيق‪.‬‬ ‫والنتيجة من ذلك كله أن الصليبيني‬ ‫اليوم يعيشون حرية من أمرهم‪ ،‬فهم‬ ‫يخشون أن يؤدي تدخلهم الكبري يف هذه‬ ‫الحرب إىل انضمام املزيد من املسلمني يف‬ ‫موزمبيق وجوارها إىل جنود الخالفة‪،‬‬ ‫خاصة وأن العدوان عىل اإلسالم وأهله‬ ‫يف كل دول املنطقة كبري وقديم‪ ،‬كما‬ ‫يخشون أن يؤدي ذلك إىل اتساع نار‬ ‫الجهاد امللتهبة التي باتت تهدد بإحراق‬ ‫الرشك واملرشكني يف هذه املنطقة املهمة‬ ‫بالنسبة إليهم‪ ،‬ملا فيها من ثروات‬ ‫وإمكانات‪.‬‬ ‫وإن كان الصليبيون يحسبون أنهم‬ ‫بدعمهم للحكومة الكافرة يف موزمبيق‬ ‫سيحمون استثماراتهم ويضمنون‬ ‫استمرار نهبهم لثروات املنطقة فإنهم‬ ‫واهمون‪ ،‬إذْ لن تلبث األوضاع أن‬ ‫تستقر لجنود الخالفة ‪-‬بإذن الله‪-‬‬ ‫عاجالً أم آجالً‪ ،‬فهم يف تقدم وانتصار‬ ‫وعدوهم إىل تراجع واندحار‪ ،‬بفضل‬ ‫الله تعاىل‪ ،‬وإن استمرار الصليبيني‬ ‫يف حشد القوى ضد الدولة اإلسالمية‬ ‫فضالً عن تدخلهم املبارش يف الحرب‬ ‫هناك‪ ،‬كما ينادي بعضهم‪ ،‬لن يؤدي إال‬ ‫إىل ما ال يشتهون! ولينرصنّ الله من‬ ‫ينرصه إن الله لقوي عزيز‪.‬‬ ‫‪3 July 2020‬‬ ‫‪Islamic State threatened to attack gas‬‬ ‫‪projects in Mozambique and warned‬‬ ‫‪South Africa that, if it sent troops to‬‬ ‫‪Cabo Delgado, IS would ‘open a fighting‬‬ ‫‪front within its borders’.‬‬ ‫‪September 2019‬‬ ‫‪200 troops from‬‬ ‫‪Russian private‬‬ ‫‪military company‬‬ ‫‪Wagner Group‬‬ ‫‪arrive in‬‬ ‫‪Mozambique.40‬‬ ‫‪23 March 2020‬‬ ‫‪A cache of weapons seized from government forces during‬‬ ‫‪an attack on Mocímboa da Praia, which insurgents‬‬ ‫‪triumphantly showed on social media.‬‬ ‫‪Islamic State reports that they shot down a‬‬ ‫‪Mozambican army helicopter (operated by‬‬ ‫‪DAG), 23 April 2020. Footage was released‬‬ ‫‪showing insurgents around the wreckage.‬‬ ‫‪9 April 2020‬‬ ‫‪Islamic State lays claim to an attack in‬‬ ‫‪Muidumbe, Cabo Delgado.‬‬ ‫‪29 November 2019‬‬ ‫‪Nacala‬‬ ‫‪Wagner forces withdraw after suffering about a dozen‬‬ ‫’‪casualties in al-Shabaab attacks.43 ‘Serious disagreements‬‬ ‫‪between the company and Mozambican military over‬‬ ‫‪strategy are reported.44‬‬ ‫‪THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS‬‬ ‫•‬ ‫‪INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION‬‬ ‫‪12‬‬ April 2021 The number of people internally displaced by the insurgency reaches 700 000, according to UN estimates.65 9 July 2021 Kigali, Rwanda The Rwandan government announces deployment of 1 000 soldiers from the Rwandan Defense Force to Mozambique.71 21 July 2021 First SADC troops deployed to Mozambique.72 Images of an insurgent camp captured by Rwandan and Mozambican forces in October 2021. The images show the vehicles and equipment recaptured from the insurgents and the harsh forest conditions the fighters were living in. Thousands of people are evacuated from Palma by boat following an insurgent attack in late March 2021. 1 April 2021 Islamic State claims that ‘caliphate soldiers storm Palma’ and celebrates the fact that the event ‘caused a stir on an international level’. A DAG helicopter evacuates people from Palma, March 2021. September 2021 Civilians begin to return to some areas previously controlled by the insurgents and recaptured by government forces.75 Approx. June 2021 Islamic State accuses ‘unbelievers’ in Western media of portraying the conflict as a ‘war against gas’ rather than (as they see it) a religious war of true Muslim believers against ‘crusaders’. 1 June 2021 Exiled Rwandan journalist and critic of President Paul Kagame’s regime, Cassien Ntamuhanga, arrested in Mozambique on 23 May 2021, and handed over to the Rwandan embassy in Maputo on 1 June 2021. 6 April 2021 DAG’s contract with the Mozambican government ends.67 5 October 2021 SADC extends troop deployment in Mozambique.78 A vehicle recovered in a raid on insurgent camps in Muera, south of Mbau, by SADC forces in August 2021. 7 October 2021 Uganda First attack claimed by the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province in Uganda, signalling an expansion of their sphere of operations from DRC.79 November–December 2021 Niassa Insurgents stage several attacks in the Niassa province, an area which previously had not experienced violence related to the conflict. 2021 2 March 2021 Amnesty International releases a report accusing government forces, DAG and the insurgents of war crimes.59 DAG denies this accusation and fund an investigation into these claims. February 2021 The Mozambican government contracts a private military consortium made up of South Africa-based Paramount Group and Dubai-based Burnham Global to provide military equipment such as helicopters and armoured vehicles, training, and advice. 24 March 2021 Palma The town of Palma is attacked by insurgents, with a simultaneous attack occurring at Macomia,62 leaving dozens dead, up to 30 000 displaced,63 and buildings and infrastructure destroyed. 100-120 insurgent reinforcements allegedly crossed the border from Tanzania the day before to assist in the attack.64 Islamic State later released footage of troops massing in Mocímboa da Praia before the attack. INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • 8 August 2021 Mocímboa da Praia Rwandan military announces the recapture of the port city of Mocímboa da Praia with Mozambican troops.73 23 June 2021 Johannesburg SADC approves military intervention in Mozambique.69 23 August 2021 Maputo The ‘Hidden Debts’ trial begins in Maputo. Nineteen people accused of blackmail, forgery, embezzlement and money laundering, including the son of former president Armando Guebuza, Ndambi Guebuza, are on trial.74 20 September 2021 Palma Humanitarian aid reaches Palma for the first time in six months.76 15 March 2021 US Special Forces begin a training programme for Mozambican troops to help fight the growing insurgency.61 10 March 2021 US State Department designates the Mozambican insurgent group aligned to Islamic State as a terrorist organization.60 14 4 April 2021 Palma Mozambique’s military reports that it recaptured Palma from insurgents after a successful counter offensive.66 26 April 2021 Paris Total Energies declares force majeure on its LNG project in Mozambique based at Afungi, near Palma, following the attack on Palma.68 Insurgents gather before an attack outside Mocímboa da Praia, 29 March 2021, in footage shared by the Islamic State al-maq news agency. 23 June–29 July 2021 Islamic State claims of attacks in Mozambique increase significantly in frequency, with 15 attacks claimed in this period, perhaps as a means of projecting an active and strong image in the face of actual losses of territory on the ground.70 THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 15 July 2021 Islamic State claims an attack in Palma District – one of several attack claims made in during July 2021. 25 September 2021 Cabo Delgado Allied Rwandan, Mozambican and SADC forces kill alleged jihadist chief, Rajab Awadi Ndanjile, along with 18 other insurgents, in a joint operation.77 11 November 2021 Islamic State reports they killed a ‘spy of the Mozambican army’ and that the ‘media office’ shared images of the attack. Islamic State claims of operations in Mozambique saw a resurgence in late 2021. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15 Economic exclusion sparks resentment of the gas project fit the long-standing patterns of The economic makeup of Cabo Delgado could local people.90 Compensation to communities forced scarcely be better designed to inspire a violent to relocate for the gas project was judged to be uprising. From the early days of Mozambique’s insufficient, while few benefits emerged from independence, the region’s politics and economy promised job-creation programmes with the gas have been dominated by senior figures linked to the developments.91 FRELIMO political party, often former generals. 80 These groups cultivate business interests in sectors involved in the exploitation of Cabo Delgado’s wide range of natural resources, including mining, forestry and transport logistics.81 wealth are bled from the region with little benefit to Residents protested a lack of access to job opportunities for their communities, and that the benefits of Cabo Delgado’s richest resource were being accorded to overseas companies and elites in Maputo and Pemba.92 At the same time, top echelons For decades, the financial gains of northern Mozam- of Mozambique’s government used the prospective bique’s illicit economies, including drug trafficking revenues of the gas to help secure US$2 billion in and illegal logging, have also accrued with many of illegal, secret loans, the fallout of which plunged the the same senior Frelimo figures and local business country’s economy into crisis.93 82 elites. Corruption is a characteristic feature of 83 governance in the region, with one expert interviewed by the GI-TOC describing corruption as the single most important factor shaping Mozambique’s economy.84 Corrupt actors have been weakening institutions and rendering the divide between legal and illegal trade a largely academic distinction.85 Similarly, mining for gemstones and alluvial gold is a major economy in northern Mozambique, particularly after the discovery of some of the world’s richest ruby fields in 2009 near Montepuez.94 Many of these gems and much of the gold is extracted by artisanal and small-scale mining groups. Artisanal miners working illegally on private mining concessions have The scale of corruption and elite control is matched been treated brutally by police and mine security. In only by Cabo Delgado’s extreme levels of marginal- the case of Montepuez Ruby Mining (MRM), which is ization and poverty.86 The province reports some of majority owned by Gemfields in partnership with a the highest levels of illiteracy and poverty in Mozam- retired FRELIMO general,95 there have been allega- bique. This chasm between rich and poor has tions of human rights abuses, including shootings, continued to widen during the insurgency: while beatings and rapes, by the mine’s security forces and nearly a million people in northern Mozambique were associated police units since 2012. Gemfields settled classed by the UN as ‘extremely food insecure’ as of a case in 2019 by agreeing to pay US$7.6 million September 2021, research has found that influential in compensation to artisanal ruby miners and people linked to Frelimo have gained more control residents.96 The company acknowledged the violence over mining concessions in Cabo Delgado. had taken place but did not admit liability.97 A dispute 87 The management of two of Cabo Delgado’s most over land ownership in MRM concessions also important natural resources fanned the flames of the spurred discontent. conflict.88 The discovery of some of Africa’s largest- Both the gas and mining sector examples are ever natural gas deposits off Cabo Delgado’s north- characterized by the use of state institutions – ern coastline in the early 2010s led to an enormous principally the police – and the use of force to expel wave of foreign investment – in fact, the largest- people from their homes and livelihoods in order to foreign investment on the continent. The gas protect powerful interests.98 This has played a pivotal developments were initially led by Anadarko, which role in the radicalization of young people in Cabo was later bought out by French energy giant Total Delgado, who feel excluded by the national govern- Energies, and ENI, who are developing offshore ment operating from Maputo, which is heavily infrastructure. To critical observers, the management dominated by the Makonde ethnic group. Several 89 16 ‘elite extractivism’, where natural resources and INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Al-Shabaab fighters in the district offices after overruning the district capital of Quissanga, 26 March 2020. Photo: Telegram research groups working in Cabo Delgado have Reserve in previous years, arguing that mining was found that former artisanal miners displaced by the one of the few economic options available to peasant 2017 expulsions joined the growing insurgency. farmers in the face of poor government service MRM has refuted claims that its operations may have delivery.102 Mozambican law enforcement have fed community feelings of exclusion that have led to claimed that Cassimo was killed in Niassa Province in the insurgency. a counterinsurgency operation in late 2021.103 99 The insurgents espouse a strong anti-state and anti-Frelimo narrative. 100 They lay claim to having In Muidumbe in April 2020, insurgent leader Bonomado Omar, also known as ‘Ibn Omar’, greater legitimacy to rule than the democratic addressed assembled residents in Swahili – the government, and that their aim to establish an lingua franca of the East African coast – saying they ‘Islamic State’ will create a more socially just and occupied the village ‘to show that the government of equitable alternative to the status quo. the day is unjust. It humiliates the poor and gives 101 One key al-Shabaab leader, Maulana Ali Cassimo, had report- advantages to the rich. The people who are detained edly protested against the harsh treatment and are from the lower classes and this is not just. Whether detention of artisanal miners working in Niassa people like it or not, we are defending Islam’.104 THE ORIGINS AND DRIVERS OF CONFLICT 17 Makua TANZANIA Makonde PALMA Mwani NANGADE MOCÍMBOA DA PRAIA MUEDA MUIDUMBE NIASSA MACOMIA MELUCO CABO DELGADO QUISSANGA MONTEPUEZ ANCUABE METUGEPEMBA MECUFI BALAMA CHIURE NAMUNO NAMPULA FIGURE 2 Generalized view of where the main local languages in Cabo Delgado are spoken – used as a proxy for ethnic distribution. NOTE: Ethnologue, via Judd Devermont and Emilia Columbo, Northern Mozambique at a crossroads: Scenarios for violence in the resource-rich Cabo Delgado Province, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019, http://www.jstor.com/stable/ resrep22604.4 Ethnic tensions exacerbate divides Cabo Delgado is deeply divided between the Muslim-majority Makua and Mwani populations, and the Christian-majority Makonde ethnic group, who hold the majority political and economic power.105 The major Frelimo-linked figures in Cabo Delgado’s business and political spheres are largely drawn from the Makonde ethnic group and are a powerful political constituency. Makonde economic prominence in northern Mozambique grew following elections in 2014, in which Makonde scion Filipe Nyusi was elected president. This spurred perceptions of marginalization among Mwani-dominated communities along the Cabo Delgado coast.106 The fact that local state institutions, particularly police, in Cabo Delgado are largely Makonde dominated only served to inflame these conflicts further as communities of other ethnicities view the exercise of police powers as ethnically targeted. This was alleged to be a factor in preventing the Mozambican authorities from containing the conflict in its early stages.107 18 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Religious extremism provides a powerful narrative Religious extremism has been described as the gained followers through radical preaching in this ‘vector’ through which social and economic grievan- area in 2012.119 These preachers were allied with ces have been channelled in Cabo Delgado.108 The Aboud Rogo, who was influential in shaping extremist insurgency has its roots in a group, known to be ideologies across the East African coast, and was active in Cabo Delgado from as early as 2007, which believed to have been a key figure in promoting the broke away from the mainstream Muslim theologies cause of al-Shabaab (Somalia) in Kenya before his dominant in the area. 109 death in Mombasa in 2012.120 Funding was provided This group has been described as an ‘Islamist sect’ in that its members from the sect to support and recruit local tradesmen advocated for the full application of sharia law and and small-business owners in and around Mocímboa withdrew from society. 110 This ‘al-Shabaab’ sect, as it da Praia.121 The movement of splinter groups of other was known, was the forerunner of the insurgent extremists from Tanzania to the south in 2016 and group as we know it today. Although concentrated in early 2017, following a state crackdown on their Cabo Delgado, particularly the Mocímboa da Praia activities, was also reported as another factor in area, 111 shaping the al-Shabaab sect into a militarized the sect is also reported to have been successful in recruiting from the neighbouring Niassa and Nampula provinces.112 The followers of the al-Shabaab sect – mainly young men from the Mwani and Makua ethnic groups – This group rose in popularity during a period of Wahhabi 113 extremist force.122 expansion to East Africa and southern came to the attention of authorities in a series of Africa, when Islamic charities made funds available clashes with police and mainstream Muslim groups in to support the construction of new mosques with 2015 and 2016.123 The sect sought to establish a imams that preached a more conservative Islamic more conservative social order, including by making doctrine. 114 This expansion into Cabo Delgado began demands to ban alcohol and blocking enrolment of as early as the mid-1990s115 and the doctrine was children in government schools, rather than in further spread by the return of young people who religious schools called madrasas.124 It was opposed had received scholarships to study abroad in coun- by the mainstream Muslim authorities, such as the tries such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Tanzania. 116 The Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO).125 influence of such scholarships in the formation of The state’s response to these early disturbances, other extremist groups such as the Allied Democratic which primarily consisted of mass arrests of members Forces (ADF) in DRC and Uganda has also been of the sect, is reported to have inflamed the already documented. 117 The al-Shabaab sect was centred around several key preachers in Mocímboa da Praia, Montepuez and Balama.118 volatile situation.126 While foreign fighters and other influences have played an important role, the al-Shabaab sect remains The more radicalized ideology of the al-Shabaab sect Mozambican-led today.127 Ibn Omar, who is recog- was influenced by a preacher called Sualehe Rafayel nized as the primary leader of the group, was (who returned to Mozambique from Tanzania in reportedly born in Palma and grew up in Mocímboa 2007), and a Tanzanian preacher, Abdul Shakulu, who da Praia. THE ORIGINS AND DRIVERS OF CONFLICT 19 Financial support to the emerging insurgency Financial support for the original Wahhabi expansion control it has undermined President Nyusi’s status in along the East African coast and into Cabo Delgado the party. This may allow a Guebuza ally to come to came from Islamic charities associated with Saudi power in the next election cycle, thus tipping power Arabia and Qatar. 128 This funding was used to back to the Guebuza faction. Consequently, the establish mosques and madrasas, fund scholarships Guebuza-aligned Frelimo faction has a vested interest to Islamic universities and to provide seed funding to in the disruption caused by the conflict. adherents to set up or expand businesses in the region, which accelerated recruitment.129 As outlined earlier, some of the business owners who benefitted from this seed funding, namely transport businesses and trade in everyday goods, continue to operate in neighbouring provinces. It appears that some of Second, there is speculation that local Cabo Delgado businesspeople may have played an early role in supporting the insurgency. The thesis is that established local businesses, who have for decades monopolized the supply and service industries in the province, angered at having been excluded from this funding was co-opted to help establish the al-Shabaab group. In the southern, governmentcontrolled areas of Cabo Delgado, some of the traders who benefitted from this funding continue to support al-Shabaab financially and enable money flows in and out of the insurgent-controlled areas. supply contracts by the large multinational gas companies, supported the insurgency in order to upset the status quo and hope that once things settled, they would be on hand to win these supply contracts. This thesis has also emerged in GI-TOC interviews with a known Tanzanian network for Several Mozambican analysts have speculated about drugs, ivory and human smuggling that has operated the potential for there being two other local sources in Mocímboa da Praia and Pemba for many years. of support to al-Shabaab. First, political faction-fight- People associated with this network explained how ing within Frelimo has led to two groups forming, one the two leaders of the network, both originally from around current President Nyusi and the second Zanzibar, were frustrated that their licit trucking and around the former President Armando Guebuza. fuel supply businesses in Cabo Delgado had not won Former President Guebuza and his allies set to benefit any of the Palma contracts and they may well have from a network of companies established with the provided initial support to the insurgents in 2017 and US$2 billion ‘secret loans’ deal, which has now fallen 2018.130 One of the leaders of this network was apart. The current president, by contrast, was not questioned by the police in 2018 over his alleged caught up in the secret loans scandal despite playing involvement with al-Shabaab and police intelligence a key decision-making role when it was unfolding and that his vehicle had been used to transport recruits holds financial interests in other parts of Mozam- from Nampula.131 He thereafter fled Mozambique for bique. However, the Cabo Delgado insurgency and the United Arab Emirates and has not returned since. the inability of the Mozambican Security Forces to 20 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Al-Shabaab fighters in Quissanga, March 2020. Photo: Telegram A composite movement The conditions that allowed al-Shabaab to emerge imagine an alternative society to this ‘unjust’ status are specific to Cabo Delgado: a breakdown in quo through imposing sharia law, and to justify governance and trust in government resulting from violence and brutality in the guise of a holy war.135 elite capture of natural resource economies and compounded by an established and diverse set of illicit economies, which generally undermine rule of law.132 The root causes are also specific to Cabo Delgado: inequality, abject poverty, elite capture of all economic opportunities (especially natural resource economies, which local people believe should be theirs as they come from their land), and exclusion from political opportunity and economic development based on ethnicity and religion.133 These conditions and root causes have created the opportunity for a violent reactionary ideology to take hold among desperate youth who see few other opportunities for their futures. ‘The government of the day is unjust. It humiliates the poor and gives advantages to the rich … Whether people like it or not, we are defending Islam’, said insurgent leader Ibn Omar, speaking in Muidumbe in April 2020.134 This rhetoric is an example of how the religious and economic causes of the conflict reinforce one another. The extremist ideology provides a framework through which other grievances are articulated, allowing al-Shabaab to Members of al-Shabaab are not a homogeneous group and have different motivations among themselves. Fighters include more ideologically driven religious zealots, young teenagers revolting against the harsh economic conditions they endure, poor people who joined for money, and child soldiers who, kidnapped and forced into violence, now see no alternative.136 Resentment towards the state – in a country where the state has never exercised full control over the use of force – is manifested through violence.137 At this tage in the conflict, the attraction of the insurgency to youth in Cabo Delgado are threefold: – Anger at the government and ruling elite (who have continued to wrest control of the region’s natural resources during the conflict) and an opportunity for agency by attacking the state.138 – Opportunistic support of the insurgent group as the best option for security and protection in their areas. – Financial reward from the insurgent groups for joining and participating in attacks.139 THE ORIGINS AND DRIVERS OF CONFLICT 21 INSURGENCY AND ILLICIT ECONOMIES IN CABO DELGADO The crew of a dhow, suspected to be carrying heroin, are intercepted by Mozambican defence and security forces. The crew allegedly set the boat on fire to destroy the evidence. © Web Mais 22 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS C abo Delgado has for decades been one of the most politically and economically marginalized regions of Mozambique. The economy in the region is characterized by forms of illegal trade, and monopolization of the region’s natural resources by political and business elites and multinationals. From the smuggling of timber, rubies and ivory to the through-traffic of heroin, cocaine and, more recently, methamphetamines, illicit economies have historically held such sway in Cabo Delgado that the distinction between legal and illegal trade is largely academic.140 The benefits of illicit trades, including drug trafficking, have been accrued by senior figures in the governing party, Frelimo, and local business elites.141 Starting in late 2017, al-Shabaab became operational in the area through which many of these trafficking routes historically flowed, with significant implications for illicit activity. The town of Mocímboa da Praia, for example, was long known as a smugglers’ hub: a landing point for heroin trafficked down the East African coast, for people smugglers ferrying passengers along the ‘southern route’ of migration from the Horn of Africa towards southern Africa, and a transit point for flows of ivory poached in Niassa Special Reserve and other illicit goods.142 In the early stages of the conflict it seemed that the insurgents’ strategy was to capture territory that would allow them to control key trafficking routes and make money from the illicit economy.143 However, by early 2021 several trafficking flows had instead shifted to new, safer routes. The areas under the control of al-Shabaab and the highly militarized surrounding region became more difficult for trafficking networks to move contraband through. A combination of the heavy presence of government (and now regional) military forces and damaged infrastructure has caused trafficking networks and transporters of illicit goods to find alternative routes.144 For example, the human smuggling route which previously followed the Cabo Delgado coast has now shifted far to the west, as more migrants now travel via Malawi and through Mozambique’s Tete corridor. According to our finding, this has meant that illicit economies do not make up a significant funding base for al-Shabaab. This is contrary to claims made by the Mozambican and regional forces operating in Cabo Delgado, which publicly emphasize that the insurgents are involved in criminal markets, including drug trafficking.145 While the insurgency may have disrupted trafficking routes within northern Mozambique, this has not had a significant effect on these flows regionally. For example, drugs trafficked down the East African coast are simply brought to more southerly ports and landing sites, continuing to supply markets in southern Africa and beyond. INSURGENCY AND ILLICIT ECONOMIES IN CABO DELGADO 23 UGANDA ou th Af ric aa nd Lake bey ond KENYA NAIROBI Victoria So m ali at Et hi op ia d Fewer dhows dropping off drugs in Zanzibar than in 2020 TANZANIA m by s Zanzibar City s at bo all To D golar es d m Sal ark aam et Small q uan titi e s; lin go d) an fie p ti , an rts u a q y p not ( od sia nb o i L oA t r ai by O C E A N Mtwara a um Rov Lichinga co I N D I A N Lake Niassa (Lake Malawi) Bua fro Zanzibar Dar es Salaam s m s; er ain air es; by tortois d e t gal) Radia al/ille ia (leg s A o t Fro m Mombasa ow gfl in ck ffi RC tra d D an n m aa hu ni d za te an ec T sp to Su an an ist k Pa nt In oS Fewer people travelling by this route than in 2020 By air ZAMBIA Fro m M Jel akr bu an td C ho oas ws t; SOMALIA Ngazidja (Grande Comore) ket ocal mar the l for Mocímboa da Praia Niassa Reserve by small boats Union of the Comoros Anjouan Moheli Montepuez Lion body parts, pangolins By air to Asia Pemba LILONGWE by small boats (France) By air to Asia e l Nacala Mayotte n Nampula Overland to Maputo and South Africa Overland to South Africa To South Africa (sometimes via Maputo) Angoche b oa ll b m n Heroin, hashish and meth flows In containers; from Brazil i b m Wildlife trafficking flows a Rubies and other high-value gemstones z M Gold flows Human smuggling routes o Beira Cocaine, heroin and meth flows Human trafficking flows q be zi Heroin flows Cocaine flows ts u Quelimane Za a y sm e MOZAMBIQUE ZIMBABWE MADAGASCAR h by Tete ts oa ll b sma a MALAWI C Cahora Bassa Dam 0 N 200km Sites of significant seizures of heroin and/or cocaine, methamphetamines FIGURE 3 Current illicit flows through northern Mozambique. NOTE: Dashed arrows indicate flows that have been reported to the GI-TOC research team where precise geographical routes are unknown. 24 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Drugs Northern Mozambique remains an epicentre for the Nampula and Zambezia provinces, including in Nacala, arrival and distribution of drugs, chiefly heroin and Angoche and Quelimane.148 International law enforce- methamphetamines. For many years, heroin has been ment sources and people involved in trafficking transported to East Africa by vessels such as Jelbut networks and local fishing communities report that dhows (large vessels capable of long-distance drugs are still arriving at Pemba’s port. Fishing vessels voyages) from the Makran coast of Pakistan and are often used to collect drugs shipments from larger Iran, and container vessels mostly from ports in vessels out at sea, before they are brought to port Pakistan. 146 In the past two years, methamphet- amines produced in Afghanistan have also begun to be trafficked alongside heroin shipments, as evidenced by several major seizures in early 2021 of both heroin and methamphetamine.147 Currently these shipments typically contain 50% heroin and 50% methamphetamines. Cocaine is transported to the region via container ships chiefly from Brazil. and warehoused before onward transit.149 The more southern landing sites are reportedly being used again during the current ‘dhow-trafficking season’, which starts when the northern monsoon season ends – usually in October – and runs throughout the southern summer. Current information suggests that dhow-based drug deliveries are occurring around Nacala and Quelimane again.150 Reports Drug trafficking hotspots have changed over the last also suggest that, from arrival into Nampula Province, three years. Heroin and cocaine arriving by container heroin and cocaine are now also being transported are still arriving into the ports of Pemba and Nacala. overland west through Malawi, rather than exclusively However, heroin and methamphetamines arriving on southward to South Africa and Maputo.151 Jelbut dhows from the Makran coast of Iran and Pakistan are now being offloaded further south. In the past, Pemba was the furthest south that these deliveries were made. The beaches, small ports and towns of Quissanga, Ilha do Ibo and Mocímboa da Praia were key hotspots for drugs trafficking activity prior to 2019. Now, Pemba is the most northerly drop-off point and drugs are landing on the coasts of The drug trade in northern Mozambique has grown and diversified during the conflict. Traffickers from other sites on the East African coast, such as Zanzibar, have based themselves in Pemba to collect drug shipments coming in from the Makran coast.152 The trade has diversified in terms of drug types, due to the rise of methamphetamines traffic, but it has also diversified in the types of traffickers involved. More A shipment of heroin and methamphetamine seized in Nacala, 24 March 2021. © SERNIC INSURGENCY AND ILLICIT ECONOMIES IN CABO DELGADO 25 UGANDA TANZANIA ds oo g ee Zanzibar City Bagam oyo fr tyDu o uth Je lb u td y By a r es To D Ov erl an dt Ov erl oS an ou dt th oS Af ou th r m Af i ar ric ke a t rry y fe s; b ood al g rci ry me fer m co By Kilwa Overland through Negomano to Mozambique (for local consumption) Mocímboa da Praia Negomano Niassa Reserve ZAMBIA In so m e ow dh ld go m a a al Rovuma sS ar e To D O C E A N b Su da n Sala am g old m arket om S I N D I A N Zanzibar Waste Island Dar es Salaam ca Lake Niassa (Lake Malawi) m s by Drug mules to Europe; by air Pa ng oli ns cal es fr Co Fro m to So ut h m al ia Cloves So ut hS Rw ud and an a, D .R.C . oa ts Mombasa fro m By air to Asia sm all b Fro m So ); legal al/il (leg s ) l e a is illeg rto ales ( to d in sc s l at go bo all an Ra From di Et a hio P te pi a Go ld d an Ma kra n NAIROBI Victoria as t; Af ric aa nd b Lake eyo nd KENYA ho w s SOMALIA Ngazidja (Grande Comore) by small boats Union of the Comoros Anjouan Mueda by small boats Pemba Moheli Mayotte (France) a Bu LILONGWE Lichinga Montepuez Lion tooth and claw, to Asia still operating (not quantified) MALAWI Ivory - no sign since 2019 l Nacala e Cahora Bassa Dam MADAGASCAR n n Nampula Tete h a Angoche MOZAMBIQUE C In containers; from Brazil ZIMBABWE Cocaine flows Quelimane Za Heroin flows q m Heroin, hashish and meth flows Gold flows Cannabis, cocaine, heroin and hashish b i be zi u e m Other goods z a Human smuggling routes Wildlife trafficking flows M o Beira 0 N 200km Rubies and other high-value gemstones FIGURE 4 Illicit flows through northern Mozambique, 2020. NOTE: Compared to the map of illicit flows in early 2021 (see page 24), these were still routing through Mocímboa da Praia in early 2020. After being captured by al-Shabaab in August 2020 these routes changed. 26 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS UGANDA NAIROBI Victoria So m ali at Et hi op ia d Fewer dhows dropping off drugs in Zanzibar than in 2020 TANZANIA Zanzibar City b s at bo all m ys To D golar es d m Sal ark aam et rica h Af Sout O C E A N Mtwara a um Rov Bua Small q uan titi e Lichinga ; ns oli d) ng a fie nti s, p t a r u pa tq dy (no bo ia s n o A Li to air by I N D I A N Lake Niassa (Lake Malawi) ZAMBIA fro Zanzibar Island Dar es Salaam to rland Ove m rs; ine n air s; by rtoise ted to l) ia a d g a R al/ille ia (leg to As Fro m Mombasa an co ta kis Pa a nt In oS Fewer people travelling by this route than in 2020 By air Fro m ou th Af ric aa nd Lake bey ond KENYA M Jel akr bu an td C ho oas ws t; SOMALIA Ngazidja (Grande Comore) ket ocal mar the l or sf Mocímboa da Praia (under insurgent control) Niassa Reserve by small boats Union of the Comoros Anjouan Moheli Montepuez Lion body parts, pangolins By air to Asia Pemba LILONGWE Mayotte (France) by small boats By air to Asia Tete n e To South Africa (sometimes via Maputo) Overland to South Africa ts Angoche C ZIMBABWE Za Quelimane q m u Heroin, hashish and meth flows Cocaine, heroin and meth flows e Gold flows Human smuggling routes Wildlife trafficking flows b i be zi Heroin flows Cocaine flows In containers; from Brazil MOZAMBIQUE MADAGASCAR n oa ll b ma by s a Nampula Drugs being moved south to Maputo and South Africa h MALAWI l Nacala Cahora Bassa Dam a m Rubies and other high-value gemstones z Supplies being transported to insurgents at night, by dhow M o Beira 0 N 200km Sites of significant seizures of heroin and methamphetamines in 2021 FIGURE 5 Illicit flows through northern Mozambique, early 2021. INSURGENCY AND ILLICIT ECONOMIES IN CABO DELGADO 27 entrepreneurial traffickers, who often previously then the volume of drugs could be expected to be far worked as drug mules or transporters of some form, higher, as the Jelbut dhows used for these lengthy have been buying smaller loads which they collect journeys can carry several hundred kilograms of from the dhows and then arrange to ship onward to drugs cargo. At the time of the seizure, the season markets. This reflects the ability of smaller-scale for dhows transiting this route south to Mozambique traffickers to use cell phone technology and banking had not yet begun and law enforcement sources to make contact and corrupt payments to lower-level confirmed to the GI-TOC that vessel monitoring law enforcement officials along the trafficking technologies had not identified suspect dhows routes. 