Belarus at a Crossroads:
Political Regime
Transformation and Future
Scenarios
Andrei Yeliseyeu
Research Director of the EAST Center,
Head of iSANS Monitoring Group
Pre-election campaign period
Shortly after the changes in the Belarusian government in August
2018, Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka (Alexander
Lukashenko) intensified his political activity. It indicated that
one of the elections will likely be moved up to 2019, though both
parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled to take
place in 2020. By separating the two campaigns in time authoritarian
regimes intend to discourage political mobilization.
The 2nd European Games in June 2019 were beneficial to this purpose,
and they inescapably became more a political than a sporting event.
In the spring of 2019, amid worsened relations with the Kremlin
and increased uncertainty in Belarus’s relationship with Russia,
the Belarusian ruler made up his mind to hold parliamentary elections
in November 2019, leaving the presidential elections for 2020.
1July, 2020
Except for two 1,000-strong protest rallies in Minsk against
the plans of further integration between Belarus and Russia
in December 2019, no prominent street protest activity took
place in Belarus last year. However, circumstantial evidence
suggested a growing public mistrust toward the Belarusian
authorities and Lukashenka personally. They were hit by a serious
blow to their reputation at the 2019 Belarus’s Independence
Day of 3 July. The festivities took a tragic turn after the fireworks
killed a 64-year-old woman and injured 10 other spectators
in Minsk. Despite state-owned media efforts to silence the incident,
it was highly publicized online, particularly via websites
of independent media, social networks, and Telegram channels.
IN THE ABSENCE OF INDEPENDENT SOCIOLOGY IN BELARUS,
ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING LUKASHENKA’S APPROVAL RATING
ARE BASED ON INDIRECT INDICATORS
such as people’s participation in state-organized events, the degree
of accepted pluralism in various areas, and characteristics of state
information policies.
Even prior to the 3 July accident, absenteeism at the 2nd European
Games pointed at Belarusian citizens’ distrust of government. They
largely ignored the European Games events, which took place from
21 June to 30 June 2019, despite enormous efforts of the Belarusian
authorities. The European Games were widely labeled Hunger Games
on social media due to state investments over $260 million, amid
difficult economic conditions.
A completely “politically sterile” Belarus’s parliament of November
2019 was another indication of state authorities’ eroded reputation.
Had his trust ratings been high, Lukashenka would have likely
allowed opposition representation to have an extra bargaining
chip in negotiations with the West, particularly amid tough talks
with Moscow. The fact that there was absolutely no opposition
in the parliament was therefore supposed to show the population
and nomenklatura that the ruler retains full control of the situation.
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
In the past few years, a growing censorship on the internet and propaganda
component in the state-owned media can also be seen as a manifestation
of the political regime’s response to Lukashenka’s undermined reputation.
The right to anonymity online was severely limited in December 2018
with the introduction of compulsory authentication of Belarusian internet
users through SMS activation or by other means. In February 2018,
the presidential administration newspaper Belarus Segodnya shut down
the comments section on the website, apparently due to an increase
in negative comments.
ATTEMPTS TO BOOST LUKASHENKA’S IMAGE BY ALL MEANS HAVE
LED THE STATE-OWNED MEDIA TO AN EXTREME DEPARTURE FROM
JOURNALISTIC STANDARDS.
Another indicator of Lukashenka’s awareness of fallen approval ratings
and his preparedness to increase degree of repression was the appointment
of Major General Ihar Siarheyenka (Igor Sergeenko), Deputy Head
of the KGB for counter-intelligence activities, as the head of the presidential
administration in December 2019. Siarheyenka’s appointment was also
an important milestone in the ongoing transformation of Belarus’s political
regime. (More on this below.)
Pre-election mobilization
and Lukashenka’s vague campaign
The presidential administration’s expectation to have non-emotional
and otherwise nondescript elections of the type seen in 2015
failed to materialize due to the increased political mobilization.
It was caused by economic grievances and exacerbated by inadequate
response to the coronavirus epidemic clearly attributable
to Lukashenka and his ruling coalition.
In early spring 2020, the normalization of relations with the Kremlin
and personally with Vladimir Putin seemed to be the only significant
challenging factor for Lukashenka’s election campaign. In the following
months, the Belarusian strongman found himself in a much more
complicated situation for several reasons.
