Armenian and Azerbaijani Youth Perspectives on Peace and Reconciliation

New York University Center for Global Affairs Armenian and Azerbaijani Youth Perspectives on Peace and Reconciliation A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS Concentration: Peacebuilding Thesis Advisor: Thomas Hill BY Inna Babakulieva New York, NY Spring, 2014  Table of Contents Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………03 Chapter I: Research Methodology and Study Design …………………………………………06 Chapter II: Current State of Peace Process ……………………………………………………19 Chapter III: Youth as Agents of Change ………………………………………………………31 Chapter IV: Theoretical Framework on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformation ……..36 Chapter V: Key Findings ……………………………………………………………………….52 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………….………………..69 Bibliography …………………………………………………………………….………………73 Appendix …………...…………………………………………………………….……………...87  Introduction Purpose and Rationale for the Study The case of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is explored in this study with particular attention to the concepts of exclusive historic representations, collective memory, identity development and its impact on youth roles and actions. The main objective of this study is to examine the largely neglected psychological dimension to the conflict and determine its impact on attitudes, beliefs and interests of young adults in both nations. Theories of identity development, reconciliation and conflict transformation form the conceptual framework to guide this study. These theories were chosen for their usefulness in examining how an appeal to the past, historical narratives and collective memory may construct values and beliefs in younger generations. These values and beliefs inform a decision-making processes and determine attitudes towards reconciliation and peace. The mediation efforts of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group to bring adversaries to an agreement on the framework for the negotiation of a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict played a crucial role in solidifying and institutionalizing a conflict resolution platform. It also has been useful in reinforcing the priority of elites and their influence over everything and everyone. A bilateral two decades-long stalemate has resulted in the expansion of the conflict and opened up space for the development of a living room war, bringing the war to everyone’s house through state-controlled media and government-censored reporting. Such government-sponsored information campaigns have helped to shape the public’s perception of what this conflict is about and the reasons behind the stalemate,while deliberately dehumanizing the adversary. The Minsk Group’s secrecy around its mediation efforts and a lack of public diplomacy efforts by the co-chairs has resulted in a lack of public awareness about the status of the negotiation process. The population on both sides has had to rely on official government statements to make sense of the deadlocked negotiations. The undertone of these negotiations is that the respective governments represent the interests and will of the people and negotiate on their behalf. Such an attitude makes it impossible for low-status, or marginalized groups, such as youth, to believe in and seize back their place in the process. The people are not prepared to play a part in conflict resolution or transformation activities. Furthermore, as the Minsk Group celebrated the 20th year of deadlocked negotiations with few results to display, both Armenia and Azerbaijan grow more suspicious of the Minsk Group’s intentions and interests. Prolonged political negotiations and excessive use of derogatory remarks by the Armenian and Azerbaijani political actors contribute to the obstacles faced by Track II diplomacy efforts. Civil society organizations (CSOs) linked to foreign agencies grow unpopular within the larger population. The NGO community, developing and implementing reconciliation and conflict transformation programs, is often subjected to harassment by government authorities, especially as they diverge from the hard-line political stance regarding the reconciliation process between the two states. Draconian NGO legislation in both states further hinders the space for implementation of programs on empowerment and capacity building of youth, women and minority groups. Thus, two decades since the deadlocked negotiations began, a new generation is coming of age with no direct experience of living alongside the other. Two groups have limited people-to-people interactions, in conjunction with endless hate speech and derogatory public statements, leading to mutual isolation. This isolation results in a mentality that dehumanizes and distrusts the other side. Such a context makes it challenging to engage in social cohesion or peacebuilding efforts. Transforming people’s attitudes and perceptions, building their capacities, and empowering them to commit to reconciliation activities is vital, if the high-level official negotiations ever are to achieve long-awaited results. Approaching a Hypothesis This study seeks to conduct a comparative analysis of the prospective role of Armenian and Azeri youth in the peace process. The goal of the study is to examine the interplay of various narratives, attitudes and perceptions between Armenian and Azeri youth, while attempting to determine which of the given narratives would likely have a soothing effect and serve as a useful tool for promoting productive interaction among youth. The study put forward the following hypothesis: Armenian and Azerbaijani youth have hidden potential to serve a productive and transformative role in the peace process to lead their countries towards reconciliation. This hidden potential could, possibly, be brought forth should: Parties disengage and discontinue hate speech, derogatory public statements, and dehumanization of the adversary; Parties collaborate to transform employed negative historical and collective narratives into more tolerant ones; The OSCE Minsk Group engages in public diplomacy efforts to demystify the negotiation process; The OSCE Minsk Group encourages and advocates for space for civil society organizations to engage in Track II diplomacy efforts (peacebuilding, social cohesion, and reconciliation activities) without a fear of reprisal; Parties encourage and empower marginalized groups to seize back their places in the peace process to become full and essential participants in it. This study employs a qualitative research approach and explores the key concepts of collective narratives and identity development. Relatively little research has been produced on the youth’s role in building peace. This study makes an effort to identify cases where youth has played an informal role in transforming relations along ethnic lines. The nature of political level negotiations that can play a vital role in the resolution and impact Track II diplomacy efforts is also discussed below. Chapter I: Research Methodology and Study Design Rationale for the Research Design A review of the available academic literature and scholarly articles reveals very few writings on the situation of low status and marginalized groups of young adults in peace processes and their role and potential for peacebuilding. Sultanli, J. (2011). Youth in Sourh Caucasus: Agents of Peace or Future Soldiers?; Gurbanov, G. (2012). Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh: the Role of Youth and Democracy. Even less has been written on youth’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Thus, I decided to employ a qualitative approach in this research and conduct primary research to try to generate some original data and examine youth’s experiences and perceptions of peace, reconciliation, and their role in the peace process through their own words. The use of this approach has been useful in beginning to generate data related to a subject about which there is a limited body of knowledge. Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory; Padgett, D. (2008). Qualitative methods in social work research. Acknowledging that youth are vulnerable to influence from outside elements, the central component of this study is to explore the manipulation of institutional and collective narratives, their influence on youth identity development, and ways these narratives may have potential for transforming beliefs into actions. Marutyan, H. (2007). Collective and historical memory in the dialogue of cultures. This research rests on the foundation of a study conducted by Garagozov (2011). He argues that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a conflict of mutually exclusive historical narratives, collective memory, and nationalistic myths. These narratives and rigidly fixed beliefs are well incorporated into the mainstream sociocultural climate, poisoning the environment and undermining prospective peacebuilding efforts. He suggests transforming mutually exclusive nationalistic narratives into more tolerant and cooperative ones by utilizing a “model of progressive narrative transformation.” Garagozov, R. (2012). Do Woes Unite Foes? Interplay of narratives, memory, emotions, and attitudes The main concept behind this model is to change and transform original narratives into ones slightly closer to each other. Once this step is achieved, Garagozov proposes to repeat it a number of times until there is a comprehensive narrative accepted by both sides that does not dehumanize or antagonize the other. However, before manipulating any narratives it is important to find the type of a narrative (or narratives) that would be more conducive to reconciliation, and to determine to what extent a specific narrative might reduce confrontational attitudes. His three-phase study attempts to answer such questions by engaging with Azerbaijani IDPs and non-IDPs. The initial phase of his research includes a questionnaire on individual attitudes and beliefs towards reconciliation; the second phase tests three different narratives and assesses participants’ moods when presented with a specific narrative. When trying to identify a narrative that would be helpful in terms of diminishing confrontation attitudes, it is important to examine if a specific narrative will have a similar effect on both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Garagozov’s research does not address this question. This study incorporated survey instruments (with certain edits) previously used by Garagozov, seeking to ensure that narratives would be examined by both populations. My study employed a perception survey to ascertain critical perspectives of youth in relation to their social status, identity development, and attitudes towards peaceful resolution of the conflict. Perception surveys, in general, allow researchers to measure what respondents feel, think and believe. Herbert, S. (2013). Perception surveys in fragile and conflict-affected states: Helpdesk Research Report. This approach helped me to gain information about youth’s understanding of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process, as well as their views about reconciliation, peace and human rights, and their attitudes, opinions about the peace process. This study reached out to both the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations to compare and draw conclusions about whether similar narratives would have similar attitudinal impacts on youth from both communities. The recruitment process took place within a popular and influential mode of communication in youth culture, internet and social media. Acknowledging time and resource constraints, and recognizing widespread internet access, the benefits of conducting a perception survey online, through an e-survey approach, seemed to supersede potential drawbacks. The survey consisted of two sections and a total of 24 questions. The first section included both qualitative and quantitative components. The quantitative component was integrated to gather information that could be used to describe and make comparisons between the Armenian and Azerbaijani youth. The study was divided in a way so there would be one week to go over the answers on a participant’s demographics before referring him or her to the next section. This was done to identify and prevent diaspora members from participating in the survey. However, both parts were later combined into a single survey, because another method emerged to identify the country location of where participants accessed a survey. Strengths and Limitations of online perception surveys There is limited research on the advantages and challenges of perception and online surveys as a whole. Certain challenges and strengths have been observed when conducting online perception surveys, that also were reflected in the literature review. In comparison to other data gathering means, and depending on the procedural approach, perception surveys provide a few advantages. The objective of this research was to collect Armenian and Azerbaijani youth’s views and beliefs on what peace and reconciliation means to them, whether reconciliation can be achieved, steps and actions to ensure a successful reconciliation process, and their attitudes toward given narratives. The perception survey provided an opportunity to do just that, which is to collect data “about issues which are intangible or difficult to measure.” Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development. (2013). http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/M-files/CCRVI/CCVRI-Practice-Product-Uses-of-Data.pdf Such surveys allow rebalancing information asymmetries and provide an important source of data when available official data is incomplete or limited. Tariq, M.O., Haqbeen, F.R., & Kakar, P.L. (2012). Afghanistan in 2012: A survey of the Afghan people. Conducting a perception survey is useful in gathering data about citizens’ views on various subjects rather than expert or official views. It additionally facilitates and assists in articulating interests and positions of a marginalized group and provides them with an opportunity to voice their concerns. In recognition of the profound impact that the internet and social media has had on youth culture, surveys were conducted online. A literature review on the methodology of e-surveys methodology features associated costs and benefits that could be attributed to both perception and online surveys. The advantages are cost effectiveness, time efficiency and convenience. Wiersma, W. (2012). The validity of surveys: online and offline. Oxford Internet Institute. Other advantages of online surveys include: a potential for international reach, incorporation of skip logic, direct database connectivity and customized instrument delivery, which this study confirms. Conducting perception surveys online, although, also has its drawbacks, such as solicitation and delivery problems, possible technological glitches, a risk of poor security, which could potentially threaten confidentiality of respondents, and limited access to prospective participants. Wiersma, W. (2012). The validity of surveys: online and offline. Oxford Internet Institute. This study has confirmed these drawbacks. A review of official statistical data and independent NGO data Caucasus Barometer. (2013). Caucasus barometer 2013 regional dataset.; Kelly, S., Truong, M., Earp, M., Reed, L., Shahbaz, A., & Greco-Stoner, A. (2013). Freedom on the net 2013: A global assessment of internet and digital media. on internet access and usage in the South Caucasus region presents the following picture: about 70 percent of Azerbaijani households have internet access and over 40 percent The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. (2013). Internet Access of Households. of internet users access it from home, with the majority of users being within the younger age distribution. That is, 15 to 34 years old individuals, constitute over 60 percent of internet users in the country. The picture in Armenia is a little different. Internet penetration in Armenia remains the lowest in South Caucasus region. About half of the Armenian population has access to the internet, with approximately one-third of households reporting having internet access. Papyan, A. (2013, January 16). Home internet access in Armenia higher than global average [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://ditord.com/2013/01/16/home-internet-access-in-armenia-higher-than-global-average/ The internet connection speeds are the lowest and costs are the highest of the three countries in the South Caucasus region, partly because two of its four neighbors blockaded Armenia. Krikorian, O. (2010). Internet in Armenia: slow, expensive, but increasingly important. Data for exact penetration rates in both Armenia and Azerbaijan is unavailable. The original study methodology did not anticipate that availability of internet and pace of IT sector development would serve as a challenge in terms of achieving high response rates, yet this was the case. The research does not provide a definite conclusion and reasons for low response rates. Low response rates could be linked either to low coverage or to connection quality in those countries in comparison to internet access and use in the West, particularly in the United States. It also could be attributed to the sensitivity of the subject matter the study aimed to examine. The internet is an integral part of people’s lives, and plays an important function in Armenian and Azerbaijani youth’s identity development. Given its role in nation’s youth culture while recalling time limitations, resource constraints and possible security dilemmas posed by traveling to respective countries to conduct in-person surveys, focus groups or interviews, at the time, benefits of an online perception survey outweighed drawbacks. Actual Research Design and Research Instruments The study was conducted using a standardized semi-structured questionnaire covering respondents’ demographics, and perceptions and narratives on peace, reconciliation and human rights. Questions and narratives were developed with the advantage of available research instruments. Surveys developed by the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace, in addition to, Garagozov’s research instruments used in his previous study were consulted and used with permission. An open-ended field was available to most questions allowing respondents to provide explanations or complete their thoughts. The two-part survey, a consent document and recruitment materials were first developed in English, and then translated into Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani, primary languages spoken by the Armenian and Azerbaijani youth population. Independent back-translations helped to finalize and validate research instruments. Sample Selection and Recruitment This survey employed convenience sampling. A convenience sampling is useful when it is difficult to determine whether each and every unit is included in the sample. It is used in cases when it is left up to each person to decide one’s own participation, which was the case with this study where web link to the survey was posted on social media platforms and was left up to each individual to decide and take part in this research. The initial recruitment process, an invitation to participate in a web survey was posted as a message on various social media platforms, online communities and organizational sites, has not been effective or successful. As the initial recruitment process attracted only few respondents, I decided to utilize a professional survey support system, such as the Survey Monkey Audience project, in which the company takes upon itself to recruit a needed number of participants from each social group. In this case, the company’s representatives indicated that neither the company nor its partners have access to the Azeri market, and do not have access to a requested pool of respondents from Armenia. Z. Gholikely (personal