153 This negates the competitive advantage held travelling as far south as Mozambique when the by the higher-volume traffickers who rely on corrupt seizure happened. Thus, if this heroin really belonged relationships with senior government or party officials. to the insurgents, it would have to have been in their Our research and interviews have found no current connection between drugs trafficking and al-Shabaab. When the conflict broke out, traffickers based in Mocímboa da Praia shifted their operations to the south, away from the conflict’s epicentre. Although regional forces have recaptured territory from the insurgents, traffickers have yet to return to their possession for perhaps three or four months. It is not clear why this would be the case. This suggests an alternative explanation is possible, and that the 28 kilograms of heroin had, in fact, been stored by someone else before the insurgents captured Mocímboa da Praia, who then abandoned it in an urgent escape. This alternative explanation fits with other evidence that heroin was still being trafficked former northern bases. However, the seizure of 28 kilograms of heroin in Mocímboa da Praia in early October 2021 has raised several questions. The drugs were found in a complex owned by a local businessman, a location known to be used by through Mocímboa da Praia until it was captured by the insurgents in August 2020. This single seizure is not definitive proof that al-Shabaab are involved in the drugs trade, especially given that all other sources, seizures and interviewees al-Shabaab during their occupation of the town. Mozambican and regional authorities have pointed to the seizure as proof that the insurgents are involved in drug trafficking without sharing any direct evidence.154 However, if the insurgents really were facilitating drugs shipments into Mocímboa da Praia, considered in this study suggest the vast bulk of the trade is now transited through Pemba, Nacala and areas south. The question of whether the insurgents have been or could become involved in drug trafficking cannot be conclusively answered. However, the bulk of available evidence points away from it. This fishing dhow in Pemba is reportedly one of the local vessels used to land drug shipments. Photo supplied 28 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION: • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS A sample of crystal meth on sale in Cape Town. Shipments are transported to South Africa via Mozambique. © GI-TOC Impact on drug markets in South Africa Mozambique is a key corridor for drug flows into Town supported this finding, as the disruption due to South Africa. South Africa is the largest consumer conflict in northern Mozambique was not perceived market for heroin in East and southern Africa, as as an issue impeding drug supply from Mozambique to well as a key transit point onward to Europe and the South Africa.160 United States, for which the overland route from Mozambique is the main supply gateway.155 Since late 2019, methamphetamines have also been trafficked along the same transit route as heroin, often in shipments of both drugs together.156 This serves South Africa’s major methamphetamines consumer market.157 Mozambique also remains a key node in a ‘southern route’ for cocaine trafficking, shifting cocaine from Brazil to markets in South Africa and possibly onwards to Australia.158 This primarily takes place via container shipments to Mozambican ports, including Pemba as well as other ports further south.159 Significant changes in drug supply from Mozambique to South Africa are currently taking place. However these are not linked to the northern Mozambique conflict. For example, whereas in previous years Tanzanian and Nigerian groups have controlled the bulk of import and wholesale distribution for the heroin market in South Africa (with South African gangs controlling street-level distribution)161 their dominance is now being rivalled by Pakistani networks.162 These groups, importing drugs via Mozambique, have reportedly been able to make inroads in this market offering drugs at lower price As outlined above, our research in Mozambique has and higher quality to South African gangs than their found that the al-Shabaab insurgency has caused Nigerian and Tanzanian rivals. These networks have drug trafficking routes through northern Mozambique been using remote crossing-points at the Mozambique to shift, southwards, into the southern part of Cabo border to transport drugs to major South African Delgado and into Nampula Province. These shifts are cities. Interviewees also reported that smuggling significant for the region, as drug trafficking networks drugs over the Mozambican land border had become operating in new regions will have an impact on the more difficult in recent months, as evidenced by local political economy and on governance. However, several major seizures of heroin and methamphet- these localized shifts have not translated into large- amines reported by law enforcement along the scale disruption of the overall drug trafficking flows border.163 Drug trafficking networks are reportedly via Mozambique into South Africa. GI-TOC interviews looking for alternative routes, for example shifting with members of drug trafficking networks in Cape smaller quantities via post, and sea and air routes. INSURGENCY AND ILLICIT ECONOMIES IN CABO DELGADO 29 Kidnap for ransom and human trafficking Kidnapping of individuals in towns and villages under Kidnap for ransom is a source of income for attack is a well-documented strategy of al-Shabaab. al-Shabaab. Interviews with relatives and friends of People who have been kidnapped and subsequently kidnapped people – both Mozambican nationals and escaped report that skilled workers are particularly from other countries such as Zimbabwe and India – sought after. This includes doctors, nurses and report that MZN1 million (US$16 000) is a standard other medical workers, mechanics and electricians. opening ransom demand from the insurgents, though Al-Shabaab offers to spare these people’s lives and the final ransom amounts after negotiations are provide them safety and, in some cases, significant unknown.171 Details have been shared with the financial rewards to work with the insurgents.164 GI-TOC of phone numbers of al-Shabaab sympathi- Other people who are captured and cannot offer zers, reportedly based in Paquitequete in Pemba, these skills or are suspected of having links with the which have been used to receive ransom payments Mozambican state are then killed. on behalf of the insurgents. Until significant territory One former employee of a company working with Total Energies who had first-aid qualifications reported that insurgents had offered to spare his life and a monthly salary of 150 000–200 000 meticals, which is comparable to a legitimate salary at a multinational like Total.165 The insurgents claimed that the employee would also need to travel internationally. Offers such as these, along with the discovery of non-functioning vehicles and equipment in insurgent bases captured by Mozambican and Rwandan military, suggest the group has a shortage of many late 2021 and services restored, phone and internet communications were reportedly a challenge for the insurgents trying to negotiate ransom settlements. Al-Shabaab negotiators reportedly had to travel to the Tanzanian border for cell reception to negotiate payments. In the case of two nuns from Brazil, who were held for three weeks in Mocímboa da Praia by insurgents before their release in September 2020, insurgents used the nuns’ own satellite phone to negotiate a payment from their Catholic diocese.172 Some of the many women kidnapped by al-Shabaab key skills and capacities.166 are ‘traded’ internally between fighters in exchange Many young girls and women have also been kidnapped.167 Human Rights Watch estimated in December 2021 that more than 600 women and girls have been kidnapped by the insurgents since 2018, and documented the traumatic abuse that they have been subject to.168 Once inside the insurgent bases, these young women are reportedly given instruction on how to worship and behave as part of al-Shabaab’s Islamist social order, and are forced into ‘marriages’ to al-Shabaab fighters.169 Other young children are also kidnapped and trained as fighters. The main role of these young fighters is reportedly to follow on behind the main fighting force to kill and loot from those remaining in attacked villages. It should also be noted that 30 was recaptured by regional and government forces in for money or assets such as motorcycles.173 It is suspected that select groups of younger women are then trafficked by the insurgents. João Feijó, a researcher at the Mozambican think tank OMR who has conducted detailed interviews with women who were kidnapped by the insurgents, reports that some interviewees say that some kidnapped women ‘selected’ to go to Tanzania and study English.174 Sources suggest that these girls and women are, in fact, trafficked overland from the insurgent-controlled areas to Mtwara and Tanga in southern Tanzania by a network involving Mozambican nationals, Tanzanians, Kenyans and Somali people.175 The subsequent fate of these girls remains unknown. since the insurgents have been dispersed from their Further, there are initial reports that young men and bases by the combined Mozambican, Rwandan and boys are trafficked overland to the Democratic SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) forces, Republic of Congo (DRC) to work in informal mining there have been reports of significant numbers of to generate money for the insurgency.176 Apparently, child soldiers being used in offensive roles in foreign labour is sought after in these mines as the subsequent attacks.170 young men and boys are less likely to abscond. INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Mozambican authorities seize 82 containers of illegally felled timber bound for China at the port of Pemba, August 2020. © ANAC Timber Trafficking of illegal timber from northern Mozambique has been occurring for decades. 177 The current during the time when al-Shabaab had its largest geographic footprint. While logging had been scale of this trade from Cabo Delgado was demon- prominent in this region for many years, it intensified strated dramatically in August 2020, when during the conflict and there were reports of military Mozambican authorities seized 82 containers of checkpoints extracting rent payments from logging illegally harvested logs bound for China and held trucks moving on this road.183 them at the port of Pemba. Those containers were later smuggled out from police custody and exported in December 2020.178 Following investigations, 66 of the containers were recovered en route to China.179 In mid November 2021, a further seven containers were recovered.180 Within al-Shabaab territory, logging activity has reportedly continued, though less intensively than in Mozambican military-controlled areas. Loggers with licenses to harvest trees around Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia, who recently returned after the government recaptured these areas, reported that Chinese logging companies dominate the Cabo Delgado logging industry. 181 These companies are trees had been felled in these areas.184 It seems that smaller-scale logging operations run by local currently most active along the corridor between residents were able to operate under insurgent Montepuez and Mueda and are often found control as they may have better connections and operating illegally within the eastern boundary of the family ties within al-Shabaab and so were better Niassa Special Reserve. 182 This area, to the west of able to navigate the volatile security environment.185 the main area of insurgent activity, has been secure However, it is unclear if and how these logs may from al-Shabaab attacks, enabling these companies have been exported out of the areas of insurgent to operate. The road from Montepuez to Mueda was activity. There are no reports suggesting that the only open transport route in the region. al-Shabaab has been either involved in the logging Meanwhile, Mueda, with its important military base, trade directly or ‘taxing’ the trade systematically as a was well protected by the Mozambican military means of funding. INSURGENCY AND ILLICIT ECONOMIES IN CABO DELGADO 31 Montepuez is home to the world’s biggest known ruby deposit. © Matthew Hill/Bloomberg via Getty Images Gemstones and gold As with timber, the activity for artisanal and exploiting local grievances over economic marginaliza- small-scale mining as well as illicit trade in gold and tion,187 or in some cases tempting recruits with gemstones in Cabo Delgado has been concentrated promises of employment in Cabo Delgado mining outside of al-Shabaab-controlled areas. This is, in sectors.188 This includes recruiting garimpeiros working part, because the largest sources of gemstones and in Niassa Special Reserve.189 During GI-TOC research gold are in other regions of Cabo Delgado and in early 2021, we received reports that some artisanal neighbouring provinces. The major deposits of miners were sympathetic to al-Shabaab, had family gemstones (including rubies) are located at members within the insurgency and could have been Namanhumbir near Montepuez and at Msawise in supporting them financially with their earnings from the Niassa Special Reserve. Gemstones illegally mining.190 A prominent leader of al-Shabaab, named mined from these areas are then traded and smug- Maulana Ali Cassimo, is known to have demonstrated gled out of Mozambique, largely destined for Asia.186 publicly against the attitude of authorities to artisanal There are longstanding links between artisanal miners of both gems and gold, and the insurgents. Several 32 miners and poachers in Niassa Reserve before the insurgency.191 different researchers have reported that insurgents There are reports that some insurgents have been have concentrated their recruitment efforts on involved in gemstone mining and that some illicit garimpeiros, as the informal miners are known, by gemstone trading has been used to finance INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS al-Shabaab.192 During an interview in Montepuez, Another businessman, who holds properties in some al-Shabaab members described how insurgents Montepuez, Pemba, Palma and Nampula, allegedly disguised as internally displaced people move around plays a similar role. This individual’s legitimate to areas such as Montepuez to work in mining and Montepuez-based businesses, in public transport and earn funds for the insurgency. goods trade, are reportedly used to launder profits 193 The GI-TOC received reports that some businesspeople based in towns such as Montepuez and Pemba are involved in funding the insurgency and enabling them to move money and make payments to people.194 These businesspeople smuggle gold and precious gems and also run other legitimate businesses in the region. They also seem to have been connected to al-Shabaab for several years, perhaps pre-dating the insurgency. The early funding that flowed to the mosques associated with the Islamist group that preceded al-Shabaab also provided grants to adherents to set up businesses. Over time, the people who controlled this initial funding, as well as the businesspeople who received some of this from gold and gems smuggling. Suspicions arose around his involvement with the insurgents in mid 2021 after business competitors noticed that his transports of goods along key routes were not ambushed by insurgents as others’ had been. Sources report that this businessman has played a key role in managing payments to families of al-Shabaab fighters and making deposits on behalf of the insurgents in banks outside of their area of control. Since these allegations have surfaced, he has reportedly disappeared from Montepuez, leaving his business in the hands of his family.198 Other individuals play this same role in other locations in Cabo Delgado Province, Nampula and Maputo. funding, may have evolved to become financial Another trader, who specializes in black-market ruby facilitators for the al-Shabaab sect, and ultimately the trading, is also allegedly a financier of al-Shabaab. insurgency. Abdala Likonga is alleged to have been His business, which trades gemstones abundant in one of these facilitators. Mocímboa da Praia and other areas under insurgent 195 A Pemba-based businessman, Likonga was identified as one of the founding leaders of al-Shabaab by Mozambican news outlets in 2020.196 Despite being identified by security forces in 2017, he continued to travel freely in and out of Pemba, and operate his businesses transporting goods along the Mozambique–Tanzania corridor. These businesses control, points to sources of gems within the insurgent group. This businessman reportedly shares the profits of gem trading with al-Shabaab and has been central to moving cash and internally displaced people in and out of the insurgents’ areas, under the guise of doing legitimate business in a high-risk area.199 include legal goods such as cashew nuts and fish, Collectively, these traders allegedly provide a as well as smuggling of gems and gold, reportedly financial network to shift cash, gemstones, gold, smuggled over the border with the assistance of people and goods over the boundary lines of the allies in the security forces. Likonga reportedly also conflict, launder funds through legitimate business, had business connections with other financiers of and deposit payments on behalf of the insurgents. the insurgency. Illicit trade of gems and gold forms one part of this 197 financial system. INSURGENCY AND ILLICIT ECONOMIES IN CABO DELGADO 33 Members of al-Shabaab gather before an attack outside Mocímboa da Praia, in footage shared by the Islamic State al-Amaq news agency on 29 March 2021. Photo: Telegram Far-fetched reports of human organ trade? Several claims were made during the October and months, there seems to have been a lack of funda- November 2021 interviews that insurgents are mental resources including working vehicles and involved in harvesting organs from victims of attacks in food, again suggesting that a sophisticated organ order to traffic human organs internationally to trade is far-fetched. Second, trade in organs for destinations such as Malawi and Tanzania, and possibly traditional practices – such as muti in South Africa beyond. 200 Similar claims have been reported in the media, although these reports may relate more to body parts – is documented in the region. It is ritualized behaviour among al-Shabaab members – possible that reports could be conflated in the to harvest organs for use in traditional practices – confused and often opaque reporting from the rather than for trafficking of the organs. 201 However, conflict zone. Finally, there are also reports that the getting definitive details of any organ trade has proven insurgents force new recruits, including child soldiers, difficult and there are several reasons to doubt it is to consume human organs. These may be used to actually taking place. brutalize new recruits into feeling unable to leave and return to normal society. These reports are First, a level of medical expertise and specialist frequent but remain unsubstantiated. equipment would be needed to maintain viable 34 and in particular the targeting of albino people for organs and transport them. As al-Shabaab insurgents Such reports should be seen as a cautionary tale in have focused on recruiting medical professionals how disinformation can arise in conflict zones, where among their kidnap victims, this skill seems to be accusations around illicit trades – particularly one as lacking within their ranks. Further, power has been brutal as organ trafficking – and the use of human largely non-existent in the areas under insurgent organs for ritualistic practices, can serve a political control since 2019 and at several points in the past agenda. INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Arms flows to al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab’s military capacity has become more sophisticated over time. Early attacks in 2017 were carried out with a mixture of machetes, which are widely available from agricultural use in the region, and firearms. The first images of the insurgents shared on social media reflect this, showing AK-47s along with more rudimentary weapons. 202 In the early days of the conflict, insurgents may well have tapped into pre-existing sources and illicit flows of weapons in the region. In the lead-up to the insurgency in late 2017, AK-47s were available in northern Mozambique from multiple sources. First, older weapons from the civil war remained in places where they were not surrendered during the demobilization process, especially places where there had been RENAMO (or just general anti-Frelimo/anti-government) sympathies. Second, AK-47s in particular were smuggled from the Lakes region (Burundi and DRC in particular) to northern Mozambique to supply a demand among ivory poachers operating in the Niassa Reserve and the Quirimbas National Park during the peak years of Mozambique’s elephant poaching crisis. 203 As poaching rates of elephants collapsed in northern Mozambique in 2018/2019, this is no longer an active source of demand. 204 However, they may have served al-Shabaab in the early days of their formation, particularly given reports of al-Shabaab recruitment among certain key groups in the Niassa Reserve. Finally, weapons from government sources have also regularly found their way into criminal hands, both for elephant poaching and for general banditry.205 Banditry had been an endemic issue in northern Mozambique for many years before the insurgency, and illicit weapons were circulated for use by these bandits. In the first attack claimed on Islamic State channels in Mozambique in June 2019, insurgents displayed weapons captured from the Mozambican military. This has been the main way in which the insurgents have armed themselves. Photo: Telegram INSURGENCY AND ILLICIT ECONOMIES IN CABO DELGADO 35 Over time the insurgents’ armouries have grown significantly. The bulk of this weaponry comes directly from Mozambican military sources, including weapons captured from security force camps, border posts and police armouries in towns and villages overrun by the insurgents and abandoned by Mozambican security forces in retreat.206 Footage shared by insurgents from the attack on Mocímboa da Praia in March 2020 shows a cache of weapons seized from an armoury in the town. This attack was a significant turning point in the scale of the conflict: an attack on a major town by the insurgents which gave them access to a large number of weapons and looted cash. In September 2021, reports emerged that al-Shabaab had used a landmine/IED, which targeted SADC forces.207 The landmine, which formed the basis for this explosive device, may have been looted from the Namoto border post armoury in 2020, where apparently some very old land mines and mortar rounds had remained.208 There have also been reports of test explosions at insurgent field bases and one report of an insurgent death during IED testing. Sources connected to the insurgent group report that some soldiers in the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM) have been providing weapons to al-Shabaab for money, particularly in 2018 and 2019 before the group had grown to become a major threat. This could take place by staging an ambush in which the military detachment would flee, leaving equipment behind, making the loss of weapons, vehicles and other equipment appear accidental. A few of the insurgents had reportedly served in the Mozambican military in the conscription system (including senior al-Shabaab leader Ibn Omar) and used former contacts in the military to arrange these transfers in exchange for payment.209 Some reports allege that groups of soldiers formed by demobilized government forces or deserters trained al-Shabaab members in exchange for money in the early days of the insurgency when they were not considered a major threat. There are also reports of military supplies sent to military outposts being redirected to the insurgents. While the bulk of weapons used by al-Shabaab clearly come from Mozambican sources, 210 there are persistent reports that the insurgents allegedly also sourced weapons internationally from Tanzania, DRC, Kenya and Somalia.211 GI-TOC investigated these reports. Three routes for weapons smuggling have been suggested. First, and most surprisingly, sources in Niassa linked to the insurgency reported that during the al-Shabaab occupation of Mocímboa da Praia weapons and logistics were flown into the town using fixed-wing aircraft.212 Other sources also reported that aircraft had been flying into insurgent-occupied Mocímboa da Praia, suggesting that this route was used to bring foreign fighters from Somalia and other countries for strategic discussions with the Mozambican insurgents. Despite there being multiple separate reports of aircraft landing in Mocímboa da Praia, it has not been possible for the GI-TOC to conclusively confirm these reports. Logistically speaking, small fixed-wing aircraft are widely used along the East African coast, and with a willing pilot and a false flight plan it could be possible to travel to Mocímboa da Praia. The kind of radar systems required to identify small, low-flying aircraft do not exist in northern Cabo Delgado. However, it is hard to imagine that this would have gone unnoticed, either in pilot circles or from the ground. It is also possible that this narrative is being used to distract from other trafficking routes. 36 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Weapons recovered from insurgents by Rwandan soldiers in Mocímboa da Praia, 22 September 2021. © Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images The second possibility is for weapons to be smuggled overland, via Malawi or over the more remote border posts into Niassa. This could include weapons sourced in conflict areas in eastern DRC, transported via Lake Tanganyika, which is known as an active smuggling route for a variety of goods, including ivory and weapons. 213 This would replicate suspected weapon-smuggling routes during the height of elephant poaching in Niassa reserve.214 Border posts along these land borders are known for extracting corrupt payments to move goods such as gems, gold, timber, bushmeat and, in the past, ivory. However, it has not been possible to independently confirm that this route has been used to smuggle weapons to al-Shabaab. Third, weapons may have been moved south via seagoing dhows from Tanzania to insurgent-held territory along the Mozambican coast. In late 2020 and early 2021, basic supplies such as food were being transported into Mocímboa da Praia from southern Tanzania (around Mtwara) at night to avoid helicopter fire from Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), the South African private military company contracted by the Mozambican government at the time.215 This may also have been used as an arms-smuggling route, as reported in GI-TOC interviews in 2020. 216 However, it has not been possible to confirm that weapons moved on this route. INSURGENCY AND ILLICIT ECONOMIES IN CABO DELGADO 37 THE CURRENT STATE OF AL-SHABAAB A burned-out vehicle belonging to one of the Niassa Special Reserve safari operators, in Lichengue village, Niassa Province, which had not previously seen violence due to the conflict. © ANAC 38 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS S ince August 2021, interventions from Rwandan and SAMIM forces in support of the Mozambican military tipped the scales of the conflict away from al-Shabaab’s favour.217 These forces rapidly recaptured territory from the beginning of their deployment, including the recapture of Mocímboa da Praia, which had been in insurgent control for almost a year.218 By October 2021, allied forces were working to consolidate these gains and reopen areas of the conflict zones to civilians.219 This reportedly slowed al-Shabaab recruitment: whereas previously some joined the insurgents out of self-preservation, this became a less appealing option when residents saw the allied forces providing viable security.220 Insurgents are facing severe supply shortages, leading some fighters to surrender.221 Yet the situation remains volatile.222 From November and December 2021 through to mid January 2022 (at the time this report was being finalized), a spate of attacks have targeted villages in Cabo Delgado, including in Mueda and Macomia districts.223 Al-Shabaab groups – including child soldiers between 10 and 15 years old – continued to target and ransack villages.224 Late November and early December also saw the first attacks in the Niassa Province, as groups of insurgents originally from Mecula District in Niassa Province returned there to recruit, get supplies and scout for possible bases. This foiled the attempts of the Mozambican and foreign forces to cordon off the conflict to the north-eastern part of Cabo Delgado.225 Reports have emerged that insurgents captured in early January 2022 have told authorities that their senior leaders and core fighters had retreated to remote bases in Macomia District226 and southern Tanzania.227 As these now come under pressure from government-aligned forces we might see more al-Shabaab fighters appear in parts of Niassa and Nampula provinces, and ADF bases in eastern DRC (as a group allied to al-Shabaab as part of the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province, see discussion below) may be used as a fallback rear base for leadership to recoup and develop new strategies and approaches. The parties to the conflict are also vying for control of the narrative. Regional forces express their confidence that regional intervention will ‘save Cabo Delgado’,228 and emphasize that insurgents have been ‘dislodged’ into the forests.229 Yet it is understood that the insurgents’ main strategic and logistical bases have always been in more remote areas along the Messalo river and elsewhere, rather than in captured towns and villages. At the same time, Islamic State propaganda has boasted of how ‘the coalition forces THE CURRENT STATE OF AL-SHABAAB 39 International boundary 2017 Mtwara Provincial boundary 2018 TA NZ A NI A TANZANIA Major towns TA NZ A NI A Palma Minor towns Main routes of travel of displaced people Areas identified as in ‘food insecurity crisis’ Negomano CABO DELGADO Mueda a vum Ro Niassa Reserve Mocímboa da Praia CABO DELGADO NIASSA NIASSA Muidumbe Ibo Island Macomia Mecula NAMPUL A CABO DELGADO Quissanga Lu ge nd a Montepuez Violence against civilians 56 Battles 8 Battles 16 Explosions/remote violence 0 Explosions/remote violence 0 I N D I A N Pemba Namanhumbir 7 Violence against civilians lo ssa Me NAMPUL A O C E A N 2019 Balama 2020 TA NZ A NI A TA NZ A NI A io Lúr NIASSA Nacala CABO DELGADO NAMPULA MOZAMBIQUE CABO DELGADO NIASSA NIASSA N Nampula NAMPUL A NAMPUL A FIGURE 6 Humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado, as of November 2021. SOURCE: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 40 By state forces Violence against civilians 162 Violence against civilians 330 Battles 36 Battles 121 Explosions/remote violence 0 Explosions/remote violence 25 By violent extremists 30 734 000 2021 DISPLACED PEOPLE 20 TA NZ A NI A Figure as of end of November 2021. 1.11million 10 FOOD-INSECURE PEOPLE Jan 2017 Aug 2017 Feb 2018 Aug 2018 Mar 2019 Sep 2019 Mar 2020 Sep 2021 Mar 2021 Sep 2021 CABO DELGADO 3 627 FIGURE 7 Number of violent incidents in northern Mozambique (2017–2021). SOURCE: ACLED Figure as of end of November 2021. 668 687 687 696 731 731 731 731 731 743 743 734 600 NIASSA LATEST TOTAL FOR FATALITIES To 9 January 2022, via ACLED� 527 425 330 172 211 59 59 64 85 90 100 110 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 43 2019 44 49 55 64 65 83 NAMPUL A 235 159 Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 2020 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jun Aug Sep Oct Nov 2021 FIGURE 9 Humanitarian situation, Cabo Delgado. Violence against civilians 423 SOURCES: OCHA, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ Battles 293 Explosions/remote violence 43 resources/; ACLED, https://www.caboligado.com/reports/ cabo-ligado-weekly-13-december-2021-9-january-2022 FIGURE 8 Displacement trend, February 2019–September 2021 (in 1 000s). SOURCE: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 40 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS THE CURRENT STATE OF AL-SHABAAB 41 suffered heavy losses’.230 The SAMIM and the Rwandan Defence Force, in turn, have released details of their own gains in recapturing insurgent bases and weaponry, giving the impression of confidence that regional forces have the upper hand.231 Al-Shabaab’s main financial resources are thought to derive from the looting of banks in towns where attacks have been staged. In particular, the March 2021 attack on Palma was reportedly staged after a large volume of cash arrived in the town to pay humanitarian workers.232 Naturally, the insurgents also loot valuable supplies, including food, fuel, vehicles and other vital supplies, during attacks.233 Ultimately, the means of funding the insurgency do not seem to be very sophisticated. As discussed above, insurgent rent-seeking or active involvement in illicit economies is less significant than was suspected in the early stages of the conflict. While much about their funding remains unknown, it is thought that the insurgents currently have few financial backers within Mozambique and abroad, and do not have sophisticated funding mechanisms .234 Al-Shabaab pays its fighters as reward for carrying out attacks.235 Although it is difficult to obtain definitive measures of how much the fighters are paid, it is estimated that at their height, the insurgents were able to offer significantly better compensation than the Mozambican defence forces. This led to a wave of defections from the Mozambican army.236 There are reports that following the Palma attack in March 2021, regular foot-soldiers were paid an estimated 30 000–60 000 meticals (US$465–930), and the senior leaders were paid in the region of 150 000–200 000 meticals (US$2 325–3 100).237 The burned-out remains of Nangololo Catholic Mission, Muidumbe, 9 April 2020. Photo: Adriano Nuvunga on Twitter, 11 April 2020 42 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS A view of the Niassa Reserve. The reserve’s communities, biodiversity and conservation management system are threatened by the insurgency. © John Guernier Impact of the insurgency in Niassa and Nampula The impacts of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado are being keenly felt in the neighbouring Nampula and Niassa provinces. Insurgents have been operating in Niassa Province since 24 November 2021 with a series of attacks marking the first incursions of violence into the region from Cabo Delgado.238 Hundreds of people were displaced as four villages were attacked and burned in the Mecula District within the Niassa Special Reserve in late November to early December. 239 Since the attacks have been moving ever closer to Mecula, the district capital, many residents fled the town.240 However, nearly 4 000 people from villages further north have fled to Mecula town and are camped out, hoping for protection from the Mozambican security forces.241 Both provinces have also reportedly been rich sites of recruitment for the Cabo Delgado insurgents. Islamic fundamentalist groups of the kind that evolved into militarized insurgency in Cabo Delgado, are said to have been present in Niassa and Nampula before the conflict broke out.242 Before the conflict, many young men from the Nampula coast would migrate north to Cabo Delgado for fishing, where some were kidnapped and forced to join al-Shabaab.243 There are also reports of significant recruitment from conservative Islamic communities in Nampula Province.244 The group of insurgents operating in Niassa are reported to be made up of recruits originally from the local area, who have left Cabo Delgado THE CURRENT STATE OF AL-SHABAAB 43 under pressure from the international military forces and returned to home territory to gather more recruits, get supplies and scout for possible bases.245 Recruitment from rural communities in Niassa Province, especially from the artisanal mining communities in Niassa Special Reserve has also been reported. A local imam in the Niassa Reserve was known to be delivering fiery sermons preaching jihadi rhetoric during 2013 and 2014. He was forced out of the area and moved to Pemba, where he reportedly joined the insurgency in its early days. Other senior Muslim figures in the Niassa Reserve and Lichinga are known to have paid for young men to travel to join the fighting.246 However, state security presence in Niassa has been tightened since 2019.247 This includes specific deployments of State Security agents (Mozambique State Security and Intelligence Service – SISE), the Police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR), the regular district police (PRM), the environmental police (PPNRMA) and the Guarda Fronteira, who maintain three border posts along the river. Informant recruits of SISE have reportedly set up small businesses at villages within the reserve to collect and transmit information to SISE. 248 However, this increased security presence in the Niassa Reserve has had negative consequences. There have been reports of disappearances of local people who are suspected of joining the insurgency or related to known insurgents. 249 Police are also accused of extorting money from the artisanal miners operating illegally in the reserve, and corruption at the border among the Guarda Fronteira is allegedly rife. The back-and-forth movement of illegal miners, and poachers from Tanzania bribing border officials, allows insurgents crossing the border to blend in and cross easily. As outlined above, coastal sites in the Nampula province such as Nacala have become major landing sites for drug trafficking as criminal networks have shifted south. The impact of illicit economies, in spurring the breakdown of governance and driving corruption, helped set the scene for the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. The increased activities of organized criminal networks in Nampula Province could also help fuel volatility in this region in future. 44 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Foreign fighters in al-Shabaab Foreign fighters play a significant role in al-Shabaab while Russia’s Wagner mercenaries were fighting in and can be categorized in two main groups. First are the region.255 Released kidnap victims from experienced fighters who have played a role in other al-Shabaab have reported ‘white’ fighters among insurgencies in East Africa, mainly from Tanzania, the insurgents – noting that this could mean light- Uganda, eastern DRC and Somalia.250 These fighters skinned people from the Swahili Coast, the Middle often share some commonalities with the East, or people of Caucasian origin.256 While it is Mozambican majority of al-Shabaab fighters, difficult to identify which nationalities are being including a common language in Swahili, the lingua referred to, these fighters include English speakers franca of East Africa.251 In the case of fighters from and possibly Arabic speakers. southern Tanzania, these fighters are part of the same communities found in coastal Cabo Delgado on both sides of the Rovuma river, which forms the Mozambique–Tanzania border.252 It is reported that this latter group of fighters are not permanently based in Cabo Delgado, in the harsh forest-camp conditions endured by the Mozambican and regional fighters. These foreign reinforcements Other fighters come from further afield. There are travel into Mozambique for specific attacks and reports of fighters arriving in Mozambique from the training, advising Mozambican units on strategy and Syrian conflict (particularly during 2020), 253 Afghan fighters,254 and several Chechen fighters arriving possibly managing communications.257 Periods where more consistent and sophisticated communications Images circulated in 2016 allegedly show fighters loyal to Islamic State training in Tanzania. A crackdown by Tanzanian security forces is said to have caused fighters to flee into Mozambique, joining the al-Shabaab movement. Photo: Site Intel Group THE CURRENT STATE OF AL-SHABAAB 45 have emerged from the insurgents, including via possibly for meetings with senior leadership.266 While Islamic State channels, may be related to the pres- this is possible, it is unlikely. Logistically, routing a ence of key foreign fighters in Cabo Delgado. For 258 difficult to do undetected, partly because such worked with al-Shabaab during the early stages of aircraft are rarely used in the region and so would the conflict, advising on strategy, training and attract attention. It is possible that these were recruitment. This individual moved freely around Dyck Advisory Group helicopters landing to support Pemba and was later identified and arrested (or killed) local militia battling the insurgents and were mistak- by security forces. enly identified by kidnappees as landing in insurgent 259 The number of South African nationals reported territory. among the insurgents is small, with security sources Some experts connect the influx of foreign fighters suggesting that seven individuals fighting in Cabo with the escalation in insurgents’ capacity and Delgado identified as South Africans. 260 Other tactical sophistication that was seen in the attacks sources in South African law enforcement suggest on Mocímboa da Praia and Palma.267 When the that a larger number of individuals have travelled, insurgency started in October 2017, fighters simply with an estimate of 30 to 40. confronted local police forces, which, in many cases, 261 South African fighter Mohammed Suliman, who was photographed in resulted in al-Shabaab members being arrested or Mozambique in 2018, reportedly travelled as part of killed. By contrast, the attacks on Mocímboa da Praia a group of 16 fighters. 