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
THE CORONAVIRUS EPIDEMIC BEGAN DEVELOPING IN BELARUS
IN EARLY MARCH, EXACTLY WHEN THE MORE ACTIVE PHASE
OF LUKASHENKA’S ELECTION CAMPAIGN BEGAN TO UNFOLD.
Since early March the media coverage of Lukashenka’s working trips
and other main topics by state-run media became much more positive
and was designed to focus on (real or invented) success stories.
Over the course of March, state media covered the topics of successful
diversification of oil supplies, the ceremonial presentation of passports
to schoolchildren for the Constitution Day, the adoption of a presidential
decree to stimulate the use of electric vehicles, and Lukashenka’s visits
to rather flourishing Adani and Belgips companies.
The positive media coverage was suddenly overshadowed by the growth
of the coronavirus epidemic. The Belarusian ruler did not hide his irritation,
repeatedly criticizing excessive public attention to the coronavirus problem.
INSTEAD OF QUICK ADJUSTMENTS TO HIS CAMPAIGN, LUKASHENKA
REPEATEDLY SPOKE OUT AGAINST EXTREME “CORONA-PSYCHOSIS”
AND DOWNPLAYED THE RISKS OF THE EPIDEMIC.
Instead of paying a single visit to a hospital or other medical institution,
he made a number of controversial statements, which provoked public
anger and jokes. Among other things, Lukashenka offered steaming in sauna,
taking shots of vodka and working in the fields as a cure for coronavirus.
State-owned TV channels used a dozen manipulative tricks to convince
the population of the insignificance of the coronavirus and the brilliant
conduct of the Belarusian authorities. TV hosts repeatedly stated that
no one died from the coronavirus in Belarus, cited absurd comparisons
of mortality from other causes such as road accidents, and argued
that world politicians were following Lukashenka’s wise actions.
A representative online poll of Belarusian city residents conducted
in April 2020 showed that over 70% of respondents wanted to be better
informed about the spread of the coronavirus.
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
By June, Belarus was among 15 most-affected countries with the highest
number of identified coronavirus cases per capita. At the same time,
Belarus maintained one of the lowest infection fatality rates in the world.
However, a number of observations (e.g., a very high share of coronavirusrelated deaths among medical workers) suggest that the actual number
of coronavirus-related deaths may be underestimated in official Belarusian
statistics by 10 times or more. Moreover, in early May Lukashenka for a split
second demonstrated a graph which was believed to contain alternative
coronavirus-related statistics, with a higher number of identified cases than
reported by the ministry of health.
A sheer drop of oil price over the spring of 2020 and COVID-19 pandemic
implications negatively affected the economic situation in Belarus.
Income from oil refining and the sale of potash fertilizers dropped,
the service sector has suffered losses, and unemployment has risen. State
support measures for small- and medium-sized businesses were limited
and came late. As Lukashenka admitted in early July, he deliberately
delayed their approval saying, “I held back this process, as I was waiting
for you [business representatives] to take your money out of your pocket
and invest it.” Furthermore, thousands of Belarusian households suffered
from the disruption of circular migration flows as the entry to Russia
and EU countries for most categories of Belarusian population remains
restricted due to the coronavirus epidemic as of late July 2020.
Belarus belongs to the ten most censored countries in the world, according
to the Committee to Protect Journalists 2019 report. This, combined with
the large staff of state ideologists and a well-functioning system of electoral
fraud, has made the Belarusian authorities quite successful at creating a myth
about Lukashenka’s electoral majority. However, due to the growing popularity
of new media and messengers like Telegram, access to information among
Belarusian has greatly improved in recent years.
Despite various tricks by the Belarusian authorities to convince
the population of the opposite (including the publication of allegedly
secret documents with sociological data),
DURING THE 2020 ELECTION CAMPAIGN AN INCREASINGLY
LARGER PART OF BELARUSIAN SOCIETY BEGAN TO REALIZE THAT
LUKASHENKA’S OPPONENTS ARE IN A MAJORITY.
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
A representative poll of Minsk residents conducted by the Institute
of Sociology of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences throughout March
and early April 2020 showed that the Lukashenka’s trust rating amounted
to 24%, while the Central Election Commission enjoyed an even lower
rating of 11%. Taking into account the effect of social desirability
and deteriorated epidemiological and economic situation since that time,
in July 2020 Lukashenka’s trust rating among Minsk residents hardly
exceeded 15–20%.
