GOVERNANCE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF NETWORKS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: UK DRUGS POLICY SINCE 1995 Beatriz Acevedo and Richard Common The Business School The University of Hull B.Acevedo@mgt.hull.ac.uk R.K.Common@hull.ac.uk DRAFT Abstract This paper utilises policy network analysis to examine UK drugs policy within the wider context of the UK Labour government’s approach to joined-up governance. The paper begins by recognising that the concept of the policy network is beset by definitional problems. Clearly, there are also limitations to political science interpretations of policy networks under the rubric of ‘governance’, thus the paper will explore this interpretation further as the practice of networking in drugs policy assumes that the various agencies work towards pre-determined policy objectives. However, the weakness of using networks to govern is their propensity to withstand policy change. In particular, the paper notes how policy objectives in relation to drugs appear to have withstood the meta-policy change from Conservative to Labour in 1997 with the development of partnership approaches. The paper goes on to examine how drugs policy has evolved to a large extent at very localised levels of practice although formally institutionalised with the establishment of Drugs Action Teams in 1995. Under the rubric of joined up government, a coordinating agency was established in 1998, the United Kingdom Anti Drugs Coordination Unit (UKADCU). Part of this strategy integrated the appointment of a ‘tsar’, responsible to the Cabinet Office. However, in 2001, the Home Office ‘retook’ the task of managing drugs policy while maintaining Drug Action Teams. To demonstrate how policy change ‘emerges’ from networks, the case of cannabis reclassification will be discussed. Finally, the paper acknowledges the usefulness of the network approach is compromised by systems of policy evaluation that focus on outcomes, which are attributable to individual organisations. 1 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] Introduction Two important conceptual developments have appeared coterminously in public sector management studies in the wake of the recent decline in the popularity of the so-called New Public Management (NPM) movement from the 1980s onwards. The two concepts appear to be interrelated; the first is the notion of the policy network and the other is ‘joined up government’. While this paper focuses on the former, it is clear that an understanding of networks is vital to the aspirations of the proponents of joined-up government in terms of achieving joined-up governance, which goes beyond top-level policy coordination to where the public sector co-ordinates and cooperates with non-state actors, such as firms and voluntary organisations to deliver policy outcomes. Therefore, the paper will examine the usefulness of network approaches in relation to UK drugs policy as an example of the type of social policy problem ‘new’ Labour was committed to tackling when it first assumed power in 1997. The fact that drugs policy is managed by a variety of actors at international, state and local level and that major tensions arise when agencies are required to cooperate with each other while competing for resources, mean that drugs policy has enormous potential for assessing the utility of network analysis. With the election of a Labour government in 1997, drugs were moved to the centre of the political stage. Drugs policy was to be ‘joined up’ in the sense that a holistic multiagency approach was to be adopted. Intervention was to be ‘evidence-based’ and closely monitored to ensure that it constitutes ‘best value’, (Marlow, 1999:1). Acknowledgment of the complexity of drug problems when related to other social problems connected with drug use is a major shift from the former Conservative government approach where the relation between crime, drugs and deprivation, ‘had been repeatedly evasive and resistant’ (Pearson, 1999:20). Labour attempted to make this connection central to its drug strategy, in addition to bringing a new dimension to what is meant by the ‘multi-agency’ approach, ‘joint working’ and partnership’ (Pearson, 1999:17). However, in the case of drugs policy in the United Kingdom, such principles of cooperation and integrated action have been present along with its development. In fact, there has been a wide range of different institutions involved in drug policy and some of the current ideas of joined up government and partnership have already been experienced in relation to drug policy (See Lee, 1996:, MacGregor and Smith, 1998:, Murji, 1998). Due to the mainstream connection between drugs and crime, the message for the 1990s was that the public and other social agencies will have to join up in the war against preventable crime (McLaughlin and Muncie, 1994:118). As a consequence, drug problems (use or supply) although regarded as crimes themselves, or connected to crime, present possibly the greatest challenge to managerialist approaches to public administration. 2 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] In this paper, we also seek to demonstrate how the participation of different agencies and professional bodies can be analysed through policy network analysis, and how their participation has evolved from the Conservative government to the Labour government, and how it is related to wider changes in the Public Sector. Some important changes appear to have emerged from changes in policy networks, especially in the reconfiguration of the organizational aspects of drug management, and the devolution of responsibility to localities and regions, through the establishment of the Drug Action Teams (DATs) in 1995, responsible for the coordination and delivery of drug policy at the local and regional level. Nevertheless the diversity of actors and institutions involved in drug policy issues means that DATs, or any other coordinating initiative, must consider the roles that all of these actors may play during episodes of