262 However, many of these and Palma involved significant planning, with individuals may have been killed or else not remained insurgents infiltrating the towns prior to the attack in Cabo Delgado long term. to gather intelligence and pre-position fighters and Insurgents enter Cabo Delgado primarily via overland routes, reportedly along the Tanzanian border at points on the Rovuma river and in Niassa Province.263 weapons.268 Withdrawal stopper groups were also deployed to ambush any possible security force pursuit. These remote border posts are reported to be unable However, some expert sources also emphasize that to control migration effectively and are known to be Tanzanian fighters have played an important role in corrupt.264 While in Tanzania, al-Shabaab insurgents the insurgency from its outset.269 Migration to reportedly liaise with sympathetic groups and are Mozambique from Tanzania, particularly for work in supported by Tanzanian contacts. the mining sector, and southward migration from the 265 Some sources reported that foreign fighters, specifically from Somalia, had entered Cabo Delgado during the occupation of Mocímboa da Praia via helicopter, 46 helicopter to insurgent-controlled territory would be example, a key leader from Somalia reportedly INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • Great Lakes are part of the social makeup of the Cabo Delgado region and this is reflected in the ranks of the insurgency. THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS The relationship between Mozambique’s al-Shabaab and Islamic State On 4 June 2019, Islamic State media channels claimed credit for repelling an attack by the ‘Crusader Mozambican army’ in a tiny village south of Mocímboa da Praia, killing and wounding ‘a number of them’ and capturing weapons, ammunition and rockets. Photographs of the weapons, which included a Russian belt-fed PK variant machine gun and RPG-7 rockets and a launcher, were distributed online under the auspices of the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province (ISCAP).270 The incident went largely unnoticed and Mozambican police were quick to deny that ISCAP was involved. But it was significant, marking the first time since the start of the insurgency more than two years earlier that Islamic State had officially announced a presence in Mozambique and involvement in a clash with the Mozambican military.271 The incident also came just two months after Islamic State claimed its first attack in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in which three Congolese soldiers were reportedly killed and five wounded. The attack was attributed to a new ‘province’ of the caliphate, Wilāyat Wasat Ifriqiyya (Central Africa), 272 marking the first military action as part of what would become known as ISCAP. 273 The clashes and claims of responsibility were followed by the release of an official Islamic State video showing fighters in the DRC and Mozambique pledging allegiance to Islamic State on 24 July 2019. Islamic State operations in the DRC have escalated, as Islamic State-affiliated fighters claimed responsibility for an ambitious attack in Kampala, Uganda, on 16 November 2021. A trio of suicide bombers targeted Uganda’s parliament and a police headquarters, and a fourth was killed before being able to detonate. The attack claimed at least four lives and wounded dozens, many of whom were police. Other East African countries have raised fears about Islamic State-linked affiliates staging attacks. 274 The concept of a Central Africa Province of the Islamic State Caliphate was not a new one. As early as August 2018, the Islamic State leader at the time, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, referred to it in a speech.275 A video released on 29 April 2019 by the Islamic State-affiliated Al Furqan Media Foundation, also showed Al-Baghdadi – in his first appearance in five years – leafing through folders including one marked ‘Wilāyat Central Africa’. In November 2019, in the wake of Al-Baghdadi’s death during a US military operation in Syria, 276 the official Islamic State newsletter, Al-Nabā, published a series of photographs of militants from Tunisia, Syria, East Asia, Pakistan, Yemen, Sinai, Somalia and Central Africa clasping hands as they pledged allegiance to Al-Baghdadi’s successor, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.277 On 2 February 2022, Al-Qurashi was killed in a US counterterrorism operation in Idlib, Syria, US president Joe Biden announced. The Islamic State’s growing interest in a little-known insurgency in northern Mozambique and its efforts to formalize allegiances with militant fighters under the banner of a Central Africa Province came as Islamic State fighters in Syria and Iraq were being routed, vast swathes of territory were being lost, and leadership figures including Al-Baghdadi were being killed.278 For the increasingly embattled Islamic State, it provided ideal propaganda fodder and a distraction from losses in Syria and Iraq.279 Their strategic shift to supporting THE CURRENT STATE OF AL-SHABAAB 47 regional ‘provinces’, not just in Central Africa but also elsewhere, has been described by analysts as a ‘democratization of jihad’ whereby Islamic State can push its agenda on multiple fronts globally, even in the absence of a central caliphate.280 For the Mozambican insurgents, the loose affiliation with Islamic State gave them greater publicity for their ever-more strategically ambitious operations. Since mid 2019, the Mozambique insurgency has been mentioned directly in over 40 editions of Al-Nabā and in brief communiqués, and distributed as jpeg images under the banner of the Islamic State on Telegram and other encrypted messenger services, detailing clashes, casualties and victories. An infographic shared on Islamic State channels celebrates the ‘victories’ in the jihadist group’s various provinces, March 2021. The reporting of operations in Mozambique via Islamic State has largely not been as sophisticated as reporting from other provinces. Photo: Telegram 48 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS But the links between the Islamic State central media apparatus and the multiplicity of platforms through which it disseminates its propaganda remain weak. The ‘fitful appearance’ of incident reports suggests that the relationship between Islamic State and the insurgents is not consistently sustained.281 Updates from the insurgents in Mozambique have been sporadic and fragmented, far more so than the slickly produced, almost weekly videos and Telegram updates about attacks in the DRC by ISCAP-affiliated militants and in Nigeria by militants aligned to the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). It was only in April 2020, for example, as attacks on towns mounted in Cabo Delgado, that the Mozambique insurgency moved prominently to the This image of an al-Shabaab fighter in Cabo Delgado appeared in an Islamic State front page of Al-Nabā for the first time with a now iconic image of an insurgent, his face newsletter celebrating pointedly shrouded by a red keffiyeh, waving the black flag of Islamic State. insurgents’ victories in 282 Videos and photos of insurgent attacks in northern Mozambique are relatively rare compared with the volume of propaganda material produced by ISWAP Mozambique, April 2020. Photo: Telegram fighters in Nigeria. Media offerings from insurgents in Mozambique also do not share the sophisticated production values of ISWAP propaganda with its soaring soundtracks, visceral and high-definition combat footage, impassioned interviews with frontline fighters, camerawork, editing and subtitles in multiple languages. Following the deployment of Rwandan soldiers in northern Mozambique in July 2021 and the recapture of the port city of Mocímboa da Praia from insurgents in August, regular communiqués from the insurgents slowed to a trickle and then went silent. In the Al-Nabā newsletter, there was hardly a mention of the insurgency until late November when it carried a report, billed on the front page, detailing ongoing battles against coalition military forces in Mozambique and the burning of two Congolese army barracks.283 Islamic State Telegram channels also lit up with an unprecedented flurry of updates – some backdated to July – as insurgents claimed responsibility for a series of 20 incidents between 24 July and 20 November 2021. These incidents included ambushes and clashes with pro-government forces, attacks on villages and the beheadings of ‘spies’. They offered little explanation for their silence, saying only that it was the result of ‘technical and operational circumstances’. 284 This rush of activity has continued into early 2022 (at the time of writing), as Islamic State has laid claim to the recent spate of attacks in Niassa Province and continued attacks in Cabo Delgado. 285 Overall, Islamic State messaging around the Mozambican conflict has also become more sophisticated than in earlier stages of the conflict, releasing more video footage of insurgents and regular claims of attacks. The insurgent propaganda aims to counter the narrative put forward by Mozambican and Rwandan/SADC forces operating in Cabo Delgado, which has sought to emphasize seizures of weapons from insurgents and the capture of insurgent bases.286 By contrast, Islamic State publications and imagery seek to show the ongoing viability of the insurgent force. THE CURRENT STATE OF AL-SHABAAB 49 ISLAMIC STATE NETWORKS IN SOUTH AFRICA Burnt religious texts in the Imam Hussain Mosque in Verulam, near Durban. In May 2018, armed men launched an attack on people attending prayers at the mosque and released a petrol bomb. © Rajesh Jantilal/AFP via Getty Images 50 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS R egionally, there are concerns that foreign fighters who joined the fight in Cabo Delgado could scatter to their home countries and stage attacks there, or that Islamic State-linked networks in other countries could gain inspiration from the Cabo Delgado insurgents.287 This may be happening already: reports have emerged that the perpetrator of a shooting attack carried out in Dar es Salaam in August 2021 had previously fought with al-Shabaab in Somalia before travelling to Mozambique to join the insurgents there. The other wing of ISCAP, based in the DRC and made up of fighters from the ADF, have escalated their attacks with bomb attacks in Kampala in November 2021.288 South Africa has some history of extremism movements linked to vigilante groups, such as PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), which claimed to be fighting gangsterism in the Western Cape and was most active in the 1990s. Since then, the country has rarely been a target for radical Islamic terrorism. The emergence of some cases linked to Islamic State since 2015, however, has led some analysts to argue that this situation is changing. Some have speculated that South Africa’s intervention via SADC in neighbouring Mozambique could make the country a bigger target. South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, for example, warned that Islamic State militants could target South Africa and other allied nations intervening in Mozambique at a summit with Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta in November 2021.289 South Africa: A base for terror networks? Some experts have argued that South Africa’s decision to not formally align itself with US-led counterterrorism policy, and not to deploy troops to counter Islamic terrorism in the past, has prevented it from becoming a target for extremist networks.290 South Africa has also sought to shield its citizens from terror-related charges and designations internationally, for example, in the case of South African cousins Farhad Ahmed Dockrat and Junaid Ismail Dockrat. The US sought to add the Dockrats to a UN sanctions list for alleged links to al-Qaeda, which South Africa rejected.291 The cousins have remained on a US sanctions list since 2007.292 ISLAMIC STATE NETWORKS IN SOUTH AFRICA 51 Key Islamist terrorism cases in South Africa July 2016 The Thulsie twins and Renaldo Smith are arrested by the Hawks in a counterterrorism raid in Johannesburg.301 Tony-Lee and Brandon-Lee Thulsie became the first South Africans to be arrested and charged for having Islamic State links. Fatima Patel and her brother, Ebrahim, were arrested in 2016 on the same day that the Thulsie twins were brought into custody – seemingly in separate incidents – on charges relating to illegal firearm ownership.302 April 2015 Twin brothers Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie and their friend, Renaldo Galdino Smith, attempt to travel from South Africa to Syria to join Islamic State, but are intercepted at OR Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg. February 2018 Sayfudeen Aslam Del Vecchio, his wife Fatima Patel and a Malawian national, Jackson Ahmad Mussa, are arrested on suspicion of the kidnap and murder of two British-born botanists, Rodney and Rachel Saunders, who were travelling in KwaZulu-Natal in search of rare plants at the time of their disappearance a week prior.304 The prosecution alleges that Patel and Del Vecchio are linked to Islamic State. May 2016 Mohammed Abdi Ali, also known as ‘Abu Fidaa’ is arrested in Kenya after allegedly being part of a plot to stage jihadist attacks using anthrax as a biological weapon.298 Ali is alleged to be a key Islamic State recruiter and was named by Kenyan authorities as a financier of Somalian al-Shabaab.299 He has been charged by the Kenyan police with several offences relating to his membership of Islamic State, including using social media platforms such as Telegram to incite persons to commit acts of terrorism on behalf of Islamic State.300 2015 2016 July 2015 The Thulsie twins and Renaldo Smith travel to Maputo, again attempting to join the Islamic State via Ethiopia. South African prosecutors say handwritten notes found at the Johannesburg home of Brandon-Lee Thulsie show that, on arrival in Addis Ababa, they would have travelled to the Sudanese capital of Khartoum before making for Libya to join the Islamic State.293 Mozambican authorities prevented them from leaving Maputo and they returned to South Africa. 52 2017 2018 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • July 2020 The case against the 12 suspects accused in the Verulam mosque attack was dropped after significant delays. The state had failed to justify why it could not proceed with the case.319 2019 THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 2020 2021 October 2019 Dutch jihadist Mohammed Ghorshid is sentenced to several years for preparing to set up a terrorist training camp in Somaliland, his third time being charged with terror-related offences.315 Ghorshid was found to have been using Rachel Saunders’ credit card to buy cryptocurrency, after her kidnapping and murder.316 In South Africa, Del Vecchio, Patel and Mussa are charged with Saunders’ murder. September 2017 US government designate the Thulsie twins as terrorists.303 August 2015–July 2016 The Thulsie twins cultivated links with known Islamic State leaders on social media and planned ‘to carry out a terrorist attack in South Africa’, according to the indictment against them. Potential targets were the US embassy, institutions associated with Judaism, and Shia mosques.295 The twins were also accused of acquiring books and publications giving instructions on how to conduct terrorist activities, including guides on poisoning and bomb-making.296 Tony-Lee Thulsie discussed plans with an undercover US FBI agent posing as an Islamic State operative, seeking bomb-making advice and funding to carry out terrorist attacks in South Africa.297 August 2021 Hoomer and his co-accused in the Verulam mosque incident have sent a letter of demand claiming R156 million damages from the state for malicious prosecution.322 23 January 2020 The last known image of Smith is posted on his personal Facebook page, allegedly showing him in Mozambique holding a gun.317 Sources suggest that he has since been killed fighting in Mozambique.318 13 May 2018 South African Police minister, Bheki Cele, visits the Imam Hussein mosque. Hours after he left, worshippers discovered an ‘improvised explosive device’.306 July 2016 After initially turning state witness and implicating the Thulsie twins in their attempts to join Islamic State and plot terror attacks in South Africa, Renaldo Smith retracts his statement, claiming he was coerced into becoming a witness. August 2015 The Thulsie twins travelled to Lesotho where they secured false passports in the names of Christian Adams Leroy and Germain Adams Troy,294 reportedly to attempt again to travel to join Islamic State. June 2018 Renaldo Smith is pictured in Cabo Delgado with a group of insurgents around an Islamic State flag, alongside another South African jihadist, Mohammed Suliman. Suliman reportedly travelled with 15 other South African nationals inspired to join the Mozambican ranks of Islamic State.307 Smith joined the insurgency in Mozambique in 2018 after rejecting the offer of a state witness protection programme.308 A warrant was issued for his arrest. October 2018 Twelve suspects are arrested and accused of alleged involvement in the Verulam mosque attack, most prominent of whom was Durban businessman Farhad Hoomer.312 The charge sheet was amended to include planting a number of incendiary devices around Durban and terrorism charges.313 The men spent 53 days in custody and made several court appearances during which the state alleged they were linked to Islamic State.314 They were then released on bail. 10 May 2018 The Imam Hussain mosque in Verulam is attacked. Men armed with knives killed one man and critically injured two others (the imam and the mosque caretaker). Part of the mosque was also set on fire.305 On the same day, Del Vecchio and Patel were appearing in court in Verulam, the same area of the city as the mosque which was under attack. July 2018 Several incendiary devices – reportedly of the same type planted at the Verulam mosque309 – are planted at Woolworths stores and food markets around Durban and attached to cars in the vicinity of the Durban July horse racing event.310 Telephone calls were made to Woolworths’ head office by unknown callers demanding payment of 1 000 bitcoin into a Bitcoin wallet for the bombings to cease.311 July 2020 Police raided a house in Kliprivier, south of Johannesburg and arrested five people who they alleged were part of a kidnapping and extortion syndicate with links to Islamic State.320 One of the arrested suspects had previously been accused of carrying out the Verulam mosque attack alongside Farhad Hoomer. February 2022 The Thulsie twins enter into a plea bargain with the state. Tony-Lee Thulsie receives an 11-year prison sentence and Brandon-Lee Thulsie receives an 8-year sentence. 2022 5 July 2021 The case against Hoomer and four others following their arrests in Mayville, Durban, is dropped. Investigations are expected to continue.321 June 2021 Hoomer is again arrested, along with four others, at a warehouse in Mayville, Durban, in June 2021. Police seized over 5 000 rounds of ammunition and handguns, an AK-47 and a bolt action rifle with a scope. Some of the ammunition was identified as coming from a state source. ISLAMIC STATE NETWORKS IN SOUTH AFRICA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 53 Connections between key Islamic State cases in South Africa Number 1 The Thulsie twins and their close friend Renaldo Smith together attempted to leave South Africa twice to join Islamic State in 2015.331 In July 2016 the trio were arrested in Johannesburg in a counterterrorism raid.332 2. Smith was pictured with Suliman, another South African jihadist, in Cabo Delgado with a group of insurgents around an Islamic State flag in June 2018.333 3. The Thulsie twins were allegedly in contact with ‘Abu Fidaa’. In messages seen by the GI-TOC, a contact identified as ‘AF’ – suspected to be Abu Fidaa – gives advice on conducting operations in secret and promises to find information on targets in South Africa of US, British and French interests.334 4. Mahomed Haffejee’s contact details were found in Jackson Ahmad Mussa’s phone.335 5. Co-accused in the Verulam mosque attack. 6. They are husband and wife. 7. Co-accused in the kidnapping and murder of Rodney and Rachel Saunders. 8. The Verulam mosque attack, which South African authorities allege Hoomer coordinated, took place on the same day that Del Vecchio and Patel were appearing in court.336 1 Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie South African twin brothers charged with planning terror attacks inspired by Islamic State.323 13 Renaldo Galdino Smith South African national who joined the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. 14 2 Mohammed Suliman South African national who joined the insurgency in Cabo Delgado.324 Mohammed Ghorshid Dutch jihadist convicted for preparing to set up a terrorist training camp in Somaliland, his third time being charged with Islamic State-related offences.327 12 3 While on bail, Hoomer attended Del Vecchio’s court hearings. He visited Del Vecchio in jail and has assisted with his legal defence. Hoomer claims to have no prior connection to Del Vecchio but that he stands in solidarity as, in his view, both he and Del Vecchio have been ‘unfairly targeted’ by the state, part of a global injustice being perpetrated against Muslims.337 11 9. While on bail, Hoomer attended the Thulsie twins’ court hearings and attempted to visit them in jail but was prevented by COVID-19 restrictions. As with Del Vecchio, Hoomer claimed to have no prior connection to the Thulsies other than a sense of solidarity. 10. Co-accused in the Verulam mosque attack. 11. Dutch jihadist Mohammed Ghorshid was found to have been involved in converting stolen money, which came from Rachel Saunders’ credit card, into cryptocurrency.338 The Dutch court that tried Ghorshid viewed him, Del Vecchio and Patel as part of an Islamic State-linked terrorist organization.339 12. Reporting on Ghorshid’s trial in the Netherlands said that he had been in contact with Abu Fidaa.340 13. Investigating officers alleged that Patel had been in contact with the Thulsie twins. Patel and her brother, Ebrahim, were arrested in 2016 on the same day that the Thulsie twins were brought into custody – seemingly in separate incidents – on charges relating to illegal firearm ownership.341 14. Dutch and South African authorities established that Patel was in touch with Ghorshid and then introduced him to the Thulsie twins.342 15. Investigations established that ‘Abu Leila Saif’ was an online moniker used by Del Vecchio.343 In Telegram chats with an ‘Abuleila Saif’, Tony-Lee Thulsie discussed attacking South African Jews.344 Evidence obtained in the Thulsie Twins matter indicated that ‘Abuleila Saif’ (i.e. Del Vecchio) was in communication with individuals outside the country with strong links to Islamic State.345 9 Mohammed Abdi Ali, a.k.a. ‘Abu Fidaa’ Alleged key Islamic State recruiter, arrested in Kenya in 2016.325 4 Jackson Ahmad Mussa Co-accused with Del Vecchio and Patel in the kidnapping and murder of the botanists Rachel and Rodney Saunders. 7 15 5 Mohammed Rashid Haffejee One of the 12 suspects initially charged for the Verulam mosque attack and for planting incendiary devices around Durban. Charges were dropped in 2020.326 Haffejee was also identified in an incident from 2014, when a call was made from a phone number registered to him, by a caller identifying as ‘Rashid’, to the Egyptian embassy, expressing happiness that 30 Egyptian nationals had died in a recent suicide attack. Farhad Hoomer Durban-based businessman who was initially charged for carrying out the Verulam mosque attack, then arrested again in Mayville, Durban, in 2021 in possession of a significant volume of firearms. In both cases, charges have since been dropped. Details 10 6 8 6 Sayfudeen Aslam Del Vecchio Alleged jihadist, Del Vecchio has been charged with the kidnapping and murder of the botanists Rachel and Rodney Saunders. Fatima Patel Alleged jihadist, Patel has been charged with the kidnap and murder of the botanists Rachel and Rodney Saunders. Nashir Hassan Sayid Ethiopian national who was one of the 12 charged in the Verulam mosque attack investigation. Sayid was also one of five suspects arrested in Kliprivier,328 who police claimed were part of a ‘kidnapping and extremism syndicate’.329 Sayid was also connected to a female Dutch national who travelled to join Islamic State in Syria and had been ‘married’ online to a South African jihadist (suspected to be Sayid).330 54 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 55 However, there have been several instances over the other countries in East Africa, including such Tanza- past two decades where South Africa has been used nia, DRC, Uganda and Burundi.350 as a base for terrorists operating internationally: as a base to plan attacks, a conduit for financing, or a hiding place.346 Some analysts have argued that South Africa’s extensive issues with gangsterism, corruption and entrenched organized crime have created a febrile situation that terror networks can exploit to their advantage.347 This includes the case of Samantha Lewthwaite, a British national who was instrumental in planning the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi by al-Shabaab. In 2014, Lewthwaite was discovered to have been living in South Africa, using a fake South African passport, since at least 2008. Other terror suspects have used falsified South African passports and South African nationals have also been identified joining terrorist networks overseas.348 The use of South Africa as a ‘rear base’ for training, concealment and fundraising for Islamist militants was acknowledged by South African state security sources in the first decade of the 2000s.349 This dynamic appears to continue today. A report released by SADC states that some funding for the Mozambican insurgency has been channelled through individ- Since the emergence of Islamic State, a number of South Africans have reportedly travelled to join the group in Syria. An estimate from 2017 ranged widely between 60 and 100 individuals.351 Since 2015, several Islamic State-linked incidents have taken place in South Africa. Some argue this represents a shift whereby South Africa is becoming an active theatre of operations for Islamist terrorism. In two of these incidents, suspects or people linked to the cases also joined the Islamic State-aligned insurgents in Mozambique, suggesting that the newer, southern African front of the caliphate can draw in individuals inspired by global Islamic State ideals. The key Islamic State-linked events in South Africa are set out in the timeline on pages 52–53. Our research team interviewed members of law enforcement, prosecutors and suspects in these cases and reviewed an extensive set of court documents to analyze whether these incidents are interconnected or isolated events, and what, if any, links these suspects have to the insurgency in Mozambique. uals and private organizations in South Africa and Fighters in Mozambique pose with an Islamic State flag in an image shared on social media channels in June 2018. 56 Two are allegedly South African nationals: Renaldo Smith An image from Renaldo Smith’s Facebook page, showing (second left, back row) and Mohammed Suliman (second him holding a weapon, believed to have been taken in right, back row). Photo: Telegram Mozambique and posted late January 2020. Photo: Facebook INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Islamic State-linked cases since 2015 The ‘Thulsie twins’ case Police stated in court proceedings that the couple First among these cases to make headlines was that of were suspected of terrorist activity from as early as the ‘Thulsie twins’. Along with their friend Renaldo Galdino Smith, Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie made attempts to join Islamic State but were intercepted by law enforcement.352 The trio were then arrested by the Hawks in a counterterrorism raid in Johannesburg in July 2016. Smith initially turned state witness against the Thulsie twins,353 but then refused the offer of a state witness protection programme and fled to Mozambique to join the Mozambican insurgency in 2018. 354 Sources suggest that he has since been killed fighting in Mozambique.355 The Thulsie twins became the first South Africans to be arrested and charged for having Islamic State links, accused of having cultivated links with known Islamic State leaders on social media, gathered materials on terrorism and bomb-making (including consulting an undercover US FBI agent for bomb-making advice and funding) and planned attacks in South Africa.356 In February 2022, more than five years after their arrest, the Thulsie twins entered into a plea bargain with the state. Tony-Lee Thulsie received an 11-year prison sentence and Brandon-Lee Thulsie was sentenced to eight years. 2017 and that the state was in the process of drafting an affidavit asking to search their home when it came to light that they were suspected of kidnapping.360 The search of Del Vecchio and Patel’s home also uncovered Islamic State flags, a modified cell phone, which appeared to be the trigger for an improvised explosive device (IED), and handbooks on bomb-making. Analysis of their phones discovered messages between Del Vecchio, Patel and Mussa about ‘killing the kuffar’ in apparent reference to the killing of Rodney and Rachel Saunders.361 A Dutch jihadist named Mohammed Ghorshid was later reportedly found using stolen money that came from Rachel Saunders’ credit card to buy cryptocurrency, having received the details from Del Vecchio and Patel.362 Del Vecchio and Patel appeared in court in a Durban area known as Verulam in May 2018. Towards the end of a day of court proceedings, there was a disturbance in the press gallery.363 The nearby Imam Hussain mosque was on fire as men armed with knives attacked the Shia place of worship, killing one man and critically injuring two others.364 Three days later, an IED was discovered in the mosque.365 Several other incendiary devices – reportedly of the same type The Del Vecchio and Patel case planted at the Verulam mosque366 – were planted in In February 2018, Sayfudeen Aslam Del Vecchio, his July 2018.368 Phone calls were made to Woolworths wife Fatima Patel and a Malawian national, Jackson Ahmad Mussa, were arrested on suspicion of the kidnapping and murder of two British-born botanists, Rodney and Rachel Saunders. The couple had been travelling in KwaZulu-Natal in search of rare plants at the time of their disappearance, a week prior to the arrest.357 Del Vecchio and Patel were not charged with terrorism, yet several aspects of their case attest to their links with Islamic State. For many years, Del Vecchio had made no secret of his radical views and his ‘affiliation to the Islamic State’.358 Fatima Patel was suspected of helping a 15-year-old join Islamic State in 2015 and had been active in posting jihadist content on social media, establishing an extremist Twitter profile as ‘The Lioness’.359 Woolworths stores367 and markets around Durban in demanding Bitcoin payments for the bombings to cease.369 Twelve suspects were accused of alleged involvement in the Verulam mosque attack, including Durban businessman Farhad Hoomer.370 The trial of Del Vecchio, Patel and Mussa has yet to commence. Farhad Hoomer Farhad Hoomer and the other men were charged with several crimes relating to the mosque attack: murder and attempted murder, planting explosive materials and arson. The charge sheet was later amended to include planting incendiary devices around Durban and terrorism charges.371 They were also charged with possessing an IED remote control and extortion of ISLAMIC STATE NETWORKS IN SOUTH AFRICA 57 three Durban businessmen (who allegedly had ammunition was identified as coming from a state dealings with Hoomer), demanding they each pay source. This case was dropped a few months later, R10 million into a hawala account in Dubai. to the frustration of police and prosecutors. In a series of raids on the day of the arrests, police reported that they discovered a Tanzanian man being held for ransom in the basement of a property belonging to Hoomer – in an apparently unrelated evidence was incorrectly gathered, either intentionally or because of ineptitude.377 criminal scheme in which undocumented foreign Kliprivier case nationals were kidnapped for ransom. Police reported Shortly after charges against Hoomer and the other that extremist literature was also found and in court suspects in the Verulam mosque attack were dropped proceedings, the state alleged the suspects were in July 2020, police raided a house in Kliprivier, south linked to Islamic State.372 Yet the case against them of Johannesburg, and arrested an alleged kidnapping was later dropped. 373 A further postponement and extortion syndicate described by South African (requested by the state) was refused by the magis- authorities as ‘one of the biggest breakthroughs [in] trate, who criticized unreasonable delays in the trial investigations of international terrorism in South as prejudicial to the accused. State prosecutors said Africa’.378 Islamic State-related material was reportedly investigators had yet to analyze the five terabytes of found at the house, just as Islamic State ‘training data recovered from over 200 devices seized from DVDs’ were recovered from Hoomer’s property after the accused.374 the Verulam mosque attack investigation. Senior state prosecutor Mahen Naidu said the state Police claimed that some of the firearms recovered at would continue with its investigations. ‘We already the house had been used in other kidnapping cases have all this information. As much as the court in KwaZulu-Natal and in a shooting at a restaurant in wouldn’t accept that COVID-19 affected the police Melville, Johannesburg, that had been identified as a and hampered investigations, it did. We will finalize terrorist incident.379 One of the suspects was our investigations and approach the DPP [director of successfully prosecuted for kidnapping and public prosecutions] to get the authority to prosecute extortion.380 It has been reported that some of the and to place the matter back on the roll,’ Naidu accomplices of the Kliprivier incident have since fled said.375 Hoomer and his co-accused have since to join the insurgency in northern Mozambique.381 threatened to launch a damages claim of R156 million against the state for malicious prosecution.376 58 A policeman close to the investigation said the An officer in the Hawks unit for Crimes Against the State told the GI-TOC that they believe that this In June 2021, a second case was also dropped after extremist network is moving members between Hoomer and four others were arrested at a ware- ‘cells’ in different parts of South Africa, including house in Mayville, Durban. Police seized over 5 000 Johannesburg and Durban, either so these members rounds of ammunition and handguns, an AK-47 can be involved in extremist operations or to allow and a bolt action rifle with a scope. Some of the members to evade law enforcement.382 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Farhad Hoomer – South African jihadist leader or unfairly targeted individual? Farhad Hoomer – formerly accused of leading the 2018 attack on the Verulam mosque and other firearms-related charges – openly discusses his radical ideology. In an interview with the GI-TOC, he argued that his goal is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Democracy, in his view, is a form of tyranny and enslavement. He said that he was prepared to take up arms to advance these goals.383 Yet, he claimed that the firearm charges laid against him were false: the guns and ammunition seized in Mayville, he claims, were for legitimate use in hunting. South African law enforcement views Hoomer as a key leader of Islamist extremists in South Africa.384 A source in the National Prosecuting Authority said of Hoomer: ‘He is one of the big fish in the leadership. There is a struggle for ascendancy among the radicals in South Africa to establish Islamic State here … We know he is an emir (of high rank or office) and he has generals under him ... He is a critical role-player. The police are understaffed and under-resourced and he’s not a priority for the state. He is unpredictable and unafraid to act on his beliefs.’385 However, another Hawks source told the GI-TOC that other extremist factions, notably a West African faction with strong links to Somalia, were also emerging to challenge Hoomer’s pre-eminence among extremists in South Africa.386 Hoomer denied the allegations against him. ‘What makes them say I am a terrorist?’ he said. ‘The state has all my bank records, my cell phones and my computers. If they have proof that I am being funded or am funding someone, let them present it.’387 He argued that he and other terror suspects in South Africa, namely Del Vecchio and the Thulsie twins, are being unfairly targeted by the state as part of a wider global injustice being perpetrated against Muslims.388 This global injustice, he says, is what has prompted his letter of demand claiming damages from the state. While on bail, he attended the court appearances of Del Vecchio and the Thulsie twins, which he claims was out of a sense of ‘fellow feeling’ for his plight. He visited Del Vecchio in jail and has assisted with his legal defence. He tried to visit the Thulsie twins in jail but COVID-19 restrictions prevented this. He claimed not to have any prior connection to Del Vecchio or the Thulsie twins. Weapons, ammunition and other materials (including a cell-phone reception jammer) recovered by police in Durban, July 2021. Charges were later dropped against Farhad Hoomer and his co-accused. Photo: SAPS ISLAMIC STATE NETWORKS IN SOUTH AFRICA 59 The Islamic State threat in South Africa Some observers argue that the cases that have recruiter in Kenya), who links the Thulsie twins, Del emerged since 2015 prove that South Africa now Vecchio and the Dutch jihadist Mohammed Ghor- ‘faces an imminent threat of jihadist terrorism’. shid. However, the available information does not 389 Whereas previously South Africa avoided becoming prove that these different incidents were connected the target of Islamic State’s jihadist ire because of its as part of a concerted extremist network. stance on international terrorism policy, it now faces ‘blowback’ due to its intervention in the Mozambican insurgency,390 as Islamic State itself has threatened in a 2020 issue of its publication Al Nabā. But the different cases are also linked in their modus operandi. In the Del Vecchio case, the bomb threats around Durban and the Kliprivier group, at least part of the aim in each instance was financial. In each Our analysis has found that there are several com- case, the suspects are alleged to have wanted to mon links between these cases. As outlined in the extort or steal money, potentially to support interna- diagram on page 54, there are several direct links tional jihadist activities. between some of the individuals involved, such as between Fatima Patel (accused of the kidnapping and murder of Rodney and Rachel Saunders) and the Thulsie twins, and between Mahomed Haffejee (one of Hoomer’s co-accused in the Verulam mosque attack) and Jackson Ahmad Mussa (co-accused to Fatima Patel and Sayfudeen Aslam Del Vecchio). There are also indirect links with international jihadist figures, such as Abu Fidaa (a key Islamic State In two instances, there are direct connections to Islamic State-aligned group fighting in northern Mozambique: first Renaldo Smith, and then the alleged accomplices of the suspects in the Kliprivier case. More broadly, South African law enforcement reports that there are at least seven South African nationals known to be currently fighting in Mozambique, but that 30–40 are suspected.391 The 12 co-accused in the Verulam mosque case appearing in the Verulam magistrate’s court in 2020. The charges were later dropped. © Sunday Times/Jackie Clausen 60 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS The risks of overestimating the Islamic State threat The northern Mozambique insurgency, its links to been instances in previous years where reporting on Islamic State, and the threats issued by Islamic State alleged terror-linked cases in South African media has to carry out attacks against South Africa have put the fallen below adequate reporting standards.395 Farid spotlight on extremist networks within South Africa. Sayed, editor of Muslim View, a monthly newspaper, This brings with it a risk that the actual threat of argues that media outlets often project the notion Islamist networks becomes overstated. that extremism is pronounced in the Muslim commu- In absolute terms, incidents that appear to be linked to extremist Islamist ideologies are still relatively few. One may compare the frequency of incidents in nity in South Africa, which has been part of the national community for hundreds of years, when in fact cases of extremism are extremely isolated.396 countries like the United Kingdom (UK), where the Rafeek Shah, a well-known Muslim cleric who runs Metropolitan Police reported that 18 Islamist terror two mosques in Durban and is a former member of plots were intercepted between 2017 and September parliament, agrees with Sayed that extremism in 2021, 392 during which time 11 terror-related attacks took place. 