While the share of Lukashenka’s supporters among the rural
population and people aged 70+ is undoubtedly higher, a low level of
support among the urban population is irrefutable. The people’s trust
in government and Lukashenka in regional cities and smaller towns
is unlikely to differ greatly from the capital region.
Earlier surveys of the population also indicate a high degree
of dissatisfaction with living conditions. Asked «How would you generally
assess your current life situation?,» only 6.9% of respondents answered
“Better than average,” a nationwide survey of the Belarusian youth (aged
18-29 years) conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Sociology
in 2017 showed. The option “It is difficult to live, but one can endure
it” was chosen by 33.8% of respondents, whereas “The situation is dire,
it is already impossible to endure” saw 21.1%.
Moreover, 55.1% of young Belarusians fully or partially agreed with
the statement “The development of society requires somewhat drastic social
and political changes from time to time.” Twice fewer (23.3%) disagreed with
this statement to varying degrees, while the rest was uncertain. Today’s figures
assessing the living situation are likely even more depressing. Hence the view
that Belarusians prefer a vague concept of “stability” to whatever societal
changes does not find support at least among young people.
BY LATE APRIL, LUKASHENKA FACED A STARK NEW POLITICAL
REALITY AFTER HIGH ELECTORAL SUPPORT OF HIS MAIN POLITICAL
OPPONENTS BECAME VERY CLEAR.
Viktar Babaryka, former head of the Board of Belgazprombank, collected
around 435,000 signatures in his support, more than any other
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
democratic candidate in Belarus’s history. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya,
a wife of popular blogger Siarhei Tsikhanouski who was put in custody
on dubious charges, also managed to collect over 100,000 signatures
required for registering as a presidential candidate, despite multiple
arrests of initiative group members and continuous state counteractions.
Amid an unprecedented political mobilization, Lukashenka’s election
campaign took vague forms and became rather reactive. It proved
to be proactive only in the part of repressive actions as explained
in greater detail below. The Belarusian ruler even canceled
his traditional annual Address to the People and Parliament.
Throughout July Lukashenka repeatedly mentioned “five pandemics”
that Belarus is witnessing, speaking about carbon, economic,
political, and information pandemics in addition to coronavirus.
His election campaign’s main message can be tentatively formulated
as «We are together, we are one country,» while Belarus’s independence
and sovereignty are presented as his primary achievements.
Lukashenka’s domestic political priorities
To forestall a growing political mobilization of the population, since April
Alyaksandr Lukashenka prioritized the following domestic political actions:
•
A campaign of repression and discrediting the most popular
political opponents.
•
Larger control over information flows, including through
reprisals against popular bloggers.
•
Intimidation of civilian population.
Both of Lukashenka’s most popular political opponents, Siarhei
Tsikhanouski and Viktar Babaryka, are facing lengthy prison terms
on various dubious charges. Tsikhanousky was detained in Hrodna
following a suspected provocation against him with the participation
of a woman who was later identified as a Minsk-based prostitute.
Among other things, Tsikhanouski is accused of threatening the life
of Lidziya Yarmoshyna, the head of the Central Election Commission.
The accusation is based, among other things, on a slogan mentioning
Yarmoshyna and containing a Russian word that means “to swat,” which
was present at one of Tsikhanouskaya’s public meetings.
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
Viktar Babaryka and his son Eduard, head of his election campaign
headquarters, are accused of various financial crimes. State officials
including Lukashenka have repeatedly used derogatory statements
about Tsikhanouski and Babaryka and asserted their guilt. Stateowned TV channels broadcast a number of reports using fragments
of investigative actions and claiming Babaryka’s implication in crimes,
in violation of the presumption of innocence.
As for the greater control of information flows, several popular YouTube
bloggers and Telegram channel authors were arrested on charges
of preparing mass events that grossly violate public order. Over
40 journalists have been detained when covering peaceful protests over
the two past months, some of them were beaten by law enforcement
officers. The Belarusian authorities began experimenting with shutting
down mobile internet during protests. The Prosecutor’s Office made
a statement that the reading of news on the internet by public servants
may amount to a corruption offense.
It was reported in early June that by the decision of the Academy of Sciences,
online polls on political issues were equalized to opinion polls, which,
according to the law, must be licenced. Therefore by conducting an online
poll Belarusian media outlets risk to be fined and to receive a warning from
the ministry of information. In the event of two warnings during a calendar
year a media outlet in Belarus may be closed as ordered by court decision.
