Journal of Sociology
Vol. 8, Issue 2, JulyDecember, 2016, pp. 7-20
ISSN: 1813-2871
Nazmul Karim Study Center
University of Dhaka
State-building, Identity Crisis and Ethnic Conflict:
The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of
Bangladesh
Muhammad Sazzad Hossain Siddiqui*
and Anurug Chakma**
ABSTRACT
The present study is an attempt to explore the nexus between state-building,
identity crisis and ethnic conflict considering the case of CHT in Bangladesh.
The study is based on multiple secondary sources of data and information (e.g.,
study reports, conference papers, documents and journal articles). It draws the
nexus between understanding historical context and dynamics of conflict;
identifies the motives, interests, strategies and capacities of conflicting parties
to show how structural and proximate causes trigger violent conflicts in the
CHT. The study also explores how state-building project escalates identity
crisis and ethnic conflict in this region. However, in the case of social science
enquiry, no work goes beyond limitation. And the present work is not exception
to this point of view. The major limitations of this study include - outright
reliance on secondary data. It was very hard for us to cross-check secondary
data on the CHT conflict for deeper understanding on the CHT conflict from
theoretical perspective.
Introduction
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is the south-eastern extensive hilly part of
Bangladesh with an area of 13,295 square kilometers which constitutes about ten
percent of the territory of Bangladesh. This area is considered as the homeland
of 13 indigenous communities (where Chakma, Marma, Tripura are predominant).
These groups are collectively known as “Pahari1” or “Jumma2” (Ahsan &
Chakma, 1989; Amnesty International, 2013). The CHT enjoyed autonomy with
the status of “excluded area” as per the CHT Regulations Act-1900 under the
British imperialists’ regime. The then Pakistan government repealed such special
status and also constructed theKaptai dam that uprooted above 100,000
indigenous peoples (Ahsan and Chakma, 1989). It can, therefore, be argued that
the genesis of the today’s CHT conflict dates back to the rule of Pakistan. When
the East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) emerged as an independent nation state in
*
**
Assistant Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka,
Dhaka-1000. His email address is sazzadhsiddiqui@du.ac.bd.
Lecturer, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka, Dhaka1000. His email address is anurug.pacs@du.ac.bd
Journal of Sociology
1971, the CHT conflict surfaced with new dimensions and new actors on issues
around the Liberation War of Bangladesh, citizenship, identity and autonomy.
Because, Mohsin (1997: 63) elucidates:
“In the new state of Bangladesh, Bengalis who constituted the new ruling
elite and the core ethnic were not only the immediate neighbors of the hilly
people, but more importantly this group endeavored to create a Bengalidominated homogenous state in Bangladesh under the rubric of
Bengali/Bangladeshi nationalism”.
This statement reveals how the state-building process deteriorated inter-group
(indigenous vs. Bengali) relations which outburst with the protest of M.N. Larma
in the parliament: “You cannot impose your national identity on others. I am a
Chakma, not a Bengali. I am a citizen of Bangladesh, Bangladeshi. You are also
Bangladeshi but your national identity is Bengali … They [indigenous people]
can never be Bengali” (Amnesty International, 2013:15). Shortly after
independence of Bangladesh, this inter-group conflict at the leadership level
turned into armed clash between the Shanti Bahini (SB) and Bangladesh military
in 1977. This was the opening of violent phase of this conflict that sternly
affected grassroots level in the form of massacres, forced displacement, sexual
violence and repression in the period of 1980-1990. During the insurgency,
particularly since 1985, dialogue set off between both parties to settle the longstanding conflict peacefully that reached the climax in 1997 with the signing of
Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (Amnesty International, 2013). Though the
Accord has plausibly stopped direct conflict between the warring parties, there
are many sources evident that violence in different forms (e.g., land grabbing,
sexual harassment, imposed discrimination, etc.) still continues in the CHT in
the post-accord regime (Siddiqui, 2016). However, more explicitly, this paper
explores the question: how do state-building and identity crisis account for
causing violence in the post-Accord regime?