393 Compared with the UK, which has been South Africa is contained within a miniscule number of select groups.397 He also believes Muslim commu- so prominent in the global ‘war on terror’ and in nities can often be caricatured as radical when military interventions overseas, South Africa has not political positions like an affinity to the struggle in been targeted for attacks to the same degree. Palestine, an opposition to US hegemony and Members of the South African Muslim community have also been anxious to emphasize that reporting should not inadvertently or lazily fall into Islamophobic and alarmist tropes, and equate isolated instances of extremism with the wide variance of interpreta- US intervention in Afghanistan are misconceived as extremism. Such misconceptions may have a real-world impact in fuelling Islamophobia and xenophobic tensions, and influence policy by exaggerating an extremist threat. tions of Islam practised in South Africa.394 There have ISLAMIC STATE NETWORKS IN SOUTH AFRICA 61 Members of PAGAD at a funeral in Cape Town. © Reuters/Alamy Stock Photo Extremist networks in the Western Cape People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) is a group that became synonymous with vigilante-style attacks in the Western Cape in the late 1990s. Since PAGAD’s rise to prominence, no similar homegrown terrorism organization has emerged in South Africa.398 The group emerged as a vigilante organization targeting gangsters and drug traffickers in Cape Town, including by carrying out assassinations and pipe-bomb attacks. PAGAD then evolved into what the United States subsequently labelled as a terrorist organization, alleging the group was behind a series of bomb attacks staged in Cape Town starting in 1998.399 The activities of PAGAD were largely quashed when several of its key leaders received lengthy prison sentences.400 By the first half of the year 2000, PAGAD’s days as a mass movement were perceived to be over.401 However, members of PAGAD have reportedly continued the group’s work in anti-gangster vigilantism over the years, albeit on a smaller scale.402 Several major PAGAD leaders were released from prison in late 2020.403 In interviews, members claimed to be sourcing weapons, training and relaunching the PAGAD cause.404 Within its predominantly Muslim membership, PAGAD has historically included both Sunni and Shia members. Throughout its history, PAGAD has reportedly been riven with tension between factions in the organization, between those which wished the organization’s role to focus primarily on the local fight against gangsterism, enacted through violence as per its original raison d’être, and more radical factions which want to align the group with extremist Islamist ideals.405 Interviews with PAGAD members suggest these splits continue today. Interviews with several PAGAD members in late 2021 and early 2022 suggested members aligned to more radical factions have been following the conflict in Mozambique with interest, but there is no evidence that these individuals have been actively involved in, supported the insurgency financially, or mobilized around Islamic State.406 As seen in previous years, PAGAD’s focus appears to be more insular, directed at gangs and drug trafficking in their own communities. 62 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS RESPONSES A Rwandan soldier in Mocímboa da Praia, northern Mozambique, August 2021. © Emidio Jozine/AFP via Getty Images ISLAMIC STATE NETWORKS IN SOUTH AFRICA 63 National security institutions in disarray in South Africa The incidents linked to Islamic State that have emerged in South Africa since 2015 do not necessarily show an immediate, sustained threat of Islamic terrorism to the country. However, they do starkly demonstrate that the institutions tasked with identifying, prosecuting and preventing these cases are fundamentally weak. South Africa’s security institutions have long been riddled with corruption, maladministration and infiltration by organized crime. Concerted efforts by powerful political interests to undermine their independence, misappropriate intelligence resources for political purposes, and cripple police and prosecutorial capacity to act on corruption – notably during the decade-long tenure of President Jacob Zuma – have had a devastating effect. The State Security Agency (SSA) – which is key to assessing intelligence on foreign and domestic threats – is among the many agencies that have been undermined. A report of a high-level review panel on the SSA, appointed by President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018, was damning in its assessment: ‘There has been a serious politicization and fictionalization of the intelligence community over the past decade or more, based on factions in the ruling party, resulting in an almost complete disregard for the Constitution, policy, legislation and other prescripts, and turning the civilian intelligence community into a private resource to serve the political and personal interests of particular individuals,’ the report concluded. Secret funds were looted, corruption was widespread and the SSA became a ‘cash-cow’ for many inside and outside the agency.407 In early 2021, the Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, chaired by Acting Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, heard evidence that millions of South African rands were funnelled through the SSA during the Zuma presidency.408 The SSA faced accusations of incompetence after the widespread violence in KwaZuluNatal and Gauteng provinces following Zuma’s imprisonment for contempt of court in July 2021. The violence, looting and burning – which left 340 dead, 150 000 jobless and R50 billion in losses to South Africa’s struggling economy409 – was unforeseen by the SSA.410 In August 2021, as part of a cabinet reshuffle, Ramaphosa scrapped the Ministry of Intelligence and announced the SSA would now be directly accountable to the 64 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Acting Chief Justice Raymond Zondo. The Judicial Commission of Inquiry heard how money was funnelled by South Africa’s State Security Agency to support the Zuma regime. © Veli Nhlapo/Sowetan/Gallo Images via Getty Images presidency.411 Ramaphosa denied critics’ allegations also faces charges of fraud, corruption and theft that the move was a power grab for the presidency, relating to the looting of a secret slush fund.414 saying the shift aimed to ‘professionalize’ the agency.412 The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), also partially hollowed out during the Zuma years and Similarly, the police’s Crime Intelligence Division has hamstrung by state capture, politically pliant appoint- been all but crippled by years of systemic abuses ments and a rapid turnover in staff and leadership, is and corruption. Funds intended for intelligence now struggling to right itself.415 It faces the continued operations and payments to registered confidential fallout from an exodus of skilled staff, the often- informants, governed by loose internal controls, were glacial pace of prosecutions and pressure to make systematically looted. 413 The division’s former head progress in high-level corruption prosecutions and to and Zuma ally, Richard Mdluli, is currently serving a prioritize prosecutions that can make an impact on prison sentence for kidnapping and assault and now violent crime.416 RESPONSES 65 The impact of weak institutions Even with the necessary political backing to create real nature. Terrorism cases also require significant reform, efforts to repair these agencies may take years manpower, informer networks, cyber capabilities, to have a real impact. The national-level problems specialist language skills, cultural knowledge and an affecting South Africa’s security institutions can be understanding of militant ideology, elements that are seen to influence its response to terrorism cases. largely lacking in South Africa’s security establish- In 2013 South Africa adopted a National Counterterrorism Strategy, which remains in effect to this day. Several other laws provide a basis for terrorism responses and efforts to curb terrorist activity and investigate terrorist financing. However, the Financial Crimes Against the State expressed concerns that the unit is ‘seriously understaffed’, with only around 20 officers with the requisite knowledge and experience nationwide.420 Action Task Force (FATF) – a global intergovernment Several sources told the GI-TOC that there is a single watchdog of money laundering and terrorist South African Police Services expert who analyzes financing – published a report in October 2021 data seized in terror raids. The Verulam mosque which found that South Africa was not pursuing attack investigation alone yielded five terabytes of investigations into terrorism financing consistent with data for analysis from 200 separate devices seized international standards. The report says the country from the accused, creating an insurmountable task has specialist prosecutors and police to investigate for the personnel available.421 One senior NPA source terrorism funding but that ‘South Africa has failed told the GI-TOC: ‘It is ridiculous that one person [has to demonstrate that it is effectively identifying, to analyze five terabytes of data from 200 devices investigating or prosecuting terrorist financiers or from this case]. You should have a team of at least 15 addressing terrorism finance through alternate people doing that. It is an impossible task. It is like measures’. 417 FATF notes that South Africa has only asking me to get to the moon but then giving me a ever convicted one person involved in terrorism horse cart to get there. It is shocking. To study ISIS, financing, while highlighting that South Africa has you need an entire team dedicated to online recruit- thousands of charitable and non-profit organizations ment alone.’ with insufficient oversight, suggesting some might be at risk of terror financing abuse. This lack of investigative capacity contributed to what the magistrate criticized as ‘unreasonable’ delays, Authorities have stated that they are engaged in which led to the Verulam mosque prosecution being active investigations into terrorist financing from struck from the roll.422 Significant delays have also South Africa to Mozambique. Hawks spokesperson affected other terror offence cases. In October 2021, Lloyd Ramovha told media in August 2020 that when the Thulsie twins appeared in court, the judge South Africans were aiding and abetting Islamic State slammed the delays in their trial as ‘preposterous’.423 in Mozambique with ‘financial and material support’. An officer close to the investigation into Hoomer’s The investigation involved Interpol and Mozambican July 2021 arrest in Mayville also said that the authorities, with detectives looking at cross-border evidence was incorrectly gathered, which led to the financial flows, the origins of these funds and the case being dropped, either due to ineptitude or wilful involvement of organized crime in raising finances.418 sabotage of the case.424 However, sources we spoke to levelled criticisms at the way counterterror investigations have been Senior Hawks sources allege that a lack of expertise domestically has left South African investigators reliant handled. 66 ment today.419 An officer in the Hawks unit for on the cooperation of overseas partners. The Thulsie Investigators with close knowledge of Islamic twins, Del Vecchio and Verulam mosque cases were State-linked cases expressed fears that South African all supported by international partners who are better authorities do not currently have enough technical able to monitor online jihadist activity. The October and specialist capacity to deal with cases of this 2021 FATF report similarly said that in the case of the INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Rwandan soldiers patrol in front of what remains of the airport in Mocímboa da Praia, September 2021. The town was occupied by insurgents for almost a year. © Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images Thulsie twins, assistance had been provided by Syria, preoccupied with high-profile corruption cases in Iraq, Kenya, Lesotho, the UK, the US and France. South Africa. Publicly, the South African government has affirmed Another reason posited was that the government did its commitment to counterterrorism. 425 President not want terror cases to tarnish South Africa’s reputa- Cyril Ramaphosa visited the Verulam mosque two tion.427 However, another senior NPA source dis- weeks after the attack and expressed condolences to agreed: ‘These are all priority crimes being worked on worshippers, saying ‘law enforcement agencies have by speciality components in the police and the NPA.’ been tasked to give this [attack] high priority’. A Hawks officer investigating terror cases told GI-TOC 426 However, several sources in South Africa’s justice and that while police wanted to pursue terror cases, the security cluster expressed fears that there is little state’s capacity to do so is increasingly diminished as appetite in government to see terrorism as a serious more and more senior detectives retire.428 issue. This is attributed to authorities being otherwise RESPONSES 67 Responses to the insurgency in Mozambique Up to early November 2021, Mozambican transparency over the Rwandan intervention in government and regional forces expressed confidence particular,436 and to some extent the SADC interven- that the conflict in Cabo Delgado is drawing to a tion as well.437 close.429 President Nyusi has promised representatives of gas companies which have invested in Cabo Delgado that the Mozambican government will ‘do everything to remove the last obstacle’ to ‘complete security and tranquillity’.430 Professor Mpho Molomo, head of SAMIM, told assembled regional experts and civil society that he believed the foreign intervention of Rwanda and the SADC is what is required to ‘save’ Cabo Delgado.431 However, the breakthrough spate of attacks in Cabo Delgado and expansion to Niassa Province have shown that the regional interventions have not yet achieved sustainable security. The SADC intervention force has since been extended until April 2022.432 Mozambican military leaders have agreed with Rwandan forces to continue and extend their operations.433 society and international observers that the conflict cannot have a purely military solution.434 While the military may have an important role in achieving initial stability and allowing the return of humanitarian aid, trade, and business to areas which have been cut off for many months, this does not obviate the structural drivers of the insurgency.435 As outlined earlier in this report, the insurgency is fundamentally driven by extreme political and economic marginalization, channelled through religious extremism and expressed through violence. to military intervention. First, authorities need to build frameworks of inclusive dialogue with communities in Cabo Delgado to prevent political grievances from repeatedly erupting into violence at later stages.438 Some international observers have also stressed the need for negotiation with al-Shabaab, when the timing is right.439 Second is the need for an ambitious redevelopment plan for the region, not only to rebuild the infrastructure that has been destroyed in the conflict but also to provide meaningful opportunities for unemployed youth in Cabo Delgado. This is essential to shift the balance of incentives for young people away from joining A third important channel is the need to strengthen the capacity of Mozambican government institutions so that they can independently manage the threat of conflict and terrorism.441 Issues of endemic corruption and high-level positions being filled by political appointees as opposed to appointments based on merit, were described as eroding the efficacy of these institutions. This includes intelligence-gathering capacities, which were assessed by Mozambican experts as ineffective.442 Faction-fighting within the Frelimo elite was also seen as a major stumbling block to effectively The intervention by Rwandan and SADC forces has recaptured territory that the Mozambican military was unable to achieve. The Rwandan forces have also reportedly been able to build better communication with communities in Cabo Delgado, in part because of their greater ability to communicate in Swahili, as the lingua franca of East Africa and Cabo Delgado, compared with Mozambican forces, as well as their better discipline, leadership and understanding that local support is critical in counterinsurgency operations. However, civil society figures have repeatedly raised concerns about a lack of INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION importance of alternative channels of peacebuilding al-Shabaab.440 However, there is a broad consensus among civil 68 Interviewees in Mozambican civil society stressed the building institutions, including the military.443 Weaknesses in the military institutions were demonstrated by defections to the insurgents in the early stages of the conflict, as well as the loss of weapons and equipment, through both capture by insurgents and, it is alleged, deliberate sabotage by elements of the military.444 The fact that the Rwandan and SADC interventions were able to make progress in a matter of months is testament to how weak the Mozambican military response was before their arrival, hence their reliance on private military capacity. • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS In a cabinet reshuffle in November 2021, President It has also been highlighted that the way the Nyusi named the former military commander of reconstruction plan is structured will shift the balance operations in Cabo Delgado as defence minister, of power over Cabo Delgado further towards the and a high-ranking police officer as interior minister. central government.448 Power in Mozambique is Nyusi has said that the appointments herald reform already highly centralized around the presidency, and restructuring in the military. leaving regional authorities with little autonomy.449 445 The Mozambican government has also produced a reconstruction plan that emphasizes the need for development. This includes support to the agriculture sector to aid the dire food security situation (as the latest UN estimates suggest up to a million people in In the face of an insurgent movement which has risen up in part in revolt against elite control and exploitation of the region’s resources, the impact of further centralization of power in Maputo will likely have negative consequences. northern Mozambique are severely food insecure) Without reform in key Mozambican institutions and and a focus on youth employment in the budget. a sustained reconstruction strategy in Cabo Delgado 446 However, the view from outside government is that offers young people a viable alternative to pessimistic that these goals will be achieved. The conflict and insurgency recruitment, Mozambique most likely outcome is that the government will be runs the risk that military gains by regional forces will able to achieve and maintain sufficient security for be short-lived, violence will re-emerge, and Cabo the oil and gas extraction, but this is unlikely to Delgado will continue to be a source of instability for translate into sustainable peace for local people. 447 the region as a destination for extremists from other countries.450 A worshipper in a mosque in Pemba. The city hosts tens of thousands of people displaced by the violence. © John Wessels/AFP via Getty Images RESPONSES 69 CONCLUSION Displaced people gather under a makeshift shelter on Paquitequete beach, Pemba. © John Wessels/AFP via Getty Images 70 T he Cabo Delgado conflict is a watershed moment in a new security environment. It has emerged out of social and economic marginalization, alongside a breakdown in governance and the rule of law. This differs from the struggle for independence of previous generations. It is a conflict with localized causes which have been channelled through religious extremism, but fundamentally many of the drivers are political and economic. These grievances have manifested in violence owing to the failure of institutions, governance and other avenues of dialogue with aggrieved groups. The illicit economy may not have become a major source of funding for al-Shabaab, but it has, nonetheless, played a significant role in creating the conditions for the conflict. The pervasiveness of organized crime in Cabo Delgado over many decades shaped the situation in which the conflict emerged: a region without effective rule of law, where corruption is pervasive, and where discontented people – particularly young people – have few avenues to make their political views heard and few opportunities for economic empowerment. Unless these failures of governance and grievances are addressed, there is a risk that Cabo Delgado may enter cycles of violence that could have a destabilizing effect on the wider region. The drivers of the conflict are not being addressed by the current military response to the insurgency, and many people remain sceptical as to whether they ever will be. Many of the same conditions that brought about the insurgency in northern Cabo Delgado also exist in other regions, in particular Nampula Province, and to some extent Niassa Province. There is a concern that the return of fighters from Cabo Delgado to these areas and redirected trafficking routes could lead to new outbreaks of violence. The link between organized crime and terrorist groups is often far more complex than the prevailing narratives would suggest, as our findings from northern Mozambique demonstrate. Similarly, the relationship between Mozambique’s al-Shabaab and Islamic State is more complex than a direct allegiance and command from Islamic State centre. Their relationship has strengthened and waned over time, and appears to be opportunistic rather than systemic, with Mozambican insurgents tapping into this global jihadist ideology while maintaining their local causes and justifications for violence. There is a tendency for government and military statements to describe al-Shabaab as being closely involved in trafficking, particularly of drugs, and aligned to Islamic State. CONCLUSION 71 The evidence to support these claims is not clear. However, it is easy to see how presenting al-Shabaab as a terrorist and criminal organization, tapped into regional trafficking flows and connected with the world’s most notorious criminal organizations, is politically expedient. In our view, this belies the more complex reality of the conflict, where endemic discontent has flared up along religious and ethnic lines, and the management of the same resources which are hailed as holding the key to Mozambique’s future has instead helped fan the flames of violence. As the conflict evolves and some foreign fighters return to their countries of origin and other regions of Mozambique, there is a risk that violent attacks could be staged elsewhere. The spate of attacks in Niassa Province shows that this is already a reality. The question is, therefore, whether the institutions tasked with identifying and preventing such attacks are resilient enough for the job. South Africa has been fortunate in that it has rarely been the target of extremist activity. However, South Africa’s security institutions have been systematically eroded and are now grappling with the legacy of a decade-long decline, leaving the country ill equipped to face emerging threats. Similarly, in Mozambique, the institutions tasked with investigating, gathering evidence and countering terrorism threats are fundamentally weak. The rapid progress of the Rwandan and SADC forces in securing insurgent-controlled territory demonstrated how ineffective the Mozambican response to the insurgency had been. It is these institutional issues, as well as the actions of extremist networks, which will determine how the regional threat evolves in the months and years to come. 72 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS Dhows in the port of Mocímboa da Praia, northern Mozambique. © Bert de Ruiter/Alamy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 73 For the Mozambican government: ■ Ensure stability of local governance structures and tackle the drivers of corruption and maladministration which have undermined governance in Cabo Delgado. There needs to be a sense of a governed and ordered space in which local people can rebuild their lives and futures following the conflict. ■ Improve trust between state and local populations, for example by bringing local civil society and community leaders into governance at district and provincial levels to ensure local issues, especially around service delivery, are heard and government spending is addressing local grievances. ■ Support ongoing decentralization by ensuring decision-making is about government investment in Cabo Delgado, such as through the North Integrated Development Agency, as transparent and locally based as possible. This will help to ensure that money is directed to the needs of Cabo Delgado communities, to create the conditions for economic opportunity and prosperity, and to give more legitimacy to the funding if it is not perceived as being pre-programmed in Maputo. ■ Professionalize law enforcement agencies into organizations that protect and serve the citizens of Mozambique. Reforms should focus on improving trust between local population and the state. Leadership changes are needed to create behaviour change and prevent future human rights abuses by security forces. These abuses drive insurgent recruitment. Human rights abuses that have already taken place should be investigated transparently. ■ Use specialist police teams and prosecutorial capacity in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula to tackle the illicit economies that helped create the conditions for the insurgency and drive corruption. Consider establishing targeted medium-term support partnerships with international partners to help provide the resources and capacities to achieve this, and to address the transnational nature of the criminal networks. ■ Communicate transparently about developments in Cabo Delgado and allow national, regional and international press easy access to Cabo Delgado. For SADC: ■ Support key member states to collaborate on regional threats linked to Cabo Delgado. For example, facilitate improved intelligence-sharing among SADC states and Mozambique to help counter regional trafficking routes and monitor regional extremist threats. ■ Support Mozambique to address the humanitarian crisis in northern Mozambique to ensure the immediate needs of the population (particularly women and other marginalized groups), such as safety, food security and shelter, are met. Also, support Mozambique to improve security-force relationships with local people, and to promote transparency and unimpeded press access. ■ Support Mozambique to create the changes in security-force culture and management recommended above, in order to improve security-force relationships with local people. ■ Maintain engagement with the government of Mozambique on key issues to ensure long-term stability in northern Mozambique, including human rights abuses, transparency and corruption, and to commit to improving local governance and socio-economic conditions. 74 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS For the international community: ■ Maintain engagement with the Mozambican government to address the underlying issues in northern Mozambique that led to the emergence of the conflict. In particular, the international community should focus on supporting processes that strengthen local governance systems and build institutions that are more resilient to corruption, more transparent and expose and prosecute all human rights abuses. ■ In order to address the drivers of the conflict and support ongoing decentralization in Mozambique, as far as possible development support programming and aid for the north should be decoupled from the Mozambican central government and provided directly to northern Mozambique at the provincial and district level. ■ Provide direct support to local non-government organizations and civil society groups that help communities to be resilient in the face of illicit economies and weak governance. ■ Bilateral and multilateral support to military and police training missions should be embedded in a joint strategy that aims to strengthen leadership and professionalism. Preconditions must include a clear commitment by the Mozambican government to reform the security cluster towards professional, effective and service-oriented law enforcement agencies. On behalf of civil society: ■ Mozambican civil society organizations have a critical role in monitoring the situation, reporting on human rights abuses and conducting research in very challenging circumstances and at great personal risk. They also play a critical role in developing innovative programmes and forums for debate to help resolve the conflict. This role needs to be acknowledged and supported by the Mozambican government and international community. ■ The international community and international civil society should engage and partner with local organizations to support them in their critical roles. ■ The Mozambican government should allow civil society organizations the freedom to operate and to take a meaningful role in conflict resolution and reconciliation. RECOMMENDATIONS 75 ANNEX SELECTION OF ISLAMIC STATE PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE An Al-Shabaab leader makes a speech during an attack in Quissanga, 26 March 2020, brandishing an IS flag. He calls on the community to join their fight, saying that the flag of the governing party is not accepted. Photo: Telegram 76 ‫‪hroughout the course of this research, the GI-TOC team has monitored‬‬ ‫‪publications and statements in Islamic State-run social media channels relating‬‬ ‫‪to Mozambique, primarily through encrypted platforms such as Telegram. This‬‬ ‫‪T‬‬ ‫‪annexure brings together a selection of translations of key statements issued by the‬‬ ‫‪jihadist group since June 2019, illustrating how the Islamic State (IS) central command‬‬ ‫‪– which directs its media output – has sought to present the Mozambican insurgency‬‬ ‫‪and what this reveals about its strategy and ideology.‬‬ ‫‪As previous analysis has revealed, the frequency of IS communiqués relating to‬‬ ‫‪Mozambique has waxed and waned throughout the conflict.451 A period of relative‬‬ ‫‪quiet up to November 2021 was succeeded, at the time of writing, in January 2022,‬‬ ‫‪by a flurry of reports.‬‬ ‫‪Our aim is not to present a quantitative analysis of the frequency of IS publications‬‬ ‫‪and claims of attacks but to use key publications to demonstrate the globalist narrative‬‬ ‫‪the jihadist group has sought to build around what (according to our analysis) is a‬‬ ‫‪conflict rooted in local grievances. Featured here are primarily issues of Al Nabā,‬‬ ‫‪Islamic State’s official weekly newsletter. The group issues a range of other short‬‬ ‫‪statements (circulated as jpegs), infographics and videos.‬‬ ‫‪Key document 1: Al Nabā issue 185, 6 June 2019‬‬ ‫العدد ‪185‬‬ ‫الخميس ‪ 3‬شوال ‪ 1440‬هـ‬ ‫عشرات القتلى والجرحى‬ ‫من جيشي الكونغو‬ ‫وموزمبيق‬ ‫وقوات "األمم المتحدة"‬ ‫غنائم املجاهدين إثر هجومهم عىل جيش موزمبيق‬ ‫والية وسط إفريقية‬ ‫سقط عرشات القتىل والجرحى من القوات املشرتكة لجييش‬ ‫الكونغو وموزمبيق وقوات األمم املتحدة الصليبية‪ ،‬إثر الهجمات‬ ‫التي شنها عليهم جنود الخالفة يف والية وسط إفريقية‪ ،‬إضافة إىل‬ ‫اغتنام أسلحة وذخائر متنوعة‪.‬‬ ‫فبعد التوكّل عىل الله تعاىل‪ ،‬هاجم جنود الخالفة الخميس (‪/25‬‬ ‫رمضان) ‪ 3‬ثكنات مشرتكة لجيش الكونغو وقوات من (األمم‬ ‫املتحدة) الصليبية‪ ،‬كانوا يتجهّ زون ملهاجمة مواقع املجاهدين‪،‬‬ ‫بالقرب من قرية (مفيفي) بمنطقة (بيني)‪ ،‬حيث اشتبكوا معهم‬ ‫بمختلف أنواع األسلحة‪ ،‬ما أدى لهالك وجرح العرشات منهم‪،‬‬ ‫وعاد املجاهدون إىل مواقعهم ساملني‪ ،‬ولله الحمد واملن ّة‪.‬‬ ‫ويف عملية أخرى‪ ،‬هاجم جنود الخالفة الجمعة (‪ /26‬رمضان)‬ ‫ثكنة لجيش الكونغو الصليبي يف قرية (ماكيكي) بمنطقة بيني‪،‬‬ ‫فالذ الصليبيون بالفرار‪ ،‬واغتنم املجاهدون أسلحة وذخائر‬ ‫متنوعة‪ ،‬كما اشتبكوا مع عنارص من جيش الكونغو الصليبي‬ ‫يف قرية (موسو) بمنطقة بيني‪ ،‬ما أدى إلصابة عدد منهم‪ ،‬والذ‬ ‫الصليبييون بالفرار‪.‬‬ ‫من جهة أخرى‪ ،‬وضمن غزوة االستنزاف‪ ،‬صال جنود الخالفة‬ ‫الثالثاء (‪ /1‬شوال) عىل تجمّ ع لعنارص من جيش الكونغو‬ ‫الصليبي يف قرية (روانغوا) بمنطقة بيني‪ ،‬واشتبكوا معهم‬ ‫بمختلف األسلحة‪ ،‬ما أدى لهالك وإصابة ‪ 25‬منهم والذ بقيتهم‬ ‫بالفرار‪ ،‬كما تمكّنوا من صد هجوم لعنارص من جيش موزمبيق‬ ‫الصليبي يف قرية (ميتوبي) بمنطقة (ماسيمبووا)‪ ،‬حيث اشتبكوا‬ ‫معهم بمختلف أنواع األسلحة‪ ،‬فقتلوا وأصابوا عددا منهم‪ ،‬ورد‬ ‫الله كيدهم مدحورين خائبني‪ ،‬واغتنم املجاهدون أسلحة وذخائر‬ ‫وصواريخ‪ ،‬ولله الحمد واملنة‪.‬‬ ‫وعىل صعيد آخر‪ ،‬نرش املكتب اإلعالمي صورا لغنائم مَ نّ الله بها‬ ‫عىل جنود الخالفة بعد صدهم هجوم عنارص من جيش موزمبيق‬ ‫يف قرية (ميتوبي)‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫وكان جنود الخالفة يف وسط إفريقية قد شن ّوا خالل األسبوع‬ ‫املايض هجوما عىل ثكنة لجيش الكونغو الصليبي فقتلوا وأصابوا‬ ‫عددا من جنودهم‪ ،‬واغتنموا أسلحة وذخائر متنوعة‪.‬‬ ‫بسم هللا الرحمن الرحيم‬ ‫االفتتاحية ‪3‬‬ ‫يحزنك قولهم‬ ‫فال ُ‬ ‫مثلما ابتيل األنبياء عليهم السالم باتهام املرشكني لهم بالكذب والسحر والجنون‪ ،‬يبتىل أتباعهم‬ ‫عىل أيدي الكفار واملرتدين باتهامهم بكل نقيصة‪ ،‬ليصدوا عن سبيل الله تعاىل‪ ،‬ويربروا حربهم‬ ‫للمهتدين‪ ،‬وهو ما تعرض له جنود الدولة اإلسالمية ‪-‬أعزها الله تعاىل‪ -‬منذ قيامها‪.‬‬ ‫وبدأ األمر يف العراق باتهام الدولة اإلسالمية بالغلو يف الدين والبغي عىل الفصائل‪ ،‬ليقنع قادة‬ ‫فصائل الصحوات أتباعهم أن قتالهم لها مندرج تحت قوله تعاىل‪َ { :‬ف َقا ِتلُوا ا َّلتِي تَبْغِ ي حَ تَّىٰ‬ ‫تَفِ ي َء إ َِىل ٰ أَمْ رِ اللَّهِ } [الحجرات‪ ،]9 :‬ال ضمن االتفاقيات التي عقدوها يف السجون مع الصليبيني‪،‬‬ ‫ومع الطواغيت يف دول الجوار بوساطة من علماء السوء ودعاة الفتنة‪.‬‬ ‫ثم تطور األمر يف الشام إىل اتهام الدولة اإلسالمية بالخارجيّة‪ ،‬والدعوة بذلك إىل قتالها ابتدا ًء‬ ‫واستباحة دماء جنودها كلهم‪ ،‬مسقطني ظلما وعدوانا كل اآلثار التي وردت يف الخوارج األوائل‬ ‫وحكمهم عليهم‪ ،‬كقوله عليه الصالة والسالم‪( :‬طوبى ملن قتلهم وقتلوه)‪ ،‬وقوله‪( :‬لنئ أدركتهم‬ ‫ألقتلنهم قتل عاد)‪ ،‬رغم علمهم اليقيني أن الدولة اإلسالمية ال تشابه الخوارج إال فيما شابههم‬ ‫فيه أهل السنة والجماعة من أمور مشرتكات بني الطائفتني‪ ،‬وعلمهم أن أكثر ما ألصقوه بها‬ ‫من أخبار استدلوا بها عىل أحكامهم إنما هي محض أكاذيب ليس لهم عليها دليل‪.‬‬ ‫واليوم ومع يأس مرتدي الصحوات ومن واالهم من القضاء عىل الدولة اإلسالمية بمفردهم‪،‬‬ ‫وحاجتهم يف الوقت نفسه إىل تقديم املزيد من فروض الطاعة للطواغيت والصليبيني‪ ،‬فإن‬ ‫إعالنهم التحالف الرصيح مع املرشكني يف قتال الدولة اإلسالمية يف كل من خراسان والشام‬ ‫وليبيا واليمن‪ ،‬وربما مناطق أخرى بات أمرا ملحا‪ ،‬يفرض عليهم تغيري أحكامهم بحق الدولة‬ ‫اإلسالمية‪ ،‬مع عجزهم منذ سنوات عىل إثبات جواز إعانة الكافر املحارب عىل املسلم ولو كان‬ ‫باغيا أو مبتدعا‪.‬‬ ‫وهذا التغيري يف الحكم يتجه اآلن صوب الحكم عىل الدولة اإلسالمية بأنها طائفة كفر وردّة‬ ‫ال طائفة بغي وبدعة كما كانوا يفرتون من قبل عليها‪ ،‬وهو مناسب لهم ليعلنوا أن تحالفهم‬ ‫مع الطواغيت والصليبيني ضد الدولة اإلسالمية إنما هو إعانة لكافر عىل كافر‪ ،‬وتكون هذه‬ ‫املظاهرة الرصيحة منهم للمرشكني عىل املسلمني‪ ،‬جهادا يف سبيل الله يف دينهم البدعي الذي‬ ‫يلفقه لهم علماء السوء‪ ،‬لعنهم الله وإياهم أجمعني‪ ،‬وذلك بعد سنني من التحالفات غري املعلنة‬ ‫التي كانوا يلبسونها أغطية شتى‪ ،‬لكي ال ينفضح أمرهم وينفض عنهم أتباعهم وأولياؤهم‪.‬‬ ‫كما أن االتجاه نحو إعالن تكفري الدولة اإلسالمية يهدف من خالله الطواغيت وأذنابهم من‬ ‫مرتدي الصحوات ومن واالهم إىل شق صف الدولة اإلسالمية وذلك بعد فشل كل محاوالتهم‬ ‫السابقة‪ ،‬بحمد الله ومنه‪ ،‬والتي استعملوا فيها االتهامات الظاملة بالظلم والغلو والبدعة‬ ‫وغريها‪ ،‬إذ كلها تصطدم بأمر النبي عليه الصالة والسالم بالصرب عىل األئمة ما لم يطرأ عليهم‬ ‫كفر‪ ،‬والتمسك بجماعة املسلمني ما دام لها إمام مسلم‪.‬‬ ‫وهكذا يفعل دين التجهم بأتباعه‪ ،‬فكما نجد مرتدي الصحوات ومن واالهم يغالون يف أسلمة‬ ‫الطواغيت كاملرشعني من دون الله والحاكمني بغري ما أنزل الله واملمتنعني عن أحكام رشعه‪،‬‬ ‫سنجدهم باملثل يغالون يف أحكامهم عىل من ّ‬ ‫يكفر أولئك املرشكني‪ ،‬فيتهمونهم بالخارجيّة‪،‬‬ ‫ثم يزدادون غلوا كلما اشتدت وطأة املسلمني عىل املرشكني‪ ،‬حتى يصلوا يف النهاية إىل تكفري‬ ‫املوحدين مثلما أسلموا املرشكني‪.‬‬ ‫ونبرش الكفار واملرتدين من كل طائفة أن سعيهم سيخيب ‪-‬بإذن الله تعاىل‪ -‬كما خاب من‬ ‫قبل‪ ،‬وإن كان اتهامهم للدولة اإلسالمية يف العراق بالبغي والغلو ظلما وعداونا أعقبه تمدد‬ ‫إىل الشام‪ ،‬واتهامهم لها بالبدعة والخارجية ظلما وعدوانا أعقبه فتح وتمكني ورفع لرايتها يف‬ ‫كثري من أقطار األرض‪ ،‬فإن تكفريهم لها ظلما وعدوانا سيعقبه ‪-‬بإذن الله تعاىل‪ -‬فتح أعظم‬ ‫وتمكني أرسخ وانتشار أكرب يف كل بقاع الدنيا‪ ،‬وإنا نحسب أن هذا من أعظم ما يدافع به الله‬ ‫سبحانه عن هذه الطائفة املظلومة من املؤمنني‪ ،‬كما قال تعاىل‪{ :‬إ ِنَّ ال َّل َه يُدَافِ ُع عَ ِن ا َّل ِذينَ آمَ ن ُوا‬ ‫َّان ك َُفورٍ } [الحج‪.]38 :‬‬ ‫إ ِنَّ ال َّل َه َال يُحِ بُّ ُك َّل َخو ٍ‬ ‫ونويص املؤمنني بأن ال تحزنهم هذه االفرتاءات التي يرمون بها‪ ،‬فما هي إال ابتالءات لهم‬ ‫ولغريهم‪ ،‬نسأل الله أن يجعلها كفارات لذنوبهم‪ ،‬ورفعا لقدرهم يف الدارين‪ ،‬وحسبهم أن الله‬ ‫تعاىل يعلم أنهم أبرياء منها‪ ،‬هو موالهم ونعم النصري‪ ،‬كما قال تعاىل لنبيهم‪َ { :‬ف َال يَحْ زُن َك‬ ‫ُسونَ وَمَ ا يُعْ ِلن ُونَ } [يس‪.]76 :‬‬ ‫َق ْولُهُ ْم إِن َّا ن َعْ َل ُم مَ ا ي ِ ُّ‬ ‫‪Translated relevant sections‬‬ ‫‪Headline: Dozens of dead and wounded from the Congolese,‬‬ ‫‪Mozambique armies and the ‘United Nations’ forces. The spoils of‬‬ ‫‪the Mujahideen after their attack on the Mozambican army‬‬ ‫‪… Dozens of the joint forces of the Congo and Mozambique armies and the‬‬ ‫‪United Nations Crusader forces were killed and wounded as a result of the‬‬ ‫… ‪attacks launched by the Caliphate soldiers in Central Africa‬‬ ‫‪Caliphate soldiers managed to repel an attack by members of the Crusader‬‬ ‫‪Mozambican army in the village of Metubi in Mocimboa region, where they‬‬ ‫‪clashed with them, using various types of weapons, killing and wounding a‬‬ ‫‪number of them … The Mujahideen seized weapons, ammunition and‬‬ ‫‪missiles, praise God.‬‬ ‫‪… The media office published pictures of the spoils that God bestowed on‬‬ ‫‪the soldiers of the Caliphate after they repelled the attack of the Mozambi‬‬‫‪can army in the village of Metubi, thank God.‬‬ ‫‪Commentary‬‬ ‫‪This is the first issue of Al Nabā to claim credit for an attack in‬‬ ‫‪Mozambique. From the outset, the jihadists report on attacks in Congo‬‬ ‫‪and Mozambique together, presenting a united front of what they‬‬ ‫‪claim as their ‘Central Africa Province’. The reference to opposing‬‬ ‫‪forces as ‘Crusader(s)’ – thereby casting the modern conflict as a‬‬ ‫‪centuries-long struggle between Islamic and Christian traditions – is common in IS publications.‬‬ ‫‪The account of the attack given here appears to be inaccurate, as the village named is not in the‬‬ ‫‪Mocímboa da Praia district but elsewhere in Cabo Delgado.‬‬ ‫‪77‬‬ ‫‪ANNEX – SELECTION OF ISLAMIC STATE PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE‬‬ ‫‪Key document 2: Al Nabā issue 204, 17 October 2019‬‬ ‫‪Translated relevant sections‬‬ ‫‪4‬‬ ‫‪Headline: Repelled attack by the Mozambican and Russian armies,‬‬ ‫‪killing and wounding a number of them in Central Africa‬‬ ‫أخبــار‬ ‫العدد ‪204‬‬ ‫الخميس ‪ 18‬صفر ‪ 1441‬هـ‬ ‫دمروا وأعطبوا ‪ 10‬آليات لهم‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫جنود الخالفة يوقعون ‪49‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫قتيال وجريحاً‬ ‫والحشدين والشرطة‬ ‫من الجيش‬ ‫ْ‬ ‫االتحادية في ديالى‬ ‫‪… With the help of God Almighty, the Caliphate soldiers in Central Africa‬‬ ‫‪repelled an attack launched on their positions by the Mozambican‬‬ ‫‪Crusader army in cooperation with the Crusader Russian army in the region‬‬ ‫‪of Cabo Delgado in the village of Mbau.