drug policy formulation and implementation. The case of the reclassification of cannabis illustrates how the decision to change the status of cannabis from Class B to Class C (based on the Misuse of Drug Act, 1971) has engaged the interest and knowledge of different actors. However, in this case, the already contestable boundary between formulation and implementation becomes even more obscure. Moreover the decision itself did not come from a single governmental institution (i.e. the Home Office) but it has involved different stakeholders and agencies, and has its roots in the historical process. In the same way, the effects of such a measure impacts upon a complex network of agencies, professional organisations, institutions, public and private organisations and individuals. Taking into account that complexity, the concepts of policy network and governance may provide some insights to understand how drug policy has evolved, and identify key actors involved in the policy process. This paper will thus focus on the case of cannabis, as an example of policy network analysis and its evolution. The paper is divided into the following parts. In the first section, we revisit the basic concepts regarding policy networks and governance. The application of policy network analysis to the case of cannabis is the subject of the second section. It will also open the discussion about the definitional problems surrounding policy networks. In the third section, we will present an account of the evolution of UK drug policy, roughly divided into three periods: from 1995-1997 when the first drug policy strategy was launched by the Conservative government. The second period is from 1997-2001, with the re launch of the strategy under the Labour government, with the creation of the United Kingdom Drugs Coordination Unit (UKDCU), or Office of the ‘Tsar’; and finally from 2001-2004, when drug policy returned to the Home Office. In the fourth section we will present some of the implications that such issues have for Public Sector Management. Finally we will offer some conclusions regarding the utility of the central concepts of this paper, and some ideas about tackling drug policy analysis in the United Kingdom. 3 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] Policy networks Although beset by definitional squabbling, policy network analysis appears to provide a useful empirical metaphor for understanding the complexity of contemporary policy processes, although its use is not confined to political science. For instance, the use of the term ‘network’ has been associated with computational science, and sociologists to analyse and map personal relationships. In political science, the term has been used to understand the complexity of policy-making in liberal democracy. The metaphor of a network or community seeks to focus on the pattern of formal and informal contacts and relationships, which shape policy agendas and decisionmaking as opposed to the interplay within and formal policy making organizations and institutions. (…) Network analysis is based on the idea that a policy is framed within a context of relationships and dependences, (Parsons, 1995:185). In Britain the network metaphor has provided a framework to understand policy making in democratic regimes. Richardson and Jordan (1979:23) stated that the policy making map of Britain was characterized by a fragmented collection of subsystems – a ‘series of vertical compartments of segments, each segment inhabited by a different set of organized groups and generally impenetrable by ‘unrecognised groups’ or by the general public (p. 74) Richardson (1982) went on to develop the idea of policy communities regarding to particular countries exhibit a variety of ‘styles’ of policy formulation1. The differences vary from seeking consensus or impose decisions, and from having an anticipatory approach or a reactive behaviour to problems in policy. The following figure illustrates these dimensions: Policy makers seek to attain consensus Policy makers anticipate problems 1 3 2 4 Policy makers react to problems Policy makers seek to impose decisions (Adapted from Richardson 1982:13)2 Policy making can move from different quadrants, and in some political decisions consensus is desirable, while in others government may impose their will. Although in industrialized countries the tendency is more toward seeking consensus, some policy issues move towards a more coercive style. It can be argued that Britain has a 1 Cited in Parsons, W. (1995) Public Policy: An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis, Edward Elgar Publisher, Aldershot. P. 186 2 Ibid. P. 186 4 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] tendency to negotiate with policy communities and to react to problems rather than to anticipate them in a rational way (Parsons, 1995:187) The policy network concept has been defined and used in different ways. However there is a broad agreement that it is a meso-level concept, which provides a link between the micro level of analysis, which deals with the role of interests and government in relation to particular policy decisions, and the macro level of analysis, which is concerned with broader questions regarding the distribution of power (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992:1). In particular, the work of Rhodes has provided an extensive approach to network analysis stressing the continuity in the relations between interests groups and governmental departments (Rhodes, 1988:, Rhodes, 1997). Rhodes has also applied resource dependency and exchange theory of policy networks to the study of local-central relations. He follows Benson in defining policy networks in terms of a ‘complex of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies’ (Benson, 1982: 148)3. It has been argued that policy networks seem to have become the main feature of policymaking in Britain and lie at the ‘heart of one of the major problems of British government: policy messes or the not correspondence of policy systems and policy problems. The failure