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RESEARCH PAPER
No. 140
FEBRUARY
2010
THE EUROPEAN UNION
POST 9/11 COUNTER-TERROR POLICY RESPONSE:
AN OVERVIEW
JAVIER ARGOMANIZ
(Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence, University of St Andrews, UK)
RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES
(RIEAS)
# 1, Kalavryton Street, Alimos, Athens, 17456, Greece
RIEAS url: www.rieas.gr
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RIEAS MISSION STATEMENT
Objective
The objective of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS)
is to promote the understanding of international affairs. Special attention is devoted
to transatlantic relations, intelligence studies and terrorism, European integration,
international security, Balkan and Mediterranean studies, Russian foreign policy as
well as policy making on national and international markets.
Activities
The Research Institute for European and American Studies seeks to achieve this
objective through research, by publishing its research papers on international politics
and intelligence studies, organizing seminars, as well as providing analyses via its
web site. The Institute maintains a library and documentation center. RIEAS is an
institute with an international focus. Young analysts, journalists, military personnel as
well as academicians are frequently invited to give lectures and to take part in
seminars. RIEAS maintains regular contact with other major research institutes
throughout Europe and the United States and, together with similar institutes in
Western Europe, Middle East, Russia and Southeast Asia.
Status
The Research Institute for European and American Studies is a non-profit research
institute established under Greek law. RIEAS’s budget is generated by membership
subscriptions, donations from individuals and foundations, as well as from various
research projects. The Institute is autonomous organization. Its activities and views
are independent of any public or private bodies, and the Institute is not allied to any
political party, denominational group or ideological movement.
Dr. John M. Nomikos
Director
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RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES
(RIEAS)
Postal Address:
# 1, Kalavryton Street
Athens, 17456, Greece
Tel/Fax: + 30 210 9911214
E-mail: rieas@otenet.gr
Administrative Board
John M. Nomikos, Director
Gustavo Diaz Matey, Senior Advisor
Yiannis Stivachtis, Senior Advisor
Darko Trifunovic, Senior Advisor
Charles Rault, Senior Advisor,
Research Team
Stefania Ducci, Senior Analyst,
Thalia Tzanetti, Senior Analyst,
Andrew Liaropoulos, Senior Analyst,
Andreas G. Banoutsos, Senior Analyst
Aya Burweila, Senior Analyst
International Advisors
Rich a r d R. V a lcou r t , Edit or- in- Chief, I nt ernat ional Journal of I nt elligence and
Count erint elligence
Sh lom o Sh pir o ( PhD) , Bar I llan Universit y
Pr of. D a n ie l Pipe s ( PhD) , Direct or, Middle East Forum
Pr of. M ir osla v Tu dj m a n ( PhD) , Universit y of Zagreb and Form er Direct or of t he Croat ian
I nt elligence Service
D r . Philip H . J. D a vis, ( PhD) , Direct or, Brunel Cent er for I nt elligence and Securit y St udies
Col ( r e t ) Vir e n dr a Sa h a i Ve r m a , Form er Milit ary I nt elligence Officer from I ndia
Ja m e s Bilot t o, CBRN Chief Operat ing Officer
Pr of. An t h on y Gle e s ( PhD) , Direct or, Cent er for Securit y and I nt elligence St udies,
Buckingham Universit y
Pr of. Va silis Bot opou los ( PhD) , Chancellor, Universit y of I ndianapolis ( At hens Cam pus)
Pr of. Pe t e r Gill ( PhD) , Universit y of Salford
An dr e i Solda t ov ( MA) , Journalist , Edit or of Agent ura.ru ( Russia)
Ch r is Ku e h l, Arm ada Corporat e I nt elligence Review
Zw e ir i M a h j oob ( PhD) , Cent re for St rat egic St udies, Jordan Universit y
M e ir Ja ve da n fa r ( PhD) , Middle East Econom ic- Polit ical Analysis I nc.
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Lu is Olive ir a R., I nt ernat ional Aviat ion Securit y and Special Operat ions ( Port ugal)
D a n ie le Ga nse r ( PhD) , Basel Universit y
Pr of. Sie gfr ie d Be e r ( PhD) , Direct or, Aust rian Cent re for I nt elligence, Propaganda and
Securit y St udies
Pr of. H e r m a n M a t t h ij s ( PhD) , Free Universit y of Brussels
Pr of. M icha e l W a la ( PhD) , Universit y of Munich
Pr of. W olfga n g Kr ie ge r ( PhD) , Universit y of Marburg
M ich a e l Ta n j i, Direct or at Threat swat ch.org - ( OSI NT)
Pr of. I oa n n is M a zis ( PhD) , I onian Universit y
Robe r t N ow a k ( PhD Cand) , I nst it ut e of Hist ory of t he Polish Academ y of Sciences, Bureau
of t he Com m it t ee for Special and I nt elligence Services ( Prim e Minist er's Chancellery)
La u r e n H u t t on ( PhD) , Researcher, I nst it ut e for Securit y St udies ( Sout h Africa)
LTC Ge ne r a l, Pr of. I zt ok Podbr e ga r ( PhD) , Universit y of Maribor, Form er Nat ional
Securit y Advisor t o t he President of t he Republic of Slovenia, Form er Chief of Defense
( CHOD) , Form er Direct or of t he Slovenian I nt elligence and Securit y Agency, Form er
Secret ary of t he Slovenian Nat ional Securit y Council.