‬‬ ‫‪A secure source told Al-Nabā that a number of soldiers of the Mozambican‬‬ ‫‪and Russian armies launched a joint attack on the positions of the‬‬ ‫‪Mujahideen in the Cabo Delgado region on Sunday 13 October, where the‬‬ ‫‪Mujahideen clashed with them with various types of weapons, which led to‬‬ ‫‪the Crusaders fleeing, leaving weapons behind and miscellaneous‬‬ ‫‪ammunition.‬‬ ‫والية العراق ‪ -‬ديالى‬ ‫قتل وأصاب جنود الخالفة‬ ‫خاص‬ ‫يف دياىل خالل األسبوع‬ ‫الحايل ‪ 49‬عنرصا من الحشد والجيش‬ ‫الرافضيني والرشطة االتحادية‬ ‫والحشد العشائري املرتدين بينهم‬ ‫‪ 6‬عنارص من الكاكائيني الكافرين‪،‬‬ ‫إضافة إىل تدمري وإعطاب ‪ 10‬آليات‬ ‫بينها عربتي (همر)‪.‬‬ ‫وتفصيالً وبحسب مصدر أمني لـ‬ ‫(النبأ)‪ ،‬فقد كمن جنود الخالفة‪،‬‬ ‫االثنني (‪ /8‬صفر)‪ ،‬ملوكب للحشد‬ ‫الرافيض املرتد عىل طريق (بلدروز‪-‬‬ ‫كركوش)‪ ،‬حيث تم استهدافه‬ ‫‪The source indicated that the clashes led to the killing of a number of‬‬ ‫‪soldiers and the wounding of many others, in addition to the capture of‬‬ ‫‪one member, praise God.‬‬ ‫باألسلحة القناصة والقنابل اليدوية‪،‬‬ ‫مما أدى إىل إعطاب ‪ 4‬آليات ومقتل ‪3‬‬ ‫وإصابة رابع‪.‬‬ ‫وقال املصدر إنه وعند قدوم آلية‬ ‫رباعية الدفع ملؤازرة املوكب الذي‬ ‫وقع يف كمني جنود الدولة اإلسالمية‪،‬‬ ‫تم استهدافها أيضا بمختلف أنواع‬ ‫األسلحة‪ ،‬ما أدى إىل إعطابها ومقتل‬ ‫وإصابة ‪ 7‬عنارص كانوا عىل متنها‪،‬‬ ‫ولله الحمد واملن ّة‪.‬‬ ‫ويف اليوم نفسه‪ ،‬فجّ ر جنود الخالفة‬ ‫عبوة ناسفة عىل عربة (همر) للجيش‬ ‫الرافيض يف منطقة (الندا) ما أدى إىل‬ ‫تدمريها ومقتل عنرص وإصابة ثالثة‬ ‫آخرين كانوا عىل متنها‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫إىل ذلك‪ ،‬ويف يوم (االثنني) أيضا ً‪،‬‬ ‫استهدفت إحدى مفارز القنص‬ ‫لجنود الدولة اإلسالمية رسية‬ ‫للجيش الرافيض املرتد قرب جس‬ ‫(حلوان) غرب (خانقني)‪ ،‬ما أدى‬ ‫إلصابة ‪ 3‬عنارص بجروح متفاوتة‪.‬‬ ‫ويف يوم الخميس (‪ /11‬صفر)‬ ‫استهدف جنود الخالفة ثكنة‬ ‫للرشطة املحلية املرتدة باألسلحة‬ ‫القناصة عىل أطراف منطقة (منديل)‬ ‫رشق (بلدروز) ما أدى لهالك عنرص‬ ‫وإصابة آخر‪.‬‬ ‫وقال مصدر أمني لـ (النبأ) إنه‬ ‫وعند قدوم املرتدين لنجدة إخوانهم‬ ‫استهدف املجاهدون آلية رباعية‬ ‫صد هجوم للجيشين الموزمبيقي والروسي وقتل‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫وإصابة عدد منهم وسط إفريقية‬ ‫‪Commentary‬‬ ‫‪In this publication, IS reports on clashes between al-Shabaab militants,‬‬ ‫‪Mozambican forces and the Wagner Group mercenaries who, in this‬‬ ‫‪earlier stage of the conflict, were contracted by the Mozambican‬‬ ‫‪government to suppress the insurgency.‬‬ ‫إفريقية هجوما شن ّه عىل مواقعهم‬ ‫والية وسط إفريقية‬ ‫الجيش املوزمبيقي الصليبي بالتعاون‬ ‫بتوفيق الله تعاىل‪ ،‬ص ّد مع الجيش الرويس الصليبي يف منطقة‬ ‫خاص جنود الخالفة يف وسط (كابو ديلغاد) يف قرية (مباو)‪.‬‬ ‫وقال مصدر أمني لـ (النبأ) إن‬ ‫عددا من جنود الجيشني املوزمبيقي‬ ‫والرويس شن َّا‪ ،‬األحد (‪ /15‬صفر)‬ ‫هجوما مشرتكا عىل مواقع املجاهدين‬ ‫الدفع تحمل عىل متنها ‪ 8‬مرتدين‬ ‫بتفجري عبوة ناسفة ما أدى لتدمريها‬ ‫واحرتاقها بالكامل‪ ،‬كما استهدف‬ ‫املجاهدون بقية الرتل بسالح القنص‬ ‫والقنابل اليدوية ما أدى لهالك ‪9‬‬ ‫عنارص بينهم ضابط برتبة (مقدم)‪،‬‬ ‫ولله الفضل عىل توفيقه‪.‬‬ ‫كما أعطبوا‪ ،‬السبت (‪ /13‬صفر)‬ ‫آلية للحشد الرافيض املرتد يف منطقة‬ ‫(علياوة) غرب (خانقني) بتفجري‬ ‫عبوة ناسفة‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫يف حني فجّ روا‪ ،‬االثنني (‪ /15‬صفر)‬ ‫بفضل الله تعاىل‪ ،‬عبوة ناسفة عىل‬ ‫آلية أخرى تُق ّل عددا من عنارص‬ ‫الرشطة االتحادية والحشد العشائري‬ ‫املرتدين يف قرية (اإلصالح) شمال‬ ‫(جلوالء)‪ ،‬ما أدى إلعطابها وإصابة‬ ‫‪ 5‬عنارص بجروح‪ ،‬نسأل الله ان‬ ‫يُعجل بهالكهم‪.‬‬ ‫ويف عملية أخرى يف اليوم نفسه‪،‬‬ ‫استهدف جنود الخالفة عنارص‬ ‫من الطائفة (الكاكائية) الكافرة يف‬ ‫منطقة (علياوة) غرب (خانقني)‪،‬‬ ‫باألسلحة الخفيفة‪ ،‬ما أدى لهالك‬ ‫‪ 6‬عنارص منهم‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪ ،‬كما‬ ‫استهدفوا منازل الطائفة الكاكائية‬ ‫الكافرة يف املنطقة نفسها‪ ،‬بعرش‬ ‫قذائف هاون‪ ،‬وكانت اإلصابة‬ ‫محققة‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫ويف يوم األربعاء (‪ /17‬صفر)‬ ‫وبفضل الله تعاىل‪ ،‬فجّ ر جنود‬ ‫الخالفة عبوة ناسفة عىل عربة‬ ‫(همر) للحشد الرافيض املرتد يف‬ ‫منطقة (علياوة) غرب (خانقني)‪ ،‬ما‬ ‫أدى إلعطابها وهالك عنرص كان عىل‬ ‫متنها‪ ،‬ولله الحمد واملن ّة‪.‬‬ ‫يذكر أن ‪ 4‬عنارص من رشطة حماية‬ ‫املنشآت النفطية ورشطة حرس‬ ‫الحدود قتلوا خالل األسبوع املايض‬ ‫إثر استهدافهم من قبل مفارز‬ ‫القنص يف دياىل‪.‬‬ ‫ديلغاد)‪ ،‬حيث‬ ‫معهم بمختلف‬ ‫أدى إىل فرار‬ ‫وراءهم أسلحة‬ ‫يف منطقة (كابو‬ ‫اشتبك املجاهدون‬ ‫أنواع األسلحة‪ ،‬ما‬ ‫الصليبيني تاركني‬ ‫وذخائر متنوعة‪.‬‬ ‫وأشار املصدر إىل أن االشتباكات أدت‬ ‫إىل قتل عدد من الجنود وجرح الكثري‬ ‫منهم‪ ،‬إضافة إىل أرس أحدهم‪ ،‬ولله‬ ‫الحمد واملنة‪.‬‬ ‫‪Key document 3: Al Nabā issue 227, 26 March 2020‬‬ ‫‪Translated relevant sections‬‬ ‫‪6‬‬ ‫‪Headline: Dozens from the police and army dead or wounded in a‬‬ ‫‪massive attack by the Caliphate soldiers in Mozambique‬‬ ‫أخبــار‬ ‫العدد ‪٢٢7‬‬ ‫الخميس ‪ ٢‬شعبان ‪ 1441‬هـ‬ ‫عشرات القتلى والجرحى من الشرطة والجيش بهجوم‬ ‫واسع لجنود الخالفة في موزمبيق‬ ‫والية وسط إفريقية‬ ‫‪… Dozens of the Crusader Mozambican police and army members were‬‬ ‫‪killed, and others were wounded in a massive attack launched by the‬‬ ‫‪Islamic State soldiers in a coastal town in Cabo Delgado region in‬‬ ‫‪north-eastern Mozambique. They also burned two army barracks and a‬‬ ‫‪number of vehicles in another attack in Quissanga region.‬‬ ‫ُقتل العرشات من عنارص الرشطة‬ ‫الصليبي‬ ‫املوزمبيقي‬ ‫والجيش‬ ‫وأصيب آخرون بهجوم واسع شن َّه‬ ‫عليهم جنو ُد الدولة اإلسالمية يف بلدة‬ ‫ساحلية يف منطقة (كابو ديلغادو)‬ ‫شمال رشقي موزمبيق‪ ،‬كما أحرقوا‬ ‫ثكنتني للجيش وعدد ا ً من آلياته‬ ‫بهجوم آخر يف منطقة (كيسانغا)‪.‬‬ ‫عشرات القتلى والجرحى‬ ‫بهجوم واسع‬ ‫‪Dozens dead and wounded in massive attack‬‬ ‫ويف التفاصيل‪ ،‬بتوفيق الله تعاىل‪،‬‬ ‫هاجم جنو ُد الخالفة يوم االثنني‬ ‫(‪ /28‬رجب) ‪ 5‬مواقع يتمركز فيها‬ ‫عنارص الرشطة والجيش املوزمبيقي‬ ‫الصليبي يف بلدة (موكيمبوا دا برايا)‬ ‫الساحلية بمنطقة (كابو ديلغادو)‪،‬‬ ‫حيث دارت اشتباكات بمختلف أنواع‬ ‫األسلحة‪ ،‬ما أدى ملقتل وإصابة‬ ‫العرشات منهم‪ ،‬فيما الذ بقيتهم‬ ‫‪In detail, by the grace of God almighty, on Monday (23.03.2020) the‬‬ ‫‪Caliphate soldiers attacked five locations where the Mozambican Crusader‬‬ ‫‪police and army were stationed, in the coastal town of Mocímboa da Praia‬‬ ‫‪in Cabo Delgado region, where clashes took place with various types of‬‬ ‫‪weapons, which led to the death and injury of dozens, while the rest fled.‬‬ ‫‪The Mujahideen seized a large quantity of weapons, ammunition, equipment‬‬ ‫‪and a number of vehicles before returning to their positions safely, praise‬‬ ‫‪God. The next day, Amaq news agency [IS media] published videotape‬‬ ‫‪showing some of the dead Crusaders and the quantities of weapons and‬‬ ‫‪ammunition seized by the Mujahideen in the attack, thank God.‬‬ ‫والية الشام ‪ -‬الخير‬ ‫استهدف جنو ُد الخالفة يف الخري‬ ‫خاص‬ ‫مقرا ً الستخبارات الـ ‪PKK‬‬ ‫املرتدين وأحرقوا برئ نفط لهم بالقذائف‬ ‫الصاروخية‪ ،‬كما قنصوا عنرصا ً منهم‬ ‫وقتلوا ساحرا ً بعمليات متفرقة‪.‬‬ ‫الجنوب مبارشة من موقع مرشوعات‬ ‫للغاز بقيمة ‪ 60‬مليار دوالر" ترعاها‬ ‫رشكات صليبية كبرية منها رشكة‬ ‫"إكسون موبيل" األمريكية ورشكة‬ ‫"توتال" الفرنسية‪.‬‬ ‫خاص‬ ‫مهاجمة وإحراق ثكنتين‬ ‫ويف هجوم آخر يوم األربعاء (‪/1‬‬ ‫شعبان) هاجم جنو ُد الخالفة‬ ‫ثكنتني للجيش املوزمبيقي يف منطقة‬ ‫(كيسانغا)‪ ،‬فالذوا بالفرار‪ ،‬وأحرق‬ ‫جنود الخالفة يتجولون داخل البلدة التي تمت مهاجمتها‬ ‫املجاهدون الثكنتني وعدد ا ً من‬ ‫بالفرار‪ ،‬واغتنم املجاهدون كمية العنكبوتية مشاهد الحرتاق مواقع اآلليات‪ ،‬واغتنموا أسلحة وذخائر‬ ‫كبرية من األسلحة والذخائر واملعدات وآليات الرشطة والجيش املوزمبيقي متنوعة‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫وعددا ً من اآلليات‪ ،‬قبل أن يعودوا إىل وسط البلدة التي قالت وسائل إعالم‬ ‫الهجمات األخيرة‬ ‫العدو إن املجاهدين "سيطروا فيها‬ ‫مواقعهم ساملني‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫ويف اليوم التايل‪ ،‬نرشت وكالة أعماق عىل بعض املناطق والثكنات العسكرية وكان جنود الخالفة يف وسط إفريقية‬ ‫ً‬ ‫رشيطا ً مصور ا ً يُظهر جانبا ً من قتىل لفرتة قصرية" قبل أن ينسحبوا منها‪ .‬قد قتلوا ‪ 20‬عنرص ا من الجيش‬ ‫الصليبيني وكميات من األسلحة وحول وقع الهجوم‪ ،‬قال ناطق الكونغويل وأصابوا آخرين الشهر‬ ‫والذخائر التي اغتنمها املجاهدون يف الحكومة املوزمبيقية "إن املهاجمني املايض‪ ،‬واغتنموا كمية كبرية من‬ ‫خلَّفوا وراءهم بعد انسحابهم سيالً األسلحة والذخائر يف اشتباك بمنطقة‬ ‫الهجوم‪ ،‬بفضل الله تعاىل‪.‬‬ ‫(بيني) رشقي (الكونغو)‪ ،‬بينما قتلوا‬ ‫من الدمار والجثث"‪.‬‬ ‫أصداء الهجوم‬ ‫كما َّ‬ ‫نواقيس الخطر عند ‪ 12‬عنرص ا ً من الجيش املوزمبيقي‬ ‫دق الهجو ُم‬ ‫َ‬ ‫وأظهرت صور انترشت عىل الشبكة الصليبيني كونه وقع "بمنطقة إىل بكمني مسلح يف قرية رشقي موزمبيق‪.‬‬ ‫استهداف مقر وإحراق بئر نفط‬ ‫للـ ‪ PKK‬ومقتل عنصر وساحر بعمليات‬ ‫متفرقة في الخير‬ ‫استهداف مقر وبئر نفط‬ ‫املرتدين يف بلدة (السوسة)‪ ،‬بقذيفة‬ ‫للـ ‪PKK‬‬ ‫صاروخية‪ ،‬ما أدى لحدوث أرضار مادية‬ ‫وتفصيالً‪ ،‬بتوفيق الله تعاىل‪ ،‬استهدف فيه‪ ،‬ويف هجوم مشابه يف اليوم التايل‪ ،‬قال‬ ‫خاص لـ (النبأ) إن جنود الخالفة‬ ‫جنو ُد الخالفة يوم الخميس (‪ /24‬مصد ٌر‬ ‫ٌ‬ ‫رجب) مقرا ً الستخبارات الـ‪ PKK‬استهدفوا برئ نفط يف بلدة (العزبة)‪،‬‬ ‫قتلى وجرحى من الـ ‪ PKK‬بتفجير‬ ‫آلية لهم غربي الرقة‬ ‫والية الشام ‪ -‬الرقة‬ ‫بتوفيق الله تعاىل‪ ،‬استهدف جنو ُد الخالفة يوم االثنني (‪ /28‬رجب) آلية رباعية الدفع‬ ‫للـ‪ PKK‬املرتدين بالقرب من قرية (السلحبية) غربي الرقة‪ ،‬ما أدى لتدمريها ومقتل‬ ‫وإصابة من كان عىل متنها‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫‪Attack Echoes‬‬ ‫بقذيفة صاروخية‪ ،‬ما أدى الحرتاقه‬ ‫واشتعال النريان فيه‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫عىل صعيد آخر‪ ،‬استهدف جنو ُد‬ ‫الخالفة يف اليوم نفسه‪ ،‬عنرص ا ً من‬ ‫الـ ‪ PKK‬يف بلدة (الجرذي) بأسلحة‬ ‫القنص ما أدى ملقتله‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫ويف عملية أخرى يوم االثنني (‪/28‬‬ ‫رجب) داهم جنو ُد الخالفة منزل‬ ‫ساحر يف بلدة (سويدان)‪ ،‬وقتلوه‬ ‫بكاتم للصوت‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫األسبوع الماضي‬ ‫وكان جنود الخالفة قد َأرسوا وقتلوا‬ ‫األسبوع املايض ‪ 3‬جواسيس للـ ‪PKK‬‬ ‫املرتدين‪ ،‬وقتلوا عنرصا ً منهم وأصابوا‬ ‫آخر‪ ،‬كما أحرقوا آليتني وفجّ روا منزل‬ ‫(قيادي) بعمليات أمنية يف مناطق الخري‪.‬‬ ‫اغتيال عنصرين من الـ ‪ PKK‬بنيران‬ ‫جنود الخالفة جنوبي البركة‬ ‫والية الشام ‪ -‬البركة‬ ‫بتوفيق الله تعاىل‪ ،‬استهدف جنو ُد الخالفة يوم األحد (‪ /27‬رجب)‬ ‫عنرصين من الـ‪ PKK‬املرتدين يف قرية (الساجية) بمنطقة (الشدادي)‬ ‫جنوبي الربكة‪ ،‬باألسلحة الرشاشة‪ ،‬ما أدى ملقتلهما‪ ،‬واغتنام سالحيهما‪،‬‬ ‫ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫‪Pictures showed up on the web of Mozambican police and army positions‬‬ ‫‪and vehicles being burned in the middle of the town where the enemy media stated that the Mujahi‬‬‫‪deen were able to take control of the military barracks for a short period before they withdrew from it.‬‬ ‫‪On the occurrence of the attack, the Mozambican government spokesman stated, ‘the attackers left‬‬ ‫‪behind after their withdrawal a torrent of destruction and corpses’.‬‬ ‫‪The attack also sounded the Crusaders’ alarm bells, as it took place in the south area directly across‬‬ ‫‪the way from the gas project site worth 60 billion dollars sponsored by large Crusader companies‬‬ ‫‪including the American company Exxon Mobil and the French company Total.‬‬ ‫‪THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS‬‬ ‫•‬ ‫‪INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION‬‬ ‫‪78‬‬ ‫‪Commentary‬‬ ‫‪This attack, in March 2020 on Mocímboa da Praia, during which al-Shabaab militants briefly‬‬ ‫‪occupied the town and targeted military buildings, was seen at the time as a significant escala‬‬‫‪tion of the conflict. It was the first in a series of attacks on the town before the insurgents later‬‬ ‫‪occupied it for several months.‬‬ ‫‪This publication contains an early example of a theme that is repeated frequently in later‬‬ ‫‪publications, where IS directly reports on (and, in a way, celebrates) the international attention its‬‬ ‫‪attacks in Mozambique are generating, attributing it to international political and business‬‬ ‫‪interest in the gas fields in Cabo Delgado.‬‬ ‫‪It is one of several publications released by Islamic State reporting on the series of attacks on‬‬ ‫‪Mocímboa da Praia that preceded the major attack, in which insurgents took full control of the‬‬ ‫‪town for several months. The focus on this particular town suggests that Islamic State Central‬‬ ‫‪views this achievement as a significant sign of its progress in Mozambique. The descriptions of‬‬ ‫‪Mocímboa da Praia in other publications suggest that it was considered significant because of‬‬ ‫‪the international impact of the takeover of the town rather than because of its strategic‬‬ ‫‪importance to the Mozambican insurgents in their efforts to extend their territory.‬‬ ‫‪Key document 4: Al Nabā issue 231, 23 April 2020‬‬ ‫العدد‬ ‫الخميس‪ 30٢31‬شعبان ‪ 1441‬هـ أخبــار‬ ‫للجيش النيجريي يف مدينة (غيدان)‬ ‫بمنطقة (يوبي)‪ ،‬حيث دارت‬ ‫اشتباكات بمختلف أنواع األسلحة‪ ،‬ما‬ ‫أدى ملقتل عنرصين وإصابة آخرين‪،‬‬ ‫فيما الذ بقيتهم بالفرار‪ ،‬وأحرق‬ ‫املجاهدون ‪ 3‬آليات واغتنموا أسلحة‬ ‫وذخائر متنوعة‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫النيجريي فقتلوا من فيها‪ ،‬إثر باألسلحة الرشاشة‪ ،‬ما أدى إلعطاب‬ ‫استهدافها بعبوة ناسفة قرب بلدة أحدهما ومقتل ‪ 4‬عنارص ْ‬ ‫وأرس عنرص‬ ‫(بوني يادي) بمنطقة (يوبي)‪ ،‬ولله خامس‪ ،‬واغتنام أسلحة وذخائر‬ ‫الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫متنوعة‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫أسير و‪ 4‬قتلى من الجيش‬ ‫التشادي‬ ‫وعىل صعيد الحرب مع الجيش‬ ‫تدمير رابع مدرعة للجيش‬ ‫التشادي املرتد‪ ،‬هاجم جنود الخالفة‪،‬‬ ‫النيجيري‬ ‫يوم الجمعة‪ ،‬قاربني محمّ لني بعنارص‬ ‫ويف اليوم التايل‪ ،‬الثالثاء‪ ،‬دمّ ر من الجيش التشادي يف بلدتي (غبوا)‬ ‫املجاهدون مدرعة رابعة للجيش و(ليرتي) يف منطقة (بحرية تشاد)‪،‬‬ ‫الهجمات األخيرة‬ ‫يذكر أن جنود الخالفة شن َّوا يف‬ ‫األسابيع املاضية هجومني منفصلني‬ ‫عىل قوات من جيش وحكومة النيجر‬ ‫يف منطقة (تيالبريي) الحدودية جنوب‬ ‫غربي النيجر‪ ،‬وأسفر الهجومان عن‬ ‫مقتل وإصابة أكثر من ‪ 30‬عنرص ا ً‬ ‫والية وسط إفريقية‬ ‫قتل جنود الخالفة ‪ 3‬من الجيش‬ ‫الكونغويل بمنطقة (بيني) رشقي‬ ‫الكونغو‪ ،‬يف حني أسقطوا طائرة‬ ‫مروحية للجيش املوزمبيقي بمنطقة‬ ‫(كابو ديلغادو) رشقي موزمبيق‪.‬‬ ‫مقتل ‪ 3‬من الجيش شرقي‬ ‫الكونغو‬ ‫األسبوع الماضي‬ ‫حطام الطائرة بعد إسقاطها عىل أيدي املجاهدين‬ ‫إسقاط طائرة للجيش‬ ‫الخالفة تمكنوا يف يوم األربعاء‬ ‫الموزمبيقي‬ ‫(‪ /15‬شعبان) من إسقاط طائرة‬ ‫ويف موزمبيق‪ ،‬قال مصدر مروحية من نوع (هيلكوبرت) للجيش‬ ‫خاص خاص لـ (النبأ) إن جنود املوزمبيقي عقب هجومهم عىل قرية‬ ‫قتيال من الجيش الفلبيني باشتبااكت جديدة‬ ‫‪16‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫مع جنود الخالفة في "شرق آسيا"‬ ‫والية شرق آسيا‬ ‫ُقتل ‪ 16‬عنرصا ً من الجيش الفلبيني وأصيب‬ ‫آخرون‪ ،‬يف اشتباكات جديدة مع مجاهدي الدولة‬ ‫اإلسالمية يف قرية بجزيرة (جولو) جنوبي الفلبني‪.‬‬ ‫واندلعت االشتباكات مساء يوم الخميس (‪/23‬‬ ‫شعبان) يف قرية (داناغ)‪ ،‬بمختلف أنواع األسلحة‪،‬‬ ‫واستمرت حتى صباح اليوم التايل‪ ،‬الجمعة‪،‬‬ ‫وأسفرت عن مقتل ‪ 6‬من عنارص الجيش الفلبيني‬ ‫وإصابة آخرين‪ .‬كما تجددت االشتباكات العنيفة‬ ‫عرص اليوم نفسه‪ ،‬لتسفر عن مقتل ‪ 10‬عنارص‬ ‫آخرين بخالف الجرحى‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫االشتباكات األخيرة‬ ‫وأصيب آخرون بهجوم عىل ثكنة لهم‬ ‫يف (كادماري)‪ ،‬يف حني ُقتل وأصيب‬ ‫عدد من عنارص الجيش التشادي‬ ‫بهجوم آخر عىل مقر لهم قرب بحرية‬ ‫(تشاد)‪.‬‬ ‫بمنطقة (كيسانغا) يف (كابو ديلغادو)‬ ‫شمال رشقي موزمبيق‪.‬‬ ‫وأوضح املصدر أن املجاهدين استهدفوا‬ ‫الطائرة باألسلحة املتوسطة خالل‬ ‫محاولتها قصف تمركزاتهم أثناء‬ ‫جمعهم الغنائم واستعدادهم لالنسحاب‬ ‫عقب الهجوم‪ ،‬ما أدى الصابتها بشكل‬ ‫مبارش وسقوطها عىل مسافة بعيدة من‬ ‫مواقع املجاهدين‪ ،‬إال أنهم تمكنوا من‬ ‫اللحاق بها والوصول إىل مكان سقوطها‪،‬‬ ‫ولفت املصدر إىل أن قائد الطائرة كان قد‬ ‫قفز منها قبل سقوطها‪.‬‬ ‫ونرشت وكالة أعماق الحقا ً رشيطا ً‬ ‫مصورا ً يظهر حطام الطائرة وتجمع‬ ‫املجاهدين حولها‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫مقتل ‪ 3‬من الجيش الكونغولي وإسقاط‬ ‫طائرة مروحية للجيش الموزمبيقي‬ ‫وتفصيالً‪ ،‬بتوفيق الله تعاىل‪ ،‬اشتبك‬ ‫جنود الخالفة يوم األربعاء (‪/22‬‬ ‫شعبان) مع عنارص من الجيش‬ ‫الكونغويل الصليبي يف قرية (تاريي)‬ ‫بمنطقة (بيني) رشقي (الكونغو)‪ ،‬ما‬ ‫أدى ملقتل ‪ 3‬عنارص منهم‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬ ‫منهم‪ ،‬والسيطرة عىل ثكنة للدرك‬ ‫الوثني واغتنام عدة آليات‪ ،‬وتحرير‬ ‫عدد من أرسى عوام املسلمني‪ ،‬ومن‬ ‫ثم االنحياز من املنطقة برغم تدخل‬ ‫الطريان الصليبي الذي تصدى له‬ ‫املجاهدون باألسلحة الثقيلة‪ ،‬كما‬ ‫ُقتل ‪ 6‬من عنارص الجيش النيجريي‬ ‫وكان جنود الخالفة قد قتلوا عنرصين‬ ‫من الجيش الكونغويل واغتنموا منهم‬ ‫بندقية رشاشة وذخائر أخرى‪ ،‬بعد‬ ‫اشتباك يف قرية (إندوما) بمنطقة (بيني)‬ ‫رشقي (الكونغو)‪.‬‬ ‫‪Headline: 3 Congolese army members killed and Mozambican army‬‬ ‫‪helicopter shot down‬‬ ‫‪A special source told Al-Nabā that the Caliphate soldiers managed to shoot‬‬ ‫‪a plane on Wednesday (08.04.2020) in Mozambique, after their attack in‬‬ ‫‪Quissanga, Cabo Delgado, in north-eastern Mozambique. The source‬‬ ‫‪explained that the Mujahideen targeted the plane with medium-range‬‬ ‫‪weapons while it was trying to bomb their position as they were collecting‬‬ ‫‪ammunition and preparing to withdraw after the attack. This led to a direct‬‬ ‫‪hit that fell not far from the Mujahideen’s position, so they were able to‬‬ ‫‪reach it. The source also pointed out that the pilot had jumped from the‬‬ ‫‪plane before its fall. Amaq news agency later published a videotape‬‬ ‫‪showing the wreckage of the plane and the gathering of the Mujahideen‬‬ ‫‪around it. Thank the God almighty.‬‬ ‫‪ 3‬قتلى وجرحى من (الحوثة)‬ ‫المشركين بنيران قناصة الدولة‬ ‫اإلسالمية في (قيفة)‬ ‫والية اليمن ‪ -‬البيضاء‬ ‫يشار إىل أن اشتباكات مماثلة وقعت الشهر املايض‬ ‫وتحديد ا ً يف يومي "السابع" و"الحادي عرش"‬ ‫من شهر (رجب) يف قرى‪( :‬ساتان) و(سلمان)‬ ‫بمنطقة (ماغويندناو) وأسفرت عن سقوط‬ ‫‪ 43‬قتيالً من الجيش الفلبيني بينهم (ضابط)‬ ‫واغتنام ‪ 3‬بنادق آلية‪ ،‬كما ُقتل ‪ 10‬آخرون منهم‬ ‫يف اشتباكات أخرى اندلعت يوم "التاسع عرش"‬ ‫من الشهر ذاته‪ ،‬يف قرية (إيغاسان) بمنطقة‬ ‫(باتيكول) جنوبي الفلبني‪.‬‬ ‫‪Translated relevant sections‬‬ ‫بتوفيق الله تعاىل‪ ،‬استهدف قناص ٌة من مجاهدي‬ ‫الدولة اإلسالمية يوم األربعاء (‪ /22‬شعبان)‬ ‫عنارص من (الحوثة) املرشكني يف موقع (دحّ ان)‬ ‫بمنطقة (الظهرة) يف (قيفة) وسط اليمن‪ ،‬ما أدى‬ ‫ملقتل عنرص منهم وإصابة اثنني آخرين‪ ،‬ونرش‬ ‫املكتب اإلعالمي الحقا ً يوم السبت‪ ،‬صورا ً تظهر‬ ‫مقتل العنرص وسقوطه من أعىل الجبل‪ ،‬ولله‬ ‫الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫‪Commentary‬‬ ‫‪This report is a typical example of the way in which Al Nabā‬‬ ‫‪publications report on attacks claimed by IS in Mozambique, detailing‬‬ ‫‪the location and number of deaths of enemy soldiers as well as assets‬‬ ‫‪seized. These may also be shared in images and videos on social media.‬‬ ‫‪The helicopter referred to here was provided by Dyck Advisory Group,‬‬ ‫‪a South African private military company contracted by the‬‬ ‫‪Mozambican government following the withdrawal of Wagner Group, a Russian private military‬‬ ‫‪group, which incurred heavy losses. As reported here, footage of the insurgents around the‬‬ ‫‪crashed helicopter was released on social media.‬‬ ‫‪79‬‬ ‫‪ANNEX – SELECTION OF ISLAMIC STATE PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE‬‬ ‫‪Key document 5: Al Nabā issue 241, 2 July 2020‬‬ ‫‪Translated relevant sections‬‬ ‫بسم هللا الرحمن الرحيم‬ ‫!‪Headline: Crusaders risk their investments in Mozambique‬‬ ‫‪… Whoever follows the various media’s coverage of news about the battles‬‬ ‫‪of the Caliphate soldiers against the Crusader Mozambican army will find‬‬ ‫‪that the focus is almost limited to the importance of the sites of these‬‬ ‫‪battles near the huge gas fields in which the Crusader oil companies have‬‬ ‫‪invested billions of dollars, and everything else is not important for the‬‬ ‫‪infidel ‘Non-Muslim’ countries nor for their media.‬‬ ‫من يتابع تغطية وسائل اإلعالم املختلفة‬ ‫ألخبار معارك جنود الخالفة ضد‬ ‫الجيش املوزمبيقي الصليبي‪ ،‬يجد أن‬ ‫الرتكيز يكاد ينحرص بأهمية مواقع هذه‬ ‫املعارك قرب حقول الغاز الضخمة التي‬ ‫استثمرت فيها رشكاتُ النفط الصليبية‬ ‫مليارات الدوالرات‪ ،‬وما سوى ذلك ليس‬ ‫مهما ً للدول الكافرة وال إلعالمها‪.‬‬ ‫فهذه املنطقة التي كانت وال تزال‬ ‫تحت نفوذ دولة الربتغال الصليبية‬ ‫التي خرجت منها قبل نصف قرن‪،‬‬ ‫وتحكمها اليوم عصاب ٌة متجرب ٌة من‬ ‫مالحدة الشيوعية؛ ليس فيها ما يه ّم‬ ‫الصليبيني غري احتياطاتها الكبرية‬ ‫من الثروات الباطنية املختلفة والتي‬ ‫تتشارك االستثمار فيها رشكاتٌ‬ ‫أمريكية وفرنسية وجنوب إفريقية‪،‬‬ ‫وتطمح رشكاتٌ روسية وصينية ألن‬ ‫قدم فيها أيضا ً‪.‬‬ ‫تجد لنفسها موطئ ٍ‬ ‫وعىل مدى قرون من الزمان‪ ،‬سام‬ ‫الصليبيون واملالحدة الشيوعيون‬ ‫املسلمني يف تلك الديار سوء العذاب‪،‬‬ ‫وأكرهوا قسما ً كبريا ً عىل ترك دينهم‪،‬‬ ‫ولم يتوقف ذلك اإلجرام حتى بعد نهاية‬ ‫الحكم الربتغايل واستيالء العصابة‬ ‫الشيوعية عىل الحكم‪ ،‬وكحال املسلمني‬ ‫يف كل مكان كانت جرائم الكافرين يف‬ ‫موزمبيق بحقهم نسيا ً منسيا ً؛ حتى‬ ‫أعلنت ثل ٌة من املجاهدين فيها انضمامها‬ ‫إىل جماعة املسلمني‪ ،‬ورفعت راية الدولة‬ ‫اإلسالمية يف تلك البقاع‪ ،‬ورأى العال ُم‬ ‫فرحة الناس هناك بتنكيل املجاهدين‬ ‫يف أعداء اإلسالم‪ ،‬عندها فقط انتبه‬ ‫‪… For centuries the Crusaders and communist atheists oppressed Muslims‬‬ ‫‪and forced a large part of them to leave their religion, and that crime did‬‬ ‫‪not stop even after the end of the Portuguese rule and the communist‬‬ ‫‪gang’s seizure of power, and like Muslims everywhere, the crimes of the‬‬ ‫‪infidels in Mozambique were forgotten, until a group of Mujahideen‬‬ ‫‪announced that they were joining the Muslim community. The banner‬‬ ‫‪[flag] of the Islamic State was raised in those spots and the world saw the‬‬ ‫‪people’s joy there over the Mujahideen’s abuse of the enemies of Islam.‬‬ ‫‪Only then did the Crusaders realise that the continuation of the‬‬ ‫‪communist government’s crimes against the Muslims had opened the door‬‬ ‫‪for Caliphate soldiers to take revenge on the Crusader Mozambican army‬‬ ‫‪and those who aided it from the infidels and apostates‬‬ ‫الصليبيون‬ ‫يخاطرون‬ ‫باستثماراتهم‬ ‫في‬ ‫موزمبيق!‬ ‫الصليبيون أن استمرار جرائم الحكومة‬ ‫الشيوعية بحق املسلمني قد فتح الباب‬ ‫أمام انتقام جنود الخالفة من جيش‬ ‫موزمبيق الصليبي ومَ ن عاونه من‬ ‫الكفار واملرتدين‪.‬‬ ‫وخاصة أن من سياسة هذا الجيش‬ ‫الجبان أنه بعد ك ّل هزيمةٍ منكر ٍة‬ ‫يتلقاها عىل أيدي جنود الخالفة يزيد‬ ‫من عدوانه عىل األهايل يف املنطقة‬ ‫التي يُهزم فيها‪ ،‬أمالً منه يف استعادة‬ ‫هيبةٍ مزعومةٍ يحاول فرضها عىل‬ ‫املستضعفني بالبطش واإلرهاب‪ ،‬األمر‬ ‫الذي يؤدي بدوره إىل زيادة التحاق‬ ‫املسلمني بجنود الدولة اإلسالمية‪ ،‬كما‬ ‫أن هذه الدول الكافرة تسعى ألن تبقى‬ ‫الحرب مع جنود الخالفة داخل حدود‬ ‫موزمبيق فقط‪ ،‬ال سيما وأن مناطق‬ ‫انتشارهم وعملياتهم تقع قريبا ً من‬ ‫حدود (تنزانيا)‪.‬‬ ‫وبعد فشل هذا الجيش املتهالك يف‬ ‫تحقيق وعوده لألمريكيني والفرنسيني‬ ‫بالنرص عىل جنود الخالفة وتكبّده‬ ‫الخسائر الفادحة يف تلك الحرب‪ ،‬بادر‬ ‫إىل االستعانة بمرتزقة االستخبارات‬ ‫الصليبية الروسية العاملني تحت‬ ‫غطاء رشكة "فاغنر" والذين نكّل بهم‬ ‫العدد ‪٢41‬‬ ‫الخميس ‪ 11‬ذو القعدة ‪ 1441‬هـ‬ ‫جنود الخالفة أيضا ً وأجربوهم عىل‬ ‫إخراج اسمهم من املعركة التي افتضح‬ ‫حجم خسائرهم الكبرية فيها‪ ،‬فانتقلت‬ ‫الحكومة املوزمبيقية الكافرة إىل طلب‬ ‫الدعم واإلسناد من الدول الصليبية‬ ‫املجاورة والبعيدة‪.‬‬ ‫وقبل أن تقرر الدول الصليبية يف أوربا‬ ‫وأمريكا إرسال قواتها هناك وجعل‬ ‫تلك املنطقة ساحة جديدة للحرب عىل‬ ‫الدولة اإلسالمية‪ ،‬وما يتعلق بذلك من‬ ‫مصاعب مشابهة ملا تواجهه يف حربها‬ ‫الغري منتهية بغرب إفريقية؛ فإنها اليوم‬ ‫تسعى لتوريط حكومة "جنوب إفريقية"‬ ‫وجيشها يف قيادة الحرب هناك‪ ،‬لقربها‬ ‫املكاني ولعالقاتها القوية مع حكومة‬ ‫موزمبيق‪ ،‬ولكن لدى "جنوب إفريقية"‬ ‫ما يكفي من املشكالت الداخلية ليدفعها‬ ‫نحو تجنب التورط يف هذه الحرب التي‬ ‫ستوقعها يف مأزق مايل وعسكري وأمني‬ ‫كبري‪ ،‬وقد تعود عليها بتعجيل جنود‬ ‫الدولة اإلسالمية فتح جبهة قتال داخل‬ ‫حدودها! بإذن الله تعاىل‪.‬‬ ‫ولم يكن دعم تحالف "دول جنوب‬ ‫إفريقية" للجيش املوزمبيقي باملستوى‬ ‫الذي يريده‪ ،‬إذْ اقترص حتى اآلن عىل عدد‬ ‫قليل من الجنود املدرّبني واملزوّ دين بكم‬ ‫قليل من السالح‪ ،‬وذلك ألن بعض هذه‬ ‫الدول تعاني أصالً من نزاعات داخلية‬ ‫أو تورطت يف حرب الصومال التي‬ ‫استنزفتهم طويالً‪ ،‬أو أنها تخىش من‬ ‫تورط طويل األمد يف ساحة القتال هذه‪،‬‬ ‫ٍ‬ ‫كما تورطت قبلها الجيوش اإلفريقية‬ ‫األخرى يف حرب الدولة اإلسالمية‪،‬‬ ‫االفتتاحية ‪3‬‬ ‫كحال الكامريون ونيجرييا وتشاد‬ ‫والنيجر وبنني ومايل وبوركينا فاسو‬ ‫والكونغو‪ ،‬واحتمال تورط جيوش‬ ‫موريتانيا والجزائر وساحل العاج فيها‬ ‫ً‬ ‫مرعبة‬ ‫أيضا ً‪ ،‬األمر الذي يشكل صور ًة‬ ‫ألي جيش يفكر بإغراق نفسه يف حرب‬ ‫طويلة يف املوزمبيق‪.‬‬ ‫والنتيجة من ذلك كله أن الصليبيني‬ ‫اليوم يعيشون حرية من أمرهم‪ ،‬فهم‬ ‫يخشون أن يؤدي تدخلهم الكبري يف هذه‬ ‫الحرب إىل انضمام املزيد من املسلمني يف‬ ‫موزمبيق وجوارها إىل جنود الخالفة‪،‬‬ ‫خاصة وأن العدوان عىل اإلسالم وأهله‬ ‫يف كل دول املنطقة كبري وقديم‪ ،‬كما‬ ‫يخشون أن يؤدي ذلك إىل اتساع نار‬ ‫الجهاد امللتهبة التي باتت تهدد بإحراق‬ ‫الرشك واملرشكني يف هذه املنطقة املهمة‬ ‫بالنسبة إليهم‪ ،‬ملا فيها من ثروات‬ ‫وإمكانات‪.‬‬ ‫وإن كان الصليبيون يحسبون أنهم‬ ‫بدعمهم للحكومة الكافرة يف موزمبيق‬ ‫سيحمون استثماراتهم ويضمنون‬ ‫استمرار نهبهم لثروات املنطقة فإنهم‬ ‫واهمون‪ ،‬إذْ لن تلبث األوضاع أن‬ ‫تستقر لجنود الخالفة ‪-‬بإذن الله‪-‬‬ ‫عاجالً أم آجالً‪ ،‬فهم يف تقدم وانتصار‬ ‫وعدوهم إىل تراجع واندحار‪ ،‬بفضل‬ ‫الله تعاىل‪ ،‬وإن استمرار الصليبيني‬ ‫يف حشد القوى ضد الدولة اإلسالمية‬ ‫فضالً عن تدخلهم املبارش يف الحرب‬ ‫هناك‪ ،‬كما ينادي بعضهم‪ ،‬لن يؤدي إال‬ ‫إىل ما ال يشتهون! ولينرصنّ الله من‬ ‫ينرصه إن الله لقوي عزيز‪.‬‬ ‫‪Especially since the policy of this cowardly army is that after every vile‬‬ ‫‪defeat it receives at the hands of the Caliphate soldiers it increases its‬‬ ‫‪aggression against the people in the area in which it is defeated, hoping to restore an alleged prestige‬‬ ‫‪that it tries to impose on the weak with oppression and terror, which, in turn, leads to an increase in‬‬ ‫‪Muslims joining the soldiers of the Islamic State ...‬‬ ‫‪After the failure of this rickety army to fulfil its promises to the Americans and the French of victory‬‬ ‫‪over the soldiers of the Caliphate and incurring heavy losses in the war, it took the initiative to enlist‬‬ ‫’‪the help of the Russian Crusader intelligence mercenaries working under the cover of the ‘Wagner‬‬ ‫‪company, who were also harassed by the Caliphate soldiers and forced them to take their name out of‬‬ ‫… ‪the battle‬‬ ‫‪… Today it seeks to implicate the ‘South African’ government and its army in leading the war there, due‬‬ ‫‪to its proximity and strong relations with the Mozambican government, but ‘South Africa’ has enough‬‬ ‫‪internal problems, which pushed it to avoid getting involved in this war, which will land it in a major‬‬ ‫‪financial, military and security predicament. It may be used to hasten the soldiers of the Islamic State‬‬ ‫… ‪to open a battle front within its borders! God willing‬‬ ‫‪Commentary‬‬ ‫‪This publication made headlines because of the direct warning that if South Africa intervened in‬‬ ‫‪Cabo Delgado, as it has now done as part of the Southern African Development Community‬‬ ‫‪force, IS would retaliate with attacks within the country itself. In contrast to most of the articles,‬‬ ‫‪which limit themselves to factual reporting about attacks, the number of enemies killed and‬‬ ‫‪assets captured, this one gives more of an insight into the ideology of IS in relation to Mozam‬‬‫‪bique. It accuses the Mozambican state and the former colonial powers of oppressing the Muslim‬‬ ‫‪population in Cabo Delgado and of a rapacious focus on the gas resources of the region rather‬‬ ‫‪than on the people. Leaders of the Cabo Delgado insurgents have made the same arguments in‬‬ ‫‪speeches to local people, which have been recorded and shared on social media. In these‬‬ ‫‪speeches, they encourage members of their audience to join them and condemn the‬‬ ‫‪Mozambican state as ‘corrupt’.‬‬ ‫‪THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS‬‬ ‫•‬ ‫‪INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION‬‬ ‫‪80‬‬ Key document 6: Al Nabā issue 249, 27 August 2020 Translated relevant sections ‫ هـ‬١٤٤٢ ‫ محرم‬٨ ‫ ا السنة الثانية عشرة ا الخميس‬٢٤٩ ‫العدد‬ ‫ صفحة‬١٢ ‫قتلوا وأصابوا العشرات من الجيش الموزمبيقي‬ Headline: Dozens from the Mozambican army killed and wounded again, the Caliphate soldiers take control over Mocímboa da Praia and its vital port ‫ جنود الخالفة يسيطرون على‬... ً‫مجددا‬ ‫)موسيمبوا دا برايا( ومينائها الحيوي‬ ً ‫شنَّ جنود الخالفة هجوما ً واسعا‬ ‫يف األسابيع املاضية عىل مدينة‬ ‫(موسيمبوا دا برايا) الساحلية‬ )‫الواقعة يف منطقة (كابو ديلغادو‬ ‫ وأسفر الهجوم‬،)‫شمايل (موزمبيق‬ ‫عن السيطرة عىل املدينة ومينائها‬ ‫الحيوي الذي يعترب بوابة إمداد‬ ‫لرشكات الغاز الصليبية القريبة من‬ ‫ وذلك بعد اشتباكات عنيفة‬،‫املنطقة‬ ‫ وخلّفت عرشات‬،‫امتدت لعدة أيام‬ ‫القتىل والجرحى يف صفوف الجيش‬ ‫ إىل‬،‫املوزمبيقي وقواته البحرية‬ ‫جانب السيطرة عىل كميات كبرية‬ ،‫من األسلحة والذخائر واملعدات‬ ‫فيما وصف إعالم العدو الهجوم‬ ،‫بأنه األكرب يف املنطقة منذ سنوات‬ "‫وأنه يعكس "زيادة الثقة والقوة‬ ‫يف صفوف الدولة اإلسالمية بوسط‬ .‫إفريقية‬ ‫ قال مصدر خاص‬،‫ويف التفاصيل‬ ‫لـ (النبأ) إن الهجوم بدأ يف صباح‬ ... )‫ ذي الحجة‬/16( ‫يوم الخميس‬ … The Caliphate soldiers have launched a massive attack in the past weeks on the coastal city of Mocímboa da Praia, located in Cabo Delgado region, northern Mozambique. The attack resulted in the control of the city and its vital port, which supplies the Crusader gas companies near the area, after violent clashes that lasted for several days and left dozens of members of the Mozambican army and its navy dead and wounded, in addition to seizing large quantities of weapons, ammunition and equipment. The enemy media described the attack as the most serious in the region in years, stating that it reflected ‘increased confidence and strength’ in the ranks of the Islamic State in Central Africa … A statement issued by the Mozambican army command late on Wednesday said that ‘in the past seven days the terrorists who infiltrated in the local communities carried out serial attacks’. He added: ‘The task of neutralising the terrorists is still under way in affected areas.’ The Mozambican media reported the port fell because the navy forces had run out of ammunition after days of fighting. According to the same source media, helicopters belonging to South African companies participated in the battle but were unsuccessful in repelling the attack, and both electricity ٢4٩ ‫العدد‬ ‫صــحـيــفـة أســبــوعــيـة تـصـدر عـن‬ ‫ديــوان اإلعـالم المركـزي‬ ‫إعطاب آليتين‬ ‫واستهداف دورية‬ ‫راجلة للجيش المصري‬ ‫بتفجيرات غربي )بئر‬ (‫العبد‬ 5 ‫ قتيالً وجريحاً من‬15 ‫الشرطة والحشد‬ ‫الرافضي‬ ‫وتدمير آليتين بكمين‬ ‫في شمال بغداد‬ ٤ ..(‫بينهم قياديان‬ ٧ ‫افتتاحية‬ ‫ قتلى وجرحى من‬10 7‫الشرطة االتحادية و‬ ‫آخرين من الرافضة‬ ‫يضرهم َمن خذلهم‬ ‫ال‬ ّ ‫وإعطاب آلية للجيش‬ ‫بهجمات في كركوك‬ 3 ٨ . . ‫هاجم جنود الخالفة يف يوم األحد‬ ‫ محرم) ثكنة للجيش الرافيض‬/4( ‫ يف منطقة (عكاشات) غربي‬،‫املرتد‬ ‫ واشتبكوا مع‬،)‫مدينة (القائم‬ ،‫عنارصها بمختلف أنواع األسلحة‬ ‫ عنارص‬4 ‫ما أسفر عن مقتل‬ .‫ ولله الحمد‬،‫ آخرين‬3 ‫وإصابة‬ ... ‫ فجّ ر‬،‫وعىل صعيد العبوات الناسفة‬ ٦ ‫التفاصيل ص‬ ‫قتيال وجريحاً من الجيش الرافضي‬ 34 ً ‫ آليات لهم في األنبار‬7 ‫وتدمير وإعطاب‬ ‫ إضافة إىل إلحاق أرضار‬،)‫(همر‬ ‫ وتنوعت‬،‫مادية بعدد من ثكناتهم‬ ‫الهجمات بني صوالت وإغارات‬ ‫ وتفجري‬،‫ وعمليات قنص‬،‫مسلحة‬ ‫ وقصف بقذائف‬،‫عبوات ناسفة‬ .)‫(الهاون‬ ،‫ بتوفيق الله تعاىل‬،ً‫وتفصيال‬ ‫ هذا‬،‫شنَّ جنود الخالفة يف األنبار‬ ‫ سلسلة من الهجمات‬،‫األسبوع‬ ‫النوعية عىل ثكنات وآليات الجيش‬ ،‫الرافيض يف محاور غربي األنبار‬ ً‫ قتيال‬34 ‫أسفرت عن سقوط نحو‬ ‫ وتدمري‬،‫وجريحا ً يف صفوهم‬ ‫ عربات‬3 ‫ آليات بينها‬7 ‫وإعطاب‬ ‫هذه الصحيفة تحتوي على ألفاظ الجاللة وآيات قرآنية وأحاديث احذر من تركها في مكان مهين‬ . ‫مقتل )لواء( روسي‬ ‫و)قيادي( في الدفاع‬ ‫الوثني )وضابط( في‬ ‫الجيش النصيري‬ ‫وعناصر آخرين على‬ ‫أيدي جنود الخالفة‬ ‫في حمص‬ ٩ and communication networks were cut off in the city. International attack Internationally, the attack sparked great fears because of Mocímboa da Praia’s location, about 80 km south of Afungi island, where the largest Crusader gas companies in Africa are located. The port of which the Mujahideen took control was a key point for providing these companies with logistical support, being closest to them geographically. On the other hand, according to international observers, the attack represents the increased confidence and strength of the Islamic State in central Africa. It reflects the extent to which its combat capabilities have developed compared to the failure and inability of the government and its army to put an end to the growing strength of the Mujahideen. In the context, an African researcher at Chatham House, a research institution concerned with global politics, stated that ‘the Mujahideen are gaining better armament and organization while the government forces are suffering from frustration. This is an unexpected setback for the government in Cabo Delgado’. Another researcher, from Risk Group, a global advisory group, stated: ‘The attack is another indication of how weak the arm’s response to the attacks in many parts of Cabo Delgado’ is, adding that ‘taking control of Mocímboa da Praia as well as previous attacks on provincial capitals several months ago shows that the Islamic State fighters have improved’. Commentary Islamic State’s media office has devoted most of this detailed report on the capture of Mocímboa da Praia to what it clearly considers a significant victory for its southernmost fighting front. As in previous publications, it highlights the anxiety the conflict is causing internationally because of its proximity to the gas projects, showing how this is an advantage to Islamic State in its mission to spread terror globally. In quoting reports from the Mozambican military, Chatham House and other sources,452 the writers also showed a surprising willingness to engage with the analysis by these sources of the conflict because they acknowledged the fact that at that point the tides of the conflict were turning in Islamic State’s favour. ANNEX – SELECTION OF ISLAMIC STATE PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE 81 Key document 7: Al Nabā issue 280, 31 March 2021 Translated relevant sections Headline: Their time has come. Caliphate soldiers storm Palma and kill dozens of Mozambican forces and Christians and launch other attacks in Congo … Raiding Palma city and killing dozens… a security source told [Al-Nabā] that the Caliphate soldiers launched a large-scale attack on Wednesday (23.03) on the coastal city of Palma in the Cabo Delgado region near the border with Tanzania. The source added that the attack was launched from the town of Mocimboa da Praia and lasted for three consecutive days, killing at least 55 Mozambican and Christian forces, including nationals of Crusader countries from outside the country, and wounding dozens of others. The source confirmed that the Mujahideens were able to storm the city and take control of government headquarters, banks and commercial factories after the army and police forces fled from it, in addition to their control of a large number of different machines and equipment. Praise God for his success. Network outage in the city The source from Mozambique noted that the Mozambican government had cut off all communication networks since the beginning of the attack in an attempt to hide its great losses and conceal the truth of what had happened in the city, which occupies an important economic position in the region due to its proximity to major economic projects for the Crusader countries in addition to its overcrowding with affiliated companies and factories for the government and the army. Echoes of the attack at an international level The attack caused a state of shock at an international level, especially among the governments of the Crusader countries, which were quick to ‘condemn’ what had happened and ‘pledge to send forces and military missions’ to support Mozambique in the fight against ‘terrorism’ that they claimed to have eradicated dozens of times before! The Mozambican government issued few ‘statements’ about the attack. No wonder. What could it say?! Other states, such as Britain and France, talked a lot about the horror of what had happened after they evacuated dozens of their ‘nationals’ who had long crouched in the region stealing the wealth of Muslims for years in complete silence before the bullets of the Islamic State dispel this silence forever, God willing, while the cries of its soldiers proclaim ‘God is great’ in Central Africa … Commentary Like the capture of Mocímboa da Praia, the takeover of the strategic town of Palma was reported in great detail. This publication also emphasises the strategic importance of Palma because of the gas project and exults in the fact that Western analysts of the conflict have acknowledged Islamic State’s successes. 82 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Key document 8: Al Nabā issue 282, 30 September 2021 Translated relevant sections Headline: Infection of failed campaigns The contagion of failed campaigns has infected all the armies fighting the Islamic State … the whole world saw what happened in Mozambique after the recent campaigns that the Mozambican army and its African allies had launched against the Mujahideen of the Islamic State in the north-eastern regions of Mozambique during the previous period and how the Mujahideen were able to absorb the campaigns and turn the tables on the Crusaders on the day the world woke up to the news of the Mujahideen’s invasion of the economic city of Palma, and how this attack shocked the Crusader governments that began to delude themselves through their media and mourn their losses. They see that the Caliphate they fought in Iraq and the Levant has been implanted in Central Africa and that the money they spent, the armies they mobilised, the parties they affiliated with and the alliances they established have failed. They have nothing but heartbreak. Commentary This publication offers an insight into the ideological repositioning of Islamic State over recent years as it has lost its core territories in Iraq and Syria, and has begun to create regional ‘provinces’ in other areas, including the ‘Central Africa Province’ encompassing Mozambique and Congo. Here, the jihadists argue that while Western forces may claim victory over the group in the Levant, its ability to wage war has endured and emerged in new regions. Key document 9: Al Nabā issue 295, 15 July 2021 Translated relevant sections Headline: 15 Mozambican soldiers were killed in Palma, and the Mujahideen cut an important trade route in the Congo … The battles were renewed on Wednesday 23 June in the outskirts of Palma and its surroundings after joint forces from Mozambique, South Africa and Portugal attempted to penetrate the land near the city but were confronted with fierce opposition from the soldiers and had to carry out airdrops to raid the area … The battles resulted in the killing of more than 15 members of the Mozambican forces, others wounded, the destruction of a vehicle, the seizing of two other vehicles and six rifles, in addition to burning three Christian villages south of Palma in simultaneous attacks. It is worth noting that since the Mujahideen took control of Palma city months ago, intermittent battles have taken place on the outskirts of the city and its surroundings, which exhausted the Mozambican forces, prompting them to seek the assistance of forces and militias from outside Mozambique. Commentary Here Islamic State reframes the formation of a SADC coalition to fight the insurgents as a development that shows its strength, forcing the Mozambican state to capitulate and seek outside help. In the months following this publication, the intervention of international forces resulted in IS losing a swathe of the territory it had built up in the preceding year. ANNEX – SELECTION OF ISLAMIC STATE PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE 83 Key document 10: Al Nabā issue 298, 5 August 2021 Translated relevant sections Headline: Their time has come … After years of negotiations and rivalries, African countries decided to form a ‘regional alliance’, whose training would be supervised by officers from Portugal and America, to confront the Islamic State in Mozambique … The African alliance, which was barely complete, began to be divided among itself … [including the] objection of the ‘Mozambican opposition’ to the arrival of ‘Rwandan’ forces in a way that they likened to the failed secret deals concluded by their government with Russian and South African mercenary companies to fight the Mujahideen, which threatens to ignite the old conflict between the government and the opposition. The infidels and hypocrites, through their media, are trying to portray the war and the battles taking place in northern Mozambique as a ‘war on gas’! Blind to the existence of the new-old Crusader invasion of Muslims and their homes in that region, which was subjected to the most heinous crimes and massacres committed by the Christians and their armies against Muslims, this deliberate misleading is an extension of the systematic campaign of distortion that accompanied the expansion of the Islamic State in the Levant. Today the Islamic State is fighting the infidels in Central Africa, jihad in the cause of God Almighty is to support and protect Islam, applying the purpose for which God Almighty created us. The goal is for the Mujahideen to win their wars against the armies of the cross in Mozambique and Congo. Commentary This editorial deviates from the usual template of IS publications, which report directly on attacks. In seeking to frame the conflict in Mozambique as one front of a global jihadist war, and not as a conflict based on local grievances – accusing international military and the media of ‘disinformation’ by framing the conflict as a ‘war on gas’ – it gives us an insight into what the Cabo Delgado conflict offers Islamic State – a fresh opportunity, at a time when it has lost its core territories in Iraq and Syria. The tone of the report differs from that in previous publications (such as issue 231, translated above), which do, in fact, argue that local factors, including the management of the gas projects, play a role in the conflict. It also conflicts with statements made by Mozambican al-Shabaab leaders about what motivates their insurgency. 