communication, March 5,2014). Nevertheless, I changed the solicitation process, and decided to recruit participants through personal communication and messaging. This was done in an attempt to increase response rates. This approach displayed better results than the original recruitment process. The personal invitation sent out to each person noted that the researcher was available to answer any questions or concerns one might have, which increased chances of a dialogue, where prospective participants replied with questions or comments. There was a pattern within questions or concerns raised during those personal communications. Some participants had concerns and questions about whether the survey was actually spam or a hacking attack on their profiles. as there has been a pattern of Armenian hackers attacking Azerbaijani online communities and vice versa There were also few, Armenian and Azerbaijani youth, who mentioned reviewing the survey, but dropped out as they thought these types of research or activities were unimportant and could not affect the situation. Some youth mentioned mistrust and vivid negative attitudes towards the other side as their reason not to participate in this research. A few responses communicated very strong and negative connotations and explicitly stated a personal hatred and aggression towards individuals of the other country’s ethnicity, while reflecting on one’s own role in protecting and defending the historical territory of the nation with arms. A considerable amount of Armenian and Azeri youth expressed support for the project, while disclosing a personal view and interest in seeing the conflict resolved through peaceful means as opposed to employing military capabilities. A review of available literature on e-survey methodology suggests that response rates for internet surveys often fall below 30 percent, which has been observed throughout the study. There were individuals who displayed a distinct non-response typology, where individuals accessed the survey, reviewed some parts of the survey and then decided not to participate in it. Over 500 personal communications were issued. Less than 10 percent replied, noting that they either participated in the survey, planned to or did not plan to complete it. The final sample size was 102 individuals, out of whom just 32 completed both parts of the survey. Sixty-seven completed the first part, and the rest partially completed the first part. As for the characteristics of the population surveyed, 75 were male and 27 were female. A general limitation in any perception survey is gender inequality and underrepresentation. Herbert, S. (2013). Perception surveys in fragile and conflict-affected states: Helpdesk Research Report. This has been the case in this research as it was difficult capture women’s voices and opinions. It was challenging to reach out to the female population through personal communications and messaging systems because of profile privacy settings. At the same time, many females who received invitations seemed uninterested in participating in the survey, which resulted in a wide gap in gender representation. Regarding the ethnic background of research participants, there were 60 Azerbaijanis and 42 Armenians. More than two-thirds of respondents (75 percent) reported having a tertiary education, with 31 percent of respondents noted having or pursuing master’s degree or Ph.D., and 45 percent of respondents having earned or were pursuing a bachelors’ degree. The rest either reported enrollment in high school or noted non-enrollment. Regarding the individual knowledge of conflict resolution field, 24 percent participated at least once in a conflict resolution or peace education program; out of this group, 50 percent had been involved in some sort of protest against war and in favor of peace by signing a petition or participating in an event. Twenty-six percent of the survey participants reported having been involved in some sort of protest. Qualitative Methods Data and Criteria of Sources The strengths and drawbacks of the study link to the methodological approach of the survey. To ensure a rigorous and high quality approach to the survey, the study incorporated methodological and theory triangulation, which utilized different sources of information, other non-survey and non-perceptions data. The study combined the use of primary sources, personal interviews, and collection of fresh data, such as statistical data, political statements when possible. In spite of few hurdles impeding the access to first hand data, bearing in mind the sensitivity of materials pertaining to political level negotiations, there is still a significant primary data materials available for this research. Among the sources utilized in this report are: Political Statements: Explicitly, speeches and declarations made by 1) governmental officials 2) individuals representing foreign agencies and institutions associated with the mediation and negotiation process Statistical Data: A review and examination of the 2008-2013 data on attitudes regarding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution Caucasus Barometer. (2013). Caucasus barometer 2013 regional dataset. collected by the Caucasus Resource Research Centers (CRRC); Krikorian, O. (2012). New data on attitudes to Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution 2010 poll conducted by Populus, a UK-based opinion polling company, in partnership with the Armenian Institute for Political and Sociological Consulting (AIPSC); Cooper, A., & Morris, K. (2013). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in light of polls in Armenia and NK and also consulted available data on internet usage of youth in both nations. Documents: Select number of documents produced by the OSCE In over two decades of the conflict’s life (since the dissolution of the Soviet Union), a large body of literature has been produced about the history and evolution of the conflict, and the ongoing negotiation process. Most of the literature concentrates on: the immediate background to the conflict; the conflict, and the conflict resolutions efforts after signing of the Bishkek Protocol in 1994, and; the Russian brokered cease-fire agreement. Most of the literature has been produced in the Armenian and Azerbaijani languages, followed by English and Russian. The sources used for the study have been selected based on their relevance and nature of the information they contain. Following are the types of secondary sources consulted for this research: Periodicals, Journals and Reports: A growing body of academic journals addresses individual and collective identity of communities engaged in conflict and/or reconciliation efforts; literature on social representations of history and its role in identity politics, in conjunction with periodicals on post-Soviet environment and the rapid escalation of ethnic armed conflicts, boomed in the past two decades. In addition, an English and Russian version of numerous Armenian and Azerbaijani academic journals became available making original materials from the region accessible. Papers and Studies: Source materials and research papers presented at symposia and conferences addressing various aspects of a larger topic of this study have been of great significance. Numerous publications produced and presented by the Group on International Perspectives of Governmental Aggression and Peace have been useful in baring new and innovative concepts and ideas for this research. Boston University Psychology. (2014). Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression Daily Press and Electronic Data: Considering an expansion and availability of such data in conjunction with the pace of new and unfolding developments in the region made the use of such reports obligatory. Throughout this research, there has been a systematic follow up of media and electronic sources to stay in the information loop of dynamic events. Among the many available sources, the ones utilized in this reports have been considered for their accuracy, reliability and validity. Data collection and analysis Data collection took place over a two months period from February to March 2014. I, on my own, designed and implemented the study. I do not have a prior experience conducting surveys, yet completed a thorough review of survey and interview techniques, the use of online technology to collect and analyze data to minimize risks and challenges. After data collection, the Survey Monkey Analysis program provided basic quantitative data analysis of demographic information. The qualitative responses to items were categorized according to the Strauss and Corbin’s Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory. grounded theory approach. The process allowed concepts and themes to emerge from the responses to provide the foundation for coding categories. The qualitative part and commentaries were imported to Market Sight for analysis. Validity and Reliability The study employs both qualitative and quantitative methods; therefore, traditional definitions of reliability and validity concepts so useful in quantitative studies have not been fully applicable to this research. Lincoln and Guba propose utilizing the concept of trustworthiness as a criterion to determine reliability and validity. Lincoln, Y.S., & Guba, E.G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage The term trustworthiness implies that survey represents what it proposes to represent, while findings reflect meanings as closely as possible to those expressed by the respondents. There are two types of validity: internal and external. These imply that questions and concepts that are set out to be measured are actually measured (internal validity), while findings and results are valid beyond the study and are applicable to the larger social group and across contexts (external validity). The most obvious threat to validity was that although there was widespread internet access in both countries, there were as many subgroups of the population that did not have an access to the internet. Another underlying challenge with the internet was the sampling selection. To avoid biases in the survey it would be best to employ random sampling. To conduct random sampling online, a full list of the population would have been needed. Yet an online list of 18-27 year old Azerbaijani and Armenian youth does not exist, as opposed to a list of students at a university. Wright, K.B. (2006). Research internet-based populations: advantages and disadvantages of online survey research, online questionnaire authoring software packages and web survey services. This situation posed a major limitation in terms of applying key findings to a larger youth demographic across borders. However, two of the six strategies described by Padgett to determine thoroughness and accuracy in a qualitative study were employed, which were triangulation and auditing. Padgett, D. (2008). Qualitative methods in social work research. Los Angeles, Calif: Sage Publications. Triangulation implies using different sources of information, other non-survey and non-perceptions data, while auditing suggests the researcher keeps notes about choices made during the progression of the course as a method to minimize bias and incorporate comprehensive analysis of lessons gathered and learned. It is important to emphasize that results of this research should be interpreted carefully and cannot be applied or generalized to a larger social group. Structure of the Study To set the stage for this research, immediately below, Chapter II: Current State of Peace Process provides an analysis of the mediation efforts made for the resolution of the conflict. It discusses ongoing efforts within Track I Diplomacy to resolve the conflict, and highlights the issue of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ serving more as representatives of their respective countries rather than as committed and objective mediators. This chapter examines Track II, so called citizens’, diplomacy efforts while arguing that lack of coordination between two tracks limits the effectiveness and efficiency of all and each individual efforts. Chapter III: Youth as Agents of Change will provide a review of available literature on the subject of youth and conflict pointing out to a biased skew in research branding youth as a destabilizing force while neglecting to emphasize and highlight their hidden and unrecognized potential. It will also provide several cases recognizing practical experiences in ethnic conflicts where youth, through self-empowerment, found a way to transform relations positively across divided ethnic communities within that social group. Social group = youth Chapter IV: Theoretical Framework on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformation highlights that an emerging line of research on youth and identity development in conflict environments implicitly or explicitly undertakes a narrative approach to the study. It also argues that there is a relationship between historical narratives built on a negative image and interpretation of the other and ethnically motivated violence. However, a thorough research of the subject provides that just as historical narratives and collective memories might escalate tensions on the line of contact (LOC); Between Nagorno-Karabakh and the rest of Azerbaijan these can also plant seeds for positive social change, counter a culture of violence, and encourage a culture of peace. Chapter V: Key finding of the Survey and Summary concludes by reviewing key findings and providing a comparative review of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth perspectives on peace, reconciliation and human rights, analyses individual comments on given narratives, while identifying narratives that could possibly diminish confrontational attitudes or serve a foundation to begin a dialogue. A references page of consulted resources for this study follows the chapter. Chapter II: Current State of Peace Process Track I Diplomacy Davidson and Montville coined the term “Two Track Diplomacy” Davidson, W.D., & Montville, J.V. (1981). Foreign policy according to Freud. Foreign Policy, 45,145-157. to raise the attention around the relationship of official and unofficial activities, as there was little recognition within governments about the civil society contribution to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. They explain Track I diplomacy as one comprising “traditional policy statements by the president and secretary of state […], or official visits and meetings.” Track II they describe as unofficial and non-structured, but as one that might help to resolve or ease “actual or potential conflict by appealing to common human capabilities to respond to good will and reasonableness.” Davidson, W.D., & Montville, J.D. (1981). Foreign policy according to Freud. Foreign Policy, 45, 145-157. McDonald and Diamond further developed the concept of multi-track diplomacy by introducing a unified system of interlinked and related tracks: government, professional conflict resolution, business, private citizen, research, training and education, activism, religion, funding and media or public opinion Diamond, L., & McDonald, J. (1993). Multi-track diplomacy: A systems approach to peace. . Today, Track II diplomacy encompasses previously mentioned sub-tracks of citizens’ diplomacy. The OSCE Minsk Group has been the main and only platform for Track I diplomacy or political level negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The OSCE In the period prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the involvement of the international bodies, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has experienced a variety of mediation efforts toward its resolution. At the time, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic, with the backing of Armenian SSR, and Azerbaijani SSR brought their concerns to the Council of the Soviet Union, however the Soviet leadership was passive in addressing needs and positions of each party, while lacking to commit to dispute resolution efforts. began to work on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict soon after the newly independent Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the organization. At the Helsinki meeting in March 1992, the OSCE Council requested to “convene a conference on Nagorno-Karabakh to provide a forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis http://www.osce.org/mg/66872 “With its regional remit” the OSCE appeared better situated than the United Nations (UN) to address the conflict, as key state actors thought the conflict reached its ripe moment and a breakthrough was forthcoming, which led the OSCE to assume responsibility for mediation. Jacoby,V. (2005). The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts. The OSCE had “a two-fold task: first, to facilitate and support a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and second, to negotiate relations among its participating states and determine the role of the OSCE and the Minsk Process within the context.” Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage Internal conflicts between key OSCE players stemming from mutually exclusive national interests complicated both agendas during initial phases. As a result, there was a move to limit the circle of participants taking part in peace talks. By 1997, a permanent “troika” of co-chairs, The only OSCE body in place on the ground was and continues to be the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Ambassador Andrzei Kasprczyk of Poland, whose mandate does not include negotiations consisting of Russia, the United States, and France, was formed Jacoby,V. (2005). The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts. with a mandate to “realize a full-coordination in all mediating and negotiating activities harmonizing them into a single coordinated effort within the framework of the OSCE.” Mandate of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE (“Minsk Conference’) The followed active period of shuttle diplomacy to find a resolution was hampered by the fact that the Minsk Group co-chairs often served more as representatives of their respective countries rather than as individual mediators. Jacoby,V. (2005). The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation efforts. Once the working relationship had been established within the Minsk Group, the discussion turned to the development of the framework for the negotiation of a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the conflict. Since 1994, the OSCE Minsk Group continues to be the only medium for official level diplomatic negotiations over the conflict and are supported by the United Nations and the international community. The Minsk Group put forward two proposals. One of the proposals incorporated the package solution, which consisted of two separate agendas: Agreement I and Agreement II. The conflicting parties had freedom to implement each agreement at their own pace “but with an understanding that at the end of the day all outstanding issues will have to be resolved.” Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage The second proposal, a “step-by-step solution,” focused on sealing Agreement I before proceeding with Agreement II. Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage Both proposals entailed a withdrawal of the Armenian forces from seven Azeri provinces followed by a discussion on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan accepted the plan. Armenia, although with reservations, also accepted it. Karabakh Armenians rejected both proposals as unacceptable. Thus, the Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosian, who accepted the plan, was forced to resign, allowing Robert Kocharian, then de-facto president of Nagorno-Karabakh to come to power, who effectively sidelined participation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians from the negotiation table. The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities continuously stated that any agreement would be impossible without them sitting at the negotiating table, yet Robert Kocharian and the current Armenian president, Serzh Sargsyan, both Karabakh Armenians, themselves effectively sidelined NK’s participation at the negotiating table. In the spring of 2004, Harutunian, R. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage a series of meetings began between the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers. This allowed the development of the first draft of basic principles outlining the structure of a comprehensive settlement, which was presented to presidents the following year. The basic principles, which were kept in secret until June 2006, OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs (2006). We have run out of ideas: Statement of mediators of Nagorno Karabakh were revealed to the larger public to pressure the parties to launch a public debate about them and, at last, come to an agreement. In November 2007, the Minsk Group formally presented the “Basic Principles for the Peaceful Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” to Armenia and Azerbaijan. It later was deposited with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to serve as a basis for future negotiations. The Madrid principles, The Madrid principles and basic principles will be used interchangeable within the entire paper. The version presented in Kazan as they became known, had an obvious advantage over the previous proposals as it avoided having to choose between the step-by-step solution or package solution. Parties agreed that the final status would be determined once all confidence-building measures (CBM) are put in place (an element of a stage-by-stage process). Then again, these CBM measures would be implemented after an agreement on the mechanism for the determination of the status has been reached (an element of a package process). Concurrently, basic principles revolve around the following points: 1) security guarantees to Nagorno-Karabakh; 2) a return of occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; 2) the Lachin corridor; 3) final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh; 4) internally displaced persons and refugees, and a possible peacekeeping operation. OSCE. (2009). Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries. Armenia and Azerbaijan agree on a majority of these points. Yet, there are two points of contention that have not been resolved and for which the parties still need to find a common ground. J. Warlick (personal communication, March 6, 2014).There is an agreement on the principle covering peacekeeping forces, the security situation, and refugees. All parties agree that a referendum will take place to determine the final legal status of the Nagorno-Karabakh, however, there are disagreements on where and when will the referendum take place, and who will participate. J. Warlick (personal communication, March 6, 2014). Another major point of discord is the final status of the Lachin corridor, currently linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh would like to retain a permanent maintenance of the entire corridor to allow unrestricted communication with between two locations. Therefore, the Minsk Group continues to seek for options That is will there be a complex leasing arrangement for Lachin which is unlikely to satisfy the Armenians, or will it belong to Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia, which is unlikely to satisfy the Azerbaijanis. that would please all sides. The peace process went through a difficult year during Armenian and Azerbaijani pre-election campaigns, as both presidents had to resort and step up their nationalist rhetoric in order to appease constituencies and ensure a win in presidential elections. For Sargsyan losing territory meant loss in elections. The precedent two terms, Aliyev was in the shadow of his father’s legacy, now he is in a stage of creating his own. The following four years, prior to the 2018 Azeri and Armenian presidential elections, could possibly provide space and a window of opportunity to tackle last few disagreements between conflicting parties. Nevertheless, numerous issues underlie Track I political negotiations of the OSCE Minsk Group starting with the dynamics between key actors and their interests. Some state that the co-chairs accord low priority to Karabakh while also advancing geo-political and national interests of their representative countries in the region. De Waal asserts that Russia is a main obstacle to the resolution, as it proved itself incapable or unwilling to mediate successfully a peace agreement. He elaborated that Russia’s role and interests in prolonging the tensions stem from the threat of its decreased influence in the region and increased influence of the USA, EU, and NATO. De, W. T. (2003). Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war. New York: New York University Press. Yet he neglects to note that each co-chair acts in a capacity as a representative of his country, and he overlooks that Ambassador Igor Popov has served much longer as a Co-Chair and has a greater depth of knowledge and expertise on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process than his counterparts. Former president Medvedev President of the Russian Federation – 2008-2012spent a lot of time and political capital pushing for the peace process. There was much expectation, by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs and the international community that the meeting in Kazan, which was the ninth that Medvedev hosted for the two presidents, Sammut, D. (2011). After Kazan, a defining moment for the OSCE Minsk Process. would result in an agreement on the basic principles. During the meeting, Aliyev, however, raised new issues that Co-chairs were not aware or informed about, resulting in an all-time low point for the political negotiations until the end of 2013. Sammut, D. (2011). After Kazan, a defining moment for the OSCE Minsk Process Nonetheless, as of early 2014, the Russian government remained committed to working with the parties. France is home to a large and influential Armenian diaspora. The country also owns 5% of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. These broad interests result in France lacking a valuable contribution to the peace negotiations. Gamaghelyan, P. (2009). Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Identity, Politics, Scholarship. The USA also has a large and highly influential Armenian diaspora. The Armenian diaspora has been successful in lobbying the U.S. Congress in passing numerous legislations including the Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act (P.L. 102-511), which prohibits the U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan. “prohibits all US government assistance to Azerbaijan, except for non-proliferation and disarmament activities, until the President determines that Azerbaijan has taken demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh” Giragosian, R. (2001). Nagorno-Karabakh: International Political Dimension Within the USA, there is a separate conflict battleground with individual states supporting Azerbaijan or Armenia by either recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state Maine – April 10-30, 2013 Recognizes NK or by “supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” Arkansas – U.S. State recognizes Khojaly Genocide The U.S. State Department under the leadership of John Kerry, a long-time peacebuilding enthusiast, and Ambassador James Warlick, current Minsk Group Co-Chair, launched a new strategy in pressing for a resolution of a protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Ambassador Warlick stepped-up the game and has been increasingly engaged in public diplomacy efforts trying to demystify and raise awareness around the negotiation process. As of the early 2014, the United States remained committed to working with the parties, as a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, to achieve a lasting and peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based upon three core principles of the Helsinki Final Act. http://armenpress.am/eng/news/751966/usa-remains-committed-to-peaceful-settlement-of-karabakh-conflict.html Track II initiatives and Confidence Building Measures Numerous factors have limited the effectiveness and efficiency of Track II initiatives in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and significantly curbed confidence-building measures. The political environment for peacebuilding and confidence building measures is unfavorable and less promising than it was in 2008-2009, and much less so than during the period 1998-2001, the “high point for Armenian-Azerbaijani CBM.” Broers, L. (2014). Confidence building in the Karabakh: what next? Caucasus Edition, Journal of Conflict Transformation. In the early and mid-1990s, most of peacebuilding NGOs in the region launched activities with a built-in CBM element. CSOs in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh participated effectively and fruitfully in a number of projects, especially those related to the exchange of prisoners of war (POW), mutual visits of students, young adults and students, or aid disbursement to refugees. Ghaplanyan, I. (2009). Empowering and Engaging Civil Society in Conflict Resolution Large groups of journalists traveled back and forth between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in late-1990s in a program that provided an opportunity to generate good journalism and were a good reality check for both sides. In the early 2000s, peacebuilding NGOs’ activities concentrated more on capacity building and citizen security enhancement, Ghaplanyan, I. (2009). Empowering and Engaging Civil Society in Conflict Resolution including awareness of land mines, clearance of mines and cluster munitions, The Halo Trust. (2014). Nagorno Karabakh. repairing schools and monitoring human rights. Most of these initiatives were introduced by foreign organizations, such as the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, or Conciliation Resources, which expected governments of the respective countries to further these processes and engage the general population. However, the lack of political will and CSOs resource and capacities’ constraints undermined challenge the implementation and effectiveness of these initiatives. Social media and blogging on Azeri-Armenian relations and the Karabakh conflict have taken off in recent years and have had an immense impact, both positive and negative, on the overall debate around the conflict. Geybullayeva, A. (2012). Nagorno Karabakh 2.0 A number of social networks serve as a platform that spreads more propaganda. Much of it is a repetition of the same hardline political stance broadcasted on TV and distributed on print media platforms. Nonetheless, there is also positive movement. A group of Armenian and Azerbaijani individuals is using this platform to convey a more tolerant narrative to circumvent government propaganda. The Caucasus Edition, Journal for Conflict Transformation Caucasusedition.net is an online policy journal that brings together authors and bloggers to share their research and analysis on South Caucasus affairs and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation organization brings together Armenian and Azerbaijani youth for conflict resolution seminars and confidence building exercises. Online platforms, such as recently created an Armenian-Azerbaijani joint initiative, Imagine Neutral Zone, http://imagineneutralzone.com/ provide space for the dialogue to continue long after face-to-face sessions. Then again this movement is constrained by few factors, as this is a self-selecting group of courageous individuals, many of whom are labeled as traitors, looked at with suspicion, have difficulties challenging mainstream nationalistic rhetoric, and lack resources and organization. Traditional ways of meeting and dialogue between the Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society representatives still exist and are the most widespread activities on the Track II front. Few of these opportunities are available through pan-regional Caucasus-wide formats that bring together Armenians and Azerbaijanis within a wider community of actors. Broers, L. (2014). Confidence-building in the Karabakh: what next? The number of civil society representatives, though, is small and most have been involved in the process for over two decades. This continuously leads to skepticism on whether those CSO veterans have anything new to contribute. In addition, while participants share a commitment to non-violence and a peaceful settlement of the conflict, each adheres to incompatible and competing visions of the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. M. Tadevosyan ( personal communication March 5, 2014). Various factors resulted in the decline of CSOs peacebuilding activity on the ground. As international organizations dictate type and design of projects they plan to sponsor, NGOs have to draw up projects, which suit the needs of organizations and governments and not necessarily realities and necessities of their respective societies. Such ill-suited proposals and projects appear to lack context and conflict sensitivity leading to populations’ outrage. In early 2012, the Caucasus Center of Peace-Making Initiative with the support of the U.S. Embassy organized an Azerbaijani film festival in Yerevan and Gyumri. The public reaction to the event was more than negative. Armenians expressed outrage online by posting negative comments on various social networks and by staging protests on the streets, which, eventually, led to the event’s cancellation. While the initiative aimed to promote reconciliation efforts and raise awareness on the Nagorno-Karabakh situation from Azeri perspective, the design of the program did not incorporate a conflict-sensitive approach. M. Tadevosyan ( personal communication March 5, 2014). - Instead of creating an individual event, organizers could have screened some of their films through annual Golden Apricot Yerevan International Film Festival Similar initiatives and projects also lead the respective government and societies to doubt the intentions and stakes of peacebuilding activists in the conflict transformation process. The foreign funding of NGO activities began to be seen as direct intrusions into the process, leading to these NGOs and civil society representatives growing increasingly unpopular and being labeled as traitors. The politicization of NGOs in the context of government opposition is significant, which leads to authorities in Armenia and Azerbaijan to regard their own civil societies with suspicion as “covert vehicles of opposition.” Hasanov, A., & Ishkanian, A. (2005). Bridging divides: Civil society initiatives NGOs exercise little to no independence, The newly NGO legislation in Azerbaijan adopted to suffocate political dissent, which allows suspension or banning of national and foreign NGOs in the country is detrimental to organizations seeking to engage in peacebuilding or conflict transformation activities, which go against hardline political position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict - http://www.civicsolidarity.org/article/892/council-europe-should-condemn-repressive-ngo-legislation-azerbaijan have limited resources, are not influential and not in position to offer expertise to government bodies. These factors present that Track II efforts are very constrained. National NGOs are weak, and despite various efforts of foreign donors, it will continue to be so unless both governments demonstrate true commitment to empowering a civil society while undertaking democratic reforms. A political environment gives no room for dehumanization of the enemy, despite the “Moscow Declaration” of 2009, Broers, L. (2010). Opening borders, preserving walls: opportunities to support the Karabakh peace process. Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation, 3(1), 5-8. in which both presidents explicitly endorsed confidence-building measures as a pillar to reinvigorate the peace process. Coordinating Track I and Track II Two decades have passed since the cease-fire agreement was reached in 1994 and the Minsk Group began engaging in a shuttle diplomacy between conflicting parties. The Track I negotiations that have repeatedly taken place behind closed doors in strict confidentiality seem to be moving in a positive direction, yet has not been successful in bringing parties to a full agreement on the framework for the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Track I has been too focused on the political negotiations and too poorly staffed to devote much attention to Track II activities. National and international actors have undertaken various non-official peacebuilding and conflict transformation diplomacy efforts, though, with little information on Track I negotiations, have not been able to contribute more or time their activities to support phases of the official process. Joint efforts of national and international actors to implement, coordinate and complement “track two diplomacy” efforts are vital for lasting and sustainable peace between two nations. “Signed peace agreement does not create peace, without the corresponding societal infrastructure to support it, the peace will never hold.” Notter, J., & Diamond, L. (1996). Building peace and transforming conflict: Multi-track diplomacy in practice. As in the case of the Levon Ter-Petrosian resignation, any concession on the political level that does not sit well with public opinion will essentially cost his or her political position, not to mention, that implementation of a peace agreement reached without widespread support would be nearly impossible. In November 2008, a coalition of British NGOs, which formed the Consortium Initiative, wrote to the co-chairs, calling for the “establishment of a mechanism for dialogue and exchange of views between the [NK] peace process led by the OSCE Minsk Group co-Chair and non-state actors working in support of the peace process”, while asking for more transparency in the process. Consortium Initiative. (2008, November 26). In March 2009, all three co-chairs attended an Armenian-Azerbaijani meeting in Vienna organized by International Alert. De Waal, T. (2003). Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war While his predecessors and Russian and French counterparts serve their traditional roles of mediators in quiet diplomacy. Ambassador James Warlick stepped-up the game and has been increasingly engaged in public diplomacy efforts. This engagement is seen in a number of activities, such as interviews and press conferences, while speaking with the largely detached public and civil society representatives on the current state of the negotiation process and future steps to be taken by the mediators. It is not, necessarily, the job of international mediators to orchestrate civil society dialogue or to strengthen the type of debate, inside the respective states, that is essential to ease polarization of public opinion on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Yet, mediators should demonstrate a greater willingness to interact with and support civil society initiatives. Similarly, civil society must be more engaged with formal Track I negotiations for both sides to tackle discordant issues and create a common vision for conflict resolution at the grassroots level. Huseynov, T. (2011, October). A Developing dialogue: entrenched positions. Yet, Track II dialogue should not imitate the stalled Track I negotiations, which often lead to belligerent debates over terminology and political status. As De Waal notes, for immediate pragmatic reasons, there should be more interaction and coordination between Track I and II efforts for both sides to counter the belief that the negotiations are “some kind of international plot to impose a settlement on unsuspecting Armenians or Azerbaijanis.” De Waal, T. (2010, August 1). Op-Ed; Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process. Chapter III: Youth as Agents of Change To explore the role of youth in peacebuilding, conflict transformation or post-conflict reconstruction, it is important to define the role and status of “youth.” There are legal and operational definitions to this term. The international legal system created a legal distinction between a child and an adult, yet made it particularly problematic to pinpoint “youth” along this range. Chronological definitions and age-defined boundaries do not capture social and cultural interpretations of the term, with age being “a common characteristic, but not the defining criteria.” Schwartz, S. (2010). Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change. This is where the differences between the legal and operation definitions of youth arise. An abundance of literature draws attention to the status of young people within a larger social scheme, whether “immigrants,” or outsiders, Magnuson, D. (2009). The need for the study of everyday life about youth work practice in divided societies. “alienated,” Bronfenbrenner, U. (1974). The origins of alienation. Scientific America, 23(1), 53-61. “not children but not certain to become adults,” Keniston, K. (1975). Prologue: Youth as a stage of life. In R.J. Havighurst & P.H. Dreyer (Eds.), Youth: The seventy-fourt yearbook of the national society for the study of education. Chicago: University of Chicago Pressor “lacking a guide to adulthood.” Coleman, J.S. (n.d.). Innovations in the structure of education. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Across cultures, an understanding of the idea of a child, youth, and adult is developed through social dynamic. Thus, a person might be regarded as a “youth” well past the legal age-definition until the occurrence of a certain life event, whether it is a marriage, land ownership, or an assessment of personal capacity. Kemper, Y. (2005). Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions. Approaches by International Organizations. A social construct of youth also has an under-studied gender dimension, as women tend to disappear when it comes to literature and theories on youth and violence. While the term “young adult” is understood in a variety of different ways, this study focuses on individuals ages 18-27, incorporating both the legal and operational definitions. These individuals are of legal age with control over personal actions and decisions, yet, might not have transitioned into a fully pledged adult within the social scheme and public opinion. Arnett, J.J. (2001). Conceptions of the transition to adulthood: perspectives from adolescence through midlife. Youth compose a significant portion of the population in the Caucasus, accounting for approximately 30 percent of the Armenian YerevanReporter. (2010, November 10). In Armenia, home to around 900 thousand young people. and 35.6 percent of the Azerbaijani Zulgugarov,S., Nagiyeva,T., Efendiyev,T., Abbasali,F., & Sadigzade, O. (2007). The state of youth in Azerbaijan: Summary of analytical report. population. Having such a significant population of youth constituencies presents an opportunity and a potential in relation to redressing violence and addressing existing conflicts. Engaging and empowering youth, an under-represented and marginalized group, is vital, as they are the next generation to lead their nations. Their experiences will influence their interpretations and perceptions of peace and conflict with a potential to alter the national trajectory towards reconciliation, a peaceful settlement of the conflict, or reincitation of the armed conflict. The abundance of literature on the role of youth in conflict examines possible correlations between youth and stability. Yet, it mostly concentrates on the role of young males as rebels and/or perpetrators in armed conflict, and the main protagonists of violence and destabilization. Boyden,J., & DeBerry, J. (2004). Children and Youth on the Front Line; Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563-595.; Singer, P.W. (2005). Children at War. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.; Zakaria, F. (2001). The roots of rage. Newsweek, 138(16), 14-33. Huntington suggests that countries and regions with youthful age structures, or “youth bulges”, more likely to experience political violence. Huntington, S.P. (2001, October). So, are civilizations at war? The Guardian. Some used the “youth bulges” theory to explain recent political crisis and destabilization in the Arab world, as well as youth recruitment within international terrorist networks. Zakaria, F. (2001). The roots of rage In essence, the literature brands youth bulges as a group with opportunities and motives for conflict. The opportunities perspective has its roots in the Collier’s greed argument, which maintains that when the potential gain from joining a rebel group is high and the expected costs are low, conditions that provide the rebel group with the financial means to fight provide opportunities for a rebel group to wage war against a government. Collier,P. (2000). Doing well out of war: An economic perspective.; Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Lancaster further elaborated on the youth’s role through the economic model of supply and demand. Youth participate in a marketplace of ideas, arms, and power in service to the market’s demands. In exchange, war and conflict provides them an entrée, an equal and immediate access to the world: elevation to higher social class, attention, power, economic advancement and vast other opportunities. Lancaster, P. (2007). Categories and illusions: Child soldiers in Burundi. The motive-oriented perspective has its roots in the grievance argument, which views the eruption of violence or rebellion a result of economic or political grievances, inequality, unemployment, or poverty. However, the distinction between the greed and grievance perspective overlap and overstated. The mere existence of a sizeable pool of youth is a factor that could lead to greed and grievance as the opportunity cost for a young adult belonging to larger group cohorts is lower compared to members of smaller size cohorts. Urdal, H. (2011, July). A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence. That is if a labor market cannot absorb a sudden overflow of jobseekers, it will result in a large pool of unemployed (greed-model) youth with strong sentiments and frustrations (grievance-model). While the “youth bulge” and “greed-grievance” model demonstrate how youth population might cause instability and conflict; these models do not provide a structure to consider youth’s role during and after conflict; or how they might influence the conflict itself. The Stedman’s “spoilers theory” focuses on the role of parties and individuals, mainly leaders and elites, seeking to hinder negotiation process or block implementation stages of peace agreements as it threatens their power and interests. Stedman, S.J. (1997). Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. Greenhil and Major redefine and reframe this theory into the “capabilities model”, examining parties’ structural and situational capacities, with an additional classification of potential or “latent spoilers”, who are “weak actors [and] would oppose the implementation of a peace accord, if only they had the material […] to do so.” Greenhill, K.M., & Major, S. (2007). The perils of profiling: Civil war spoilers Schwartz Schwartz, S. (2010). Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change. further elaborated that the model is applicable to the low-status group like youth. If young adults are threatened with low opportunity cost, such as unemployment in peacetime, with an opportunity to benefit during wartime by holding a secured position, the expected utility to continue fighting may be greater. Grattan, A. & Morgan, S. (2007). Youthwork in conflict societies: From divergence to convergence. This model presents that parties’ behavior is not predetermined, but rather has the “potential to change if proper conditions are in place.” Schwartz, S. (2010). Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change. Blindly classifying and branding “young adults,” men and women, as a dangerous demographic and a destabilizing force overlooks and discounts number of individuals and forces behind peace movements, and their significant contributions towards peacebuilding, relationship transformation and dispute resolution efforts. In Serbia, youth organized into clubs to shelter from ongoing ethnic conflicts while developed projects to transform their daily lives. Ognjenovic, V., Skorc, B. &Ivackovic,S. (2007). Introduction to Programs and Organizations Developmental Youth Groups with War-Affected Children and Youth In Bosnia, “youth reconstructed a fountain to restore a historic meeting place for youth from divided communities.” Helsing, J., Kirlic, N., McMaster, N., & Sonnenschein, N. (2005). Young People's Activism and the Transition to Peace: Bosnia, Northern Ireland, and Israel In Angola, orphaned and runaway youth built homes for themselves and developed a system of values to sustain a stable and cooperative family Nordstrom, C. (1997). A different kind of war story. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Youth possess an enormous potential and resilience to become the driving force behind a peaceful resolution to the conflict. A central feature of peacebuilding is in its conflict and context sensitive approach. To avoid potential causes of instability, it is important to fully understand various youth roles in conflict, as perpetrator or combatant, as a victim of violence, and as a leader in peace efforts. This would allow a better understanding on how to approach structural challenges young adults face that lead towards destabilizing behavior, in order to transform these challenges to empower an under-represented group. Young people are urged to be peacemakers, yet they are marginalized, excluded and are not perceived as a group with the right to voice their position in the negotiation process. Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP.(2005). Youth and violent conflict: society and development in crisis? A strategic review with a special focus on West Africa. They are not recognized as having a role of active citizens, political constituencies, and are seldom invited as full and essential participants during the negotiation and post-conflict processes. Investing in young people from early on, engaging them in peace processes, and introducing them to a perspective on conflict and peace will allow youth to gain knowledge, will provide them with space for network development and initiate experience towards social and political inclusion. Broadening opportunities for youth should include a holistic approach, that is, policies’ implementation in the areas of education, labor, and capacity building for civic and political participation to, eventually, enable them to grow, fulfill their potentials, and turn them into active and productive citizens. A sound and efficient policy implementation that positively alters the incentive structure allowing youth to benefit more from the peaceful settlement to the conflict, might prevent them from resorting to violence and contribute positively to the stability and peace. The Armenian and Azerbaijani nations need to be dedicated to empowering young leaders to advance reconciliation and conflict transformation efforts. Yet, systemic change requires a shift in thinking from merely advocating for youth and consulting with them to putting them at the center of policy development and peacebuilding process. Chapter IV: Theoretical Framework on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformation Nagorno-Karabakh as a conflict of historical representations and identities The negotiation and mediation process of the OSCE Minsk Group building on the awareness of the conflict, emerged in recognition that parties to the dispute cannot eliminate the other side and, therefore, must work with each other to achieve their goals. The role of international mediators is to facilitate the articulation of needs, positions and interests of the concerned parties into practical and mutually acceptable solutions to promote relationship restructuring. Yet, so far, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs have been institutionalizing a conflict resolution platform focused on the fundamentals of settlement, while reinforcing the priority of elites and their influence over everything and everyone. The conflict resolution and management efforts of international mediators failed to acknowledge the need for holistic conflict transformation. The literature on peace and reconciliation studies Galtung, J. (1964).An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1-4; Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization.; Goodhand, J. (2006). Aiding peace? The role of NGOs in armed conflict.; Lederach, J.P. (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington,DC: USIP refers to two related phenomena when describing the concept of peacemaking. First, it describes a stage of institutionalized conflict resolution and conflict management. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, it means - maintaining a cease-fire agreement and getting the adversaries to agree on the framework for the negotiation of a comprehensive and peaceful settlement. The OSCE Minsk Group and the conflicting parties derive and evolve their plan from the notion that the conflict must be managed, by dealing with destructive consequences and components of the conflict, while promoting the impression that a conflict is undesirable and must end (or be eliminated). Lederach argues that concepts of resolution and management do not adequately describe the nature of the conflict “in the relational ebb and flow over time,” while questioning “its usefulness in the construction of peace.” Lederach, J.P. (1995). Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures. Further, he inquires whether it is possible to manage human interaction the way we manage material things, which possibly explains sporadic escalations and violations of the cease-fire on the line of contact. Second, the concept of peacemaking presupposes that negative peace (the end of direct violence and sustaining cease-fire) at the formal political level is closely linked with positive peace Galtung, J. (1964). An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1),1-4. building (the lasting progress through improved human communication, understanding, and education). This stage refers to a greater project of reconciliation and conflict transformation. Lederach suggests that transformation does not imply that there is need to eliminate or manage conflict (like resolution and management), but highlights its inherent dialectic nature. Lederach, J.P. (1995). Preparing for Peace P. 17 He further expands that conflict is a phenomenon of human creation that alters relationships, affects direct and indirect communication channels, and transforms broader social context. Volkan and Kelman add that conflict has a psychological dimension to it, as it effects perceptions and understanding of the other and of self, which is precisely the case of protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in which symbols and a notion of the enemy are institutionalized and dominate public discourse. In other words, developing a sustainable and lasting peace through conflict transformation suggests: 1)addressing cultural violence, beliefs and values that explain, justify, and reproduce violence; by 2)transforming mutually destructive and harmful patterns of expression towards constructive and mutually beneficial ones; while also 3) attending to structural violence (inequality and discrimination); Schirch, L. (2013). Conflict assessment and peacebuilding planning: and 4) seeking systemic change by “building on the energy and impact of conflict itself.” Lederach, J.P. (1995). Preparing for Peace pg. 19 Thus, while the Minsk Group Co-Chairs are working tirelessly to advance discussions and negotiations on the formal level, they failed to acknowledge and push conflicting parties to address a neglected aspect of a psychological dimension to the conflict. Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project. Tensions and mistrust between Armenian and Azerbaijanis are linked to socio-cultural and historical dimensions, that of memory, exclusive historic interpretations, nationalistic myths and a collective identity. Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project. An application of research concepts developed in studies on nationalism, ethnicity and group identification allows selecting a few very important features of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh to understand a mechanism that contributes to the emergence and reigniting of armed conflict. The basis of analysis of the Armenian and Azerbaijani perception of conflict will demonstrate a correlation between Karabakh events and processes of nation-building, and arising difficulties in this process that are detrimental to the peaceful settlement of the conflict. The stalemate in the negotiation process within the ongoing “no peace, no war” scenario, led to criticism and skepticism from both nations on a possibility of achieving a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Prolonged negotiations led to a belief in a single win-lose approach deepening the polarization of public opinion. Polarization of public opinion, assimilation of collective symbols and memory of war, continuous propaganda, and negative attitudes towards the other, exclusive hard-lined political stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh future legal status only intensify feelings of mutual mistrust and hatred. Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project. In intractable conflicts, negative transformations also take place through reinterpretations and rewriting of historical accounts. Cases of shaping and transforming selective narratives within the domestic public domain are not rare. It is a reflection of a development of a group identity as it These shared perceptions and collective identity imitates a sense of solidarity in times of turbulence and confusion, Garagozov, R. (2012). Do Woes Unite Foes? and possesses a powerful ethnic mass mobilization potential. Zolyan, M. (2005). Historical narratives and the representation of a conflict An appeal to history and the past is a common and a very powerful mechanism of a psychological impact on masses. Framing and constructing the past and political realities in the domestic public domain are widespread phenomenon and not constrained to a specific country or era. Ilham Aliyev, during his speech at the opening of the Guba genocide memorial, emphasized the need of all, especially younger generations, to know all aspects of history, including disasters the [Azerbaijani] nation faced in the past. He went on to state that it was necessary to produce research reflecting the historical truth and communicate that history to Azerbaijani population. Aliyev, I. (2013, September). The opening of the Guba Genocide Memorial complex. Similar calls have been made by the Armenian counterparts urging to support a comprehensive and meaningful research around historical lands of the Armenian population. MassisPost. (2011, July 31). Critical moment in Armenian history: An appeal A clash between disputed national historical accounts does not necessarily result in the emergence of a political conflict. There are numerous cases, when utterly opposing accounts of history do not interfere with the peaceful and positive development of bilateral relations, or relations between various ethnic groups within a single state. Yet, it is difficult to deny the existence of a direct relationship between narratives of a national history, built on a negative image and interpretation of the “other” and ethnically motivated violence. A narrative written on a combination of various elements and characteristics, such as, a common vision of the world grounded on experience, historic events, and adopted interpretation of selected narratives, has a decisive influence on the development of group identity. Garagozov, R. (2008). Characteristics of collective memory History provides a narrative that constructs the spirit and core of a group’s identity, its values, obligations and norms, relationship with other groups, determines routes for present challenges and a trajectory for the future. Liu, J.H. & Hilton, D.J. (2005). How the past weighs on the present: Groups’ representations of their history are in its “charter”, an account of its origin and historical mission”. Malinowki, B. (1926). Myth in primate psychology. Longon: Norton. The charter, as Malinowsky describes, defines the timeless and fundamental nature of a group that explains why nations and ethnic groups react differently when presented with a similar challenge. The charter continuously reconstructed and renegotiated to reflect a fluctuating environment legitimizes present political policies. Major institutions that promote this talent of historical myth- and memory-making are the ones that facilitate the absorption of these historical accounts and written records across generations, which are educational facilities, the media, and religious institutions. These narratives are part of “institutional history,” Ferro, M. (1994). Kak rasskazyvaiyut istoriyu detiam v raznyh stranaah mira. Moscow: Vysshaia Shkola the type that supported by those institutions dominated in the community and dominates in a given community. Historical memories, communicated by way of mass education, allow influencing beliefs and attitudes of people who could turn those filtered experiences into action. Gahramanova, A. (2010). Paradigms of political mythologies and perspectives of reconciliation This explains the reason behind inflated in importance historical chronicles in societies tangled in ethnic disputes. Events and narratives of the past transformed into important political issues at present. Debates around historical truth have little to do with the objective historiography, as the aim is not to clarify historical facts, but to provide an ideological explanation to a specific political campaign. A correlation between conflict and historical narratives are twofold: 1) the effect of national representation of history on events in the region, and 2) how various events in the zone of conflict influence transformation of historical narratives. The angle on national memory and historiography attracted a lot of attention. Researchers noteworthy of mentioning, Garagozov, Furman, Marutyan, Astourian, developed and produced a considerable amount of research on this subject. Garagozov, R. (2012). Do Woes Unite Foes? ; Marutyan, H. (2007). Collective and historical memory in the dialogue of cultures.; Astourian, S. (1994). In search of their forefathers: National identity and the historiography and politics of Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnogeneses.; Furman, D. (2001). Azerbaijan i Rossiya. Yet, they emphasize the need to differentiate between “historical narratives” and “collective memory”. Shared memories have a complex relationship, as they are based on historical narratives but might clash with collective memories, which as Ferro points out preserved in the form of oral accounts and transmitted in an informal environment (home, a neighborhood) through community storytelling. Ferro,M. (1994). Kak rasskazyvayut istoriu detiam v raznyh stranakh mira In this context, instrumentalization of the “Soviet people” narrative, founded on explicit antinationalistic Soviet ideology, to educate Homo Sovieticus, The term coined by A. Zinovyev, and implies the average soviet man by suppressing negative experiences and recollections of traumatic events was unable to wipe out collective memories of the people in the Caucasus. Ironically, this flawed system provided vast opportunities for the nation building process, which strengthened ethno-nationalist myths in the former Soviet space. Wertsch, J.V. (2002). Voice of Collective Remembering.; Slezkine, Y. (1994). The USSR as a communal apartment or how a socialist state promoted ethnic particularism. Since the mid-1980s, the policy of “glasnost” promoted freedom of the press, and led to a rapid rise of nationalism in a society, which was deprived of a forum for public debates and exchange of opinions. From the very start of this public debate, the Armenians and Azeris connected their national identity to the ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh. A preceded re-surfacing and wide circulation of nationalistic rhetoric and political mythology activated a corresponding pattern of collective memory. However, for the specific narrative to provide a foundation for the outbreak of ethno-political conflict, it had to be powerful enough to transform beliefs into actions. Marutyan, H. (2007). Collective and historical memory in the dialogue of cultures The influence a narrative has on a group is conditioned by the manifestation of the following elements: 1) the group “has definite patterns of collective memory” and 2)the distribution of narratives’ contents that “interpret the present and/or historical events of the past […] capable of exerting influence on these patterns” in excessive quantities. Garagozov, R. (2008). Characteristics of collective memory, Analysis of various research Garagozov, R. (2008). Characteristics of collective memory; Rothchild, J. (1982). Ethnopolitics: A conceptual Framework.; Gahramanova, A. (2010). Paradigms of political mythologies and perspectives of reconciliation in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. present that the theme of Armenian Genocide, and a pattern of collective memory linked to numerous Armenian-Turkish clashes, combined with an anarchical and weak state led to the transformation of the image of the victim and gave way to the image of a fighter, seeking justice and compassion to be achieved through struggle. Such oversimplification does not explain the reason behind the scale and dynamic of 1988 mass mobilization of the Armenians in a matter of two weeks From several hundred on February 13, 1988 to 700,000 February 25, 1998 , yet, in conjunction with other elements, the narratives serve to be powerful catalysts for a group’s social and political mobilization and a “high level of in-group solidarity”. Cornell, S.E. (1997). Conflict Theory and the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict: Guidelines for a Political Solution? Research provides analyses of developments that took place in the years leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as, general practices in the Armenian and Azerbaijani historiography. Just as collective memories are capable of mobilizing masses, inciting ethnic conflicts, they also can nurture reconciliation. The reconciliation process, though, must stem from the shift in participants’ collective identities and social attitudes. Kelman, H.C. (2008). Reconciliation from a social-psychological perspective. Studies point out various ways to promote reconciliation efforts and deal with troubled memories. One way to cultivate trust and confidence for groups’ reconciliation and cohesiveness is to seek, acknowledge and address grievances, wrongdoings and injustice through mechanisms such as Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as in the case of Kenya or South Africa that provide opportunities to explore the narrative of the past, develop new patterns of a collective memory, and create a framework for new historical narratives. Another strategy that could possibly be conducive to reconciliation is to let the past be forgotten, as in the case of Catalonia and Spain. The strategy of erasing and forgetting the past was effective in bringing reconciliation to the country at that moment. Yet, this strategy of simply forgetting and erasing the past from historical accounts seems to resolve the dispute temporarily, but cannot escape collective memories of the troubled past preserved and passed through generations in the form of storytelling. Intergroup dialogue and contact is also seen as a type of peacebuilding initiative that is believed to result in mutually beneficial cooperation. The underlying idea is that creating collaborating interethnic relations could possibly break political myths, transform hostile stereotypes and change negative attitudes. Kriesberg, L. (2000). Coexistence and the reconciliation of communal conflictsGaragozov, however, is skeptical with regard to intergroup dialogue as a strategy for reconciliation and attitudinal change. Plasticity, openness and readiness for collaboration, a transformation and shared commitment to a peaceful settlement to the conflict is difficult to overcome by opposing positions and visions on the future of the Nagorno-Karabakh. He, instead, suggests changing collective memories through the process of a progressive narrative transformation. The objective of which is to construct a common narrative that would allow conflicting parties to come to terms with their troubled past. In the context of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, recasting ethno-nationalist myths into more cooperative and tolerant ones, alongside with writing and teaching of fair-minded historical chronicles instead of nationalistic ones could be more effective and efficient. The need for this type of change is obvious in this case, as mutual mistrust is the main obstacle to conflict resolution and point to the importance of building trust between the disputed parties. Peace negotiations and conflict transformation efforts undertaken by national, international organizations and political leaders have failed to bring about positive peace. This failure highlights the limitation of negotiations and conflict resolution initiatives and advocates the launching of a process of reconciliation through a narrative transformation as a foundation for peace. Youth, Historical Narratives and Identity Formation The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is at a pivotal moment for conflict transformation. The priorities must shift from merely resolving the conflict and managing the risk of unintended escalation to investing in a gradual attitudinal change in Armenian and Azerbaijani societies to rule out military force as a legitimate means to secure goals and interests in this conflict. L. Broers (personal communication March 31, 2014). While parties are having difficulties to come to an agreement on various subjects, a new generation is coming of age with important implications for the feasibility of the peace process. Given the current negotiation context and the tendency of peace agreements and settlement implementation to be elongated, currently disenfranchised adolescents and those in their early adulthood will determine success or failure of a peace process as they attain their political and institutional reigns. McEvoy-Levy, S. (2001). Youth, Violence and Conflict Transformation, Peace Review, 13, 89-96 In light of their roles, youth have significant transformative powers and their prospective contributions to politics and civil society are determined by their experiences, collective memories and learned symbols of conflict and peace. As was elaborated in the “Youth as Agents of Change” chapter, youth is not a biological stage of human development, but a social process that reproduces and/or renounces cultural practices or historical narratives in the public discourse. Youth depicts a process of personal human and socio-cultural development, and they can and often have come to dissent and dispute received social order. Keniston, K. (1971). Youth and dissent. The rise of a new opposition. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich The role of youth in escalating or otherwise transforming conflict presupposes the need to explore the relationship between identity formations, narrative, collective memory and conflict. The emerging line of research on youth and identity formation in conflict environments implicitly or explicitly undertakes a narrative approach to the study. Identity is set at both personal (individual) level and the social (collective) level of circulating narratives on shared experiences and group placement. In the field of psychology, there is an emphasis on narrative identity at the level of individual development. In the field of political science, an emphasis is placed on the larger collective level with narratives reproduced and communicated through political ideological rhetoric and institutionalized written accounts. Identity development of younger generations probed in a process of individual meaning making and memory telling helps to internalize shared experiences, collective memory and historical accounts. An analytical point of study involves the way youth engage with historical narratives, as they create and develop their personal and collective identities. McLean’s study on memory telling function in identity construction McLean, K.C. (2005). Late Adolescent Identity Development: Narrative Meaning Making and Memory Telling. defined identity development as a process of narrative engagement closely “mediated by social experiences,” in which individuals encounter and utilize various discursive options to seek a meaning of their experiences. Porat furthered the line of scholarship by studying how individuals and youth engage with given narratives. He discovered that written accounts are important, however, the interpretation is linked to youths’ community and environment. That is, the narrative engagement does not happen in a cultural vacuum, but closely mediated by social experiences and requires “sustained communities of shared […] interpretation to maintain salience.” Porat, D. (2004). Its not written here, but this is what happened: Furthermore, youth are not merely passive objects upon which narratives project. Youth are producers and products of Shwemer. Collective psychology collective memory, socio-cultural and group identity. They are part of a larger systemic structure, and, although, not drivers of systemic change, they are active contributors to social, political, and economic processes in peacetimes and conflict. See Abeyratne 2004 and Daiute 2006 for in-depth analysis of youth roles and social integration (Hammack) A narrative approach to identity development revealed the way a dialectic nature of narratives’ meaning making reflects individual placemaking in a conflict setting and the ability of circulating master narratives reify the narrative basis of conflict. On a socio-structural and collective level two underlying concepts of identity emerged in the literature on youth and political conflict categorizing identity as either a burden or benefit. Hammack, P.L. (2010). Identity as burden or benefit? Youth, historical narrative, and the legacy of political conflict. The notion of identity as a burden is linked to its function in influencing individuals to join and support collective behavior and social activities that recreate or maintain the status quo of conflict. Collective behavior and social activities involve active contribution to political violence and social processes of “memory making”, such us use of a negative image and interpretation of the “other” and inflating intergroup differences that complement libeling in conflict environments. The concept of identity, through this lens, becomes a tool hindering individual judgment, rationality and morals. Bar-Tal, D. (2007). Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts. American behavioral scientist, 50, 1430-1453 The concept of identity built on a discourse of power, subordination and social categorization and order framed as “natural.” Reicher, S. (2001). Self and nation categorization, contestation and mobilization London : SAGE. Parties struggling with representation and identification are likely to be the subject to the established system of social order and are likely to utilize arrangements within that system to enhance their position in the social hierarchy. An identity as a burden for youth is rooted on the belief that if polarized narrative of a collective identity accepted incontestably and internalized by individuals, then these individuals are likely to overlook and miss identity as a tool for liberation, separation to have an agency over narrative meaning making. The bulk of the literature highlights the negative effects that political violence has on the psychological well-being of young adults. In order to cope with the stress of violence, young adults are likely to turn to narratives and collective memories that rationalize and make a meaning of ongoing senseless conflict. Such strategies allow youth to build their resiliency capacities and maintain their ability to function under extreme stress. Punamaki discovered that “Israeli children with much experience of political violence, did not manifest increased psychological problems, when they had a strong ideological commitment” to the group’s participation in armed conflict. Punamaki, R.L. (1996). Can ideological commitment protect children’s psychosocial well-being Muldoon and Wilson, however, suggested that mental health, internalization of the group’s identity, and ideological commitment have a bit more of a complex relationship. Greater ideological commitment might lead to young adults taking part in violence, increasing their risk of mental health problems afterwards. Muldoon, O.T. & Wilson,K.(2001). Ideological Commitment, At the same time, ideological commitment and a high level of identification appear to develop a negative image of the other, stereotypes, negative attitudes, and support for violence against “outsiders.” Bar-Tal, D. (1996). Development of social categories and stereotypes in each childhood: The case of ‘the Arab’ concept formation, stereotype and attitudes by Jewish children in Israel. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 20, 341-371 Yet, their study established that youth in Northern Ireland with high levels of ideological commitment reported high levels of self-esteem. Ultimately, it might provide a reason and an explanation on the youth’s decision to internalize narratives of collective memories to build resiliency and cope with possible psychological problems that might arise. Education is a source of social reproduction, instrumentalization of collective memory, and a site for rewriting historical accounts. An absolute state control over historical narratives, with capacities and abilities to alter and implant master narratives, provides an advantage over maintaining hegemony and supremacy over minds. Educational materials could delegitimize the stance of the other side, could sustain and promote the status quo, and promote tension escalation. Numerous cases, as in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the role of geography and history education effectively delegitimizes the narrative of the other side, while delivering blanket of themes of collective victimization, security, and positive self-image. Bar-Gal, Y. (1994). The image of the Palestinian in geography textbooks in Israel. History is an essential component in sustaining the group’s identity and historical memory. History is a tool for emotional resonance that purposefully commemorates conflicts between groups by identifying friends, foes, and the group’s calling. Written accounts of factual events in conjunction with widely recognized figures, which are woven into temporary versions of a narrative, communicate emotional messages of collective memory and shared experiences, intelligence and wisdom of the group. Present day interpreters are the ones who evoke needed emotions and attitudes. Factual accounts of events and people are undisputed Similar to the saying of “history written by the victors”,, however their meaning, interpretation, the larger narratives woven into and relevance to the present time can be easily disputed. If these historical accounts and social representation of events are widely accepted in public discourse, it assures legitimization of current social order and political arrangements. In a way, formal education and state-controlled institutions, that enables communicating a specific narrative, provide fertile ground for identity polarization and conflict reproduction. However, education can also plant seeds for positive social change. Education can actively counter a culture of violence through a series of inter-communal encounters, lecture series on peace education and conflict resolution, while facilitating broader interaction between divided and contested societies. In their research on social representation of history Liu, J.H., Wilson, M.W., Ward, C., & Abraham,S. (2002). Social representations of history in Malaysia and Singapore: On the relationship between national and ethnic identity. Liu, Lawrence, Ward and Abraham also argue that when the dominant representation of history offers an acceptable and fair position for each subgroup within a nation it facilitates a “positive networking”, a term that defines a positive relationship between national and subgroup identity. Liu, J.H., Wilson, M.W., Ward, C., & Abraham,S. (2002). Social representations of history At the same time, a representation of history should contain narratives that allow for subgroup reconciliation, reflect the group’s identity to participate in the national agenda, and be part of the socially constructed definition of nationality; Reicher, S. (2001). Self and nation categorization, contestation and mobilization London : SAGE. thus, to allow self-identification at a higher level (regional and national) to complement lower-level self-identification (ethnicity, subgroup, individual). Hawke, D. (2005). Reconstructing the past and attributing the responsibility for the Holocaust. Should the minority representations of history contradict with the dominant narrative, it is likely to create tensions between majority and minority (ethnic) identities, the results of which we have seen in the eruption of secession movements after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Papazian, L. (2001). A People’s Will: Armenian Irredentism over Nagorno-Karabakh, Built on the framework of oppression and liberation theology, an alternative perspective on identity highlights a transformative nature of identity. This idea challenges the notion of conflict as essentially negative and undesirable, and situates it as a need to transform the status quo, which undermines interests and needs of marginalized and low-status groups for recognition and representation. Similarly, to that of “identity as burden”, the starting point and basis of this concept of “identity as a benefit” lays on the axis of power, subordination and social order. A comprehensive scholarship on education and identity formation presents the notion of narrative engagement that demonstrates how youth can confront internalization of conflicting narrative, at the same time having young adults engage in multicultural education and coexistence programs to expose them to the narrative of the other. Conflict can be a positive force challenging discrimination and inequality and initiating steps towards social change, justice and human rights. Battles have been waged and the global rise of political activism laid a foundation to counter oppression, social order, subordination, authoritative regimes while contributing to social justice for marginalized groups. Youth are seen as subordinated to adults and elites with a hegemonic agency for decision-making in the political, financial, conflict resolution or humanitarian fields. More than often, political voices of youth are silenced with little to no representation. Nonetheless, youth have the agency to develop personal identities, to construct make a meaning of narratives, communicate memories through storytelling, to gain and share knowledge with their group and wider audience. McEvoy-Levy, S. (2000). Silenced Voices? Youth and peer relationships in armed conflict and its aftermath. The view of conflict as transformation and narrative identity as a tool for systemic change can be tied to the identity politics movement. Bernstein, M., & Taylor, V. (2013). Identity politics. As Taylor argues the identity politics movement is about recognition and redistribution of power within political, social and economic spheres. Taylor, C. (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition. There are numerous cases in modern history of the “use of identity as a tool for liberation from subordination,” Hammack, P.L. (2006). Identity, Conflict, and Coexistence: Life stories of Israeli and Palestinian Adolescents. such as struggles and movements for recognition and equality of ethnic minorities, LGBTQ rights, or civil rights. The use of identity represents the framework of “strategic essentialism” Term first coined by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak; Hangen, S. (2005). Race and the politics of identity in Nepal.; and Garza, C.M. (1995). Chicana lesbian identity and strategic essentialism in its acknowledgement that just as social categories serve the foundation for oppression and subordination, they can confer political power and state control. The intention of this chapter has been to examine the interplay of hegemonic narratives, collective memory and its effect on youth identity, development and status in conflict and post-conflict settings. Historical narratives are a powerful tool that promotes collective remembering, develops a group identity, and evokes emotions and attitude. Acknowledging that in a fragile and unstable environment, there is widespread dissemination of exclusive and glorifying representations of history and identities; youth internalizes a given narrative to make sense of context and cope with stress. However, branding youth as a source of instability and perpetrators of violence, fails to recognize the complex role and status youth holds in such settings. Programs that cater to the needs of youth and realize youth’s positive and transformative potential can facilitate the young people’s role in conflict transformation. Sequencing these programs with efforts to lessen confrontational attitudes through narrative transformation could possibly mediate attitude changes and facilitate rapprochement between parties. Chapter V: Key Findings Youth Attitudes and Beliefs on Peace and Human Rights A review of national and regional context demonstrate that Armenia and Azerbaijan have been involved in a number of armed conflicts going back centuries and are currently involved in a mutually destructive conflict. The existence of a conflict with sporadic violent escalations has claimed lives and has been detrimental to fostering a peaceful environment for people to enjoy their freedoms and rights. A continuous support and ongoing efforts of international mediators and civil society organizations allowed both nations to reach and enjoy negative peace within their borders. Yet, constant escalations on the line of contact, militaristic and hateful official statements, personal and historical memories of conflict and aggression, affected the way youth defines, perceives peace and conflict. Thus, the survey attempted to answer the following questions: when asked to define peace, do respondents provide negative or positive definitions Galtung, J. (1964). An Editorial. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1-4 of peace? Do they view peace as achievable or idealistic? Do they believe a right to peace is a human right? Do they believe reconciliation between Armenian and Azerbaijani nations is realistic and achievable? What steps and factors are necessary to achieve inter-group reconciliation, regional security and stability? What actors should be involved to bring about peace? and, Do they believe youth is an important social actor that could influence the peace process? The sample for the first section was composed of 69 respondents: 31 Armenians and 38 Azerbaijanis. Respondents’ demographic information allowed me to analyze individual conceptualization and understanding of terms based on certain demographic characteristics (other than ethnicity) such as: gender; participation in peace education programs; involvement in some sort of protest activity, and; having a family member who was affected by or who participated in armed combat. The majority of participants provided basic demographic information; however not all replied to all items throughout they survey, as respondents had an option to skip or decline to answer questions. This chapter provides key findings of the survey. First, participants were asked to define what peace meant to them. Respondents’ answers to this question varied from a single word to lengthy sentences. To analyze the data, each answer was placed and sorted by thematic categories. Definitions of peace were categorized by the following themes: negative peace, positive peace, and idealism. Responses sorted into ‘negative peace’ column described peace in terms of the absence, removal or an end of a threatening situation or aggressive act. The ‘positive peace’ column included responses that described both prerequisites and outcomes of peace and incorporated components such as equality, tolerance, human rights, freedoms, that must be in place to achieve peace. The ‘idealism’ category incorporated responses that questioned attainability of peace, and rather described peace as an ideal scenario. More than two thirds (70 percent) of the Azerbaijani youth responses included definitions within a “negative peace category” as opposed to 40 percent of the Armenian youth and defined peace as “an absence of armed and military combat.” Positive peace - included in 10 percent of Azerbaijani youth definitions, and 39 percent of Armenian youth responses, was defined as “mutual understanding,” “positivity” and “harmony.” Five percent of the Azerbaijani and 19 percent of the Armenian youth defined peace as an ideal state. Demographic characteristics, such as gender, involvement and participation in protests or peace education, did not reveal any statistical significance when defining the term. One can argue that this displays that youth in way is conditioned to see the world peace through a lens of arms and power struggle, where a single state or international system has a right to utilize any available means to bring about peace. Galtung argues this concept of peace, which dominates political environment, serves the interests of the powerful to maintain status quo in the society. Galtung, J. (1981). Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace. Journal of Peace Research, 17(2), 189-199. Once youth reflected on what peace meant to them, subsequent questions explored their attitudes on the right to peace. There is a deep linkage between peace and human rights. Just as peace promotes and protects human rights, a respect for human rights and dignity serves the foundation of freedoms and peace. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the HC on the outcome of the workshop on the right of peoples to peace Thus, while the Armenian and Azerbaijani youth displayed their beliefs towards peace, this question examined whether they believe in the right to peace. The majority of respondents (94 percent) conveyed their strong belief that “all human beings have a right to peace,” including 91 percent of Armenian and 97 percent of Azerbaijani youth. Responses to this question varied, with many responses perceiving this right as an individual (personal) right, while a few mentioned it as a collective right. Similar to definitions of peace, responses on the human right to peace argued the responsibility to protect and promote the right to peace lies with states, and are the one to blame for concurrent violation of this inherent right. For example, one respondent reasoned, “From my point of view, there should be no obstacles to a happy and peaceful life in this world. Egotistical (selfish) start wars, who during the planning or implementation process do not think about the lives of others, and cannot put oneself in a place of ordinary people who suffer in the course of actions.” This statement possibly implies that youth places the blame for lack of peace on elitist groups, those with power (governments), rather than “ordinary people”, since an “average citizen” has no influence on policy development. Few other examples included “the right to peace is as inherent as the right to life”, and “every person – is an individual, why would (s)he seek war?” The question regarding childrens’ rights to grow up in a world of peace received similar positive feedback with 96 percent of respondents agreeing with the statement: 92 percent of Armenians and 100 percent Azerbaijanis. Respondents’ explanation to this question can be categorized into a culture of peace theme. A culture of peace means that peace cannot be imposed; rather it can come about through a change of mindset and change of culture. United Network of Young Peacebuilders (2013, February). http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RightPeace/Pages/WGDraftUNDeclarationontheRighttoPeaceStatements.aspx A respondent wrote, “Children developing into adulthood should not see war as to avoid [possible] negative consequences. A child needs to see a peaceful environment to think in peaceful terms; a future might not be easy for them because of various obstacles, but the war is not something kids should experience growing up.” Justifications and explanations for violence, invasion or attack, are incompatible with a culture of peace. While, the majority of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth respondents defined peace as an absence of war, they do, however believe, that the next generation should instead think in terms of positive peace and restoration of relationship. They also argue that there should policies and structures in place to develop a culture of peace for the benefit of children, future and world peace. Regarding the right to protest against war and in favor of peace, there was conformity about this right. An analysis of responses revealed that 15 percent of Azerbaijani and 11 percent of Armenian youth argued against such a right, as opposed to 86 percent of Armenians and 70 percent of Azerbaijanis, who argued in favor. The majority of proprotest respondents noted that people are entitled to this right (to peacefully voice their concerns), and that “The desire to leave in peaceful times – is an inherent right”. There were those respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement, as one respondent expressed “I would not participate in this type of events, as I believe any protest or rally lead to those same wars, however, on a smaller scale. Peace cannot be achieved until there is harmony and understanding. People need to be heard to be understood, however cry always perceived negatively, which can be said about the protest.” Literature on the right to peaceful assembly and association maintains that antiwar, non-violent peace activism plays a significant role toward the decline of armed conflict and attainment/sustainability of peace. Cohrs, C.J., & Boehnke, K. (2008). Social psychology and peace. Social Psychology, 39(1), 4-11 – Pierhke Overall, Armenian and Azerbaijani respondents demonstrated a widespread support for the right to protest in favor of peace, while reaffirming it as an inherent and basic human right, and an outlet to voice one’s concerns and needs. However, none of the participants linked the right to protest to an engagement in advocating political parties for peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Perspectives on the right to protest did not seem to vary in relation to one’s gender, neither in relation to previous involvement in protests, nor participation in peace education programs. Youth Attitudes and Beliefs on Reconciliation Intractable ethnic conflicts and long-running disputes deeply set and influence ecological and socio-political environment with aggression, hostility, distrust and anger. For high-level political negotiations to be accepted by the general population, processes of inter-group contact and reconciliation must accompany a top-down process of conflict resolution. Reconciliation is a complex term, as it implies both, a process and a state. Prior to delving deep into the subject, it is important to explore how Armenian and Azerbaijani youth define reconciliation and if they believe reconciliation is possible. An overwhelming majority of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth indicated that they believe reconciliation is achievable and only eight percent of Azerbaijani and five percent of Armenian youth argued the opposite. Based on collected responses, definitions of reconciliation ranged and were categorized into following major themes: 1) process, 2) an achieved state, 3) and perceived reality. A “perceived reality” category incorporated responses that referred to or reflected some sort of a real event or situation, such as “1994”, rather than a definition of the term. An “achieved state” or stage, referred to definitions such as the end of the conflict, or hostilities, or a positive emotional state, like “when everything is good.” A “process” theme incorporated responses that referred to an act of finding a way to live alongside with former adversaries, placing or setting aside the memory of the contested past, to rebuilding relationships with the enemy in “an attempt to get along and improve relations.” A majority of responses (43 percent), defined reconciliation as an achieved state, followed by “reconciliation as a process” (32 percent) and a “perceived reality” (25 percent), with the latter mainly including Armenian responses. Demographics characteristics revealed a significance of association. Proportionally more Azerbaijani and Armenian women, rather than men, provided a definition that was categorized to the ‘process’ theme. On the other hand, respondents with a family member who was affected by or who participated in armed combat were more likely to provide a definition that was categorized into an ‘achieved state’ or stage theme. These responses display how definitions vary in complexity and substance. Differences in demographics demonstrate that youth across ethnic lines define terms in similar or divergent ways depending on a specific characteristic and current regional context. Historical and collective memories of the nation’s past, lengthy history of conflicts and invasions, remembrance of marginalization from the hands of invaders, in addition to ongoing direct or indirect exposure to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reflect the way Armenian and Azeri youth define reconciliation. Young adults do not necessarily see reconciliation as a process that involves forgiveness, or healing, rebuilding relationships or trust, as Lederach defines it. They see it a state, such as “a temporary cease of armed conflict,” or a “specific stage between conflict and peace.” However, lacking a vision of process, lacking a vision of future orientation and mutual collaboration for a common cause should raise concerns. These findings of a small group of respondents reconfirm that those seeking to bring parties to an agreement must raise awareness on what reconciliation will be should parties come to an agreement on the implementation of confidence building measures; and of utmost importance should reflect ordinary people’s priorities and interests within the holistic reconciliation process. Steps and conditions for inter-group reconciliation An intractable and prolonged conflict such as the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh raises notes of distrust. Both nations are suspicious of each other, and suspicious of proposed solutions to the conflict by the adversary. Trust-Building. (n.d.). In International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict. An important element in a reconciliation process is rebuilding a certain level of trust between