to appreciate that service delivery systems are complex, disaggregated an indeterminate has led to the failure of policies (Rhodes, 1988:85)4 The existence of a policy network both influences, although it clearly does not determine, policy outcomes and reflects the relative status, or even power, of the particular interest in a broad policy area (Rhodes, 1997:29) The notion of ‘appreciative systems’ is based on the formative work of Sir Geoffrey Vickers (1995), who points out a very important issue for analysing drugs, which is the way that the problem is ‘appreciated’ by a particular group within the policy network. These ‘appreciations’ are embedded in historical conditions: The decisions of public bodies and, in various degrees, the mental processes that underlie them are more explicit than those of the individual mind. They are nonetheless the work of individual minds, and any analysis of them must reach conclusions or make assumptions about individual mental processes as well as about the social and historical matrix that conditions and makes them possible, (Vickers, 1995:30). When analysing drug policy issues, social constructions regarding to drugs are a key determinant in the policymaking process. Some authors have emphasised the fact that current perceptions of drugs are social constructions, based on the negative view of drugs and its association with moral panics (Cohen, 1973:, Musto, 1973:, Cohen, 1990:, Cohen, 2003:, Levine, 2003). In the case of Britain, commentators such as Becker (1966) and Young (1977) have stressed out the importance of ‘moral entrepreneurs’ in the construction of the typology of ‘marijuana user’ and the deviant feature of the drug taker. Those moral 3 4 Ibid. p. 188 Ibid. p. 189 5 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] entrepreneurs may be politicians or social leaders, who assume a radical discourse regarding this social practice. As drugs are such a controversial topic, some politicians do not want to risk looking ‘soft’ on drugs, and will opt to proclaim a ‘tough’ approach. Whilst some reforms in the state toward a managerial approach in terms of efficiency and efficacy seem to open possibilities to include alternative approaches to drugs, some politicians make echo of the prevalent opinion against drugs. In this way, they attach to the bestseller discourse of prohibition: ‘menace’, ‘threat’, ‘scourge’, ‘tough new powers’ and ‘crack down’.5 Rhodes (1997:37) defines a policy network as a cluster or complex of organisations connected to one another by resources dependencies. The types of networks are to be distinguished by their degree of integration. At one end of a continuum are policy communities that have stable and restricted memberships. Policy communities are highly integrated within the policy making process. Issue networks, in contrast, represent a much looser set of interest and are less stable and non-exclusive and have much weaker points of entry into actual policy making.6 The notion of a policy community also needs to be considered in relation to drugs policy here. Policy communities themselves may also vary in patterns of relationships from one policy sector to another. In his approach, Rhodes (1997:36) also emphasised the structural relationship between political institutions, rather than interpersonal relations, and concentrates on the existence of networks at sectoral rather than sub sectoral levels. It is clear that the drugs policy also exists across a range of sub sectoral levels. Governance Many contemporary debates about public management revolve around the concept of governance. Much of its current attractiveness to both politicians and policy makers is that governance implies obtaining a much wider range of policy outcomes than those provided by the state. In the case of drugs policy, governance implies a wider analysis of the outcomes delivered by policy that go beyond the mechanistic assessments and the tinkering with inputs implied by the public management approach. In addition, the association with networks is clear due to the centrality of multiple and often conflicting stakeholders at the core of governance approaches to policy management. Clearly, there are limitations to political science interpretations of policy networks under the rubric of ‘governance’. Rhodes (1997:50) also recognises this when he identifies ‘governance as a socio-cybernetic system’ as one possible use of ‘governance’. The term cybernetics has its origins in the Greek word: kybernetes, which refer to the action of steering. Although this term presents different 5 These are some of the terms that adorn PM Tony Blair’s speeches toward drugs. In Stimson, G. V. (2000) 'Blair declares war': the unhealthy state of British drug policy International Journal of Drug Policy, 11,(4) 259264. 6 Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability, Open University Press, Buckingham. Pp. 38-39 6 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] interpretations, it can be assumed that is in the interest of governance to keep a balance between maintaining control over political decisions whereby empowering policy networks; by consultation, restitution or direct decentralization. In Rhodes (1997:51) terms, ‘the socio-cybernetic approach highlights the limits to governing by a central actor, claiming that there is no a sovereign single authority. And he adds, that ‘governance is the result of interactive social political forms of governing’: As British government creates agencies bypasses local government, uses specialpurpose bodies to deliver services and encourages public private partnerships, so networks become increasingly prominent among British governing structures (Rhodes, 1997:51) Whether, the object of governance is the management of complex networks, which in theory reinforces subsystem autonomy enabling networks to resist central control; and autonomy is enhanced further because networks possess specialist knowledge and control of ‘street-level’ implementation (Taylor, 2000:52); the question here is to what extent can