84 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS ‫‪Key document 11: Al Nabā issue 313, 8 November 2021‬‬ ‫خاص‬ ‫‪4‬‬ ‫أخبــار‬ ‫العدد ‪313‬‬ ‫الخميس ‪ 13‬ربيع الثاني ‪ 1443‬هـ‬ ‫‪Headline: Two suicide bombings hit the heart of the Ugandan‬‬ ‫‪capital, Kampala, and the Mujahideen escalate their attacks in‬‬ ‫‪Mozambique and Congo‬‬ ‫تفجيران استشهاديان يضربان قلب العاصمة‬ ‫األوغندية (اكمباال)‬ ‫يصعدون هجماتهم في موزمبيق والكونغو‬ ‫والمجاهدون ّ‬ ‫‪Two suicide bombings hit the heart of the Ugandan capital, Kampala,‬‬ ‫‪leaving more than 30 Ugandan policemen and other Christian followers‬‬ ‫‪dead and wounded. [The attacks were] carried out by three Ugandan‬‬ ‫‪suicide bombers from the Islamic State soldiers to cause a state of panic‬‬ ‫‪among the Ugandan government, which is currently paying the price for its‬‬ ‫‪involvement in the Mujahideen’s war at home and abroad, to start the bill‬‬ ‫‪of reckoning in the capital of Uganda and its most fortified areas.‬‬ ‫للهجمات فيها‪ ،‬حيث اشتبك جنود‬ ‫الخالفة يف يوم الخميس (‪/6‬ربيع الثاني)‬ ‫مع دورية للجيش املوزمبيقي‪ ،‬يف قرية‬ ‫(تشاي) بمنطقة (ماكوميا) يف (كابو‬ ‫ديلغادو)‪ ،‬باألسلحة الرشاشة‪ ،‬ما أدى‬ ‫ملقتل عنرص منهم وفرار البقية‪ ،‬واغتنم‬ ‫املجاهدون أسلحة وذخائر‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫نحر ‪ 6‬من الجيش وجواسيسه‬ ‫صورة من موقع التفجري االستشهادي الذي وقع أمام مركز الرشطة األوغندية يف العاصمة (كامباال)‬ ‫والية وسط إفريقية‬ ‫‪ 8‬قتلى وجرحى من النصارى‬ ‫كان أبرزها بمنطقة (مويدا) يف (كابو‬ ‫رضب تفجريان استشهاديان قلب ديلغادو)‪ ،‬إضافة إىل هجمات أخرى‬ ‫العاصمة األوغندية (كامباال) مخلّفان لجنود الخالفة يف الكونغو طالت أربع‬ ‫أكثر من ‪ 30‬قتيال وجريحا من الرشطة قرى للنصارى يف (بيني) و(إيتوري)‪.‬‬ ‫األوغندية ورعاياهم النصارى‪ ،‬نفذهما‬ ‫إحراق منازل للنصارى‬ ‫ثالثة استشهاديني أوغنديني من جنود‬ ‫في )نداليا)‬ ‫الدولة اإلسالمية‪ ،‬لتسود حالة من الذعر‬ ‫والرتقب يف صفوف الحكومة األوغندية ويف التفاصيل‪ ،‬بتوفيق الله تعاىل هاجم‬ ‫التي تدفع حاليا ثمن تورطها يف حرب جنود الخالفة يف يوم الخميس (‪/6‬‬ ‫املجاهدين يف الداخل والخارج‪ ،‬لتبدأ ربيع الثاني) دورية للجيش الكونغويل‬ ‫فاتورة الحساب من عاصمة أوغندا الصليبي‪ ،‬يف قرية (نداليا) النرصانية‬ ‫بمنطقة (إيتوري)‪ ،‬باألسلحة الرشاشة‪،‬‬ ‫وأكثر مناطقها تحصينا‪.‬‬ ‫بينما واصل املجاهدون تصعيد ما أدى لفرارهم من القرية‪ ،‬واقتحم‬ ‫هجماتهم يف موزمبيق حيث قتلوا ‪ 17‬املجاهدون القرية وأحرقوا عدة منازل‬ ‫فرار الجيش الكونغولي‬ ‫عنرصا من الجيش املوزمبيقي و‪ 17‬وممتلكات للنصارى الكافرين‪ ،‬ثم عادوا‬ ‫من ثكنته‬ ‫آخرين من الجواسيس وامليليشيات إىل مواقعهم ساملني‪ ،‬ونرش املكتب اإلعالمي‬ ‫املوالية لهم‪ ،‬بهجمات واشتباكات الحقا صورا لنتائج الهجوم‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪ .‬ويف سياق متصل‪ ،‬هاجم جنود الخالفة‬ ‫يف يوم الثالثاء (‪/11‬ربيع الثاني)‬ ‫ثكنة للجيش الكونغويل الصليبي‪ ،‬يف‬ ‫قرية (تيسيبي) بمنطقة (رونزوري)‬ ‫يف (بيني)‪ ،‬واشتبكوا معهم باألسلحة‬ ‫الرشاشة‪ ،‬فالذوا بالفرار من الثكنة‪،‬‬ ‫واغتنم املجاهدون أسلحة وذخائر‬ ‫متنوعة‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫كما هاجم املجاهدون يف نفس اليوم قرية‬ ‫(كيسانغا) النرصانية بمنطقة (باشو)‬ ‫يف (بيني)‪ ،‬باألسلحة الرشاشة‪ ،‬ما أسفر‬ ‫عن مقتل خمسة من النصارى عىل األقل‪،‬‬ ‫وأحرق املجاهدون عددا من منازلهم ثم‬ ‫عادوا إىل مواقعهم ساملني‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫ويف عملية ثالثة‪ ،‬تمكن املجاهدون من‬ ‫زرع وتفجري عبوة ناسفة داخل قرية‬ ‫(تينامبو) النرصانية بمنطقة (أويشا)‬ ‫يف (بيني)‪ ،‬ما أدى ملقتل وإصابة ثالثة‬ ‫من النصارى‪ ،‬وعاد املجاهدون إىل‬ ‫مواقعهم ساملني‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫مقتل عنصر‬ ‫من الجيش الموزمبيقي‬ ‫هجوم جنود الخالفة عىل قرية (نداليا) النرصانية بمنطقة (إيتوري)‬ ‫وانتقاال إىل موزمبيق التي تشهد تصاعدا‬ ‫‪Translated relevant sections‬‬ ‫كما هاجم املجاهدون يف اليوم ذاته‪،‬‬ ‫قرية (ميغيليوى) بمنطقة (مويدومبي)‬ ‫يف (كابوديلغادو)‪ ،‬وقاموا بأرس ونحر‬ ‫ثالثة جواسيس للجيش املوزمبيقي‪،‬‬ ‫واغتنموا أسلحتهم‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫ويف اليوم التايل‪ ،‬الجمعة‪ ،‬هاجموا‬ ‫قرية (نماتييل) بمنطقة (مويدا) يف‬ ‫(كابوديلغادو)‪ ،‬وقاموا بأرس ونحر‬ ‫ثالثة عنارص من الجيش املوزمبيقي‪،‬‬ ‫وأحرقوا عددا من منازل النصارى‬ ‫داخل القرية‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫‪The Mujahideen continued to attack in Mozambique, where they killed‬‬ ‫‪17 Mozambican soldiers, 17 spies and militia members, with attacks and‬‬ ‫‪clashes in the most prominent areas in the Mueda district in Cabo Delgado‬‬ ‫‪in addition to other attacks by the Caliphate soldiers in Congo that‬‬ ‫خاص‬ ‫الـنـبأ‬ ‫‪affected four Christian villages in Beni and Ituri.‬‬ ‫‪Commentary‬‬ ‫‪It is significant that this publication draws attention to ‘escalating‬‬ ‫‪attacks’ on both fronts in Central Africa simultaneously. Islamic State is‬‬ ‫‪trying to suggest that there is a coordinated strategy between the two‬‬ ‫أسلحة وذخائر اغتنمها جنود الخالفة‬ ‫بهجوم بقرية (تيسيبي) يف (بيني)‬ ‫‪fighting groups.‬‬ ‫‪Key document 12: Al Nabā issue 313, 8 November 2021‬‬ ‫خاص‬ ‫‪4‬‬ ‫أخبــار‬ ‫العدد ‪313‬‬ ‫الخميس ‪ 13‬ربيع الثاني ‪ 1443‬هـ‬ ‫‪Translated relevant sections‬‬ ‫‪Headline: Central African harvest during the first third of the year‬‬ ‫‪2021‬‬ ‫تفجيران استشهاديان يضربان قلب العاصمة‬ ‫األوغندية (اكمباال)‬ ‫يصعدون هجماتهم في موزمبيق والكونغو‬ ‫والمجاهدون ّ‬ ‫‪70 operations:‬‬ ‫‪- 29 Congo‬‬ ‫للهجمات فيها‪ ،‬حيث اشتبك جنود‬ ‫الخالفة يف يوم الخميس (‪/6‬ربيع الثاني)‬ ‫مع دورية للجيش املوزمبيقي‪ ،‬يف قرية‬ ‫(تشاي) بمنطقة (ماكوميا) يف (كابو‬ ‫ديلغادو)‪ ،‬باألسلحة الرشاشة‪ ،‬ما أدى‬ ‫ملقتل عنرص منهم وفرار البقية‪ ،‬واغتنم‬ ‫املجاهدون أسلحة وذخائر‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫‪- 27 Mozambique‬‬ ‫‪- 4 Uganda‬‬ ‫نحر ‪ 6‬من الجيش وجواسيسه‬ ‫صورة من موقع التفجري االستشهادي الذي وقع أمام مركز الرشطة األوغندية يف العاصمة (كامباال)‬ ‫والية وسط إفريقية‬ ‫‪ 8‬قتلى وجرحى من النصارى‬ ‫كان أبرزها بمنطقة (مويدا) يف (كابو‬ ‫رضب تفجريان استشهاديان قلب ديلغادو)‪ ،‬إضافة إىل هجمات أخرى‬ ‫العاصمة األوغندية (كامباال) مخلّفان لجنود الخالفة يف الكونغو طالت أربع‬ ‫أكثر من ‪ 30‬قتيال وجريحا من الرشطة قرى للنصارى يف (بيني) و(إيتوري)‪.‬‬ ‫األوغندية ورعاياهم النصارى‪ ،‬نفذهما‬ ‫إحراق منازل للنصارى‬ ‫ثالثة استشهاديني أوغنديني من جنود‬ ‫في )نداليا)‬ ‫الدولة اإلسالمية‪ ،‬لتسود حالة من الذعر‬ ‫والرتقب يف صفوف الحكومة األوغندية ويف التفاصيل‪ ،‬بتوفيق الله تعاىل هاجم‬ ‫التي تدفع حاليا ثمن تورطها يف حرب جنود الخالفة يف يوم الخميس (‪/6‬‬ ‫املجاهدين يف الداخل والخارج‪ ،‬لتبدأ ربيع الثاني) دورية للجيش الكونغويل‬ ‫فاتورة الحساب من عاصمة أوغندا الصليبي‪ ،‬يف قرية (نداليا) النرصانية‬ ‫بمنطقة (إيتوري)‪ ،‬باألسلحة الرشاشة‪،‬‬ ‫وأكثر مناطقها تحصينا‪.‬‬ ‫بينما واصل املجاهدون تصعيد ما أدى لفرارهم من القرية‪ ،‬واقتحم‬ ‫هجماتهم يف موزمبيق حيث قتلوا ‪ 17‬املجاهدون القرية وأحرقوا عدة منازل‬ ‫فرار الجيش الكونغولي‬ ‫عنرصا من الجيش املوزمبيقي و‪ 17‬وممتلكات للنصارى الكافرين‪ ،‬ثم عادوا‬ ‫من ثكنته‬ ‫آخرين من الجواسيس وامليليشيات إىل مواقعهم ساملني‪ ،‬ونرش املكتب اإلعالمي‬ ‫املوالية لهم‪ ،‬بهجمات واشتباكات الحقا صورا لنتائج الهجوم‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪ .‬ويف سياق متصل‪ ،‬هاجم جنود الخالفة‬ ‫يف يوم الثالثاء (‪/11‬ربيع الثاني)‬ ‫ثكنة للجيش الكونغويل الصليبي‪ ،‬يف‬ ‫قرية (تيسيبي) بمنطقة (رونزوري)‬ ‫يف (بيني)‪ ،‬واشتبكوا معهم باألسلحة‬ ‫الرشاشة‪ ،‬فالذوا بالفرار من الثكنة‪،‬‬ ‫واغتنم املجاهدون أسلحة وذخائر‬ ‫متنوعة‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫كما هاجم املجاهدون يف نفس اليوم قرية‬ ‫(كيسانغا) النرصانية بمنطقة (باشو)‬ ‫يف (بيني)‪ ،‬باألسلحة الرشاشة‪ ،‬ما أسفر‬ ‫عن مقتل خمسة من النصارى عىل األقل‪،‬‬ ‫وأحرق املجاهدون عددا من منازلهم ثم‬ ‫عادوا إىل مواقعهم ساملني‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫ويف عملية ثالثة‪ ،‬تمكن املجاهدون من‬ ‫زرع وتفجري عبوة ناسفة داخل قرية‬ ‫(تينامبو) النرصانية بمنطقة (أويشا)‬ ‫يف (بيني)‪ ،‬ما أدى ملقتل وإصابة ثالثة‬ ‫من النصارى‪ ،‬وعاد املجاهدون إىل‬ ‫مواقعهم ساملني‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫مقتل عنصر‬ ‫من الجيش الموزمبيقي‬ ‫هجوم جنود الخالفة عىل قرية (نداليا) النرصانية بمنطقة (إيتوري)‬ ‫وانتقاال إىل موزمبيق التي تشهد تصاعدا‬ ‫كما هاجم املجاهدون يف اليوم ذاته‪،‬‬ ‫قرية (ميغيليوى) بمنطقة (مويدومبي)‬ ‫يف (كابوديلغادو)‪ ،‬وقاموا بأرس ونحر‬ ‫ثالثة جواسيس للجيش املوزمبيقي‪،‬‬ ‫واغتنموا أسلحتهم‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫ويف اليوم التايل‪ ،‬الجمعة‪ ،‬هاجموا‬ ‫قرية (نماتييل) بمنطقة (مويدا) يف‬ ‫(كابوديلغادو)‪ ،‬وقاموا بأرس ونحر‬ ‫ثالثة عنارص من الجيش املوزمبيقي‪،‬‬ ‫وأحرقوا عددا من منازل النصارى‬ ‫داخل القرية‪ ،‬ولله الحمد‪.‬‬ ‫‪- 269 Christian deaths and injuries‬‬ ‫‪- 12 ambushes‬‬ ‫‪- 5 explosions‬‬ ‫‪- 2 assassinations‬‬ ‫خاص‬ ‫الـنـبأ‬ ‫‪- 49 attacks and clashes‬‬ ‫‪- 2 martyrdom operations‬‬ ‫‪- 39 vehicles were destroyed and damaged‬‬ ‫‪- 13 barracks were destroyed and burned‬‬ ‫‪- 69 homes were destroyed and burned down‬‬ ‫أسلحة وذخائر اغتنمها جنود الخالفة‬ ‫بهجوم بقرية (تيسيبي) يف (بيني)‬ ‫‪Highlighted attacks:‬‬ ‫‪(02.09.2021) – An ambush in which explosive devices were used to target‬‬ ‫‪the Congolese army patrol near their camp in Bacho area in Beni, killing at‬‬ ‫‪least two members and wounding others.‬‬ ‫‪(13.11.2021) – An armed attack by the Mujahideen on four villages in … Cabo Delgado, which‬‬ ‫‪resulted in killing 10 Mozambican police members, police stations and Christian houses were also‬‬ ‫‪burned.‬‬ ‫‪(16.11.2021) – Two suicide bombings hit the Ugandan capital, Kampala. The first took place in front of‬‬ ‫‪a police station, the second near the Parliament, killing more than 30 policemen and injuring policemen‬‬ ‫‪and Christians.‬‬ ‫‪85‬‬ ‫‪ANNEX – SELECTION OF ISLAMIC STATE PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE‬‬ Commentary This type of infographic is characteristic of the relatively sophisticated reporting in Islamic State publications and video productions referring to its operations in West Africa. The presentation of the statistics here – on deaths and injuries, suicide attacks and destruction – shows the same willingness to present attacks in Mozambique and Congo as a united front for the Islamic State Central Africa Province. The word ‘harvest’ in the title refers to deaths and destruction. It should be noted that the total number of attacks Islamic State has claimed in Mozambique since 2019 is only a small proportion of the violence that has engulfed Cabo Delgado. 86 INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS NOTES 1 2 David M Matsinhe and Estacio Valoi, The genesis of 7 a ‘think tank industrial complex’ providing analysis on Studies, 2019, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ Cabo Delgado. See Richard Poplak, IS-land: Has the age The_Genesis_of_insurgency_in_N_Moz.pdf. of southern African terrorism properly begun?, Daily Allan Olingo, Security agony for Dar, Nairobi as terror Maverick, 4 May 2021, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ suspects sneak back home, The East African, 28 August article/2021-05-04-islamic-state-land-has-the-age-of- 2021, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/eastafrica/security-agony-for-dar-nairobi-as-terror-suspects3 southern-african-terrorism-properly-begun/. 8 Eric Morier-Genoud, The jihadi insurgency in sneak-home-3529032. Mozambique: Origins, nature and beginning, See analysis from Cabo Ligado Weekly: Cabo Ligado, By Journal of Eastern African Studies, 6 July 2020. DOI: the numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017–December 2021, 30 November 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/ 10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271. 9 Merilee Chapin, Vincent Pardieu and Andrew Lucas, reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-22-28-november-2021; Mozambique: A ruby discovery for the 21st century, field Cabo Ligado, By the numbers: Cabo Delgado, October report, Gems & Gemology, Spring 2015, 51, 1. https:// 2017-December 2021, 7 December 2021, https:// www.gia.edu/gems-gemology/spring-2015-mozambique- www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-29november-5-december-2021. 4 To the point that one commentator wryly referred to insurgency in northern Mozambique, Institute for Security Aaron Y Zelin, Al-Nabā, Issue #241, Jihadology.net, 7 November 2019, https://jihadology.net/2019/11/07/newissue-of-the-islamic-states-newsletter-al-naba-241/. ruby-discovery-21st-century. 10 Jason Boswell, Mozambique’s lucrative ruby mines, BBC, 10 February 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/ business-38934307. 11 Vijay Prasad, Why the discovery of natural gas in 5 Ibid. Mozambique has produced tragedy, Mail & Guardian, 3 6 See Simone Haysom, Where crime compounds conflict: September 2021, https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-09-03- Understanding northern Mozambique’s vulnerabilities, why-the-discovery-of-natural-gas-in-mozambique-has- Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime produced-tragedy/. A second large natural gas field was (GI-TOC), 2018, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ discovered off the north Mozambican coast in October northern_mozambique_violence/; GI-TOC, Civil Society 2011. Discovery made by Italian firm, Eni, which has been Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern prospecting since 2006. See BBC News, Large gas field Africa risk bulletin, Issue 7, 7 May 2020, https:// discovered off the coast of Mozambique, 20 October globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/GI- 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-15386875. Risk-Bulletin-007-04May1845-proof-5.pdf./; Alastair The Coral gas field was subsequently discovered in 2012, Nelson, A triangle of vulnerability: Changing patterns of in the Rovuma basin. It contains 16 trillion cubic feet illicit trafficking off the Swahili coast, GI-TOC, May 2020, in place. See Offshore Magazine, Coral South partners https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/triangle-vulnerability- commit to FLNG project offshore Mozambique, 2 June swahili-coast/; GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit 2017, https://www.offshore-mag.com/field-development/ Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, article/16800464/coral-south-partners-commit-to-flng- Issue 17, 28 April 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/ project-offshore-mozambique. analysis/esaobs-risk-bulletin-17/. NOTES 87 12 Estacio Valoi, The blood rubies of Montepuez, 27 Interview with João Feijó, Observatório do Meio Rural Foreign Policy, 3 May 2016, https://foreignpolicy. (OMR) researcher, in Maputo, 5 October 2021. David M com/2016/05/03/the-blood-rubies-of-montepuez- Matsinhe and Estacio Valoi, The genesis of insurgency mozambique-gemfields-illegal-mining/. in northern Mozambique, Institute for Security Studies, 13 Ibid. 14 2019, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ Ibid. The_Genesis_of_insurgency_in_N_Moz.pdf; Brenda 15 Cecilia Jamasmie, Gemfields to pay $7.8m to settle human rights abuses claims in Mozambique, mining.com, 29 of jihad”: The ecosystem of militancy in East, Central and January 2019, https://www.mining.com/gemfields-pay- Southern Africa, International Centre for the Study of 7-8m-settle-claim-human-rights-abuses-mozambique/. In paying the compensation Gemfields did not admit culpability for the abuses. of Cabo Delgado, Daily Maverick, 29 May 2020, mozambique-the-forgotten-people-of-cabo-delgado/. 17 Intelyse, Southern African jihad: The Cabo Delgado 29 Theo Neethling, Offshore gas finds offered major promise for Mozambique: What went wrong, The Conversation, 30 March 2021, https://theconversation.com/offshore- insurgency, Part 1: Uncovering the origins of the Cabo gas-finds-offered-major-promise-for-mozambique-what- Delgado insurgency, April 2020, https://stability- went-wrong-158079. operations.org/news/522081/Intelyse-MozambiqueInsurgency-Report.htm. 30 Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli and Yussuf Adam, The emergence of violent extremism in northern Mozambique, 18 Ibid. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, https://africacenter. Eric Morier-Genoud, The jihadi insurgency in org/spotlight/the-emergence-of-violent-extremism-in- Mozambique: Origins, nature and beginning, northern-mozambique/. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 6 July 2020, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271. 31 Club of Mozambique, Men trained in DR Congo to destabilise are captured – Mocímboa da Praia, 22 March 20 Ashoka Mukpo, Gas fields and jihad: Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado becomes a resource-rich war zone, Mongabay, 26 April 2021, https://news.mongabay.com/2021/04/ gas-fields-and-jihad-mozambiques-cabo-delgado- 2018, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/watchmen-trained-in-dr-congo-to-destabilise-are-capturedmocímboa-da-praia/. 32 David M Matsinhe and Estacio Valoi, The genesis of becomes-a-resource-rich-war-zone/; Mozambique LNG: insurgency in northern Mozambique, Institute for Security Resettlement, https://mzlng.totalenergies.co.mz/en/ Studies, 2019, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ sustainability/resettlement. The_Genesis_of_insurgency_in_N_Moz.pdf. 21 Ilham Rawoot, Gas-rich Mozambique may be headed for 33 Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli and Yussuf Adam, The disaster, Al Jazeera, 24 February 2020, https://www. emergence of violent extremism in northern Mozambique, aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/2/24/gas-rich-mozambique- Africa Center for Strategic Studies, https://africacenter. may-be-headed-for-a-disaster. org/spotlight/the-emergence-of-violent-extremism-in- 22 Ibid. northern-mozambique/. 23 Andrew England, IMF halts Mozambique aid after finding 34 The Defense Post, Ugandans detained in Mozambique undisclosed debts of $1bn, Financial Times, 18 April 2016, over attacks in gas-rich Cabo Delgado Province, https://www.ft.com/content/6c755214-057f-11e6-9b51- 29 January 2019, https://www.thedefensepost. 0fb5e65703ce. com/2019/01/29/mozambique-ugandans-detained- Alisha Patel, Mozambique’s debt scandal: Impunity is attacks-cabo-delgado/; see also: Club of Mozambique, the catch of the day, African Arguments, 19 July 2017, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) opens cell in https://africanarguments.org/2017/07/mozambique-debt- Mozambique, says security expert – report, 2 April 2019, scandal-impunity-is-the-catch-of-the-day-2/. https://clubofmozambique.com/news/allied-democratic- 25 Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli and Yussuf Adam, The emergence of violent extremism in northern Mozambique, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, https://africacenter. forces-adf-opens-cell-in-mozambique-says-securityexpert-report/. 35 Jason Warner, Ryan O’Farrel, Héni Nsaibia and Ryan org/spotlight/the-emergence-of-violent-extremism-in- Cummings, Outlasting the caliphate: The evolution of northern-mozambique/. the Islamic State threat in Africa, CTC Sentinel, 13 (11), 26 International Crisis Group, Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, 11 June 2021, 18-33, https://ctc.usma.edu/outlasting-the-caliphate-theevolution-of-the-islamic-state-threat-in-africa/. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/ 88 Studies, 2019, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ The_Genesis_of_insurgency_in_N_Moz.pdf. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-05-29- 24 Radicalisation, 2021. 28 David M Matsinhe and Estacio Valoi, The genesis of insurgency in northern Mozambique, Institute for Security 16 David Matsinhe, Mozambique: The forgotten people 19 Mugeci Githing’u and Tore Refslund Hamming, “The arc 36 World Vision, 2019 Cyclone Idai: Facts, FAQs and how to mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiques- help, https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news- cabo-delgado. stories/2019-cyclone-idai-facts. INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 37 Brenda Mugeci Githing’u and Tore Refslund Hamming, org.za/conflict-trends/insurgency-in-mozambique-the- “The Arc of Jihad”: The Ecosystem of Militancy in East, role-of-the-southern-african-development-community/; Central and Southern Africa, International Centre for the Peter Fabricus, Mocimboa da Praia: Islamic State Study of Radicalisation, 2021. insurgents recapture strategic port town, Daily Maverick, 38 Ibid.; Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Emelie Chace-Donahue 12 August 2021, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ and Colin P Clarke, The evolution and escalation article/2020-08-12-mocimboa-da-praia-islamic-state- of the Islamic State threat to Mozambique, Foreign insurgents-recapture-strategic-port-town/. Policy Research Institute, 2021, https://www.fpri.org/ 52 Brenda Mugeci Githing’u and Tore Refslund Hamming, article/2021/04/the-evolution-and-escalation-of- “The Arc of Jihad”: The ecosystem of militancy in East, theislamic-state-threat-to-mozambique/. Central and Southern Africa, International Centre for the 39 ExTrac, The Islamic State in Mozambique: A Profile, September 2021, https://public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ Study of Radicalisation, 2021. 53 See OCHA, Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, Nampula & ExTrac_ISCAP_090921.pdf. Niassa humanitarian snapshot, https://reliefweb.int/ 40 Pjotr Sauer, In push for Africa, Russia’s Wagner sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mozambique%20 mercenaries are ‘out of their depth’ in Mozambique, -%20Cabo%20Delgado%2C%20Nampula%20and%20 The Moscow Times, 19 November 2019, https://www. Niassa%20Humanitarian%20Snapshot%20-%20 themoscowtimes.com/2019/11/19/in-push-for-africa- 41 September%202021.pdf. russias-wagner-mercenaries-are-out-of-their-depth-in- 54 Ibid. mozambique-a68220. 55 Ibid. Cabo Ligado, Cabo Ligado Weekly 12–18 October 56 Ibid. 2020, 21 October 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/ 57 ExTrac, The Islamic State in Mozambique: A Profile, mozambique/cabo-ligado-weekly-12-18-october-2020. September 2021, https://public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ 42 AFP News, Six killed in Tanzania attack near border with Mozambique, News 24, 13 November 2019, https://www. ExTrac_ISCAP_090921.pdf. 58 Reuters, Mozambique, Tanzania to launch joint operations news24.com/news24/africa/news/six-killed-in-tanzania- against insurgents, 23 November 2020, https://www. attack-near-border-with-mozambique-20191113. reuters.com/article/mozambique-insurgency-tanzania- 43 Peter Fabricus, Wagner private military force licks wounds in northern Mozambique, Daily Maverick, 29 November idINL8N2I94OL. 59 Amnesty International, “What I saw is death”: War crimes 2019, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019- in Mozambique’s forgotten cape, 2 March 2021, https:// 11-29-wagner-private-military-force-licks-wounds-innorthern-mozambique/. www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/3545/2021/en/. 60 Chrispin Mwakideu, Mozambique’s extremist violence 44 Borges Nhamirre, Will foreign intervention end terrorism in poses a threat for neighbors, DW News, 29 March Cabo Delgado?, Institute for Security Studies, 5 November 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/mozambiques-extremist- 2021, https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/will- violence-poses-threat-for-neighbors/a-57043563; foreign-intervention-end-terrorism-in-cabo-delgado. Office of the Spokesperson, State Department terrorist 45 UN Global Humanitarian Overview, Mozambique 2020, designations of ISIS affiliates and leaders in the https://gho.unocha.org/mozambique. Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, US 46 BBC News, Islamist militants ‘behead more than 50’ in Department of State, 10 March 2021, https://www.state. Mozambique, 9 November 2020, https://www.bbc.com/ gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-isis- news/world-africa-54877202. affiliates-and-leaders-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the- 47 DefenceWeb, Private military contractors appear to be active in Mozambique, 15 April 2020, https://www. Declan Walsh and and Eric Schmitt, American soldiers defenceweb.co.za/featured/private-military-contractors- help Mozambique battle an expanding ISIS affiliate, The appear-to-be-active-in-mozambique/. New York Times, 8 October 2021, https://www.nytimes. 48 Energy Voice, Insurgents shoot down helicopter in Mozambique, 24 April 2020, https://www.energyvoice. com/oilandgas/africa/237067/insurgents-shoot-downhelicopter-in-mozambique/. 49 Zitamar News, Analysis: Insurgent attack on Macomia Town and surrounding villages, 1 June 2020, https:// zitamar.com/analysis-insurgent-attack-macomia-townsurrounding-villages-may-2020/. 50 Ibid. 51 congo-and-mozambique/. 61 com/2021/03/15/world/africa/mozambique-americantroops-isis-insurgency.html. 62 Brenda Mugeci Githing’u and Tore Refslund Hamming, “The Arc of Jihad”: The ecosystem of militancy in East, Central and Southern Africa, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2021. 63 Joseph Cotterill and David Keohane, ‘Some hid in the sea’: Islamist attack on Mozambique town a turning point in Africa’s ignored war, Financial Times, 6 April 2021, Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu, Insurgency in Mozambique: https://www.ft.com/content/48373faa-b77d-43f5-b4dc- The role of the Southern African Development 4fd6221e57c3. Community, Accord, 21 April 2021, https://www.accord. NOTES 89 64 Brenda Mugeci Githing’u and Tore Refslund Hamming, Central and Southern Africa, International Centre for the www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/aid-reaches- Study of Radicalisation, 2021. mozambiques-insurgent-hit-palma-after-6-monthhiatus-20210920. Niassa humanitarian snapshot, https://reliefweb.int/ 77 Mark Lauria, Mozambican president calls on insurgents to sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mozambique%20 surrender after key militant killed, Organisation for World -%20Cabo%20Delgado%2C%20Nampula%20and%20 Peace, 3 November 2021, https://theowp.org/reports/ Niassa%20Humanitarian%20Snapshot%20-%20 mozambique-president-calls-on-insurgents-to-surrender- September%202021.pdf. after-key-militant-killed/. 66 BBC, Mozambique town Palma ‘retaken’ from militant 78 Amanda Khoza, SADC leaders extend deployment of Islamists, 5 April 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/ troops in Mozambique, Times Live, 5 October 2021, world-africa-56637573. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2021-10- 67 AFP, Back from Mozambique, mercenary sees ‘only hardships’ for insurgent-hit north, Economic Times, 23 April 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 05-sadc-leaders-extend-deployment-of-troops-inmozambique/. 79 Brenda Mugeci Githing’u and Tore Refslund Hamming, news/defence/back-from-mozambique-mercenary- “The Arc of Jihad”: The ecosystem of militancy in East, sees-only-hardships-for-insurgent-hit-north/ Central and Southern Africa, International Centre for the articleshow/82214280.cms. Study of Radicalisation, 2021. 68 Total Energies, Total declares Force Majeure on 80 International Crisis Group, Stemming the insurgency Mozambique LNG project, 26 April 2021, https:// in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, 11 June 2021, totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total- https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/ declares-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project. mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiques- 69 Reuters, African nations to send troops to tackle cabo-delgado. Mozambique insurgency, 23 June 2021, https://www. 81 Eric Morier-Genoud, The jihadi insurgency in reuters.com/world/africa/african-nations-send-troops- Mozambique: Origins, nature and beginning, Journal of tackle-mozambique-insurgency-2021-06-23/. Eastern African Studies, 14, 3, 396–412; International 70 ExTrac, The Islamic State in Mozambique: A Profile, Crisis Group, Stemming the insurgency in Mozambique’s September 2021, https://public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ Cabo Delgado, 11 June 2021, https://www.crisisgroup. ExTrac_ISCAP_090921.pdf. org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/303-stemming- 71 Isaac Mugabe, SADC upset by Rwanda’s military aid to appease Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, DW insurrection-mozambiques-cabo-delgado. 82 Richard Poplak, IS-land: Has the age of southern African News, 13 July 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/sadc-upset- terrorism properly begun?, 4 May 2021, Daily Maverick, by-rwandas-military-aid-to-appease-mozambiques-cabo- https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-04- delgado-province/a-58250646. islamic-state-land-has-the-age-of-southern-african- 72 Peter Fabricus, SA troops arrive in Mozambique to fight terrorism-properly-begun/; Ashoka Mukpo, Gas fields and insurgents, Daily Maverick, 21 July 2021, https://www. jihad: Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado becomes a resource-rich dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-21-sa-troops-arrive- war zone, Mongabay, 26 April 2021, https://news.mongabay. in-mozambique-to-fight-insurgents/. com/2021/04/gas-fields-and-jihad-mozambiques-cabo- 73 BBC News, Mozambique insurgency: Key port retaken from insurgents – Rwanda, 8 August 2021, https://www. delgado-becomes-a-resource-rich-war-zone/. 83 Joseph Hanlon, The Uberization of Mozambique’s heroin bbc.com/news/world-africa-58138507. trade, London School of Economics, July 2018, https:// Africa News, Mozambique’s ‘Hidden Debt” scandal www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/ trial begins, 23 August 2021, https://www.africanews. Documents/PDFs/Working-Papers/WP190.pdf; com/2021/08/23/mozambique-s-hidden-debt-scandal- Simone Haysom, Where crime compounds conflict: trial-begins/. Understanding northern Mozambique’s vulnerabilities, GI- 75 See Cabo Ligado, Cabo Ligado monthly: September 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/ cabo-ligado-monthly-sept-2021; Baz Ratner and Shafiek Tassiem, Mozambicans return to uncertain future after Islamists pushed back, Reuters, 25 September 2021, 90 AFP, Aid reaches Mozambique’s insurgent-hit Palma after 6-month hiatus, News24, 20 September 2021, https:// 65 See OCHA, Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, Nampula & 74 76 “The Arc of Jihad”: The ecosystem of militancy in East, TOC, 2018, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/northern_ mozambique_violence/. 84 Interview with ISS consultant Borges Nhamirre, Maputo, 6 October 2021. 85 Simone Haysom, Where crime compounds conflict: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mozambicans- Understanding northern Mozambique’s vulnerabilities, GI- return-uncertain-future-after-islamists-pushed- TOC, 2018, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/northern_ back-2021-09-24/. mozambique_violence/. INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 86 David M Matsinhe and Estacio Valoi, The genesis of concessions increase as armed conflict in Cabo Delgado insurgency in northern Mozambique, Institute for intensifies – Who are the owners of mining licenses in Security Studies, 2019, https://media.africaportal.org/ Cabo Delgado?, 20 July 2021, https://www.cipmoz.org/ documents/The_Genesis_of_insurgency_in_N_Moz.pdf. 87 Public Integrity Center, Requests for mining concessions en/2021/07/20/8153/. 96 Cecilia Jamasmie, Gemfields to pay $7.8m to settle increase as armed conflict in Cabo Delgado intensifies – human rights abuses claims in Mozambique, Who are the owners of mining licenses in Cabo mining.com, 29 January 2019, https://www.mining.com/ Delgado?, 20 July 2021, https://www.cipmoz.org/ gemfields-pay-7-8m-settle-claim-human-rights-abuses- en/2021/07/20/8153/. 88 Joseph Hanlon, Special report: Evolution of the Cabo Delgado war, Club of Mozambique, 27 February 2020, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/specialreport-evolution-of-the-cabo-delgado-war-by-josephhanlon-153785/; Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique’s mozambique/. 97 Leigh Day, Gemfields, 2019, https://www.leighday.co.uk/ latest-updates/cases-and-testimonials/cases/gemfields/. 98 Interview with Adriano Nuvunga, CDD, Pemba, 15 October 2021. 99 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 jihadists and the ‘curse’ of gas and rubies, BBC, October 2021; João Feijó, From the ‘faceless enemy’ 18 September 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/ to the hypothesis of dialogue: Identities, pretensions world-africa-54183948; Romeu da Silva, João Mosca: and channels of communication with the Machababos, Cabo Delgado já vive ‘maldição dos recursos naturais’, OMR, 10 August 2021, https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp- Deutsche Welle, 3 January 2020, https://www. content/uploads/DR-130-Cabo-Delgado-Pt-e-Eng.pdf. dw.com/pt-002/jo%C3%A3o-mosca-cabo-delgado- MRM has refuted claims that the impact of its project j%C3%A1-vive-maldi%C3%A7%C3%A3o-dos-recursos- may have fed community feelings of exclusion that have naturais/a-51711555. 89 See Megan Darby, Seven countries back Africa’s biggest fed into the insurgency, telling The Continent newspaper that its own investigations have found this suggestion investment, a $20 billion gas project, Climate Change to be ‘absurd and misleading’. See: Luis Nhachote, News, 20 July 2020, https://www.climatechangenews. Cabo Delgado is a warzone, but profiteers strike it rich, com/2020/07/20/seven-countries-back-africas-biggest- Mail & Guardian, 4 September 2021, https://mg.co.za/ investment-20-billion-gas-project/. africa/2021-09-04-cabo-delgado-is-a-warzone-but- 90 Interview with Adriano Nuvunga, Centro para Democracia e Desenvolvimento (CDD), Pemba, 15 October 2021. 91 Ashoka Mukpo, Gas fields and jihad: Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado becomes a resource-rich war zone, Mongabay, 26 April 2021, https://news.mongabay.com/2021/04/ gas-fields-and-jihad-mozambiques-cabo-delgadobecomes-a-resource-rich-war-zone/. 92 International Crisis Group, Stemming the insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, 11 June 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/ mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiquescabo-delgado. 93 Ashoka Mukpo, Gas fields and jihad: Mozambique’s Cabo profiteers-strike-it-rich/. 100 João Feijó, From the ‘faceless enemy’ to the hypothesis of dialogue: Identities, pretensions and channels of communication with the Machababos, OMR, 10 August 2021, https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/ DR-130-Cabo-Delgado-Pt-e-Eng.pdf. 101 GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 7, April–May 2020, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ uploads/2020/05/GI-Risk-Bulletin-007-04May1845proof-5.pdf. 102 João Feijó, From the ‘faceless enemy’ to the hypothesis of dialogue: Identities, pretensions and channels of communication with the Machababos, OMR, 10 August Delgado becomes a resource-rich war zone, Mongabay, 2021, https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/ 26 April 2021, https://news.mongabay.com/2021/04/ DR-130-Cabo-Delgado-Pt-e-Eng.pdf. gas-fields-and-jihad-mozambiques-cabo-delgadobecomes-a-resource-rich-war-zone/. 94 Jason Boswell, Mozambique’s lucrative ruby mines, BBC, 103 VoA, Moçambique: aumentam sinais de alastramento da insurgência islâmica ao Niassa, 13 December 2021, https://www.voaportugues.com/a/aumentam- 10 February 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/ sinais-de-alastramento-da-insurgência-islâmica-à- business-38934307. prov%C3%ADncia-moçambicana-de-niassa/6351986. 95 The biggest single holder of mining concessions in the province is Mwiriti, owned by retired general Raimundo html. 104 GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies Domingos Pachinuapa and his business partner, Asghar in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 7, Fakhraleali. Mwiriti owns MRM in partnership with 7 May 2020, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ Gemfields and owns 7% of mining concessions in the uploads/2020/05/GI-Risk-Bulletin-007-04May1845- province. Public Integrity Center, Requests for mining proof-5.pdf. NOTES 91 105 Eric Morier-Genoud, The jihadi insurgency in recruited. Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Mozambique: Origins, nature and beginning, Journal of Económicos researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October Eastern African Studies, 14, 3, 396–412. 2021, via Zoom. 106 International Crisis Group, Stemming the insurgency Cummings, The Islamic State in Africa: The Emergence, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/ Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront, mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiques- Hurst, 2021, p229. cabo-delgado. 118 Eric Morier-Genoud, The jihadi insurgency in 107 Interview with ISS Consultant Borges Nhamirre, Maputo, 6 October 2021. Mozambique: Origins, nature and beginning, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 14, 3, 396–412. More recently, 108 International Crisis Group, Stemming the insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, 11 June 2021, https://www. the Mozambican authorities indicted four Muslim clerics based in Pemba on charges of supporting the insurgency. crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/303- See Omardine Omar, Os tentáculos do terrorismo em stemming-insurrection-mozambiques-cabo-delgado. Cabo Delgado, Carta de Moçambique, 7 December 2021, 109 Eric Morier-Genoud, The jihadi insurgency in https://cartamz.com/index.php/politica/item/9455- Mozambique: Origins, nature and beginning, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 14, 3, 396–412. For analysis of the prevailing theologies in Mozambican Islam, os-tentaculos-do-terrorismo-em-cabo-delgado-i-poromardine-omar. 119 Alex Vines, Responding to Mozambique’s Islamic see Eric Morier-Genoud, L’islam au Mozambique insurgency: Will foreign military assistance make après l’indépendance: histoire d’une montée en a difference?, Georgetown Journal of International puissance, L’Afrique politique (Paris,), 2002: 126, and Affairs, 15 September 2021, https://gjia.georgetown. Liazzat JK Bonate, Raizes de diversidade no Islão edu/2021/09/15/responding-to-mozambiques-islamic- moçambicano, Lusotopie, XIV(1) | 2007, 129-149, http:// insurgency-will-foreign-military-assistance-make-a- journals.openedition.org/lusotopie/1074. difference/. 