conflicting parties. When the trust is damaged, a trust-building process should consider the following factors: 1) who should take the initiative to stimulate reconciliation, and who actually desires to rebuild trust; and 2) if those, whose trust was broken are willing to reconcile and restore trust? Lewicki, R.J., & Tomlinson, E. C. (2003). Trust and Trust Building. Beyond Intractability. Respondents rated their level of agreement with the following statement “rebuilding trust is essential for reconciliation, and it is the offender who should take the initiative in stimulating reconciliation.” The majority of responses, 82 percent, agreed that trust-building is essential for reconciliation and the offender should the initiative, accounting to 79 percent of Armenian and 85 percent of Azerbaijani youth. Some respondents concentrated their responses to the first part of the statement, noting, “trust building might help resolving the conflict”, while others pointed out the importance of the second part: “it is well established that the first step to make a truce originates from perpetrators of the conflict.” Fisher’s exact test assessed the extent to which there was a significance of association between the statement and respondents’ demographics. Proportionally more respondents, who previously participated in peace protests or peace education, than respondents who did not, agreed with the statement. Zartman, on the other hand, argues that timing for negotiations is a key to the peaceful settlement of disputes. He further describes this concept as a “ripe moment.” Zartman, W.I. (2013). Ripeness. Beyond Intractability The concept centers on the conflicting “parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate” Zartman, W.I. (2013). Ripeness. Beyond Intractability – thus, a situation in which parties realize that status quo – is lose-lose situation, as opposed to a zero-sum game. A stalemate and continuation of the status quo is harmful to both parties. Hence, to avoid the mutual loss, parties seek a “way out” or an alternative policy to settle the conflict as it might negative affect both. So, respondents were asked to rate their agreement to the following statement “a situation, in which neither side can win, continuing the stalemate negative affects attitudes and sharply increases sufferings; seeking an alternative policy might alter attitudes and serve as a tool for reconciliation.” Over half of respondents (53 percent), accounting for 44 percent of Armenian and 65 percent of Azerbaijani respondents, reported their agreement with the statement. Perspectives on the concept of “ripe moment” did not seem to vary in relation to one’s gender, neither in relation to previous involvement in protests, nor participation in peace education programs. A further review of the literature on steps and factors to achieve reconciliation suggests that a sincere apology has potential to facilitate forgiveness and healing, as apology and recognition of past wrongdoings are essential parts to the larger process. Yet, simply apologizing is not enough: recognition of wrongdoings, the circumstance of the apology and further action following public apology are very relevant. Thus, respondents had to answer whether they believe “an apology by the invading country could improve the chances for reconciliation”, and “what steps are necessary to make an apology successful in achieving reconciliation?” An analysis of responses displayed a statistical significance. The majority of Azerbaijani youth, 71 percent, as opposed to 46 percent of Armenian youth believed an apology was a necessary component for reconciliation. There were major differences on their views regarding steps and factor that should accompany an apology in achieving reconciliation. The Fisher’s exact test revealed that Armenian youth focused and provided an answer that was included within ‘repairing relations’ category. These responses accounted for 55 percent of Armenian respondents, as opposed to 8% of Azerbaijani respondents. Examples of such are “parties should think about the future”, or “end the politics of hatred, Armenophobia and Azerophobia”, “stop antagonizing youth towards aggression and hatred.” The Azerbaijani youth concentrated on the type of apology that is furthered by actions, as simply apologizing is not enough. These responses accounted for 50 percent of Azerbaijani, and only 14 percent of Armenian respondents. However, Armenian and Azerbaijani responses that were categorized within the tangible needs category varied in meanings. The following are the answers by Azerbaijani respondent coded to tangible needs category: “return all currently-occupied Azerbaijani territory. […] And reimburse all financial costs and effects to refugees in Azerbaijan”; “An apology and compensation, reparations to families of victims, forcibly resettled persons, and refugees; full payment of economic damage.” While Armenian responses within the same category were, “open the border” and “independence and recognition of our territories.” These responses could imply that both groups associate their sense of identity with the same territory. As each side provides explanations such as ‘we must possess or live on our historic lands as they represent our nation’s meaning, past and current sufferings and collective identity.’ Thus, a threat of losing the land implies losing their identity in a sense. Other responses included: recognition of wrongdoing, implying that the country that is apologizing must admit and recognize one’s own mistake, and readiness for diplomatic negotiations. Gender, one’s involvement in antiwar protests or peace education programs did not display a significance of association within this category of question. Armenian and Azerbaijani youth have a strong belief that reconciliation can be achieved. They also view apology as an important aspect that can promote and further support reconciliation efforts. However, views on how to make an apology effective differed as conflict, narratives is present and reinforced through historical narratives, collective memory, personal experiences and national values. Yet, again, they all agreed that apology has a potential and could be a step forward towards the end goal. The dynamic of identity and reconciliation There are identity-related processes at various levels (individual, social, structural) that play significant roles in maintaining, escalating a conflict, contributing to intractability, creating a negative image or dehumanizing the adversary. In an intractable and prolonged conflict, in which parties perceive a threat to their individual and collective identities, they are not likely to be ready or willing to move toward resolution or reconciliation. Thus, the change in the dynamics and nature of the relationship must take place to allow changes to occur on a larger level. Changes to the nature of a relationship would not directly, or immediately, alter individual or collective identities, but the experience of relating in some significant different way, over time, can create change in identity. Northrop notes several elements that could facilitate a redefinition of the nature of the relationship. Northrup, T.A. (1989). The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict. First, the introduction of a new threat, that endangers all conflicting groups and requires adversaries to cooperate to defend themselves against the new threat, can serve as a useful reconciliation tool. Forty-one percent of respondents agreed with the statement, while over 26 percent disagreed to the statement arguing, “a threat is a provocation to new conflict that can only worsen conditions.” Gender, involvement in antiwar protests or peace education programs did not display a significance of association within this category of question. Northrop further explored that changes in the nature of relationship also might occur if a subgroup within one of the parties to a conflict is able to legitimize some kind of cooperative relationship with the adversary, change and path forward to reconciliation may be possible. Responses to this statement display that more than half agreed with the statement, while about 25 percent of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth could neither agree nor disagree with it. Gender, one’s involvement in antiwar protests or peace education programs did not display a significance of association within this category of question. The literature review presents that grass-roots dialogue and inter-group contact is a useful tool in shifting the nature of a relationship from one that is adversarial to one that is conciliatory. The survey questioned if respondents agreed with the prompt. Proportionally more women than men agreed with the statement. Seventy-one percent of Azerbaijani respondents agreed with the statement, as opposed to 54 percent of Armenian respondents who agreed. Respondents noted, “a dialogue provides a good a chance to be heard.” The second most popular answer to this statement displayed neither agreement nor disagreement with the statement; and few strongly disagreed noting that the adversary “does not want peace; and the conflict can only be resolved with war.” Certain implications for strategies for change exist. Responses of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth display that although shifting and transforming the nature of relationship might sound like a good alternative, as it does not necessarily seek to change individual and collective identities, achieving that change through Northrop’s above suggested methods would be highly unsuccessful. The introduction of a new threat is perceived as detrimental to rebuilding relationships, and, thus, such strategy would be faced with obstacles and resistance from both nations. Encouraging a subgroup to initiate intergroup contact is believed to be effective, however, did not receive a widespread support from either group. The use of grass-root dialogues can be considered a feasible strategy, as these dialogues would not occur outside the usual public channels and would provide a mechanism through which disputants and adversaries may more safely derigidify their relationship. The question that explored whether youth, as a social group, would be an important actor to participate and influence the peace process revealed that only 65 percent believe it to be so, while approximately 30 percent did not see youth as an important actor. Armenian youth was more likely to view their social group an important actor in the peace process (71 percent), as opposed to Azerbaijani youth (61 percent). Similarly, those who reported being involved in conflict resolution or peace education programs were more likely to agree with the statement (65 percent), as opposed to those who did not (35 percent). The most commonly cited (38 percent) role that youth could play was categorized as a positive and productive role. Categories with youth defining their roles as negative and passive accounted for 13 percent each. Responses to this question ranged considerably. One respondent noted, “young people, students and activist can play a prosperous role in the peace process.” Another respondent argued, “I do not think my group could lead the peace process between the parties, but I believe, that we can ensure and avoid displaying negativity towards the people of the country, with whom there is a conflict.” While one confidently stated “I could participate in armed combat.” A sustainable and lasting solution to a conflict is feasible only with the involvement of all groups, including youth. It is encouraging to see that more than half of Armenian and Azerbaijani population recognize the importance of their role in the peace process, yet, it is discouraging do see that many see their participation in a passive or negative manner, while 27 percent did not believe in the importance of youth participation in the peace process at all. The current negotiation format and mediation process are evidence that political elites are far from promoting and empowering active participation of various groups, be that civil society activists or youth groups. Yet, again, an imposed political resolution that does not sit well with public opinion will essentially cost a politician his or her position. Voices and concerns of ordinary people should be taken into consideration. Part II: Narratives Section Once respondents completed a questionnaire, they were directed to the next phase. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four narratives about current situational context and various impacts of the unresolved Karabakh conflict. These narratives were: “common suffering,” “blame the OSCE,” “blame the Russians,” “youth’s role in the peace process.” Narratives’ descriptions and instructions are provided in the Appendix. A social distance question measured Azerbaijani’s and Armenian’s attitude towards the adversary. The average of responses to the social distance question presented high scores meaning greater distance between the two nations (Azerbaijani’s mean = 3.48; Armenian’s mean = 3.0). Thus Azerbaijani youth showed greater social distance than the Armenian youth. A grounded theory approach was used to create a coding system to assess participants’ general negative or tolerant association or mood towards a narrative. An analysis of the general attitudes to the narrative did not display positive correlation. Moreover, the narrative on the role of youth in the peace process presented statistically significant higher levels of negativity attitudes and social distance in the Azerbaijani youth. While the ‘common suffering’ and presented similar findings in the Armenian youth. Narratives that blamed the Russians or the OSCE seemed to bring both parties to agreement, with attitudes ranking similarly. In order to develop an understanding of this subject, I analyzed comments and individual responses. Responses discussing the “common suffering” narrative appeared to follow several themes: “they are the enemy,” “the current situation hinders livelihoods,” and “comparative victimhood.” Respondents, who provided explanations within the “enemy” theme displayed high social distance and negativity attitudes. One respondent wrote the situation must end “homes in Shusha and Karabakh remain empty from the war.” While another further explored “the conflict is not only detrimental for the ordinary people, but for the state and power structure. First, there are numerous human losses, involuntary displacement and exile from native territories. The conflict plays a detrimental role, as hatred towards Armenians only leads to increased aggression and violence. Those who have Armenian roots are forced to hide them, or turn into enemies. For the state – the conflict is detrimental as it prevents countries from creating a free trade zone on the Caucasus territory that could strengthen economies. Yet, instead both conflicting parties are highly dependent on “outsiders”, and the help that is provided is not gratuitous.” Few comments manifested what might be called a “competitive victimhood”, which is subjective claim that one’s group has suffered more than the other. Nadler, A. (2002). Postresolution processes: Instrumental and socioemotional routes to reconciliation. Yet, these types of perceptions and claims could develop into obstacles during the reconciliation process. “Blame the OSCE” and “blame the Russians” narratives resonated deeply with the Armenian (67 percent) and Azerbaijani side (75 percent), and displayed high negativity attitudes. Armenian and Azerbaijani responses discussing the OSCE and Russia appeared to follow several common themes: The OSCE Minsk Group lacks influence and pressure, Russia is interested in weak Caucasus region, outside powers influence the peace process and status quo. An Azerbaijani respondent wrote, “The OSCE does not have a leverage or pressure on the conflicting parties. The Madrid principles are interpreted differently by different countries. The approach “not to offend anyone” eventually will be rejected. Then we can talk about the progress.” An Armenian replied to the ‘Blame the Russians’ narrative, “Well, it is beneficial for the RF (Russian Federation) to have instability in the region, that way it can enforce its control and influence countries (in the South Caucasus region).” While another respondent further elaborated “This is not only the case with Russia; there are other countries interested in conflict as a way to easily manipulate conflicting parties.” Another theme emerged from the comments to both narratives, such as “blame the other side for the lack of progress,” with comments set at two extremes. An Azerbaijani respondent wrote, “The OSCE Minsk Group, unfortunately is ineffective. For all the talks – over 20 years – nothing has been achieved. They fail mainly because Armenia shows no respect for international law, the OSCE and the UN resolutions requiring a return of occupied Azerbaijani territory.” At the other end, an Armenian respondent wrote, “To this date, an alternative to the OSCE Minsk Group does not exist. This is the only platform for mediators and conflicting parties to exploit. As for the failure of the Minsk Group, it is largely due to the absence of a constructive approach to negotiations from Azerbaijan.” It is encouraging to see that there are certain themes within a narrative that seem to resonate similarly with both groups. Those involved in peacebuilding and reconciliation process should aim and seek to explore these themes within the larger narrative to begin a discussion and dialogue on common beliefs in an attempt to restructure the nature of the relationship in a longer-term. Similarly, type of perceptions and claims that could develop into obstacles during the reconciliation process should be addressed in a conflict-sensitive manner. The narrative on the role of youth in the peace process displayed negative attitudes from the Azerbaijani side, and tolerant attitudes from the Armenian side. Responses discussing the theme appeared to follow several common themes. A theme on youth agency, included responses such as “we are the future for this country if we do not take up this problem, it will continue; our children and grandchildren will suffer.” A theme on the power of elites, incorporated comments like, “In my opinion, young people cannot have an impact on a peace process in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, this issue is very complex and probably is a question of political relations between two countries.” The literature review suggests that the line between agency and manipulation of the elitist structures is not clear-cut. The conflict is a creation of elites struggling for power, and the role that youth will get to play depends on the existing structures. As evidence suggests not only is the general population in Armenia and Azerbaijan detached from the negotiation process, but their management rights have been seized, while elitist structures in both nations far from empowering or facilitating active participation of all groups. A sustainable and lasting peace is only feasible with the involvement and collaboration of all type of actors: top, middle-range and grassroots leadership. General Discussion This research contributes to a bank of knowledge of a complex dynamic between narratives, collective memory and attitudes by providing insights into the feasible mechanisms that could stimulate narrative-based attitudinal change in a conflict situation. To gain a better understanding of this subject, conducting a study on the ground would be the best choice. Conducting online perception surveys with groups originating from contested and divided societies presents challenges and obstacles in terms of the recruitment process, data collection and analysis. Therefore, a similar comparative study in person would be highly advisable. This research provides evidence that although the new generation does not have a first-hand account of living alongside with the adversary, collective and historical