networks effectively have autonomy to influence policymaking and not just at the level of implementation or consultation? Drugs policy represents an opportunity to analyse the extent of influence of networks over policy formulation. In the case of cannabis, networks have had representation in the ‘advisory councils’ or the ‘commissions’ in the different governmental agencies. They can be defined as taskforces, and hence, they may seem to be the: ‘response of the Labour government to the demands of central coordination of intergovernmental relations: the epitome of government steering rather than rowing’, (Taylor, 2000:53-54). Although this paper does not seek to overstate the influence of the governance approach, in relation to the management of complex and diverse social policy problems, the governance perspective provides an alternative to the organisational fragmentation, mechanistic evaluations and narrow concerns of NPM. The examination of the interaction between government and society, and public, private and voluntary actors implied by the governance perspective also provides, at the very least, an alternative to NPM strategies by stressing collaboration rather than competition in the face of ‘wicked’ social problems. Drug Policy in the United Kingdom Developments from 1995 By the 1990s ideas regarding community participation began to be implemented in drug policy. In 1991, Operation Welwyn in King’s Cross was noted for the level of police collaboration with community participation in dealing with crime (Lee, 1996). In 1994 the Advisory Council of Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) stressed the importance of community partnership. A more explicit partnership approach was finally articulated when the Department of Health launched ‘Tackling drugs Together: a strategy for England’ (Health-Department, 1995). It aimed to take effective action by invigorated enforcement, accessible treatment and a new emphasis on education and 7 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] prevention. The importance of this strategy is that it encompassed former experiences in an integrated policy. In addition, 150 Drug Action Teams were created in order to deliver public policy at the local and regional level and the National Treatment Agency was conformed to coordinate treatment issues. This strategy incorporated the main principles of a managerial approach, and the acknowledgment of community partnerships approach in a street level bureaucracy. When Labour finally returned to office in 1997, this strategy was to form the basis of their commitment regarding drug policy. However, it is clear that the 1995 Department of Health initiative saw the start of formalising policy implementation in a holistic way, which appears to run against the grain of the NPM ‘boom’ being experienced across the rest of the public sector during much of the decade. On closer inspection, it appears that the Conservative governments under John Major were more prepared to relax central control over certain welfare policy areas, such as ‘Community Care’, while still attempting to ‘steer’ policy networks. Following the accession of Labour in 1997, this strategy was revisited, while acknowledging the difficulties of coordinated action. However, by now, the Labour rhetoric of ‘joined up’ government within the Third Way philosophy was being articulated. Thus, in 1998, Blair announced the appointment of the United Kingdom Anti Drug Coordinator, more popularly known as the Anti-Drug ‘Tsar’. Located in the Cabinet Office, the UKADC Unit was responsible for the coordination and implementation of the drugs strategy. The strategy was coordinated and driven across government by the Cabinet Sub Committee on Drug Misuse, to which the Anti-Drugs Coordinator reported. In turn, the Coordinator chaired a new body, the UK Anti Drugs Strategic Steering Group. However, delivery at local level continued to be through 150 Drug Action Teams (DATs) and their Drug Reference Groups (DRG) (Marlow, 1999: 4). During the same year, the Crime and Disorder Act introduced, for the first time, enforceable drug treatment and testing orders for people convicted of crimes committed in order to maintain their drug use (See Bean, 2002:Chapter 5). It also gave to the prosecution procedure major powers for the stop and search of ‘potential offenders. The importance of these measures is the major involvement on Criminal Justice agencies in tackling drugs while a governmental effort to organise and distribute responsibilities about this complex issue. In the second election of Labour party, in June 2001, the Home Office retook the task of managing drugs policy while maintaining Drug Action Teams. Similar developments occurred elsewhere in the public sector such as in community health care and health promotion, where emphasis was given to decentralise treatment through Health Action Zones and the development of ‘primary care groups’ for the coordination and delivery of health services in the community7. 7 See Teeman, D., South, N. and Henderson, S. (1999) Multi-impact Drugs Prevention in the Community In Young People, Drugs and Community Safety, (Ed., Marlow, A. and Pearson, G.) Russell House Publishing, Dorset. Pp. 99-108 8 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] Another important aspect is the consideration of ‘money laundering’ as a major problem in drug trafficking business. As a consequence of this concern, in 2003 the Criminal Assets Recovery Agency (CARA) was created. CARA’s director is accountable to the Home Secretary and he or she will carry out tax recovery functions, for example, income tax, capital gains, corporation and inheritance taxes, where he or she has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person’s income or gains were derived from crime (UK Drug Strategy, 2000 p. 13). To summarise policy developments since 1995, it appears that the establishment of DATs were indicative of a trend towards partnership approaches to policy problems, which owed little to a public sector context otherwise charged