Understanding State Building: Concept and Theories
The modern history (1940-present) of state-building can be divided into two
major parts- decolonization period and post-cold war period when a number of
new quasi-states according to Jackson came into being without pre-colonial
experience of statehood (Hehir and Robinson, 2007). Generally, state building
refers to establishment, re-establishment and strengthening of a state capable of
delivering public goods (Deutsch, 1966), establishing legitimate monopoly of
physical force (Weber, 1984) and gaining legitimacy from the sovereign power
of the people (Beetham, 1991). More specifically, the state-building project
embraces the policy of changing names of the states and locations of capitals,
national currencies, military conscription, religious and linguistic harmonization
and national identity etc. (Ghatak et al., 2008) as outlined by Scott (1998) and
Young (2012). But sub-nations or tribal people have resisted assimilation and
harmonization policies of the state and its monopolization of power that have
created violence between groups and the state as it happened in Turkey, Peru,
Venezuela and Guatemala (Nagengast, 1994). The recent scholarship on statebuilding emphasizes on state reconstruction with humanitarian intervention of
international community to save a state from crisis (e.g. Afghanistan, Syria and
Iraq etc.) from global security perspective (Hehir and Robinson, 2007). In other
Muhammad Sazzad Hossain Siddiqui and Anurug Chakma
words, state-building is implemented in the fragile or weak states which have no
infrastructural power as argued by Mann to penetrate society, regulate social
relationships, extract and use resources in determined ways (Hehir and
Robinson, 2007). In a nutshell, the present-day state-building projects are
concentrated on weak states of Africa and Asia where ethnic conflicts have
sparked from state failure (Taras & Ganguly, 2016: 210).
Different Schools of Thought on Ethnicity
Sometimes ethnicity used to refer to ‘nation’ in academic arena but ethnicity and
nation are fundamentally different from each to other. According to Yang (2000),
ethnicity is the outcome of the subjective perceptions based on several objective
characteristics such as physical attributes, ancestry, culture or national origin.
But this definition is not comprehensive in this sense that it cannot distinguish
ethnicity from nationhood. Varshney (2009) has clearly drawn boundary
between ethnicity and nation by arguing that a nation is a group whose members
have a sense of collective belongings but has a political and territorial home. On
the contrary, an ethnic group is smaller compared to nation and it can obtain
nationhood establishing a sovereign political entity (ibid). The present paper
briefly presented three dominant theories (e.g., essentialism, instrumentalism and
constructivism) of ethnicity below.
The primordialist or essentialist school of thought, which dominated the thinking
on ethnicity until 1970s, is based on three arguments. Firstly, ethnicity is an
ascribed identity that persists from generation to generation. Secondly, it is static
and fixed in drawing boundary between groups. Thirdly, it stresses the role of
primordial factors for instance, culture, language and identity (Yang, 2000). The
essentialism explains ethnic conflict from “primordial animosity” perspective.
After the World War II, the state-building projects of decolonized nations faced
resistance from ethnic groups due to century-old historical or primordial
animosity (Taras&Ganguly, 2016; Varshney, 2009). On the other hand, ethnicity
is seen neither as inherent in the nature of human beings nor valuable
intrinsically. Hence, ethnicity is used in multiethnic societies as an instrument by
political leaders for the sake of their political and economic interests which can
be explained from the greed vs. grievance model of conflict (Collier, 2004). To
put it more simply, interests are the sole elements of identity formation. Rational
choice theory is the best example of this school of thought according to which,
people act based on cost-benefit analysis (Taras&Ganguly, 2016; Varshney,
2009). Moreover, the constructivism is based on three major arguments. Firstly,
ethnic identity is a social construction. Secondly, ethnic identity is flexible and
dynamic. Thirdly, ethnic affiliation is determined by the society. Anderson in his
“Imagined Communities” has said that ethnic identity formation is closely
associated with the “print capitalism”. Constructivism explicates ethnic conflict
from the “master cleavage perspective” which is historically constructed and can
be easily used by leaders to intensify or instigate violence just inserting local,
often trivial, incidents and rumors into the “master narrative” (Yang, 2000;
Varshney, 2009, Taras & Ganguly, 2016).