Since the beginning of the election campaign until mid-July over
700 people were detained, most of them have either received
fines or administrative arrests. Lukashenka and representatives
of law enforcement agencies made a number of statements aimed
to intimidate the population. In early June, Lukashenka praised bloody
suppression of Andijan protests by the former Uzbek ruler Islam Karimov.
STATE-RUN TV CHANNELS SHOWED THE KGB CHIEF VALERY
VAKULCHYK TAUNTING A 81-YEAR-OLD LADY WHO HAD PUBLICLY
CRITICIZED LUKASHENKA’S POLICIES.
Lukashenka repeatedly spoke about readiness to prevent a “Maidan”
at any cost, groundlessly accusing his political opponents of intention
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
to “organize a massacre in the square.” Interestingly, a number
of marginal Russian sites also published stories about possible serious
provocations by “radical Belarusian nationalist groups” in the Mahiliou
and Viciebsk regions adjacent to Russia.
Political regime transformation: Towards
a stronger military rule
While a number of factors, primarily historically lowest level of public’s trust,
make Lukashenka’s ongoing election campaign most challenging,
he benefits from the highest degree of centralization of power in sovereign
Belarus’s history and unprecedented strength of the security apparatus.
Belarus’s political regime is often categorized as a classic personalist type.
For two decades the capacity of all state institutions in Belarus was kept
very low so as not to give rise to organizational centers of opposition.
In accordance with the categorization of political regimes by Juan J. Linz
and Alfred Stepan,1 Belarus’s political regime is likewise sometimes
classified as sultanism. This type of political regime is characterized
by the extreme personal presence of the ruler in all elements
of governance. In sultanism, the ruler is not bound by any rules or a given
ideology. In their final stages of existence, sultanisms often have a very
narrow social basis, often restricted to a small circle of its clients.
The original Geddes classification of authoritarian regimes reflects
three ideal types: personalist, military, and one-party dictatorships.
Based on the approach that differs from the existing practice
of creating categorical typologies of autocratic regimes,2 one can speak
about the recent, or rather ongoing evolution of Belarus’s political
regime to a personalist military type. Indeed, lately political scientists
point at the practical need to distinguish between collegial
and personalist military rule.3
Linz, Juan J.; Stepan, Alfred. «Modern Nondemocratic Regimes». Problems of Democratic
Transition & Consolidation (1996). Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore.
1
Wright, Joseph C. “The Latent Characteristics That Structure Autocratic Rule.” Political Science
Research and Methods (2019): 1-19.
2
3
NK Kim, AM Kroeger. “Regime and Leader Instability under Two Forms of Military Rule.”
Comparative Political Studies (2018) 51 (1): 3-37.
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
Acknowledging that authoritarian regimes of any type almost always
rely on some degree of repression against competing groups, personalist
military dictatorships are characterized by much stronger military rule.
Under the military not only the army, but security bodies and other lawenforcement agencies may be thought to include.
The appointment of KGB Major General Ihar Siarheyenka as the head
of the presidential administration in December 2019 was an important
milestone in the evolution of Belarusian authoritarianism towards
a personalist military type. Until 2016 Siarheyenka was blacklisted
by the EU for repressions against civil society and democratic opposition
in the Mahiliou region and in Belarus. Lukashenka also put Mikhail
Miasnikovich, a powerful figure in a ruling coalition, aside by sending
him to Moscow upon his appointment as Chairman of the Board of the
Eurasian Economic Commission.
The influence of persons specialized in the use of force
in the Belarus’s ruling coalition increased even more after
the June 2020 government reshuffle. Raman Halouchanka (Roman
Golovchenko), who previously chaired the State Authority for Military
Industry and served as a chief specialist of the State Secretariat
of the Security Council, replaced liberal-minded economist Siarhei
Rumas as a new prime minister.
Other than that, former KGB Deputy Chairman Major General Ivan
Tertel replaced Leanid Anfimau with background in the industrial sector
and management as Chairman of the State Control Committee. Tertel
has been very zealous in putting his efforts to persuade the Belarusian
population and international community in Babaryka’s crimes.
At the closed meeting with the US and EU countries’ diplomats on 18 June
2020, which was dedicated to the Belgazprombank criminal case, Tertel
reportedly played a leading role and acted rather aggressively, including
towards Belarus’s foreign minister Uladzimir Makei.