with NPM initiatives. The elaboration of the governance perspective, particularly reflected in the drive for ‘joined up’ policy implementation, under the new Labour government meant that the Drugs Tsar was part of a range of ‘joined up’ flagship projects that marked the first term of Blair’s office. The second term of office (from 2001) saw the Home Office wresting control of drugs policy from the ‘cross-cutting’ unit of the Cabinet Office. On this reading alone, it appears that the experiment with ‘joined up’ government in the area of drugs policy had a very short life-span, but this did not fit the rationale for the policy ‘Tsars’, who were partially intended to ‘kick start’ cross-cutting solutions. Finally, the Home Office proposed a revision of cannabis policy asking to the Advisory Council of Misuse of Drugs an expert opinion about cannabis harmfulness. The next section illustrates in detail the complexities of such a decision based on the variety of actors and agencies involved. As stated previously, it is expected that policy network analysis can provide some insights for understanding this particular case and eventually may provide some valuable insights for an overall comprehension of drug policy issues in the United Kingdom. The Case of Cannabis Reclassification The process of cannabis reclassification has embraced an extensive consultative process, taking into account the variety of actors involved. In simple terms, cannabis reclassification can be understood as the modification of the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, which has been the main legal instrument for regulating what are labelled as controlled drugs. It divides drugs into three classes: Class A: cannabis oil, cocaine and crack, ecstasy, heroine, LSD, methadone, processed magic mushrooms. Class B: Amphetamines, barbiturates and codeine. Cannabis (resin and herbal form) was included in this class. Class C: Mild amphetamines, anabolic steroids and minor tranquillisers. The idea of moving cannabis from Class B to Class C emphasises the fact that cannabis should not be in the same category as more harmful drugs. Nevertheless, the measure does not mean that cannabis is legal or decriminalized. This proposal is not a novelty, since some of its antecedents can be found in the Indian Hemp Drug Commission of 1893 and in the Wooton Report 1969 (See Mills, 2003:, Woolner and 9 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] Thom, 2003). On the other hand, social movements and the media have mobilized a strong campaign on the revision of cannabis legislation. In 1967 the Times published an advertisement sponsored by SOMA (and allegedly financed by The Beatles): the law against marijuana is immoral in principle and unworkable in practice. 8 However, as already mentioned, although this pressure might have influenced the Wooton Report, the desired revision of the classification of cannabis was not included in the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971. Despite several efforts for calling to a new legislation, it is until very recently that cannabis has been effectively included in the political agenda. Both medical opinion as well as some sectors of public opinion has pressed for changes in the legal status of cannabis.9 This time the political environment appeared to be prepared for considering a revision to the classification of cannabis. In 2001, the Home Secretary invited for an ‘adult and intelligent debate’ on drugs, and he asked the ACMD for a revision on cannabis. In March 2002, the ACMD recommended: the reclassification of all cannabis preparations to Class C. The Council believes that the current classification of cannabis is disproportionate in relation both to its inherent toxicity, and to that other substances (such as amphetamines) that are currently within Class B…In making this recommendation, however, the Council wishes it to be clearly understood that cannabis is unquestionably harmful (ACMD, 2002:I) Whilst considering the advice of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs the House of Commons made an extensive consultation including the opinions of different actors and stakeholders, around 45 witnesses over a total of 11 evidence sessions were called to express their opinion about drug policy and the cannabis issue (House of Commons, 2002:2). In spite of a general claim for further reforms of the status of cannabis, toward decriminalization, the final decision was simply to change the category of cannabis, which means that penalties for possession are 2 years instead of 5 years (following the ACMD proposal). As a Class C drug, penalties for possessions should have decreased to 7 years, however, due to general criticism of this measure in addition to the International Control Narcotic Board (INCB, 2002:par. 44) comments on reclassification as to be sending the ‘wrong message to producers countries and to British society’, penalties for possession remained at 14 years. The Criminal Justice Act, 1998, supported this decision. Although reclassification does not mean decriminalization or legalization, a ‘fog of confusion’ has been spread over the general public and moreover, those responsible for applying this measure, the Police in particular, seem puzzled by it.10 The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Cannabis Enforcement guidance stated in 2003, that decisions about arrest for possession of cannabis are ‘very much left to the discretion of officers’.11 In some cases of course, this discretion may mean that 8 Interview with Steve Abrams, SOMA leader. October 17, 2003. Research Notes by B. Acevedo. In 1998 11,000 people marched in London on March of this year; at the same time, The Independent (newspaper) has advocated for a better policy regarding to cannabis. The year before, the British Medical Association voted for cannabis products to be legally available for medical use with conditions such as MS and cancer. 10 See The Independent, January 16, 2004. ‘Police Chief acknowledges ‘muddle’ over drug law’ 11 See http://www.drugs.gov.uk/NationalStrategy/CannabisReclassification/ACPO, Accessed on 24-03-2004. 