Global Overview of State-Building Projects, Identity Crisis and Ethnic Conflict
Ninety percent of the countries of the world are multiethnic states (Mishra,
2014) and most of the developing countries of Asia and Africa are wracked by
61
Journal of Sociology
ethnic tensions and violent conflict (Taras & Ganguly, 2016). Approximately 80
ethnic conflicts are active in the world and 35 of them can be described as civil
wars (Gurr, 1993). But there is an academic debate on why some states have
ethnic conflict while others do not have. Edward Azar (1990) has rightly pointed
out that majority of the contemporary conflicts cannot be elucidated from
traditional perspective of conflict according to which conflicts arise due to big
power politics and territorial rivalry. Rather the contemporary conflicts are
arising out of internal dynamics of the societies revolving around the issues
related to communal identity and the relationship between communal groups and
the state. Simply speaking, the outbreak of ethnic conflicts and violence
manifests under such a multiethnic state system where the government is failure
to address the deprivation of basic needs. Mishra (2014) has identified the
techniques the states apply to manage differences between ethnic groups as the
root cause of conflict. In South Asia, all the techniques ranging from genocide
and ethnic expulsion (negative technique) to territorial elimination in the form of
secession, decolonization or partition (positive technique) have been used in the
process of state-building. In short, the state-building projects have sparked ethnic
conflicts in South Asia due to failure of national integration in the post-colonial
period. Long-standing insurgency in north-eastern India, Mohajir movement and
Sheikh problem in India, the Sindh, Pakhtun and Beluch problems in Pakistan,
Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka, Drukpha community problem in Bhutan, ethnic
tension in Nepal and ethnic conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in
Bangladesh present a set of analogous features: failure of articulation of a
common political identity, applying the Western notion of nationalism without
modifications, ancient hatred, security dilemma and fragility of state
(Taras&Ganguly, 2016; Mishra, 2014). The status of minorities and their
political demands for autonomy and statehood have contributed to ethnic
conflicts in newly independent states in the Soviet Union, in eastern and southeastern Europe after the demise of Cold war (Taras & Ganguly, 2016).
The post-colonial Africa is not also an exception. Identity conflicts sparked in
the Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Niger Republic, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Uganda (Jinadu, 2007: 8). Let
us consider two cases of Africa: Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC). Kenya was granted independence in the 1960’s by the British
government but the state-building project of Kenya came under the attack with
the emergence of insurgency of Northern Frontier District Liberation Army
(NFDLA) which waged a political program (secession) supported by the
Somali Republic. In the context of the eastern part of Democratic Republic of
Congo, ethnicity or identity politics is deep-seated in the society that is
generating bottom-up tensions around issues of land, citizenship, resources,
access to status and power (Soderlund et al., 2012: 9-13).
Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict
Ethnic conflict is as old as human civilization. Ethno-political movements
emerge when ethnic groups compete to prioritize ethnically defined interests
(e.g. legal and moral ownership over a given territory) on the agenda of the state
but the strength of the movements depend on group solidarity (Taras&Ganguly,
Muhammad Sazzad Hossain Siddiqui and Anurug Chakma
2016). We have discussed three dominant theoretical perspectives on ethnic
conflict in the following for better understanding of the CHT ethnic conflict.
According to
Horowitz (1998), ethnicity can drive ethnic conflict based on ten propositions
which have been highlighted below.
I.
Ethnicity is a primordial affiliation.
II.
Ancient hatred drives ethnic conflict.
III.
Ethnic conflict manifests a clash of cultures. Both parties perceive each
other’s values from negative perspective.
IV.
Ethnic conflict is caused by modernization.
V.
Ethnic conflict involves economic competition between traders and
customers of different ethnic groups.
VI.
In ethnically divided states, dominant ethnic group(s) prioritizes their
interests in the state policies at the expense of other groups and this
imbalance of power creates conflict between privileged and deprived
groups.
VII.
Interethnic conflict is the product of negative social relations rather than
feelings of antipathy.
VIII.
Ethnic conflict is the result of political struggle of leaders to strengthen
their powers by using ethnic identity.
IX.
The sense of insecurity derived from the threat of opponents generates
ethnic conflict.
X.
Strong emotion among the group members about their identities and
interests causes ethnic conflict.
However, human needs theory depicts a bunch of universal and nonnegotiable
basic needs beyond the physical needs (e.g., like food, water, shelter and
healthcare). The following table has identified such issues more explicitly.