110 Eric Morier-Genoud, The jihadi insurgency in 120 Intelyse, Southern African jihad: The Cabo Delgado Mozambique: Origins, nature and beginning, Journal of insurgency, Part I: Uncovering the origins of the Eastern African Studies, 14, 3, 396–412. Cabo Delgado insurgency, https://stability-operations. 111 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, in Maputo, 5 October 2021. org/news/522081/Intelyse-Mozambique-InsurgencyReport.htm. 112 Salvador Forquilha and João Pereira, After all, it is not just 121 João Feijó, From the ‘faceless enemy’ to the hypothesis Cabo Delgado! Insurgency dynamics in Nampula and Niassa, of dialogue: Identities, pretensions and channels of Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, 11 March 2021, communication with the Machababos, OMR, 10 August https://www.iese.ac.mz/ideias-n-138e-sf-jp/. 2021, https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/ 113 Wahhabism refers to a fundamentalist movement within DR-130-Cabo-Delgado-Pt-e-Eng.pdf; Sérgio Chichava, Sunni Islam, which is the dominant form of Islam in The first faces of ‘Al Shabaab’ in Cabo Delgado: The case Saudi Arabia. The movement ascribes to a puritanical of André Idrissa in Cogolo, Instituto de Estudos Sociais interpretation of the Koran and seeks to purify the e Económicos, 28 September 2020, https://www.iese. Muslim faith of other interpretations and practices that deviate from this view. See Christopher M Blanchard, ac.mz/ideias-134e-sc/. 122 Interview with OMR researcher, João Feijó, Maputo, The Islamic traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, CRS 5 October 2021; David M Matsinhe and Estacio Valoi, Report for Congress, January 2008, https://sgp.fas.org/ The genesis of insurgency in northernn Mozambique, crs/misc/RS21695.pdf. Institute for Security Studie, October 2019, https://media. 114 Abisaid M Ali, Islamist extremism in East Africa, Africa africaportal.org/documents/The_Genesis_of_insurgency_ Security Brief No. 32, 9 August 2016, https://africacenter. in_N_Moz.pdf; Brenda Mugeci Githing’u and Tore Refslund org/publication/islamist-extremism-east-africa/. Hamming, ‘‘The Arca of Jihad”: The ecosystem of militancy 115 Alex Vines, Responding to Mozambique’s Islamic in East, Central and Southern Africa, International Centre insurgency: Will foreign military assistance make for the Study of Radicalisation, 2021, https://icsr.info/ a difference?, Georgetown Journal of International wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ICSR-Report-The-Arc-of- Affairs, 15 September 2021, https://gjia.georgetown. Jihad-The-Ecosystem-of-Militancy-in-East-Central-and- edu/2021/09/15/responding-to-mozambiques-islamicinsurgency-will-foreign-military-assistance-make-adifference/. Niassa travelling to study in Tanzania and later being INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION Southern-Africa.pdf. 123 Eric Morier-Genoud, The jihadi insurgency in Mozambique: Origins, nature and beginning, Journal of 116 One researcher cited instances of young people from 92 117 Jason Warner, Ryan O’Farrell, Héni Nsaibia, Ryan in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, 11 June 2021, • Eastern African Studies, 14, 3, 396–412. 124 Sérgio Chichava, The first signs of ‘Al Shabaab’ in Cabo THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Delgado: Some stories from Macomia and Ancuabe, insurgency: Will foreign military assistance make Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, 8 May 2020, a difference?, Georgetown Journal of International https://www.iese.ac.mz/ideias-no-129e/. Affairs, 15 September 2021, https://gjia.georgetown. 125 Sérgio Chichava, The first faces of ‘Al Shabaab’ in Cabo Delgado: The case of André Idrissa in Cogolo, Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, 28 September 2020, https://www.iese.ac.mz/ideias-134e-sc/. 126 International Crisis Group, Stemming the insurgency edu/2021/09/15/responding-to-mozambiques-islamicinsurgency-will-foreign-military-assistance-make-adifference/. 134 GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 7, in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, 11 June 2021, 7 May 2020, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/ uploads/2020/05/GI-Risk-Bulletin-007-04May1845- mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiques- proof-5.pdf. cabo-delgado; Salvador Forquilha and João Pereira, After all, it is not just Cabo Delgado! Insurgency dynamics in Nampula and Niassa, Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, 11 March 2021, https://www.iese.ac.mz/ ideias-n-138e-sf-jp/. 127 João Feijó, Characterization and social organization of 135 Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021, via Zoom. 136 João Feijó, Characterization and social organization of Machababos from the discourses of kidnapped women, OMR, April 2021, https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp- Machababos from the discourses of kidnapped women, content/uploads/OR-109-Characterization-and-social- OMR, April 2021, https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp- organizacion-of-Machababos.pdf. content/uploads/OR-109-Characterization-and-socialorganizacion-of-Machababos.pdf; João Feijó, From the ‘faceless enemy’ to the hypothesis of dialogue: Identities, 137 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021. 138 In July 2021, the Maputo-based NGO Public Integrity pretensions and channels of communication with the Center (CIP) published an analysis finding that Machababos, OMR, 10 August 2021, https://omrmz.org/ attributions of mining concessions have shot up since omrweb/wp-content/uploads/DR-130-Cabo-Delgado- the start of the Cabo Delgado conflict. The CIP analysis Pt-e-Eng.pdf. found that ‘the ownership of a good portion of the 128 Abisaid M Ali, Islamist extremism in East Africa, Africa concessions is owned by politically exposed people or Security Brief No.32, 9 August 2016, https://africacenter. directly linked to influential individuals from the Frelimo org/publication/islamist-extremism-east-africa/. party’. See CIP, Requests for mining concessions increase 129 Ibid. One interviewee confirmed that overseas wealth came as armed conflict in Cabo Delgado intensifies – Who are into the region during this period, and members of the the owners of mining licenses in Cabo Delgado?, 20 July sect were enabled to set up businesses. Interview with ISS consultant Borges Nhamirre, Maputo, 6 October 2021. 130 Interview with a local source employed in a legal transport business owned by known Tanzanian traffickers operating in Pemba, Pemba, 18 January 2021. See also the description of the Zanzibar network in: 2021, https://www.cipmoz.org/en/2021/07/20/8153/. 139 Interview with OMR Researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021; interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021. 140 Simone Haysom, Where crime compounds conflict: Alastair Nelson, A triangle of vulnerability: Changing Understanding northern Mozambique’s vulnerabilities, patterns of illicit trafficking off the Swahili coast, GI-TOC, GI-TOC, 2018, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ May 2020, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/trianglevulnerability-swahili-coast/. 131 Estácio Valoi and Luís Nhachote, Al Shabab em northern_mozambique_violence/. 141 Joseph Hanlon, The Uberization of Mozambique’s heroin trade, London School of Economics, July 2018, https://www. Moçambique ou 43 anos de soberania à meia haste?, lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/ Centro de Jornalismo Investigativo, 28 June 2018, PDFs/Working-Papers/WP190.pdf; Simone Haysom, https://cjimoz.org/news/en/al-shabab-em-mocambique- Where crime compounds conflict: Understanding northern ou-43-anos-de-soberania-a-meia-haste/. Mozambique’s vulnerabilities, GI-TOC, 2018, https:// 132 Simone Haysom, Where crime compounds conflict: Understanding northern Mozambique’s vulnerabilities, globalinitiative.net/analysis/northern_mozambique_violence/. 142 Alastair Nelson, A triangle of vulnerability: Changing GI-TOC, 2018, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ patterns of illicit trafficking off the Swahili coast, GI-TOC, northern_mozambique_violence/; Alastair Nelson, May 2020, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/triangle- A triangle of vulnerability: Changing patterns of illicit vulnerability-swahili-coast/. trafficking off the Swahili coast, GI-TOC, May 2020, 143 GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/triangle-vulnerability- in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 7, swahili-coast/. 7 May 2020, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ 133 Alex Vines, Responding to Mozambique’s Islamic uploads/2020/05/GI-Risk-Bulletin-007-04May1845NOTES 93 proof-5.pdf. bulletin-17/. 144 GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 17, suggest insurgents also drug traffickers, 18 October 28 April 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ 2021, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/ esaobs-risk-bulletin-17/. mozambique-heroin-seizure-suggest-insurgents-also- 145 At a seminar hosted by the Institute for Security Studies in early November 2021, Colonel Omar Saranga, drug-traffickers-202975/. 155 Jason Eligh, A shallow flood: The diffusion of heroin in speaking on behalf of Mozambique’s Ministry of eastern and southern Africa, GI-TOC, May 2020, https:// Defence, said that the insurgents are involved in human globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/A- and drug trafficking and a range of other illicit activities. Shallow-Flood-The-Diffusion-of-Heroin-in-Eastern-and- Professor Mpho Molomo, Head of SADC Mission in Mozambique, said that the funding of the insurgents Southern-Africa-GITOC.pdf. 156 GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies by the illicit economy was known to be a problem, but in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 12, it was too early to make a definitive assessment. See October 2020, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ the recording at: Institute for Security Studies, Will uploads/2020/10/GI-TOC-ESAObs-RB12.pdf; GI- foreign intervention save Cabo Delgado?, 8 November TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies 2021, https://issafrica.org/events/will-foreign- in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 21, intervention-save-cabo-delgado. In October 2021, 28 October 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ kilograms of heroin were seized in Mocímboa da Praia uploads/2021/10/GITOC-East-and-Southern-Africa- from a building previously occupied by insurgents. Risk-Bulletin-21.pdf. Mozambican authorities reported that they ‘suspected’ 157 Jason Eligh, A synthetic age: The evolution of the drugs were being trafficked by the insurgents. Club methamphetamine markets in Eastern and Southern of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado: Military find heroin in Africa, GI-TOC, March 2021, https://globalinitiative. building previously occupied by insurgents, 19 October net/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GITOC-A-Synthetic- 2021, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/cabo- Age-The-Evolution-of-Methamphetamine-Markets-in- delgado-military-find-heroin-in-building-previously- Eastern-and-Southern-Africa.pdf. occupied-by-insurgents-dw-203059/. 158 Allesandro Ford, Mozambique becoming Southern 146 Simone Haysom, Where crime compounds conflict: Africa’s cocaine platform, InSight Crime, 18 June 2021, Understanding northern Mozambique’s vulnerabilities, https://insightcrime.org/news/mozambique-becoming- GI-TOC, 2018, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ southern-africas-cocaine-platform/. northern_mozambique_violence/. 159 GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies 147 GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 8, in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 17, June 2020, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ 28 April 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ uploads/2020/06/Civil-Society-Observatory-of-Illicit- esaobs-risk-bulletin-17/. Economies-in-Eastern-and-Southern-Africa-Risk- 148 Interview with international law enforcement source, Maputo, 5 October 2021. Bulletin-8.pdf. 160 Interviews with members of drug trafficking networks, 149 Investigative report: Pemba, Montepuez and Negomano, submitted by Omardine Omar to the GI-TOC, 9 October 2021 (unpublished). Cape Town, October–November 2021. 161 Jason Eligh, A shallow flood: The diffusion of heroin in Eastern and Southern Africa, GI-TOC, 150 Interview with Mozambican law enforcement May 2020, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content official, WhatsApp, 11 January 2022; Interview with Mozambican journalist, WhatsApp, 13 January 2022. 151 Interview with international law enforcement source, Maputo, 5 October 2021. uploads/2020/05/A-Shallow-Flood-The-Diffusion-ofHeroin-in-Eastern-and-Southern-Africa-GITOC.pdf. 162 Interviews with members of drug trafficking networks, Cape Town, October–November 2021. 152 GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies 163 See, for example, Jonisayi Maromo, Two in court for in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 17, attempt to transport R1.5 worth of crystal meth, 28 April 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ IOL News, 21 October 2021, https://www.iol.co.za/ esaobs-risk-bulletin-17/. news/crime-and-courts/two-in-court-for-attempt- 153 Joseph Hanlon, The Uberization of Mozambique’s to-transport-r1-5-worth-of-crystal-meth-2b4a989e- heroin trade, London School of Economics, July 2018, 1b99-454f-9978-6b382657a82a; Suthentira Govender, https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/ Alleged drug smugglers bust with R6.9m worth of heroin Assets/Documents/PDFs/Working-Papers/WP190.pdf; in KZN, 24 November 2021, https://www.timeslive. GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies co.za/news/south-africa/2021-11-24-alleged-drug- in Eastern and Southern Africa, Issue 17, 28 April smugglers-bust-with-r69m-worth-of-heroin-in-kzn/. 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/esaobs-risk- 94 154 Club of Mozambique, Mozambique: Heroin seizure INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • 164 Investigative report: The nuances of transboundary THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS trafficking in firearms, women and mineral resources specific to northern Mozambique, submitted by Arlindo 174 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021. Chissale to GI-TOC, 7 November 2021 (unpublished); 175 Investigative report: Pemba, Montepuez and Negomano, Interview with private-sector security officer, northern submitted by Omardine Omar to GI-TOC, 9 October Mozambique, 7 October 2021. 165 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021. 166 Interview with private-sector security officer, northern 2021 (unpublished). 176 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021. 177 Alastair Nelson, A triangle of vulnerability: Changing Mozambique, 7 October 2021. See, for example, images patterns of illicit trafficking off the Swahili coast, GI-TOC, shared of insurgent bases recaptured by the Rwandan May 2020, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/triangle- Defence Force and the Mozambican military in October 2021: https://igihe.com/imikino/article/rdf-n-ingabo- vulnerability-swahili-coast/. 178 Environmental Investigation Agency, Shipping industry: za-mozambique-bakomeje-guhashya-ibyihe-mu- Where there is a will there is a way, 26 May 2021, https:// mashyamba-ya-cabo. eia-global.org/press-releases/20210527-containers-of- 167 João Feijó, Characterization and social organization of Machababos from the discourses of kidnapped women, stolen-illegal-timber-return-to-mozambique. 179 Mozambique News Agency, Mozambique: Three more OMR, April 2021, https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp- containers of stolen timber recovered, AllAfrica, 27 July content/uploads/OR-109-Characterization-and-social- 2021, https://allafrica.com/stories/202107270743.html. organizacion-of-Machababos.pdf. 168 Human Rights Watch, Mozambique: Hundreds of 180 Club of Mozambique, Mozambique: Illegally exported timber recovered, 16 November 2021, women, girls abducted, 7 December 2021, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique- https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/07/mozambique- illegally-exported-timber-recovered-204690/. hundreds-women-girls-abducted. See also UNHCR and 181 While many companies operate with legal concessions London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, A to harvest logs, this becomes illegal trade when the rapid assessment of the gender-based violence (GBV) volumes and species harvested go outside legal situation and response in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, bounds, and when unworked logs are exported from December 2021, https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/media/56116; https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/07/mozambiquehundreds-women-girls-abducted. 169 Investigative report: The nuances of transboundary Mozambique. 182 Interview with senior wildlife official from Niassa Special Reserve, 7 October 2021. 183 Interview with conservationists working in Niassa trafficking in firearms, women and mineral resources Special Reserve, 7 to 10 October 2021; GI-TOC, Civil specific to northern Mozambique, submitted by Arlindo Society Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern Chissale to the GI-TOC, 7 November 2021 (unpublished). and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 17, 28 April 170 Carta de Moçambique, Terroristas assassinam 11 pessoas em Mueda e Macomia, 16 November 2021, https:// cartamz.com/index.php/politica/item/9298-terroristas- 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/esaobs-riskbulletin-17/. 184 Investigative report: Pemba, Montepuez and Negomano, assassinam-11-pessoas-em-mueda-e-macomia; submitted by Omardine Omar to GI-TOC, 9 October WhatsApp messaging communication with a local 2021 (unpublished). journalist, 14 November 2021. 185 Interview with local source, Pemba, 10 October 2021. 171 Investigative report: The nuances of transboundary 186 Marcena Hunter, Chikomeni Manda and Gabriel Moberg, trafficking in firearms, women and mineral resources Scratching the surface: Tracing coloured gemstone flows specific to northern Mozambique, submitted by from northern Mozambique and Malawi to Tanzania, Arlindo Chissale to the GI-TOC, 7 November 2021 Thailand, and Sri Lanka, GI-TOC, 5 November 2021, (unpublished). https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/gemstone-flows- 172 AP News, Two nuns seized by Islamic rebels Mozambique released, 10 September 2020, https:// mozambique-malawi-asia/. 187 Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli and Yussuf Adam, The apnews.com/article/praia-mozambique-tanzania-islamic- emergence of violent extremism in northern Mozambique, state-group-europe-fde6b10a3ee696d3e557f11e507 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 25 March 2018, 6b5a0; Interview with private-sector security officer, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-emergence-of- northern Mozambique, 7 October 2021. violent-extremism-in-northern-mozambique/. 173 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 188 Salvador Forquilha and João Pereira, After all, it is not just 5 October 2021; Investigative report: The nuances of Cabo Delgado! Insurgency dynamics in Nampula and Niassa, transboundary trafficking in firearms, women and mineral Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, 11 March 2021, resources specific to northern Mozambique, submitted https://www.iese.ac.mz/ideias-n-138e-sf-jp/. by Arlindo Chissale to GI-TOC, 7 November 2021 (unpublished). 189 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021; Interview with senior wildlife official NOTES 95 from Niassa Special Reserve, 7 October 2021. submitted by Omardine Omar to the GI-TOC, 9 October 190 GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 17, 28 April 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ Maputo, 8 October 2021; Interview with international esaobs-risk-bulletin-17/. law enforcement representative, Maputo, 5 October 191 João Feijó, From the ‘faceless enemy’ to the hypothesis of dialogue: Identities, pretensions and channels of communication with the Machababos, OMR, 10 August 2021; Interview with private-sector security officer, Pemba, 11 October 2021. 201 See Centro de Jornalismo Investigativo, Bonomado 2021, https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/ Machude Omar ou Ibn Omar: The Mozambican face DR-130-Cabo-Delgado-Pt-e-Eng.pdf. of terrorism in Cabo Delgado, 22 September 2020, 192 Interview with private-sector security officer, Pemba, 13 October 2021. https://cjimoz.org/news/en/bonomado-machude-omarou-ibn-omar-the-mozambican-face-of-terrorism-in- 193 Investigative report: Pemba, Montepuez and Negomano, submitted by Omardine Omar to the GI-TOC, 9 October 2021 (unpublished). cabo-delgado/. 202 As illustrated in the earliest known images of the insurgents, featured in the timeline on page 10. 194 International Crisis Group reported a similar finding in 203 See Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane, How to silence the guns? 2020, saying ‘some experts fear that the movement Southern Africa’s illegal firearms markets, GI-TOC, could start taking a slice of contraband profits, including 15 September 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ via bankrolling networks of gold and gemstone southern-africas-illegal-firearms-markets/. miners and smugglers operating in the province’. 204 Ed Stoddard, Mozambique’s Niassa Reserve turns tide International Crisis Group, Stemming the insurrection on ‘catastrophic’ ivory poaching, Daily Maverick, 19 June in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, 11 June 2021, 2019, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019- https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/ 06-19-mozambiques-niassa-reserve-turns-tide-on- mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiques- catastrophic-ivory-poaching/; GI-TOC, Civil Society cabo-delgado. Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern 195 Information confirmed from interviews with three Africa risk bulletin, Issue 5, 28 February 2021, https:// separate sources, one the son of an al-Shabaab leader, one a former member of the insurgency based in globalinitiative.net/analysis/esaobs-risk-bulletin-5/. 205 Rachel Bale, How illegal weapons fuel poaching – and Montepuez, and another a local source connected to the poaching fuel illegal weapons trade, National Geographic, fishing community. 12 January 2016, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/ 196 International Crisis Group, Stemming the insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, 11 June 2021, animals/article/160112-Africa-gun-control-poachingelephants-rhinos. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern- 206 Calibre Obscura, The weaponry of IS Central Africa africa/mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection- (Pt 1): Insurgents in Mozambique, 22 December 2021, mozambiques-cabo-delgado. See also Centro de https://www.calibreobscura.com/the-weaponry-of-is- Jornalismo Investigativo, Bonomado Machude Omar central-africa-pt-1-insurgents-in-mozambique/; Piers ou Ibn Omar: The Mozambican face of terrorism in Pigou and Jasmine Opperman, Conflict in Cabo Delgado: Cabo Delgado, 22 September 2020, https://cjimoz. From the frying pan into the fire?, Rosa Luxemburg org/news/en/bonomado-machude-omar-ou-ibn-omar- Stiftung, 15 June 2021; Intelyse, Southern African jihad: the-mozambican-face-of-terrorism-in-cabo-delgado/; The Cabo Delgado insurgency, Part II: Cabo Delgado Centro de Jornalismo Investigativo, Lifting the fog ignites, October 2017–31 January 2020, 17 August reveals ringleaders behind Cabo Delgado terrorism, 2020, https://stability-operations.org/news/522081/ 29 September 2020, https://cjimoz.org/news/en/lifting- Intelyse-Mozambique-Insurgency-Report.htm; of-the-fog-reveals-ring-leaders-behind-cabo-delgado- International Crisis Group, Stemming the insurrection terrorism/. in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, 11 June 2021, 197 These contacts reportedly include another known https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/ member of the insurgency and a Tanzanian businessman mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiques- who has allegedly financed the insurgency in Cabo cabo-delgado; interviews with private-sector security Delgado and Tanzania through his various businesses in Tanzania and Kenya. officers, Pemba, 9–12 October 2021. 207 Erika Gibson, SADC forces tread dangerous ground in 198 This information was confirmed by four separate Mozambique, Business Day, 19 September 2021, https:// participants in Montepuez, one of them the son of an www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2021-09-19- al-Shabaab leader. sadc-forces-tread-dangerous-ground-in-mozambique/; 199 Investigative report: Pemba, Montepuez and Negomano, 96 2021 (unpublished). 200 Interview with a Mozambican investigative journalist, INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • Cabo Ligado, By the numbers: Cabo Delgado, October THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 2017–September 2021, 14 September 2021, https:// 15 September, https://www.caboligado.com/monthly- www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-6- reports/cabo-ligado-monthly-august-2021; Cabo 12-september-2021. Reports that the insurgents are Ligado, By the numbers: Cabo Delgado, October using explosives were later refuted by the Mozambican 2017–September 2021, 14 September 2021, https:// authorities. See Mozambique News Agency, Mozambique: www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/cabo-ligado- Defence Minister unaware of landmine use by Isis monthly-sept-2021; Cabo Ligado, October at a glance, terrorists, 20 September 2021, https://allafrica.com/ 15 November 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/ stories/202109210178.html. 208 Interview with a private-sector security/logistics consultant, Pemba, 13 October 2021. 209 There are reports that Ibn Omar had served in the navy in Pemba. João Feijó, From the ‘faceless enemy’ to the hypothesis of dialogue: Identities, pretensions and channels of communication with the Machababos, OMR, 10 August 2021, https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wpcontent/uploads/DR-130-Cabo-Delgado-Pt-e-Eng.pdf. 210 Calibre Obscura, The weaponry of IS Central Africa (Pt 1): Insurgents in Mozambique, 22 December 2021, https://www.calibreobscura.com/the-weaponry-of-iscentral-africa-pt-1-insurgents-in-mozambique/. 211 João Feijó reports from interviews with kidnapped monthly-reports/cabo-ligado-monthly-oct-2021. 218 Africa News, Rwanda military says it has helped Mozambique retake Mocímboa da Praia, 9 August 2021, https://www.africanews.com/2021/08/09/ rwanda-military-says-it-has-helped-mozambique-retakemocímboa-da-praia//. 219 Cabo Ligado, October at a glance, 15 November 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/caboligado-monthly-oct-2021. 220 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021. 221 Cabo Ligado reports that civilians who escaped insurgent custody during October 2021 said insurgents are facing extreme supply shortages after being women that there were suspicions that al-Shabaab pushed out of their bases by offensives from the pro- had been sourcing weapons from overseas. João Feijó, government coalition. Cabo Ligado, October at a glance, Characterization and social organization of Machababos 15 November 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/ from the discourses of kidnapped women, OMR, April 2021, https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/ monthly-reports/cabo-ligado-monthly-oct-2021. 222 Médecins Sans Frontières, “It’s extremely volatile” – OR-109-Characterization-and-social-organizacion- people in Cabo Delgado continue to flee violence, 21 of-Machababos.pdf; Investigative report: Pemba, December 2021, https://www.msf.org/people-flee- Montepuez and Negomano, submitted by Omardine Omar to GI-TOC, 9 October 2021 (unpublished); Jenni insecurity-and-violence-cabo-delgado-mozambique. 223 Cabo Ligado Weekly: 6–12 December, published 15 Irish-Qhobosheane, How to silence the guns? Southern December 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/reports/ Africa’s illegal firearms markets, GI-TOC, 15 September cabo-ligado-weekly-6-12-december-2021. André 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/southern- Baptista, Moçambique: Novos ataques em Cabo Delgado africas-illegal-firearms-markets/. fazem população temer regresso da guerra, VoA, 6 January 212 Interviews with two sources in Niassa Province linked to the insurgency, November 2021. 213 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021; Investigative report: Pemba, Montepuez and Negomano, submitted by Omardine Omar to the GI-TOC, 9 October 2021 (unpublished). 214 Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane, How to silence the guns? 2022, https://www.voaportugues.com/a/moçambiquenovos-ataques-em-cabo-delgado-fazem-populaçãotemer-regresso-da-guerra/6385482.html. 224 Information from local journalist, WhatsApp, 15 December 2021. 225 Cabo Ligado, By the numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017–December 2021, 30 November 2021, https:// Southern Africa’s illegal firearms markets, GI-TOC, www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-22- 15 September 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ 28-november-2021; Cabo Ligado, By the numbers: Cabo southern-africas-illegal-firearms-markets/. Delgado, October 2017-December 2021, 7 December 215 GI-TOC, Civil Society Observatory of Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa risk bulletin, Issue 17, 28 April 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ esaobs-risk-bulletin-17/. 216 Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane, How to silence the guns? 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligadoweekly-29-november-5-december-2021. 226 Pinnacle News WhatsApp group reporting information gleaned from the capture of Amade Muahamed Dade by Rwandan forces at Namoto, 8 January Southern Africa’s illegal firearms markets, GI-TOC, 2022. See also: https://twitter.com/DelgadoCabo/ 15 September 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/ status/1479798131093086208. southern-africas-illegal-firearms-markets/. 217 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021; Cabo Ligado, August at a glance, 227 Zitamar, Local militia capture suspected insurgents in Nangade, 26 December 2021, https://zitamar.com/localmilitia-capture-two-insurgents-in-nangade/. NOTES 97 228 SADC, Experts agree that foreign intervention will Delgado, October 2017–December 2021, 7 December help Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado to curb insurgency, 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado- 11 November 2021, https://www.sadc.int/news-events/ weekly-29-november-5-december-2021. news/experts-agree-foreign-intervention-will-helpmozambiques-cabo-delgado-curb-insurgency/. 31 December 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb. 229 Cabo Ligado, October at a glance, 15 November 2021, int/files/resources/Northern%20Mozambique%20 https://www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/cabo- Crisis%20%20Flash%20Report%203-%20Newly%20 ligado-monthly-oct-2021. Displaced%20Families%20in%20EPC%20Mecula%20 230 Aaron Y Zelin, Al-Nabā newsletter issue #312, Niassa%20%2831%20December%202021%29.pdf Jihadology.net, 18 November 2021, https://jihadology. net/?s=al-naba+312. 242 Salvador Forquilha and João Pereira, After all, it is not just Cabo Delgado! Insurgency dynamics in Nampula 231 SADC Press Statement, SADC Mission in Mozambique and Niassa, Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, (SAMIM) in brief, 10 November 2021, https://www. 11 March 2021, https://www.iese.ac.mz/ideias-n-138e- sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-mission-mozambique- sf-jp/; Interview with a veteran conservation manager in samim-brief/; Flavien Ndagijamana, Abakomando ba RDF Mozambique, Pemba, 9 October 2021. n’ingabo z’iki Gihugu bakomeje guhiga bukware ibyihebe mu mashyamba ya Cabo Delgado, Amizero.rw, 31 October 2021, https://amizero.rw/mozambique-abakomandoba-rdf-ningabo-ziki-gihugu-bakomeje-guhiga-bukwareibyihebe-mu-mashyamba-ya-cabo-delgado-amafoto/. 232 Interview with ISS consultant Borges Nhamirre, Maputo, 243 Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021, via Zoom. 244 Ibid.; Interview with Yussuf Adam, Maputo, 8 October 2021. 245 Cabo Ligado, By the numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 6 October 2021; Interview with private-sector security 2017–November 2021, 30 November 2021, https:// consultant, Pemba, 12 October 2021. www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-22- 233 Interview with private-sector business owner, Palma, 7 October 2021. 28-november-2021; Interview with Government official in Niassa Province by WhatsApp, 9 December 2021. 234 Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021, via Zoom. 246 Interview with the Niassa Reserve conservation manager, Pemba, 9 October 2021. 247 Interview with senior conservationist, Maputo, 235 Ibid.; interview with private-sector business owner, Palma, 7 October 2021; interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021. 7 October 2021. 248 Interview with Niassa government official, Pemba, 9 October 2021. 236 Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021, via Zoom. 249 Ibid. 250 Borgess Nhamirre confirmed Ugandan, Somali and Congolese fighters are present. Interview with ISS 237 Conversions via Oanda currency converter, as of consultant Borges Nhamirre, Maputo, 6 October 20 December 2021, https://www1.oanda.com/currency/ 2021. The Ugandans, Tanzanians and Congolese make converter/. up the majority of the permanent foreign fighters in 238 A conservationist working in Niassa shared a report with Mozambique, but others travel into the region for the GI-TOC stating that insurgents were first spotted in specific missions. Interview with private-sector business the province on 24 and 30 November 2021. owner, Palma, 7 October 2021; Interview with OMR 239 Angus Begg, Mozambique’s ISIS insurgency threatens to destroy conservation progress and fragile environmental researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021. 251 João Feijó, Characterization and social organization of protections in Niassa Special Reserve, Daily Maverick, Machababos from the discourses of kidnapped women, 17 December 2021, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ OMR, April 2021, https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp- article/2021-12-17-mozambiques-isis-insurgency- content/uploads/OR-109-Characterization-and-social- threatens-to-destroy-conservation-progress-and-fragile- organizacion-of-Machababos.pdf. environmental-protections-in-niassa-special-reserve/. 252 Interview with Yussuf Adam, Maputo, 8 October 2021. Information also shared by Colleen Begg, managing 253 Interview with a security analyst based in Maputo, director at the Niassa Carnivore Project, via Twitter, 13 January 2021 and 6 October 2021. 11 December 2021, https://mobile.twitter.com/ 254 Interview with security analyst, Maputo, 6 October 2021. ColleenBegg1/status/1469652519894896641. 255 Ibid.; Interview with private-sector security consultant, 240 Information shared with the GI-TOC from Pemba, 12 October 2021. conservationists working in Niassa on 3 December 2021. See also Cabo Ligado, By the numbers: Cabo 98 241 IOM, Flash Report 3 | Displacements in Mecula sede, INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • 256 João Feijó, Characterization and social organization of Machababos from the discourses of kidnapped women, THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OMR, April 2021; Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021; Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021, via Zoom. 257 Interview with ISS consultant Borges Nhamirre, Maputo, 6 October 2021. 258 See the ExTrac report for a summary of how the Islamic State communications on Mozambique have changed over time: ExTrac, The Islamic State in Mozambique: A profile, September 2021, https://public-assets.extrac. io/reports/ExTrac_ISCAP_090921.pdf. 259 Interview with private-sector security/logistics consultant of 15 years, Pemba, 11 October 2021. 260 Interview with private-sector business owner in Palma, 7 October 2021. 261 Interview with Hawks officer in the Crimes Against the State unit, 4 November 2021, by phone. 262 Brenda Githing’u, The counterterrorism conundrum: newsletter-al-naba-190/. 272 A wilāyat, the plural of wilāyah or the Arabic ‫ةيالو‬, refers to an administrative division, state, province or governate. 273 Robert Postings, Islamic State recognizes new Central Africa Province, deepening ties with DR Congo militants, The Defense Post, 30 April 2019, https://www. thedefensepost.com/2019/04/30/islamic-state-newcentral-africa-province/. 274 Dino Mahtani, The Kampala attacks and their regional implications, International Crisis Group, 18 November 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ uganda/kampala-attacks-and-their-regional-implications. 275 Wassim Nasr, 18 April 2019, https://twitter.com/ SimNasr/status/1119161605650915328. 276 Missy Ryan and Dan Lamothe, Trump says Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi blew himself up as US troops closed in, The Washington Post, Exploring the evolution of South Africa’s extremist 27 October 2019, https://www.washingtonpost. networks, Hudson Institute, 23 October 2021, https:// com/world/national-security/us-forces-launch- www.hudson.org/research/17128-the-counterterrorism- operation-in-syria-targeting-isis-leader-baghdadi- conundrum-exploring-the-evolution-of-south-africa-s- officials-say/2019/10/27/081bc257-adf1-4db6-9a6a- extremist-networks. 9b820dd9e32d_story.html. 263 Interview with Adriano Nuvunga, CDD, Pemba, 277 Aaron Y Zelin, Al-Nabā newsletter issue #207, 15 October 2021; Interview with Instituto de Estudos Jihadology.net, 21 November 2021, https://jihadology. Sociais e Económicos researcher Salvador Forquilha, net/2019/11/07/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states- 12 October 2021, via Zoom. newsletter-al-naba-207/. 264 Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos 278 Cameron Glenn, Mattison Rowan, John Caves and researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021, via Garrett Nada, Timeline: The rise, spread and fall of the Zoom; Interview with senior wildlife official from Niassa Islamic State, Wilson Center, 28 October 2019, https:// Special Reserve, 7 October 2021. www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread- 265 Investigative report: The nuances of transboundary trafficking in firearms, women and mineral resources and-fall-the-islamic-state. 