9 10 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] cannabis users will not be prosecuted. Some police have rejected that the idea of reclassification suggested a tougher attitude against cannabis users.12 Reclassification has, of course, caused a political reaction. The Conservative leader Mr. Howard called the measure ‘absurd’ and promised to reverse it if the Conservatives are returned to office.13 Of course, politicians using ‘drugs’ as an electoral issue is not a novelty. In fact, despite the managerialist approach of the Labour drug strategy, PM Blair’s speeches are littered with terms such `menace', `threat', `scourge', `tough new powers', and `crack down' when referring to drugs (Stimson, 2000:262). Despite the apparent call for a ‘rational drug policy’ based on a multi agency approach within a joined up government, British policy seems to be reversing toward an ‘unhealthy’ drug policy (Stimson and Rhodes, 2001). As can be appreciated, a simple movement on cannabis categorization has mobilised a complex network of diverse actors and institutions. The following figure illustrates the different actors involved. The next question is whether policy network analysis can provide a comprehensive framework for drug policy understanding by reviewing the evolution of the network approach. The analysis will also attempt to map the various vertical and horizontal interdependencies to emphasize the problematic of managing complex networks and to assess the extent to which interorganizational relationships is a necessary and potentially enduring feature of governance. 12 See The Independent. January 19, 2004. ‘Police chiefs to get tough on cannabis and ignore new law’ See The Guardian, January 18, 2003. http://politics.guardian.co.uk/homeaffairs/story/0,11026,1128675,00.html. Accessed 2004-01-22 13 11 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] 12 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] Applying policy network analysis The concept of policy networks for analysing drug policy issues is immediately beset by definitional problems. For instance, drugs policy appears to display the characteristics of ‘issue networks’, which are unstable, have large numbers of members and ‘limited vertical interdependence’ (Rhodes, 1997:38). However, drugs policy also appears as an ‘intergovernmental network’ at the sub-national level, particularly as it is based on an ‘extensive constellation of interests’. In the case of drugs, these constellations of interests are also articulated in national strategies while at the same time, there is a range of manoeuvre for local authorities given their service delivery responsibilities. An issue network tends to have many participants, fluctuating interactions, limited consensus, interaction based on consultation, unequal power relationship and few resources (Rhodes, 1997:45). In the case of drugs the great variety of opinions make that although there is a remarkable process of consultation, this is not leading to a real negotiation, and politicians retain their discretion in final decisions which are unlikely to change core values in the consideration of drugs. The application of policy network analysis in a similar case such as drugs may be illustrated in the case of tobacco.14 As illustrated by Read (1992) policy network analysis can enlighten the understanding of policy of smoking. He argues that: In the smoking field a producer network and an issue network coexist. I have shown that there are close links between the tobacco industry and the government, which have been established over the last 400 years. However this close tight relationship has come under increasing challenge form external groups which have highlighted the links between smoking and heart disease (p. 148) In the case of cannabis, however, the tight link in policy making has been between the puritan groups and the American government, who led the crusade against drugs since the Twentieth Century (Bischke, 2003). In Britain there has not been a ‘cannabis producer’ group, although in recent times, home grown production is providing a good percentage of cannabis availability (estimated at 50%, See (Hough et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the comparison is useful, since instead of having a significant ‘producer network’ the increased use of cannabis among Britons might be represented as a kind of ‘consumer network’. Some of the consumption facts about cannabis may suggest this idea. Cannabis seems to be the favourite illicit drug for Britons. More than 44% of population revealed to have tried cannabis in their lifetime. The spread use of cannabis in a normalized way might be one of the possible explanations to get a decision toward its reclassification. Based on the British Crime Survey 2002-2003, around three million 16-59 years old have used cannabis in the last year (11%) (Condon and Smith, 2003:1). 14 Some authors have suggested that tobacco case may have similarities with cannabis. See for example, Engelsman, E. L. (2003) Cannabis control: the model of the WHO tobacco control treaty International Journal of Drug Policy, 14, (2) 217-219. 