Table-1: Human Needs as Outlined by Theorists
Maslow
Food, water,
shelter (1)
Safety and
Security (2)
Belonging or
love (3)
Self-esteem (4)
Personal
fulfillment (5)
Burton
Distributive
justice
Safety and
security
Belonging or
love
Self-esteem
Personal
fulfillment
Identity
Cultural identity
Freedom
Participation
Rosenberg
Physical Nurturance
Max Neef
Subsistence
Interdependence
Protection
Integrity
Affection
Autonomy
Play
Understanding
Creation
Celebration and
mourning
Spiritual
communication
Identity
Leisure
Freedom
Participation
Source: Danielson (2005).
63
Journal of Sociology
In principle, the state is obliged to provide these indispensable needs through
policies, public goods and institutions. Violence becomes inevitable when a state
fails to fulfill essential needs of communities (Burton, 1990). Among all of these
needs, identity works mostly as a catalyst of political mobilization by which
group members can express their highest level of concerns and collective fears
against state policies. Besides, it is the cheapest and quickest channel of political
leaders to reach their political objectives (Doucey, 2011: 1-6).
Moreover, very often conflict is caused by feelings of threatened identity which
can best be described as a multi-stage psychosocial process that starts at the
stage of threat and moves on finally to the stage of collusion with increase in
intractability. Northrup (1989) also argues that de-escalation of conflict can take
place at any stage of a conflict (see the figure.1).
Figure-1: Sequential Model of Ethnic Conflict
Threat
Distortion
Rigidification
Collusion
The aforementioned figure shows that both conflicting parties perceive each
other as the threat to their identity and survival at the first stage as it is observed
in Israel-Palestine conflict. In the next, both parties move on to the distortion or
aggressive stage involving the use of force according to Kelly (1955). Under this
situation, both parties enter into the stage of rigidification where they interpret
(self vs. other) from radical (intolerable) perspective. In this stage, communication
between parties is wrecked, negative stereotyping and dehumanization increases
with deployment of defense forces along national borders. The rigidification
stage escalates into the stage of collision, the final stage of the conflict process,
with extreme level of separation between conflicting parties (Northrup, 1989).
Historical Context of the CHT Conflict
The following discussion may suffice to comprehend the historical context of the
CHT conflict and its peace process.
British Period (1860-1947)
The British period can be marked with the armed clash between British army
and Chakma king in 1776 which continued for decades. Finally this war was
ended through signing an agreement between Lord Cornwallis and Chakma King
Jan Box Khan. As per this treaty, British started trade with this region and the
CHT was declared as an “excluded area” in 1860. Besides, British government
passed a legislation titled “CHT Regulations Act-1900”, which is also called
“Hill Tracts Manual”, with an aim to administer this region through transferring
administrative and judicial powers to three circles – Chakma circle in Rangamati
with small portion of Khagrachhari, Bomang circle in Bandaban and the Mong
circle in Khagrachari. Each circle, headed by a circle chief called Raja, is
divided into several mouzas which is under the jurisdiction of Headman. There
are 380 Mouzas in this region and each Mouza is partitioned into several
villages. At the lowest level of hierarchy, each village is administered by a
Muhammad Sazzad Hossain Siddiqui and Anurug Chakma
Karbari. These traditional leaders – Raja, Headman and Karbari – are
authorized to govern matters related to petty crimes, family disputes, allocation
of lands, revenue collection and so on (Amnesty International, 2013; Chakma,
2010). The CHT Regulations Act-1900 was the first codified law that prohibited
the sale of land to non-indigenous people and settlement of Bengalis in the CHT
(Panday& Jamil, 2009) without permission from the deputy commissioner who
was bound to take recommendation from the circle chief and Headman (Zahed,
2013: 97-98).