279 ExTrac, The Islamic State in Mozambique: A profile, specific to northern Mozambique, submitted by Arlindo ExTrac, September 2021, https://public-assets.extrac.io/ Chissale to GI-TOC, 7 November 2021 (unpublished). reports/ExTrac_ISCAP_090921.pdf. 266 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 280 Jason Warner, Ryan O’Farrell, Héni Nsaibia, Ryan 5 October 2021; Interview with security analyst, Maputo, Cummings, The Islamic State in Africa: The Emergence, 6 October 2021; Interview with ISS consultant Borges Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront, Nhamirre, Maputo, 6 October 2021, who reported that Hurst, 2021, p 229. this had been confirmed by four separate sources. 267 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 5 October 2021. 268 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 281 Cabo Ligado, July at a glance, 16 August 2021, https:// www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/cabo-ligadomonthly-july-2021. 282 Aaron Y Zelin, Al-Nabā newsletter issue #229, 5 October 2021; Interview with private-sector business Jihadology.net, 9 April 2020, https://jihadology. owner, Palma, 7 October 2021. net/2020/04/09/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states- 269 Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021, via Zoom. 270 Robert Postings, Islamic State arrival in Mozambique further complicates Cabo Delgado violence, The Defense Post, 13 June 2019, https://www. thedefensepost.com/2019/06/13/islamic-statemozambique-cabo-delgado-iscap/. 271 Ibid. See also Aaron Y Zelin, Al-Nabā newsletter issue #190, Jihadology.net, 11 July 2019, https://jihadology. net/2019/07/11/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states- newsletter-al-naba-229/. 283 Aaron Y Zelin, Al-Nabā newsletter issue #312, Jihadology.net, 18 November 2021, https://jihadology. net/2021/11/18/new-issue-of-the-islamic-statesnewsletter-al-naba-312-2/. 284 Cabo Ligado, By the numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017–November 2021, 16 November 2021, https:// www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-8-14november-2021. 285 Information from monitoring of Islamic State encrypted NOTES 99 social media channels, November–December 2021. article/2019-10-17-whos-who-on-the-us-blacklist/; Analysis also supported by International Crisis Group Brenda Githing’u, The counterterrorism conundrum: CrisisWatch initiative, Mozambique: November 2021, Exploring the evolution of South Africa’s extremist https://www.crisisgroup.org/index.php?q=crisiswatch/ networks, Hudson Institute, 23 October 2021, database&location%5B0%5D=125&crisis_=. Cabo https://www.hudson.org/research/17128-the- Ligado, By the numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017– counterterrorism-conundrum-exploring-the-evolution- November 2021, 15 December 2021, https://www. of-south-africa-s-extremist-networks; Peter Fabricius, caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-6-12- Case against Dockrats ‘legally sufficient’, IOL News, december-2021; Cabo Ligado, By the numbers: Cabo 29 January 2007, https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ Delgado, October 2017–November 2021, 30 November 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligadoweekly-22-28-november-2021. (SDGT) designations, 26 January 2007, https://home. 286 For example, see this release of images to the media from the SADC force operating in Mozambique: treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recentactions/20070126. https://clubofmozambique.com/news/samim-mediarelease-sadc-mission-in-mozambique-fully-operationalunabridged-200315/. 293 Interview with South African prosecutor with knowledge of the Thulsie case, October 2021. 294 Provisional indictment, in the High Court of South 287 Allan Olingo, Security agony for Dar, Nairobi as terror suspects sneak back home, The East African, 28 August Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, State vs. Brandon-Lee Thulsie and Tony-Lee Thulsie, 2017. 2021, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east- 295 Ibid. africa/security-agony-for-dar-nairobi-as-terror-suspects- 296 Provisional indictment, in the High Court Of South sneak-home-3529032; Dino Mahtani, The Kampala Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, State attacks and their regional implications, International vs. Brandon-Lee Thulsie and Tony-Lee Thulsie, 2017. Crisis Group, 18 November 2021, https://www. Annexes to the Indictment, State vs. Brandon-Lee crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/uganda/kampalaattacks-and-their-regional-implications. Thulsie and Tony-Lee Thulsie, 12 March 2019. 297 Provisional indictment, in the High Court of South 288 Dino Mahtani, The Kampala attacks and their regional implications, International Crisis Group, 18 November 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn- Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, State vs. Brandon-Lee Thulsie and Tony-Lee Thulsie, 2017. 298 BBC News, Kenya police ‘foil anthrax attack’ by ‘IS-linked africa/uganda/kampala-attacks-and-their-regional- group’, 4 May 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- implicationshttps://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/ africa-36198561. horn-africa/uganda/kampala-attacks-and-their-regionalimplications. 299 Andrew Wasike, Kenya names 9 terrorism financiers, freezes assets, Anadolu Agency, 2 September 2020, 289 Peter Fabricius, Islamic State insurgents could https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/kenya-names-9- target South Africa, warns President Ramaphosa terrorism-financiers-freezes-assets/1961089. during Pretoria conference with Kenya’s Kenyatta, 300 According to a report by the European Institute of Peace, 24 November 2021, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ Abu Fidaa is a Kenyan academic who was regarded as article/2021-11-24-islamic-state-insurgents-could- an important IS recruiter who controlled a network of target-south-africa-warns-president-ramaphosa-during- other recruiters and facilitators assisting recruits to join pretoria-conference-with-kenyas-kenyatta/. IS affiliates in Libya, Syria and Somaliland, European 290 Brenda Githing’u links this opposition to ‘war on terror’ policies to the ANC’s own history as a designated Institute of Peace, The Islamic State in East Africa, 2017, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2018648.html. terror organization and argues that this position ‘is 301 Provisional indictment, in the High Court of South widely thought to have garnered the support of Muslim communities and civil society organizations both locally and internationally. Consequently, there has been a long- Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, State vs. Brandon-Lee Thulsie and Tony-Lee Thulsie, 2017. 302 Jeanette Chabalala, Terror-accused siblings’ case standing assumption that South Africa would be safe from postponed for trial, News24, 10 November 2016, domestic threats of terrorism’. See Brenda Githing’u, The https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/ counterterrorism conundrum: Exploring the evolution of news/terror-accused-siblings-case-postponed-for- South Africa’s extremist networks, Hudson Institute, 23 October 2021, https://www.hudson.org/research/17128- trial-20161110. 303 82 FR 44024 – Designation of Brandon-Lee Thulsie, the-counterterrorism-conundrum-exploring-the-evolution- aka Sallahuddin Thulsie, aka Salahuddin ibn Hernani of-south-africa-s-extremist-networks. as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, https:// 291 Jacques Coetzee, Who’s who on the US blacklist, www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2017-09-20/2017- Mail & Guardian, 17 October 2019, https://mg.co.za/ 100 case-against-dockrats-legally-sufficient-312987. 292 US Department of the Treasury, Global terrorism INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • 20031 82. FR 44023 - E.O. 13224 Designation of Tony- THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS Lee Thulsie, aka Yakeen Thulsie, aka Yaqeen ibn Hernani, 315 De Limburger, Zes jaar cel voor Maastrichtse jihadist aka Yakeen, aka Simba as a Specially Designated Global Mohammed G, 22 October 2019, https://www.ad.nl/ Terrorist, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2017- limburg/zes-jaar-cel-voor-maastrichtse-jihadist- 09-20/2017-20030. 304 IOL News, Kidnappers of UK couple discussed plans to mohammed-g-br~a1a81885/. 316 News24, Dutch jihadist suspect ‘involved’ in South ‘kill the kuffar’, 6 March 2018, https://www.iol.co.za/ African kidnapping – reports, 27 August 2018, https:// news/kidnappers-of-uk-couple-discussed-plans-to-kill- www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/dutch- the-kuffar-13627042. jihadist-suspect-involved-in-south-african-kidnapping- 305 Jeff Wicks, ‘It looked like a slaughterhouse’ – eyewitness reports-20180827. to KZN mosque attack, TimesLive, 10 May 2018, https:// 317 Social media post viewed by GI-TOC, 23 January 2020. www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-05-10- 318 Interview with South African prosecutor with knowledge it-looked-like-a-slaughterhouse--eyewitness-to-kznmosque-attack/. 306 Jeff Wicks, update | Moulana targeted by ‘bomb’ in of the Thulsie case, October 2021. 319 Kailene Pillay, KZN terror suspects accused of Woolworths bombings and deadly mosque attack free Verulam mosque, TimesLive, 13 May 2018, https:// after 2-year court battle, IOL News, 14 July 2020, www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-05-13- https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/ police-respond-to-bomb-threat-at-verulam-mosque/. kzn-terror-suspects-accused-of-woolworths-bombings- 307 Brenda Githing’u, The counterterrorism conundrum: Exploring the evolution of South Africa’s extremist networks, Hudson Institute, https://www.hudson.org/ and-deadly-mosque-attack-free-after-2-year-courtbattle-50948917. 320 Peter Fabricius, Kliprivier kidnapping cell was funding research/17128-the-counterterrorism-conundrum- Islamic State terrorism, say sources, Daily Maverick, exploring-the-evolution-of-south-africa-s-extremist- 30 July 2020, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ networks. article/2020-07-30-kliprivier-kidnapping-cell-was- 308 Interview with South African prosecutor with knowledge of the Thulsie case, October 2021. 309 Brenda Githing’u, The counterterrorism conundrum: funding-islamic-state-terrorism-say-sources/. 321 Orrin Singh, Durban firearm raid: Case withdrawn against former ‘terror-linked’ accused, TimesLIVE, Exploring the evolution of South Africa’s extremist 5 July 2021, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/ networks, Hudson Institute, https://www.hudson.org/ south-africa/2021-07-05-durban-firearm-raid-case- research/17128-the-counterterrorism-conundrum- withdrawn-against-former-terror-linked-accused/. exploring-the-evolution-of-south-africa-s-extremist- 322 Letter of demand, Yusuf Cassim & Associates, Case No. networks, and Jeff Wicks, Explosives experts to analyze mosque ‘bomb’, TimesLive, 14 May 2018, https:// www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-05-14explosives-experts-to-analyse-mosque-bomb/. 310 Rebecca Davis, A tale of two eerily similar bombs found in two very different KZN places, Daily Maverick, 9 July B612/18 Verulam Mag Crt, on behalf of Farad Hoomer et al, 26 August 2021. 323 Provisional indictment, in the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, State vs. Brandon-Lee Thulsie and Tony-Lee Thulsie, 2017. 324 Brenda Githing’u, The counterterrorism conundrum: 2018, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-07- Exploring the evolution of South Africa’s extremist 09-a-tale-of-two-eerily-similar-bombs-found-in-two-very- networks, Hudson Institute, https://www.hudson.org/ different-kzn-places/; Suthentira Govender, Extortion link research/17128-the-counterterrorism-conundrum- to Durban bombings: Bheki Cele, 5 October 2018, https:// exploring-the-evolution-of-south-africa-s-extremist- www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-10-05extortion-link-to-durban-bombings-bheki-cele/. 311 Janine Moodley, Court orders KZN terror ‘kingpin’ to networks. 325 According to a report by the European Institute of Peace, Abu Fidaa is a Kenyan academic who was regarded as provide his voice samples, IOL News, 31 January 2020, an important IS recruiter who controlled a network of https://www.iol.co.za/thepost/news/court-orders-kzn- other recruiters and facilitators assisting recruits to join terror-kingpin-to-provide-his-voice-samples-41803124. IS affiliates in Libya, Syria and Somaliland, European 312 19 suspects were initially arrested. Following an identity parade, charges against seven were dropped. 313 Charge sheet, Case No B612/18, Farad Hoomer and 18 others, 8 October 2018. 314 Mxolisi Mngadi, KZN bomb attacks: Court hears Institute of Peace, The Islamic State in East Africa, 2017, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2018648.html. 326 Kailene Pillay, KZN terror suspects accused of Woolworths bombings and deadly mosque attack free after 2-year court battle, IOL News, 14 July 2020, https://www. 11 accused linked to ISIS, news24, https://www.news24. iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/kzn-terror- com/news24/southafrica/news/kzn-bomb-attacks- suspects-accused-of-woolworths-bombings-and-deadly- court-hears-11-accused-linked-to-isis-20181023. mosque-attack-free-after-2-year-court-battle-50948917. NOTES 101 327 De Limburger, Zes jaar cel voor Maastrichtse jihadist Sayfudeen Aslam del Vecchio and Bibi Fatima Patel. Mohammed G, 22 October 2019, https://www.ad.nl/ limburg/zes-jaar-cel-voor-maastrichtse-jihadist- show Tony-Lee Thulsie describing how he ‘crave[d] mohammed-g-br~a1a81885/. Israeli blood’, evidence shared with the GI-TOC relating 328 Officer in the Hawks Crimes Against the State unit with knowledge of the Kliprivier case, 4 November 2021. 329 Peter Fabricius, Kliprivier kidnapping cell was funding Islamic State terrorism, say sources, Daily Maverick, 30 July 2020, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ to the investigation. 345 Affidavit, Anuresh Jugpersad Lutchman, in respect to Sayfudeen Aslam del Vecchio and Bibi Fatima Patel. 346 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke, Strengthening South Africa’s response to the threat of international terrorism, South article/2020-07-30-kliprivier-kidnapping-cell-wasfunding-islamic-state-terrorism-say-sources/. African Journal of International Affairs, 28, 2, 187–202. 347 Ryan Cummings, a senior analyst at Signal Risk, put it 330 Evidence shared with the GI-TOC relating to the this way: ‘We basically host the criminal underworld in investigation. this country. Which means that this is a major part of the 331 Interview with South African prosecutor with knowledge of the Thulsie case, October 2021. world for extremist groups to use as a financing base for their operations.’ Richard Poplak, IS-land: Has the age 332 Provisional indictment, in the High Court of South of southern African terrorism properly begun?, 4 May Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, State vs. 2021, Daily Maverick, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ Brandon-Lee Thulsie and Tony-Lee Thulsie, 2017. article/2021-05-04-islamic-state-land-has-the-age-of- 333 Brenda Githing’u, The counterterrorism conundrum: Exploring the evolution of South Africa’s extremist networks, Hudson Institute, https://www.hudson.org/ research/17128-the-counterterrorism-conundrumexploring-the-evolution-of-south-africa-s-extremistnetworks. southern-african-terrorism-properly-begun/. 348 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke, Strengthening South Africa’s response to the threat of international terrorism, South African Journal of International Affairs, 28, 2, 187–202. 349 ‘A classified report allegedly drafted by the country’s National Intelligence Agency in 1998 … stated that 334 Evidence shared with the GI-TOC relating to the foreign Islamist militants “prefer[red] to keep South investigation. Africa [as a] rear base for military training, convalescence, 335 Report: AJ Barnard, State vs Goolam Mohammed Rashid fund raising, media and proselytizing”, claims that were Haffejee, Verulam case 148/05/2018; Investigating later confirmed by the head of the National Intelligence Officer: Detective Warrant Officer Chonko. Coordinating Committee in 2007.’ Concerns were later 336 Jeff Wicks, ‘It looked like a slaughterhouse’ – eyewitness raised in 2008 that ‘al-Qaeda operatives were taking to KZN mosque attack, TimesLive, 10 May 2018, https:// refuge in South Africa with the possibility of establishing www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-05-10- networks’. Brenda Githing’u, The counterterrorism it-looked-like-a-slaughterhouse--eyewitness-to-kzn- conundrum: Exploring the evolution of South Africa’s mosque-attack/. extremist networks, Hudson Institute, 23 October 337 Interview with Farhad Hoomer, Durban, October 2021. 2021, https://www.hudson.org/research/17128-the- 338 News24, Dutch jihadist suspect ‘involved’ in South counterterrorism-conundrum-exploring-the-evolution- African kidnapping – reports, 27 August 2018, https:// www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/dutch- of-south-africa-s-extremist-networks. 350 Southern African Development Community, Report of jihadist-suspect-involved-in-south-african-kidnapping- the Double Troika Plus Angola technical assessment reports-20180827. mission to the Republic of Mozambique on the 339 Evidence shared with the GI-TOC relating to the assessment of the security situation in Cabo Delgado investigation. and required regional support, 21 April 2021, https:// 340 News24, Dutch jihadist suspect ‘involved’ in South African kidnapping – reports, 27 August 2018, https:// www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/dutch- zitamar.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/SADCREPORT-assessement-report.pdf. 351 Raeesah Cassim Cachalia and Albertus Schoeman, jihadist-suspect-involved-in-south-african-kidnapping- Violent extremism in South Africa: Assessing the current reports-20180827. threat, Institute for Security Studies, May 2017, https:// 341 Jeanette Chabalala, Terror-accused siblings’ case media.africaportal.org/documents/sareport7-v2.pdf. postponed for trial, News24, 10 November 2016, 352 Provisional indictment, in the High Court of South https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/ Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, State vs. news/terror-accused-siblings-case-postponed-for- Brandon-Lee Thulsie and Tony-Lee Thulsie, 2017. trial-20161110. 353 Smith alleged that the twins had formed links with a 342 Interview with a prosecutor familiar with the Thulsie twins case, November 2021. INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION South African fighting for ISIS in Syria known as ‘Abu Hurera’, detailed the two failed attempts to travel to join 343 Affidavit, Anuresh Jugpersad Lutchman, in respect to 102 344 Screenshots of these conversations seen by the GI-TOC • ISIS, and explained how Tony-Lee Thulsie had discussed THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS ‘ideas and targets of terror attacks in South Africa’. Witness statement, Renaldo Galdino Smith, July 2016. 354 Interview with South African prosecutor with knowledge of the Thulsie case, October 2021. 355 The latest news of Smith was a post on his personal 365 Jeff Wicks, Update: Moulana targeted by ‘bomb’ in Verulam mosque, TimesLive, 13 May 2018, https:// www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-05-13police-respond-to-bomb-threat-at-verulam-mosque/. 366 Brenda Githing’u, The counterterrorism conundrum: Facebook page from 23 January 2020, allegedly showing Exploring the evolution of South Africa’s extremist him in Mozambique holding a gun. Interview with South networks, Hudson Institute, 23 October 2021, https:// African prosecutor with knowledge of the Thulsie case, www.hudson.org/research/17128-the-counterterrorism- October 2021; social media post viewed by the GI-TOC, conundrum-exploring-the-evolution-of-south-africa- 23 January 2020. s-extremist-networks; Jeff Wicks, Explosives experts 356 Provisional indictment, in the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, State vs. Brandon-Lee Thulsie and Tony-Lee Thulsie, 2017. to analyze mosque ‘bomb’, TimesLive, 14 May 2018, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/201805-14-explosives-experts-to-analyse-mosque-bomb/. Annexes to the Indictment, State vs. Brandon-Lee 367 A high-end clothing and food retail chain in South Africa. Thulsie and Tony-Lee Thulsie, 12 March 2019. 368 Rebecca Davis, A tale of two eerily similar bombs found 357 Searches of Del Vecchio and Patel’s home uncovered in two very different KZN places, Daily Maverick, 9 July evidence including a GPS device belonging to the 2018, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018- Saunders’ and a pair of trousers belonging to Del 07-09-a-tale-of-two-eerily-similar-bombs-found-in- Vecchio stained with Rodney Saunders’ blood. Suspicion two-very-different-kzn-places/; Suthentira Govender, of the couple stemmed from the fact they had been in Extortion link to Durban bombings: Bheki Cele, the area withdrawing significant amounts of cash with a 5 October 2018, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/ card that later transpired to belong to Rachel Saunders. south-africa/2018-10-05-extortion-link-to-durban- African News Agency, Kidnappers of UK couple bombings-bheki-cele/. discussed plans to ‘kill the kuffar’, IOL News, 6 March 369 Hawala is a traditional system of transferring money 2018, https://www.iol.co.za/news/kidnappers-of-uk- used widely in the Arab world. Money is moved by a couple-discussed-plans-to-kill-the-kuffar-13627042. system of hawala brokers who operate on a system of 358 Erica Abrahams, Update: ISIS suspect was a resident of trust. See https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/ Umdloti, The North Coast Courier, 2 March 2018, https:// hawala.asp; Janine Moodley, Court orders KZN terror northcoastcourier.co.za/104284/isis-suspect-resident- ‘kingpin’ to provide his voice samples, IOL News, umdloti/. 31 January 2020, https://www.iol.co.za/thepost/news/ 359 This account has reportedly been ‘preserved’ and taken offline pending further investigations. 360 Affidavit, Anuresh Jugpersad Lutchman, in respect to Sayfudeen Aslam del Vecchio and Bibi Fatima Patel, April 2021. 361 Affidavit, Anuresh Jugpersad Lutchman, in respect to Sayfudeen Aslam del Vecchio and Bibi Fatima Patel, court-orders-kzn-terror-kingpin-to-provide-his-voicesamples-41803124. 370 Initially, 19 suspects were arrested. Following an identity parade, charges against seven were dropped. 371 Charge sheet, Case No B612/18, Farad Hoomer and 18 others, 8 October 2018. 372 Mxolisi Mngadi, KZN bomb attacks: Court hears 11 April 2021; Indictment, in the Durban High Court accused linked to ISIS, News24, https://www.news24. State vs. Patel, del Vecchio and Jackson Mussa, 2018. com/news24/southafrica/news/kzn-bomb-attacks- 362 France24, Dutch jihadist suspect ‘involved’ in South African kidnapping – reports, 27 August 2018, https:// court-hears-11-accused-linked-to-isis-20181023. 373 Kailene Pillay, KZN terror suspects accused of www.france24.com/en/20180827-dutch-jihadist- Woolworths bombings and deadly mosque attack free suspect-involved-safrica-kidnap-reports. after 2-year court battle, IOL News, 14 July 2020, 363 Interview with a reporter who was in the court that day, October 2021. 364 Jeff Wicks, ‘It looked like a slaughterhouse’ – eyewitness to KZN mosque attack, TimesLive, 10 May 2018, https:// www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-05- https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/ kzn-terror-suspects-accused-of-woolworths-bombingsand-deadly-mosque-attack-free-after-2-year-courtbattle-50948917. 374 Orrin Singh, Investigators wade through five terabytes of 10-it-looked-like-a-slaughterhouse--eyewitness-to- data in case of alleged Islamic State loyalists, TimesLIVE, kzn-mosque-attack/; Matthew Savides, Three fighting 22 July 2019, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/ for their lives as KZN mosque comes under attack, south-africa/2019-07-22-investigators-wade-through- 10 May 2018, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south- five-terabytes-of-data-in-case-of-alleged-islamic-state- africa/2018-05-10-breaking--three-fighting-for-theirlives-as-kzn-mosque-comes-under-attack/. loyalists/. 375 Peter Fabricius, Dismissal of Islamic State case NOTES 103 sparks controversy, Daily Maverick, 14 July 2020, https:// counterterrorism.police.uk/met-commissioner-calls-for- www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-07-14-dismissal- global-coalition-to-tackle-ct-threat-posed-by-online- of-islamic-state-case-sparks-controversy/. platforms/. 376 Letter of demand, Yusuf Cassim & Associates, Case No. B612/18 Verulam Mag Crt, on behalf of Farad Hoomer et al., 26 August 2021. 2020, https://news.sky.com/story/terror-in-the-uktimeline-of-attacks-11833061. 377 Interview with senior source, Hawks, October 2021. 378 Peter Fabricius, Kliprivier kidnapping cell was funding 394 See discussion in Peter Fabricius, Dismissal of Islamic State case sparks controversy, Daily Maverick, 14 July Islamic State terrorism, say sources, Daily Maverick, 2020, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020- 30 July 2020, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ 07-14-dismissal-of-islamic-state-case-sparks- article/2020-07-30-kliprivier-kidnapping-cell-was- controversy/. funding-islamic-state-terrorism-say-sources/. 395 See, for example, the backlash against reporting in 379 Ntwaagae Seleka, 5 foreign nationals linked to South Africa’s Daily Maverick in 2013 about the South kidnapping, extremism syndicate and New Year’s Eve Africa-based Dockrat family and alleged links to al- Melville shooting arrested, News24, 23 June 2020, Qaeda: Faranaaz Parker, Dockrats respond to al-Qaeda https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/ allegations, Mail and Guardian, 16 May 2013, https:// police-arrest-5-foreign-nationals-linked-to-a-kidnapping- mg.co.za/article/2013-05-16-00-dockrats-respond-to- and-extremism-syndicate-20200723. terrorism-allegations/. 380 Interview with Hawks officer with knowledge of the Kliprivier case, 4 November 2021. 396 Interview with Farid Sayed, October 2021. 397 Interview with Rafeek Shah, a well-known Muslim cleric 381 Brenda Githing’u, The counterterrorism conundrum: Exploring the evolution of South Africa’s extremist networks, Hudson Institute, 23 October 2021, https:// and former member of parliament in South Africa, September 2021. 398 Richard Poplak, IS-land: Has the age of southern African www.hudson.org/research/17128-the-counterterrorism- terrorism properly begun?, 4 May 2021, Daily Maverick, conundrum-exploring-the-evolution-of-south-africa-s- https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-04- extremist-networks. islamic-state-land-has-the-age-of-southern-african- 382 Hawks officer in the Crimes Against the State unit, 4 November 2021. terrorism-properly-begun/. 399 Caryn Dolley, Three Pagad vigilantes freed from jail, 383 Interview with Farhad Hoomer, Durban, September 2021. reviving memories of a war waged on Cape Town’s streets, Daily Maverick, 5 December 2020, https://www. 384 Hawks officer with knowledge of the Kliprivier case, 4 November 2021. dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-12-05-three-pagadvigilantes-freed-from-jail-reviving-memories-of-a-war- 385 Interviews with a source in the National Prosecuting Authority, September and October 2021. waged-on-cape-towns-streets/. 400 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Hansard: EPC: Debate 386 Hawks officer with knowledge of the Kliprivier case, 4 November 2021. on Vote No 10 – National Treasury (State Security). House: National Assembly, 23 Jul 2014, https://pmg.org. 387 Among the claims against Hoomer was that he laundered money using cryptocurrency. He denied this in an za/hansard/18594/. 401 Bill Dixon and Lisa-Marie Johns, Gangs, Pagad & interview, saying cryptocurrency was against Islam. the state: Vigilantism and revenge violence in the 388 Interview with Farhad Hoomer, Durban, October 2021. Western Cape, Centre for the Study of Violence 389 Aaron Y Zelin, Al-Nabā newsletter issue #241, and Reconciliation, May 2001, https://s3-eu-west-1. Jihadology.net, 2 July 2020, https://jihadology. amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/documents/15544/ net/2020/07/02/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states- gangs-pagad-and-the-state-by-bill-dixon-and-lisa.pdf. newsletter-al-naba-241/. 402 Khadija Patel, A Cape cocktail: Pagad, drugs and the 390 Brenda Githing’u, The counterterrorism conundrum: dregs of apartheid, Daily Maverick, 22 August 2013, Exploring the evolution of South Africa’s extremist https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-08-22-a- networks, Hudson Institute, 23 October 2021, https:// cape-cocktail-pagad-drugs-and-the-dregs-of-apartheid/. www.hudson.org/research/17128-the-counterterrorism- 403 Caryn Dolley, Three Pagad vigilantes freed from jail, conundrum-exploring-the-evolution-of-south-africa-s- reviving memories of a war waged on Cape Town’s extremist-networks. streets, Daily Maverick, 5 December 2020, https://www. 391 Interview with Hawks officer in the Crimes Against the State unit, 4 November 2021, by phone. for ‘global coalition’ to tackle CT threat posed by • waged-on-cape-towns-streets/. 404 Interviews with PAGAD members, Cape Town, October– online platforms, 13 September 2021, https://www. INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-12-05-three-pagadvigilantes-freed-from-jail-reviving-memories-of-a-war- 392 Counter Terrorism Policing, Met commissioner calls 104 393 Sky News, Terror in the UK: Timeline of attacks, 26 June November 2021 and January–February 2022. THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 405 Henri Boshoff, Anneli Botha and Martin Schönteich, Fear Intelligence boss Richard Mdluli finally appears in court, in the city: Urban terrorism in South Africa, Institute for News24, 26 March 2021, https://www.news24.com/ Security Studies, monograph 63, https://issafrica.org/ news24/southafrica/news/police-slush-fund-looting-ex- research/monographs/monograph-63-fear-in-the-city- crime-intelligence-boss-richard-mdluli-finally-appears- urban-terrorism-in-south-africa-henri-boshoff-anneli- in-court-20210326; Caryn Dolley, Zuma’s legacy: The botha-and-martin-schonteich. See also: Bill Dixon and build-up to breaking down Crime Intelligence, Daily Lisa-Marie Johns, Gangs, Pagad & the state: Vigilantism Maverick, 13 July 2021, https://www.dailymaverick. and revenge violence in the Western Cape, Centre for co.za/article/2021-07-13-zumas-legacy-the-build-up-to- the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, May 2001, breaking-down-crime-intelligence/. https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica. 415 Marianne Merten, NPA pushes for full independence, net/documents/15544/gangs-pagad-and-the-state-by- 12 November 2021, Daily Maverick, https://www. bill-dixon-and-lisa.pdf. dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-13-zumas-legacy- 406 Interviews with PAGAD members, Cape Town, October and November 2021. 407 South African Government, High-level review panel on the-build-up-to-breaking-down-crime-intelligence/. 416 Erin Bates and Rob Rose, Why SA’s most wanted have nothing to fear from the justice system, Financial Mail, the State Security Agency, December 2018, https:// 20 November 2021, https://www.businesslive.co.za/ www.gov.za/documents/high-level-review-panel-state- fm/features/cover-story/2021-07-15-why-sas-most- security-agency-9-mar-2019-0000. 408 Marianne Thamm, Secret billions poured into State wanted-have-nothing-to-fear-from-the-justice-system/. 417 Financial Action Task Force, South Africa’s measures Security to sustain and protect ‘Zuma regime’, claims to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, 7 Acting DG Loyiso Jafta, Daily Maverick, 26 January 2021, October 2021, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/ https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-01-26- mutualevaluations/documents/mer-south-africa-2021. secret-billions-poured-into-state-security-agency-to- html. sustain-and-protect-zuma-regime-claims-acting-dgloyiso-jafta/. 409 Qaanitah Hunter, Kaveel Singh and Jeff Wicks, Excerpt: Eight days in July – Inside the Zuma unrest that set South Africa alight, News24, 8 November 2021, https:// www.news24.com/news24/books/excerpt-eight-days- 418 Graeme Hosken, IS terror group in Moz is getting manpower, money from SA: Hawks, Sunday Times, 26 August 2020, https://select.timeslive.co.za/news/202008-26-is-terror-group-in-moz-is-getting-manpowermoney-from-sa-hawks/. 419 Stephen Buchanan-Clarke, Strengthening South Africa’s in-july-inside-the-zuma-unrest-that-set-south-africa- response to the threat of international terrorism, South alight-20211108. African Journal of International Affairs, 28, 2, 187–202. 410 Sam Mkokeli and Thanduxolo Jika, State Security Agency ‘was never ready in any way’ for violent unrest, TimesLive, 18 July 2021, https://www.timeslive.co.za/ 420 Interview with an officer in the Hawks Crimes Against the State unit, 4 November 2021, by phone. 421 Orrin Singh, Investigators wade through five terabytes of sunday-times/news/2021-07-18-state-security-agency- data in case of alleged Islamic State loyalists, TimesLIVE, was-never-ready-in-any-way-for-violent-unrest/. 22 July 2019, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/ 411 Juniour Khumalo, Ramaphosa does away with south-africa/2019-07-22-investigators-wade-through- intelligence ministry, SSA to report directly to him, five-terabytes-of-data-in-case-of-alleged-islamic-state- 5 August 2021, https://www.news24.com/news24/ loyalists/. southafrica/news/ramaphosa-does-away-with- 422 Ibid. intelligence-ministry-ssa-to-report-directly-to- 423 Lwandile Bhengu, ‘It’s preposterous’ – Judge slams him-20210805. 412 Mawande Amashabalala, Placing SSA in presidency request to postpone Thulsie twins terror trial to March, News24, 1 October 2021, https://www.news24.com/ not ‘emergence of a dictatorship’: Cyril Ramaphosa, news24/southafrica/news/its-preposterous-judge- TimesLIVE, 12 August 2021, https://www.timeslive. slams-request-to-postpone-thulsie-twins-terror-trial-to- co.za/politics/2021-08-12-placing-ssa-in-presidencynot-emergence-of-a-dictatorship-cyril-ramaphosa/. 413 For example, confidential sources could easily be march-20211001. 424 Interview with a Hawks officer, September 2021. 425 Qaanitah Hunter, ‘We are taking it very, very seriously’: invented by police intelligence operatives and threats Dlodlo on ISIS threat, News24, 19 July 2020, https:// hyped or invented to gain access to the funds. Jane www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/exclusive- Duncan, Why SAPS Crime Intelligence is a hot mess, we-are-taking-it-very-very-seriously-dlodlo-on-isis- Daily Maverick, 1 February 2021, https://www. dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-02-01-why-sapscrime-intelligence-is-a-hot-mess/. 414 Alex Mitchley, Police slush fund ‘looting’: Ex-Crime threat-20200719. 426 Rebecca Davis, A tale of two eerily similar bombs found in two very different KZN places, Daily Maverick, 9 July 2018, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018NOTES 105 07-09-a-tale-of-two-eerily-similar-bombs-found-in-two- Club of Mozambique, 14 September 2021, https: very-different-kzn-places/. clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-lessons- 427 Interview with a prosecutor familiar with the Thulsie twins and Hoomer cases, October 2021. joseph-hanlon-200886/. 428 Interview with senior Hawks officer, September 2021. 429 Cabo Ligado, Monthly: October at a glance, 440 Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021, via 15 November 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/ monthly-reports/cabo-ligado-monthly-oct-2021. Zoom. 441 Ibid. 430 Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique News Reports and 442 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, Clippings – issue 579, 18 November 2021, https://www. open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/news-reportsclippings-2021. 5 October 2021. 443 Interview with ISS consultant Borges Nhamirre, Maputo, 6 October 2021. 431 Institute for Security Studies, Will foreign intervention 444 Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos save Cabo Delgado?, 8 November 2021, https://issafrica. researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021, via org/events/will-foreign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado. Zoom; Interview with ISS consultant Borges Nhamirre, 432 Duarte Sitoe, Prorrogação da missão da SAMIM vai custar 29.7 milhões de dólares a SADC, 13 January 2022, https:// Maputo, 6 October 2021. 445 DW, Moçambique: Nyusi substitui dois ministros com os evidencias.co.mz/2022/01/13/prorrogacao-da-missao- olhos postos em Cabo Delgado, 11 November 2021, da-samim-vai-custar-29-7-milhoes-de-dolares-a-sadc/. https://www.dw.com/pt-002/mo%C3%A7ambique- 433 CDD, Mozambique’s security discussed in Rwanda!, nyusi-substitui-dois-ministros-com-os-olhos-postos-em- 11 January 2022, https://cddmoz.org/wp-content/ cabo-delgado/a-59795201?_x_tr_sl=pt&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_ uploads/2022/01/Mozambiques-security-discussed-inRwanda.pdf. tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=nui,sc. 446 Cabo Ligado, October at a glance, 15 November 2021, 434 See discussion in: Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique News Reports and Clippings – issue 579, 18 November 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/caboligado-monthly-oct-2021. https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/ 447 Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos news-reports-clippings-2021; Institute for Security researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021, via Studies, Will foreign intervention save Cabo Delgado?, 8 November 2021, https://issafrica.org/events/willforeign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado. Zoom. 448 Cabo Ligado, October at a glance, 15 November 2021, https://www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports/cabo- 435 Interview with Adriano Nuvunga, CDD, Pemba, ligado-monthly-oct-2021. 15 October 2021. 449 Interview with Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos 436 Ibid. researcher Salvador Forquilha, 12 October 2021, via 437 Borges Nhamirre, Will foreign intervention end terrorism in Cabo Delgado?, Institute for Security Studies, Zoom. 450 Report submitted to GI-TOC from David Africa on the 5 November 2021, https://issafrica.org/research/policybrief/will-foreign-intervention-end-terrorism-in-cabo- views of South African security sources (unpublished). 451 ExTrac, The Islamic State in Mozambique: A profile, delgado; Interview with Adriano Nuvunga, CDD, Pemba, September 2021, https://public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ 15 October 2021. ExTrac_ISCAP_090921.pdf. 438 Interview with OMR researcher João Feijó, Maputo, 452 Both quotes used by Islamic State in this publication 5 October 2021; Interview with Adriano Nuvunga, CDD, seem to have been drawn by Al Jazeera, Rebels seize Pemba, 15 October 2021. port in gas-rich northern Mozambique, 13 August 2020, 439 For example, see Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: Lessons for Moz from Afghanistan: Talk to men with guns, 106 for-moz-from-afghanistan-talk-to-men-with-guns-by- INSURGENCY, ILLICIT MARKETS AND CORRUPTION • www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/13/rebels-seize-portin-gas-rich-northern-mozambique. THE CABO DELGADO CONFLICT AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS ABOUT THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is a global network with over 500 Network Experts around the world. 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