Pr of. Gr e gor y F. Tr e ve r t on , ( PhD) , Senior Policy Analyst , Pardee RAND Graduat e School
Re se a r ch Associa t e s
I oa n n is Kon st a n t opou los, ( PhD) , I nt elligence St udies
Spyr idon Ka t sou la s, ( PhD Candidat e) Greek- Am erican Relat ions
I oa n n is Kolovos ( MA) , I llegal I m m igrat ion in Greece
Lia m Be lla m y ( MA) , Marit im e Securit y ( Piracy)
N a ve e d Ah m a d ( MA) , Sout h- Cent ral Asia and Muslim World
I oa n n is M ou t sos ( MA) , I ndependent Journalist
N a dim H a sba n i ( MA) , Lebanon- Syria and Nort h African St at es
N ik os La la zisis ( MA) , European I nt elligence St udies
RESEARCH PAPER
No. 140
FEBRUARY
2010
THE EUROPEAN UNION
POST 9/11 COUNTER-TERROR POLICY RESPONSE:
AN OVERVIEW
JAVIER ARGOMANIZ
(Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence, University of St Andrews, UK)
Abstract:
Examinations of the EU response to the threat of jihadist terrorism in Europe tend to
encompass these policies with the vague label of ‘EU counter-terrorism’. This paper
contends that such approach ignores the fact that the impact and influence of the
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Union as a counter-terror actor diverges profoundly across the different dimensions of
the response. Consequently, this report provides an overview of the key policies
developed by the Union in each of the policy sectors that constitute the Union antiterrorist activity and concisely examines the practical relevance of these measures.
Introduction
The attacks in New York, Madrid and London have made the European Union
a relevant counter-terror actor. Whereas 9/11 acted as a catalyst for the rapid approval
of measures that had been progressing at a disappointing pace at the Council (den
Boer & Monar, 2002), Madrid was a loud wake up call for the need of increased
European collaboration and the events in London further served to solidify counterterrorism as an EU priority (Edwards & Meyer, 2008). The result is that the EU is
now considered by European governments as a legitimate forum for conducting
counter-terror cooperation. The transnational character of the threat, the networked
presence in Europe of violent Islamist groups and the worrying phenomenon of
radicalisation of some second and third generation European Muslims (Vidino, 2006)
have reinforced the need of growing European counter-terror cooperation. They also
signify the necessity of a complex response that would encompass enhanced
cooperation not only on the prosecution of those accused by terrorist crimes but also
on the prevention of radicalisation processes, the protection of potential terrorist
targets and the provision of response mechanisms in the aftermath of an attack. Unlike
other unidimensional European security actors (i.e. NATO), the EU’s competencies in
a wide range of economic and social spheres made it in principle a valuable forum for
a multidimensional response.
Such response has been extensive and wide-ranging at the policy and
institutional level, a point illustrated by the almost 50 policy outputs –each
encompassing an extra number of more targeted initiatives- included in the November
2009 iteration of the EU’s Action Plan on Combating Terrorism1. Considering the
substantial number of measures and the fact that the EU reaction has been sharply
criticised by some observers for being piecemeal and incrementalist (den Boer, 2003;
Keohane 2005), it is not surprising to find that the Action Plan paints an unwieldy and
complex picture. Indeed, the 2005 Counter-terror Strategy2 has aimed to provide
clarity to the EU counter-terror efforts by framing it under four pillars based on the
UK’s own CONTEST strategy: Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond. In principle,
the goal of the strategy is to provide a holistic response and endow with coherence a
sprawling policy reaction. In practice it has acted more as an instrument of political
marketing as its main aim has been to communicate ‘what the EU is doing’ in this
area to external audiences3.
The intention of this report it is not to assess the effectiveness of the Strategy
as a guiding document but to shed some light on the policy response that the EU has
advanced since 2001. To be precise, the adopted ‘helicopter view’ will set aside
institutional transformations to zoom instead on the key policy outputs originated in
this complex arena of European governance. The aspiration is therefore not to account
for every initiative that has emerged with a connection to the fight against terrorism
but to concentrate on those that have shaped more substantially the EU’s reaction.
It will become abundantly clear in this document that the EU’s relevance
varies substantially across the different dimensions of counter-terror action. In other
words, there are important divergences in the extent to which the different policy
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sectors that constitute EU counter-terrorism have become europeanised. This is a
major reason why the report will examine the Union policy response by framing it in
eight broad areas: Police and Intelligence Cooperation, Judicial Cooperation,
Infrastructure and Transport Protection, Customs and Border Security, Response
Management, Anti-terrorism Financing, Anti-radicalisation and Terrorist Recruitment
and External Relations. As shown below, some of these sectors do not fit neatly
within any of the four dimensions of the Strategy and some easily straddle the
conceptual gaps between these pillars.
Table 1. Counter-terror Policy Sectors by Pillar
Sector
Police and Intelligence Cooperation
Judicial Cooperation
Infrastructure and Transport Protection
Customs Control and Border Security
Response Management
Anti-terrorism Financing
Anti-radicalisation
and
Terrorist
Recruitment
External Relations
Pillar
Pursue, Prevent
Pursue
Protect
Protect
Respond, Protect
Prevent, Pursue
Prevent
Prevent, Pursue
Accordingly, whereas previous studies have tended to obviate these sectoral
cleavages and immerse policies in the same vague label of ‘EU counter-terrorism’,
this paper contends that a sector-by-sector approach provides a more effective
approach to the understanding of the policy outputs produced by the Union.
Accordingly, the following sections will explore each of these sectors in turn.
Police and Intelligence Cooperation
Police work and the production and management of intelligence are at the core
of effective counter-terror action. Hence improving the sharing of information
between European security services has been from the outset considered a central
element in the EU anti-terrorist efforts. The 2005 Counter-terrorism Strategy
emphasised for instance that the Union will support member states’ efforts by
‘encouraging the exchange of information and intelligence between them, providing
common analyses of the threat and strengthening operational co-operation in law
enforcement’.4
This strategic goal has evolved in practice into three areas of action:
a) Expansion of powers and material resources of EU bodies with competencies in
law enforcement;
b) Increase of the exchange of counter-terror information horizontally amongst
member states’ authorities and
c) Vertically between national and European agencies.
Although broadly outside the policy-focused remit of this report, the first area
of action has resulted in significant institutional changes at the EU level. These
include the creation and injection of resources to internal teams specialised in
terrorism within Europol and Eurojust (Gregory, 2005), the establishment of an
dedicated anti-terrorist unit within the Commission JLS DG5, the upgrading of the
terrorism-specific Council Working Groups COTER (second pillar) and TWG (third
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pillar)6 and, most importantly, the setting up after Madrid of a Counter-terror
coordinator post under the EU High representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP)7.
In parallel, new structures have been created to formalise the exchange of
information between national police authorities with the approval of the 2002
Framework decision on Joint Investigation Teams and the 2002 Council
Recommendation to set up Multi-national ad-hoc teams for gathering and exchanging
information on terrorism.8 The latter specialise uniquely on antiterrorism and can be
formed in the pre-criminal investigative phase for the informal sharing of intelligence
data and operational coordination9.The former have been undoubtedly more visible
and permit law enforcement officials and representatives from the judiciary to work
jointly in cross-border judicial investigations involving serious crime in two or more
member states. Europol officers and Eurojust magistrates are also allowed to take part
in JITs investigations (Nilsson, 2006, p.80).
The JITs and ad-hoc teams are integral to the goal of promoting the exchange
of information at the horizontal level. This objective has been facilitated by the
introduction at the Hague Programme of a European principle of governance for these
procedures. In this respect, the principle of availability, a response to the post-Madrid
calls by the European Council for simplifying the exchange of intelligence between
law enforcement authorities10, enables police officers from any member state to obtain
information from a law enforcement agency in any other state. The purpose behind
the principle is to address bureaucratic slowdowns to the process of data sharing by
removing the requisite for judicial authorisation.
The principle is a key step forward insofar it provides a guiding framework for
the formulation of further legal initiatives. Thus, it has served to instigate some
proposals by the Commission’s Justice Liberty and Security (JLS) Directorate
General such as the 2005 Framework Decision on the exchange of information under
the principle of availability11 and the 2005 retention and storage of
telecommunications data directive12. The 2006 Framework Decision on simplifying
the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of
the Member States13 also aims to guarantee that police intelligence is provided to
other national authorities on request.
Moreover, Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA, by
translating to EU legislation some of the provisions from the 2005 Prüm Treaty, have
also served to partially advance the principle of availability goal of access to
information held by other member states’ authorities. These initiatives authorise
Member States to start the indirect exchange of DNA, fingerprint and vehicle
registration data14, with potentially very important consequences for practical
cooperation in terrorism and cross-border crime.
Taken together, these proposals aim to address the underlying challenge that
represents the traditional lack of trust between European internal security services.
Yet the overlap between these and other legislative initiatives has been criticised in
some quarters15 for engendering an over-complex acquis and being a potential source
of confusion for national practitioners. Although these advances put new instruments
in the hands of national counter-terror police units, their impact will be limited unless
they are consistently and similarly interpreted by all partners.
On the other hand, moves towards enhancing horizontal information exchange
have been accompanied with somewhat less ambitious initiatives for the strengthening
of bottom-up terrorism data sharing from the national to the European level. The 2002
Council Decision on the implementation of specific measures for police and judicial
8
cooperation to combat terrorism and the 2005 Council Decision on the exchange of
information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences are the most relevant. The
Decisions called upon member states to designate a contact point to communicate to
Europol general information regarding ongoing terrorism cases such as the groups and
acts under investigation.16 In addition, member states would also appoint a Eurojust
national correspondent for terrorism matters, a figure who will have access and share
information concerning prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences that could
affect two or more member states.17 It should be noted however that these ‘soft laws’
are as far as the Council has been willing to go in legally encouraging vertical
assistance between national and European police authorities.
On balance, Union policies have contributed more significantly to the
strengthening of horizontal forms of information exchange than hierarchical
cooperation between EU and national security agencies. The Commission’s more
ambitious proposals to enforce stronger rules for information exchange –including a
competing principle of equivalent access to that of availability18- have been shotdown by the more reluctant member states, who much prefer to formalise bilateral and
multilateral ad hoc cooperation than to support a top-down approach.
A similar picture emerges in relation to intelligence data sharing. EU
institutions have also acknowledged that closer cooperation between member states’
intelligence services is fundamental for an efficient counter-terror response. The EU
has aimed to address this need not only by calling for more cooperation between
national agencies but also by enhancing its own institutional capacity in this area. The
latter should not imply however that the EU has followed a vertical approach where
intelligence from national agencies is channelled by a centralised EU body. This was
the essence of a post-Madrid proposal for a European CIA coming from Austria and
Belgium that was swiftly struck down by the large member states. The much more
favoured alternative has been the establishment of a Situation Centre under the High
representative for CFSP. Essentially, the Sitcen acts as a unit to collect and manage
processed, non-operational intelligence analyses from individual member states
representatives.
It is safe to say that neither a genuine intelligence circle nor a European CIA is
in sight for the near future (Müller–Wille, 2008). The persistence of bilateral
cooperation is explained by the increased risk of compromising sources when more
actors are involved and the chronic problem of mistrust. In this regard, perhaps the
greatest contribution by EU agencies in this area is that they create a platform for
promoting trust and confidence-building which has the potential to facilitate further
bilateral sharing in the long term.
Judicial Cooperation
Judicial cooperation in terrorism matters has developed from the principle of
Mutual Recognition of judicial decisions agreed at the 1999 Tampere European
Council.19 Indeed the first concrete application of this principle has been the 2002
Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), arguably the
most relevant instrument in the area of European judicial cooperation in criminal
matters. Thus, the EAW was designed to replace the existing system of multilateral
extradition by requiring each national judicial authority to recognise the requests for
the surrender of a person made by another member state’s judicial authority.20
Crucially as regards terrorism crimes, the Warrant does not make exceptions for
9
political offences or for the surrender of a country’s own nationals. Terrorism is also
one of the 32 serious crimes for which the rule of double criminality is forfeited.21
Following this, the measure’s practical impact on the acceleration of extradition
procedures should be seen as a remarkable success. This is illustrated by the reduction
on the average time to execute a Warrant from more than nine months to 45 days. 22
The extradition from Italy to the UK of Hussain Osman, a suspect involved in the
failed 21 July London bombings represents the most high profile example of its
application for counter-terrorism purposes.23
Following on the EAW steps, other relevant legislative measures based on the
same principle and following similar provisions have been developed. From these the
most important is the 2008 Council Framework Decision on the European Evidence
Warrant (EEW), a judicial decision issued by a competent authority of a member state
‘for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in
criminal matters’.24 The objective is to accelerate the transfer of evidence in serious
crime cross-border cases, yet it must be noted that the EEW does not include key
materials such as forensic information (i.e. DNA) or statements from witness and
experts.
Whilst the principle of mutual recognition has been at the core of EU
developments in this area, legislative harmonisation in counter-terrorism has been
contained to a rather basic level. Yet in view of the political sensitiveness of
terrorism, these limited steps still represent substantial advances. Hence the 2002
Framework Decision on Terrorism marks a milestone by establishing a common
European definition of terrorism. The definition relates to groups, individuals or
entities committing or threatening certain violent acts (i.e. murder, kidnapping) with
the intent to intimidate a population or destabilise a country’s political system or
economic structures. Furthermore, the Decision also consists of a list of harmonised
terrorist offences and penalties, instituting no less than eight years as maximum
penalty for participating in a terrorist group and no less than 15 for leading a terrorist
organisation. The practical implications of the Decision are very clear: the number of
states explicitly addressing terrorist crimes in their national penal codes has expanded
from six in 2000 to the 27 EU member states. This certainly institutes a solid legal
baseline from which to develop further practical cooperation between judicial national
authorities. Moreover, as Nilsson has noted (2007, p.84), it also constitutes a major
political landmark: ‘for the first time terrorist offences are defined in a binding legal
instrument drafted within a multi-lateral forum’. Complementing this basic
harmonisation, the 2001 Council Regulation issuing a Common list of terrorist
organisations also represents a common operational reaction in the form of the
freezing of assets of those entities included in the list.
Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that the expansion of practical
cooperation and information exchange between European judicial authorities is a
consequence of national governments’ political choice for mutual recognition over
harmonisation. This has helped to circumvent the obstacle of differentiated legal
systems and to foster transgovernmental contacts between national judges supported
by the pre-existing European Judicial Network (EJN) and the formation in Eurojust of
a Terrorist Team. It is important to note however that differences in national
legislations have engendered problem areas in the application of mutual recognition
instruments. Interestingly, this has encouraged several member states to request
further steps to ‘approximate legislation and identify common procedural standards as
means of enhancing mutual trust’25.
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Infrastructure and Transport Protection
Along with Border security, Transport and Infrastructure protection are the
main policy priorities of the EU Strategy’s ‘Protect’ pillar. The rationale for EU
involvement in these areas is underlined in the Strategy with a reference to the
‘interdependency of border security, transport and other cross-border
infrastructures’.26 The document contends that the EU should provide a platform
through which to share information about national responses, foster public-private
actors’ networks and deliver good practices and innovations. All with the goal of
reducing the vulnerability of critical and transport infrastructure (CIs) across Europe
from physical and electronic attacks by terrorist groups.
As such, the principle of subsidiarity and the idea that states take full
responsibility for the operational elements have taken central stage in the seminal
2004 Commission Communication Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight
Against Terrorism. 27 The document introduced first the proposals for a European
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) and Critical Infrastructure
Warning Information Network (CIWIN) both aiming to set up a horizontal framework
for the protection of CIs. However discussion of these Commission initiatives has
progressed extremely slowly at the Council and the only significant practical outcome
has been a 2008 Council Directive formulating a common procedure for designating
CIs in Europe.28
Advances have undoubtedly occurred faster in other areas with the release in
2008 of an Action Plan in Enhancing the Security of Explosives. Containing more
than 40 measures, the Plan aims to combat the use of explosive devices by terrorists
within the EU. The most relevant measures have been the setting up a Network of
European Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) units and the work on an Early
Warning System (EWS) and a Europol-hosted database with data on incidents related
to explosives (European Bomb Data System (EBDS)).29
In the same vein, EU action in transport security has centred on enhancing the
protection of seaports, airports and other transport systems from terrorist attacks. This
has been addressed mainly through Europe-wide harmonisation of minimum security
standards. These are the goals behind the 2002 EU’s first Common Regulation on civil
aviation security30 that followed the 9/11 attacks and was updated in 2008, and the
2006 Regulation on on-board liquids that came as a result of the August 2006
Heathrow plot to explode transatlantic carriers with liquid explosives. With regards
maritime security, the 2005 Directive on enhancing port security31 enforced common
standards by requested member states to draw up port security plans and appointing a
security officer in each major European port.
Crucially, the Commission has endowed itself with the powers of conducting
inspections in order to identify weak points and monitor the application by Member
States of these norms in both sea and airports. Due to this fact, this is a sector where
the Commission has enhanced its remit through binding community legislation and
now maintains a significant operational role. As a result, few other spheres of EU
counter-terror action compare in terms of the extent of direct impact on the ground by
EU supranational bodies.
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Customs Control and Border Security
Strengthening external border management and control is presented in the EU
Counter-terror Strategy as a mechanism to prevent known or suspected terrorists to
enter or operate within the EU. EU work in this area has focused on firstly, obtaining
more exhaustive information of those entering the EU area and, secondly, supporting
national surveillance at EU’s external borders by setting up in 2005 a European
Border Agency in Warsaw.
In relation to the first area of activity, a European Passenger Name Record
programme emulating the American own system is presently under discussion. The
legislation would force airlines to provide passenger information to national border
authorities on flights entering their territory from outside the EU32. A second
generation of the Schengen Information System (SIS II) will also include critical new
functions33 that will transform this instrument from a border control database into a
powerful investigative tool that can also be applied to terrorism. Its development
however has been plagued with technical problems and forced delays that have
pushed the start of its operation to 201134. Similar problems have stopped the Visa
Information System (VIS) from entering into operations. The VIS encompasses a
centralised database including individual visa files containing biometric information
(digital face image and fingerprints). These are inputted into the system by national
consulates outside the EU. The tenuous connection with terrorism comes from the fact
that the VIS permits checking visa applications against terrorist watch lists and both
national authorities and Europol have been authorised access to the database in the
investigation of serious crimes offences. Lastly, in 2004, a new Regulation on EU
passports agreed to the inclusion of biometric identifiers in machine-readable chips
on newly-issued passports.
Response Management
The management of the consequences of terrorist attacks is the fourth priority
of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Under the ‘Respond’ strand, the document
states that the effects of a terrorist attack can constitute a crisis of transborder impact
or produce an extreme emergency overwhelming the resources of a single state.
Therefore there would be a role for the EU in coordinating the exchange of security
information between states and managing mutual operational support.35 Taken
together the management of the consequences of a terrorist attack has been formulated
at the EU level as consisting of three different strands of policy: Civil Protection,
Assistance to the Victims and Security Research.
In this respect, the advent of 9/11 ensured the inclusion of threats of terrorist
origin as a major element in EU’s Civil Protection policies, as reflected in the
adoption of Council Decision 2001/792, which formally established the Community
Mechanism. This Mechanism acts as the script for EU action in the event of a terrorist
attack or a natural disaster, involving a number of measures and instruments set in
place –including a European Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) within the
Commission- in order to improve preparedness and facilitate real-time mutual
assistance in the event of a major emergency.36 Interestingly, these resources can be
12
deployed outside the EU as part of ESDP missions. The mechanism was activated
informally in September 2001, one month before being officially established.37
As part of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, the EU has established
networks of alert and mutual assistance (Early Warning Systems) to detect in real time
the break out of security emergencies and disseminate information to designated
actors at the European and national level. Since 2006, these specialised systems came
together under a general rapid alert system with the name of ARGUS that channels
information between all existing crisis centres and rapid reaction mechanisms.38
Within Civil Protection, strengthening preparedness to deal with the
consequences of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) attack has
become a major priority. A CBRN programme39 was instituted on December 2002
following the 9/11 attacks and the Anthrax scare in US and this has evolved into the
2009 EU CBRN Action Plan. The Plan aims to prevent and limit the impact of CBRN
attacks by restricting the access to these materials, improve their detection and
efficiently respond to events involving CBRN substances40. The lengthy negotiations
and preparatory work invested on the plan have taken place in parallel with a number
of periodical training courses and seminars, joint simulation exercises and a peer
evaluation review of national preparedness and consequence management
arrangements in the field of terrorism.
Alternatively, the aspect of the assistance to the victims of terrorism was first
introduced in the EU’s Counter-terror Plan after the 2004 attacks in Madrid with the
approval of Council Directive establishing a compensation scheme.41 Since then the
Commission has co-funded a number of projects from local authorities, NGOs and
research institutes on raising awareness and helping the victims to recover. These
have been accompanied with the financing of a Network of Associations of Victims of
Terrorism established to nurture links between European groups.42
Finally, EU efforts in the fields of infrastructure protection and consequence
management have been underpinned by an exponential increase in funding for
security research by the Commission. Thus, Research DG has supported the
development of the ESRP (European Security Research Programme) within the 7th
Framework Programme of Community Research (2007-2013) with an allocation of
more than € 400 Mio.43 It currently involves more than 80 collaborative research
projects on dual use technology and 900 public and private organisations44, a sizeable
security-industry complex now growing attached to these policies.
In sum, EU policies in response management are characterised by the principle
of subsidiarity and complementarity: clearly, there has been a reluctance by national
governments to give significant operational powers to the EU in civil protection. As a
consequence, most EU measures have been of a coordinating character, avoiding the
introduction of new legislation and harmonisation. Nonetheless EU involvement in
this area has resulted in the emergence of new agencies and transnational networks45
and, remarkably, the Commission involvement in this field has been expanded to
include man-made attacks.
Anti-terrorism Financing
It was at the extraordinary meeting of 21st September 2001 when the European
Council first requested national ministers to take measures to combat the financing of
terrorism. By 2005 this issue had already became an internal security priority and a
key element of the Pursue strand of the Strategy.
13
Even so, the EU initial actions were rather limited in ambition and based
mostly on transposing at the European level UN Security Council resolutions 1373
and 1267. This was achieved through the Council Common Position 2002/402/CFSP
and Regulation 881/2002 whose aim was the freezing of Taliban and Al-Qaeda
financial resources. As these instruments were exclusively focused on Al-Qaeda’s
operatives, they have been complemented with similar efforts directed to other
terrorist groups with interests in Europe. Consequently, a December 2001 Council’s
Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism
criminalised the financing of terrorism whereas Regulation 2580/2001 authorised the
Council to draw an additional list of individuals and groups involved with terrorism in
Europe. This involved the freezing of part of their funds, financial assets and
economic resources by member states.
Whereas the UN resolutions steered EU’s initial steps, it was the G-8’s 2001
FATF Recommendations on Terrorism Funding which subsequently became the basis
for the EU Anti-terrorism funding response. The 9 FATF recommendations impact as
international standards is reflected in the Commission Communication on the
Prevention and the Fight against Terrorist Financing and the joint CouncilCommission EU Anti-Terrorist Financing Strategy. These two documents have acted
since 2004 as a route map for EU anti-terrorist funding efforts and set out three
strategic dimensions: improved cooperation in the exchange of information, enhanced
traceability of financial transactions and greater transparency of legal entities.46
Some of the Recommendations have been translated into EU legislation by the
2005 Third money laundering directive. The directive extends the existing provisions
in the second money laundering directive to terrorist crimes. It also introduces more
detailed requirements regarding customer identification and makes compulsory the
reporting of transactions of goods or services of 15000 € or more.47 Other key EU
measures implementing FATF Special Recommendation are the Regulation on
controls of cash entering or leaving the Community, a Regulation on information on
the payer accompanying transfers of funds, a Directive on a New Legal Framework
for Payments in the Internal Market and a Code of Conduct for NPOs (Not-ProfitOrganisations).
It is clear from the above that EU policies in this field have been
fundamentally shaped by the Union’s international obligations. Thus, most EU action
has been predominantly legislative or focused on the exchange of best practices. Yet
action at the European level has shifted more recently towards operational horizontal
cooperation in intelligence exchange and financial investigations. In this area the
Commission partially funds the FIU.NET computer network that links member states’
FIUs (Financial Intelligence Units), the state authorities that receive the suspicious
transaction reports (STRs) submitted by the financial sector. In parallel, both Europol
and Sitcen have also started to play a role in the intelligence analysis of terrorism
financing-related intelligence.
Anti-radicalisation and Terrorist Recruitment
Not unlike national counter-terror strategies, a preventive approach was a late
addition to the overall EU response, first becoming a formal priority at the 25 March
2004 European Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism.48 A year later, the EU’s
Counter-terror Strategy cemented the view of the necessity to accompany repressive
measures with the countering of radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism.
14
In practice, EU efforts have so far centred more on mapping out and analysing
the problem than on seriously tackling it. The Commission Communication Terrorist
recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation was key to
kick start these efforts resulting in both an EU Action Plan and a Strategy for
Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. Partly because the more
detailed measures were produced separately for the Anti-radicalisation Action Plan,
the Strategy’s proposals are rather vague and diffuse. The latter articulates the EU’s
‘comprehensive response’ to radicalisation under three main pillars: the disruption of
radical networks and individuals activities, the support for mainstream voices over
extremism and the promotion of ‘security, justice, democracy and opportunity for
all’.49
Interestingly, work in this area has been separated in ‘streams’, thematic areas
assumed by individual countries, often according to previous national experiences and
expertise. Namely, whereas the UK has contributed with initiatives on media and
strategic communication, Denmark has led work on disengagement and Spain on
imam-training50. This is an innovative use of the EU as a platform for task allocation
and specialisation but also illustrates how Member states are certain that the antiradicalisation and integration of immigrants fall primarily within their competences.
National experiences in this area vary markedly. States’ integration models and
Muslim communities’ size, origins and Islamic traditions vary enormously across
European member states. Due to this diversity, national governments’ perspectives
have coalesced into the view that a one-size-fits-all approach would be of limited
effectiveness.
Therefore, with the important exception of the 2008 amendment on the
Framework Decision on Terrorism criminalising public provocation, training and
recruitment for terrorism51, the EU’s role has been hitherto less about initiating
legislation and more about acting as facilitator. The main aim has been to enhance
transgovernmental learning through the sharing of best practices and the setting up of
networks of experts. Nonetheless, inefficiencies remain. Hence the external antiradicalisation dimension is seriously underdeveloped, defined as it is by rather
symbolic and poorly-funded initiatives. One major problem, as some authors (Behr &
Berger, 2009) point the finger at, is the EU’s refusal to recognise the elephant in the
room in their narratives on the cause of jihadist terrorism by ignoring the authoritarian
character of governments in the Arab world as a subject of discussion.
External Relations
As shown above, the global nature of the terrorist threat has made external
relations a necessity in the European Union counter-terrorist effort. This is highlighted
by the strong external dimension in the EU Counter-terror Action Plan: almost a third
of the measures in the November 2009 update involve some form of international
cooperation52.
In this regard the EU has been a strong supporter of the Council of Europe, G8 and other regional organisations in their efforts to build consensus and eventually
establish an international anti-terrorist regime. The EU’s own counter-terror
coordinator has close links with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and has
encouraged other countries to adopt the existing 16 UN Conventions in this area.
Similarly, the EU has cooperated with third countries on the basis of political
dialogue, technical and financial assistance projects and the inclusion of anti-
15
terrorism clauses in bilateral and multilateral agreements. Since 2004, the Union has
sustained high-level political dialogues with individual states such as Russia, India or
Pakistan, established regional conferences on inter-faith dialogue and opened talks
with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council about the fight against terrorism
financing.53 Most of these initiatives however have been criticised at the practitioner
level for the lack of concrete achievements emerging from the meetings. There is still
the impression that these are not much more than ‘talking shops’ and have had very
little effect in practice. Moreover, EU officials have complained that ‘in some
countries there is no connection between our assistance and the political issues that
are discussed at a top level’ as ‘they don’t see it as a high priority’.54
Special clauses on anti-terrorism have also been included in regional accords
(i.e. Cotonou commercial agreement) and bilateral agreements with non-EU countries
such as Algeria, Egypt or Lebanon. These clauses however are rather vague and
‘difficult to apply beyond the immediate political effect and it will not lead in practice
to sanctions and blocking of agreements’.55 The ineffectiveness of this mechanism has
been highlighted by the fact that there has been so far not a single punitive action or
sanction applied to a non-compliant country.56 It is difficult not to argue that
cooperation with third countries has been limited at the political level and counterterror clauses have had a purely rhetoric significance.
Alternatively, the COTER Working Group at the Council has identified seven
priority target countries to receive technical and financial assistance and training. On
balance however EU officials have acknowledged that so far results have been meagre
partially because of the third countries’ preference to work with bilateral partners
rather than the EU as a whole.57 Although technical assistance has the greatest
potential to enhance security levels in neighbourhood countries out of the different
EU activities, a significant increase in funding may well be necessary before a
substantial difference is made.
Finally, and notwithstanding EU’s efforts in building up a network of allies,
there is little doubt that EU’s key partner in this area continues to be the United
States. In spite of divergent strategic cultures and judicial and data protection
practices (Mitsilegas, 2003), US-EU counter-terror cooperation has grown
exponentially since 9/11 and it is now substantial, extensive and working at a variety
of levels. The examples are multiple: the Europol-US authorities information sharing
agreements58, 2002 agreements on extradition practices and mutual legal assistance
(MLA)59, the 2004 Container Security Initiative60, the 2007 Passenger Name Records
Agreement61 or the transatlantic Policy Dialogue on Borders and Transport Security
(PDTBS) 62. No other international actor has influenced EU policies more
comprehensively than the US, leading in some instances to an asymmetric process of
internalisation of US policies by the EU (Argomaniz, 2009).
Conclusion
What emerges from this concise policy overview is that whereas in some areas
such as police cooperation there is a constellation of actors active at the European
level and a substantive number of measures have been produced since 2001; in other
sectors the EU activity has been less matured. This is due not only to the relative
recentness of these issue areas (i.e. anti-radicalisation) but also because European
action is constrained by member states’ understanding that a particular sector is
fundamentally a national competency (i.e. infrastructure protection). This partly
16
explains why the internal dimension has been significantly more developed than the
external action.
Therefore the often used cliché of the EU as a ‘paper tiger’ is only partially
truth: whilst in some areas its relevance has been limited -not far from empty rhetoric
in truth- there are other aspects where the Union decisions have had an important
practical impact. To reach this conclusion however it is important to look at this field
of EU activity as a collection of policy sectors with their own separate institutional
dynamics and decision-making actors. The presence of strategic documents and action
plans should not divert us from a picture of an increasingly fragmented sphere of
governance. A policy domain that is complex, in places overstretched and sectorially
carved.
Finally, consideration has to be given to the recent shift from prioritising the
formulation of policies to their implementation, the latter often considered a very
problematic characteristic of the EU response (Monar, 2006). The fact that there are
about 50 broad measures in the latest iteration of the Action Plan whereas there were
more than 130 in the March 2007 update is very revealing. This goes in line with the
idea that EU policies in counter-terrorism have been ‘bomb-driven’: characterised by
sudden burst of frenzy policy-making efforts followed by periods of inertia. Thus, the
recent lack of high profile attacks in Europe and resultant public pressure has had the
effect of allowing European policymakers the necessary ‘breathing space’ to reflect
more closely on the substantial implementation challenges associated to these
measures.
ENDNOTES
1
Council of the European Union (2009b) EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, 15358/09, 26
November 2009.
2
Council of the European Union (2005e) The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
14469/4/05, 30 November 2005.
3
Interview with Council Official, General Secretariat, DG H - Justice and home affairs, January 2006.
4
Council of the European Union (2005e) op. cit. , p. 10.
5
Interview with Commission Official, DG JLS, April 2008.
6
Interview with National Official, Member State Permanent Representation, April 2008.
7
Gijs de Vries was appointed as the first EU counter-terror coordinator in 2004. Ex-Council Secretariat
JHA director Gilles de Kerchove replaced him in 2007 after the former stepped down from the post.
Council of the European Union (2007c) ‘Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, appoints
Mr. Gilles de Kerchove as EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator’, Press Release, 19 September 2007
8
European Commission (2004f) European Security Strategy—Fight against Terrorism, SEC(2004)
332, 9 November 2004.
9
Interview Spanish National Police Officer, May 2006.
10
European Council (2004) ‘Declaration on Combating Terrorism’, 25 March 2004.
11
European Commission (2005b) Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the on the exchange
of information under the principle of availability, COM/2005/490 final, 14 October 2005.
12
European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2006) Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March
2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending
Directive 2002/58/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, L 105, 13 April 2006.
13
Council of the European Union (2006b) Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18
December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement
authorities of the Member States of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, L
386, 29 December 2006.
14
Council of the European Union (2009b) op. cit., p.11.
15
UK House of Lords (2009) Prüm: an effective weapon against terrorism and crime?, Paper 90
(London: HMSO), p19.
17
16
Council of the European Union (2003) Council Decision 2003/48/JHA of 19 December 2002 on the
implementation of specific measures for police and judicial cooperation to combat terrorism in
accordance with Article 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, Official Journal of the European
Union, L 16, 22 January 2003.
17
Council of the European Union (2005c) Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 on
the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, Official Journal of the
European Union, L 253, 29 September 2005, p. 23.
18
UK House of Lords (2005) After Madrid: the EU’s response to terrorism, Paper 53 (London:
HMSO), p. 13.
19
Council of the European Union (2005e) op. cit. p. 10.
20
Council of the European Union (2002) Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002
on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, Official Journal
of the European Union, L 190, 18 July 2002, p. 2.
21
Ibid. p. 4.
22
European Commission (2005a) Commission evaluation report: the European arrest warrant has
broadly achieved its objectives, Memo/05/58, 23 February 2005.
23
UK House of Lords (2006) European Arrest Warrant-Recent Developments, Paper 156 (London:
HMSO), p. 8.
24
Council of the European Union (2008c) Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18
December 2008 on the European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and
data for use in proceedings in criminal matters, Official Journal of the European Union, L 350, 30
December 2008.
25
Spellman, J. (2009) European Evidence Warrant , Mutual recognition and judicial co-operation in
criminal matters in the EU, Irish Eurojust representative talk at IIEA, available online at:
http://www.iiea.com/events/the-european-evidence-warrant-as-approved-in-december-2008 .
26
Council of the European Union (2005e) op. cit. p. 8.
27
European Commission (2004e) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament.Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight against terrorism, COM(2004)702
final, 20 October 2004.
28
Council of the European Union (2008b) Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the
the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to
improve their protection, Official Journal of the European Union, L 345, 23 December 2008.
29
European Commission (2007c) ‘Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives, Press Release,
6 November 2007.
30
European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2008) Regulation 300/2008 of 11 March
2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No
2320/2002, Official Journal of the European Union, L 97, 9 April 2008.
31
European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2005) Directive 2005/65/EC of 26
October 2005 on enhancing port security, Official Journal of the European Union, L 310, 25 November
2005.
32
European Commission (2007b) Proposal for a Council framework decision on the use of Passenger
Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, COM (2007) 654, 22 October 2007.
33
Such as new categories of alert, new categories of data (including biometric data), the interlinking of
alerts, widened accessibility for Europol, Eurojust and national security authorities and a shared
technical platform with the Visa Information System. Council of the European Union (2005b) ‘New
Functions for the Schengen information system in the fight against terrorism’, Press Release, 15 March
2005.
34
Council of the European Union (2009b) op. cit. p. 6
35
Council of the European Union (2005e) op. cit. p. 15
36
European Commission (2004d) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament. Preparedness and consequence management in the fight against terrorism,
COM(2004) 701 final, 20 October 2004, p. 3.
37
Interview with Council Official, General Secretariat, DG I-Protection of the environment and
consumers, January 2006.
38
Council of the European Union (2006a) EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, 11882/06, 20 July
2006, p. 33.
39
European Commission (2004a) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
18
Reinforcing the civil protection capacity of the European Union, COM(2004)200 final, 25 March 2004,
p. 10.
40
Council of the European Union (2009a) EU CBRN Action Plan , 15505/1/09, 12 November 2009.
41
Council of the European Union (2004) Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to
compensation to crime victims, Official Journal of the European Union, L 261, 6 August 2004.
42
Network of Associations of Victims of Terrorism website available online at:
http://www.europeanvictims.net/
43
European Commission (2007a) Commission Activities in the Fight against Terrorism, Memo/07/98,
12 March 2007.
44
Council of the European Union (2009b) op. cit.
45
European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB), European Network and Information Security
Agency (ENISA) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control are only some of the
examples.
46
European Commission (2004c) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament on the Prevention of and the Fight against Terrorist Financing through measures
to improve the exchange of information, to strengthen transparency and enhance the traceability of
financial transactions, COM(2004)700 final, 20 October 2004, p. 3.
47
European Commission (2004b) ‘Money laundering: Commission proposes to update and improve
Directive’, Press Release, 30 June 2004.
48
European Council (2004) op. cit.
49
Council of the European Union (2005d) The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation
and Recruitment to Terrorism, 14781/1/05 REV 1, 24 November 2005.
50
Council of the European Union (2009b) op. cit. p3-4
51
Council of the European Union (2008a) Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28
November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on Combating Terrorism, Official
Journal of the European Union, L 330/21, 9 December 2008.
52
Council of the European Union (2009b) op. cit.
53
Council of the European Union (2007a) ‘EU Council Secretariat Factsheet. The European Union and
the Fight against Terrorism’, Press Release, 9 March 2007, p. 5.
54
Interview with Commission Official, DG Relex, February 2006.
55
Interview with Commission Official, DG Relex, February 2006.
56
Interview with Commission Official, DG Relex, February 2006.
57
Interview with Commission Official, DG Relex, April 2008.
58
Council of the European Union (2005a) Outcome of proceedings of the informal High Level EUUSA Freedom, Security and Justice meeting, 5437/05, 17 January 2005.
59
European Union and the U.S.A (2003) Agreement on extradition between the European Union and
the United States of America, Official Journal of the European Union, L 181, 19 July 2003.
60
European Community and the U.S.A (2004) Agreement on intensifying and broadening
the Agreement on customs cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters to include
cooperation on container security and related matters, Official Journal of the European Union, L 304,
30 September 2004.
61
Council of the European Union (2007b) Processing and transfer of passenger name record data by air
carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security- ‘PNR’, 11304/07, 28 June 2007.
62
US State Department (2005) U.S. Measures Implementing the 2004 U.S.-EU Declaration on
Combating Terrorism, Press Release, 20 June 2005.
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About the Author:
22
Javier Argomaniz is a teaching assistant and researcher at the Centre for the Study
of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews, UK)
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