A ‘CIVILIAN’ COMPONENT IN LUKASHENKA’S RULING COALITION
HAS NEVER BEEN AS SIDELINED FROM DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES AS IT IS NOW.
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
Decision-making in sovereign Belarus has never lied in the hands
of the so strong military bloc consisting of siloviki as chairmen
of the presidential administration and the government, the Security
Council, KGB, Ministry of Interior, State Control Committee, Investigative
Committee, Prosecutor’s Office, and other law enforcement agencies.
Such political transformation poses a coup threat against an eventual
nascent democratic regime in Belarus until it is reformed.
“The anticipation that the military will be reformed in the future acts
as an additional motivation for the military to undertake coups against
democratic governments,”4 one comparativist political study says.
The recently increased military rhetoric of the Belarusian ruler
and Belarus’s state-run media reflects the evolution of Belarus’s political
regime. In mid-July 2020 Lukashenka advocated for a constitutional
amendment preventing a person who did not serve in the army,
to become a president. Unlike Russian leadership, he did not postpone
the Victory Day military parade on 9 May 2020 amid a surge
of coronavirus cases, despite widespread public criticism. Reporting
about Belarus’s Independence Day of 3 July 2020, state-owned
TV channels claimed it has much in common with the Victory
Day, making parallels between WWII war and continuous struggle
for Belarus’s independence and sovereignty led by Lukashenka.
The dynamics of the Belarus-Russia relationship
In response to Minsk’s wishes for Moscow’s greater economic support,
including in the form of compensations for Russia’s oil tax reform
and lower gas prices, in late 2018 the Kremlin articulated
the integration ultimatum. It lies in the readiness to provide Minsk
with more beneficial energy deals, subject to deeper integration
of Belarus with Russia in various spheres within the framework
of the 1999 Union State Treaty. This would involve the introduction
of common currency, creation of single Tax and Civil Codes
and supranational bodies, and approximation of Belarusian legislation
with Russia’s in many other spheres.
4
Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. 2010. «A Theory of Military
Dictatorships.» American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2 (1), pp.36-37.
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
Over the last two decades Lukashenka skillfully traded geopolitical
loyalty and military cooperation for Russia’s generosity. The Kremlin,
however, pointed to a change in the model of bilateral relationship,
declining the long-standing scheme “oil and gas in exchange for kisses”
and demanding the shares of Belarus’s sovereignty instead. Since
the beginning of 2019, the Belarusian authorities have been involved
in intensive negotiations with Moscow over the program of action
on stepping up integration. Its content and course were concealed
as much as possible from the Belarusian parliament and the public.
Although the program of action was initialled and a list
of 31 integration roadmaps was approved by the prime ministers
of Belarus and Russia on 6 September 2019, none of these documents
has been published.
IN DECEMBER 2019 FORMER RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER DMITRY
MEDVEDEV STATED THAT THE 31ST INTEGRATION ROADMAP
FORESEES THE INTRODUCTION OF A SINGLE CURRENCY
AND CREATION OF SUPRANATIONAL BODIES, SOMETHING THAT
LUKASHENKA REPEATEDLY DENIED OF BEING DISCUSSED.
In the 31st integration roadmap Moscow reportedly proposed
to discuss the creation of a single Court of Audit, single customs, tax,
and competition authorities, as well as common regulating agencies
in transportation, industry, agriculture, and other spheres.
The program of action was not, however, approved by the Belarusian
and Russian leaders on 8 December 2019 to coincide with the 20th
anniversary of the Treaty on the Union State. The negotiation process
was put on hold since December 2019. The Belarusian authorities
conditioned the signing of integration agreements with top-priority
concessions from Russia, primarily in terms of oil revenue compensation
and reduced gas price, and were reluctant to discuss the 31st integration
roadmap, presenting it as the issue of a distant future. In turn,
the Kremlin counted on Minsk’s written commitments as for the deeper
integration within the agreed timeline, before providing concrete
economic concessions in the energy field and others.
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
One can assume that the erosion of Lukashenka’s reputation
among Belarusian officials has been relentless since late 2018
due to unsuccessful series of negotiations with Putin. The two leaders
met 11 times, including for 2- and 3-day negotiations, between
December 2018 and December 2019. By 2020 Minsk did not succeed
in getting either compensations for Russia’s oil tax reform or lower
gas prices. Over the years, Lukashenka’s ability to provide Russian
resources has shaped him as an irreplaceable earner. In the event
of a conclusive inability to find a mutually beneficial solution with
Moscow, an accelerated Lukashenka’s delegitimization among
nomenklatura may occur. As of mid-July 2020 no signs of disloyalty
in his ruling coalition were observed.