Pakistan Period (1947-1971)
The British India was partitioned into two independent [nation] states – India
and Pakistan based on two-nation theory and it was decided that India would be
composed of regions of non-Muslim population while Pakistan with Muslim
majority regions. Bangladesh (earlier East Bengal) being a Muslim majority
region was annexed to Pakistan with the CHT although its population (97%) was
non-Muslim. Prior to independence of India and Pakistan, delegations of the
CHT met Indian leaders, Patel and Nehuru, to integrate the CHT as a tribal state
into India and they were assured by the Indian leaders. Ironically, the Radcliffe
boundary commission published its controversial report on 17 August, 1947 and
the leaders of this region protested against the inclusion of the region with
Pakistan (CHTC, 1991; Chakma, 2010). The Indian flag was hoisted in
Rangamati on 14 August while the people of Bandarban erected the flag of
Burma on 15 August, 1947 (Mey, 1994; Shely, 1992). From the inception of the
Pakistan state, the government of Pakistan (GoP) marked indigenous leadership
as pro-Indian. The GoP did not recognize the autonomy of the CHT as per the
CHT Regulations Act-1900. Rather it repealed the Chittagong Hill Tracts
Frontier Police Regulations-1881 (CHTC, 1991: 13). Furthermore, the GoP
changed the status of the CHT from “excluded area” to “tribal area” with
withdrawal of restriction on settlement of Bengalis in 1963. In addition, the
construction of Kaptai dam (1960) for generating electricity displaced about
100,000 indigenous people from their ancestral lands (CHTC, 1991; Chowdhury,
2002). The GoP did not provide compensation and rehabilitation facilities to the
victims (Ali & Tsuchiya, 2002).
Bangladesh Period (1971-1997)
Bangladesh started its journey with deep-seated misperception between
indigenous peoples and the GoB on the issue of less active participation of
indigenous peoples in the Liberation War (CHTC, 1991: 13). On 15 February
1975, a delegation of the CHT led by M.N. Larma met ShekhMujibur Rahman,
then Prime Minister, with a proposal of four points demand - autonomy with its
own legislature, retention of the CHT Regulations Act-1900 in the CHT,
continuation of circle chief’s offices and restriction on the influx of Bengalis
from plain lands (Haq&Hoque, 1990). The Prime Minister refused these
demands with threat to assimilate into mainstream forgetting their identities and
cultures (al-Ahsan & Chakma, 1989; Salam &Aktar, 2014; CHTC, 1991).
Moreover, the constitution adopted in 1972 reflected Bengali chauvinism that
triggered the hostility. The Article-6 of the constitution states that “The people
of Bangladesh will be known as Bengali”.
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Journal of Sociology
The discriminatory constitution and state policies of Bangladesh pushed the
CHT leadership to form a political organization named “ParbatyaChattagram
Jana SanhatiSamiti (PCJSS)” to shape their destiny in 1972 which established an
armed unit “Shanti Bahini (peace force)” in 1976. The democracy was cancelled
by the military government in 1975 and the CHT leadership had to start
insurgency. On the contrary, the GoB adopted three polices to combat insurgency.
Firstly, it deployed one army person per six indigenous persons in the CHT in
the name of national security and territorial integrity (Mohsin, 1999; Levene,
1999). Secondly, around 26, 220 Bengali families were rehabilitated in the 1980s
in 8 Upazillas under Kharachari and Rangamati hill districts (see the table.2) on
the lands of indigenous peoples to change demographic composition and land
distribution of the CHT (Adnan and Dastdar, 2011). This added a new dimension
(land conflict between locals and migrants) which is the biggest challenge in the
post-accord period. Thirdly, the Islamization [proselytization] policy was
undertaken by the government itself and a Saudi NGO named Al Rabita to
convert indigenous peoples by offering food, money and jobs (Talukdar, 2005).
Table-2: Upazila3-wise Rehabilitation of Bengali Settlers
Sl No.
Upazilla
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total=80
Dighinala
Khagrachari
Panchari
Matiranga
Manikchari
Mahalchari
Ramghar
Lakmichari
Number of Villages
15
4
11
24
6
6
11
3
Number of Families
4,185
1,167
4,186
9,265
1,670
1,088
4,310
391
26,220
Source: Chakma (2012: 31)
On the other hand, negotiation between the PCJSS and government of
Bangladesh started since 1985 to resolve the conflict peacefully. In the long run,
both parties reached the CHT Accord in 1997 that officially opened the window
of peace-building process. The Accord has been successful to end armed conflict
but failed to reduce communal riots, human rights violations and land conflicts
in the region (Islam & Chakma, 2013).
Analysis of the CHT Conflict
Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the profile, causes, actors and
dynamics of conflict. It can be conducted at different levels ranging from project
and sector to community, district, regional and national level (Saferworld, 2004).
The key elements of conflict analysis outlined by the Saferworld have been used
to provide a critical analysis of the CHT conflict.
Context
The previous section of historical background of the CHT conflict reveals that
the CHT was the homeland of indigenous peoples under the British period but
population make-up, political and economic structure, history of use of violence
by the state and deep-seated grievance among indigenous peoples have pushed
Muhammad Sazzad Hossain Siddiqui and Anurug Chakma
the CHT to a protracted ethnic conflict in Pakistan and particularly, Bangladesh
period (CHTC, 1991; Amnesty International, 2013). More specifically,
indigenous people started armed struggle for their nonnegotiable political
demands which clashed with interests of the GoB (see the table.3).
Table-3: Incompatible Goals of the CHT Conflict
Nonnegotiable Goalsto the GoB
Nonnegotiable Goals to the PCJSS
Unitary state
Autonomy
Territorial integrity
Identity
Sovereignty and hegemony
Land rights
Protection of national security
Cultural rights
Disarmament of insurgents
CHT Regulations Act-1900
Assimilation of indigenous peoples
CHT special police force
The second crucial contextual factor is the change of demographic composition
in both Pakistan and Bangladesh period. The graph-1 and graph-2indicate that
indigenous population increased slightly while Bengali population increased
rapidly in the period of 1941-2011. According to the census of 1941, Indigenous
peoples constituted 97.06 percent of the total population while Bengalis 2.94
percent. The first census of Bangladesh period was conducted in 1974 according
to which the ratio of indigenous and Bengali stood at 77:23. Latter, rehabilitation
of Bengali settlers in the 1980s altered the demographic scenario of the region
drastically. As the 1981 census reveals, Bengalis share 41.48 percent of the total
population of the region. The latest 2011 census reports that the current ratio of
indigenous and Bengali population is 53: 47.
Trend of Indigenous Population (1941-2011)
0
Trend of Bengali Population (1941-2011)
1940
1960
Source: PCJSS Website
1980
Year
2000
2020
1940
1960
1980
Year
2000
2020
Source: PCJSS Website
The rehabilitation of Bengali settlers has affected the life of indigenous peoples,
particularly on their lands. Almost both indigenous and Bengalis have referred to
the land issue as the core problem of the CHT in reply to the question of
Amnesty international: “What is the core issue in the Chittagong Hill Tracts?”
Therefore, it can be argued that the context of the CHT conflict is very much
complicated due to presence of many intractable destabilizing factors.
Structural Causes, Proximate Causes and Triggers
As the Saferworld (2004) defines, structural causes are associated with policies,
structure and fabric of the society that work as pre-conditions of conflict whereas
67
Journal of Sociology
proximate causes contribute to a climate conducive to conflict and triggers are
single event that escalate violent conflict. In the context of the CHT conflict,
structural causes include exclusive citizenship, denial of identity of indigenous
communities, forced assimilation policy, entrenchedinter-community misperception
and distrust. As discussed in the historical background of the conflict, proximate
causes of the CHT conflict are human right abuses, insurgency, militarization
and rehabilitation of Bengali settlers. On the contrary, land grabbing, sexual
violence, kidnapping and murder cases trigger violent conflict between indigenous
peoples and Bengalis (CHTC, 1991) as it has been observed in the Longudu
violence (1989), Matiranga violence (1986) andMatiranga violence (2013).
Actors (Local, National and International)
The main actors of the CHT conflict can be categorized into three types: local,
national and international. Besides, they fall further into two types based on their
negative/ positive roles: anti-peace and pro-peace actors. Some local, national
and international actors (e.g. Shanti Bahini, military, Bengali settlers and
Indiaetc.) engaged directly and indirectly in the conflict while others local and
national actors (e.g. local mediation committee) played crucial role to establish
peace in the region. The conflict became internationalized with international
campaigns of Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, Amnesty International and
International LabourOrganization (ILO) urging India to protect unarmed
refugees and putting pressure on Bangladesh military for respecting human
rights (CHTC, 1991). After the accord, European Union, Ausaid and UNDP
have engaged in peace-building process through implementing multi-sector
development projects.
Consequences of the Conflict
Direct Violence
Since 1977 Bangladesh military and Shanti Bahini engaged in armed clashes.
During insurgency period, Shanti Bahini waged the biggest organized attack on
military and Bengali settlers in 1986. In turn, government forces and Bengali
settlers carried out for reprisal attacks on indigenous villages. Attacks on the
indigenous villages are mostly used to uproot indigenous and capture their lands.