13 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] However, these people do not have a direct representation as a ‘consumer network’ group, but their influence on drug policy decisions should not be diminished by the fact of their ‘invisibility’. Anyway, it is argued by Smith (1993) that the policies that emanate from the state do not always reflect the demands of group or classes but are the result of how state actors perceive their interests and how they perceive particular problems and their solutions (p. 51). In this sense, the term ‘perceive’ may be replaced by ‘appreciation’; hence, the appreciation of this situation could have conduced to the decision about reclassification. Consequently it can be said that cannabis use is spread over the British population, without meaning necessarily that its use causes evident problems related to crime. In this case the appreciative system regarding to drugs seem to have incorporated both a reality judgment and value judgment: Appreciation manifests itself in the exercise through time of mutually related judgement or reality and value. (…) Such judgement discloses what can be described as a set of readiness to distinguish some aspects of the situation rather than others and to classify and value these in this way rather than in that. (…) I will describe these readinesses as an appreciative system. (Vickers, 1995:82), Finally, it is important to note the role of professional networks that dispute the validity of certain type of knowledge regarding drugs. The reaction toward cannabis reclassification shows how those different types of networks may play a significant role in changing current policy: at the time of the implementation of the measure (29th January, 2004), many groups raised their voices in opposition to that measure. Groups of concerned parents about a novel type of ‘psychosis’ triggered by cannabis challenged the ‘related less harmful’ of cannabis.15 They were supported by Robert Murray, a psychiatrist in London who argues that cannabis almost always exacerbated symptoms of psychosis in people who were already suffering from any mental health problem.16 Opinions amongst the medical profession are also diverse. When the idea of reclassification began to be supported by media and other stakeholders, the British Medical Association proposed its decriminalization under medical conditions. However, at the time of implementation, they expressed their concern that by ‘reclassifying cannabis the Government was sending out the message to the public that the drug was safer than previously thought’.17 Ultimately, shifting positions within the network ultimately shaped public policy. Constraints of the Network Approach The case of drug policy and particularly the recent example of cannabis reclassification shows the complexity of this issue when analysing it through policy 15 See The Times on Line, January 18, 2004. www.timesonline.co.uk, accessed on 2004-01-22 See The Guardian, January 20, 2004http://www.guardian.co.uk/health/story/0,3605,1126670,00.html Accessed 22-01-2004. 17 See ‘Doctors condemn plan to down grade cannabis’ Times on Line, January 21, 2004. www.timesonline.co.uk accessed 2004-01-22. 16 14 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] networks. Atkinson and Coleman (1992) presented a critique of the network approach in three basic points: firstly, that the models have a problem with the influence of macro political institutions and the impact of political discourse. Secondly, that they have difficulty with the issue of the internationalisation of many policy domains, and thirdly, that the network/community approach has failed to address the problem of policy innovation and change.18 In addition, the weakness of using networks to govern is their propensity to withstand policy change. In particular, the paper notes how policy objectives in relation to drugs appear to have withstood the meta-policy change from Conservative to Labour in 1997 with the development of partnership approaches. In addition, networks highlight the fallacy of a key assumption of NPM; that policy formulation and implementation are, and should be, separable. In the case of drug policy, this gap seems to be inherent to the policy itself. While professionals and public managers must face the diversity of drug problems in their localities, the government tries to maintain control over the situation through updated legislation and major controls. Whilst the strategy of Tackling Drugs Together (1995) emphasises the intergovernmental cooperation and a multi-agency approach whilst allocating responsibilities of execution and (eventually) a certain level of decision in the Drug Action Teams, the reality shows that this is not leading to an improvement of the drug policy. Otherwise, Drug Action Teams face complex issues of a striking and diverse reality that must be considered particularly, with an almost religious emphasis on monitoring and control from the managerial discourse. As one DAT coordinator has expressed: “Monitoring has become almost religious in its status, as has centralised control… The demand for quick hits and early wins is driven by a central desire analogous to the instant gratification demands made by drug users themselves…The criminal gangs that control the market are laughing all the way to the bank and beyond, as we tie ourselves in knots with god practice guidelines and monitoring. It’s like trying to fight with one hand tied behind your back, a boxing glove on the other and strict instruction not to punch” Richard Elliot in Special Report by Nick Davies in The Guardian (2003) Interdependence between formulation and implementation in networks allows organisational learning to become embedded within the practice of networking, although learning is compromised not only by competition for resources (based on ‘valid’ knowledge or ‘correspondent responsibility’) but also by electoral competition. Although the picture is further obfuscated by shifts in public opinion and the salience of the drugs issue in the mass media, the multiple inputs into the drugs policy process are highlighted. 18 Cited in Parsons, W. (1995) Public Policy: An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis, Edward Elgar Publisher, Aldershot. P. 191 15 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] The paper acknowledges the usefulness of the network approach is compromised by systems of policy evaluation that focus on outcomes, which are attributable to individual organisations. If we are discussing the users of drugs services, then we can argue that policy effectiveness depends on an assessment of the network, ‘since client well-being depends on the integrated and coordinated actions of many different agencies’ (Provan and Milward, 1995:2). Similarly, the case is true of those who produce, traffic and supply drugs. Therefore, a weakness of standard accounts of policy analysis is that they are informed by a top-down analysis driven by resource allocation mechanisms. Implications for public management The final aim of the paper is to assess the utility of the network concept for public management, particularly in terms of managing networks to produce successful policy outcomes. As Huczynski and Buchanan (2001:543) observe, such interorganizational relationships are neither ‘market transaction nor a hierarchical governance structure… which possesses its own logic’ and work on the basis of trust. The task of public sector management thus shifts from that of hierarchical control to strategic management. At the micro-level, strategic management is an increasingly important part of the task of public sector management. The increasing reliance on ‘evidence based’ policy making to evaluate public service delivery encompasses a range of agencies that all take responsibility for public policy delivery. At the mesolevel, the policy environment within which organisations operate tempers strategic management. Organisational goals are political goals although strategic management should allow organisations to take control over how they are evaluated. NPM is clearly an inadequate response when faced with the problems of analysing networks. For instance, Rhodes (1997), points to the weaknesses of NPM, which are relevant to the case of drug policy. Summarizing he argues that: a. b. c. d. Managerialism adopts an intra organizational focus not interorganizational, and it is ruled by efficiency, economy and efficacy; terms that must be revised on each particular policy. Managerialism is obsessed with objectives and again he recalls Vickers, pointing out the regulatory function for managing networks. NPM focuses on results, whereby it is very difficult to identify which single agency may have caused that particular effect There is a contradiction between competition and steering. 19 Instead, he is proposing to consider networks as a third governing structure, emphasising that they are not better than either bureaucracies or markets, but they may suit policy areas some of the time: 19 Cf. Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability, Open University Press, Buckingham. P. 55 16 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] Reciprocity and interdependence, not competition, characterized networks relations. So managing interorganizational networks is both game like and requires strategies rooted in trust. Planning, regulation and competition need to be supplemented with facilitating, accommodating and bargaining, the keys to effective network management. (Rhodes, 1997:57) Finally, the ability of networks to learn by practice and through the acquisition of shared knowledge defies managerialism approaches to dealing with policy problems, such as drugs. Institutionalised learning within the network may run contrary to the strategic intent of policy makers as the network, in time, becomes highly resistant to change forcing elected politicians to either ‘reinvent’ policy or ‘negotiate and persuade’ through networking (Pollitt, 2003:47). Conclusions Although the network perspective has received wide attention and criticism within political studies, it remains of value as a heuristic device for analysing potentially messy policy processes. Drugs policy represents one of the more extreme cases, due to the existence of its underground economy, and the internationalisation and localisation of its supply, production, traffic and effects. The difficulties of policy formulation within such a constant and evolving context cannot be overstated. As we have demonstrated in the paper, although networks are fluid and open, key state actors who have considerable command over resources dominate policy within the network, although as in the case of cannabis, opinion within the network can influence policy. In addition, being such a sensitive topic political decisions are very much influenced by public opinion, and the particular action of stakeholders over a certain period of time. Although it is difficult to talk about a ‘consumer network’ in the case of cannabis, it is undeniable that the increasing proportion of cannabis users may be influencing political decisions. While demonstrating that there is no a direct link between their consumption and criminal actions, strong views from the media and stakeholders have pushed for a revision of the legal status of cannabis consumption in a normalized way. Moreover, the shift of policy direction to the Home Office in 2001 is not surprising given that it is one of the big spending departments. However, the initial idea of the UKADCU seems to fit into the logic of multiagency approach in a subject, which definitively requires the participation of different agencies. Perhaps, the orientation of the Tsar Office was perceived at the same level of other offices, and both the media and politicians heavily criticized its role. In any case, it is possible to say that the drugs policy network is not a deliberate ‘Balkanisation’ of the policy process, rather the result of bargaining over resources, information and knowledge by key agencies. The shifts mapped out in this paper aim to demonstrate this. Finally, it is clear that managerialist approaches to policy analysis will be strictly limited within such a fluid environment where the drugs issue has such a high political saliency. However, it must be acknowledged that whilst locating drugs as a problem to be managed, the debate may cut loose from a prohibitionist approach 17 Copyright © 2004 [Political Studies Association] and its unhealthy consequences. At the same time, when emphasising managerialism, some aspects related to the practicalities of drug policy may be incorporated into drug policy making, in terms of a learning process. However, in some other cases it seems that managerialism might also be an obstacle rather than a facilitator for practitioners and public officers in dealing with this complex issue with particular circumstances. 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