A GROWING POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND HEIGHTENED
REPRESSIONS IN BELARUS, AND HENCE WORSENING
RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, INCREASE THE PROBABILITY
OF A NEW LUKASHENKA’S INTEGRATION PACKAGE WITH RUSSIA
IN EXCHANGE FOR KREMLIN’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT.
Prior to or immediately after the two previous presidential
elections, Lukashenka ensured the deepened integration between
Belarus and Russia. Ten days before the presidential elections
of 19 December 2010, Lukashenka and Medvedev agreed on the terms
of Belarus’s accession to the Common Economic Space. Shortly after
the brutal dispersal of street protests on election day, all 17 documents
pertaining to the CES creation were ratified by Minsk. A year before
the 2015 presidential elections, Minsk ratified the Treaty on the Eurasian
Economic Union. For each of these deals, Belarus was awarded with
larger oil revenues.
After a series of public squabbles between Belarusian and Russian
officials over the response to the coronavirus pandemic in the spring
of 2020, a dialogue over deeper integration has intensified in June.
During the online discussion “Russia and Belarus: The post-pandemic future”
on 4 June, Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Uladzimir Siamashka (Vladimir
Semashko) stated, “Minsk is ready at any time to sit down at the negotiating
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
table [to discuss integration roadmaps] if we have the goodwill
of our Russian partners and friends.” Such a moment for the continuation
of negotiations may come in September of October, Siamashka added.
During the same event Russian ambassador Dmitry Mezentsev said
that the West follows Brzezinski’s commandments and wishes to tear
Belarus away from Russia. He also criticized the fact that on account
of “far-fetched, artificial pretexts and obstacles” resulting from “political
nuances and conjuncture” Belarusian goods cannot make it to Crimea.
On June 5, an online meeting of the High-Level Group of the Council
of Ministers of the Union State of Russia and Belarus was held.
During the meeting, several issues were resolved, including those
related to integration roadmaps, while other issues were postponed
until September.
Another online conference with the participation of high-ranking
officials of Belarus and Russia and Secretary of the Union State
Grigory Rapota was held on 10 June. At the conference, entitled “Russia
and Belarus: Horizons of Strategic Cooperation,” Mezentsev mentioned
Siamashka’s promise to continue negotiations in the fall and again
spoke about alleged attempts by external forces to tear Belarus away
from Russia. In his opinion, soon such attempts will surely be “even
tougher and more refined.”
During the online conferences, it turned out that Minsk and Moscow have
different understandings of the number of agreed integration roadmaps.
According to Mezentsev, 27 documents out of 31 have been approved,
whereas Siamashka stated that 28 and a half out of 30 roadmaps
had been agreed upon. Apparently, the Belarusian side continues to ignore
the existence of the 31st roadmap, although in early July it was confirmed
by the Secretary of the Union State Grigory Rapota.
The format of future Belarus-Russia relationship remains in the state
of uncertainty given the strained personal relationship between
Lukashenka and Putin, upcoming presidential elections in Belarus amid
low Lukashenka’s electoral rating, and possible negative impacts that
the novel coronavirus outbreak is poised to bring for both counties.
At the same time, likely due to Lukashenka’s signals to Moscow about
his readiness to proceed with a new integration round in exchange
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
for the much needed political support, the bargaining process over
deepened integration restarted in June. The rather restrained reaction
of the Russian side to the Belgazprombank criminal case and recent
statements by Russian officials favouring further integration indicate
that the Kremlin is eyeing the possibility to strike a new integration deal
with the politically weakened Lukashenka.
Dilemmas and Future Scenarios
In Belarus the state organs such as courts, electoral commissions,
and Prosecutor’s Office are in the hands of the ruler and his inner
circle. It allows him to unilaterally control the organization, monitoring,
and adjudication of elections. Opposition unity and a consequent threat
of massive civil disobedience can compel autocrats to hold clean
elections and leave office by triggering splits within the state apparatus,
one article suggests.5
Although the contours of the Belarusian opposition unity emerged
on 16 July with the decision of Viktar Babaryka’s and Valery
Tsepkala’s campaign headquarters to unify around Sviatlana
Tsikhanouskaya,
SO FAR NO GENUINE THREAT OF MASSIVE CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE WAS POSED, THEREFORE A VAST ELECTORAL
FRAUD REMAINS VERY LIKELY.