memories communicated via state-sponsored or community-based channels have led to a mentality that dehumanizes and distrusts the adversary and is reflected in individual responses. Besides, both groups displayed rather high level of social distance towards the other. It is likely that narratives similar to “blame the OSCE or the Russians” makes it possible to divert one’s attention towards blaming a third party. It also has potential of finding a common base to begin a dialogue between two groups that could possibly result in positive and productive interaction between the two. One of the most interesting findings is that the majority of Armenian and Azerbaijani respondents did not believe in their right to fully participate in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Moreover, they believed this should be left to states and multinational organizations. This finding suggests that youth are alienated, disengaged, and misinformed about the actual process of conflict resolution or the peace process. The need to demystify the negotiation process, to advocate for youth empowerment, engagement and participation in a process is greater than ever. Armenian and Azerbaijani youth has as much potential for peacebuilding as for violence, and in a unified voice survey respondents noted that they believed reconciliation is possible. As these young adults become the next generation to lead their countries, their experiences and memories may alter the nation’s trajectory towards reconciliation, a peaceful settlement of the conflict, or reincitation of the armed conflict. Only by empowering and engaging youth, and other low status and marginalized groups, will the elitist structures involved in a mediation process be forced to act responsibly by listening to and understanding the needs and positions of a larger society. Conclusion The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a conflict of mutually exclusive historical interpretations, shared perceptions, and collective identity. The evidence suggests that both communities have connected their national identity to the ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, a threat of losing the land implies losing their identity. The OSCE Minsk Group, working tirelessly to resolve the conflict on a political level, failed to acknowledge an important aspect of a psychological dimension to the conflict. Failure to recognize and address psychological, social and collective aspects to the conflict hinders the possibility and a potential to transform inter-group relations and the conflict. Track II diplomacy efforts around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are weak, but not necessarily for lack of trying. The main issue is that the governments would prefer to monopolize the negotiation process to prevent its development into a more comprehensive and inclusive process they are not able to control. The civil society space is very limited and the NGO community is barely tolerated. NGOs are punished and actively condemned for promoting and implementing social cohesion or reconciliation types of activities and initiatives. Yet, “societal reconciliation, rather than political negotiations, is a key to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformation.” Babakulieva, I. (2013). The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the Narrative Transformation Project. The overwhelming majority of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth, who participated in this research, indicated that they believe reconciliation can be achieved and that there is a desire for it. However, differences in views exist about what reconciliation is and how to achieve it. These differences in perceptions and attitudes are a direct result of mutually exclusive and hostile narratives employed by the governments. Government-controlled media and educational sector provide an opportunity to reproduce and communicate historical narratives to a larger population, including youth. As young adults internalize these narratives and inherit these identities, they come to believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation and peace process should be left to states, governments, and multinational organizations. The majority of Armenian and Azerbaijani youth respondents did not believe in their right to fully participate in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, which is reflected in the limited involvement of the grassroots, marginalized, and low-status social groups, such as youth, within the ongoing negotiation and peace process. At the same time, the lack of progress within the mediation efforts led to criticism and skepticism about the probability of resolving the conflict peacefully, while embedding the belief in a single win-lose approach. Derogatory public remarks, hate speech and widespread propaganda around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict led to polarization of public opinion and only intensified mutual mistrust and hatred. The “no peace, no war” status is volatile as government-sponsored information campaigns, in conjunction with historical and collective narratives widely communicated within societies, have ensured that any concession on the political level will produce public outrage. The need to promote a comprehensive and inclusive peace process, while, consequently, transforming historical narratives in order to influence collective memories, attitudes and perceptions is greater than ever. The conflict is a creation of elites struggling for power: the role that youth will get to play depends on the existing structures. As the survey findings suggest not only are young adults in Armenia and Azerbaijan detached from the negotiation process, but their management rights have been seized. Elitist structures in both states do little to empower them or to facilitate their active participation. A sustainable and lasting peace is only feasible with the involvement and collaboration of all groups and actors, especially youth, a large and a significant portion of the population in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Having such a significant population of youth presents an opportunity and a potential to redress violence and address existing conflicts. Engaging and empowering youth, an under-represented and marginalized group, is vital, as they will be the next generation of leaders. Their experiences, collective identities and historical memories will influence their interpretations and perceptions of peace and conflict with the potential to alter the national trajectory away from re-inciting of the armed conflict and toward reconciliation and a peaceful settlement of the conflict. References Aliyev, I. (2013, September). The opening of the Guba Genocide Memorial complex. Speech presented at the Heydar Aliyev Foundation. Guba, AZ. 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Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001578/157806e.pdf  Appendix Demographic Characteristics Perspectives on Peace Perspectives on Reconciliation Perspectives on Reconciliation and Identity  Youth as an important social group in the peace process  Narratives Section   Research Instruments Part 1. Questionnaire Demographics DIRECTIONS: Please answer each question by highlighting the correct answer or filling in the space provided. What is your age? What is your gender? – Female Male What is your ethnic background/nationality? Where do you live now? ---------------------------------------- How long have you lived there for?------- What is your native tongue? What is the highest level of education you have completed? Are you currently a student? ____ If yes, grad or undergrad? ___________ Major: Describe your employment status Has any member of your family been affected by the violent conflict or participated in combat? If so, please indicate time, location, the effect, and the relationship of the family member Opinions Please provide your personal definition and understanding of each of the following terms: Peace: __________________________ Reconciliation:________________________ Have you ever participated in any conflict resolution or peace education programs? If yes, please indicate when and where, and describe the program____________________ Have you ever been involved in any sort of protest against war and in favor of peace, by signing a petition, participating in the event? If yes, please explain _________________ DIRECTIONS: Answer the questions to the best of your ability. Please click the appropriate number to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. There are no right or wrong answers. Strongly Disagree 1 Disagree 2 Neither agree nor disagree 3 Agree 4 Strongly Agree 5 Children have the right to grow up in a world of peace? – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating: All human being have a basic right to peace – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating: Regional stability and inter-group reconciliation can be achieved – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating: Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace? –1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating: The introduction of a new threat, that endangers all conflicting groups and requires adversaries to cooperate to defend themselves against the new threat, can serve as a useful reconciliation tool. – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating: A grass-roots dialogue and inter-group contact is a useful tool in shifting the nature of a relationship from one that is adversarial to one that is conciliatory – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating: A situation, in which neither side can win, continuing the stalemate negatively affects attitudes, sharply increases a suffering, and might lead to an outbreak of violence; seeking an alternative policy might alter attitudes and serve as a tool for reconciliation – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating: If a subgroup within one of the parties to a conflict is able to legitimize some kind of cooperative relationship with the adversary, change and path forward to reconciliation may be possible – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating: If a country has in the past invaded, colonized, exercised control over the government affairs of another country, an apology by the invader can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries – 1 2 3 4 5 Explanation of rating: DIRECTIONS: Please answer the question by filling in the space provided. Do you see yourself and your social group, as an important actor, who could participate and influence in the peace process:_______________ Part 2. Narratives Narratives DIRECTIONS: PLEASE READ THE NARRATIVE. TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITIES, ANSWER FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN THE COMMENT BOX BELOW 1st narrative: Armeno-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict created enormous hardships for both people. Tens of thousands of people lost their lives, or became disabled. Hundreds of thousands became refugees, displaced persons, lost all their property. Intermarried families had to be separated or became refugees overseas in order to keep their families together. To the best of your abilities answer the following question in the comment box below. QUESTION: Based on your personal experience, heard, or learned knowledge, how harmful and devastating was and continues to be the Nagorno-Karabakh war and conflict to both nations? 2nd narrative: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution is in deadlock because the OSCE-Minsk Group has not been wholeheartedly committed to the process while prolonging negotiations indefinitely. Moreover, they work effortful shifting geopolitical balance towards individual Co-Chairman Representative countries’ interests and positions. The OSCE-Minsk Group neglects to address and focus on interests and positions of conflicting parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh’s status and security, which point to the ineffectiveness of the negotiation and mediation mechanism. To the best of your abilities, answer the following question in the comment box below. QUESTION: Reflect on the role of the OSCE-Minsk Group in mediating the peace process, what have been the Group’s successes? In what ways are they failing to achieve their mandate? What are possible solutions in improving the OSCE Minsk Group effectiveness in mediating the process? 3rd narrative: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still not resolved because Russia had interests in seeing conflict in the Caucasus. To the best of your abilities, answer the following question in the comment box below. QUESTION: What is the role of Russia in provoking conflict and preventing peace in the Caucasus? 4th narrative: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will not be resolved and the negotiation process will not be successful while youth and the general population of both nations are excluded and detached from the peace process, without getting a chance to be heard and to provide alternative ideas. Reflect on the role youth plays and has in the educational, employment sector, or household level. To the best of your abilities, answer the following question in the comment box below. QUESTION: Are there youth initiatives aimed at introducing persons to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? What role can and should youth play in resolving the conflict? Will youth likely be more successful in resolving the conflict? What are the current impediments in youth’s involvement and participation in the peace process? Attitude assessment: Armenians’ attitudes towards Azeri: If an agreement was reached between two sides, in which the solution confirms positively with your interests and positions, how would you feel if: Azerbaijani travel freely to the neighboring country Having Azeri as neighbors Having Azeris as co-workers Having their children or close relatives marry an Azeri Attitude assessment: Azerbaijanis’ attitudes towards Armenians: If an agreement was reached between two sides, in which the solution confirms positively with your interests and positions, how would you feel if: Armenians travel freely to the neighboring country Having Armenians as neighbors Having Armenians as co-workers Having their children or close relatives marry an Armenian Strongly Against 1 Against 2 Neither against nor in favor 3 In favor 4 Strongly in Favor 5 Consent to Participate in a Research Study You have been invited to take part in a research study to gain understanding of Armenian and Azeri youths’ perceptions on the group dynamics and tensions surrounding both nations. This study will be conducted by Inna Babakulieva, a graduate student at the Center for Global Affairs of School of Continuing and Professional Studies, New York University. The research study on perceptions about peace, conflict, reconciliation, and narratives of events is part of her master’s thesis work. Her faculty sponsor is Prof. Thomas Hill, Center for Global Affairs – New York University. If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to do the following: Complete a demographic and perceptions on reconciliation survey: age, gender, occupation, other identities, perceptions on peace, conflict, and reconciliation? Answer two questions posed on a given narrative about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the best of your abilities. Your answers and responses will be recorded. You may review these records and request that all or any portion of the information be destroyed. Participation in this study will involve about two hours of your time: 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire and approximately 30 minutes for the narrative portion. There are no known risks associated with your participation in this research beyond those of everyday life. Although you will receive no direct tangible benefits, this research may help the investigator to understand the narratives employed to form youth’s national identity better. Moreover, the researcher will share findings and the master’s thesis once completed. Confidentiality of your research records will be strictly maintained by attaching a unique identifying number for you, which will be used to track your progress through the three components of the study. From that point forward, your name will never be requested, only your unique identifying number. The number will have no association with your identity. Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without penalty. For questionnaire and survey, you have the right to skip or not answer any questions you prefer not to answer. If there is anything about the study of your participation that is unclear, or that you do not understand, if you have questions or wish to report a research-related problem, you may contact Inna Babakulieva at vk.com/innayb or iyb204@nyu.edu,. For questions about your rights as a research participant, you many contact the University Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects, New York University, 665 Broadway, Suite 804, New York, NY 10012 at 212-998-4808 or ask.humansubjects@nyu.edu Agreement to Participate Subject’s Initials: Date: Recruitment Letter #1 Dear friends, My name is Inna Babakulieva and I am graduate student at New York University completing my studies in Global Affairs. I am currently working on my thesis to gain an understanding of Armenian and Azeri youth perception on the group dynamics, relations, and history. The goal of the survey is to document views and perceptions of individuals, like you, as you are the population of young adults, who will be the next generation to lead your countries. Your answers will support efforts helping to improve knowledge and understanding on youth identities, needs, and interests, I would greatly appreciate if you could participate in this survey. It will take you approximately one hour to complete both sections (30 minutes for each part) IF YOU ARE: Ages 18-27 Citizen and/or permanent resident of Armenia or Azerbaijan, who are de-facto, de-jure, permanently residing in Armenia or Azerbaijan You qualify to participate in this survey. If you are a student, studying abroad, that is, outside of Armenia and Azerbaijan, yet remain residency in Armenia and Azerbaijan, you qualify to participate in this survey. As a token of my appreciation, I will make results and a final report available to you by publishing it online and you can request the results to be sent to you by email. The information gathered will be processed and shared in an aggregate manner, that is, your identity will remain confidential unless previously agreed. To sign up as a participant in this study, or to receive additional information, please email iyb204@nyu.edu. Whether you choose to participate or not, please, forward this message to any individual you know, whose opinions you feel should be included. Please free to contact me with any questions at iyb204@nyu.edu or at vk.com/innayb Thank you for your time and participation Inna Y Babakulieva M.S. Candidate Global Affairs Center for Global Affairs - New York University New York, NY, USA Iyb204@nyu.edu Recruitment Letter #2 I am currently working on my thesis to gain an understanding of Armenian and Azeri youth perception on the group dynamics, relations, and history. For that, I am conducting a survey. IF YOU ARE: Ages 18-27 Reside in Armenia Please participate in this survey, which you can access at - https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/37SWQMB I would greatly appreciate if you could participate in this survey. Feel free to contact me with any questions you might have. To receive additional information, please email iyb204@nyu.edu  Whether you choose to participate or not, please, forward this message to any individual you know, whose opinions you feel should be included. Please free to contact me with any questions at iyb204@nyu.edu or at vk.com/innayb Thank you for your time and participation 77