A Chakma refugee reported to the CHT Commission;
I lost my land. Settlers came and captured my land. They burnt our houses
first. They came with soldiers. This took place on 1st May 1986 at Kalanal,
Panchari. My house was in a village with a temple. The whole village of
60 houses was burnt. After seeing this we ran through the jungles and
eventually reached India, coming to Karbook camp (CHTC, 1991: 54).
Human Rights Violations
Over the years, the security forces have been involved in gross human rights
violations which have been well documented and internationally publicized. A
total number of eleven major massacres have taken place in different places of
this region in the period of 1979-1997 (CHTC, 2000; 12). Major General
Manjur’s statement is noteworthy here: “We want the land, not the people
(Mohsin, 1999).The graph-3 and graph-4 present data on the number of
indigenous persons killed and injured by security forces and Bengali settlers in
these massacres.
Muhammad Sazzad Hossain Siddiqui and Anurug Chakma
Number of Indigenous Injured in Masscres (1971-1993)
0
100
50
200
100
150
300
Number of Indigenous Killed in Masscres (1971-1993)
0
1970
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1975
1995
1980
Year
Injured
Year
1985
1990
1995
Injured
Source: PCJSS Website
Source: PCJSS Website
In the post-accord period, human rights are still being grossly violated (Islam &
Chakma, 2013). The following graph-5shows major areas of violation of human
rights (e.g. burning and looting of houses of indigenous peoples, torture,
harassment and arrest).
Human Rights Violation in the CHT (1998-2011)
Arrest
Harassment
House burnt
House looted
Kidnapping
Killing
Lang grabbing
Rape
Sexual harassment
Torture
0
500
1,000
sum of NumberofIndigenousVictims
1,500
Source: PCJSS Website
Gender-based Violence
There is no available statistics on gender-based violence of insurgency in the
case of CHT conflict. The CHT Commission reports that rape was used as a
systematic weapon against women in the CHT in this period. About 94 percent
of rape cases were conducted by security forces and mostly female children were
victims of sexual violence (AIPP, 2013).The trend of sexual violence against
indigenous women of this regionin the post-accord period also shows the upward
trend (see the following graph).
Sexual Violence in CHT (1998-2014)
Insecurity of Indigenous Women
Frequency of Sexual Violence
80
1995
2000
60
40
20
2005
Year
2010
0
2015
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Journal of Sociology
Displacement
Most of the massacres and large-scale violence (1978-1992) produced a large
flow of indigenous refugees who took shelter in two states of India: Tripura and
Mizoram. The graph-7 below shows that about 70,000 refugees, the large influx
in the history of the CHT, reached six refugee camps established in Takumbari,
Pancharampara, Karbook, Lebachara, Shilachari, and Kathalchhari of Tripura by
the Indian government in the 1980s decade (Report of the CHT Commission,
1991).
Number of Refugees (1978-1992)
Tripura
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
Mizoram
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995 1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Year
Source: PCJSS Website
Conclusion
The CHT conflict is the product of failure of national integration that turned into
protracted ethnic conflict. Although it started as a national problem but later
received international attention in the 1980s when massive scale violence took
place with large influx of refugees who took shelter in two states (Tripura and
Mizoram) of India. The conflict set off on the issues of autonomy and identity
but land disputes added as a new dimension in the 1980s when around 450,000
Bengali settlers were rehabilitated in the region by the government. Both parties
were pressured by local, national and international actors to resolve the conflict.
In the long run, both parties signed an agreement in 1997 that terminated the
long-standing conflict officially. Ironically, the peace accord has been
challenged by local and national political parties (spoilers of the peace process).
Despite to presence of anti-peace elements, the accord is still the hope for the
future of the CHT which opened the window of development intervention of
national and international organizations.
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Notes:
1.
The common identity of “Pahari” is used to denote 11 indigenous groups collectively
of the CHT due to their residence in the hilly or mountainous region. The word
“Pahari” refers to hill or mountain in Bengali language.
2.
This is another collective identity which has been derived from their agricultural
system which is called “Jum” and it is very much political identity in this sense that
the PCJSS leadership called for a movement against injustices and racial
discrimination of the government of Bangladesh. The “Jumma” nationalism united
all the groups during the period of insurgency to fight against Bangladesh military.
3.
The upazila is the second lowest tier of administrative system of Bangladesh which
is known as sub-district in English.
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