The existing institutions have not been transformed and electionrelated malpractices continue. For the upcoming presidential election,
out of 1,989 members of the territorial election commissions only
two represent opposition parties, whereas out of over 63,000 members
of local election commissions only a few represent the Babaryka-led “Honest
People” initiative. Minsk’s refusal to invite OSCE/ODIHR observers
also points to the Belarusian authorities’ plans to announce another
Lukashenka’s devastating victory, without any regard for real voting results.
5
Beatriz Magaloni. The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule.
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54 (2010): 751-765.
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS FOR THE FURTHER
DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BELARUS WILL
BE THE KREMLIN’S POSITION AND THE LEVEL OF OPPOSITION
MOBILIZATION CAPACITY.
The West’s actions will hardly be decisive given its very limited leverage
over the situation in Belarus.
In the event of limited mobilization capacity with no genuine
revolutionary threat, Lukashenka will get more maneuverability
in negotiations with Moscow. However, even in this situation, it will
not be easy for him to continuously postpone a new integration
deal with Russia. Faced with an increasingly problematic balance
of payments, Minsk’s needs for rapid external financial assistance will
likely increase in the coming months. In this situation the West may find
itself in an awkward position: To provide macroeconomic assistance
to Belarus despite mass violations of human rights and electoral
standards, or to leave Minsk alone in tough negotiations with Moscow
which will increase risks to Belarus’s sovereignty.
The less the ‘civilian’ component in the Belarus’s ruling coalition,
the lower the probability of its split over the issue of a new integration
package with Russia will likely be. However, one cannot rule
out a repeated opposition’s mobilization stemming from the activation
of deepened integration talks.
If, despite the efforts of repressive apparatus, the opposition’s
mobilization capacity remains high and massive acts of civil
disobedience take place, the likelihood of a new Belarus’s integration
deal with Russia will increase exponentially. In the situation of an even
greater Lukashenka’s delegitimization the Kremlin will, however, face
deeply uncomfortable choices: To provide Lukashenka a life-saving
support, to push him into a deeper integration but create a time bomb
for Russia’s image among Belarusians, or to avoid providing political
support to Lukashenka therefore risking to get a more problematic
bilateral relationship with an eventual new Belarusian leadership.
The first option entails a combination of heightened repressions
in Belarus, possibly with Russia’s direct or indirect support
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
in one form or another, and buying loyalties thanks to greater
economic support from Moscow.
THIS SCENARIO WILL RESULT IN THE COERCION OF THE BELARUSIAN
POPULATION TOWARDS A NEW REALITY OF A DEEPER INTEGRATION
WITH RUSSIA UNDER THE CONTINUOUS RULE OF LUKASHENKA,
EVEN IN THE SITUATION OF HIS RECORD LOW APPROVAL RATING.
The other option, envisaging Moscow’s deliberate lack of political
support to Lukashenka amid possible massive civil disobedience
in Belarus, is rather improbable. Such form of the regime’s replacement
in Russia’s vicinity, particularly in the neighbouring Belarus, will be seen
in the Kremlin as an undesirable turn. Moscow will unlikely play such
a risky game and bet on any alternative political force in Belarus,
if only Lukashenka’s position becomes extremely weakened. This
development, however, would rather prompt Moscow to force him into
a new integration deal on Russia’s terms. At the same time, the odds
of success for deliberate strategies of any major actor will lengthen
in the light of quickly evolving circumstances and imperfect information.
About EAST Center
The Eurasian States in Transition Research Center (EAST Center) is an independent,
interdisciplinary think-tank focused on post-Soviet and east European studies.
The EAST Center’s mission is to produce high quality research on disinformation
in the Central and Eastern Europe, domestic and foreign policies in the eastern
European countries, and the Eurasian Economic Union. All EAST Center studies
and other publications are available on our website at www.east-center.org
About iSANS
The International Strategic Action Network for Security (iSANS) is an international
expert initiative established in 2018 and aimed at detecting, analysing and
countering hybrid threats against democracy, rule of law and sovereignty of states
in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. The iSANS’s website is www.isans.org
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Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios